CHAPTER 6

ŚABDA PRAMAŅA (TESTIMONY)

The word Śabda means sound or a sound used as a symbol for the expression of some meaning. In the present context Śabda means word or words as a source of knowledge, it corresponds, therefore to ‘authority’ or ‘testimony’. Śabda pramāṇa means knowledge derived from authority or words as the source of knowledge. The distinctive cause of śabdipramāṇa is Śabda pramāṇa. According to Vēdāntaparibhāṣa, “When for a statement its syntactical relation that is purportful is not sublated by other evidence, that statement is a pramāṇa”. The absurd statement ‘let it be made met by fire’ has the character of words being connected in the form of a sentence. To exclude such statements from the purview of the definition the condition ‘sublated’ is added.

The Vaiśeśikas and Boudhas refuse to accept verbal testimony as a separate pramāṇa on the ground that it can be brought under inference. The knowledge of the meaning of word or a sentence arises in the same way as the knowledge of fire is acquired by inference from smoke. But in the case of an inferential argument, itself; so also the mountain and inferentially the fire, for example, perceive the smoke. The word ‘gōman’ (one who has a cow) there is no separate cognition brought about by the word of the possessive suffix ‘matup’. Again the mountain is cognized before its
qualification ‘fire’ while in the case of a word ‘gōman’ the word ‘gō’ means cow is first understood before the person who possesses the cow indicated by the suffix ‘man’. More over there is no affirmative or negative concomitance of the word with the meaning. One will not be able to say where there is a word, there is a meaning is not recognized as being concomitant with the word either in time or space. If it is said that the word is omnipresent and eternal then every word in existence would be about the notion of all things in the world. Now can it be said that the cognition of the form of the word is concomitant with the cognition of meaning, for in the case of illiterate people, there is cognition of the form of the word without the cognition of the meaning. Even when the word is repeated a thousand times, the illiterate man does not comprehend the meaning. If it said that if the relation of the meaning to word is earlier ascertained, there could be concomitance. Then because there is such an ascertainment before the comprehension of concomitance, the concomitance is not the means of getting at the meaning of the word. Thus inference does not have some use without the invariable concomitance.

A sentence generates the cognition called Śabdipramā by four causes namely आकांक्षा (expectancy) गोप्तता (competency), आसलि (proximity) and तात्त्वर्यान्तम् (Cognition of purport).²

.Expectancy is defined as the capacity of the word senses, which are mutually the contents of the desire to know.³ For e.g. the words like a cow, a
horse, an elephant, will not generate this cognition. Thus in a sentence, there should be mutual affinity between the words. The word ‘catch’ expects the word ‘the ball’ or anything else. One cannot convey the full sense of the one without the other.

The capacity of the words to serve the requirements mutually is very important. Any two random words will not have this expectancy. The ball in other words is such that it can complete the sentence of the word ‘catch’ and vice versa. What defines the capacity to fulfill mutual requirements is being an act (क्रियालयम्) or a causal correlate. Thus statements like ‘cow’ ‘horse’, man’, ‘elephant’ etc. will not have the capacity and mutual expectancy, and the sense, consequently will not be complete. In the case of the scriptural texts like ‘तत्त्वसि’ or in an ordinary statement like ‘Rose is red’ where there is neither क्रियालयम् nor कारकलयम् And where, however there is non-difference of syntactical relation, अभेदान्वया, what determines the capacity is the identity of suffixes (सामान्यिकः). Being an act being a causal correlate, having the same suffix etc. are only various kinds of determinant of आकार्णशा. For instance, fire may be produced by burning the grass, by churning the araṇि wood, or by powerful lenses. But whatever be the causal instrument, fire is of one form only. So is the case with आकार्णशा too.

Competency or योग्यता consist in the non-sublation of a relation that is the content of a purport. The statement ‘moisten with fire’ is a case in point.
There is no such property in the fire as is capable of being sprinkled on something and moistening it. Thus there cannot be a connection between the fire and the moistening. Where there is no fit and unsublated connection between words, there arises no verbal cognition. Or in other words, where there is no तात्पर्यानन्त, knowledge of the purport there is no verbal cognition. In the statement in Pūrvamīmāṃsā ‘Prajāpati plucked out his own omentum’ the meaning is not that Prajāpati plucked out his omentum, but only the declaration of the greatness of the sacrifice of the omentum of the sacrificial animal. Only this purport will make the statement unsublated and the words will have competency or yōgyatā. Only thus the arthavādavākya becomes authoritative. In the matter of texts like ‘तत्वमसि’ it is said that though there is sublation of the expressed non-difference there is still competency for the sentence because the non-difference of the substrate through secondarily implied is not sublated.

Proximity or आवस्थिति is the cognition of the word senses generated by words (वदन्यम) is intended to show that the syntactical relation is not cognized by any evidence other than Sabda. The Prabhākaras hold that it is not the cognition of the word-senses generated by words that it is the accessory of verbal knowledge, but only the mere cognition caused by perception (उपस्थितिमात्रम) of the sense through expectancy etc. of words. In the case of the word ‘door’ though there is the absence of the cognition of ‘close’ as generated by the word ‘close’ (द्वार निधिंहि) along with the ‘door’ yet
by the deliberate importation (अथास्थ) of the sense of the form of the word ‘close’, the word ‘door’ becomes communicative of meaning. That is we can make अथास्थ (importation of the sense) and get the meaning even without the पदाथास्थ (importation of a word). The knowledge without the word ‘close’ there will be no verbal cognition of the door being ‘closed’ by arthāpatti through the word qualified by that, is not at all prolix since it is quite originative of knowledge and is without defect. Moreover in the case of ‘door’ it is not as though it has expectancy only with ‘close’ it has expectancy even with ‘open’. As such unless the word ‘close’ is there, the sense of ‘close the door’ cannot be secured. Therefore just as, inference is brought about by the subsumptive relation (प्रतिवर्ण), the verbal cognition is brought about by the knowledge of the word sense generated by the word alone. Just as in the case of secular statements like ‘close the door’ there is not the verbal knowledge except through the words generating their senses, so is the case of the texts from the Veda also. To the words ‘thee’, for food (िेत्वा), the word ‘I cut’ (ििेििि) is supplied. For the same reason, in what we called rites there is the use of the words like “I make the offering propitious to Sūrya” (सूर्यैं जुप्त निर्यापति). The offering in to Sūrya is modeled on the Āgneya rite where the words आन्ये जुप्त निर्यापति occur. The question is whether in the Sūrya rite the word Sūrya is to be substituted or not for आन्ये. According to ‘Pūrvamīmsā7 it is to be substituted. Though it is a modeled
rite, Sūrya is a different deity and as such, without reference to him, the mantra will make no sense. For all these reasons, it is clear that the cognition of the word sense is generated only by words; and not by any other means. And these words together in a sentence, but also in cases where great texts like तत्वमसि are to be interpreted in alliance with minion texts (अवान्तरवाक्यम) teaching the senses of that (तन्त्र) and thou (ते) which are in syntactical relation to the great texts. Here the causality for āsatti is through the recall of sense. The utterance of the word ‘fetch’ and the utterance of the word ‘pot’ after a long interval of time do not originate any verbal cognition. Similarly in respect of matter words, interval refers to space. It may as we saw, refer to recall of sense also.

Here we have to discuss some important logical problems regarding the meaning of a word, is it particular (व्यक्ति) or universal (जाति). According to the Sāṅkhyaśas a word signifies a particular, since they hold that in speaking we have to deal with particulars alone. When we say, “The cow is red’ we mean a particular cow, and not the whole class of cows. To say that, the cow, as a class red, is meaningless. According to Vātsyāyana’ “An attribute can be predicated of a substance alone, not of a universal”8
Besides there are terms which are singular or proper, such as sun, moon, Ganges etc. which can never refer to any class, as there is no other object – to which the same term can be applied. Consequently we must admit that a word signifies a particular and not a universal.
According to the Jaina philosophers a word cannot mean a particular. For the word cow does not apply to a particular cow but to all animals having the general form of a cow. The form cannot be understood without the particular object or objects having the form; knowledge of the form necessarily leads to the knowledge of particulars. Hence a word; though it primarily and directly means a universal, comes indirectly to means as well. This theory does not fail to explain singular terms, since knowledge of form is essential there also. For e.g. a particular, man sitting today is signified by the word Dēvadatta then surely the same name cannot be applied to him in all his postures and at all times. Besides as we shall show after words, a particular can be known only once and even memory cannot reproduce it for a second time; so it is doubly impossible that a particular should be meant by a word that is to be used more than once and in more than one connection. Hence it is a universal namely the generic form which is the meaning of a word.

This theory is criticized that this is an improvement on the first time, as it recognizes that only a universal can be meant by a word, yet it is not altogether free from objections. Gouthama illustrates that a clay cow may possess all the formal similarities of a cow and still we never seriously call it a cow. We must qualify it with the adjective ‘clay’ just to show that it is not a real cow. On the contrary a substance like gold is always called gold, whether it is a bracelet or a necklace or an earring, none of which possess
any formal similarity to the rest. Thus it is found that the universal that is
the import of a word, and on the strength of which we apply a term is not the
mere universal form or shapes but the universal class character. It is not the
akṛti, but the jāti, which is the primary meaning of a term. The majority of
Indian thinkers, the Mīmāṃsakas the vedantins and grammarians of the
older school hold this view.

The problem as we stated at the beginning is, what is the primary
meaning of a term? A word that deserves the name must primarily
symbolize one meaning, and that meaning must be a universal, or the word
cannot be used more than once and of more than one particular. And we
have shown, that of the three factors, vyakti, akṛti and jāti, only the last can
be the primary meaning of a word while the other two cannot. Hence we
have shown that the Advaitic view of a meaning of the word is a universal as
generic essence or character. But there are certain objections against this
theory, which must be considered here. It may be asked, if a word means a
universal, how does it come to denote a particular? If the word ‘cow’ means
‘cowness’ how can we at all apply the word to an individual cow? As we
actually apply the word ‘cow’ to an individual or particular does it not argue
that the word means also an individual? The meaning of a word has surely
to be inferred from its application. The knowledge of the universal or the
concept which constitute the meaning of a word necessarily leads to the
knowledge of a particular, since in experience we have always the universal
and the particular synthesized together, as the universalized particular which becomes the object of the same knowledge. As we perceive a cow always as an individual possessed of the universal character 'cow ness' given the universal 'cow ness' we can in the light of the knowledge of this universal find out in experience the particular or particulars to which the universal is applicable. The universal as the Vedicantaparibhasa remarks is known in the same knowledge that reveals the particular.\textsuperscript{11} Here we have a question regarding this; what is the relation of the universal to the particular? According to Vedicanta Paribhasa, a Jati or a universal was not a mysterious eternal entity but consisted of the common essential characteristics actually existing in a group of particulars (प्रकृतिगुण-परम-बृहत: वास्तवथावृत्ति:). They illustrate that it was a fact of experience that the particular was also characterized by the universal, and consequently both were known, together in the same process of knowledge. Thus although a word meant only the universal aspect of the universalized particular, there could be no difficulty in the application of the word to a particular which invariable possessed the universal characteristics signified by the word. In Brahmasutra bhasya, Sankara says that the relation of a word is not with a vyakti but the अक्षरिति, which has been interpreted by his followers as jati, in the sense we have just indicated. The later Vedicantins of course use the word jati to indicate the universal.
Another illustration given by the Vedāntins is that, though a word primarily and explicitly means a universal, it does not follow that it does not mean the individual at all. But reference to the individual is latent (क्षणिक), whereas reference to the universal is explicit (ज्ञातम). The meaning, which must be explicitly known by a person, so that he may be able to use the word, is as we have already seen the universal and not the particular. When the universal meant by a word is known, the particulars possessing that universal character become, by their very nature (स्वरूप) denotable by the word. If so, why should the particular not be included in the meaning? The reply is because the knowledge of the universal alone is logically presupposed in the use of the word and if this alone is sufficient for its application it is needless, on the principle of the simplicity of hypothesis, to holds that the particulars also must form a part of the meaning. Moreover, to know all the particulars possessing the same universal would be impossible, which to know only a few would not be enough.

Language is essentially the result of conceptual analysis and synthesis. The percepts that we directly presented to us require names to signify them. When different percepts are analyzed and compared and similarities are detected we begin to classify the previously unrelated percepts on the grounds of similarity. It is thus that we arrive at a single concept subsuming different percepts under it. Consequently a mark or a name has to be given to the concept. There for the origin of language rests on the classification of
particulars on the basis of the universal characters common to all of them. Consequently it is only natural that isolated words should primarily mean not particulars of experience but the universals present in them. It is clear therefore why the word cow primarily stands for the universal concept ‘cow ness’. But the theory will not appear to be at all absurd if we only remember that what is meant here is not that cow is a cow ness but that the meaning of the word ‘cow’ is cow ness or, in other words, it connotes cow ness. And the meaning of the word ‘cow’ being the concept that defines and determines the use of the word, can on no score be the particular animal, it must be the essential common attributes which bring all such animals under the same category.

When we discuss the problem has every word a connotation, Mādhavācārya, in his Sarvadarsanaśaṅgraha says, it is wrong to suppose that a proper name has no connotation. In his words ‘the universal (जाति) connoted by a proper name (संज्ञा) like Dēvadatta is proved on the basis of the knowledge of his identity, from his birth till his death, through all the changing stages of childhood, boyhood and youth.’ And it is due to this fact that a proper name can at all be used, sometimes as a common name or can yield an adjective.

In addition to the primary meaning, there are also secondary ones. In Indian logic, the primary meaning of a word is called वाच्यार्थ or शब्दार्थ or मुख्यार्थ or even अभिवेदनार्थ. The secondary meaning of a word is called लस्यार्थ. The
Indian rhetoricians, however hold that in addition to the primary and secondary meanings of a word there can be a tertiary meaning as well, which they call vyañgyārtha and which can be roughly rendered in to suggested meaning. The primary meaning of a word has already been discussed. When in a certain context the primary meaning of a word is not suitable, we must understand the word in a secondary sense. Hence we have to discuss these implied sense or lakṣyātha of words.

The implied sense is the content of implication. (लक्ष्यतिस्वत: लक्ष्य:). This secondary implication is related to that which is primarily indicated by that word. The implied meaning of a word is classified in to two ways.

1) Bare implication (केवल लक्षण)

2) Implication by the implied (लक्षितलक्षण). Gouṇa is brought under the latter variety. Implication stands in direct relation to the express sense. For e.g. In the expression ‘The hamlet on the Ganges (गंगाय घोष:) for the word ‘Ganges’ there is bare implication of the bank which is in direct relation to the stream. Ganges only stands for the bank being directly related to it.

But in the second kind, implication by the implied, there is no such direct relation to the express sense. For e.g. In the word ‘dvirēpha’ there is denotation of the ‘bee’ by the indirect relation through the word ‘bramara’ which contains two ‘r’s. Dvirēpha means ‘bee’ only by reference to the ‘bramara’, which contains two ‘r’s as dvirēpha itself’, literally means two
‘r’s. For another example, in the figurative (गौण) expression, ‘The pupil is a lion’ (सिंहो माणवकः) the pupil is related in ferocity which is related to the primary sense of the word lion.

Another classification of implication is in to three kinds.

1) Exclusive implication (जहल्लक्षणा)
2) Non-Exclusive implication (अजहल्लक्षणा)
3) Exclusive Non-Exclusive implication. (जहलजहल्लक्षणा)

Exclusive implication or जहल्लक्षणा is the implication of some sense which is other than the sense primarily indicated by the word, but which is related to the primary sense, while the primary sense is completely given up.

Or in other words, where there is the cognition of other words without including the express sense, there is excluding the express sense, there is exclusive implication. For e.g. when it is said ‘eat poison’ it may not be that the person is asked to eat poison. The implication may not have the express sense of the words at all. It may mean ‘Avoid eating in an enemy’s house’ Eating in an enemy’s house is like eating poison. For another example in the expression, ‘the village on the Ganges’ the primary significance of Ganges is completely given up and the bank, which is related to it, is implied.

In non-exclusive implication, there is cognition of another sense even while including the express sense. For e.g. in “the pot is white” white includes the quality of whiteness, but also denotes by implication the substance which that quality characterizes.
In exclusive non-exclusive implication or अजह्लल्लङ्गा, part of the express sense of a word is accepted and part of it is relinquished. For e.g. In ‘This is that देवदत्त’ the substrate alone in ‘this’ and ‘that’ is taken to be the purport. For there cannot be oneness for two qualified by difference of place and time. That is part of the meaning of the word, ‘this’ and that which is देवदत्त, alone is taken as the purport of the expression and the sense of place and time are relinquished. In other words, ‘this’ and ‘that’ are understood only in so far as they refer to Devadatta who is their substrate. It is thus that the expression conveys identity.

It is said that in construing the scriptural texts declaring supreme identity like ‘that thou art’ and ‘I am the Brahman’ जहवजहल्लङ्गा is employed which is the generally accepted view. In the texts like ‘that thou art’ which express identity of ‘that’ with ‘thou.’ There cannot identify because ‘thou’ denotes soul qualified by the internal organ, and therefore, ‘Parviscience’ while ‘that’ denotes Brahman who is omniscient. So if identity or oneness is to be established, it should be only in respect of the substrate ‘स्वरूप’ in ‘that’ and ‘thou’. And this is only by secondary implication, जहादाजाहल्लकिषण because the qualifications are disregarded. Dharmarāja differs from the followers of tradition in this interpretation. He does not believe that there is any secondary implication, though only a part of the denotation is taken as the purport. It is admitted that there cannot be oneness for things that are differently qualified, though these are, only as qualified the express, or
primary sense of the words, 'that' and 'thou'. But Dharmarāja believes that there is no contradiction in taking the reference to the substrates as the express sense of the words. Whenever a predication is made as in 'pot is non eternal' where the predication holds good of the bare subject alone irrespective of the qualification, there need be no resort to the secondary implication. For non-eternality, does to the pot ness, but only to the pot. Here the qualification 'pot-ness' is not essential to the interpretation of the sentence. As Dharmarāja puts it 'there is syntactical relation of non-eternality with what is competent, i.e. the bare pot

Interpretation by secondary implication is, on the other hand, possible of such sentences, as 'pot is eternal'. Here it is the pot ness, that is eternal and is in relation the predicate, and the primary meaning of 'pot' is actually given up. The statement 'that thou art' resembles more 'pot is non-eternal' than 'pot is eternal. If the predicate holds good only of the bare subject without the qualification that is irrelevant, then 'that' and 'thou' are indicated only by the primary sense of the words and there is no need for any secondary implication. Otherwise, even such plain statements like 'Bring the pot' must have to be interpreted by secondary implication, since 'pot ness' which cannot be brought, has to be discarded. Here Dharmarāja can be charged with inconsistency. As an Advaitin, he should subscribe to the theory that a term primarily means the class, or the Jāti. So pot has 'pot ness' for it expresses sense. How can this be disregarded in pot is non-
eternal without recourse to implication? Dharmarāja’s position can possibly be defended on two counts learning aside for the moment the contention that he takes this stand adopting the Naiyāyikas position on the matter. It is thought that in the statement ‘pot is non-eternal’, ‘pot’ is said to refer to a born particular. Obviously one who devises implication in interpreting this statement in this way cannot be an Advaitin who holds that the primary sense of a term is its class-character. Hence pot cannot be a particular. But Dharmarāja says that ‘pot’ and not its primary sense ‘pot ness’ is the subject. Here ‘pot’ is not ‘pot ness’ but the bare particulars. So either Dharmarāja surrenders the Advaitic position regarding the primary sense of terms or accepts implication here. That is the dilemma. If ‘pot’ in ‘pot is not eternal’ means as it should ‘pot ness’ the statement pot is non eternal becomes false, for it really states ‘pot-ness is non-eternal. And pot cannot have anything other than pot ness as its primary sense. Its primary meaning must be kept intact i.e. pot ness. And the statement also, at the same time, should be made intelligible.

The universal ‘potness’ can be taken to mean ‘having origination and parts’. This is in perfect accordance with the Advaitic position with regard to non-eternity. Being an effect, therefore, like a pot is invariably associated with non-eternity. Pot is one of the many things which are effects and which constitute the world. So, by ‘pot’ in the statement, ‘pot is non-eternal’ not only the pot but also the nature of things like pot are meant.
Even if the pot meant, therefore the universal pot ness, the statement should only be real as pot-ness (class nature of things like pot) invariably associated with non-eternality. The statement will strictly read. Pot is a thing, which is non-eternal. Pot-ness can only mean thing ness. Madhusūdana observes in Advaitasiddhi commenting on the words of ‘Citsukha’ that the ‘yarn’ mentioned by Citsukha is one of his arguments is representative of the whole class of material causes. It will be seen now that it is not that pot ness is non-eternal but that only effeteness which the pot stands fore here is concomitant with non-eternality. Only thus, then the statement ‘pot is non-eternal can be made without contradiction. Secondly Dharmarāja holds that the cause of secondary implication is only non-intelligibility of purport, tātparyānupapatti. His example of जहवजहल्लक्षणा is “let the curds be protected from the crows” (काकेक्षो दविरस्थताम्) which has no unintelligibility of syntactical relation unlike ‘the hamlet on Ganges’ which has the crow is not abandoned but is taken but other dangers to the curd, among which crow is one, are also referred to. The primary sense is not at all abandoned here. Even so, in, ‘pot is non eternal’ pot is not abandoned but other things, which are not eternal and among which, pot is also one, also are indicated. When primary sense it self is thus intelligible, there need be so recourse, to implication. And of course we does not say in the case of the example quoted above, ‘let curd ness be protected from crow ness’.
Similarly in the case of ‘that thou art’ the terms ‘that’ and ‘thou’ express their primary sense alone and no implication is necessary. The word ‘thou’ expresses the consciousness as associated with Parviscience, and the word ‘that’ with omniscience. But nothing new that was not already expressed in the statement is brought in. Thus the words ‘thou’ and ‘that’ express their primary sense, as in the example pot is non-eternal. And infact what the जहल्लक्षणा really does is only this exclusion of attributes. It is not at all an implication. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his Advaitasidhi goes on to say that the term implication in जहल्लक्षणाः itself only used in the figurative sense, and not in the primary sense, as implication are brought in only to bring in fresh ideas which are not conveyed by the statement as such.\textsuperscript{22}

All these discussions granting that Dharmarāja expresses his opinion fully sharing the Advaitic principle that, a term must be taken in its primary sense only. But it is not so certain. Because it is held that Dharmarāja argues on the Naiyāyika principle that a term means both the class nature and the individual primarily. If this were so, then the difficulty expressed earlier in the statement, ‘pot is non-eternal’, where if ‘pot’ meant ‘pot-ness’ as it should according to Advaitins, the absurdity of ‘pot-ness’ a universal, being non-eternal, will arise, does not at all arise.

We have already seen that the statements like ‘this is that Dēvadatta’ express only identity otherwise these statements will become meaningless. For it is to be made clear whether by the above statement.
1) Only one essential nature of देवदत्त is conveyed, or

2) The identity of ‘this’ ‘with’ ‘that’ देवदत्त or

3) The relation of this देवदत्त cognized at the present moment to ‘that देवदत्त’ that was cognized at a different time or

4) The identity of the देवदत्त qualified by the present with the देवदत्त qualified by the past.

If the first as that essential nature is conveyed by the single word, other words are profitless. Moreover if it is the essential nature of देवदत्त that is sought to be conveyed, that is secured even by direct perception of देवदत्त here and now, and thus, no verbal testimony is necessary. If the second, - identity that too is secured by direct perception, and no verbal testimony is necessary, not the use of plurality of words as one word is enough. If the third – the connection of देवदत्त to the past and the present, then there is no proof for saying that it is the same देवदत्त that is connected with both the moments of time, past and present. There is, in other words, no proof that it is to the देवदत्त related to the present alone that the past is related. If the fourth – the identity for the देवदत्त, qualified by past and present times, this is not intelligible, as there cannot be the mutual relation between that which is qualified by the past and that by the present, just as there cannot be mutual relation between the past and present times themselves. If it is objected that, though there is no mutual relation between the qualities like form and colour, for instance there can be
an entity which is one and which is related to both i.e. form and colour and that, similarity it is possible to conceive one person connected with both past and present, though past and present themselves may not have any mutual connection, it is replied that, between colour and form, there is no unintelligibility of existing together in time in one locus, as there is no rule with regard to them that one can exist only when the other does not exist. They are not mutually incompatible. Not so two times, which cannot exist together. They are mutually incompatible, as in the case of existence and non-existence. 25 So past and present cannot co-exist in Dēvadatta as his qualifications.

Thus according to Jñānaghana pāda, the author of Tatwāsūdhi, in the statement ‘this is that Dēvadatta’ when the direct sense is not possible, the implied sense must be taken. The adjuncts of time ie past and present and the designation as ‘this’ and ‘that Dēvadatta’ should be treated as inessential and illusory. Only the essential nature of Dēvadatta is to be understood by all these and this nature is always the same and one. This is what is known as भागत्यागलक्षण or जहजहलक्षण where a part of the meaning is given up26 such a recourse to implication, says Jñānaghanapada, is necessitated by the fact of the contrariety of the senses of the words, the contrariety being created by the fact of the perception of the coherence in a sentence of the words, this coherence, in turn being brought – about by the co-ordination or identity of the word-senses, and identity or co-ordination being not for one word but for
The impartite sense is such that there should be a different notion in the words of a sentence which is dissolved by the impartite sense and not mere identity as in ‘pot is pot’ or ‘A is A’. Thus the essential nature of Dēvadatta is not conveyed by one word, but by two words. And when there are two words, secondary implication is the only course open to interpret the sentence as expressing the basic substrate identity of ‘this’ and ‘that’ Dēvadatta, the space-time –name adjuncts which are meant there primary being treated as illusory and as not affecting the basic oneness of Dēvadatta.

The example clearly illustrates this idea is, when one says “the brightest object in the skies is the moon” he says it in answer to the question “In the skies, which is the moon? The answer does not refer to any quality of the moon, or the relation of the moon to that quality. It merely identifies the moon, which shines with the excelling brightness in the skies. Shining is common to the other luminaries in the sky also. What distinguishes the moon is its excelling brightness. By both the references ‘excelling’ and ‘brightness’, only the moon is indicated and not senses of those words themselves. Thus the sentence has an impartite sense of the identity of the moon. This cannot be objected that since the knowledge of the identity of Dēvadatta is not sense generated it is not perception. For sense-generated ness is not the determinant of perceptibility but non-difference of pramāṇa – define consciousness from the content defined consciousness. Here, the
psychosis or the Vṛtti defined consciousness goes out and becomes one with Devadatta defined consciousness. The statement ‘this is that Devadatta’ is understood to mean only one person leaving out the inessential adjuncts. Thus it is a valid knowledge arising out of śabda.

Though Devadatta is the same person as before, the result that ensues from the above identity-statement is new. The past and present perceptions of Devadatta and the recognition of his identity called अभिज्ञा, and प्रत्येकभिज्ञा respectively alike give only identity. Not that in recognition we have a new identity established which was not already given in the direct perception of Devadatta. It is not even that the sameness of person related to past and present times in the result of recognition. Even by the two perceptions at a past time and a present time, that sameness is secured already. What recognition really accomplishes is that it removes the illusion of difference denoted by two times. This is the new result. And this recognition does not disclose identity (एकत्वम्) as a quality but as essential nature. ‘That-ness’ and ‘this-ness’ in ‘this is that Devadatta’ are not the modes of ‘that Devadatta’. And oneness is not a numerical qualification, since in essential nature (स्वरूप) there is no qualification by an attribute that differential attribution of qualities is not the contradictory of differential error is obvious. If that had been intended, the sentence will be ‘He is that and one’ and not ‘he is that’. In this latter expression there is no word indicative of qualification. Therefore differential denotations due to
limiting adjuncts indicate one content only that is the impartite sense, as impartite as the great ether contained in the pot.

Purport (तत्त्वर्ज्ञानम्) consists in the competency to generate that cognition thus the sentence “pot in the house” generates knowledge in relation to pot and not in relation to cloth; therefore pot is it purport. And when a sentence or a word is uttered and if the word has two meaning, as in the case of “सैन्यव” which means both ‘salt’ and ‘horse’, difficulty may arise with reference to the purport. So non-utterance of anything, preferring what is other than is actually desired at the time is also a qualification in respect of purport. As sentence or word, being competent to generate cognition of a particular nature, is not uttered with the desire for cognition. But were utterance with a desire to convey a sense, as the Naiyāyikas hold is not the purport, for purport is evident even from the utterance of one who has no knowledge of the sense and even though a teacher may desire to convey a sense, the disciple may know that the teacher has not understood the sense.

अन्विताभिधानवाद & अभिहितान्वयवाद

The distinguishing characteristic of a sentence is the construction of different meanings in to a single meaning. But a question necessarily arises here as regards the relation of the words of sentence to the construed meaning of the sentence. Do the words of a sentence possess the double
function of presenting their individual meanings and also the construed meaning of the sentence? Or do they only present their isolated meaning while these meanings subsequently combine again to produce the single meaning of the sentence? The two opposing schools of Mīmāṁsā philosophy seriously debated the question. The Prābhākaras maintained the first position, which was called अनिविषाधानवाद where as the Bhāṭṭas held the second view termed अनिविषान्त्यवाद. The Prābhākaras held that all words spoken must directly or indirectly enjoin some duty or practice on the listeners. On hearing the word ‘cow’ me must necessarily expect that something have to be done with the cow. It is held that verb expressing an action is the nucleus of a sentence and the object etc-are held together through their relationships with the verb. It is found that the words themselves can discharge the double function of presenting their own individual meaning, the meaning of a sentence. It is not true that words present only their own isolated and unrelated meanings, while these meanings after words combine together to yield the construed meaning of the sentence. This assumption is gratuitous and far-fetched, because it is only related and construed (अनिविषति) meanings that are expressed by words. Construction is not therefore a subsequent function it is already presupposed in the very uttering of the words of a sentence.

As against this view the Bhāṭṭas hold that words cannot discharge both the functions ascribed to them by the Prābhākaras. They can only present their own isolated meanings, and construction takes place after words. It is
not true that all words in a sentence are related to the verb. In the sentence
‘Bring the white cow’ the adjective ‘white’ is connected with the noun ‘cow’
and not with the verb bring. In this illustration the noun has reference to the
verb and the adjective to the noun. The meaning of no word therefore is
primarily presented to us as an isolated universal. The Advaitins as a rule
follows the Bhāṭṭas. The authors of the Vīvāraṇa and of the
Vīvāraṇa-praṇaya Saṅgraḥa31 regard both these views as equally good for
their purpose. The author of the Vēdānta-paribhāṣā32 while discussing the
problem of the relation of the universal (as the meaning of a word) to the
particular, offers as one of the solutions the view of the Prābhākaraśa, that the
particular is also implicitly means by a word, though explicitly it means a
universal. But almost all great authorities on Advaita, namely Vācaspati,
Citsukhācarya, Madhusūdana saraswati hold that, Abhihitānvayavāda alone
is tenable.33 The author of the Citsukhi goes to the length of saying that this
is the only view that Śaṅkara himself favours in his commentary on the
samānvaya sūtras. But Śaṅkara does not really explicitly mention they’re
any of these two theories in so many words. The Prābhākaraśa hold that the
Vēdic texts without exception directly or indirectly refer to some injunctions,
and that even those texts which apparently contain statements of the facts are
to be understood as incidental expressions calculated to actuate persons to
follow the Vēdic injunctions or avoid their violation with this definite
purpose they advanced the theory of अविताभिधान्त, which made the verb
action) the very nerve of a sentence, making all other words subsidiary to it. The essential motive of this theory therefore, was antagonistic to the Advaitins, who laid the greatest emphasis on the texts that speak of the reality that can be attained not through action but through knowledge. But Śaṅkara while refuting the original proposition that all texts are fore some ritual practice, says that even if that were conceded, yet one must admit that there are texts which state the existence of materials necessary for practice. The texts themselves do, therefore, state the existence of things, as preconditions to commandments themselves. The fundamental position of the Prabhākaras that the texts are never statements of facts but always express some injunctions therefore falls through Śaṅkara thus refutes the Prabhākaras by assuming

their own dictum; and as this served his purpose he did not raise the questions about anvīṭābhidhāna or abhihitānvaya.

The author of Vivaraṇa says that while abhihitānvayavāda is in perfect agreement with Vedantic interpretation of the texts about self, Brahman etc, even the theory of abhītāśāṣṭra is not opposed to it. In order to prove the contention the author interprets abhītāśāṣṭranvāda in a new light. He says that it is absurd that this theory should mean that the meanings of all words are connected with action alone. What it should mean is that all words have meanings that are originally construed or have reference to all suitable things like attributes, substance and action. Interpreted in this way this theory can
explain the texts in question, because the theory would no longer demand that every word must have a reference to some verb (or action) and then even according to this theory the Advaitins object would be obtained.

In supporting the theory of अन्विताभिधानवाद we have already considered the modification supported by the author of Vivaraṇa. This modification may be sufficient to save the Vēdāntic texts from the particular objection raised by the Mīmāṃsakas. But considered from other points of view, this theory, as we have already shown cannot stand even in the modified form. The author of Vivaraṇa and some others look at the question only from that limited point of view, and they think, therefore, that both the theories are tenable as serving their purpose. But the authors of the Citsukhī, the Bhāmatī and Advaitasidhi consider the argument from other points also and declare that abhihitānvayavāda alone can be supported.

We have already shown that anvitābhidhānavaḍa is not acceptable even in any modified form. Indeed if universals were the meanings of words, the meaning of a sentence couldn’t be directly obtained from words. The meanings obtained from words have to be synthesized in order that we may be able to know the constructive meaning of the particular sentence, and the primary meaning of a word being a universal according to the Advaitins; अभिहितान्वयवाद is the only possible logical conclusion. In connection with the meaning of words, however, we have given as one of the Vēdāntic views the theory that though the explicit meaning of a word is a universal; the
particulars also is implicitly meant. The Prābhākara School originally holds this view, and the author of the Vēdāntaparibhāṣā adopted it.

The theory, if analyzed, can be understood to mean two things, only one of which is compatible, to a certain extent, with the theory of Anvitābhidhāna, while the other is definitely against that theory. The theory may either mean that the universal, which is the primary, meaning of a word implicitly contains all individuals as such or that the universal contains implicitly all individuals as characterized only by the universal. If the first, be the meaning, namely if cow means explicitly ‘cowness’ and implicitly white cow, black cow etc, it may then be some how held that the word when used, in a sentence could without any subsequent construction, signify the particular as meant in that sentence. The Vēdāntins can be accepted the theory anvitābhidhānavāda only in the second sense according to which a ‘cow’ would mean implicitly a white cow or a black cow, in so far as it possess the essential generic attributes ‘cowness’ connoted by the word, and not in so far as it is red or black. The theory in this form is really useful in this form is really useful as an explanation if the Vēdāntic view, which does not consider the universal to be a pure abstraction purged from all reference to particulars. But if the theory is to be understood in this second sense, anvitābhidhānavāda becomes far less acceptable. According to the Advaitins then, whether he holds- that a word means a pure universal, or that it means a universal having implicit reference to particulars, abhīhitānvaya vāda can
be the only consistent conclusion. It is natural; therefore, that some of the
greatest Vedic authorities should reject anvitābhidhānavāda and support
the other theory.

The most important difference that follows from the two different
theories however is as regards the knowledge of the meaning of sentence.
According to अन्तिमतिथिहानवाद the meaning of a sentence can be known through
memory. Since the meaning is presented by words themselves, which are
remembered to possess certain meaning. But according to अभिहितवाद the
knowledge of the meaning of a sentence being constructed out of the
meanings presented by the words, is not mere remembering. It is a new kind
of knowledge, though usually built on the materials supplied by memory.
This is generally called 'abhaboda or constructive knowledge of the
meanings of words. A combination of universals leads to sabdabodha or
knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is a construction that can take place
only under specific conditions, which distinguish it from other kinds of
construction such as memory synthesis, on the one hand and inference on the
other. And it is because of this fact that any and every combination of
significant words, such as 'cold fire' or hot ice' is not itself significant.

Scriptures declares the nature of Brahman as Existence,
Consciousness, Bliss. Now the question arises. Does such a declaration as
this have a differentiated meaning, or an integral, impartite significance?
The Advaitins answers that; it imports the impartite sense only. The
declaration 'Brahman is Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, comes as an answer to the enquiry 'what is the nature of Brahman'? In the texts 'one who knows Brahman attains the supreme' it is naturally implied that Brahman of such and such nature, ought to be known. So Brahman is what is indicated as in the case of the 'bright moon.' The other words indicate Brahman by implication. It is not that one word alone conveys the expressed meaning, i.e. Brahman, because each of the words there removes, one particular illusion. The word existence removes the illusion of illusoriness or unreality in Brahman. The word 'consciousness' removes the illusion of inertness in Brahman. The term 'Bliss' dispels any illusion of pain in Brahman. By 'ananta' or infinity, any illusion of limitedness by space, time and substantiality is destroyed. The usefulness in considering these words as separate is proper only to the extent of dispelling of these illusions.

It cannot be said that the word 'Brahman' expresses only the substance qualified by existence, consciousness, Bliss etc. For the expression 'Brahman' is self-evidently clear in meaning itself. If existence etc are taken as qualities qualifying Brahman like Rāmānuja (रामानुज़) then there is the conflict with the declarations of infinity. The expressibility of Brahman in words is flatly refuted by the declaration 'where from words return' etc. The texts 'one alone without a second' Plenum of consciousness alone speaks of the homogenous nature of Brahman. And texts like 'there is no plurality here', he passes from death to death; deny
any inner differentiation of forms in Brahman. All these texts will be countered and contradicted if one supposes that existence etc. are the various aspects of the substrate Brahman.

Where a sentence conveys a sense only through remains what is super imposed on it, its validity is by that removal alone, and thus laksanā eliminating the super imposed adjuncts and bringing out the substrate is alone proper. The expressions, ‘existence’, ‘knowledge’ etc, imply Brahman by negating the unreal, the inert, the painful etc. Similarly in the great text ‘that thou art’ the indirectness or mediacy contained in the expression that and the element of transmygratoriness in the expression ‘thou’ are given up, and the second less Brahman alone is implied.42 Thus the great texts only declare Brahman and not ‘His qualities’. Otherwise they are unintelligible. By both implication and inference, only the impartite sense of the great texts is proved. In the Advaitasidhi, it is held that the sentence सत्यं ज्ञानमन्नतं ब्रह्म yields an impartite sense each of three words conveying Brahman alone, because of being a sentence seeking to give a definition of Brahman or because it is given in answer to a specific question as to its definition like the statement. ‘The most luminous in the sky is the moon’.

The impartite sense can be in any one of the following seven modes.

1) निरवश्वार्थपरतम्
2) अधेत्वश्वार्थपरतम्
3) निविषेक्षणपरतम्
4) विशेषमात्रापरत्वम्

5) निर्मेयार्थपरत्वम्

6) भावरूपविशेषणार्थितपरत्वम्

7) एकविशेषपरत्वम्

The first निरवस्वार्थ परत्वम् is based on the fact that in an impartite sentence, the separate parts of the sentence do not present themselves individually or separately as parts. Thus the impartite sentence is part less. There is neither the qualified nor the qualities nor their relation in an impartite statement. Each word in the statement सत्य ज्ञानमात्र ब्रह्म denotes only one entity, though they may not be synonymous, and they are non-relational. So the nature of partlessness implies the non-divisibility अच्छेदत्वम् also, the second meaning of अखण्डार्थम्.

The third meaning is निरविशेषणत्वम्. The negative statements like ‘not this’ ‘not this’ (नेति नेति) deny all differences and what remains after his negation is only the reality, just as when the specific determinations of bracelet and necklace are negated, what remains is only the generic gold. So निरविशेषणत्व means negation of all specific determinations and existence in the most general form. The sentence having such a meaning is अखण्ड. Fourthly विशेषमात्रापरत्व is only many words expressing each the same meaning or entity. Fifthly निर्मेयार्थ परत्वम् too must be similarly interpreted. In the final psychosis of the mind (अखण्डकार्यसृजित) all differences and also absence of all difference
are dispelled for absence or abhāva is an empirical category or the product of nescience. Brahman alone with no tinge of the empirical in it is meant by अखण्डत्व according to the author of इष्टिसिद्धि.

The sixth definition is भावरूपमिश्रणसहितपरत्व which is adopted in the views of Maṇḍana who holds the theory of भावादेत, and Vimuktatman and Ānantabodha who hold the fifth mode of the removal of nescience (पंचमप्रकार अविद्यानिर्वृत्ति) Here the negation of the world is as red as Brahman, though not as a separate category. There is no positive entity other than Brahman.

Lastly एकविशेष परत्व also is only the expression of one meaning or entity, by each of a group of words, an entity without reference to any qualities. In all these seven modes, the purport (तात्त्विक) is the most important and common element. When tātparya requires it, the apparently unfitting elements must have to be disregarded.

A sentence is as we have seen said to need four characteristics - आकार्यता, योग्यता, आस्ति, and तात्त्विकत्व. All these obtain even in the case of ‘That thou art’, आकार्यता and आस्ति are the qualities of the words. योग्यता is with regard to the meaning. तात्त्विक has reference to the speaker. All these requirements are certainly present in the Mahāvākya, and as such the character of a sentence cannot be justly denied to that. And the tātparya in the case of the Mahāvākya is only the essential nature of reality as one. This purport of identical oneness meant by all the words in a sentence is absent in
sentences like ‘Devadatta is black and young’ though they may also be sentences. That is why Madhusūdanarasawatya argued that the impartite sentences arise in answer to specific question with regard to the identity of the object (तन्मात्राप्रश्नोतरत्वम्). In the statement defining the nature of Brahman ‘लक्षणवाक्यं’ ‘सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म’ in the three words there is difference of connotation (प्रबृत्तिनिर्मित्तेतम्). As such there is no synonymity in their meaning as in the case of ‘घट’ and ‘कलश’. In the expression ‘brightest luminary’ the two terms have different meanings but yet connote one entity. This they do by excluding whatever is not bright. This exclusion is the upalakṣaṇa or definition. In the case of ‘satyam jñānamanantam Brahma’, the exclusion of अनृत्तं, जडं and दुःख is the उपपक्षण which serves the purpose of removing all possible doubts or wrong notions. Even in statements like ‘the earth has smell’ only the essential nature of earth through the exclusion of everything other than earth is indicated.

Vimuktātmān in his Iṣṭa-siddhī argues: If it is said that impartite sense is not found in the terms that are not synonymous the reply is seen in the sentences like the ‘brightest luminary is the sun’ etc. Here the ‘brightness’ and ‘luminosity’ are not different from the sun, even then they are not synonymous because there is also the usage, intense darkness (प्रकृतम् तः) In all this, only the purport of the question and the intention of the question must be taken in to consideration. The answer is commensurate with the
question which wants to know the object in itself as ‘which is the mooA? 
What is Brahman?’ etc.

Thus the definitive sentences convey only that which is characterized
by a quality, both in giving the definition and excluding the opposites.
According to the principle that what ever is the reason (हेतु) for the exclusive
knowledge of something, that generates only the knowledge of the nature of
that something. Thus sentences, where purport to be definitive (लक्षणवाक्यानि)
will define only the essential nature of the defined object. This is the
opinion held by Vimuktaśman.

If the text ‘सत्यं ज्ञानमत्तं ब्रह्म’ is taken to qualify Brahman variously on
the ground that all sentences are qualifying statements, then it amounts to
saying that the statements in the Upaniṣads that connote attributelessness are
invalid. It cannot be said that the word attributelessness (निर्गुण) means only
the absence of बाह्य qualities (हेयगुण). In interpreting statements like तत्वमसि etc. expressing qualities of Brahman, there is not only unintelligibility of
purport, but also unintelligibility of syntactical only. Because, in a
qualifying statement, the qualified and the qualification stand in mutual
apposition. Applying this we find in the statement तत्वमसि apposition of
omniscience (in tat) and parviscience (in tvam), which is absurd. To
overcome this contrariety is exactly the function of an impartite
interpretation.
Even the mutual apposition of words here is rather figurative (नम्प) as the impartite meaning is the implication of the entire sentence, and not merely the connotation of the constituent words put in apposition since the latter is available even in qualificatory sentences.

Vācaspatimisra considers that the impartite sense is found not merely in the case of proposition, which are amenable to interpretation by implication, but also in the case of ordinary sentences, which need not be interpreted by recourse to implication. For example, the phrases ‘the man whose is that beautiful cow’ really speaks about the man who has a cow and identifies him. Everything else goes only to identify the man, and with that their function ceases. Thus we find that, the impartite sense of identify is possible even in cases where there is no room for implication. Sarvajñatma mahāmuni in his Saṅkṣēpaśārīraka interprets the impartite sense of the sacred text by jahadajahallakṣanā and jahallakṣanā. According to the first, in ‘that thou art’ only the non-dual aspect from the word ‘that’ and the aspect of being the innermost nature of all from the word ‘thou’ must be taken from the primary senses of the terms. Thus the two words point to the same reality. According to the second, the statement ‘that thou art’ may be read as the statements. Like ‘this coat shouts’, ‘iron burns’ ‘the rope before you is poisonous’ are to be read. The word ‘Brahman’ in the text ‘I am Brahman’ primarily expresses the nescience with consciousness reflected there in and the word ‘I’ expresses the ego with consciousness reflected there in, just as
in ‘the rope is poisonous only the serpent is meant, since the rope cannot be said to be poisonous. This is, then, interpretation by exclusive implication.

According to other schools of philosophy like Nyāya etc, the object is insentient (जड) The knowledge of an object should be criticized only after the study of pramāṇas. But in Vēdāntasāstra, the base of knowledge and its means is the non-dual reality, the real witness, is the object. Therefore in Vēdānta, Brahman is the object of criticism and the means (pramāṇa) should be criticized only after the criticism of Brahman.⁴¹

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{मानेन मेयावगतिस्च युक्ता} \\
\text{परंत्य जात्वात्त्विधि निष्ठकाण्डे} \\
\text{मेयेन मानावगतिस्च युक्ता} \\
\text{वेदात्तशास्त्रेणज्ञज्ञ हि मेयम् ॥}
\end{align*}
\]

The function of pramāṇas is only to make known what is hither to unknown. But Brahman is not a pure subject, the self of all things, and it is not self-luminous. To this Śaṅkara points out that Brahman is not a non-object in an absolute sense.⁴⁵ Because it is the object of the notion of the ego and because it is immediately known.⁴⁶ The existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being the self of every one. No man thinks ‘I am not’ which will be his thinking if the self were not known to exist.⁴⁷ Thus both by the fact of its self-luminosity and by the fact of its being the self of everyone, Brahman is not unknown; Śaṅkara has thus put forward an effective rebuttal of the opponent’s dilemma.
The question will then be, Is Brahman known or unknown? If it is known, there is no use in enquiring in to that, which is already known. If it is unknown, one cannot enter on such an enquiry, Śaṅkara’s categorical reply is Brahman is known. Then, what is the need of an enquiry? Or what is the use of a pramāṇa in what is already known? Śaṅkara replies that an enquiry is necessary because, though Brahman is understood as the self-manifesting self of all things, yet its nature is not comprehended completely. Once Brahman is completely comprehended, or one’s Brahmanhood is realized, there is the total destruction of nescience. In the matter of completely comprehending Brahman’s nature, there is use for a pramāṇa. If the non-manifestation of Brahman were illusion; this illusion itself is based on nescience. It is due to this nescience that no distinction is felt between the inert and the intelligence by the unwise. Thus it is brought about that even the self luminous should be illumined by a pramāṇa. Here by illumination is meant only the removal of the obscuring nescience, just as digging a well is only the removal of the mass of matter, earth etc. The well space was always there and it seems to be produced only now by the digging. Similarly in the case of the self-luminous self, it was never non-manifest. But now that the obscuring nescience has been lifted it appears to be illumined. This is the reason why the pramāṇa does not cognize Brahman like any inert object. It reveals Brahman, not as it would reveal an ordinary sensible object, but just as the disciple would reveal his preceptor. A
disciple does not reveal or speak of his preceptor, as he would of his own disciple. Similarly a servant does not introduced his master as he would his own servant. So here the pramāṇas reveal Brahman’s nature only by removing nescience. It can be realized that the Advaitins position is that the pramāṇa illumines only in the sense that it removes the obscuring nescience. Validity is established because of the capacity to remove अज्ञान. Thus Brahman can be said to be an object of pramāṇa.

The Prabhakara Mīmāṃsakas argue that the authoritativeness of the Vēdānta is not with reference to an established reality, but only with reference to what is to be accomplished, depending upon the actions of the elderly persons. All the words denote only what is to be accomplished by activity either directly or indirectly. This inducement by words to activity towards what is to be accomplished follows only from the words whose connection has been grasped. Therefore with regard to an established entity like Brahman, these being no grasp of the connection of words, there cannot be authoritativeness for Vēdānta.

It may be pointed out against this Mīmāṃsaka position that there can be the understanding of the words denoting established objects without any association with action for example the sentence ‘A son is born to you’ generates pleasure in the hearer. This is obvious to a person near and hearer by the beaming of face, and other physical indications in the hearer. One knows also from his personal experience that the cause of such pleasure is
the cognition of a pleasing thing. Out of curiosity to know what the specific reason for the pleasure in the hearer is, he decides, by means of positive and negative instance ‘A son it born to you’. And it is already known also that the birth of a son alone is pleasing to this particular hearer. So the word indicates only the birth of the son, and not anything else. And in this sentence ‘A son is bom to you’ the meaning of each individual word is arrived at in association with other words in the sentence, which all point to one event or thing the birth of a son. It cannot be said that this knowledge too leads to action because that will land us in reciprocal dependence as between purport and valid knowledge of what is to be done. When there is valid knowledge having what is to be done for content, there is established purport characterized as the capacity to generate that valid knowledge, and when the latter is established, the valid knowledge gets established.

According to the Mimāmsakas though the experience of pleasure could be inferred from the beaming face and other bodily expression and that there by the cause that produced the experience – the word stating the birth of a son could be determined, still it is very difficult to say that the words ‘A son is born to you’ are the ground for denoting the cause of pleasure ie the birth of the son. These words being such a ground cannot be arrived at by the process of elimination, for causes for pleasure are numerous belonging to the past, present and future and far and near. But action is seen directly to follow the words, in so far as its sphere is the particular object. So it is
action that constitutes the first step in the knowledge of things. And action is always with reference to what is to be accomplished. Thus if there could be any word in usage which refers to an established entity, it must be taken as having only a secondary meaning. And there could be no such word.

Similarly, in the case of the scriptural texts like ‘The self is to be known’ only action is enjoined so that the fruit if release can be secured. And text like Brahman is existence, knowledge, bliss attain syntactical relation with injunctive texts, setting forth, the nature of Brahman meditating on whom, or knowing whom, the fruit of release is secured.\(^{55}\) or else, even granting that words have established entities for their import in the ordinary usage, that is not possible at any rate in case of the scriptural texts cannot be the proof with regard to the nature of Brahman as non-dual and Bliss, since, then they will come in to conflict with other valid means of knowledge like perception etc, and remembrance. All these means of knowledge do not give us the proof of Brahman as non-dual and Bliss. They show Brahman as the self and the seat of egoism. More over the self-luminous Brahman is not known for the reason that it is self-luminous. So the Vēdāntic texts are not authoritative in the matter of the knowledge of Brahman.

The Advaitin answers that all the argument of the Mīmāṁsaka will be true only if the original cognition of the power of the word dealing with an established entity as its content is difficult to obtain? But it has already seen in the example “A son is born to you’ that the cognition of the power of the
word dealing with an established entity is possible to obtain. And that the birth of a son would bring and would alone bring happiness being known earlier by so many evidences, it is conclusively established that the cause of happiness is the statement of fact that a son has been born. The person who brings the news of the birth of a son to (Dēvadatta) knows already that, which would cause great delight in him. When such a known cause for Dēvadatta’s pleasure as his news exists, there is no need to search for an unknown cause in the past, present or future, which may be innumerable. According to Vācaspati “persons doubting that there might be other reasons for the delight of Dēvadatta may doubt even their own Brahmin hood suspecting an illicit connection in their own mothers case, and consequently they may suspect whether they are eligible for the performance of the rites customary to Brahmins. Then why take the trouble of studying Mīmāṃsā”.

The statement ‘A son has been born to you’ should be the cause of Dēvadatta’s delight. The cause might really have been the fact that Dēvadatta’s wife has been delivered of the child without difficulty, a fact that is implied in the birth of a son. This criticism loses all strength when it is remembered that the sentence ‘A son has been born to you’ should be construed only on the basis of the relation of the words like ‘son’ etc, in the sentence to the object like ‘son’ and thus, the word ‘son’ as used not only here but elsewhere also means only the object ‘son’ and not the wife. Secondly in a sentence ‘A son is born to you’ the words that occur in it
should be construed in mutual relation and there by only a meaning relating to the son becomes intelligible and not when relating to wife. It is therefore, possible to arrive at the reference only to the son by the process of elimination. Moreover kārya or what is to be accomplished is only one of the counter correlates of words; it is not the sole counter correlate. If it is said that at the time of understanding the relation between the word and its sense kārya or what is to be done is the only undesirable consequences for the Prābhākaraś that in Vēda also at the time of knowing the meaning of words in Vēdas the root-meaning will be kārya and not niyōga, as the Prābhākaraś’s claim.

Nyāyamakaranda distinguished three kinds of knowledge with regard to Brahmaṇ.

1) Verbal knowledge,

2) That born of imagination,

3) Direct intuition (प्रथम शास्त्रीय, द्वितीय या भावनात्मिका तृतीय या साक्षात्कारस्वतः)\footnote{57}.

With regard to the first there is no possibility of injunction, for verbal knowledge with regard to Brahmaṇ can come to a person who knows the meaning of words and their implications, even without injunction. Nor is there an injunction in the second type knowledge namely भावना or imagination or meditation, since it is established by co-presence and co-absence of the intensity of knowledge with the intensity of the practice of meditation. Consequently no injunction is
necessary here also\textsuperscript{58} nor is it the third kind direct intuition. This direct intuition is either the nature of Brahman itself, or a particular evolution of internal organ having Brahman as its object. With regard to the first alternative, there can be no injunction concerning the nature of Brahman, for Brahman is eternal and cannot be anything to be accomplished as an effect. Nor is it based on the evolution of the internal organ is a fruit and this fruit being of the nature of Bliss is desired naturally by every one.

Therefore the passages like ‘The self should be known’ are not injunctions, self should be known must be interpreted as, “self deserves to be known.”\textsuperscript{59} That is why the nature of Brahman is first described so that there may be a desire to attain it.

And in the Védāntic passages conveying the nature of Brahman, there is no conflict with other means of valid knowledge. For it has been shown that even perception does not give us difference. Even granting that there is conflict of scripture with other means of valid knowledge. It cannot also be said that Brahman is not comprehended by the other valid means of knowledge, because though Brahman is not known as an object, that aspect distinguished by us in it which is the supreme bliss is known as in the capacity of the object of supreme love by other valid means of knowledge.

The cognitions ‘Let me not be extinct’ ‘Let me be alive’ arise because the self is the object of ultimate desire. Therefore, the self is the object of ultimate desire. Therefore the self being the object of ultimate desire, \textit{प्रभु-}
It is not intelligible if it were not of the nature of Bliss. It is the purport of the statement ‘know the self’ that the Self who is the nature of Bliss deserves to be known and hence it is not an injunction.

It is clear to the Advaitins that the meaning of injunction in the Védas is only with reference to an established object and not something to be accomplished in the future and thus, has only the state of being the cause of desired object, which deserves to be so desired.\(^6^0\)

**The theory of Sphota**

The word sphōṭa (derived from स्पृहा, to express is explained either as that which is expressed (or revealed) by letter sounds or as that which expresses (or reveals) a meaning\(^6^1\). According to this theory, the syllables of a word do not directly present the meaning of the word, either separately or jointly, as this process has been found to be inexplicable. In reality, however, corresponding to every word perceived, there is an unperceived, particles (निरवचन) symbol, which directly presents the meaning. The symbol is called sphōṭa (or संवेदना-the word). The different syllables of a word only serve to reveal this symbol to the mind. The first syllable rouses this latest symbol in the mind only vaguely, and the succeeding syllables, as they are gradually heard, draw it more and more towards the focus of consciousness till finally the last syllable, being heard fully reveals the symbol to consciousness.\(^6^2\) The theory of sphōṭa was hinted at by Patanjali, the great...
commentator of the Pāṇiniyasūtras and elaborately discussed and developed by later grammarians.63

The process of the gradual revelation of sphōṭa by the succeeding syllables of a heard word may be understood step by step. For e.g. when a person is about to speak to us, we are quite ignorant of what he will say, and we have only a blank expectancy that allows no room even for a guess. But as soon as we hear him utter the first syllable ‘a’ where our imagination begins and then he utters the next syllable ‘ni’ and then the last syllable ‘ma’ is uttered all the unknowns are solved and result is completely defined to consciousness, as a meaning fully known. So by analysis we find that meaning is known through a gradually consummated process beginning from complete ignorance, passing through partial knowledge and ending in complete knowledge. Each of these stages of the knowledge of meaning is presented by a corresponding stage of the knowledge of the symbol or sphōṭa of the heard word, which by being gradually perceived defines the sphōṭa from the mere vagueness of the initial stage to the complete certainty of the last stage so the grammarians speak of the gradual revelation of sphōṭa through the gradual perception of the word symbol. Thus it will be found that this ingenious hypothesis of a unitary, indivisible symbol, which in being revealed expresses a meaning, solves the difficulty that arises about the apprehension of a sound-series. At the same time it explains the utility of all the different syllables of a word.
When we hear the word ‘animal’ it cannot directly remind us of the meaning, because neither through memory, nor through perception can we grasp the whole word at one moment, as the syllables come in to consciousness one after another and not simultaneously. But corresponding to the word ‘animal’ we must have some unitary symbol, that is sphōṭa in which there are no parts and consequently no question of ‘before’ and ‘after’. This sphōṭa can therefore be grasped by a single act of consciousness, as a whole, which directly presents the meaning. The word only serves to arouse the symbol into consciousness. This symbol or sphōṭa varies according not only to the variation of the component syllables but also to their order, so that the symbol revealed to consciousness by the word ‘lame’ will not be so revealed by the word ‘male’ (having the same sounds in different order) which has quite another sphōṭa corresponding to it. The unity of a word which are generally speak about and which, as we have seen, can be given neither through perception nor through memory, is really derived from the felt unity of the sphōṭa which the different parts of the word serve to reveal to consciousness.

Different persons pronounce a word differently. But the different sounds of a word lead to the same meaning. There we must say that just as there is a general idea of the ‘cow’ that is applicable to all particular cows with varying individual peculiarities, so there must be something, general and universal to stand for the differently, pronounced word having the same
meaning sphōṭā serves this very purpose. It is held to be general and universal. The sound that is heard and dies away is only a particular passing sensation that rouses the symbol unheard which is called the real śabda or sphōṭa. Thus śabda or sphōṭa is both universal and eternal. It is that has a direct and eternal relation to meaning.

According to Saṅkara, and Vācaspati, the hypothesis of sphōṭa, in order to explain both the felt unity of a word and the possibility of its yielding meaning, i.e. unnecessary and unsatisfactory. Therefore the theory has been rejected by the Vēdāntins.

Saṅkara as well as his followers, holds that though a series cannot be apprehended as a whole through perception, we have, after all the members of the series have been perceived one by one, a memory of all the members combined together. We have in experience, in all cases of temporal and spatial series, the knowledge of wholes, which preserve the internal relations obtaining among their component members. When we already have such experience it is idle to ask how it is possible we need only admit on the basis of such experience, that the intellect possesses the power of synthesizing elements, which were originally apprehended at different moments of time. This function of the intellect is called by Saṅkara, "समस्तप्रत्ययमन्नी वृद्धि." (Intellect looking back on past experiences as a whole.) The theory of sphōṭa explains only verbal services. But regarding temporal series we must either say that even those have their corresponding sphōṭas, which the
grammarians would not admit; or we must say that the knowledge of the unity and internal order of other series is possible without sphōṭa, in which case there is no reason why a verbal series also should not be known in exactly the same way. Consequently we have no ground for making a special case of verbal series, and the hypothesis of sphōṭa becomes unnecessary.

Therefore we are compelled to say that the problem of the knowledge of a series is not peculiar to words alone. We have many other cases such as the knowledge of a line of arts or a collection of trees where the same difficulty arises and where the theory of sphōṭa is not meant to apply. It is unnecessary because what is wanted is a general explanation that will cover all instances of the knowledge of series (spacial and temporal) and not a special hypothesis explaining only a special group of instances, namely the verbal series, since without such a general explanation, the fundamental problem remains unsolved.

A particular word should be able to call up its corresponding unitary symbol or sphōṭa, it is necessary to know all the syllables of the word in their fixed order and also as a combined whole. For without such a presupposition, the revelation of sphōṭa itself to consciousness cannot be explained. There for the word cow arouse in the mind in the particular sphōṭa which gives the meaning cow, not dog or horse. Thus we find that the difficulty, which the theory of sphōṭa tries to avoid, remains concealed in
its very supposition. That we have knowledge of the sounds in their
determinate order is the very pre supposition, which explains sphōṭavāda. If
that knowledge is possible, then the word itself can present its meaning
directly, and the hypothesis of any mediating agency is quite redundant.
Again it is foolish to deny that we have the knowledge of a serial whole; just
because it is difficult to say how that knowledge is obtained.

We are concerned, however with the perception of words in this
connection. Though sphōṭavāda has been found to be untenable, the
problem raised by this theory is not yet fully explained. Śaṅkara of course,
says that the word as a whole with its peculiar internal order can be grasped
in memory through the synthetic activity of the intellect (समस्तप्रत्ययमणिनी वृद्धि:) but he does not think it necessary to explain how simultaneity and succession
are compatible in the same act of the mind. The question, how, even in
memory we can avoid remembering the syllables in their order and therefore
avoid failing also to grasp them as a whole, is not further dealt with.

Śaṅkara seems to consider the testimony of consciousness regarding
the knowledge of a temporal series to be too strong to be shaken by any
doubt, and believes in the existence of a peculiar faculty of the
understanding as being the only explanation for the knowledge of such
series.
The syntactical unity as of a word, पदेकवाक्यत्वम is described as the mutual supplementation of words in a sentence. Where there is reciprocal expectancy with regard to a whole sentence in relation to another, there is syntactical unity of sentences. For instance the sentence, ‘there is a cow’ though it is complete, may arouse the question, who is the owner? This is known as the contingent expectancy between two sentences, which in them convey a complete sense. The question is what is the nature of this syntactical relation? Is it that of a word to a sentence of which it forms a part, or that of one sentence to another? Does the arthavāda, in other words, convey a complete sense, though it seeks syntactical relation with another, because of its own futility by itself? Or does it convey an incomplete sense like a word sense, becoming articulate only as linked with an injunction, for example, the performance of a rite, offering a gift etc? Dharmarāja holds that the eulogistic or condemnatory statement does not attain completeness in themselves and they, therefore, it should be considered to find such syntactical relation with the injunction, as that of a word in a sentence.

But syntactical harmony of sentences also is not totally rejected by Dharmarāja. In the words of Dharmarāja where, in the case of two sentences, each declaring separately a different relation of word senses, there is because of expectancy, the making known of the sense of a major
sentence, the syntactical unity is as of a sentence.\textsuperscript{67} Again the cognition of the sense of the major text depends upon the cognition of the sense of the subsidiary text standing in syntactical relation to it. This is true of the great texts of identity as much as of injunctive texts. The understanding of the text ‘that thou art’ depends upon the cognition of the texts teaching the sense of the words ‘that’ and ‘thou’. This is also called ‘Āsatti’ which is not here the proximity of words, but immediate recall of sense, which is the cause of verbal knowledge of sentence sense.

According to the Advaitins the Vēdas are not eternal\textsuperscript{68}. Since it has an origin and whatever has an end must have an end. And Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad declares the Vēdas are the नियात of the great Brahman. The letters, words and sentences are as much the products of creation as ether etc. and the Vēda is composed of these words and sentences only. It comes in to being at the time of creation and comes to an end at the time of dissolution. But this origination and destruction however are not for letter in the middle, (like तोष गकरा:) because the letter does not perish and come in to being in the middle. Once it has been created, it lasts until dissolution.

What is not eternal is the audible sound, Dhvani that manifest the letters. They are short or long. They come into being and perish\textsuperscript{69}. The non-eternal Dhvani is super imposed on the letters which are eternal (in the sense that once created they do not perish till the time of word dissolution) and the
letters are due to super imposition mistaken to be non-eternal. Thus though the Vēdas are not eternal in the sense that they are uncreated and endless, yet they are not momentary. Once created, they last till the time of dissolution. They do not perish in the middle. This is to sum up for two reasons.

a) If the Vēda is momentary, there will be no recognition as in the statement “the same Vēda that was studied by Dēvadatta is studied by me too.”

b) The apparent non-eternality of letters is due to the super imposition of the non-eternality of audible sounds on the letters, which, though not eternal in the Mīmāṃsaka sense, are not yet momentary.

With reference of the origin of the Vēdas, it can be called personal (पीर्येय). The word पीर्येय means dependence according to Tattvāṣudhī. As against the Mīmāṃsakas the Advaitins hold that the Vēda depends on Iśwara for its production. Even he has no power to manifest the Vēda many form other than the form in which it existed in the previous form. There was no time at which the Vēda did not exist since the world does not have an absolute beginning at a point of time, it is difficult to trace when the Vēda was not existent.

The Advaitins insists that scriptural testimony is the only source of the knowledge of Brahman. In the commentary on Brahmasutra, Śaṅkara clearly establishes that Brahman is to be known only from scripture. Brahman is not the object of perception and other means of knowledge, for
everything is rooted in Brahman. That which is the basis of all things cannot be grasped by anything that is based on it. It is not explained by anything, as everything is explained by it. In his Naiśkarmyasidhi, Sūryāśrama points out that since self is devoid of sensible qualities it is not an object of perception and since it does not have any distinguishing marks, it is not an object of inference. The nature of Brahman is transcendental and supersensible, and perception, if inference etc. which have only the sensible world for their object and cannot grasp the nature of Brahman. Scripture alone can give us that knowledge perception and the other empirical means of knowledge teach about objects, scripture has, as its special topic Brahman.

Sarvajñātmaṁahāmuni in Saṅkṣēpaśārīraka has established that Śruti alone can teach as about the Self. All the other pramāṇas like perception have the external world as their content. The senses perceive the external world and not the inner self. The difference between Śruti and other pramāṇas can be stated as follows.

When the pramāṇa has for its object something not divested of its objectivity, it is empirical. But when it manifests its object, the self, divested of its objectivity, it is Śruti texts like ‘that thou art’. Again all pramāṇas except Śruti, apply to that which is empirical, and not to reality, because, they are incapable of generating the cognition of the uncognized and the uncognisable. That is before the rise of pramāṇa in respect of various contents, there is non-cognisedness for the object. But there is no means of
cognizing this non-cognisedness of this object. The external object cannot reveal itself because it does not have self-luminosity. Now unless one knows that before a thing was cognized by a pramāṇa, there was its non-cognisedness which could not known by any pramāṇa, and that it was by a pramāṇa that the uncognised object was cognized, one cannot know whether an object was known by any pramāṇa at all, or it manifested itself by self-luminosity. For example one who has not seen a cloth soiled previously cannot know whether it has become white by cleaning or it is the very nature of the cloth to be white. Similarly one cannot say, in the case mentioned above, whether its manifestation was its own nature or was by a pramāṇa. In this sense, all pramāṇas fail to make unknown things known, what they generate is the empirical usage only. But this empirical world is indeterminable. Perception etc. therefore cannot put us at any time in touch with the real. It is the scripture that can teach us the nature of world-illusion. Just as Arjuna kills the Kouravas who have been already killed by Vāsudēva, so also the knowledge generated only nominally by the scriptural texts destroys the world-illusion because consciousness or knowledge is eternal. Again means of knowledge other than śruti have external objects, which being the products of nescience are characterized by difference and mutual non-existence. Scriptures speak of an impartite non-dual self, while non-difference is the truth difference is illusory. Hence perception etc. cannot claim any capacity to reach reality.\textsuperscript{73}
The Vēdas including the Upaniṣads contain the great declarations of unity called Mahāvākyas that are the report of the direct realization of unity by the sages. He who desires to liberate himself from the delusive appearances of multiplicity, and realize the one Brahman behind all, and realize also the unity of his own self and Brahman can utilize the teachings of the seers. These are to start with mediate knowledge (परोष) for him, but by constant meditation they can be turned into immediate (अपरोष) knowledge. The Advaitins illustrate the possibility of the conversion of mediate knowledge obtained first from authority (शब्द) into immediate knowledge with a story. Ten persons having crossed a river, count themselves. Every time the counter forgets to count him and finds only nine. They mourn the loss of the tenth person. A passer corrects the error by who counts all, and tells the counter, ‘you are the tenth’. This mediate knowledge from authority after words becomes immediate knowledge when, counting again and including himself, the counter comes to realize ‘I am the tenth’. One who would realize his unity with Brahman should first of all, go through the fourfold mental and moral discipline namely discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal giving up desires for enjoyment of fruits of actions here or here after, acquisition of self-control, powers of endurance, concentration etc. and ardent determination for liberation. Prepared thus one should
enter upon the three step path under the guidance of a master who himself has realized Brahman. The steps are 1) listening to the upanisadic teachings (अवण) 2) Reasoning (मनन) about their truth, and 3) Intensive mediation (निदित्यासन) on the truths rationally accepted. By long and continued contemplation the truths known from authority attain maturity (परिपक्व) and immediacy (अपरोक्ष) Brahman shines forth as the only (reality) in all outer thing and the inner self. It is thus that the teachers precept ‘that thou art’ comes to be realized by the pupil in and immediate consciousness of the form, ‘I am Brahman’. This is the culmination of Vedantic knowledge.

The object of speech is to communicate informations to others. But these informations may be right or wrong. In this particular condition we are compelled to test the opinion of Budhists and Vaisesikas regarding verbal testimony. We already know they reject verbal testimony as a source or method of knowledge. They believe that as the validity of information received from others has ultimately to be established or rejected through inference from the trustworthiness of the speakers, the independence and ultimacy of sabda cannot be supported, it must be brought, therefore under anumāna. Here me shall understand better in what sense a particular method of knowledge is accepted or rejected by a particular school of thinkers. To apply the result of this analysis to the method under consideration, we at once find that those who think that verbal testimony cannot be considered a
method of knowledge, because the validity of such knowledge has to be ascertained through inference and therefore this method becomes reduced to inference itself. Any source, which gives us information about facts, can be and should be considered a method of knowledge, irrespective of the question whether its validity is ascertained intrinsically or by some external method. For otherwise even perception cannot stand as an independent method. When the validity of a perception is doubted, it has to be established through inference, and then perception also has to be brought under inference. Neither can it be said that as the validity of perception is not always doubted, at least in those causes of absence of doubt, it can be accepted as a method. For if this be granted, exactly for a similar reason verbal testimony, the validity of which also remains very often undoubted and unchallenged, should also be accepted as a method at least for those cases. And if inference or perception is necessary to validate testimony, testimony also is at times, employed to validate inference and perception. We perceive the sun to be moving, but in difference to the authority of astronomers, we disbelieve our perception. Thus we find that the grounds on which sabda as a method of knowledge is discarded lead us to absurdities. In fact, however, for a method to be so considered it is sufficient that it should give some information which is not derived from other sources. And the object of inference is the establishment of truth or falsehood, and that of the verbal statement, the information that is to be subjected to the judgment
of truth or falsehood. If this distinction were remembered, we find that the information yielded by verbal testimony, being itself not derived from inference cannot be reduced to the latter. On the contrary, verbal testimony can be regarded as an independent method of knowledge as much as perception or inference.

Knowledge, whether perceptual inferential or verbal, is essentially a process directed to the attainment of truth. Thus truth is an intrinsic characteristic of knowledge. If knowledge sometimes fails to attain truth, it is because some special hindrance stands in the way of knowledge itself. Falsity therefore, is due to or constituted by some special conditions that are external to the conditions which make knowledge possible, and the fulfillment of which alone would otherwise make for truth. So it is falsity that is externally conditioned, where as validity is conditioned by the conditions of knowledge itself.

This discussion can thus be summed up like this. The knowledge derived from a vākya is not really derived from any other source, though in some cases it can be so derived and in other cases it cannot. This fact alone entitles śabda to be a method of knowledge. Inference may at most establish the validity of the knowledge derived from a vākya; it does not yield the knowledge itself. Thus it is wrong to suppose that testimony is reducible to inference. Even if truth of knowledge derived from śabda is known through inference; śabda would not cease to be a source of knowledge. But the
Vedāntins have shown that the truth of knowledge also is vouched for and known by the inherent conditions of the knowledge itself. Thus the truth of verbal knowledge also has not to be established by an external method like a validating inference, which can only remove doubts. Moreover in some cases like the knowledge of the questions, wishes, requests etc; of other persons their words are our primary, and sometimes the only, source of knowledge for us. It follows; therefore, that śabda should be accepted as an independent and ultimate method of knowledge in the fullest sense of the term.
References


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. P. 114 योग्यता तत्त्वविषयतायं समांतातः, योग्यता अद्य प्रके तत्त्वविषयवाचायातः एव.

Advaitasidhi. P.689.


6. आचार्यावत वाणेन पदार्थपदार्थोपगतिः:

यानान्तरोपस्थापितपदार्थवीचारवाचार्यस्मि पदार्थस्य यथि इति "Ibid." P.115.


8. Nyayabhasya 2.2. 634.


10. Nyayasutra 2.2.66.


13. Kavya prakasa of Mammata 2,6 and 2, 19.


15. Ibid. P. 123. तत्र शक्यार्थमन्नत्तत्त्वाय यत्र अर्थाविन्दार्थत्रत्तत्र: तत्र जहल्लक्षणाः.

16. Ibid. यत्र शक्यार्थमन्नत्तत्त्वाय अर्थाविन्दार्थत्रत्तत्र: तत्र अजहल्लक्षणाः

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid. P 125.

19. घटंदि पदानां विशेषमात्रपरतं लक्षणेव स्यात् Ibid. P. 129.

20. शान्कराभाष्यम् I.3.28

21. Ibid.


24. Ibid. P.60. वर्तमानाकल्पनकालगोरित तद्निषण्याचरणि परस्परसंबंधानुपत्ते:


27. Ibid. समानाधिकरणस्य च अनेकपदगतिल्लात.

28. पदमयलक्षणाश्रयने वन्द्यप्रतिखादिकामाध्यंगते नावं पर्यवस्थति इति सिद्धम् अखण्डार्थ
विषयत्म. Tatwāsūdhi. P.63 निविकल्पकं तू संसर्गान्वयताहि ज्ञानम्
Vedāntaparibhāṣā. P.43.

29. Ibid. P.135.

30. Prakaraṇa Pancika. P. 93.अन्वितानं एव अभिधानं न तू अभिहितानं अन्वय :


32. Vedāntaparibhāṣā P.118.


34. Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgṛaha. P. 260.

35. Ibid.


38. Ibid.


40. Chāndogyaopaniṣad. VI. 2.1.

41. Ibid. IV. 4.19.

42. Naiṣkarmyasidhī. III.9. लघुप्रभुत - दुःखितत्व तद्भवत्व-परोक्ष्य च व्यावृत्ते:

43. Pancadāsī. VIII verse. 43.


45. Sāṅkarabhāṣya. I. 1.1. न तावदवं एकातत्नाविषयः

46. Ibid. अस्त्राशारविषयमत्वात् अपरोक्षत्वात् प्रत्येकात्मालप्रसिद्धे:

47. Ibid. सर्ववाच्या आत्मत्वात् ब्रह्मसिद्धत्वप्रसिद्धिः यदि हि नात्मसिद्धत्वप्रसिद्धिः: यथा लोकः

48. Ibid.

49. Iṣtasidhi. P. 71. तथेव ब्रह्मापि स्यवत्र प्रकाशं सच्च नासिन न प्रकाशते च अज्ञानम्। अतः प्रमाणं

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.अज्ञाननिवर्तकवत्य सिद्धम्।

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid. P. 72.


56. Nyāyamakaranda P. 163.
57. Ibid. P. 171.

58. Ibid. अम्बासो अम्बासमानवस्तुनि प्रकर्षाधायक इत्यन्तव्यतिरिक्तिसिद्धत्वाल् शब्दं अपेक्षते.

59. Ibid. P. 172. अर्थार्थतः येव व्याख्येयः.

60. Ibid. P. 256.

61. Vākyapadiya I. 98

62. Brahma Sūtras 7.3.28

63. Mahābhāṣya I. 1.1

64. Brahmāsūtra Bhāṣya 1.3.28 Bhāmati, 1.3.28.

65. Brahmāsūtra Bhāṣya 1.3.28.

66. Kumarilla Bhatta in Śloka-vārtika.

67. Vēdānta Paribhāṣa P 111.

68. Ibid. P. 144. अर्थांक तू मते वेदो न नित्यः.

69. Ibid. P. 148. वेयभित्यचर्चकन्धिनि गतित्यति निश्चितं परम्परा संबंधं विषयते चन्द्र प्रमाणं वा.

70. Tatwāśudhi. P. 87


72. Saṅkarabhāṣyam. II. 3.1

73. Naiskarmya sidhi ch. II

74. Pancadaśi. Ch. 5, P. 142, 143.

75. Vēdānta sāra P. 1 साधन चतुष्टयम्.