CHAPTER II
THE MISSION OF CAPTAIN GRESLEY
(Dec. 1841 - Nov. 1842)

Appointment and Instructions

When the Government of India agreed with Resident Fraser's proposal to depute an able officer for full-scale and on-the-spot enquiry into the affairs of Surapur this in itself did not constitute a conclusive measure. But it was a step in that direction; for, British policy towards Surapur would hinge on the deputed officer's report. His recommendation would help the Resident to decide whether the British should assume temporary administration of Surapur till the Raja's financial liabilities towards Hyderabad were liquidated or to effect some other feasible arrangement. Whatever the final decision it could be carried through by winning the confidence of the Raja about which the officer was being specially instructed.

The Resident's choice for this delicate assignment fell upon Capt. Francis Gresley, firstly because he suited the Government of India's requirement that the officer should be either covenanted or commissioned; and secondly because the Resident had the fullest confidence in the "distinguished ability and judgement of Capt. Gresley". While intimating the Government of India of his appointment and enclosing a copy of his instructions to Gresley on 29th November 1841, the Resident wrote, "no public interests committed to his charge would ever suffer".

Guidelines were laid down by the Resident for the proposed enquiry. Gresley was instructed to report especially on the following points: (1) Was the Raja of Surapur merely a tributary Zamindar, like many others of Hyderabad State or was
be more or less independent except for periodical payment of	tribute? (ii) Was the tribute and *narrana* imposed upon him by the Nizam's Government higher than that of his predecessors	and disproportionate to his resources or was he treated fairly?
(iii) What was the precise, total amount paid by the Raja to Hyderabad so far and what was the unpaid balance? What were his other liabilities and general debts? (iv) In case the Raja's dues were merely arbitrary demands of a stronger power what should be considered as fair and correct dues and on what basis? To what extent could the British justifiably assist Hyderabad in its future demands upon the Raja or be a party to enforcement of his dues? and lastly (v) Gresley was to report on Surapur's revenues and resources, find out whether there was any decrease in it and if so, whether the decline was due to the Raja's extravagance, mismanagement or partly or wholly due to the exorbitant amount of *narrana* and tribute. As a result of the recent disturbances a wing of infantry regiment had been stationed in Surapur region. Gresley was also to advise on its exact location. Particular emphasis was laid upon establishing direct communication with the Raja and on winning his confidence. If Gresley happened to recommend temporary British assumption of Surapur administration it was necessary to reassure the Raja that his own welfare and that of his subjects was the sole object in view and that his interests would be fully protected. Similarly, Raja's suspicions had to be allayed by explaining that British detachments were stationed in his raj merely to guard the frontiers and prevent repetition of disturbances like the recent ones.

Gresley had already studied all the records connected with Surapur available in the Hyderabad Residency. He was to be further assisted by a *vakil* on the part of the Nizam's
Government. Minister Chandulal named Bishan Sing who had already been Hyderabad's vakil at Surapur as a knowledgeable person. But the Resident considered him as undesirable on account of his past record; so the Minister nominated Nasimuddaulah, a mansabdar in the Nizam's service who was to accompany Greeley. A couple of letters intimating Greeley's appointment to the Raja and seeking his co-operation were to be personally delivered by Greeley to the Raja. One was from the Resident and the other from the Hyderabad Government. On 13th December 1841 the Government of India conveyed their approval of Greeley's appointment, and of all the above arrangements and instructions to him. Greeley was now ready to set out for Surapur for his mission.

Greeley's mission thus differed from previous deputation of other British officers who were sent merely to enforce payment of Surapur's dues. He was to conduct a full enquiry that should result in decisive regulation of Surapur-Hyderabad relations and definition of the part to be played by the British in it.

Question of Ruzzums, Cattle-lifting and Other Depredations

As soon as Greeley was ready to launch upon his special assignment the Raja was ready with complaints of his own. As we have seen before financial relations between Surapur and Hyderabad were not one-sided but mutual. If Surapur owed tribute and nazrana to Hyderabad it had also the right to collect ruzzums in Hyderabad's domains. The Raja now requested Greeley to pass on to the Hyderabad Minister his request for their payment. Greeley recommended it by stating that Resident Martin in 1829 had promised such assistance to the Raja in this matter. Thereafter, the Raja complained that
Kundola, a jagir village and three other villages, viz. Khanapur, Hungalli and Bomanpal in Arikeri taluq of his zamthan were plundered and cattle from these villages carried off, by the villagers of Balchakar in Narainpet taluq and Gobbur in Raichur district respectively, both under Hyderabad. He substantiated his complaint with statements of natwaria concerned. The Raja could have sent his own akbandi for recovering the plunder but forbore hoping that Greeley would get them restored through the Nizam's taluqdars. Once again, Greeley passed on the request recommending orders by the Hyderabad Minister to his taluqdars for restoration. Very soon Greeley was involved in a more serious threat to peace in the region than petty plunder.

**Disturbances of Hanamappa Naik**

In the third week of January 1942, Raja Krishnapa Naik informed Greeley that his half-brother Hanamappa Naik was preparing to cross the Bhima river with a large body of armed followers with a view to invading Surapur and seating himself upon the Surapur gadi. Hanamappa could not cross it immediately as the river was in flood. It is a sad reflection upon the character of the Raja that after soliciting Greeley's assistance he himself proceeded on a hunting expedition! Nor his servants would help to secure supplies for Greeley's camp. Perhaps, the Raja expected his half-brother to forfeit claim to the stipend by such open revolt, a situation quite welcome to him as the Raja was already deep in debts. Greeley who was then at Anola, however, moved to Naikal, 24 miles away, close to a ghat on the Bhima to investigate the matter. He also asked Capt. Palmer to be ready with his detachment.

On his arrival he found the region in a state of alarm, absurd rumours prevailing and armed assemblies in the taluqa of
Hyderabad adjoining Surapur ready to join any disturbances. The taluqdar of Yadgir admitted that 30 - 40 Arabs had bought ammunition at Yadgir and returned to Mundargi from where Hanamappa was to cross the river when it subsided. Greeley issued warnings to Sidi Bilal, the amil at Mundargi, to Hanamappa himself and to the Jamiyya of Garmatkal who was also suspected to be in league with Hanamappa, Greeley thereby hoped to nip any disturbances in the bud. Intelligence reports made Greeley, along with Capt. Palmer, move to Koupur from where Hanamappa's armed party was reported to have decided to cross the river on 30th night. Ghat at Naikal and Ahar were guarded by the British troops. The forces at Lingasugar and Firozabad were ready to assist and Brig. Tonkyns, commandant of Hyderabad Division was ordered to defend Surapur.

These defensive moves caused the Arabs and others to abandon the enterprise. Greeley found some Arabs encamped at Mundargi, Sidi Bilal defiant as before and the Arabs quarrelling with him over their pay. Hanamappa was reported to be hiding in some village under the Sidi's authority. On 2nd February Greeley reported that the danger of attack on Surapur had disappeared. However, Brig. Tomkyns who had arrived at Koupur, opined that troops should not be withdrawn as troubles may erupt again. The Resident in the meanwhile had been urging Minister Chandulal to check movements of armed Arabs and the Minister, besides taking other measures, informed that Greeley could seize Sidi Bilal if he wanted to. Brig. Tomkyns's suggestion of a reward for the capture of Hanamappa was turned down by Resident Fraser, presumably at Capt. Greeley's instance. Hanamappa had already been directed to return to Chadarghat (at Hyderabad) and threatened with forfeiture of his stipend. His seizure on 8th February put an end to this abortive coup.
Meanwhile, a number of other conspirators had been apprehended and inquiry set afoot. These later investigations confirmed current rumours that at the back of it all was Raja Balaprasad, Minister's own grasping and unscrupulous son. He had loaned about 1½ lakhs of rupees to Raja Krishtappa. As there was no hope of realizing it through the Raja, Balaprasad, planned to recover it through Hanamappa by promising the Surepur agdā to him. Hanamappa, like most disinherited princes, had never ceased hopes of one day ascending it. Besides, he had grievance enough in the stoppage of stipend by Raja Krishtappa. There were other disgruntled jagirdars, Raja's own uncles in Surapur whose jagirs had been resumed, reportedly mutinous aibandī at Surapur willing to join hands with Hanamappa and any number of mercenary Arabs in Hyderabad region on the look-out for plunder. Sidi Bilal was to help in recruiting them and his father too was a party to these intrigues. In the opinion of the Resident, Hanamappa was a half-wit and lacked energy for enterprise but became bold with such encouraging elements. Himself living in penury he made reckless promises to Balaprasad, his agent Bishan Sing (who had been Hyderabad's former vakil at Surapur) and others. It was suspected that the would-be palace revolution had been blessed or at least connived at by Minister Chandulal himself.

The Resident did not hesitate to convey these suspicions to the Minister who hotly denied the allegations and promised punishment to the guilty. As the conspirators had already been confined and Hanamappa himself was under the Resident's custody, no further action on the part of the British was considered necessary except stationing detachments of troops strategically for the defence of Surapur. Depositions of various persons who had been apprehended lead one to the conclusion that the
Hyderabad Government was playing an underhand double game. While always seeking British aid to recover Surapur's dues it did not hesitate to try its own plans behind the back of the British. Readily agreeing to Greasley's mission it felt no qualms to thwart it by using Hanamappa as their own instrument.

Plunder of Hanamapur and the Problem of Hao Rumma

As soon as Hanamappa Naik's conspiracy was suppressed Greasley had once again to turn his attention to the recurring problem of frontier disputes between Surapur and Hyderabad. Like financial dues between the two, depredations into each other's adjoining territories were mutual and frequent. We have already referred to the Raja's complaint of looting of his 3 villages in Arikeri taluq by the Nizam's subjects. Now, the ryots of Hipperga taluq in Nizam's dominions were reported to have been robbed of their cattle by the Raja's subjects.

Gresley, though not himself convinced that the theft had been proved against Surapur, urged the Raja, as instructed, to restore the cattle whereupon he offered to pay Rs. 18 or give 11 two bullocks to the villagers of Hipperga. A few days later, he received further complaints from the Nizam's officials about similar depredations by the Bedars and officials of Surapur. In particular, the villagers of Hanamapur in Raichur taluq jointly protested that they were looted by the Bedars and Rohillas engaged by Gururao and Govindarao, officials of the Surapur Raja in Arikeri taluq. The villagers of Gobbur attested to this depredation. Greasley refrained from any interference but offered to investigate if directed, since the Nizam's officials were pressing for his assistance and ignoring the affair might lead to more such instances. The
Resident directed that the Raja should either restore the stolen property and cattle or pay cash compensation. His general instruction, however, was that Gresley should endeavour to settle the disputes amicably and maintain peace till he could finalise his report on Surapur.

Gresley took up the investigation into Hemnapur plunder only after the submission of his report. The villagers of Hemnapur readily repeated their story of how 51 households were attacked and robbed while the defendants from Arikeri had to be pressurised to depose. The property looted was probably worth Rs. 14,000. To Gresley's surprise the sale proceeds of cattle heads carried away were reported to have been credited to the Raja's taluqa accounts and it appeared that he had ordered the attack in retaliation of looting of villages in Arikeri taluq. The Raja evaded when questioned and would not care to apprehend the ring leaders of the attack. However, Gresley held him responsible for the loot and recommended that he should compensate.

This investigation, however, revealed to Gresley the real nature of these frontier depredations. The Bedars of Arikeri and Devedurg had time-honoured ruzum claims on the adjoining taluqs of Hyderabad. If these were not paid punctually or disputed, they considered it as their right to realize them forcibly. It must be noted that there was no indiscriminate looting. The Bedars took away only what they considered as their rightful due. It included a fixed number of buffaloes, sheep, coconuts and mangoes, a definite quantity of baize, jawar, rice, saltpetres, tamarind, cotton, gara, chaff, oil, betel-nut and betel-leaves and a measured length of cloth. All this was commuted into cash and demanded. Probably the Hemnapur inhabitants offered no resistance at the time when
attacked but chose to protest later because the Bedars were justified to a certain extent. Several other villages in Raichur taluq had similar experience. Stationing of regular troops to prevent them was of little use. Perhaps, better policing would stop them if Devadurg and Aneri were transferred to the Nizam as suggested by him in his report. The terrain in these taluqs was difficult and it was easy for those who took law into their hands to conceal themselves. But the problem was much larger. Mutual depredations could not be stopped or settled by merely investigating two or three prominent instances. That would merely provoke further similar cases than dormant where one party would be determined to enforce and the other to withhold demands till it was settled by the British. The Bedars had claims upon nearly 2000 villages in the Nizam's territory. If plundering had to be permanently checked all these ruuma claims had to be investigated, adjusted finally and guaranteed.

The problem was similar to that of the Bhils in Khandesh and Berar who were in the habit of plundering the plains to realize what they considered to be their hag ruuma and used to take refuge in the Satpura ranges. Military campaigns against them proving of no avail, a conciliatory policy was adopted, and Capt. Ovens was appointed as 'Bhil Agent' to deal with the problem. He and succeeding Bhil Agents investigated and guaranteed the claims, granted the Bhils lands in lieu wherever possible and raised a local regiment of Bhils to channelize their habits. It had taken ten years (1819-29) to find a lasting solution. Gresley felt that some such measure would have to be adopted in this region as well. If it was not possible to tackle it thus, complete non-interference was preferable.
Though Greley's letter on this subject displays deep insight into the problem he appeared to have overlooked its alternative solution, viz., the commutation of Surapur's *rusuma* for which the Raja could get credit in his dues towards Hyderabad. He himself had recommended it in his report. Since the Government of India's orders on it were awaited, the Resident refrained from any instructions on this subject. The Government fully accepted his report. Their acceptance of Greley's recommendation in the report in respect of *rusuma* appears to have been reinforced by their fear that otherwise such depredations may extend to other parts of Hyderabad which were already disposed to throw off the Nizam's authority. But pending the actual implementation of Greley's settlement the question of *rusuma* continued to erupt. In June 1842 the Raja sought the assistance of Maj. Hugh Inglis, Cavalry Commander at Gulbarga, to realize his *rusum* from the damna villages of Hussain Wall of Gulbarga which had not been paid for 2 years; otherwise he would attack those villages. The Wall on the other hand complained that the Raja's people had already taken away cattle from three of his villages which had affected cultivation thereby forcing him to stop paying his taxes. He expected Inglis to have the cattle restored first. The Resident directed that both the parties should refer the matter to Hyderabad Government whereas the Government of India permitted Inglis to mediate, presumably because Greley was busy during this period in reducing the Arabs at Marched in Raichur taluq.

**Greley's Report and Settlement**

Though for the sake of convenience we have dealt with the plunder of Heemnapur earlier we have already noticed that Greley was directed not to undertake any investigation into
it till he submitted his report. Therefore, his main task after the suppression of Hanamappa's abortive invasion of Surapur was to carry out the instructions given by the Resident at the time of his appointment by a full-scale enquiry.

Greeley's initial account was more in the nature of a tirade against Raja Krishtappa's maladministration than a report giving information sought by the Resident. Though Greeley went to Surapur and stayed there for 6 days the Raja would not meet him. Perhaps, his officials prevented him. Greeley reported that no class of people in the principality was satisfied with the Raja's administration; they were blaming the British for saving his rotten government from Hanamappa's conspiracy. Greeley had no opinion of the Raja's manager, Chanbasappa (which was to have such an impact, almost out of proportion, on later British relations with the principality), who, he said was neither paying the sibandi nor returning loans raised from bankers, and was starving jangirs by resuming jaggir. Unless the Raja appointed a proper diwan discontent in Surapur would reach a point where the Raja himself might be killed in a palace revolution (khadaianol). His subjects had been plundering the neighbouring regions and he would forfeit British friendship if they carried out depredations into the Company's territories. When Greeley demanded accounts he submitted false statements. He had no intention of paying anybody though in favourable season he ought to have had money in his treasury. At the same time, finding his affairs sinking day by day, he sought Greeley's advice. Though Greeley found that he was not going to follow it, nevertheless he advised him to appoint a suitable diwan, turn out bad advisers, redistribute jaggir properly and pay up arrears to Hyderabad. He exhorted him to rule as a Raja
responsible for the welfare of his principality and warned him of catastrophe otherwise.

A couple of days later, Greeley submitted his report proper, with special reference to the Resident's queries. It is a longish document of fifty-five paragraphs accompanied by 12 appendices which are extracts from official papers to substantiate his report. In it he confirmed that the Surapur Rajas were independent chiefs. Though they paid tribute to the Nizam and the Marathas the amount was never fixed. The Nizam fixed it at Rs. 1,45,000 in 1802 when he first took British aid for its enforcement. In 1823, the British gave up claim to Surapur's tribute to the Peshwa as his successor the amount being considered equal to the Raja's pucus in the former territories of the Peshwa which he was no longer collecting. But the Nizam was allowed to collect Rs. 15,000 for the British as chauth owed by Appa Desai Nipanikar to them. Thus, the total tribute from 1823 onwards should have been Rs. 1,60,000 but the Nizam arbitrarily raised it to Rs. 1,75,000. Adding up other sums under various pretexts and instalments of a huge nazrama of 15 lakhs imposed on Kristappa's accession in 1823 the Hyderabad Government's annual demand upon the Raja now had been raised from Rs. 1,60,000 to Rs. 2,30,600. The Raja had agreed to these hard terms for the sake of recognition as Raja; it was no wonder, if he fell into arrears and could raise money to pay Hyderabad only by farming out his territory to bankers. The British had assisted Hyderabad from 1833 onwards to enforce the demand.

Surapur's revenues in 1842 were about 5½ lakhs (land revenue from khalsa lands 2,80,000 and revenue from jatias 19 1,30,000, taxes like kullali etc. 40,000 and pucus in Nizam's region 1 lakh). Not all of it could reach the treasury,
however, on account of the Raja's weakness in enforcing his just demands, the peculation of his servants, and the turbulent nature of his subjects who would resist if they considered some assessment as unjust. In addition to strict management he could add to his revenue by resuming some jagirs; as many as 213 villages had been given away in jagir, more than half of them by the present Raja; but only the previous year the Hyderabad Government had forbidden him to resume any jagirs thus encroaching upon his rights. Another way to augment his revenues was by extensive cultivation of cotton for which the soil was fertile and great export potential existed. As for rupees in the Nizam's regions, in former times their amount was greater than the so-called tribute to Hyderabad. With Krishtappa's accession the Hyderabad Government decided to collect Rs. 55,000 on his behalf and credit the amount to his account, and only the remaining Rs. 46,000 were allowed to be collected by him. Though the British had assisted the Nizam, a stronger power, to collect his demands, they had always refused the Raja, a weaker power, to collect his rupees from Hyderabad. Their collection had often led to mutual depredations and disputes.

Greasley had been unable to procure an exact statement of State expenditure. That furnished by the Raja indicated it to be Rs. 3,85,652. It was palpably false, as many items appeared fictitious. Several khas villages were shown as jagirs and revenue underrated at Rs. 2,68,343 to prove the Raja's inability to pay. Greasley estimated that the Raja spent about half a lakh on military establishment of various description (cavalry, aigles, pideas, colandes, European style infantry, Telinga matchlockmen, Bedars and Rohillas) and about Rs. 20,000 on civil establishment the latter being very
rudimentary. His personal expenses were not known; he was extravagant if he had the means but had no reputation for liberality. He kept up very little state and whatever he spent was on his harm.

The Raja's debts amounted to nearly Rs. 17 lakhs without interest. The principal creditors were the Gossain bankers. Others were Siddappa Sahukar of Bagalkot, the Swami of Sankeshwar and Raja Balaprasad; of these the British stood guarantee only for the Gossains. They had also interfered for payment of annual stipends of Rs. 12,500 and Rs. 3,600 to Hanamappa Naik, Raja's half-brother, and Yenkappa Jellapalli, a cousin, respectively. The former had forfeited it at present but forfeiture was not yet declared to be final.

Greeley pointed out and underlined the iniquity of the British acting as the strong arm of the Nizam to extort all sorts of arbitrary exactions from Surapur, apart from tribute proper. The only ground on which the Nizam was justified even in asking for tribute was that the Nizam's contingent afforded protection and security to the Raja. This was the only just principle on which the amount of tribute could be computed. Keeping in view the Raja's revenues his share of expenses for such protection would amount to Rs. 2 lakhs. It could also be calculated as: (i) Tribute in 1802 - Rs. 1,45,000, (ii) Nipanikar's chauth - Rs. 15,000 and (iii) Nazzana, fees, and all other demands present or future - Rs. 40,000. Thus, Greeley arrived at Rs. 2 lakhs as the Hyderabad Government's annual demand upon Surapur, which the British would be justified in enforcing upon the Raja.

How best could the British ensure that the Raja punctually paid this amount of Rs. 2 lakhs to Hyderabad? One alternative was to place Surapur under temporary British
management till all arrears calculated on the above principle were liquidated and firm basis laid for payment in future. This would also help to liquidate the Raja's other debts including those guaranteed by the British to the Gossain bankers. Another advantage was that Surapur's administration would improve considerably, particularly in policing the principality. But Greasley felt that disadvantages outweighed the advantages and foresaw far too many objections to this alternative in actual implementation. For one thing, no party in Surapur except the Raja's creditors were in the least anxious for British interference. By taking over the management, the British would be responsible for settling many other claims upon the Raja with which they had no concern so far. Jamiir grants would have to be revised and the Raja's expenses curtailed. The European officer in charge would have to appoint his own people to carry out his reforms. Those thus displaced would be very jealous and disgruntled. Taking the management out of his hands would be most unpalatable to the Raja himself though he apparently used to request for British assistance in managing his affairs. Disgruntled jamiirs, displaced state servants, pensioned off Raja - it was not a desirable set-up. Moreover, while temporary British management might remedy present evils, it did not guarantee their non-recurrence. When the principality would be restored to the Raja, the British would have to ensure that pledges given by them during temporary management would be honoured by the Raja. This would lead to further disputes and complications ultimately forcing the British to annex Surapur permanently, a measure not contemplated by them so far. Immediate permanent annexation, justified on the grounds of maintaining peace in the region was preferable to temporary management by the
Greeley, himself did not prefer either alternative and made his recommendations on the basis that the Raja should not be deprived of his power and influence enjoyed by him and his ancestors for the past two centuries. These recommendations were: (i) Relinquishment by the Raja of all jummas in the Hyderabad region Rs. 55,000 collected by Hyderabad but credited to his account and Rs. 46,000 collected by himself. This would account for half of the Nizam's annual demand and remove permanently a constant source of disputes between the officials of the Nizam and the Raja; (ii) cession of the districts of Devarug, Arkeri, Jalalpalli and Gunawattal all south of the Krishna river, yielding a total revenue of Rs. 60,000, to be transferred to the Nizam. These districts were comparatively recent acquisitions of Surapur, Nizam Ali having rented them out in 1797 to the then Raja for Rs. 37,500. The Nizam, therefore, could be said to have a right to resume these districts; (iii) The first two accounting for Rs. 1,60,000 the Raja should pay in cash the remaining Rs. 40,000 out of the Nizam's demand fixed at 2 lakhs annually, agreeing to cede further territory of this value in case of failure to pay. The only objection Greeley could think of to this arrangement was that the inhabitants of the districts to be ceded attached to the Raja as their ruler might resist. But this objection could be overcome by guaranteeing their hereditary rights and by seeing to it that the Nizam's officials did not over-assess the districts.

Greeley's proposed settlement was fully approved by the Resident and forwarded to the Government of India who appreciated the able and creditable manner in which the report was drawn up. They recommended it for implementation, asserting that no British guarantee of any kind should be given for districts
to be ceded. Greeley had already been recommended by the
Resident to effect the settlement and to deal with subsidiary
matters.

Subsequent to this report, Greeley put forth another
proposal. He suggested that the district of Andola yielding
a revenue of Rs. 40,000, unencumbered with jama, could also
be transferred to the Nizam in lieu of cash payment. The
district of Nilgi could also be transferred temporarily to
Hyderabad but its revenues amounting to nearly Rs. 40 to 45,000
could be assigned towards liquidating debts of Cossin bankers and
stipends to Hanamappa Naik and Yenappa Naik Jallapalli. He
was, however, of the opinion that once the settlement was
accepted it would be very harsh to enforce arrears of dashkash
to the Nizam by the Raja. As we shall see later, the Hyderabad
Government accepted the settlement only on the latter condition
and continued to dun the Raja for it through Capt. Greeley.
The Minister's demand was that he should at least pay the recent
Mats which were overdue and it became Greeley's duty to call
the Raja for these Mats, though unsuccessfully.

Reduction of Marched

As we have seen before though Capt. Greeley was now
essentially employed in a civil capacity, he was not free from
military duties as Commanding Officer at Metkal for maintenance
of peace in the region. That is how he was required to suppress
the disturbances threatened by Hanamappa. A similar occurrence
demanded his attention in the beginning of June 1842 when the
Raja reported to him the plunder of the village of Joladadgi in
Surapur samathan by Arabs from Raichur and Marched. Marharas
sent by Greeley confirmed the report and brought in graphic,
gory details of the outrage. They found traces of bloodshed,
mutilated corpses, wounded men and women, burnt cotton and grain, and houses set on fire. The village was not fortified and though the villagers could offer scant resistance bullets and daggers had been used to kill 17 persons including the village patil. Common plunderers had joined the Arabs to surround the village, had looted about half a lakh of rupees, had torn ornaments off women and carried away the cattle. The patil's sons had been tortured for money and later taken away as prisoners. Only a few villagers escaped to tell this horrifying tale. Some of the gangsters had been recognised as being in the service of the Zamindar of Marched (in Raichur district) and his uncle. As there was no feud between Marched and the village, reported wealth of the patil appeared to be the sole cause of this violence. Greely himself attributed the carnage to enmity between the Arabs and Surapur Raja. It had sent out such a wave of terror that other villagers apprehending revenge by the Surapur Bedars had taken refuge in Raichur.

Greely apprehended that if no punitive measure was taken it would provoke further disturbances between Surapur and the neighbouring Zamindars of Hyderabad Government. Raja Krishtappa demanded to know whether the Hyderabad Government would punish the perpetrators of the outrage or he himself should do it. Greely was also informed that Arabs from Hyderabad had gone to Raichur either to defend it against possible attack by Surapur or to attack Surapur itself. He suggested regular troops to reduce the Arabs. When the Zamindar of Marched refused to restore the loot or release the patil's sons as ordered by the Hyderabad Government, Greely was ordered to march against the Arabs who were rallying at Marched fort and the Raja was advised to desist from any revengeful action on
his own. Greeley succeeded in reducing the strong fort of Marched. The Arabs were imprisoned for later trial. The zamindar of Marched and his uncle had surrendered themselves and the patills sons released. Greeley listed the arms found in the fort, restored such property taken there as could be returned to Jolabadgi people, held the remaining in deposit till the trial was over, and handed over the fort to the taluqdar of Raichur. Only some culprits of the carnage at Jolabadgi still remained at large.

Greeley was occupied with this affair for the whole of June 1842. And even when his mission came to an end at the end of 1842 he was required to forward the list of Marched property held in deposit. The Amir of Matkhal and the Company's troops from Lingsugur under Capt. Adam gave excellent cooperation throughout. But it is Capt. Greeley who earned 26 encomium from Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough for his reduction of Marched in the face of fierce defence by the Arabs.

**Implementation of Greeley's Settlement**

On 7th May 1842, the Government of India approved Greeley's settlement and left it to the Resident to secure the consent of both the Hyderabad Government and the Surepur Raja to the new arrangements. Curiously enough, in the meanwhile, Greeley did not anticipate any opposition to cession of his territory on the part of the Raja. His only apprehension was that the Raja's officials might excite the Bedar population of the districts to be ceded who might resist the change of masters. He, therefore, suggested that the Nizam's officers who would take charge of the districts should be accompanied by troops.

Immediately on receipt of the Government's orders the Resident sent his assistant Capt. Malcolm to explain
the arrangements to the Minister who wrote back that Devadurg district did not belong to the Raja; that its revenue should be estimated only at Rs. 20,000; that the Raja, besides surrender of his jagir in Hyderabad region and cession of territory, must pay all arrears up to the end of Febr. 1251. The Resident in reply urged the Minister to accept Cresley's valuation of Devadurg and sent a copy of Nizam Ali Khan's original signed to the Surapur Raja to prove his full title to that district. In characteristic style the Minister exclaimed, "There is no limit to the Government's losses! How great is the distress of the Government!" He agreed to whatever was proposed by the Resident as if in extreme disgust and as if the whole settlement was unfair to the Hyderabad Government. He gave an impression of accepting it under duress. The Resident ignoring the Minister's pretended pique now enquired from the Minister the names of officials who would take charge of the ceded districts and disapproved of Sultan Nawazul-Mulk, taluqdar of Raichur who was obnoxious to the Bedar inhabitants of the region. Thereupon the Minister nominated Budun Khan, taluqdar of Mathkal, which was approved.

It is characteristic of the high-handed methods and pressurizing tactics of the Resident that even before he had obtained the Minister's full consent he informed Cresley that he had done so and directed him to negotiate with the Raja. He was to obtain the Raja's willing consent if possible, threaten him verbally if necessary, and as a last resort requisition troops from Bolarum to enforce the settlement if the Raja tended to create difficulties. He also agreed to temporary transfer of Nilogi to the Nizam to cover partly Surapur's dues to Hyderabad and partly in payment of debts due to the heirs of Motigir Gosain. We have already noticed
that the transfer of Nilogi was not proposed by Gresley in his original report but at a later date and as such the Government of India knew nothing about it and had not issued any instructions. After approving of Budun Khan as new official of Hyderabad in charge of ceded districts, the Resident directed Gresley to fix a day for the actual transfer of territory which should be 20 days after the receipt of the letter to the Raja to that effect. He was to inform the Resident as to how he would meet any reluctance on the Raja's part. Copies of the proclamation to be issued regarding transfer of the territory were to follow soon. To the Government of India the Resident justified possible use of troops and measures of coercion in effecting the settlement by referring to the 17th Article of the Anglo-Nizam Treaty of 1800.

Gresley was mistaken in thinking that the Raja would not resist the cession. As soon as the Raja was informed of it, he made his opposition clear. He had no objection to giving up his rusums in Hyderabad territory, though. After all, under his weak administration he had hardly been able to collect them regularly or to account for them in his treasury. The irregular mode of collection of rusums had meant only filling up of the pockets of his officials or Bedar subjects. It was certainly advantageous to get credit for them in his dues towards Hyderabad. Permanent cession of territory, however, was quite another matter. Unable to obtain the Raja's willing consent to the latter, Gresley proposed that the Hyderabad Minister should fix a day for the transfer of territories and send his officials with sibandi to take charge of the thanas. Regular troops should be held in readiness to meet any opposition. He, however, still expected that if the Hyderabad Government guaranteed hereditary rights in the ceded districts
and the new district officers were proper persons there would be no actual opposition. He was certain that estimated revenues of the districts to be ceded would meet the Hyderabad Government's permanent demands upon Surapur. It might even produce additional revenue which could be ascertained at the collecting season and surplus lands restored to the Raja.

On receiving the Resident's final instructions and copies of the proclamation regarding transfer, Gresley wrote to the Raja that on 20th Jamad-us-sani (29th July) the specified districts must be handed over to the Nizam's authorities. He sent him a draft tagid to be issued by the Raja to his own officials and a vakil to explain it all to the Raja in Kannada. As instructed by the Resident, the Raja was threatened with loss to the samathan if he or his officials dared to oppose. If there were delay or difficulties, Gresley proposed to proceed to Surapur personally to effect the new arrangement.

The Raja's immediate reaction was to submit an humble and piteous appeal to Gresley, to the Resident and to the Nizam. He supplicated that he should be saved from the disgrace of transferring parts of his hereditary, ancient possessions. Once again he made promises to pay his dues but agreed to abide by Gresley's advice regarding the management of his principality and requested Gresley to visit him for that purpose. Gresley now proposed that British detachments at Gulbarga and Lingsugur should help the Nizam's officials to take charge of the cessions. Even then he did not apprehend actual disturbances but suggested that it was better to be prepared to meet resistance. The Resident had learnt reliably that the Raja had sent vakils to Hyderabad to carry his petition. A douceur to the Minister or his son Balaprasad
from the vakil might halt the arrangement. Bent upon effecting it through force, if necessary, he directed Brig. Tomkyns to hold troops at Matkhal and Lingsugar ready for possible requisition by Gresley, even requested troops at Sholapur, which was nearer to Surapur than Hyderabad, to be prepared, informed the Raja that he should forthwith order his officials to hand over the districts and not to compel Hyderabad Government to employ force and directed Gresley to proceed to Surapur with a small detachment to hand over to the Raja personally his own and the Minister's letters rejecting the Raja's petitions. Gresley was to requisition additional troops only after making sure that they were necessary. At a later date, he authorised him to send for troops from Kalghatgi as well. Gresley was to intimate if a large-scale campaign would be necessary in which case the commanding officer of Bolaram Division would be sent down to head it.

Though Gresley does not report it in his letter to the Resident, it would not be wrong to presume that the Raja must have been cowed down by this British preparation to enforce the settlement of which Gresley must have talked to the Raja in his personal interview. The bullied Raja handed over all the districts proposed to be ceded to the Nizam, but showed utmost reluctance in respect of Andola and Nilogi. These were his most ancient, hereditary possessions. He sent a 

He was ready to pay Rs. 30,000 for allowing him to retain them...
in one instalment after Dasra when Kharif crops would be harvested and annually without fail in future. Gresley agreed with him and recommended that the Raja be allowed to retain them on giving security for payment of Rs. 40,000 in lieu; and actual payment of Rs. 1 lakh as arrears of peshkaush to the Nizam and the stipend to his half-brother Hanamappa. Maj.Inglis from Gulbarga who had occupied thanas in Andola-nilogi for the Nizam should continue till final orders were received. When the Resident communicated his agreement with Gresley's proposal the Minister demanded the security of Siddappa sahukar for Andola-nilogi. The Resident objected as this banker was staying at Bagalkot in the Company's territory. While submitting to the Government of India that Andola-nilogi would be under British military occupation till their orders were received he urged that the Raja must forfeit these districts if he could not furnish some other security.

It is noteworthy that Gresley also reported the reluctance of Hyderabad officials to take charge of the ceded districts as they had not received sanads for it and also on account of current rumours about further negotiations between Surapur and Hyderabad on the subject. It was here, for the first time, finding that neither party appeared to be fully satisfied with his arrangements, that Gresley recommended the policy of complete non-interference in Hyderabad-Surapur affairs. The permanent transfer of the ceded districts and the surrender of ruums, however, became a settled fact during Raja Krishtappa's lifetime. Only the question of Andola and Nilogi remained under consideration even after his death.

**Gresley After the Death of the Raja**

During the course of the implementation of his
settlement Capt. Gresley received the news of Raja Krishtappa's sudden demise and transmitted it to the Resident on the 10th August 1842. The Raja must have died a sad ruler losing almost half of his hereditary raj which might have hastened his death-pangs. Unlike in many other Indian states and in Surapur itself on the previous occasion, succession to the gadi was smooth this time. Venkatappa Naik (IV), the late Raja's 8 years old son by Rani Ishwaramma was immediately acknowledged by all as the rightful successor. As was customary in the Surapur samsthan, the dead body of the Raja could be cremated only after the seal of the Raja's office and his sword were handed over to his heir and his subjects had paid their obeisance to him. It was true that Raja Krishtappa, when he had no hopes of any male issue, had adopted his brother Pid Naik's son to be his successor. But on the birth of Venkatappa, the nephew's claim lapsed automatically. None, therefore, not even Pid Naik who could be the real interested party had any objection to Venkatappa's succession. Capt. Gresley apprehended disturbances if any one else was appointed by the Nizam's Government. Resident Fraser, however, directed Gresley not to take the young lad's succession for granted before making further enquiries. He himself enquired from Minister Chandulal about it. The Minister's reply revealed that he had no definite information, but, perhaps, out of sheer habit, expressed doubt about the legitimacy of Venkatappa. Gresley's own enquiries discounted this and confirmed the above.

What was at issue, however, was not who should be the Raja but who should wield authority and act as regent since the new Raja was a minor. Rani Ishwaramma, the queen-mother, was the natural regent. She was a clever, competent woman, perhaps a shade too temperamental to earn everyone's affection.
but certainly capable of commanding loyalty and respect of her subjects. With the support of Chanbasappa who had on account of his integrity and competence, the management of the late Raja's household, private jagirs, and other establishments for which specific assignments had been made by the Raja, the Rani could shoulder the responsibility of running the administration. She did, in fact, assume administration of the State in the name of her son. All she needed was recognition of her authority as regent and the customary khilat for her son in token of his recognition as Raja from the Nizam's Government. She applied for such recognition.

How it must have dismayed the Rani to learn that instead of being recognised as the rightful regent, her brother-in-law Pid Naik, her enemy, soaked in wine and sunk in debauchery, was being proposed as the diwan! It was Capt. Gresley who was responsible for this nomination. Though Gresley feared no succession disputes or disturbances after the Raja's death he certainly anticipated a struggle for power among the late Raja's relatives. To the Resident's queries on the subject he answered that the Rani in league with Chanbasappa would in future resume a number of jagirs. The dispossessed jagirdars would consequently create troubles similar to those in January 1842 created by Hanamappa. They would be again aided by Arab imadars anxious to have a footing in Surapur. In consequence of recent arrangements Hyderabad Government could not levy nazrana any more on any succession in Surapur. But it would make the payment of Rs. 5 lakhs which it claimed as arrears from Surapur up to end of Pasli 1251, a pre-requisite for conferment of khilat. As the Rani and Chanbasappa were reported to have amassed private fortunes during the past 3½ years when they virtually wielded authority in Surapur, it is they alone
who would be in a position to guarantee payment of these arrears. Thus, they would secure Hyderabad Government's support. Their ample resources would also be used to recruit Arabs and other mercenaries and thus strengthen them, if appointment of a suitable diwan was delayed. But what had really scandalised and antagonised Gresley against the Rani was her reported illicit connexion with Chanbasappa. He believed that this was detected by all and reported that he had several messages from the Raja's relatives to use his influence for removing Chanbasappa. But for the fear of British intervention the abominable Chanbasappa would have been banished, even killed, long ago. If it was made known to the people that he was not supported by the British he would not be able to maintain his position for long.

The nominal diwan at the moment was one Basappa Desai who, however, did not enjoy any authority. Gresley did not consider anyone from Surapur as really fit for the office of diwan. They were, without exception, the most disrespectful set of people he had ever had any dealing with. He had heard nothing about one Ranga Naik whom Capt. Jackson had proposed as diwan in 1840. Though Lakshmangir Gosain was a respectable character, his personal pecuniary claims upon the samathan disqualified him. Gresley had no opinion of Pid Naik either; he considered him to be ignorant and no more honest than the rest of the Raja's family. But he was the best of the bad lot. Moreover, Pid Naik promised to pay in instalments the Hyderabad Government's arrears urging at the same time that this be kept a secret; otherwise the Minister might auction the samathan to the highest bidder and he would meet Hanamappa's fate!
As was rightly observed by Greeley, Minister Chandulal's sole interest in the question was the realisation of arrears. It did not matter to him as to who paid them. When the Resident asked him as to whom he considered as the fittest person to be regent during the young Raja's minority, to begin with, he opined that the Rani was the rightful claimant. "In proof of this all high and low have obeyed her and they are all much attached to her", he wrote. But the Resident ascribed this opinion to secret negotiations at Hyderabad between the Rani's supporters and the Minister. He firmly held it as an 'unquestionable fact' "that in this Government no political or other arrangement ever takes place without being intimately blended and combined with some negotiation or intrigue having the acquisition of money for its object". The Resident forwarded extracts from Greeley's letters condemning the Rani and Chahbasappa and informed the Minister that "they would ultimately prove extremely injurious to the interests of Surapur". He, therefore, urged the Minister to accept Pid Naik as divan and issue letters to that effect. The Minister agreed after initial hesitation, explaining that he had not been made aware of the Rani's immoral character till then.

Thus, with Capt. Greeley's recommendation, the Resident's insistence, the Minister's acquiescence and the Government of India's approval, Pid Naik, the 'least undesirable' among all was imposed upon Surapur as divan. As it turned out, it was a most significant step on the part of the British that led them to intervene in Surapur to a much greater extent, brought them closer to its internal administration which they had avoided so far and entirely altered the course of Surapur's political history, so to say.
The Rani was not altogether unaware of what was happening and what was going to happen. The Resident had instructed Gresley to secure the Rani's consent to Pid as diwan in a friendly way. Nomination of, or even future support to, Pid should not appear as a positive act by the British Government. Tact was to be employed. But instead, while informing the Rani of khilat for her son which was on the way, and reassuring her that no nasrana would be levied, Gresley had peremptorily urged her to remove Chanhasappa who would ruin the samasthan, to arrange to pay the Nizam's Government's arrears immediately, to stop thinking of recruiting Arabs from Hyderabad, about which her late husband had also executed an agreement, and to accept Pid Naik as diwan. In reply, she sought exemption from any payment on compassionate grounds in consideration of the samasthan's previous losses. She pleaded on behalf of Chanhasappa emphasising that he was holding his position for the past 10 years on account of his competence, integrity and honesty. His enemies indulging in intrigues might spread malicious gossip but otherwise none else had any complaints against him. It was the late Raja's last wish to continue him in office. Unfortunate circumstances had intervened and the Raja had not been able to convey this wish to Gresley. If Chanhasappa were removed resulting in anarchy in accounts, "what good will result from making complaints after the mischief is done"? she asked. As for recruiting Arabs, she stoutly denied the allegation, invited Gresley to conduct a strict enquiry and satisfy himself. How could she ever allow herself to fall into the hands of those who were Surapur's inveterate enemies and who had looted its property which had recently been restored to Surapur by
Oresley himself? So far as the State administration was concerned, district affairs and accounts were looked after by confidential servants. Supreme authority always rested in the Raja which had now come to her according to custom but she was running the government with the advice of her relatives and officers of the State. It was not the custom to appoint the Raja's or Rani's relatives who belonged to the nobility to high posts; their help in administration was of an advisory nature. Pid Naik belonged to the nobility; he too was associated, like others, in running the government. But it was against the custom to appoint him diwan as the nobility was not expected to exert itself. She repeatedly and politely said that it was incumbent on her to seek Oresley's advice as well, that she would not depart from any advice that was meant for her good. But she urged him to come to Surapur, listen to what she had to say and then she would abide by his advice. "Your allegations add to the grief caused by the death of my husband. Please do not believe in stories against me. Satisfy yourself personally on all points. I look forward to you to uphold the dignity of my son. Please favour us and earn a good name for yourself".

As we have already seen, this reasonable explanation was like throwing water on duck's back. Oresley's mind had already been prejudiced and made up against her and her pleas fell on deaf ears. The appointment of Pid Naik as diwan became a fait accompli.

It must be noted that the Government of India had cautioned the Resident against coercion in anything respecting Surapur. While upholding young Venkatappa's claim to the gadi they had not only insisted that no makkara should be levied by Hyderabad Government but had specially instructed
the Resident to extend to Surapur his 'care in the spirit of friendship and goodwill'. He was required to convey the Government of India's warm feelings and friendly disposition towards the young Raja who was succeeding in difficult circumstances and towards the queen-mother or the Rani who was specifically mentioned. Had the Resident interpreted these instructions in the right spirit, he would have refrained from imposing Pid Naik as diwan. Instead, he deviously sought the Government of India's approval soliciting that it be not considered as undue interference as it had been agreed to by Hyderabad Government as well. On the one hand he pressurised the Hyderabad Government into accepting Pid Naik and on the other presented the Government of India with a fait accompli so that they were inclined to take the line of least resistance and approved it. And all this relying entirely on reports from Gresley.

It would be pertinent to point out here that Gresley's reports on the character and competence of the Rani and Chanbasappa were largely influenced by Lakshmangir Gosain. This ambitious banker who had lost his position with Raja Krishappa by refusing him loans, bore personal enmity to Chanbasappa who knew the wicked nature of this wily man, and the mischief of which he was capable through intrigues. Chanbasappa had managed to pay some arrears of Hyderabad by raising loans elsewhere. To regain his position and control the Gosain had at first prejudiced Gresley's mind with anti-Krishappa reports. After the Raja's death he began to spread canards against Chanbasappa and the Rani which were entirely false. It was he who suggested to Gresley the name of Pid Naik as diwan with a view to gaining his personal ends. Given the weak and debauched character of Pid he expected him to be a puppet in his hands, so
that he himself would be the power behind the throne. Gresley ought to have kept an open mind on the subject and judged the Rani and Chanbasappa for himself by personal, independent enquiries. But Lakshmangir was a master artist so far as the crafts of poisoning a person's mind was concerned. Unostentatiously, with pleasing manners, the banker managed to prejudice Gresley against the Rani and Chanbasappa, so that he came to suggest Pid despite his weaknesses. However, there is no trace of Lakshmangir's underhand influence and behind-the-scenes activities in Gresley's official letters and reports. He was completely deceived and his honest, straightforward nature easily taken in. The deceit of Lakshmangir Gosain practised upon Gresley and its baleful influence upon Surapur politics came to light much later.

While conveying the Government of India's good wishes to young Venkatappa the Resident now wrote to him to accept Pid Naik as diwan. He also wrote to Pid Naik, "... the high character you bear, ... the general esteem in which you are held by the inhabitants of Surapur, afford satisfactory assurance that your administration will be a just one". So long as he was just he would receive the friendly support of the British and Hyderabad Government. These high sentiments regarding a man of whom he knew little, that too based on hearsay reports, though fitting with the tone of diplomatic correspondence make strange reading especially in the light of later events and the Resident's own adverse comments about Pid Naik a few days later. Gresley was to carry these letters personally to Surapur for delivery, instal and support Pid Naik in office and take with him whatever troops were necessary for this purpose. The Resident thus retracted from his own instructions to Gresley just 4 days before in which he had
left to Gresley's discretion visit to Surapur for this purpose but had cautioned him against any steps that might provoke quarrels or compel recourse to arms. At that time the Resident had admitted that the Rani might be the regent according to Hindu custom but had expected Pid Naik to assume virtual control of administration on his own. As for Gresley's fear that the Rani might recruit Arabs in support, the Resident had considered it enough firstly to instruct Gresley to eject them from Surapur and secondly to get this conveyed to Arab jamadar at Hyderabad through Minister Chandulal.

As instructed by the Resident, Gresley arrived in Surapur on 26th September 1842. On his way Pid Naik passed on his request for British aid against the Rani who was not willing to hand over power to him. On his arrival he found the gentry of Surapur preparing to leave the town expecting disturbances. While Pid Naik was trying to enrol some men to strengthen himself the Rani had already recruited Rohillas and some sibandi sufficient to overpower Pid Naik. In her personal talks with Gresley she pointed out the worthlessness of her brother-in-law both as a man and as a ruler. She particularly feared that her son's life would not be safe if Pid was made divan. On Gresley's guaranteeing the minor Raja's safety she agreed to Pid Naik's divani. In a meeting of royal family, jamadar, Bedar chiefs and servants of the State the following day all accepted Pid Naik as divan, but some Rohilla jamadar and Bedar chiefs and the giladar of Wandurg would agree only if the Rani ordered them. The Rani's orders were dependent upon a guarantee about her jagirs which were under Chanbasappa's management. She wanted to retain the royal seal and the sibandi under her and a promise that nothing in state
administration would be done without her consent. This amounted to virtual defiance. Oresley thus failed to achieve his purpose, but stayed on in Surapur at the request of bankers who were afraid of disturbances if he left. He now awaited the Resident's further instructions. In his opinion the Rani's party had grown stronger in the long period that passed between the Raja's death and the appointment of Pid Naik as divan. She was now not likely to part with power without struggle. Oresley did not consider the Rani's adherents as respectable, but she had a following of 600-700 loyal Bedars. A large force would have to be sent to subdue her and all the ghats leading into Surapur guarded to prevent her recruitment of outside mercenaries. Moreover, even if she accepted Pid Naik as divan but retained power as regent, the British Government's purpose would be defeated. The Resident now instructed Oresley, in consultation with the Minister, to threaten the Rani with dire consequences of her defiance and to leave Surapur taking with him Pid Naik or whosoever else wished to accompany him.

Henceforth almost all letters from Oresley on the situation in Surapur were a reiteration of his reports that the Rani continued to defy the Government though at a later date she agreed to Pid Naik as divan at least on paper, that her party was gaining strength day by day, that Pid Naik was incapable of securing authority for himself without British support, that a strong show of British force was necessary to reduce the Rani to submission and that without it he was unable to instal or support Pid Naik in the office of divan.

Thus, he raised an important problem of the limits of British interference in the affairs of Indian States. So far as Surapur was concerned Oresley gradually veered to the view that there were only two alternatives - either to abandon
Surapur to its fate and let things take their own course or to assume complete control during the Raja's minority.

Resident Fraser, by temperament an aggressive imperialist, preferred the latter alternative. He would have liked to move in the troops immediately but for the Government of India's earlier instructions to avoid extreme measures. Secondly, while there were troops enough to guard the ghats on the Krishna and the Guma leading into Surapur which he was arranging to check the movement of mercenaries who might strengthen the Rani, they were not adequate for full-scale military action. Calculating on the basis of Surapur's military strength as furnished by Gresley in an earlier memo he estimated that 2000 bayonets with proportionate artillery and cavalry would be necessary for such a campaign. British detachments stationed on the frontiers of Surapur did not muster to this strength. He could detach troops from Bolarum-Secunderabad but that would be taking a security risk. So, he decided to play for time till other troops under his command but on duty elsewhere became available for service.

Meanwhile, to prepare the Government of India for complete assumption of Surapur administration, he pleaded that Pid Naik did not appear to have any character, ability or energy enough to discharge his duties as diwan competently. His installation with British armed support did not ensure immediate restoration of order in Surapur nor did it guarantee liquidation of Surapur's dues towards Hyderabad. He thereby spoiled his case for a military campaign. For, the Government of India rightly retorted that if nothing was to be gained by installing Pid Naik in office it was enough to check the Rani or her adherents from employing Arabs (or similar mercenaries) and not to deploy detachments from Secunderabad thereby weakening
Temporarily disappointed that the Government of India did not accept his recommendation the Resident appeared to be at a loss as to the instructions to be given to Gresley. All he could ask him to do was to watch the situation, to inform Pid Naik that he was responsible for whatever happened as the Rani had accepted him as divan at least on paper, to avoid showing open hostility towards the Rani but at the same time to see to it that her party did not gather strength. He even suggested to Gresley to proceed to Surapur so that he might help Pid to succeed to his office by tact and diplomacy, to give first-hand, on-the-spot reports on relative strength of the parties. He expressed his anxiety that Surapur could not be regarded as a lost case, if for nothing else at least to honour British treaty obligations towards Hyderabad in respect of Surapur. He even idly asked Gresley again to confirm whether Pid was the fittest person to be divan, himself underlining the futility of such a query by pointing out that the divan having been accepted by the minor Raja and the queen-mother nothing could be done about it any more!

However anxious the Resident might have been to extend armed support to Pid Naik he felt that this could be only in general line with British policy towards other Indian States over which he certainly had no control, nor was it easy to suggest isolated intervention in Surapur alone. He indulged in an astonishing degree of equivocation to persuade the Government though, by writing, "Extreme measures are not always those which are decided by the wisest and best policy though I am not prepared to say that it would be otherwise in the present instance". The Government of India must have somehow managed to make some sense out of this astounding ambiguity. At last,
on 15th November 1842 they permitted the Resident to support Pid Naik against any opposition by the Rani or others. There was silence as to employment of troops or any overtly coercive measure.

So far as Gresley was concerned these instructions came too late. The temporizing policy temporarily adopted by the Resident and recommended to Gresley while awaiting these orders had left him extremely dissatisfied. Even earlier he had refused to go to Surapur personally for supporting Pid unaccompanied by troops. He pleaded for at least a small detachment which he felt would be sufficient but which it was not within the Resident's power yet to sanction openly. Without such a detachment Gresley felt quite powerless in his mission. He clearly wrote that his mere advice to the ruling party at Surapur was futile as by now his personal influence was destroyed. Without troops his presence at Surapur would "merely exhibit a spectacle of a British officer, endeavouring as an unsuccessful partisan, to bring about a measure which he has not the authority to enforce and professing to support a party, while he has not power to do so". He could not put up with such a humiliating situation. He acknowledged failure, submitted formal resignation from his current mission and requested for return to Mominabad where he had served formerly in a purely military capacity. Gresley had sought transfer even earlier on grounds of ill-health, though his mission was far from nearing an end, successful or otherwise. The Resident had not been thinking of another officer in his place and he was awaiting the Government of India's final instructions about the extent of British intervention. Now that he received them he accepted Gresley's resignation and appointed Capt. Meadows Taylor in his place.
Capt. Taylor states that the Rani defied all arrangements made by Gresley which is not borne out by the official correspondence. As we have seen before, the cession of Devadurg and other taluqs had already taken place. The Hyderabad Government appointed Budun Khan to take charge of them. Gresley himself assembled the yatandars, etc. in the ceded taluqs and explained to them that their hereditary rights, etc. will not be infringed by their new rulers. Since Budun Khan wanted to bargain for the amount of annual revenues to be paid to Hyderabad Government by him he consequently presented a below average statement about it to the Minister and the Minister felt that further cessions would be necessary to have the full revenue. Gresley refuted the Minister by actual enquiry. In any case the question of the Rani defying the cession never arose. As for Andola-Milogi the question continued to hang fire. But this too had nothing to do with the Rani's defiance. At one stage, Gresley suggested that they be handed over to Hyderabad. Fid Naik, though unable to establish his authority, yet begged that at least Andola be retained with Surapur. But influenced by Lakshmanpuri Gosain, Gresley recommended that Milogi should be handed over to the Gosain for his dues. The Resident turned down his suggestion and directed him to inform Fid that he would be held responsible as diwan for both the taluqs. These could be ceded to the Mism only in case of failure of payment. The revenues collect-ed by officials were to be held in deposit till the actual restoration which would take place only when Fid furnished necessary security for payment. The question was of the kind of security Fid Naik could or should give. The Minister repeatedly asked for security of Sidappa sahukar of Bagaléot,
but the Resident turned down the suggestion in the strongest possible terms. He was against any influence of bankers in Hyderabad administration itself and to provide opportunity for it through a banker residing in the Company's territory was most repugnant to him. Thus, the question continued till Pid was firmly established in office i.e. after Gresley's resignation, but the Rani had no hand in it. As for payment of 5 lakhs arrears on which the Minister had been harping throughout Gresley was not convinced of his calculation, just as Taylor was not at a later period, though the Resident was. As directed by the Resident, he, however, asked the Rani to pay it, she expressed her inability, and as it turned out later, justly so as the Government of India itself considered these arrears as unfair.

What the Rani objected to was the imposition of Pid Naik as diwan since she considered him incompetent, an opinion shared alike by Gresley, his successor Taylor and the Resident. Even here she continued to inform through the minor Raja that Pid had been appointed. But she did not transfer real authority to him, for which Pid himself was partly responsible as he could not assert himself. It now became the task of Capt. Meadows Taylor to settle him in office with the avowed object of securing the Nizam's peshkash arrears.

Notes and References:

1. FPC, 13 Dec. 1841, No. 42.
2. Ibid., No. 43. The reference is to disturbances created by Kohran, an Arab jamadar, but these were not in Surapur jamathan.
3. FPC, 20 Apr. 1842, Nos. 61-2.
7. FPC, 30 Mar.1842, Nos. 43-5; HRC, Vol.551, Oresley's letters to Malcolm and Fraser, 26 Jan; 2,8,14,17,18, Feb.; 1 Mar., 1842.
8. Oresley reported that Gurmukhrama gave him up to Tomynes (Oresley to Fraser, 14 Feb.1842), whereas the latter reported that a taluqdar handed him over. (Tomynes to Mily Secy, 14 Feb.1842), FPC, 30 Mar.1842, No.44.
9. According to Taylor's later report this was not an actual loan but a promise to pay in consideration of Balaprasad's influence and services when the Raja's succession was yet to be confirmed. FPC, 23 Jan.1852, No. 165, para.13.
10. References to his earlier intrigues, Raynsford to Mily Secy, 26 Oct.1832, FPC, 20 Nov.1832, No.71; FPC, 21 Dec.1840, Nos. 47 and 52.
11. HRC, Vol.551, Oresley to Fraser, 5 and 7 Mar.1842.
12. Ibid., 7 Mar. 1842.
13. FPC, 8 June 1842, No. 173.
15. FPC, 8 June 1842, No. 176.
17. HRC, Vol.551, Ltrs to Fraser, 23 Mar. 1842.
18. FPC, 8 June 1842, Nos. 167-8. Copies of the report available in these and in HRC, Vol.551, are defective inasmuch as para 74 and appendix No.8 are missing in both.
19. Oresley is not justified in including the whole amount in State revenues as the Raja could claim only one third of it as Charamatti.
20. Oresley mistakenly refers to him as Sankeshwar Swami of Poona. The Swami might have been temporarily residing at Poona. Sankeshwar, famous only for its math, is a small town in Belgaua District.
21. Oresley was not quite well-informed on this point. See Note No.7 in Chapter I.
22. FPC, 8 June 1842, No. 171.
23. Ibid., No. 166.
27. FPC, 8 June 1842, No. 171.
29. FPC, 3 Aug. 1842, No. 346.
30. Ibid., No. 344. The Minister's consent was obtained on 1st June 1842 whereas instructions to Gresley were issued on 25 May 1842.
31. Ibid., No. 348.
32. Ibid., No. 343.
34. Ibid., Gresley to Fraser, 6 July 1842.
35. FPC, 17 Aug. 1842, No. 164 and HRC, Vol.551, Gresley to Fraser, 18 July 1842.
36. FPC, 17 Aug. 1842, Nos. 158-63.
37. FPC, 31 Aug. 1842, No. 141.
38. FPC, 14 Sep. 1842, No. 39.
40. FPC, 14 Sep. 1842, Nos. 36 & 39.
42. Ibid., Gresley to Fraser, 10 Aug. 1842.
43. Pid Naik to Gresley, FPC, 19 Oct. 1842, No. 133.
44. It was reported that after Raja Krishtappa's death Pid Naik himself went to the Rani, resigned all claims on the part of his son and tore up succession documents receiving in return the promise that his jagirs would not be resumed. Capt.I. Campbell to Resident, 11 Jan. 1853, para.5, FPC, 22 June 1855, No. 78.
46. Fraser to Gresley, 19 Aug. 1842; FPC, 12 Oct. 1842, No. 72.
47. FPC, 14 Sept. 1842, Nos. 44 and 46.
49. Additionally he was addicted to opium and had got involved with Arabs on that account. Maj. Hampton's report on Surapur, pt. III, FPC, 22 June 1855, No. 78.
51. Ibid., Gresley to Fraser, 9 Sep. 1842.

52. FPC, 26 Oct. 1842, No. 49 Resident-Minister exchange of notes, 13 Sep. 1842.

53. Ibid., No. 46.

54. Ibid., No. 49.

55. Ibid., No. 51.

56. FPC, 19 Oct. 1842, Nos. 130 & 132.


58. Translation in FPC, 26 Oct. 1842, No. 49.

59. Refers to property secured by Gresley from the Arabs at Marched.

60. FPC, 26 Oct. 1842, No. 49.

61. FPC, 14 Sep. 1842, No. 49.

62. FPC, 2 Nov. 1842, No. 178.

63. Capt. Meadows Taylor laid these bare in a detailed letter to the Resident on Lakshmanig's doings. FPC, 23 May 1842, No. 116.

64. Resident to Pd Naik, 14 Sep. 1842, FPC, 26 Oct. 1842, No. 49.

65. FPC, 30 Nov. 1842, No. 196.

66. FPC, 26 Oct. 1842, No. 50.

67. FPC, 2 Nov. 1842, No. 181.

68. FPC, 30 Nov. 1842, No. 197.

69. Ibid., No. 199.


71. Ibid., 13 Oct. 1842.

72. FPC, 14 Sept. 1842, No. 41. This also dismisses Taylor's statement in the Story (p. 143) that "General Fraser, however, did not consider an exhibition of force necessary".

73. FPC, 30 Nov. 1842, No. 200. According to it Raja Krishtappa's armed strength had been: 100 Rohillas; 50 Muggals; 150 linevallas; 200 bodyguard Bedars; 200 Telinga matchlockmen in Wandurg garrison; 150 cavalry; a few speelans. He could also rely upon 8-12 thousand Bedars and hundreds of mercenary/Arabs. Surapur proper had natural strength. Wandurg was a strong fort. Honhalli, Ijeri, Kata rah and 3 other villages had strong ghurias. Most Surapur villages had towers and houses constructed with a view to stiff defense.

74. Ibid., No. 196.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., No. 201.

77. FPC, 14 Dec. 1842, No. 121.

78. FPC, 30 Nov. 1842, No. 217.
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<th>No.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>78.</td>
<td>FPC, 30 Nov. 1842, No. 217.</td>
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<td>79.</td>
<td>FPC, 21 Dec. 1842, No. 80.</td>
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<td>80.</td>
<td>Gresley to Fraser, 17 Nov. 1842, HRC, Vol. 551.</td>
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<td>81.</td>
<td>FPC, 18 Jan. 1843, No. 51 and Gresley to Fraser, 27 Nov. 1842, HRC, Vol. 552.</td>
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<td>82.</td>
<td>Ibid., Nos. 50-1.</td>
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<td>83.</td>
<td>Story, p. 143.</td>
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<td>84.</td>
<td>Gresley to Fraser, 14 Aug. 1842, HRC, Vol. 551.</td>
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<td>85.</td>
<td>Minister to Resident, 13 Sep. 1842, FPC, 26 Oct. 1842, No. 49.</td>
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<td>88.</td>
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<td>89.</td>
<td>FPC, 21 Dec. 1842, No. 74.</td>
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<td>90.</td>
<td>Ibid., No. 75.</td>
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<td>91.</td>
<td>Gresley to Fraser, 7 Nov. 1842, HRC, Vol. 551.</td>
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<td>92.</td>
<td>FPC, 14 Sept. 1842, No. 36; FPC, 21 Dec. 1842, No. 78.</td>
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<td>93.</td>
<td>FPC, 21 Dec. 1842, No. 77; FPC, 14 Sept. 1842, Nos. 36 and 39; FPC, 19 Oct. 1842, No. 133.</td>
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<td>95.</td>
<td>FPC, 21 Dec. 1842, No. 31.</td>
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