CHAPTER I
THE BEGINNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH RELATIONS WITH SURPUR

A - BEGINNINGS OF BRITISH CONNECTION

The beginning of British connection with the principality of Surapur whose history has been briefly sketched before, is to be traced to the 17th article of the treaty concluded between the East India Company and the Hyderabad State in 1800. The relevant sentence in the article relating to Surapur reads as follows: "It is therefore hereby agreed that if in future the Shoraper or Gudwal Zemindars, or any other subjects or Dependencies of His Highness's Government should withhold payment of the Circar's just claims upon them or excite rebellion or disturbance the Subsidiary Force, or such proportion thereof as may be requisite (after the reality of the offence shall have been duly ascertained) shall be ready in concert with His Highness's own troops to reduce all such offenders to obedience".

Although in accordance with this article the East India Company undertook to supply armed aid to the Nizam against Surapur whenever necessary, the beginning of this relationship was quite accidental and to reverse a well-known phrase the stage was not in the least set for it. By the Anglo-Nizam treaty of 1798 Lord Wellesley had already brought Hyderabad under his system of subsidiary alliance. In 1800 he felt the need for another treaty of defensive alliance with the Nizam mainly with a view to checking the growing power of Moulstrae Sinda. But on either occasion he expressed no anxiety to extend military aid to the Nizam against his rebellious feudatories. In fact, while issuing instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad in 1798 he had clearly stated, "In framing the new
subsidiary engagements with the Nizam you will endeavour to restrict the employment of the British troops within His Highness's Dominion, to those important cases in which his person or authority shall be really endangered, and that you will provide effectually against the use of the British force in those disgraceful services against petty renters and zamindars, which more properly belong to Secundy Corps; this is an essential point. Wellesley could not have attached any more importance to the Surapur Raja in 1800, who was described in the article as a 'Zaminder'. Moreover he was fully aware that Surapur was not only a feudatory of the Nizam but also equally a feudatory of the Peshwa. Were he keen to assist the Nizam against Surapur there was reason enough in the reports that Surapur Raja had been assisting Dondya Wagh, a freebooter who was creating disturbances in the Company's territories. But Wellesley paid no attention to these reports.

How then did the British come to undertake a treaty obligation to aid Hyderabad against Surapur? It was at the insistence of the Hyderabad Government. In 1798 relations between Hyderabad and Surapur were friendly, so much so that the district of Devadurg in the Nizam's dominions had been farmed out to Surapur Raja for Rs. 10,000. But in the two subsequent years these relations deteriorated as a result of the Raja's non-payment to the Nizam of Hyderabad's dues on account of Devadurg. The Hyderabad Minister, Azimul-Umara, was therefore keen to take advantage of this fresh treaty and alliance with the East India Company to secure British military aid against Surapur for realization of these and other tributary dues in arrears. In fact before negotiations for the treaty (of 1800) were set afoot the Hyderabad Government had already assembled a force more to subdue the Raja with threats than to
chastize him actually. The Poona Government was also informed
of the proposed expedition and that Government had conveyed its
claim to half the territory in lieu of long-standing chauth dues
to it by Surapur in case the principality was annexed by the
Nizam. Resident Kirkpatrick, although aware that the intended
expedition was a mere show of force, had firmly asserted that the
subsidiary forces could be employed for the purpose only with the
Governor General's consent and that Poona Government's
acquiescence should be conveyed in proper form to Col. Palmer,
Resident at Poona, and not to the Nizam directly. However, in
the treaty negotiated by Kirkpatrick he agreed in a separate
article to help the Nizam against his refractory dependents
after duly ascertaining the reality of the offence. The treaty
as concluded by him contained only 14 articles and even in the
3 separate articles which the Hyderabad Government regarded as
the sine qua non of the treaty, Surapur was not specifically
mentioned. In fact during the negotiations Kirkpatrick secured
the Nizam's order to Surapur Raja to help in operations against
Dhondya Wagh. Azimul Umara, however, persisted during the
negotiations in including a clause specifying measures against
Surapur. But Kirkpatrick, while promising assistance in a general
way, refused to put down in so many words specific military
measures. The dissatisfied Minister, even after the conclusion
of the treaty wrote an express letter to Lord Wellesley convey­
ing the Nizam's intention to annex the principality and seeking
British assistance for the purpose.

As the treaty was to be still ratified by the Governor
General he succumbed to Hyderabad's pressure as a point of
bargain. In his observations to the Resident on the treaty as
finalized by the latter, Wellesley expressed his dissatisfaction
at the manner of conducting negotiations in which the Resident
had failed to derive maximum advantage for the Company in return for assistance against the Nizam's rebellious zamindars. He was, however, pleased that the British were to investigate and determine the merits of disputes arising between Hyderabad and its tributaries. It is he who drafted the article concerned in its final form and embodied it in the text of the treaty as its 17th article instead of keeping it separately. He informed Azimul-Ulumara that the article "provided for the objects in his Excellency's contemplation to as great an extent as is consistent either with the honor of the British Government or the justice of the Nizam".

Thus began the British connection with the principality of Surapur. By offering military aid to the Nizam against a tributary of whom he knew nothing whatever, Lord Wellesley did grave injustice to Surapur which had nothing to do with the British so far, which had done no harm to the East India Company nor had the small samsthan ever come or had any possibility of coming into clash of interests with the growing power of the Company. True, there was no real intention on the part of the British to offer assistance nor could it be accorded without investigating the justice of the Nizam's claims. But the Nizam did not need much military aid against the small samsthan. He could use the mere threat of British bayonets to subdue the samsthan and mulct it whenever he found an opportunity. He could now enlarge and complicate his claims upon the Raja to such an extent that the British Residents could no longer investigate their justness with ease, and left the Nizam with freedom to deal as he chose with his hitherto independent tributary. By this article British relations with Surapur turned in the main into a long tale of injustice perpetrated by a bigger power upon a smaller
State through the connivance and instrumentality of the British, even though they had no such intention. Surapur was used as a pawn in Wellesley's game of power politics and suffered from its consequences. The history of small States which unwittingly, without their knowledge and consent, become involved in the power game of bigger States with disastrous consequences was once again repeated in the case of Surapur.

Curiously enough, Nani Gopal Chowdhry remarks that the 17th article in the Anglo-Nizam treaty of 1800 curtailed the autonomy of Hyderabad. In theory it was so, as the British were to offer assistance against the Nizam's tributaries only after examining the dispute. But in practice the Nizam was no longer powerful enough to punish them independently, as before. Hyderabad had already been reduced to a British protectorate, which the Nizam lacked in dealing with his tributaries was now supplied by the British and he could use as well as abuse that power. The British, none too keen on offering aid to him, conveniently ignored looking into the justice of his claims. And this in actual practice proved an advantage to the Nizam.

Wellesley thus bartered away the semi-independence of a small principality to gain political advantage for the East India Company. By ignoring Surapur's tributary relationship with the Peshwa, of which he was fully aware, he showed temporary political wisdom, thus cutting off the Marathas from the principality. But he thereby helped Hyderabad to gradually assert its own exclusive relationship with Surapur, which in the long run was not beneficial to the Company itself. And finally by describing Surapur Raja as a mere 'zamindar' in the article, he reduced the status of the Raja for which there was no justification in its previous history.
Raja Venkatappa II and the British (1801-02)

As soon as the Treaty of 1800 was concluded, Minister Azimul-Umar took the earliest opportunity of suggesting action against Surapur. Two battalions of the Subsidiary Force were about to leave for restoring order in the Edguntla region; these could be simultaneously employed for this purpose. But the Resident, Kirkpatrick, was in no hurry. He was not prepared to act upon mere hints; he needed documentary proof of the Raja's failure to pay. Meanwhile, the Minister was further enraged over a report that two Pathan subjects of the Nizam had been robbed and drowned by the Raja. He urged that the Subsidiary Force should join Hyderabad's own troops for an expedition against Surapur after monsoon. On the Resident's stock demand for written evidence were produced copies of the Raja's adhara for Devadurg district and the fort at Sagar and the agreement by Surapur vakil regarding payment of tribute. Even then the Resident stalled action by insisting that the Raja should be given a chance to explain his conduct and to pay up. Time had to be gained as part of the Subsidiary Forces were then busy against some southern palakara. A letter to that effect was, therefore, despatched to Surapur, additionally asking the Raja to deliver the fort of Sagar, but simultaneously orders were issued for assembling the expedition. Sikander Jah, the Nizam's eldest son, was to lead it and two battalions of the Subsidiary Force were to join it.

The Resident, however, still hoped that the mere threat of action would bring the Raja to reason and at his instance another letter was sent similar to the earlier one but informing him of the intended forces. Kirkpatrick sent his own messengers along with the letter to urge the Raja to accommodate. After
some delay the expeditionary force left with Lt. Col. Kenny as in charge of the Subsidiary Force, but he was instructed not to storm the fort of Sagar without Sikandar Jah's written authority. The Minister was also anxious to avert such an attack to prevent the Company's troops from claiming a share in whatever treasure might be found in the fort. In fact the Subsidiary Forces were directed to stay put as far as possible. They were only to demand from the Raja the cost of the expedition and a written engagement agreeing to pay tribute punctually in future, surrender fugitives if any and protect travellers passing through his domain.

While the expedition was on its way to Sagar, a vakil from Surapur met the Resident at Hyderabad but merely conveyed the Raja's inability to pay; he was not entrusted with powers to execute any agreement. However, by then the Nizam's letter, the Resident's verbal message and news of the departure of the expeditionary force had reached the Raja and he hastened to send his near relation Yenkappa as vakil entrusted with full powers. Yenkappa arrived at Hyderabad on 2nd May 1802, met the Minister as well as the Resident and the result was an agreement to be ratified by the Raja. He was to clear off by instalments the annual tribute of Rs. 1,45,000 and Nizam's annual share amounting to Rs. 37,500 on account of Devadurg revenues, both not paid for the past four years. From this amount were deducted uncollected zamin of Surapur upon nakhsh estates. A Hyderabad mutasaddil was to be stationed in Devadurg for receiving revenues from that district. The cost of the expedition fixed at Rs. 4 lakhs was to be paid up in two instalments. The Raja was to submit in 15 months' time his title to the territories under him. The rest of the items were the same as conveyed to Lt. Col. Kenny. Finally the Raja was to give up the Sagar fort.
The expedition which thus started with a loud bang ended in a mere whimper. The ratified agreement was received in Lt. Col. Kenny's camp on the northern bank of the Bhima. It now only remained for the force to take possession of the Sagar fort which was quietly delivered to Sikandar Jah, accompanied by Lt. Winfield of the Subsidiary Force, in the first week of June 1802. The combined forces returned to Hyderabad in July 1802.

In this first ever employment of the Subsidiary Forces in accordance with article 17 of the Treaty (of 1800) one can clearly notice the Resident's anxiety to limit its use. Surapur was yet terra incognita to the British and the Governor-General had been silent on the nature of assistance to be given to the Hyderabad Government in respect of Surapur. The British did not wish to enter into any armed clash with the Surapur forces and hence the Resident was keen to bring about an amicable settlement among the contending parties. He acted as a mediator and succeeded as the old and infirm Raja could not have offered any resistance. The Nizam's Government was equally anxious that the Resident should only provide troops but not intervene directly. In fact the Resident had to threaten the Minister that if the Surapur vakil was not allowed to meet him (the Resident) the march of the Subsidiary Force would be halted. One would expect the Resident to be enthusiastic in chastizing the Raja who had helped the rebel Dhondya Wagh, but he seems to have taken his cue from the silence of the Governor General on this point. The British Resident's increasing importance at the Hyderabad Court also may be noted by the fact that the Minister could discuss Hyderabad's requisition for troops only at the Resident's convenience.
Death of Venkatappa II and Installation of Pid Naik III

Shortly after the surrender of Sagar fort the aged Raja Venkatappa II died, news of which was received at Hyderabad on 20th July 1802. Apprehending disturbances, the Hyderabad Minister proposed to depute Raja Raghottamrao with a cavalry detachment to Surapur but that Raja having declined the mission only a letter of condolence and mourning clothes were sent for the sole heir, the late Raja’s minor daughter Venkat Rangamma, and Timmappa was confirmed in his post of diwan. The Hyderabad Government now began to look forward to a sizable amount as narmada, the usual condition for confirming the accession. But neither diwan Timmappa nor any one of the numerous widowed raniis proved to be suitable as regent. Timmappa was reported to be fomenting quarrels among the raniis and some of the vellimala in the principality also appeared to be refractory under such unsettled conditions. The late Raja’s relation Yenkappa also joined the fray and tried to secure the gadi for himself but the diwan and some of the raniis combined to oust him. Troops were reported to have collected with a view to defying the agreement executed by the late Raja with Hyderabad. The eldest rani tried to secure the Resident’s support by presenting him with dogs and hawks. But the Resident refused to be involved in any way; he only advised the Hyderabad Minister to keep troops ready for employment near Sagar. The Minister acted upon the suggestion and sought the presence of Subsidiary Forces as well whenever required. Meanwhile the ruling party in Surapur attacked the Hyderabad forces near Sagar but were repulsed. Thereafter Raja Mahipatram was despatched to restore order. He managed to capture several ring-leaders of the attacking party. But in the whole affair the
Resident remained so neutral as to observe that Surapur's fate was uncertain and that perhaps it might be annexed by the Nizam. It is not understood why the Hyderabad Government did not then choose to add the principality to its dominions. Perhaps it might have been afraid of resistance from the local populace among whom the military clan of Bedars was predominant. Even if annexed, it would have had to appoint a revenue collector instead of which it was less troublesome to extract a tribute from someone willing to pay it. It is not known how the minor daughter's claim to the gadi was altogether set aside and as successor how the choice fell upon one Pid Naik, a cousin of the late Raja living in a distant place like Pandi. Anyway he succeeded to the santhan by agreeing to pay a huge amount of narmada in coins and jewels. He also bound himself to abide by the agreement executed by his predecessor. But during the first years of his regime he was unable to pay the annual tribute on account of various calamities. Gratified with the jewels, the Hyderabad Government also made no special efforts to realize it. British relations with Pid Naik III were also confined in the beginning to only demand of fugitives like Diwakar Nair who were suspected of concealing themselves in the Surapur region. But Pid Naik could render no help as such rebels immediately sought asylum in the neighbouring regions of the Peshwa.

Raja Pid Naik III and the British (1807-8)

But very soon the British appeared on the Surapur scene indirectly owing to the interference by Raja Mahipatram, former civil administrator of Berar, into Surapur affairs.

When Raja Mahipatram was dismissed from his Berar post and banished to Sagar on the border of Surapur and the Nizam's dominions, two military officers of Berar, Muhammad Riza Khan
Sindhi and Nabi Yar Jang attached themselves with their troops to Mahipatram and were consequently dismissed by the Hyderabad Government. Mahipatram, however, found it difficult to maintain these troops and was looking for some means for their subsistence. It occurred to him that he could make use of the principality of Surapur for this purpose. Surapur lay within easy distance from Sagar the fort of which had been delivered to the Nizam just 5 years back. Besides, during the disturbances that were created sometime after that Raja’s death Mahipatram had succeeded ‘more by intrigue than force’ in dispersing the Surapur forces bent upon defying the Hyderabad Government and had captured the main leaders.

Thus he was well-acquainted with the principality and saw in it a happy hunting ground to establish his influence and to maintain his small army. Therefore, he at first proposed to Diwan Timmappa of Surapur that the Diwan should employ at least 200 cavalrymen under the Qiladar of Shaapur. Timmappa turned down the proposal. Timmappa also refused Mahipatram’s offer of standing as surety for the Surapur tribute to Hyderabad, and thus incurred his enmity. Mahipatram thereupon made common cause with Yenkappa Naik (Sellapar) who was inimical to Timmappa. Thwarted by Timmappa in his attempt to secure the gadi of Surapur for himself, Yenkappa had fled to Sagar, collected a band of adventurers and was living by making raids upon Surapur and its neighbouring regions. Mahipatram had not forgotten Yenkappa’s previous offer to him of Rs. 10 lakhs for securing the gadi of Surapur. The gadi was now occupied but it was possible to secure the Diwani. Mahipatram now offered it to Yenkappa (in the place of Timmappa) if he agreed to take some of Mahipatram’s troops into his service. Yenkappa eagerly accepted this proposal. It was agreed that Riza Khan Sindhi’s troops should be engaged by
Yenkappa for which Mahipatram would secretly pay in the beginning. As soon as Yenkappa felt sufficiently strong, he attacked Surapur, but Timmappa repulsed him successfully. Thereupon Riza Khan Sindhi with his remaining troops and Nabi Yar Jang joined Yenkappa who, thus reinforced, succeeded in his second attack. Timmappa escaped with his eldest son, took refuge first in the Peshwa's territory and later arrived at Hyderabad to seek support.

Meanwhile Raja Pid Naik III welcomed Yenkappa presumably because he was his relation. He did not hesitate to appoint Yenkappa as a Dawan jointly with Murugappa, another influential man of Surapur. Pid Naik even agreed to have guards placed over Timmappa's house where he had left his family. Pid Naik's quiet acceptance of Yenkappa's authority as Dawan seems due to the fact that he had suspected Timmappa of having embezzled some money from the state treasury. Riza Khan Sindhi and Nabi Yar Jang were also taken along with their troops into Surapur service and thus Raja Mahipatram succeeded in establishing his influence over Surapur. This change in Surapur was brought about in just a fortnight's period in June 1807. Raja Mahipatram also undertook to be security for the payment of Surapur tribute.

When the British Resident Cudeman discussed this change in Surapur administration with the Hyderabad Durbar he found that the Nizam had instructed the Minister Mir Alam to ignore it. Fully aware of Mahipatram's anti-British attitude the Resident would have liked the Hyderabad Government to take some action to curb Mahipatram's growing influence at Surapur. The only ground on which it could be done was the tribute due to Hyderabad from Surapur. Mir Alam, therefore, proposed to despatch troops to secure it, but the Nizam had granted inasvatana to Mahipatram.
despite Mir Alam’s remonstrances, agreeing to Mahipatram as a guarantor for the tribute. Mahipatram even gave some bills on Hyderabad sakhars for that purpose, so the idea of despatching troops had to be abandoned and a Hyderabad agent was ordered to go to Shahapur (where Mahipatram was residing) to settle the peshkash. The Resident had to keep quiet since it was an internal affair between the two States.

Raja Pid Naik soon came to regret Yenkappa’s Diwani; for, Yenkappa began to make exactions from the Surapur inhabitants for Mahipatram. When the Bedar population seemed rebellious Yenkappa left for Bijapur to collect Surapur’s rusums from that region. Obviously Surapur had been sufficiently fleeced. While Yenkappa was away Mahipatram and Riza Khan Sindhi accused Raja Pid Naik that he had instigated a Nizam’s official to seize some Surapur territories. The Raja, afraid for his life, fled to the hill-fort of Wandrug, but there too felt insecure. Mahipatram, perhaps no longer able to squeeze further money from Surapur, seized the Raja’s jewels and other personal property, and finally brought the Raja and his family as well as Diwan Timmappa’s family to Shahapur and kept them there under strong confinement. The Raja was also made to sign a bond that he owed money to the troops of Riza Khan Sindhi on which pretext Mahipatram held the Raja’s son as a hostage.

The Raja, however, managed to send piteous appeals to Minister Mir Alam and Resident Sydenham for the restoration of his authority over Surapur which was now being ruled over by Riza Khan Sindhi and indirectly by Raja Mahipatram. On 22nd December 1807 Diwan Timmappa presented these petitions to the Minister and the Resident and sought assistance of troops from Hyderabad. Timmappa represented that there was no possibility of Hyderabad’s receiving the tribute in the Raja’s present
condition. Yen kappa had already openly admitted his inability to pay as no revenues could be raised any further from Surapur. The Resident got Timmappa's narrative of Surapur affairs written down but could only assure that if called upon he would suitably advise the Hyderabad Government, though in reality he was anxious to check the conduct of Mahipatram.

Neither Mir Alam's nor Sydenham's representations on behalf of the Raja and the Diwan would have had any effect on the Nizam, since Mahipatram was his friend and confidant. But the Nizam was compelled to move, as by then news had been received that Nabi Yar Jang and Riza Khan Sindhi had raided Dalan estates of the Nizam in Gulbarga district. Though reluctantly the Nizam had to agree to punish these former dismissed officials for such depredations. It was, therefore, decided by the Hyderabad Government to send its own forces under Nizamat Jang and Maj. Gordon to Gulbarga for that purpose and as Nizamat Jang had no military experience he was to be guided by Maj. Gordon. In his discussions with the Resident the Minister informed him that troops being sent to Gulbarga would also be employed to restore Pid Naik's authority over Surapur; that Diwan Timmappa would accompany the troops and use his influence at Surapur to persuade influential persons there to abandon the cause of Yen kappa. Only thus could the tribute now amounting to Rs. 8 lakhs which would shortly become 13 lakhs in a few months' due from Surapur, could be realized. Since Riza Khan Sindhi and Nabi Yar Jang were ostensibly in Surapur service, the only way to stop their depredations on Nizam's territories was to punish them and restore Pid Naik's authority. It is significant to note that the Resident plainly told the Minister that he was not particularly concerned with the fate of Surapur as much as with the conduct of Mahipatram. The Nizam agreed that
Mahipatra should be asked to abandon Yenkappa's cause, deliver Raja Pld Naik and his family, as well as Diwan Timmappa's family, surrender the Raja's jewels and other personal property, sever his connections with Riza Khan Sindhi and Nabi Yar Jang and to undertake not to interfere in Surapur affairs. When the Nizam asked about reinforcing Nizamat Jang's detachment with troops from the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force the Resident replied that only if the Nizam's troops failed in their objective Subsidiary Forces might be drawn upon. He also did not offer the services of any European from the Residency to talk over matters with Mahipatra for fear of offending the Nizam.

Mahipatra, alarmed at the despatch of troops from Hyderabad, announced his disassociation with Yenkappa. Yenkappa and Riza Khan Sindhi returned from Gulbarga region to Surapur and proceeded to raid the Peshwa's territory to maintain their troops. Meanwhile Mahipatra played for time by requesting that the Nizam's troops be halted at Narayanpet, away from Shahapur, and that William Palmer (later of the notorious Palmer & Co.) be sent for negotiations. Mahipatra offered to retire to Benares if given an allowance and during his talks with Palmer he even handed over the son of Raja Pld Naik. Later he gave up the family of Diwan Timmappa as well. By then Yenkappa and Sindhi returned to Shahapur with their troops from the Peshwa's region. Yenkappa now out of panic decided to leave Sindhi's camp but was held up for payment of arrears to troops. Mahipatra persuaded Sindhi to let Yenkappa escape; thereupon the latter surrendered himself to Maj. Gordon and was sent to Hyderabad.

But it appears that Mahipatra was only temporizing. Perhaps his nephew Sripatram instigated him to assume an imperious attitude and roused his anti-British frenzy; he also failed to persuade the desperate Sindhi to quit the Nizam's dominions. In
any case Palmer was required to leave Shahapur; the Nizam's forces marched towards it, but retreated on the mere sign of a forceful attack during which however, a number of Europeans including Maj. Gordon were killed (12 Feb. 1908). On hearing of this defeat the Resident prevailed upon the Nizam for the despatch of a detachment of Subsidiary Force under Col. Montresor against Mahipatram. Pursued by Montresor Mahipatram fled to Holkar's camp and later lost his life there having refused to leave it.

On the withdrawal and flight of Mahipatram from Shahapur, Raja Pid Naik IIInd's authority over Surapur was restored and Timmappa secured back his Diwani. This was an indirect result of British action against Mahipatram. It is seen that the British Resident's intervention was restricted to removing Raja Mahipatram's influence over Surapur administration since the latter's anti-British posture was manifest. The Resident displayed no anxiety to secure Surapur tribute to Hyderabad, nor did he feel called upon to lend the services of Hyderabad Subsidiary Forces for that purpose. Neither the Nizam nor Minister Mir Alam referred to article 17 of the Treaty of 1800 though it was obvious that without restoring Pid Naik's authority it was not possible to realize the tribute. It is doubtful if the Resident would have taken any notice of this fact had the anti-British Mahipatram not been involved in Surapur affairs. It is possible to argue that the Diwani's or Raja's petitions would have at best been passed on by the Resident to Hyderabad Government for such action as they considered necessary. At this period non-intervention in Hyderabad's relations with the Surapur seems to be the stand-point of British policy, in sharp contrast to their approach three decades later.
After the restoration of his authority Pid Naik III devoted his attention to the long neglected problem of revenues. Though he was illiterate he proved himself to be a skilful administrator. He was a man of great decision of character and took great pains to improve his country, and so endeared himself to the people that they were always ready to meet his wishes, and from their cordial cooperation he was enabled to pay off with comparative ease his large Nuzzurana and Peshkash. He was in every way a friend to the Ryot and permitted none to be ill-treated or ruined by famine or other adverse circumstances.

Another important factor that helped Pid Naik III to pay off his financial obligations to Hyderabad was the quiet on the Peshwa's front in this respect. He was no longer bothered about the tribute to be paid to the Peshwa. During his regime Surapur's tributary relationship with the Peshwa gradually lapsed and ceased altogether owing to the British alliances with Hyderabad and the Peshwa. Though Bajirao II was installed as the Peshwa in December 1796, the domestic turmoil at Poona that followed his installation, the plots and counter-plots of those opposed to him, the troubles he had with Daulatrao Sindsia and the invasion of Yashwantrao Holkar left him no time to pay any attention to his tributaries. Even after his re-entry into Poona in May 1803 with the help of British bayonets, he had to deal with the revolts of the sulky, southern jagirdars. Fishing in troubled waters Surapur not only ceased to pay either the Nizam or the Peshwa but even tried to extract more than its vassal dues from the latter's domains. With the installation of Pid Naik III the Hyderabad Government was able to settle its claims, but the Peshwa was himself too insecure to think of his claims on tributaries. Only by 1806 did he attain some measure of tranquillity and comparative peace not known for years. Thereafter in the beginning of 1806
he made over his claim on the mokasa of Sagar in Surapur samsthan to Shidojirao Nipanikar (a southern jagirdar popularly known as Appa Desai) who went to Surapur with an army to realize it. When Hyderabad protested against Nipanikar to Barry Close, Resident at Poona, he replied that "The Poligar of Surapur, like the Peshwa's other tributaries, will discharge no tribute unless compelled to do so by force". But meanwhile the Supreme Government sent orders that mutual claims between the Nizam and the Peshwa be submitted to it for arbitration in accordance with the 13th article of the Treaty of Bassein which Bajirao had concluded with the British. The Poona Government committed the blunder of including Surapur tribute in its claims though it had nothing to do with the Nizam directly. On 10th May 1806 Barry Close forwarded these claims to Calcutta Government which sat over it till the end of 1815 and thereafter felt no need to consider them in view of its own deteriorating relations with Bajirao which led to his eventual deposition and the end of the Peshwaship itself in 1818.

In the meanwhile Bajirao continued to complain against Surapur and in 1807-8 even despatched Bapu Gokhale with troops to realize tribute from the samsthan. But Gokhale's advance was halted by the Hyderabad Resident's plea that Surapur was in difficulties on account of Mahipatram. Thereafter the Raja was expected to send a vakil to Poona as in the past to negotiate the amount but no such step was taken. Instead a non-committal despatch was received from the Calcutta Government emphasizing the inferior status of the Peshwa in respect of Surapur vis-a-vis the Nizam, and challenging the Peshwa's right to send troops to enforce his demands. However, it was admitted that "the Peishwa is entitled to some security for the discharge of the acknowledged tribute, and if he is withheld from enforcing it by his troops, it
must be guaranteed to him by the Nizam". When pressed through Hyderabad, Pid Naik III did at last, send a vakil to Poona who protracted the negotiations till the matter was forgotten. At intervals the Peshwa renewed his threats and the Raja his negotiations, but no payment was ever made. Nor could the Peshwa pursue it with the British since the whole subject continued to be under their consideration for years together, and he could not afford to lose his patience. All in all, the British indirectly and almost unconsciously helped Pid Naik in non-payment to the Peshwa who was fettered by the 13th article of his treaty (of Bassein) with the British. In the end Bajirao lost and the Nizam gained in this bureaucratic game and Pid Naik managed to pay only one of his two suzerains. Meanwhile he continued to collect his traditional rusuma in the Peshwa's territories thereby adding to his revenues.

Despite the favourable lapse of tribute to the Peshwa, continued collection of rusuma in the latter's districts and his own kindly but wise management of the revenues Pid Naik III must have found the huge amount of more than 34 lakhs to be paid to the Nizam albeit in instalments, too heavy for the modest resources of the principality. Moreover the samathan suffered from a short-lived but severe famine in 1813. In a report on Hyderabad prepared at the instance of Lord Moira on 30th March 1816 Henry Russell states that the revenues had dwindled from 8 lakhs to 6 lakhs. Pid Naik could maintain only a small army of 2000 on regular pay, most of the ghurias (fortified towns) were out of repair and besides Surapur there were only three other strong forts viz. Wakingera, Wandruag and Guikotah.
Raja Venkatappa III and the British (1821-23)

On the death of Pid Naik III his son Venkatappa III succeeded to the samsthan in 1818 A.D. He had to pay a nazrana of Rs. 6 lakhs to the Nizam for confirmation of his accession. It can be easily seen that the nazrana was a purely arbitrary amount his father having agreed to Rs. 15 lakhs. If the amount was much less this time it cannot be ascribed to the generosity of the Hyderabad Government. It took full advantage of the troubled condition of Surapur at the accession of Pid Naik III, to exact a huge amount; it had no particular pretext on this occasion. Nor can the Nizam be considered to have been lenient on account of the severe famine which afflicted the principality. Crops were damaged by heavy rains and price of jawar which usually sold at 70 seers per rupee rose to 3 seers per rupee. But this happened in 1819. However, the principality quickly recovered in the following favourable seasons. And the Raja appears to have managed to pay not only the nazrana but also the annual tribute punctually as the Nizam made no call upon the British for assistance in its realization. The Raja was, perhaps, enabled to do so by his unremitting efforts to collect the traditional ruuna due to him in the Nizam's regions employing force whenever necessary. The Company's military officers in Hyderabad State complained against the violence that attended such collection but Minister Chandulal paid no attention, presumably because he was aware that the Raja had a right to these ruunas; moreover he was satisfied with the nazrana and tribute.

It was during the regime of Raja Venkatappa III that the territories of the Peshwa were conquered by the British (in 1818).
This was the occasion for the British Government to assert its sovereignty over Surapur by demanding the Peshwa's tribute as his successor. True, Surapur had ceased to pay anything to Peshwa Bajirao II; and also it had an equal traditional right accepted by the previous Peshwas of collecting ruzums as well in some of his southern regions adjoining Surapur (Bijapur and Sholapur districts). But the amounts mutually due to each other could have been settled by investigation. In fact Neelkanth Rao, naqlatdar of Bijapur held the amounts due to Surapur for Faali 1229-33 (the beginning of British rule over the Peshwa's territories) in deposit submitting the question to William Chaplin, Commissioner for the Deccan. A vakil from Surapur Raja had met the Commissioner in December 1820 and returned to Surapur for relevant papers. The vakil had expressed his anxiety to settle the question without interference by the Nizam. The Commissioner however, formally requested Resident Metcalfe at Hyderabad to arrange the despatch of the vakil from the Surapur Raja to assist in the investigation of mutual claims. But the Resident only informed that the Hyderabad Minister was opposed to the despatch of such a vakil and desired the accounts to be settled between the Resident and the Commissioner among themselves. Chaplin's repeated efforts to get the assistance from Surapur vakil supplying such information about them as was available to him to the Resident to investigate the accounts bore no fruit due to Hyderabad's persistent opposition and Resident Metcalfe's acquiescence in it. It was undoubtedly in Minister Chandulal's interest to prevent a measure by which the British could claim equal suzerainty over Surapur. What is difficult to understand is the Resident's reluctance to help his own government. The Resident's final decision was: "... the cessation of tribute to the British Government by the Shorapoer
Chief, and of Hugs and Business on the part of the British Government would, it appears to me, to be the most convenient arrangement for all parties, and the Commissioner agreed with him. It was no doubt convenient to drop examination of 20 year old unsettled accounts but thereby the Company lost the opportunity to claim equal suzerainty over Surapur and allowed the Nizam to treat Surapur as his exclusive tributary.

In 1823 the Company further strengthened the Nizam's hands against Surapur by transferring to the Nizam chauth amounting to Rs. 15,000 per annum due to the British Government from Appa Dossi Nipenikar. As we have seen before this chauth on account of mokasa Sagar due to the Peshwa from Surapur was handed over by Bajirao II to Appa Dossi for collection. As Bajirao's successor the Company should have got this amount from Surapur on behalf of Appa Dossi. For the sake of convenience they chose to realize it from the Nizam allowing him to collect it from Surapur. The British were not losers by this arrangement but it provided Hyderabad with an additional pretext to mulct the principality. Minister Chandulal took immediate advantage of the arrangement by informing Surapur Raja that he was no longer required to pay anything to the British on account of the Peshwa by treaty agreement but peremptorily demanded from him Rs. 30,000 per annum as dues from Surapur on account of the Peshwa now transferred to him. It can be safely presumed that the Raja dared not protest against this arbitrary double enhancement of the demand as British name was deceitfully used to awe the small samathan.

These transactions proved ruinous to the finances of the samathan. Its own revenues were already on the decline on account of the visitation of cholera and mismanagement by the Raja's revenue officials. The Peshwa's districts from which it used
to collect its hereditary immemorial were now under British occupation and the Raja dared not collect them any more. Even if he had attempted to do so he would have been prevented by the Resident's decisive observation. The Resident and the Commissioner believed that mutual dues between Surapur and the Company neatly balanced and therefore, mutual surrender of them did not result in loss to either. But this was decided upon without investigating the actual accounts nor does the Raja appear to have been informed of it; it was a unilateral decision on the part of the British. It is possible to argue as Capt. Meadows Taylor later did that the balance might have been in Surapur's favour. Whereas Surapur's tribute to the Peshwa was a fixed amount as per treaty its immemorial in his territories were a percentage upon the revenues which had improved under the British administration and might have resulted in a surplus for Surapur. Not only this additional source of revenue for Surapur was stopped but Minister Chandulal imposed an additional burden of Rs. 15,000 which went unnoticed by the Resident. The decline in the aanathan's income must be traced to these transactions which later on called for increasing British intervention and ultimate British management of the principality.

B - Increasing British Intervention

Raja Krishtappa and the British (1828-1841)

In the beginning of 1828 Raja Venkatappa III died leaving behind a succession dispute. His son Krishtappa was the eldest but he had promised the gadi in writing to Hanamappa, another son by a second wife. The party supporting the latter first appealed to Hyderabad Minister Chandulal who demanded Rs. 23 lakhs as nazarana and unable to pay such an exorbitant
amount they sought recognition from Resident Martin. Martin's assistant Ravenshaw was in favour of Hanamappa but meanwhile Krishtappa's party secured recognition for him by agreeing to Minister Chandulal's rapacious demand of Rs. 15 lakhs as nazrana and Rs. 2,30,600 as annual tribute both to be paid in 9 years by instalments but Rs. 4½ lakhs as cash down. While the nazrana was the same as was imposed upon his grandfather ascending the gadi in similar circumstances the tribute was exorbitantly enhanced by adding chauth, farm of Dewdury, fees to the Minister, durbar kharch and so on. The Minister assured the Resident that customary usage had been respected regarding succession and showed Rs. 4½ lakhs, the immediate cash kist from the Raja as the tribute demanded from Surapur. The Resident considered it equitable accession to the resources of the State (of Hyderabad) and did not care to make any further enquiry. He might not have considered the demand as exorbitant via-via Surapur's resources its yearly revenues being erroneously estimated at Rs. 10 lakhs by his assistant though these had dwindled to half that amount long ago. The Resident undoubtedly failed in his duty enjoined upon him by the 17th article of the Treaty of 1900 by ignoring to conduct a detailed enquiry into the Nizam's demands and claims.

Raja Krishtappa's pecuniary troubles started almost immediately after his accession. He had committed the initial blunder of agreeing to sums beyond his capacity to pay. His father had died indebted to the tune of Rs. 2 lakhs. Decline in revenues had already begun in his father's time. Had he possessed in any measure his grandfather's administrative ability he might have been able to augment them and meet the Nizam's demands with some degree of punctuality. But as testified to by various British officers who were required to meet him subsequently he
was incapable of managing his principality. Consequently he got completely into the hands of his agents who possibly had pleaded his case at Hyderabad and had agreed to exorbitant demands ultimately with a view to filling their own pockets and managing the samasthan for the Raja. His credit and resources were expended in meeting his liabilities in the very first year (1929) and in the subsequent year Minister Chandulal had to exert pressure upon him through the Resident who in turn asked the Commanding Officer at Matkal on the frontiers of Surapur samasthan to see to the payment of hit by the Raja. Henceforth this became a regular procedure. The British Commanding Officers at Matkal came to exercise the functions of some kind of political agent with the Raja. But in the main their duty came to be to dun the Raja for his dues to the Nizam and to arrange for payment through sabukara. They performed the unpleasant task of acting as the strong arm of professional moneylenders. The Nizam was the creditor, the Raja the debtor and the British the agents of the creditor helping him with their military might. The Raja of an autonomous principality was reduced to this pitiable position and the East India Company whose power was growing in all directions to this ridiculous role of a creditor's agent for a small samasthan. The rise of Motigir Gosain, an indigenous banker who started with a small capital, may be ascribed to this condition and period.

In 1931 the Raja expressed his inability to pay the hit as his revenue collection was prevented by turbulent Arab moneylenders. Some zamindars in Surapur had borrowed from them but were not in a position to return the loans. The Arabs insisted on being paid first before revenues could be collected. Capt. Raynsford, Commanding Officer at Matkal was ordered to
investigate and he managed to disperse them by arranging for their payment. But it would appear that the Arabs proved only an opportune pretext for the Raja to delay the payment of Hat. In fact his main banker Motigir had refused to advance any sums unless his earlier loans to the Raja were cleared by the latter. In 1832, therefore, the Raja’s Hat fell in arrears and Capt. Raynsford had to proceed to Surapur to arrange with Motigir Gosain who undertook to pay the Hat on behalf of the Raja only if districts equivalent to that amount were handed over to him. The arrangement was tantamount to revenue management of Surapur by a banker! The Raja was hopelessly dependent upon the Gosain and refused to have his accounts with him examined even though the balance was likely to be in his favour lest it gave offence to the banker.

It was during the course of this arrangement that Capt. Raynsford for the first time came to realize the actual break-up of the Raja’s dues amounting to Rs. 3 lakhs per annum. Till then neither he nor the Resident were even aware what these were though they were required to realize them! But owing to the policy of non-interference in the affairs of Indian States dictated by the then Governor-General Bentinck, Capt. Raynsford was prevented from conducting any detailed enquiry. It is doubtful how far he would have succeeded even if he were empowered to do so since details regarding the nazrana payments and income and expenditure receipts of the Raja were concealed from him. Raynsford’s own attitude is evident from his remark, “His [Raja’s] whole life will probably be passed in a state of pecuniary difficulty but this does not come within my province, which was to secure to the Government the payment of its dues, and which I trust the Resident will be of opinion, I have done on as favourable terms for all parties as under existing
circumstances was practicable".

Till July 1896 British assistance was not again required as the Raja managed to pay the *kiata* however irregularly. But his financial troubles were on the increase. Though he had promised to Raynsford to reduce his expenses and troops and to look into his accounts of which he was profoundly ignorant, he did not dare to reduce his troops composed of sanguinary Arabs. To meet payment to them he had to interfere with Motigir Gosain’s revenue collection. Once again the *kiata* fell into arrears and Motigir refused to oblige any more. Though Hyderabad reduced the amount of *kiat* (but not the total amount of dues) it was not of much help to the Raja under such circumstances.

In the beginning of 1837 Minister Chandulal once again sought British military aid to realize the *kiata*. But this time he proposed sequestration of part of Surapur territory towards payment. The Officiating Resident at Hyderabad, Maj. Cameron, was initially agreeable to temporary sequestration if the Raja failed to pay and Capt. Lee at Matkal was ordered to Surapur. For the first time, however, the affairs of the principality were brought to the notice of the Government of India which expressed itself against such an extreme measure as sequestration and suggested the services of Capt. Raynsford who was experienced, to arrange for payment. However, Capt. Lee who was on the spot was entrusted with this task. He was directed to arrange payment through Motigir Gosain. The Resident appears to have been aware of the flight of ryots on account of oppression by the banker’s agents and yet he could not think of any alternative. However, Motigir’s persistent refusal to lend any more to the Raja made him shun to a Paris banker at Hyderabad. But the Minister did not agree. This led the Resident to suspect that he was more keen on sequestring the principality placing it in the Raja’s
half-brother Hanamappa’s hands than in realization of the klata
and that Motigir Gosain was in league with this secret plan.
Capt. Lee, however, succeeded in arranging payment by assuring
the Gosain in writing that the British Government would intervene
if the Raja failed to pay back the Gosain’s debts. He misunderstood
the Resident’s instructions that he should only countersign the
gabulwata to be given by the Raja to the banker. Once more the
districts were assigned to Motigir Gosain as before. Neither
the Resident nor the Government of India were aware of the exact
nature of Lee’s guarantee and in their blissful ignorance were
happy that the Raja had not to be set aside. It was left to the
Court of Directors, where the Raja’s obligations to the Nizam were
brought to their notice, to observe the disproportion between
the Raja’s resources and demands upon him and to urge for more
lenient settlement with him. The payments had to be enforced
as a British officer was standing guarantee but non-payment was
not to be made a pretext for measures such as sequestration or
deposition of the Raja.

Another instance of Minister Chandulal’s rapacity was
his mention of chauth from Surapur which he alleged was transferred
to Hyderabad by the Anglo-Nizam treaty of 1822, while keeping the
successive Residents ignorant of the fact that a part of the klata
was composed of Appa Desai’s chauth which he had unilaterally
doubled. The Officiating Resident Cameron ignored the demand, but
by not bringing the subject fully to the Government of India’s
notice he exhibited the same strange reluctance to enquire
thoroughly into the Nizam’s demands while agreeing to provide
armed aid for their realization.

In October 1837 the Minister informed the Resident that
payments were to be received through his agent, one Nishan Sine,
and an Arab Sidi Mannu and that both he and the Raja were highly
satisfied with this arrangement. In view of the Court's
observations, the succeeding Resident, J.S. Fraser persuaded the
Minister to reduce the fixt to 2 lakhs per annum to enable the
Raja to pay. Fraser's profound ignorance of the Minister's
continual extortions by which the Raja had been driven more and
more to financial morass can be seen in his remarks forwarding
the arrangement. "In the whole of my intercourse with the
Rajah Chundoo Lal in connection with Shorapore affairs, I have
certainly found him far more liberal than I would possibly have
anticipated". He believed the nathan's revenues to be 4 lakhs
of which 2 could be certainly paid to the Nizam, and he went so
far as to suggest that the British would not be justified in
preventing sequestration in the event of the Raja's failure to
pay henceforth. He was completely unaware of the different un­
due components of the fixt itself nor of the Raja's heavy
indebtedness on account of loans incurred from a variety of
sources mainly to meet Hyderabad's demands.

Though the fixt was reduced the Raja did not find it
easy to pay it. With the death of Motigir Gosain towards the
end of 1837 his disciple Mahadevir gained ascendancy over the
Raja on account of the Gosain's loans to him, appointed Arabs to
hold the Raja in thrall and took over entire revenue management,
appointing his own amilatdar and diwan. His intrigues at
Sureapur, particularly to oust Lakeeja, the illegitimate son
of Motigir, ultimately resulted in his own expulsion. Capt.
Hampton, the Commanding Officer at Matkal was required to expel
the turbulent Arabs in Sureapur service. The Raja had to take
recourse to borrowing from another sahukar, one Siddappa from
Bogalkot who would oblige only on his own terms, such as grant
of a jagir, exorbitant rate of interest, and so on.
It cannot be said that the Raja did not try to augment his revenues or attempt some kind of management. He set apart certain villages for essential establishments and put them in charge of Chanbasappa, an honest and capable servant. He tried to persuade the fleeing ryots and weavers to return by giving them jamla at fixed rates. There were sporadic attempts to collect jamla dues from the Nizam's dominions. Additional temporary taxes were imposed upon every house, every door and every head of cattle. His own personal expenses were little. Instead of cash salaries he chose to grant jessira to hereditary servants. But his efforts to prop up his collapsing mansion were of little avail. He was powerless with sehukara and his servants acted more as their agents resorting to private peculation than as royal servants. He could not check or remove them. The jessiraras considered themselves independent and refused to pay dharanattil. It was beyond a Raja weak by nature and heavily indebted, to set his finances on a sound footing.

In January 1841 or thereabouts Minister Chandulal once again complained of not having received any jista for the past 4 years. This was a blatant lie as these had been paid up to September 1840. Capt. W.B. Jackson, the Commanding Officer at Matkal succeeding Capt. Hampton himself had helped their collection employing pressure. The memorandum on Surapur affairs compiled by Assistant Resident D.A. Malcolm on this occasion on the basis of Residency records, however imperfect it might have been, clearly revealed the blunder committed by former Resident Martin in conniving at the huge narrana to which almost all of Surapur's troubles could be traced. It shed sufficient light on the extortions practised by Hyderabad under different pretexts and concluded: "The whole case from first to last
affords ... an admirable illustration ... of the embarrassments in which we have been involved consequent on our ... Military Force ... the services of which have been employed for a period of twelve years in enforcing claims with the real merits of which we do not appear at the outset to have made ourselves sufficiently acquainted". Capt. Jackson, prepared another memo which after briefly sketching the history of the Jamadar gave full indication of decreasing revenues and the financial crisis towards which Surapur was heading. He too opined, "... from the present impoverished state of the country it surely behoves a liberal Government to lessen the amount of Kist, and wipe off all old scores in the shape of Nuzzurana, in order that country may remain in the hands of a family whose claim is so undeniable". He suggested new, fixed terms of payments by Surapur failure of which could justify sequestration...

But these memos left Resident Fraser unmoved. He refused to interfere in Surapur affairs under the specious plea that the Raja had not complained against the excessive demands and that these were quite common in the Nizam's country. He postponed any detailed enquiry to future failure of Kista.

This occurred sooner than expected by the Resident. Meanwhile in the south of Surapur an Arab Jamadar named Kohran began creating disturbances and later even captured Badami fort. The disturbances were suppressed but the Minister took advantage to allege that Surapur Raja was helping Kohran. On the contrary the Raja prevented Kohran's Arabs from passing through Surapur and even apprehended one Jag Mohan SIng of the party. Brig. Tomkyns who was sent to check Kohran also took the opportunity to clear the Raja of Bombay Government's allegations that he was in league with some conspiracies in Southern Maratha States. The Raja's borrowing from the Swami of Sonkeshwar and granting
him a jagir in return, an instance of the Raja's increasing financial difficulties, was quoted as an example of the Raja's alleged conspiracy! Tomkyns also confirmed that Surapur was heading towards bankruptcy. Already the Raja had asked for time to pay the kist, the Minister had refused and sought British military assistance as usual. The Resident now proposed temporary British management of the principality. But before taking this decisive step he proposed a full enquiry into Surapur's finances and suggested Henry Dighton, a European banker from Hyderabad for the purpose. The Government of India agreed but directed that the person to be deputed should be from among covenanted or commissioned servants of the Company or the Nizam. With this decision the period of unilateral intervention on behalf of the Nizam in the past 40 years of British relations with Surapur came to an end.

Notes and References:

1. The earlier sentence reads: "By the present Treaty of general defensive alliance the ties of Union, by the blessing of God are drawn so close that the Friends of one party will be henceforward considered as Friends of the other, and the Enemies of one party as the Enemies of the other". The remaining part of the article has been deleted here being not relevant to British connection with Surapur. FSC, 20 Nov. 1800, No. 136. Also Aitchison, Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol. IX (1929), p. 67 wherein the punctuation etc. is slightly different.

2. FSC, 20 Nov. 1800, No. 1.


5. Dhondia Wagh, a Maratha by descent but born in Channagiri in Mysore served in Mysore cavalry, left it with a considerable booty during the 3rd Anglo-Mysore war, collected a gang of freebooters and made many depredations in Dharwar district then under the Marathas. Defeated by them in 1794 he re-entered Tipu's service but incurred his displeasure and was thrown into prison. After the
fall of Seringapatam in 1799 he escaped and fully launched upon his freebooter’s career. He was ultimately killed in 1800 in Arthur Wellesley’s campaign against him. Details of the campaign are available in FSP, 1800, Paraams, History of Sambii State, pp. 25-32 and V.V. Khare, Aithihasik Lakh Samraksha, Vol. X.

6. FSC, 20 Nov. 1800, No. 5.

7. Originally this district was among the direct possessions of Surapur which, however, gradually appears to have lost control over it after the rise of the Nizam in the Deccan. The amount of tax is mentioned in FSC, 26 Apr. 1802, No. 41.


10. Ibid., No. 39.

11. Ibid., Nos. 81, 88 and 90.

12. Wellesley’s Despatches, No. LXXIX, paras. 35 and 37.

13. FSC, 20 Nov. 1800, No. 91.


15. Instruments of the ratified treaty were exchanged on 12 Oct. 1800. FSC, 20 Nov. 1800, No. 137.


17. FSC, 26 Apr. 1802, No. 37.

18. Ibid., Nos. 40-3.

19. Ibid., No. 39.

20. Ibid., Nos. 55-6, 93-4.

21. Ibid., No. 98.

22. Sadashiv Manakshwar, Peshwa’s vakil at Hyderabad suggested to Bajirao II that he too should take advantage of the situation and join the Nizam’s forces to realize the tribute due to him. Bajirao ordered Ramchandra and Chintaman Rao Patwardhans to march towards Surapur but soon recalled them apprehending Holkar’s invasion. V.V. Khare’s surmise that the vakil’s suggestion was in consultation with the British Resident at Hyderabad is, however, unfounded. Khare, Aithihasik Lakh Samraksha, Vol. XIII, p. 6892 and Nos. 6359, 6390, 6394.

23. Kirkpatrick to Wellesley, 30 Apr. 1802, FSC, 3 June 1802, No. 21.

24. Meanwhile the alarmed Raja was trying to arrange emergency asylum with the Patwardhans of Miraj and sent a vakil, Mudabasappa, there for the purpose. Khare, XIII, No. 6392.
25. The annual thakre was stated to be Rs. 10,000 only in FSC, 26 Apr. 1802, No. 41. This is an instance of how Hyderabad Government started enlarging its claims and began to realize them through armed aid of the British.

26. FSC, 18 Nov. 1802, No. 32.

27. Ibid., Nos. 44-51.

28. The Resident wrote to Lt. Col. Kenny to obtain every possible information re. Suraptir as their knowledge of the country was limited and imperfect. Ibid., No. 35.

29. See Wellesley's instructions on the implementation of the Treaty of 1800. FSC, 9 July 1801, No. 42.

30. FSC, 18 Nov. 1802, No. 52.

31. Ibid., No. 56.

32. Ibid., No. 69.

33. Ibid., Nos. 72-3.

34. HRC, Vol. 126, p. 220. Pamdi is a small town in Anantapur District, Andhra Pradesh.

35. The nizama amount agreed was Rs. 15 lakhs of which 9 lakhs were to be paid in coins and the rest in jewels. The actual worth of the jewels presented to the Nizam, the Minister and his wife and Raja Raghottama Rao was Rs. 4,90,300. FSC, 2 May 1805, No. 269. The total demands agreed to by Pid Naik III amounted to Rs. 34,50,000 which included numerous other items like peshkara, durbar expenses, disumani expenses, Devadurgy revenues, cost of expedition to Sagar and so on.


38. He was the son of Amrit Rao, a Gujarati Khatir, took service in the 'petitions office' (Arzbeati), and accompanied the Hyderabad Minister Azim-ul-Mur to Poona where he was appointed 'house steward' (Khan-saman). Later he served as peshkar to the French troops in the Nizam's dominions, who detained him during their mutiny. He attained prominence at the Hyderabad Court on account of his loyalty and devotion to Secundar Jah, the son of Nizam Ali Khan and held such posts as rai-rayan, civil administrator of Berar etc. On Azim-ul-Mur's death in 1802, administrator with permanent authority of the Western part of the Nizam's dominions, Nizam Sikundar
Jah was keen to have him as nazir at Hyderabad. But he was thrown into the anti-British party at Hyderabad owing to his tussle with Mir Alam, the Minister. Jealous of Manipatram's influence over the Nizam Mir Alam, in concert with the British Resident, he keen to crush this leader of anti-British party, managed to have him banished to Sagar in the beginning of 1807.

39. FSC, 18 Nov. 1802, No. 73.
40. Ibid., No. 67.
41. Sydenham to Minto, dt. 22 Dec. 1807, paras. 6-26, and enclosure II. (HRC, Vol. 36).
42. Ibid., enclosures I, III-IV.
47. Capt. W. B. Jackson's memo, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 103.
48. However Parshurambhau Patwardhan, heavily indebted and himself obliged to pay the Peshwa for his release sent his son towards Surapur and proposed to follow him, in Oct. Nov. 1708. But Venkatappa Naik III sent his vakil for negotiations and cleared off the tribute in the form of cloth in lieu of ready money. He even agreed to render military service with a thousand infantry and 500 cavalry. Khare, X, No. 4426; XI, No. 4545, 4550.
49. There was a report of Surapur trying to plunder Chand Kavas and Bandola in the southern Jangturs' regions. Khare, XI, Nos. 4618, 4647. Chatrapati of Kolhapur negotiated with Surapur for military aid. Khare XI, Nos. 4529, 4988, 5158. In Sept. 1803 it was reported that Surapur collected 1½ lakhs from Midgundi in Peshwa's region. Khare, XIV, No. 6723 and 6735.
52. FSC, 27 March 1806, Nos. 87-8.
54. FSC, 5 June 1806, No. 44 & K.w.
55. PRC, XII, No. 199.
56. PRC, VII, No. 300.
57. PRC, XII, No. 23.
58. T. Warden, Chief Secretary to Bombay Government to William Chaplin, Commissioner in the Deccan, 8 Nov. 1821, HRC, Vol. 190.
61. Reproduced in The Indian Archives, Vol. IX, No. 2 from the original in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
63. Sherapur, p. 8.
66. Under Secretary Edwards's memo on Surapur. FPC, 23 May 1845, No. 146, paras. 4-5.
67. No. 9 in appendix to supplement of FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, No. 39.
68. Capt. Jackson's memo on Surapur, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 103.
70. FPC, 15 Oct. 1852, No. 39.
71. Memoes of Capts. Malcolm and Jackson, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, Nos. 102-3. Martin's remark received rough treatment at the hands of all British officials who had to deal with Surapur subsequently.
72. Ibid.
73. "His ignorance and imbecility of character have hitherto prevented him from taking any part in the management of his affairs." Capt. F. Raynsford, letter to C. Secy to Resident at Hydaraad dt. 28 Oct. 1832, extracted in FPC, 20 Mar. 1837, Nos. 96-9 and ENGL. "The Raja is described by Capt. Lee ... as a reckless spendthrift or drunken loothch in debt to every one and pays no one 'almost always intoxicated with opium and seldom in a fit state for business ... To the list are added the laziness, indifference and sensuality". Capt. Malcolm's memo, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 102. "Raja Krishnappah Naick is a good man and means well, but is of a very weak and indolent character and since his ascension his country can scarcely be said to have been governed by himself but by those who possessed influence on the death of his Father, in connection with Sahooars". Capt. Jackson, FPC, 19 Apr. 1841, No. 103. "The Raja is too indolent and puzzle to think of anything which would head exertion and organization. ... His habits are degrading, appearance indicative of excess. He spends his time in trifling amusements ... influenced by unprincipled advisers whom he himself has raised to lucrative offices
from low status, he is quite incapable of managing the
sums than* a ... 
transactions. MflBfili of J®rs Stuart* pp. 192*218*219*
221*272,370*389*390.