CHAPTER I

Geo-Strategic Set-up
Geostrategic Set-Up

The importance of geographical facts on the development of history is only now receiving wide and general recognition. Geopolitics as a handmaid of warfare and as a guide for political programmes may be a recent pseudo science, but as early as the fourth century B.C. we have in Kautilya's Arthashastra, a definition of Chakravartipatha, boundaries and lands which should belong to any empire. Even in respect of the modern science of Geopolitics, India can claim to be a pioneer. The question of suitable land frontiers agitated the great minds of Anglo-India from the time of Warren Hastings. Lord Curzon, who gave to the question of frontiers a scientific basis and emphasised its importance as a subject worthy of serious study. Lord Curzon himself thought of the sea only as a frontier and not as a vital territorial area. Because the interposition of the sea many countries lost their interests, so India willingly agreed to part with the administration of Aden, one of the key point for the control of the oceanic area probably the north western part of Indian Ocean, i.e. Arabian sea.

If interest in the problems of the Arabian sea was absent in India itself, it is not a matter of surprise that it did not receive much attention from the writers on Geopolitics elsewhere.

Geopolitical Significance of the Area

The Middle East Politics would probably have run along its usual course, but there arrived oil. Oil was found here early in the twentieth Century, but it was not till the Arab-Israel War of 1973 that it discovered its power. It was for the first time that
the world realised what it meant to have more than half the oil reserves of our planet, to produce one third of the total world output, and to have command of oil power in a few hands. Among the 13 members of the OPEC seven are in the Middle East. ¹ The great monopoly was compounded by rise in prices from 2 to over $35 per barrel by 1981, threatening to escalate further and giving exporters access to finances as might inspire yet another serial of Arabian nights. For the first time again, a developing region has had enough and to spare to develop itself.

The fundamental causes of its past weakness—lack of resources, low level of economic development, and poor education—are being rapidly remedied. Much of the old Arab ingenuity and enlightened culture is undergoing renaissance in the modern setting and one is surprised how even the smallest of the states is raising infrastructure of the highest class. There are coming up excellent communication systems, biggest refineries & fertilizer plants, nuclear reactors, desalting complexes, prosperous banks, and business houses of international fame.

Money is not all honey, while being a source of strength, it makes oil producing countries more vulnerable to internal subversion and external aggression. Unless power structure changes radically, there is no reason to suppose that the violence of the masses will not erupt. This itself is a reason for a strong, sophisticated military establishment. The flood of arms now sweeping

¹ Chopra, India and the Indian Ocean, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, p. 70.
the Arabian sea states is unprecedented, exceeding even certain states of Europe in the high quality of weapons which the petrodollars can buy. After all the ultimate purpose of arms is to enable people to fight, and in the region fighting is perennial and is likely to become a major regional and international concern.

Britain had the biggest real estate in the Middle East, but with its evacuation of the Masirah base in Oman this last foothold in the region disappeared, and nothing has taken its place. No doubt there have been military alliances such as CENTO and several bilateral treaties involving Russia, the U.S.A., Iraq, the two Yemens and others.

There is enough in the region to invite outsiders. The very nationalism is sometimes an invitation; in Oman the ruler asked for external aid to preserve the integrity of the state against guerrilla rebels. When the states are too small, lying under the shadow of giants, as on the Persian Gulf, only external props can provide assurance of security. The two powers must choose befitting friends from outside, illustrated by Saudi Arabia and Jordan leaning towards the United States and Iraq towards the Soviet Union. Oil is the dire need of technology which can come predominantly from the industrial states. Indeed oil is a commodity of such vital importance that the great powers would in any

2. Ibid. p.71.
case keep some kind of a hold on the region, no matter what the regional states say. The result is that while foreign soldiers rather thinned out and incidently they have been replaced by technicians businessmen, diplomats, strategists, intelligence agents, and traffickers in arms in numbers that far exceed anything that was ever here except during war.

The immense economic activity provides great opportunities of countries like India to invest in manpower and skill. India has in fact signed several collaborative agreements with Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and smaller Gulf states, of which the Iran-Hind shipping line and extraction of Indian iron with Iran's Petrodollar are outstanding examples. When in 1980 the Western powers imposed sanctions, it was to India that Iran turned for replenishment. India-Middle East trade relations extend over the past two to three thousand years and have been maintained even in the midst of violent military and political upheavals. The difference to day is that trade and politics are much more inter-linked than ever before.

It is inconceivable that in the event of violent disturbances, for instance, India could be assured of supply of oil no matter how much it pays. The influence of oil power on India casts a shadow on foreign relations, armed forces, security and economic development. In so far as the oil route from the Persian Gulf to the west coast of India is concerned, the upper Arabian Sea becomes a highly sensitive sector from the viewpoint of country's over-sea contacts. And so far as the source of supply is concerned, the
politics of the region, attitudes and influence of external forces have become matters of high priority in India's diplomatic life.  

If things go well, some of the old sleeping giants of the area are bound to come to life in a big way. In the past, India was one of the countries which felt the impact of Persian imperial power, when part of its north west was conquered. Today Iran has the look of the one country with territory, population, and resources which could become a foremost state in this part of the world. Other upcoming states are Iraq and Saudi Arabia. But Iranian revolution and the ousting of a highly ambitious Shah altered the situation, while the power equation among the regional states stampeded the rise of any one particular nation to a high power status. If at present the conquest of territory is out of fashion, other forms of ascendancy as leverage of finance, competition in trade, influence at the international forums, control over communications are very much in fashion. Unless India forges ahead and its per capita resources in this respect are lower it is bound to be out paced, if not overshadowed.

In Arabian sea & recent oceanographic investigations indicate that such locative as the narrow sheef the Persian Gulf and the Red sea abound in petroleum, gold and sea food. The deep sea plains and Gulfs may be vast storehouses of sea wealth.

3. Ibid, P. 72.
This Indian Ocean region is predominantly not much more agricultural is nature, the Industrial base being still very weak. The overall food production is still inadequate and much of the vast mineral resources are still untapped. The total picture of foreign trade shows the dominance of the industrially developed countries over the littoral states. Almost 90% of the littoral trade is oriented to the U.S.A., Europe and Japan. The intra-regional trade is insignificant.

To the big powers, this region offers excellent prospects of economic exploitation. Apart from their natural wealth, the developing countries also constitute large markets for the finished products of the industrialised nations. Inter-state and inter-regional rivalries provide the big powers with opportunities to heighten the dependence of individual states on them for economic support and military assistance.

The enlarging strategic importance of the Arabian sea is evidenced by factors such as the emergence of China as a world power, the growing Japanese economic strength, the big power rivalry for influence and technical innovations in sea warfare. The vying for political balance has given rise to an arms race in various states. In addition to fostering regional military pacts, military bases have been openly established in the area by such countries as the U.S.A. and France. The Soviet Union has consistently denied setting up bases, but finds it necessary to maintain a permanent naval presence in the sea area.
The situation in the region today is not normal but though most littoral states are independent and some have struck military alliances with outside powers and some foreign bases have been established. The trading pattern has remained overwhelmingly external rather than regional and for this reason, the entrances to the Arabian sea from the Atlantic and Pacific oceans continue to be of crucial importance. The navies of the littoral states are weak in comparison with those of the big powers, the new political patterns that have emerged have brought to evidence certain rivalries and conflicting interests of regional powers.

This, as an area of extraordinary potential for natural resources, an area crossed by trade routes vital to outside powers and those belonging to the region, an area of conflicting big power political and economic interests and area of certain regional turbulence, the Arabian sea is a pivot of world affairs. It would, therefore, be worthwhile to examine the interests and compulsions of the various regional and extra-regional states which have brought about the present conditions.

America's economic interests in the Arabian sea have always been and still are considerable in the Post W.W. II period U.S. Govt. statements enunciating its concepts concerning the region: "The Indian Ocean must remain available for free passage of U.S. commercial & military traffic."

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and a cross the region......" "We are particularly disquieted by the potential for instability in the Persian Gulf and what this might mean to our and allied oil interests........" And so on, ad infinitum. Her dependence on oil and other minerals and the need to secure markets for her manufactures, the U.S. is probably the most advanced in the technology and resources necessary for exploiting the vast untapped wealth of the Arabian sea. Now economic interests can seldom be divested from politics. The age-old policy of the creation of spheres of influence continues, possibly as an economic necessity, but inevitably with strong political overtones. Moreover, apart from economic compulsion, there is the ideological rivalry between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union which leads to political and economic competition. That is worse, it has also developed into a permanent military presence in the Arabian sea area. Various modern and ultra modern electronic listening, tracking and other devices are being installed on territories of allies whose base facilities are being developed and are available for use by the Americans when required. Navigation & communications satellites are also based there. U.S. surveillance aircraft & cover whole of the Indian Ocean region & submarines patrol in its depths. U.S.A. poses a threat by establishing Diego Garcia base on the littoral states of Arabian sea has much more importance to them, because this base gives him staying power. Waging a conflict against countries not favourably inclined
towards the U.S.A. by using surrogates backed by U.S.A. Sea power is also a possibility in this area. At the oil-crisis, U.S.A. warned Arab oil-producing countries of armed intervention and parading during times of local crisis also. The Soviet naval presence is also a reason for the stay of U.S. Force in the area.6

U.S.S.R. also has her trade relations with littoral states though cannot yet compare with the U.S.A & other western countries. U.S.S.R. may have to enter the West Asian oil trade, so she is determined to protect the oil trade routes in the area. Oil is ample reason for the U.S.S.R. to develop and expand her mutual trade with the countries of the Arabian sea littorals. The stationing of American ballistic missile submarines in the region, capable of striking at the regions of U.S.S. This threat can not be ignored by U.S.S.R. From the point of view of geographic, economic, political and military factors, it becomes apparent that the Russian presence in the area could serve a variety of aims. It could extend commercial, diplomatic and military influence in the area dominated completely by the West. It could enhance the Soviet Union's capacity to defend itself against western ballistic missile submarines and carrier task forces operating in the area. It could provide some security to the sea's routes passing through the Arabian Sea to the littoral countries and contribute to a policy of containing Chinese power and countering Chinese influence.
in the area. It could reassure friends and further political & economic relationships. This is a part of the Big power rivalry and considered essential countervailing presence to that of the U.S.A., who otherwise exert an unbearable dominance over the area.

China's naval expansion programme all over the ocean, indicates that she has realised the necessity of sea power in areas where her vital national interests are at stake. The U.S.S.R.'s close ties with India, and the Soviet naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, seems China constantly. China may be expected to continue supporting Pakistan. She appears to give help to anti soviet moves by U.S.A. and others. China also wants to extend her influence far beyond her frontiers. Late Chow en Lai announced that the China have exercised greater care in their attempts to influence the countries of Africa & West Asia. This attitude is now giving way to more assertive policies, and more aggressive initiatives, to compete with or off set Soviet influence in the area.

All the important countries like Japan, Britain, France & others import large quantities of oil and raw materials for her industries and export their products on a mammoth scale to the countries of this area, therefore all are indulge to secure the oil supply routes of the Arabian sea area because now oil has

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become a more valuable political weapon to the superpowers, and a major economic resource to the littoral states of this area.\(^8\)

The bulk of Pakistan's foreign trade moves by sea. About 85% of her oil comes from the Gulf and among her vital imports are ferrous and non-ferrous metals and machinery of all kinds. Her exports are cotton in various forms, rice, hides and skins and a few other materials.

Pakistan has strong bonds with certain Arab countries of the Gulf who help her with financial resources and whose armed forces she ships to man & train. During the 1971 conflict, Saudi Arabia loaned Pakistan naval hardware though at the time, she herself was not wellstocked.\(^9\) Since then, there has been a rapid build-up of modern military hardware in the Gulf countries, and a repetition of Saudi Arabia's 1971 policy could widen the threat to India. Pakistan's relations with Iran have been close and cordial. He helped her in the 1965 & 1971 conflicts with India and both are the members of OIC since 1956.\(^10\) Pakistan's friendship with China has been steadfast and could be expected to continue for strategic and political reasons. The history of Pakistan's relations with India is well known. It present attempts to norm-

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nalise relations succeed, the foundation can soon be laid for very fruitful, peaceful cooperation between these two countries, whose ethnic, economic, and linguistic affinities lend themselves to reciprocal friendship.

Pakistan has strengthened her defence services and appears to be indulging in an arms race with India. She spends a high percentage of her budget on defence and may be working towards Mr. Bhutto called the "finest Armed forces in Asia."11 Her defence budget has doubled since 1971 and the development of her navy is proceeding according to plan. Pakistan voted for the zone of peace concept in the U.N. yet her policies indicate only half hearted support for it. She is still a member of OSLO and in 1973 conference, she demanded that the role of OSLO be revised in the light of what she called the close Soviet relationship with Iraq and India and the alleged Soviet support of certain insurgencies in various West Asian countries.12 This attitude is in the interest of the Big powers such as the U.S.R. & Britain and the possibilities it offers them in terms of their military presence in the Arabian sea area and the whole Indian Ocean.

Iran regards her Arabian sea role as an extension of her role in the Gulf. Her rapid naval development along the most
role in the Gulf. Her rapid naval development along the most sophisticated lines indicates her determination to be a strong, dominant Arabian sea power. Whereas her land forces could be involved in border defence, it is the sea that is given prime importance in her defence blueprints because her lifeblood her trade depends on it.

The development of oil ports outside the Shatt-el-Arab has given Iran greater strategic flexibility and security. Big military bases are under construction at Bandar Abbas and Char Bahar, and the occupation of the strategic Tumb islands and Abu Masa at the entrance to the Gulf has been attributed to the determination to prevent, at all costs, the blockading of the Strait of Hormuz. Until before some times the U.S. surveillance aircraft used Iranian airfields and ships to the naval bases whose infrastructure is largely of American origin. All this was done to establish her influence in the area. Iran has relations with U.S.S.R. also. Soviet intentions & ability to establish influence in this area are very well known to counter the U.S.A. Though Shah has stated that big powers should keep out of the area and that its security should be the responsibility of the littoral states, Iran's dealings with Iraq have improved in the recent past and their long lasting feud is being played in a very low key. This is an important development and if the reapproachment holds, it could be of

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the region. It is believed that Saudi Arabia & Kuwait's military build-up is aimed at keeping Iran from appearing as cock of the wall. Iran's oceanic policy decrees that upto 1967 she was only on locker, from 1967-1971 she took initiatives to establish her supremacy in the Gulf in the wake of the reduction in the British presence in the region, and from 1971 onwards, she has openly voiced her aspirations to power in the region in a determined move to secure the safety of her trade routes. Iran has sponsored an agreement with India for the supply of iron ore, and has expounded ideas on an Asian common market and freedom of trade & navigation. Indo-Pak conflict of 1971 and Arab-Israeli war of 1973 affect the Iran's supremacy in this area and also her relations with India, U.A.R. & U.S.S.R. influenced from the above events. So this area becomes again a significant area from the point of view of establishing the influence by super powers and exposing their strategic will upon those who are the friends of them.

India is wary of sea threats emanating mainly from Pakistan and the problems of the Arabian sea tended to be overlooked. Some concern was generated when Pakistani warships bombarded Dwarka in the 1965 conflict but damage caused insignificant instead of a attack on India's maritime interests. India's relations with Pakistan have haunted the regional scene since Independence and have erupted into open hostilities several times. Today winder issues are at stake. India is conscious with growing Big powers
rivalry and tensions in the area. India has endeavoured to solve outstanding issues with her neighbours and has succeeded in some cases. India tries to strengthening cultural & economic ties with the countries of this area. Some western countries rumoured that India has granted base facilities to the Russians at certain ports on her mainland & outlying islands. But it is true that western warships have enjoyed more time than Russia. It should be clear to the world that India values her independence and is determined to stand her ground. Whatever the obstacles, that India concerned over the defence of her maritime interests, has no desire to exert a predominant influence in the area. She opposes the concept of any one power dominating it. so the above desires & considerations show the significance of the area.

Though India geographically dominates the Arabian sea, after 1947 India has mainly been confronted with wars and frontier disputes in landlocked areas to its north and west with little possibility for developing a systematic policy in the Arabian sea which has also been claimed compared to the Himalayas or the desert wastes of the west. India is particularly not a seafaring nation. Maritime tradition is mainly confined to the coastal regions of the country.

There is no unified political pattern in the Arabian sea area and whether it is in the west or east, the political postures vary greatly from the diversified politics of Oman and Yemen, to those of India and Pakistan in the east. Today without being more
energetic and forceful, India can not provide protection to its coasts of the area.

The western coastline of India stretches from the Gulf of Kutch in the northwest down the Malabar coast of cape comorin. There are several important ports and naval establishments including Bombay, and Cochin where shipyard is being built. Three important sectors of the coast-Bombay to the Pakistan border, the Goa coast in the central sector, and Cochin on the Malabar coast in the southern zone, helps India project to three different sectors of the Arabian sea. Unlike the Bay of Bengal, India has no broken coastline nor other neighbouring nations to deal with on its western front. India's own oil route from the Persian Gulf is through the Arabian sea, and it has important trading links with middle east states, particularly Persian Gulf countries. Despite the obvious stability arising out of a mercantile relationship, nearly all the countries of the Persian Gulf area, including Iran, have adversary attributes for India, expressed through solidarity with Pakistan in times of conflict. India's own efforts at maintaining a pivotal role in the Arabian sea should be through increased naval strength. The benefits of a long coastline could only be made effective use of if there were a proper naval force to take advantage of the strategic benefits that a coastline has to offer.

The same disadvantage that India faces as a result of a wide open sea it has to protect, works to its advantage when viewed
from the distance that a possible adversary would have to cover in case of a conventional attack. The breadth of the Arabian sea serves the purpose of a defensive shield. It is the north western part of the sea which is the most sensitive for India, as it is there that it shares a coastline with Pakistan & Iran. In 1971 Indo-Pak conflict, this was an area of naval action between Pak and Indian Navies. A future naval conflict between the two countries would be of a more sophisticated nature and with greater destructive possibilities on both sides. Iran has been stepped up political, military and economic cooperation with Pakistan. There have also been recent attempts at establishing a non-Arab Islamic alliance between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Iran involves in Baluchi and Pakhtun movements also and Pakistan opposed the movement. India's military predominance in the region also gives Pakistan a shielding role between Iran & India while would not be possible if Pakistan ceased to exist as a country or existed in a greatly truncated form Iran has as a result of these factors poured military & economic aid to Pakistan making it a constant threat to India. It is also in Tehran's interest to see a Pakistan which can combat India. Iran's ambitions in the Arabian sea one of dominating the north western quadrant never-theless go against India's interests. It is certain that India will not assume a role whereby it will mainly be a coastline power while Iran dominates the Arabian sea from the coasts of the Horn of Africa and Oman to India. It would appear that there is quite rivalry between Iran and India to maintain naval supremacy in the region.
Linking India's Arabian sea coast with that of Bay of Bengal is what could be considered a curve which moves from Cochin in the west to Palk strait, separating the northern tip of Sri Lanka from the Cenmandel coast of India, in the east. This area commands access to the central Indian Ocean particularly Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

This area is likely to grow in sensitivity in the future particularly in light of India's ability to build up a naval potential which can make an impact in all directions of the ocean and not just in areas adjoining the coasts. While the Arabian sea has Indian fleet deployments and coastal naval establishments, this region due to the sensitivity has not been left undeveloped. With the building of Cochin as a modern naval establishment it may become possible for India to give more attention to the Maldives - Sri Lanka region. The deployment in the Chagos Archipelago the pressure has grown up and the possibility of big power naval presence in the Seychelles and Mauritius and the British withdrawal from Can take the southern half of the Indian Peninsula vulnerable. This is also an area where India to take special interest being just off its coast due to the establishment of Diego Garcia base by U.S.A. with a power vacuum in the Maldives and increased sensitivity in the central zone, this area has become more significant to India, because several countries have already negotiated port facilities at Maurities and several countries have made a bid for Can. An area of relative neglect the Ocean from Can to the Indian coastline is Gisscrossed with Ocean
routes moving from Suez to Singapore. From an Indian perspective it provides a most between Diego Garcia & Soviet mid ocean anchorages and the south Asian subcontinent. This area covering Cochin Minicoy, Gan & Colombo will be looked at as a geopolitical unit in the Indian Ocean developments. Its relevance for India will be examined. This area is bound to the northwestern quadrant by the Laccadive Islands which provide a shield to the Indian coast in the southern Arabian sea. Malpe, southernmost Laccadive islands is good sentinel for Indian base in this area which 150 miles opposite to Cochin. From here India can commence the activities to encouter the actions through Diego Garcia. It is 250 nautical miles from Calicut also, can be developed for strategic purposes. There are so many islands Core Cochin, in the area has significant strategic situation. This is linked with the direct lanes from Africa to East Asia, Colombo to Japan and Bombay. It is a possible stop on the long journey from Europe to the Far East. It is under India's influence and deserves greater attention by New Delhi for its developments. The strategic axis moves from Cochin-Minicoy towards Mal & Gan & both are also important for India.
pitation of 10,000 km$^3$ and run off of 525 km$^3$ from the rivers of India and Pakistan. Arabian sea covers only about 7% of the total area of the Indian ocean. It receives 23.9% of total precipitation and run-off.\textsuperscript{5} Arabian sea, in fact, occupies only 1.5% of the world oceanic area but receives 9% of the global river run-off. The Arabian sea, a vast expanse, separating the two peninsulas of India and Arabia and also bounded on the north by the barren coast of Persia is one of the vital seas of the world.

The northern boundary of the Arabian sea is land locked and it receives waters of high salinity from the Gulf and the Red sea. The Gulf water flows through the Hormuz strait which has a maximum sill-depth of about 100 m while the Red sea water flows through the strait of Bab-al-Mandab with a maximum sill-depth of 125m.\textsuperscript{6} These are the only two water masses of the Arabian sea which originates from the north. The presence of the Gulf and the Red sea water masses have been traced all over the Arabian sea upto the equator and into the western part of the Bay of Bengal. The Gulf water can be identified in the depth rang 100 to 300 m. of the Arabian sea. The water from the Red sea can be traced by 400 and 900 m. depth in the Arabian sea. (Rochford 1964, Wooster etal 1967).

Apart from these two other surface water masses are formed in the Northern Indian Ocean. These included a high salinity surface water in the Northern and central Arabian sea formed due to excess of evaporation there and this water mass is present upto a depth of about 125 m. (Rochford 1964).

\textsuperscript{5} R.C. Sharma : The Oceans Realities and prospects (Rajesh Publications, New Delhi) Page 9.

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., p. 9.
Ivanenkov and Gubin (1960) termed the water mass between 100 and 300 m. as the North Indian Ocean i.e. Arabian Sea region. Deep water with a sigma-t of 27.6, and the water mass below 3000 m with a sigma-t 27.8 as the North Indian Ocean Bottom Water.

The Arabian sea is a fascinating sea, important to the great Pacific in its wealth of lovely islands. It is situated between two political worlds: On the one hand are the U.S.S.R. and her neighbour, the China and on the other hand, the U.S.A. and Britain. For the Big Powers, the military and commercial significance of the various islands and ports scattered in the Arabian sea has increased with the passage of time. 7

The strategic location of the Arabian sea itself exposes it to big power rivalry, with the intensification of this rivalry. The littoral states feel all the more threatened: they are acutely aware of the vulnerability of their coasts because of which colonialism had made inroads into them, and they dread a repetition of the colonial experience.

It was by defeating her rivals on the sea one after the other that England had gained mastery of the world. The British naval policy in the Asia stemmed from her necessity to dominate the seas in order to maintain her colonial domains. The trade routes through the Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea to India, Australia and China were of great importance to Britain.

The Arabian sea has relatively fewer ports and harbours. The eastern seaboard of Arabia is over 4000 miles long, but there is hardly any major port before Aden in Arabia. Muscat, a port of Oman and the Persian Gulf, ports of Kuwait and Abadan have acquired immense importance because of the oil industries there. Bushire, Bandar-Abbas and Chabban are minor harbours in south Iran, linked with the hinterland only by road. Peshni another minor port in Baluchistan is also connected by road with Kalat and Quetta. Pakistan and India also have few ports in this region with good facilities for ships including dry docks. The principal sea ways in this region connect Aden and the Persian Gulf to Karachi, Bombay and others.

**Boundaries:**

In case of the Indian subcontinental shallow water plate forms face its west and east coasts. To the west, in the Arabian sea, it is widest off Bombay, about 200 miles. South of Bombay it narrows down substantially, over widths of 20 to 60 miles, right down to Kanya Kumari, the depths are under 500 feet. With its long coastline, India has a continental shelf of impressive dimensions. This is going to be the scene of India's major maritime activity for several years to come, because of economic, political and military reasons.

The western leg of Indian ocean is Arabian sea includes Iran.

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8. K. Chopra: *India & The Indian Ocean*, (Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, P.7)
Iraq, South Arabia, United Arab Emirates and the African continental, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and Western Coast of India and its islands. Arabian sea is a major constituents of Indian Ocean. The Indian subcontinent is flanked by two plains, in the Arabian sea and the Bay of Bengal, each at the depths of 10 to 15 thousand feet. The Arabian sea plain is associated with the Indus river. When we talking about the Arabian sea, we must have a close look at its extent and size. This north-west part of the Indian Ocean is known as 'British Lake'. The Western part of this British lake i.e. Arabian sea rounds Arabia and part of the African coast, was called the Erythrean sea. This name and division was discarded as a result of centuries of exploration and surveys and political changes.

The geographical boundaries of the sea have been a subject of much discussion and are not yet finally settled. Generally, the description offered by the International Hydrographic Bureau is accepted. Accordingly its western boundary lies along the meridian of Cape Agulhas (20° east latitude) and also at the western coast line countries are U.A.E., Oman, Yemen, Aden, Somalia and Kenya and the north-western coastal countries are Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Southern coastal countries are Lakshadweep, Maldives, Seychelles and Chagos Archipelago and the eastern boundary is made by the western coastal line of India. The northern boundary includes the Persian Gulf and the Red sea upto 30° N Latitude when a narrow strip separates it from the Mediterran-
The Arabian sea is wide and extensive covering the area from
the Horn of Africa to the west to Cochin and Sri Lanka in the east.
It washes the coasts of Yemen Oman and a small eastern portion of
Iran, Pakistan lies to its north. India, its largest littoral
states, provides as it were a solid land mass on its eastern front.

In the South of the Arabian sea is the continent of Africa,
to the north Asia and to the deep south Antarctica. The Gulf of
Aden, situated in the north-east of the region, is the funnel
through which pass all the sea routes from the east to Europe via
the Suez canal. The Gulf constantly narrows from its western end
to the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, situated at the lower entrance to
the Red sea. Aden is a fuelling station for both the naval and
merchant ships and is, therefore, of vital strategic importance.

Further off the Gulf of Aden, in the north, is the Arabian sea. In
the north-west, the Arabian sea juts into the Persian Gulf. The
Gulf of Oman connects the Arabian sea with the Persian Gulf. Oppo-
site the eastern coast of the Indian Peninsula lies the triangle
shaped Bay of Bengal. Thus on different sides, the Arabian sea
washes the coasts of African countries, Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and
India. Arabian sea is connected with the Gulf of Aden, Persian


10. K. Gupta : The Indian Ocean (Harwah Publications, New Delhi-
110016), P. 76.

11. V.K. Bhasin : S. Power Rivalry in the Indian Ocean (Sterling
Gulf and Gulf of Oman and being linked with Indian Ocean is also connected with the Mozambique channel and other straits situated in the Indian Ocean both the sides of west and East, when the Suez Canal was closed, the European ships coming via cape town passed through the nearby Mozambique channel in order to reach the oil rich Arab countries and farther east.

There are three archipelagoes—the Laccadives, Maldives and Chagos between the meridians 70 and 75. The Laccadives is situated off the Malabar coast opposite calicut in the Arabian sea. Below the Laccadives lie a group of 17 atolls and a huge number of smaller islands which together constitute the Maldives group. More than 300 are inhabited. The Chagos Archipelago lies to the south of Maldives islands. It has a total area of about 75 square miles and only about 1000 people. The only inhabited island of this group is its harbour of Diego Garcia. It measures 13 x 6 miles. It is situated in the belt of tropical trade winds and has a moderate climate, high winds are rare and water is fresh. It is at present under the influence of Americans, who have turned it into a military base. It forms an ideal base site.

In the west of the Indian Ocean along with the meridian 55 are situated the islands of echelles. The Archipelago comprises of 92 islands. Mahe being the most important and lies between 0° and 50°E latitude and 55° E & 56°E. longitude. It is 17 mile long and 4-7 miles wide. The strategic importance of the 92 islands

12. Ibid. p. 15.
of Seychelles is great, for they are the first land pieces on the Bombay-Africa run.

The island of Socotra lies at the entrance of the Gulf of Aden. Its former name was Sukhadhara and the Portuguese changed it to Socotra. It was well known to the Greeks, Romans, Arabs and Egyptians. Britain acquired it from the Portuguese at the time of the opening of the Suez canal. As such, they can protect the Indo-Pak subcontinent against a surprise attack, although their different political entities would pose problems in military coordination in the event of war in this area.13

The Suez canal is the gateway to the Arabian sea from the west. Some of the strategically important gulf's of the Arabian sea are the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, Aden, Suez, Aqaba and Bombay and Strait of Hormuz.

Environmental Aspect

The unique feature of the north-west region of the Indian Ocean is that the surface circulation reverses every half year, from north-east during the winter monsoon to south-east during the summer monsoon. This phenomenon makes the region a very suitable area to study the sea.

Wyrski (1973) has identified three distinct large scale circulation systems in the Indian Ocean region namely 1. The seasonally

13. Ibid, p. 11.
changing monsoon gyre north of 10°S, 2. The southern hemispheric subtropical anticyclonic gyre and 3. The Antarctic waters with the circumpolar current. 14

During the south-west monsoon the south equatorial current becomes stronger. This current subsequently forms the East African coastal current and flow northwards ending up as the Somali current which frequently attains a velocity as strong as the other western boundary currents, e.g. Gulf Stream or the Kuroshio (Warren et al. 1965). The monsoon current, the south equatorial current and the Somali current form a strong wind driven gyre in the equatorial Indian Ocean region. This gyre then breaks down in a series of large gyres in the Arabian sea (During 1970). The resultant upwelling along the Somali coast is most intense between 5°N and 11°N, where the entire warm surface layer is removed and the subsurface water with temperatures well below 20°C reaches the sea surface. 15

Strong winds blow also parallel to the Arabian coast, east of 55°E during the south-west monsoon and cause upwelling. This upwelling is different from the Somali upwelling because in this no strong current develops. In the south-west monsoon season a weak upwelling has been reported from the east coast of India (Varasaday & Sharma 1967). Along the west coast of India, however.

15. Op cit, p. 11.
the subsurface water comes very close to the surface, which has been taken as upwelled water. 16

The hydrographic structure of the Antarctic waters flowing into the Indian Ocean is very similar to those occurring in the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is governed by the surfacing of the main thermocline and by the strong deep-reaching circumpolar current forming the major bulk of the Indian Ocean deep and bottom water flowing north-ward.

Climatic Conditions

The very fact that the Arabian sea is flanked by Asia to its north upsets the usual system of ocean winds. North of the equator is the region of the monsoons. The direction of the monsoons is south-west in the Arabian sea, down as far as the Mozambique Channel, and it is north-east in the Arabian sea and the Bay of Bengal. Thus Arabian sea usually has a tropical climate which ensures a smooth sailing from Aden to Colombo. The winds are especially conducive to deep water sailing on account of the regularity with which they direction according to season. The Monsoons are the most distinctive feature of the Indian Ocean region. The alternate heating and cooling of the immense land tract of Asia give rise to seasonal changes in temperature and atmospheric pressure. Certain areas in the Arabian sea are visited by violent tropical storms which took a heavy toll of ships in the past and can at time prove

dangerous even to modern steam ships. The strategic implication of the climate of the region is that, generally, military operations are best undertaken between October and April. There is either intense heat or heavy rains during the rest of the year.17

17. opcit, p. 15.
Arabian Sea in Relation to India and Pakistan

Arabian sea is most important sea for India and Pakistan strategically. After Independence three wars have been fought between India and Pakistan. During these wars the role of navy was played in 1971 War. In 1965 when Pakistan attacked India, navy was directed not to safeguarding India's coastline and protecting the country's maritime trade.

In 1971, however, when hostilities once again broke out between India and Pak the navy was permitted to adopt a strategy aimed at immediately wresting the initiative from the aggressor, and it lost no time in doing so. On the night of Dec. 4, a composite force of missile boats and other surface ships struck Karachi.

There was a total blockade of the Pak's ports in the Arabian sea. This blockade prevented any reinforcements of men and material from reaching the Pakistani army in the then East Pakistan. On the western sea board, it resulted in the complete stoppage of supplies, including the much-needed petroleum products, to Karachi. This was factor that reduced the fighting capacity of Pakistan forces and led to an early termination of the War. This was the Arabian sea through which such type of action had to do.

Another important result of the navy's successful prosecution of trade warfare, was that it had a direct world wide impact. Manufacturers, exporters, shipowners, shipcrews and insurance, Banking and other financial institutions concerned with trade with India and Pakistan were inextricably involved in the outcome of the war.
at sea and were therefore exposed and more influenced by our victory at sea than by our successes on land and in the air. The course of war at sea in 1971 underscored the lessons of history and military geography. India's need for sea power was re-established in the eyes of the nation and the navy's pride received a great fillip. India's own use of the seas to secure victory was a lesson - 'a lesson in the value of sea power'. Pakistan, with a long open coast unprotected by islands and one single ranking harbour, is undoubtedly in a vulnerable position.

The coastal area of Arabian sea is most sensitive and vulnerable both for India and Pakistan, because most of the trade routes are passing through this area and helping to make strong economic position. Pakistan depends heavily upon foreign trade, which mostly polutic, moves through Karachi. It is true that there are no hostile shores opposing her coast line but the proximity of Karachi to Indian waters only emphasises the disadvantages of the objective conditions. An additional factor is the existence of a single road-cum-rail system going up country on both sides of the Indus river, a system which can be described as Pak's umbilical cord.

This type of unfavourable situation evidently calls for vigorous remedial measures. Short falls in the past were the result of the limitations of Pakistan's resources. These restraints will remain for a long time. All the same it is necessary to redress this position and cast around for ways and means to do so.

This means that Pak has to develop its naval strength with fixed objectives in view. Whether it can marshal the resources to fit the desired objective can not be said off hand but even if the task appears impossible, the goal has to be pointed out. At any rate, the fact that Pakistan operates under material constraints has to be kept in mind.

A power vacuum has appeared in the Arabian sea after the withdrawal of the British presence from the east of Suez. This attracts potential and foreign naval activities which are increasing. The Soviet Union & United states are probing this sea. Iran is raising its naval strength, not merely to the level required inside the Persian Gulf, but to a capacity enabling its reaching into the Arabian sea. India is making a bid for naval supremacy after the decline of the Indonesian Navy. 19

For Pakistan, the presence of these four different naval interests hold complications. It had merely to consider its position vis-a-vis India. Now it has two super powers at its doorsteps and Iran into the bargain, a power which stands in a class of its own, drawing considerable weight in the Arabian sea. Pakistan can not aspire at holding its own against a super power. Iran’s build up poses problems for India rather than for Pakistan. Here it suffices to make the basic assumption that it is India which Pakistan has to face.

The protection of our coastline and outlying islands embraces the effective defence of our ports, harbours, and naval bases. The protection of our off-shore interests involves the safeguarding of our legitimate exploitation of our off-shore wealth. The protection of our sea lines of communication implies the defence of our merchant shipping and where necessary, the provision of safe passage to neutral vessels willing to continue trade with us during periods of stress or conflict.

The prosperity and well being of a maritime country or a country dependent on imports are closely linked with the successful operation of its merchant ships and the ability to use the sea freely. Pakistan is one of those countries who is mostly dependent on import. It must be recognised that almost 95% of the world’s trade moves by ships, because air transport of goods and passengers is much faster but the costs incurred are prohibitive and air freight of the volume of cargo carried by sea today is unthinkable in the foreseeable future. Her future is dependent on the freedom of this vast water surface.

India today imports several commodities essential for her survival and development through Arabian sea. In respect to Pakistan further naval development is unnecessary and all that is required modernization and replacement. In 1971 war the whole navy was then concentrated in the western wing, leaving only a few

units, which were not capable to give the Indian Navy even token resistance, and were mainly assigned to patrolling duties in the east. Even then, the Pak navy could not prevent Indian missile boats from attacking Karachi twice. Because of its poor reconnaissance system the Indian flotilla, after its first strike at Karachi, could move westward without being detected, and return later on to deliver a second blow. To get after this experience that Pakistan does not need much of a navy is to desert the realm of realism. India faces the challenges on different portions of its coastline in a separate manner.

The view that Pak navy is underdeveloped has there much to command itself, and the need to consider the role that must be assigned to it in war can not be questioned. There are several possible objectives which can be aimed at; they have to be considered one by one. It must be understood as an underlying principle, while doing so, that these objectives are by no means mutually exclusive; to a large extent they are complementary.

The first objective is merely the protection of Pakistan's shores against attacks. The second is to secure tanker traffic to and from the Gulf. Since Pakistan depends upon the import of oil and its products, their flow in war must be ensured countries friendly to Pakistan may, in times of war, offer benevolent neutrality and assistance short of military involvement in the conflict. The 3rd objective is to secure Pak's overseas trade passing through the Suez canal. 21 This requires freedom of traffic upto

21. Ibid, p.40
the Bab-el-Mandab and the absence of hostile influence in the northern tier of the Arabian sea.

The fourth objective is to ensure the freedom of trade with East African countries. This means a considerable extension of the commitments envisaged earlier. The fifth objective is to safeguard Pakistan's links with the far East, this being especially important in view of its ties with the Peoples Republic of China.

The basic principle of warfare along with this is that the first task is to inflict maximum damage on the enemy. The infliction of damage to the largest possible extent, whatever the objective chosen, must be its integral part. This means that Pakistan has to think in terms of taking naval operations into the Arabian sea. Submarine attacks in those waters are within the realm of the feasible, provided the means to do so are required.

The protection of civilian targets against enemy action of any type is primarily the task of the civilian population which must be trained, equipped and organised for the purposes; only installations belonging to the armed forces themselves should normally be defended by them against enemy attacks. This principle has to be applied to sea-war defences. Only a limited number of installations belonging to the armed forces can be found close to the shore, sufficiently close to be assigned to the navy for defence in the event of war. The task now is to determine the objectives for which the navy has to be tailored and to assess the means that subservive best the option once exercised.

There is an important consideration which has to be kept in
view, naval acquisitions take long from the time they are ordered to the date when they become operational.

Establishments of the defence services located on or close to the shore, so close at any rate that they are accessible to naval attack, can be protected by guns and missiles both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air. This type of weaponry is also suitable for the protection of civilian targets.

The effective protection of the shores must reach out to the sea in the first instance for purposes of reconnaissance with aircraft, patrol boats and impressed civilian craft, with anti-submarine helicopters, with aircraft capable of striking at war, equipped with air-to-surface missiles. To prevent the enemy to reach his targets, the more his attacks will be blunted. It is therefore necessary to stretch out to the enemy harbours in order to attack his war in their own waters. The economy will be affected by the naval activities and this activity can impel him to divert some of his naval strength from offensive to defensive measures. It almost draws Pak into it. As yet it depends upon the import of oil and oil products. It is therefore necessary to ensure the supply of oil from the Gulf and this is the reason for framing the second objective. The supply of military stores and ammunition through the good offices of countries prepared to support Pakistan in an armed conflict. In the event it would be upto Pak to bring in such stores from friendly port. At a first a glance this appears to be an extension of the first objective of pushing sea-war defences further
out, as far west as the strait of Hormuz. 21

The objective of keeping safe the passage of tankers and other ships can be ensured by greater strength at sea and in the air providing thereby better protection of civilian targets. As long as the enemy can interdict the movement into Karachi of ships coming from the Gulf, it has a stronghold on Pakistan's industries and transport system. Pakistan's stocks of oil and of oil products can last only for a short time. There is no need of damaging Pakistan's network of communications and its industries but only the blockade of Karachi is necessary to damage the above network. 22

The moment Pakistan acquires the capability of ensuring the flow of oil and other supplies from the Gulf, the picture changes profoundly. If the flow of oil into Karachi can not be effectively stopped, it will become necessary to inflict heavy damage on the port, the distributive channels and the users. This will drive the enemy into expanding his airforces and missile capability.

India is capable of blocking Karachi as long as Pakistan stays with the first of the objectives defined earlier. It does not need to do more than to fight a war of attrition; that is, attrition of the Pakistan's oil reserves and other warlike supplies. Once they are reduced to the point of exhaustion, either Pakistan folds up or a settlement is arrived at through the good

22. Ibid, p.42.
offices of some big power or powers on the enemy's terms. He can carry through offensives by air and by land, not to achieve any strategic or tactical gains on the ground, but force Pakistan into consuming its reserves of oil and to curtail its defensive capacity.

Pakistan acquires the wherewithal to run the blockade of Karachi and to secure the approaches to the Gulf. It is no more feasible for the enemy to impel Pakistan into exhausting its strategic reserves. Pakistan can count upon benevolent neutrals to case the problems of the supply of the essentials of war. Warfare becomes then much more extensive, and correspondingly costly for the enemy. In order to bring fighting to a successful conclusion, it can increase its army and airforce and opt thereby for an escalation of war; or can add to naval potential to reinforce Karachi's defences.

The means which can be poured into an armament race are limited. It will lay greater stress on one rather than try to strike an even balance. The first possibility is likely to lead to a longer conflict. It would also leave the enemy exposed to submarine warfare, and this especially as an expansion of Pakistan's underwater capability would be an integral part of achieving the second of its objectives. The blockade of Karachi will ensure a quick end of the war-on terms favourable to the enemy.

Extraneous presences in the Arabian sea impose limitations upon local hegemonistic intentions. The stronger such a local
navy, the more an extraneous power has to put into the area to makes its weight felt. For outside powers, problems of logistics are much more complicated and expensive than for a regional state. In the game of showing the flag, some of the local powers enjoy a decided advantage, which support their diplomatic efforts in acquiring greater sympathy for their point of view in regional affairs.

None of the local powers can compete with a superpowers, despite some logistical advantage in the Afro-Asian Ocean but they can meet each other’s growing might. Iran has strengthened its naval position in the Gulf and is now stretching out into the Arabian Sea. In a few years from now, Iran’s presence in it will count for much. Apart from the fact that Iran can give Pakistan effective help in war. 23 Iran’s notable presence in that sea is not acceptable to India. To India, an Iranian build-up in the Arabian Sea is much worse than the naval presences of the superpowers. But India has at least the wherewithal to meet Iran at sea.

Truly it would be at great cost to its economy. The growth of Iran’s sea power impels it into such a course even without any cause attributable to Pakistan. A strong flotilla of submarines, coastal Craft, Strike aircraft, an anti-submarine system only can protect tanker traffic between Karachi and the Gulf. 24 A substantial build-up will impell the enemy into a more vigorous naval programme, and inevitably Pakistan will have to join the race. The

23. Ibid, p.43.
24. Ibid, p.43.
change of objective imposes upon the strategy considerations that alter its very quality. What is then the shape of the two navies in the event?

Pakistan pushes into Indian home waters a powerful flotilla of long and medium range submarines. India counters them with strengthened anti-submarine defences. Pakistan acquires bombers fitted with air-to-surface missiles so that they can attack Indian ships, while staying out of the range of their air defence; India adds an aircraft carrier capable of packing jet fighters to neutralise the bombers.

Pakistan acquires destroyers and frigates fitted with missiles to meet Indian ships probing the sea lanes between Karachi and the strait of Hormuz and to provide escorts for tankers as well as for other ships; India increases its surface strength to stay one punch ahead. India augments her underwater strength to attack shipping. Pakistan adds to submarine defences in the coastal belt.

India expands its air force so as to interdict the flow of oil, not merely into Karachi, but up-country as well, with the capacity to wreak destruction on industrial installations. The war at sea extends now to the air and to the land, with the principal burden falling on the Navy.

The acquisition of an offensive capacity draws Pakistan's purposes further out from her shores. The ability to keep the Indian Navy from the straits of Hormuz and their approaches cannot be encompassed by a protective screen reaching out that many
nautical miles. War at sea is essentially a war of movements. Pakistan's objective, that of mere protection of its shores, has but little built in offensive capacity. The weaponry needed for it is not adequate. Since it is basically accepted that action in war is primarily aimed at doing maximum damage to the enemy, offensive capacity will be used to the greatest possible extent. Physically it becomes feasible to stretch further is required merely for protecting the approaches to the straits of Hormuz. The Pakistan Navy will inexorably be drawn further out, and just as inexorably it will stretch its protective activities to the Bab el Mandeb, in order to secure the freedom of passage of merchantmen. In terms of prolonged war the civil-defence should be maintained and expanded. The inflow of warlike stores has to be ensured. This demands that the freedom of shipping to and from the Suez canal is safeguarded.

A long war requires of Pakistan to secure the whole of the northern section of the Afro-Asian Ocean, all the sea space located on the north of a line drawn from the Peninsula of Kutch to the Horn of Africa.

The protection of Pakistan's tanker traffic to and from the Persian Gulf will impel India into a naval build-up which Pakistan has to match. Any increment to Pakistan's strength so as to ensure the passage of merchantmen between Karachi and the Bab-el-Mandeb will only intensify the naval race. Since Pakistan is economically a weak country so it has to look for ways and means to redress the unfavourable balance. Its coast line runs for over 700 km which
it has to dominate and it starts to ahead of India for this security building of base facilities is necessary.

The assessment of navy is by Pakistan during the dynamic sea war which is now prevailed in the modern concept, is not possible to dominate the sea lanes to the Bab el Mandeb. With the strong naval force it is not possible to ensure the freedom of trade with the countries of East Africa. Communications between Pakistan and the ports on the eastern seaboard of Africa are short and direct. Trade can, therefore, develop readily. The imports & exports of African countries will also be affected in times of war of sea. Yet, that area will like to purchase Pakistani capital goods only if there is an assurance that the capital goods and the spare parts will be available in war.

The safeguarding of Pakistan's sea communications with the Far East can not be approached without Indian Mercy. No doubt Pakistan's sea connection with the china is very important. Against this stands the fact that it has to skirt the whole of India, all the time remaining exposed to Indian action on the surface, below it, and also above it.

The protection of the sea lanes connecting Karachi with the straits of Hormuz implies Pakistan into the concept of the totality of war without reservation and ensuring the safety of movement to and from the Bab el Mandeb. This amounts really to an effective

25. Ibid, p.45
pressure in the northern sector of the Arabian sea from Kutch to the eastern tip of Somalia. With this it becomes possible to afford protection to trade with the East African seaboard. Since India can not allow Iran’s build-up to go unchallenged, the armament race is an even without any provocation being offered by Pakistan, and Pakistan has already an option but to join it.

Pakistan's long coast-line by the area that has to be secured can be dotted with bases for the navy—at a price, but it is intended to pay. Pakistan's ships and aircraft will under these conditions be able to carry greater pay loads than their Indian adversaries, and their turn around time will be much shorter. This is of utmost importance since in this fashion Pakistan can match the Indian numbers with a lesser strength. It is feasible for Pakistan to dominate the air space in front of its coast for beyond the line we have drawn by means of a strong land based fleet air arm. Its aircraft can enter into this space from various directions. Whatever India can muster for detection it can not prevent the aircraft from operating. Its aircraft will either have to move in well defined axis to the coastline or from land, attacking Pakistan movements at sea from the rear; or else, they will have to fly far out to sea, to deliver attacks from different directions, with a greater expenditure of fuel and hence a reduced payload. 26

Pakistan has a large reservoir of trained and experienced

26. Ibid. p. 47.
seamen. There are found off fishing trawlers, in its merchant navy, on ships flying foreign flags. It is possible to convert them into fighting seamen with training and organisation. This will take time and money but it will be cheaper than to rely for the defence effort exclusively on the build-up of the navy. Once Pakistan's seamen are trained in the use of weapons, merchant ships can be refitted to carry out warlike operations in a limited way. With the defensive weapons Pakistani merchant ships will have the capacity to counter the Indian submarine warfare. Once Pakistan opts for waging a prolonged war, the ability to damage Indian shipping assumes crucial importance. India has an extensive overseas trade which forms a very important sector of its economy. It also depends heavily upon the import of good grains and in incapable of ever reaching self-sufficiency. Interference with its foreign trade in bound to damage seriously its war effort.

To protect the coast line drawn from Kutch to the Horn of Africa against attack from sea by ships, the domination of the sea space is essential for this purpose the infliction of maximum damage on the enemy navy in its home waters and during attempts to intrude into the sea space to damage on the enemy overseas trade on a global scale and raids on enemy installations on shore, disruption of the enemy's overseas traffic in distant waters by auxiliary cruisers and armed merchantmen. There should be following operational commands - as coastal defence including air defence, anti-submarine warfare, aerial warfare anti-reconnaissance flights, fighter protection and air strikes. Greater range missiles than artillery gun,
and heavier ships mounting missiles should be used. A move towards self-reliance in defence production will not only enhance the country's capacity to face actual aggression; it will act as a deterrent against aggressive designs. SAMs are useful against air attack would be useful and it will provide air umbrella over the sea of Pakistan, while at the same time keeping their numbers low. Coastal defence will then be based on artillery and missile emplacements close to likely coastal targets.

Since Pakistan trawler fleet is very big, it can easily be deployed densely, itself a consideration important in spotting submarines, keeping them under close observation if once found, and combating them. These high speed craft will have to comb large areas. A large number of Pakistan's are employed in the Gulf. They are used as civilian servicemen in peace and at the event of war they can be used for anti-submarine operations.

The more effective the operations of Pakistan's navy, the greater the deterrent effect of the bombers of the fleet air arm and the less the likelihood that enemy's non-o' war will move into the sea of Pakistan. Pakistan thought to phase them out and ultimately dispense with reliance on them for the purposes of seafar defence.

The strike arm of the naval air command needs bombers which can deliver asha on enemy ships; they will be practically invulnerable to the anti-aircraft defences mounted on enemy vessels. While Pakistan possesses such bombers the enemy ships will be
forced to stay out of the waters over which they can range. The acquisition of this weapon system will place Pakistan in an influential position in the northern sector of the Arabian sea. Not only will its trade with the west be safeguarded, but it will affect the use of the Suez canal by hostile forces. The economic penalty thereby imposed upon the enemy will be severe, and he will have to rely more and more upon vessels flying foreign flags. Pakistan naval bombers attacked by land-based aircrafts and this will be advantage to Pakistan to use several air bases for the purpose.

The ships engaged in anti-submarine operations escorts of merchantmen, bombers flying strikes against enemy targets may well need protection by fighter aircraft. But land-based bombers carrying NEMs can go far to establish Pakistan's dominance over the northern sector of the Indian Ocean i.e. Arabian sea and thereby afford protection to merchant ships and their escorts. Pakistan's sea-space has to be secured by surface vessels. They must be fast and modern, capable of holding their own against the modern frigates which India is now producing at home, and getting from abroad. Indian forays have to carry into Pakistan's air umbrella, imposing harsh requirements upon the attackers.

Once, however, Pakistan is committed to the protection of trade routes along the African coast, the need for frigates imme-

27. Ibid, p. 47
28. Ibid, p. 47
diately increases. The ratio in which Pakistan ought to match the opposing strength by rough estimate should be about a third of what the other side can field. During offensive activities of all types, the airial dominance over the area of combat will be decided first, and after that the question of the opposing flotilla slugging it out with their missiles will simply no more arise.

It follows that Pakistan does not require any missile boats to oppose those of India, missile carrying bombers will be able to perform the task, if necessary protected by high performance fighters. It does not appear feasible to commit Pakistani missile boats against targets on the Indian coast, unless tactical aerial domination can be ensured for the duration of the attack including the movement to, and again after wards away from, the target area area. Whether such conditions can be achieved is doubtful. The area north of the line running from Kutch to the Horn of Africa will come under the air cover of the Pakistan Navy, and further west one proceeds in it, the thinner this umbrella will become. Indian surface vessels will be able to intrude into the western reaches of that sea-space. India's need to keep open her trade routes through the Suez canal will drive her into breaking Pakistan’s effective influence in the approaches to the Bab el Mandab.3

A powerful force of Indian surface vessels composed of cruisers, frigates, destroyers and the aircraft carrier penetrates towards the approaches to the Bab el Mandab. This is opposed by a

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3. Ibid. p. 48
flotilla of Pakistani missile boats and frigates or destroyers. The Indian air cover consists of fighters from the 'Vikrant'. planes which cannot launch ASMs against the Pakistani missile boats; this job has to be left to land based bombers which, by virtue of the distance they have to fly, are handicapped in their payloads and in the time they can stay with the target.

The Pakistan air umbrella is provided by land-based fighters and by reconnaissance aircraft directing the fire of the missile boats. The distance from their bases reduces the time for which they can operate, but less than is the case with the Indian ASMs carrying bombers coming from Indian bases which are intercepted by Pakistani fighters before they reach the battle area. In such a setting Pakistani missile and their acquisition is justified. 30

The fleet of the Pakistan Navy should then consist of frigates and destroyers numbering approximately one-third of what India has plus an flotilla of missile carrying craft with an operational range up to and beyond the Bab el Mendab. The disruption of the opposing country's overseas trade will be the task of a separate command. The merchantships should be armed under international recognitions and retaining their peaceable character. This provision of very limited armament will enable the merchant ships to intercept such enemy vessels as they come across. Most meetings of armed Pakistani ships with enemy merchantmen will fall within

30. Ibid. p. 49
the realm of chance, and the total of pelagic warfare extended to a global scale will be of little practical effect. Arrivals and departures of merchant ships are well known routine. Pakistani recruit citizens try together the informations about the movement of enemy ships by getting training in the use of communications equipment and codes for the transmission of such information in Arabian sea.

International law allows the arming of merchant ships for defensive purposes while at the same time recognizing their civilian character. But if the merchant ships indulge in offensive hostile action against enemy, they will, thereby, lose their civilian character and be treated as warships. This thing does not want to test but this much will depend upon the attitude struck by individual countries, and they will certainly be guided by their respective policies in a conflict between India and Pakistan.

Impressing of merchant ships for warlike action against ships carrying the Indian flag will have some practical effect upon India in times of war. Its oversea trade will suffer and this will in turn diminish its potential to fight. This is so especially because India can not reach the often proclaimed and so often denied goal of self-sufficiency in food. In the event of a war food requirements in some areas might increase while some part of the productive labour force will be diverted to sustain the war effort. It is safe to presume that the need to import foodgrains will go up and any damage to the Indian carrying capacity will have its immediate effects. Since the import of foodgrains and other commodities also
has repercussions, large scale damage to Indian shipping will be projected over years and years into the future.

Much of the Indian overseas trade is carried by ships belonging to foreign countries. While they will normally not care much if armed Pakistani merchantmen attack and capture Indian flag carriers, they must be expected to take a very serious view if such action is taken against ships flying their flags, and care must be taken not to cause offense to neutrals.

Since any programme for a naval build up will take five years to materialise, taking an optimistic view and the need is to find an immediate redress for the imbalance at sea, the attack command needs to be organised right now. It becomes essential to impart training to Pakistan’s so that they can use the weapons which their ships will be provided with.

Foreign shipping lines will be reluctant to fly it if they fear that their ships are impressed into warlike actions. As and when naval activities are expanded so as to draw into their ambit ships and seamen of the merchant fleet, foreign enterprises basing themselves on Pakistan will have to be given assurances that their ships will not be impressed for warlike purposes. Such assurances need not extend to the provision of defensive equipment which even a foreign owner may find reason to welcome. Raids of Indian installations in Kutch or Kathiawar may become possible and even

32. Ibid. P. 50
necessary. This will require forces specifically trained for the purpose i.e. marines. Pakistan may wish to acquire the capacity to train large numbers of frogmen, and in order to do so, clubs should be set up.

The expansion of naval commitments will require the provision of additional shore facilities. For the purpose of Pakistan's navy, Karachi loses its significance once the objectives explained in the preceding pages are accepted. The protection of the approaches to the Gulf and to the Bab el Mandab, the provision of escorts for ships engaged in trade with the western seaboard of the Afro-Asian Ocean require that base facilities for them are established as far west as Pakistan's frontiers reach. Pakistan can build base facilities with its own personnel and given some limited imports, to a large extent also with its own industrial capacity. The correct action of naval bases will enhance the striking capability of the navy.

This goes for both the fleet of the navy and its air arm. The move of bases to the west will also bring fresh problems to the Indians when mounting air attacks on them: for they will have to traverse a much longer stretch of Pakistani territory than is the case with an attack upon Karachi, or else they will have to fly far out at sea with a consequent loss of payload.

The problem of easing the dangerous tension that has developed in the Arabian sea has lately become one of the major military and political problems of our time. Because of its strategic
Position the Arabian sea has become now a focal point of limiting the arms race and preventing the outbreak of new conflicts. The later is quite probable because of the unprecedented concentration of American naval forces, including two attack aircraft-carrier units.

Since 1978 when the Soviet-American talks on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the area broke off, the United States took steps to intensify its militaristic preparation in this area with the ultimate aim of establishing its permanent military strategic presence on the shores of Arabian sea. \(^{33}\) The number of warships of the U.S.A. and its allies from aggressive blocs now concentrated there. U.S.A. is expanding and modernising the existing military bases in the area, fulfilling plans of deploying there its ground forces or marines and creating a sea and shore based infrastructure to support naval operations there. A seminar on the problems of demilitarising the area in New Delhi in 1980 was held, where the concentration of military forces and establishment of bases was condemned but the United States ignored this and a qualitatively new situation in the area is being created by the accelerated militarisation of Pakistan.

In accordance with a recent agreement reached between Washington and Islamabad, the U.S.A. will annually supply Pakistan with 400 million dollars worth of arms and military equipment over the

\(^{33}\) International Affairs, Page 40.
next five years. 34 Such a manner the re-establishing U.A. air and naval bases on the territory of Pakistan is a subject of worry. Late Mrs. Gandhi stated that the U.S.A. intends to make Pakistan the Central link of the American strategy of defending the Persian Gulf.

China is making a determined effort to reunite Pakistan, too and trying a possible construction of a Chinese military base near Karachi. 35 China is further increasing its southern fleet which is intended first of all for operation in area and whole of the Indian Ocean. It is believed that the P.R.C.s military presence in the Indian Ocean area will inevitably lead to the further destabilisation of the already tense situation there. America and China both are determined for expanding, existing and creating new naval bases in that area. The policy of further stepping up the arms race in the Arabian sea pursued by Washington and its allies is a direct challenge to all the littoral countries. This course is totally at odds with their desire for a lasting peace in the region.

34. Ibid. P. 40.
35. Ibid. P. 41.
Strait of Hormuz

The strategic Hormuz strait and the Shatt-al-Arab have acquired enhanced strategic importance in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war. All the Gulf oil exports, over a quarter of the world's total supplies including 40% to the non-communist world, pass through the 30 miles wide and up to 235 feet deep Hormuz strait. More than 5,000 tankers and 800 million tonnes of oil annually move through this vital waterway. Moreover, 90% of Indian oil imports contracted for 1980 were to come from the Gulf oil refineries at the head of the Gulf and Shatt-al-Arab estuary. Sixty foreign vessels were trapped in the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. These included 22 Indian mechanised vessels with a crew of 400 standard at Basra and Fao. 47

Iranian navy claimed that it was in an undisputed control of the Hormuz strait, northern shores of the Gulf and their continental shelf. The waterway remained open for international traffic. Iran made it known that it had no intention to enforce blockade of waterway. Traffic in the strait was reduced because some shipping companies refused to risk their vessels and crew during the hostilities.

The U.S. stationed the largest ever international naval force of 50 to 60 war ships in the approaches to the Gulf and close to the Hormuz strait in October 1980, the first-ever show of strength by the western navies led by the U.S.A. in the region. The muscle-

flexing force included 35 U.S. warships led by two aircraft carriers, 5 French, 10 British, and 4 or 5 Australian warships. Interestingly, the U.S. sponsored multipower armada was deployed during the campaign preceding the U.S. presidential election in November.

A joint Anglo-American maritime exercise by 25 warships, 170 aircraft and 18,000 sailors, airmen and marines was held close to the region commencing 20 October 1980 as a show of force further exacerbating the explosive situation. Gulf Emirates feared that the sharp increase in U.S. military presence would prompt the Soviets to counter with matching military moves. The show of force was aimed to ensure that the strategic water way was kept open for international shipping, an unfettered access to oil and support for pro-west Gulf rulers. India had serious misgivings about the provocative move aimed at ensuring the continuous flow of oil by force, if necessary, as it carried with it the risk of further escalation.

The geopolitical significance of international waterways has gained added importance since all the major maritime nations taking part in the third U.N. conference on the land of the sea have asserted the right of overflight and unimpeded passage through the international straits. The principles of 'innocent passage' and transit passage through territorial waters, international straits, archipelagic waters and the 200 mile economic zones have been agreed to the satisfaction of major maritime powers. The revised

48. Ibid. P. 86.
49. Ibid. P. 86.
Informal Composite Negotiation Text (ICNT) put up in 1980 provides rights of navigation and overflights free of economic and political costs, 'transit passage' through international straits, especially less than 24 miles in width, and it applies to all ships whether on surface or submerged and includes the movement of warships and aircraft in military formation. All these concepts are in the "consensus basket" of the draft text of the sea law treaty.

The strait of Hormuz is of particular importance to the maritime countries, because it provides the outlet for tankers exporting oil from the Persian Gulf. Since Nov. 1971, when Iran took advantage of the British withdrawal to seize control of three islands in the strait, Iran has effectively controlled this outlet. There is no evidence that Iran would wish to interfere with traffic through the strait except to exert pressure on Iraq, with which Iran has a number of boundary disputes associated with the Shatt-al-Arab, the land boundary through Kurdish areas, and the division of the continental shelf at head of the Persian Gulf. It is noticeable that maritime countries, and especially the United States, have been at pains to establish cordial relations with Iran.

It therefore appears that in the contemporary situation this question of passage through international straits occupied by territorial waters is potential rather than actual. However the maritime

states, aware that claims to territorial water in excess of 12 nautical miles will extend this potential difficulty to a large number of international straits, would prefer such problems to be removed.

On average, two tankers an hour pass through the strait of Hormuz and it became clear since the war between Iran and Iraq that because of serious threat to the oil route through the Strait of Hormuz, western countries were much more interested in the prompt military protection of their energy supplies than in other considerations, and indeed that the Arab oil producers were themselves dependent on this passage remaining open, since it is their economic life-line. Iraq lacks Iran’s strategic significance due to the latter’s position astride the northern shores of the straits of Hormuz through which passes the bulk of the oil bound for sale on the international market. An agreement was made in 1975 between Iran and Oman for a joint naval supervision of strait of Hormuz. The Gulf oil is the most emphasised resource essential to the west and for this purpose the western countries have established their naval bases in the Arabian sea and on the shore of Persian Gulf. The threat of possible closure of the straits of Hormuz has received intense international attention, especially since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980. Large forces have been positioned in the vicinity to keep the straits ‘open’ and investments in arms supplies and security arrangements have been made in

52. Ibid, P. 110.
the region leading to expenditures of billions of dollars. An
alternative to the vulnerability of the straits of Hormuz "Chock-
point" could have been the construction of an oil pipeline by
passing the Chock-point and leading directly into the Arabian
sea. 53 The countries concerned are already part of a Gulf coopera-
tion council. Extending a pipeline from Kuwait to Masirah/Oman
(a distance of around 1000 miles) may well be in the order of
£ 200 million; a figure representing possibly one week's cost of
maintaining the naval armada near the straits of Hormuz.

The Persian Gulf

Persian Gulf is also one of the Gulf of the Arabian sea.
It separates the Arabian peninsula from the coast of Iran. The
shallow strait of Hormuz connects it with the Gulf of Oman. The
Gulf contains a number of islands which are the main cause of
conflict between the states of this region.

The Gulf covers an area of about 97,000 square miles. The
length of the Gulf from the coast of Oman to the northern head is
500 miles and from the Gulf of Oman to the south-east is another
200 miles. The former is 180 miles wide but the width narrows
down to 28 miles at the strait of Hormuz. The waters of the Gulf
are shallow and the maximum depth does not exceed 228 feet. 54

53. Ibid, P. 111

54. K. Asopa : Oil Arms and Islam in the Gulf - (Printwell Publi-
shers Jaipur), P. 4
Its north-western coast forms the part of Iran which is mountainous and almost without any streams. But it has few inlets which have been developed in good ports by Iran. The south-western coast of the Gulf forms the part of the Arab lands. The shallowness of the Gulf makes the southern coast unsuitable for harbours except for a Persian Gulf.

In the whole of the Indian Ocean no sea zone is more closely concerned with Indian than the Persian Gulf. India's links with it, dating from the Indus valley-Mesopotamian civilisation, are most ancient. Every time a dominant power arose in the Middle East, the Gulf became its base, from where control of the Arabian sea sectors was exercised. The repercussions were always felt in India. The India-based British strategy could never leave the Gulf alone and as the 1980s opened, the Persian Gulf became a glaring focus of confrontation between the super powers.

Eight states of the Middle East have coastlines on the Gulf. The only common thing along them is religion and all but Iran speak a common language; otherwise they differ in size, economic resources, political ideas and foreign orientations. Here there are kings and king breakers, rightists and leftists, the richest and poorest in the world and the liberal and the fanatic. Unrest, tension and conflict have had a field day here, marked by military coups, civil wars, assassinations, guerrilla operations and ethnic frictions.

The revolution in Iran and the war between Iran and Iraq are the high watermarks of the gross abnormalities around the Gulf.

Till the war between Iraq and Iran, these two countries along with Saudi Arabia were the three topmost oil-producing countries in the OPEC - and also the biggest buyers of arms in the Middle East. They were medium powers, closely connected with the power structure in the Gulf. That structure was largely conditioned by their alliances with super powers: Iran was a member of CENTO, Saudi Arabia links with the United States and Iraq had friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Efforts on their part to fortify and upgrade their military positions led to massive arms build-up, for which there was no ostensible reason other than mutual suspicion or some vague idea of ascendancy. This notion was imregnated with super power interests, the United States largely concentrating on oil and the U.S.S.R. on the security of one of its border lands. The upshot was that the Persian Gulf became the most heavily armed part of the Middle East and also the most sensitive, more than the Red Sea because here the super powers faced each other directly. 56 There are three factors concerned with the balance of the region: super power interests, relations between the three major local powers, and oil. These were variable according to time and circumstances. Wars and revolutions destroyed the alliance picture, but that only intensified India's interest.

56. Ibid. P. 115.
India's interest in the Gulf would be threefold. The potential of sophisticated, long-range weapons, the emergence of base facilities for their use, and the unpredictable ambitions of powers around the Gulf had all extra-regional nuances that affected India, particularly in its relations with Pakistan. Secondly, the massive confrontation of superpowers in the area had brought conflict right at India's doorsteps. Thirdly, the whole development threatened India's principal source of oil import as well as the security of its own offshore oil producing sector. 57

In any strategic development, oil would be an important factor. India had struck oil offshore west of Bombay and in 1982 has ambitious plans to search for more in the vicinity. This along with a great variety of installations would have to be protected. Much more than the locally produced crude was the quantity of oil coming from Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia; thus, the north-east of the Arabian sea assumed a crucial importance because it contained the transportation lines.

For the first time, therefore, India would be forced to restructure its strategy in terms of the Arabian sea. The distances involved were not long and India had the resources to cope with contingencies arising in the area. New Delhi would seek to keep on friendly terms with the disparate Gulf states, but it could not take chances. India's maritime power would thus be influenced by

57. Ibid, P. 115.
what was happening in the Gulf, which meant more and better ships for high seas operations, long-range naval-air arm, and more fortified bases on the west coast.

On the whole, close linkage between the India subcontinent and the Middle East, in particular the Persian Gulf, would be an important feature of the 1980s. This could be based upon peaceful intercourse, of which history has provided an example. But history is also reminiscent of something quite the reverse, for the waters off the Persian Gulf and off Gujarat have been the scene of armed clashes in the past. Military power is being escalated in both the regions of the Persian Gulf and the Indian sub-continent, and this is not merely in terms of local compulsions; a time is likely to come when it would be measured on the regional scale.

The most important is the Bay of Kuwait which in the past served as the Chief port of the region. Another Bay is at Dubai. In most of the oil ports of the Gulf, ships anchor at a distance and oil is shipped by pipes. At the northern extremity of the Gulf is the silt plain of Iraq and Iran built up by the Shatt-al-Abad, the Common estuary of the Euphrates and Tigris joined by Karakah and Karun rivers of Iran. This area being cultivable and fertile is most thickly populated. Most of the shores of the Gulf are arid and uncultivable.

The important of the Gulf also lies in its being the shortest sea route connecting Europe with the lands of Asia. The Gulf served as a major route for maritime trade through which goods
possessions in India.

In consolidating their hold over the Gulf region, British entered a number of treaties with the local Amir and Sheikhs which gave them enormous powers. The naval paramounty of the British in the Gulf came into conflict with the Russian desire to expand in this direction and counter the German ambition also towards this region when they contract from the Ottoman Empire to construct the Constantinople-Bagdad Railway line (1899) to be extended later upto Kuwait.  

The increasing German interest and initiative in the Gulf region brought Russia and Britain closer to each other which resulted in the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. According to this convention, Britain undertook to accommodate Russian interests in the Gulf region and adjoining areas. Britain also concluded an agreement with Kuwait in 1891 which debared the latter from entering into any negotiations with the external powers without the Consent of the British. By the end of the 19th century, Britain consolidated its position in the Gulf through treaties with Oman, Muscat, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the Sheikhdoms.

Britain's oil interests also need to be mentioned. Britain had acquired oil concessions in Iran as early as 1901 and established the Anglo-Iranian oil company in 1909. Britain had to share these oil concessions with the United States by accepting it as a

59. Ibid, P. 117.
partner in this oil deal. The oil contest led to the partition of the Gulf region between large companies of the West.

After II W.W. Britain emerged more stronger than ever before as now it was the sole claimant of power in the Gulf region except Iran. Iran under Shah Reza Khan posed problems for Britain. During II W.W. the Gulf owing to its geo-political and strategic importance and vast oil reserves became vulnerable to Nazi and Fascist expansionist designs. The mounting pressure from the Arab nationalist posed serious threat to British power and influence in West Asia. Iran along with Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey had proclaimed the policy of strict neutrality through the Saadabad Pact in 1937. 50 It weakened the British defence system, so Britain felt once again the need of befriending Russians and formed an agreement of January 1942 forced Iran to abandon the policy of neutrality. Simultaneously, British armed intervention in Iraq suppressed the anti-British government of Al-Caylani and Britain entered the process of winding up its power in most of the Arab territories.

The termination of its empire in India and the growth of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements in the newly emergent countries made it difficult for Britain and France to hold on their rule in the west Asian regimes as well. Britain had to relinquish its power in all the Arab States except Sheikdoms.

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In the Post War period, the U.S.S.R. refused to vacate the Iranian province of Azerbaijan and supported the secessionist Tudeh Party and demanded for a joint control over the Black sea. The result was that all the countries situated at its southern periphery threatened to their independence. The creation of Israel in the heart of the Arab lands and the west's drive brought them more closer through military pacts and alliances further aggravated the danger to the independence of the West Asian states. The Arabs mounted pressure on the west for the liberation of their territories and termination of the unequal treaties which had placed the natural resources of the area under the control of the colonial powers. Thus the super powers conflict began to start in this region. American involvement in Lebanon and Israel and arms supplies to Iran, Jordan and Israel grew rapidly. Due to this the Soviet Union also increased its involvement with the radical states of this region and started giving military aid to Syria, Egypt and Iraq. In this way the Soviet influence posed a threat to traditional Arab monarchies. President Nixon offered his Qan Doctrine (1969), 61 to the Arab nationalists which was simply an extension of Indo-China policy to west Asia which aimed at building military installations, naval bases and air fields in the region under the pretext of preparing the local states to defend themselves and their resources. But in the aftermaths of the Iranian revolution, the American strategy was updated through carter

Doctrine of 1980 formulated the salvage the western interests in the Gulf region. The Indian sub-continent was a very low political priority by Washington. After the end of Vietnam war, the Persian Gulf sub-region became the centre of American interests in the Arabian sea. Outside pressure on the Gulf region during the 1980s will however be much more intense than was that on ASEAN countries and internal tensions will be at least as great due to energy crisis of 1973 and Iran-Iraq War of 1973 and OPEC policy of oil price increases, production cuts and a boycott which was called a oil weapon used as the political instrument together with economic measures, for the specific purpose of exerting on the west pressure that would have a decisive effect on the Arab-Israel conflict.

United States activities were condemned by all the countries of Gulf region except Oman and Soviet Union gained a chance to continue her important political activities against United States which gave it potential access to the Gulf. Its support for these Arab aims made it valuable as a possible ally. The Islamic Summit at Taif (Saudi Arabia) in January 1981 showed clearly where the emphasis lay with regard to the super powers, for in spite of being handicapped by Afghanistan, the Soviet Union came off better than the United States.

Brezhnev's proposal of Dec. 1980 to all concerned powers
to safeguard the Gulf region met with no response in the region because of the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet Union and it was treated as a countermove, to the Carter Doctrine of January 1980. On account of this the Gulf region had developed into a dangerous grey area between the antagonistic power blocs and a crisis management among the major powers.

The Gulf States are realistic in that they primarily fear those threats to their security which are the most obvious: domestic unrest, sabotage, espionage, intra-regional conflicts and so on. To counter act these threats they are attempting to develop closer cooperation in those areas which affect their security. To guard against this continuous opponent possible activity of super powers in this region, they are in a way to adopt a formula of Peace zone concept. The western powers were much more interested in the prompt military protection of their supplies than in other considerations since it is their economic life line too, if any internal or external attack was made there.

The Gulf region is likely to remain highly unstable because of internal political and social factors. The Gulf is significant to the Western allies for their arms sale and to make themselves economically strong and weak to them for their use against others. It is astonishing that the conservative Gulf regimes, for their narrow interests of maintaining the traditional political structures.

62. Ibid. P. 33.
at home have opted for massive militarization instead of utilizing their financial resources in the internal development.

The west's Gulf policy should therefore be shaped predominantly by a sense of shared responsibility for a region which can no longer be western domain, but which substantially consolidates the foundations of its economics and of its security. The linkage between oil, arms and Islam developed at the detriment of the people of this region has exposed the Gulf to disintegrating forces both from within and outside.
Gulf of Aden

Gulf of Aden is situated between the southern coast (North and South Yemens) of Arabland and Africa. It is 900 kms. long and 320 kms wide. The strait of Bab-al-Mandeb, which is at its western end, connects it with the Red sea. It is twice as long as the Gulf of Oman. Bab-al-Mandeb which in Arabic means 'gate of tears and sorrows', is 27 kms wide. Its Arabic name is very appropriate in view of its complete hold over ships from or on route to Suez canal and its consequent capability of bringing the ship captains and crews to tears and sorrows. The rocky island of Perim is situated in this strait.

Aden is a fuelling station for both the naval and merchant ships and is therefore, of vital strategic importance. Rather the Gulf of Aden is in the north of the Arabian sea. In the north-west, the Arabian sea juts into the Persian Gulf. The entry of this Gulf from the east side is controlled by the island of Socotra. For ages it had been the home waters of the Arab corsairs, who had their base in Aden, a covered and almost hidden post on the coast of the tip of Arabia.

The last quarter of the 19th century was a period of increasing anxiety in Britain about problems of imperial defence. It was

37. Ibid, p. 20.
a period of industrial revolution and serious challenges. Britain had to look to her defence and to her outposts along the sea routes of the globe. The colonial rivalry was begun and there could be no doubt of Aden's importance in the new state of Affairs. After the opening of the Suez canal in 1869 a tight cluster of sea routes bent southward through the Red sea and fanned out east, south-east and south-west ward from the Bab-el-Mandeb to British possessions in India and Africa. Aden now ranked among the most important possessions of the British crown. 39

Aden is about half way between Suez and Bombay. It is a strategic station on one of the chief high roads of the world and has a good harbour which was strongly fortified by Great Britain. Aden occupies a commanding position on the southwest point of Arabia at the head of the Persian Gulf & looks at the horn of Africa. Britain paid much attention to the development of the Aden harbour since it linked the Mediterranean and the Arabian sea and guarded the entrance to the Red Sea from the east as Gibraltar did from the west. She considered it essential to maintain a large naval force in Aden to safeguard her interests in the region.

Aden's strategic importance was certainly much greater than when it had been a half forgotten appendage of the Bombay presidency during the days before the Suez canal project was conceived. Aden as the guardian of the main lifeline of the Empire seemed very

such less obvious. Some defence experts were saying that the Suez canal route could not be counted on in wartime because it could too easily be blocked by sunken ships. 40 Such a view was further reinforced by the rapid growth of French naval strength in the Mediterranean in the late 1880s and a development of Russian Black Sea naval power. By the 1890s it was generally assumed that wartime communication with India would be maintained via the Cape. The Indian Govt. continued to cite the tonnage of British merchant shipping using Aden for purposes of fund-raising in London for Aden defences, but at last it was found that Aden was less capable for protection of commerce than of sealing off the Red Sea should the canal fall into enemy hands. In this way in 1903 it was assessed as being of very doubtful importance. 41

Between 1880s and 1904 Britain's naval position in the Mediterranean was uncertain and Aden's strategic role had not greatly changed from the days when its possession would make very strong in those parts of influence. Therefore after 1863, an unarmed steamer was placed there to maintain contact with the adjacent coasts.

Nevertheless Aden's seaward defences were substantially improved in the 40 years prior to W.W.I. The invention and improvement in military technology impressed and influenced the fortresses

40. Ibid. P. 174.
41. Ibid. P. 176.
defence, so the Aden with others acquired additional value and got its new defences.\footnote{Ibid, P. 176.}

Aden had always been a well-defended place. The nature of Aden had been changed in broader sense. It meant that military security was given absolute priority over all other considerations. When Aden had first been occupied it had been regarded as a centre of commercial influence as well as a military base. Aden was commercially prosperous. The key to Aden’s new prosperity was the coal buckering business and the opening of the Suez canal in 1869. Aden’s fortunes were also bound to those of the steamships which it served and steam was still not in a position to displace sail in 1869. Sailing ships still provided cheaper carriage for goods in bulk. By 1883 the coal buckering business at Aden seemed poised for an even greater boom due to the competition from the island of Perim. After 1890 the cutthroat competition ceased and Aden reacquired its earlier important position. Aden had the appearance of one of the finest natural harbours in the world.\footnote{Ibid, P. 182.} There the Choppy water was supplied from the shaykh Ulhman wells. Aden was not much deep harbour, so there were so many problems in case of loading and buckering of coal bags, and they could not be thrust through the port with that celerity which was so desirable. The Aden harbour had dredged in 1890, after an act setting up the Aden port trust was passed in Bombay. Aden was still under the Presi-
dency of Bombay but no Governor of Bombay was willing to spend capi-
tal sums on anything except Bombay garrison army. Aden served the
purposes of British rather than Indian foreign policy and as for
the port, the shipping which used it was far more British than
Indian. There were proposals during 1861 to 1900 that Aden should
be transferred entirely to the Home Government. But the Indian
Government was not willing to relinquish all control while the
British Treasury had no desire to pay the expenses of the settle-
ment. This was the difficulty in the way of the improvements to
Aden harbour.

In 1891 Indian Government was willing to lend money to the
Aden Port Trust once it saw that by so doing it would not saddle
itself with unlimited responsibility. By 1895 Aden began to breathe
again by completing the dredging scheme. The dredging and re-dred-
ging of the harbour kept Aden competitive against rivals half way
across the globe for the custom of the increasingly long ranged
steamers that could now pick and choose their refuelling depots.

The massive flow of shipping through the port helped Aden
gather up the greater part of the commerce in its immediate vicin-
nity. Goods were turned over fast by Aden merchants and telegraphic
communication enabled them to buy and sell at the most profitable
price. Aden was now a main station on the telegraph route between
Europe and the East through Arabian sea. The advantages in charge
payment and facilities were given to those steamers who linked
Aden with other ports along the coast. The businessmen at Aden
steadily secured a domination over the commerce of the whole area
including with Arabian sea area. Aden was a most strategical and a multiracial market place. Aden was as overcrowded as before and therefore the unemployment was also taking place there. Stern measures were taken about outsiders from time to time by Government to repel these invaders of its fortress from point of view of security.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the idea that the state should intervene to promote social welfare was gaining ground in Britain and India, and this had its effect at Aden. The population of Aden was quite amenable to the prevailing methods of administrative control and every government attempt to alter the pattern of economic and social life in the port. In 1866, a new attempt was made through schooling the people of Aden in English and Arab based institutions.

During this period the economic and social links between Aden and the hinterland became of less importance than the purely political connection. Trade and politics became less closely integrated and in Aden the British authorities became concerned less with keeping the landward trade routes open than with obtaining an internationally recognised frontier which would more directly secure the hinterland of the fortress and the entrepot.

The British foreign secretary said in March 1903 that we

44. Ibid. P. 227.
have never desired to interfere with the internal and domestic affairs of the tribes in Aden and should not be interfered with by any other power. In this way we can say that British adopted non-intervention policy in Aden but they were heavily involved in tribal politics and very soon discussion developed in Aden about methods of political control.

Aden was a bustling port with strong defences and a powerful modern minded commercial community and improved facilities of every kind. Aden itself fed on the trade and ideas of a developing world where massive investment in railways, mines and commercial agriculture was taking place and progress and development were proposed by imperial agents since. Hence they attempted to try to attract the Asians and Africans after 19th Century.

Now Aden became successful to expand its amenities and prosperity into the neighbouring country and in this time a member of new projects were initiated as opening of dispensaries, colleges, recruitment of tribesmen into force and financial assistance to agricultural development etc. But these were being put in the bag till further decision on account of the threat of Turkish attack.

In 1906, when the liberal Party Government came in power, the new secretary for India was Lord Morley and Viceroy was Lord Minto. They were against the previous development plans and wanted to give a direction to India of self-government gradually and this policy was affected to Aden also. The paramountcy of power politics in industrial Europe with its immense and growing armaments gradually prevailed, the importance of local and independent prog-
tection of imperial posts like Aden correspondingly declined.

On 4 May 1906, a long despatch was sent to government of India calling for a complete change in policy. It was also directed to withdraw all the troops from the hinterland and no military operations were to be conducted beyond a ten-mile radius from Aden without the permission of the secretary of state. Frontier questions were to be handled through diplomatic channels in Europe and not by action on the spot. India reacted sharply to his attack on so many of their pet schemes and on the suggestion of Aden for dealing directly with the minor shaykhs in the Aden hinterland and rejected it. Indian government said that if the home government wanted to run Aden in their own way they should take over full financial and political responsibility for the settlement. This affected the secretary of state who delayed the withdrawal of the troops from Aden for the duration of a serious diplomatic crisis on the Egyptian frontier at Akaba but the home government was seemed uncompromising in tone on this. The occupation of Aden derives its main importance from its relation to the general foreign policy of the Empire and it was not regarded as another province of British India.

British activity in the hinterland altered and became more subdued but it could not return completely to the status quo ante demarcation. Moreover, the Aden government had a clearer idea of

46. Ibid, p. 236.
how Arab society worked and it could now pursue a more coherent and purposeful course of action within the limits laid down by London. New national consciousness has started taking place in Arab world and British government was anxious to this radical change. So she adopted a policy of close co-operation with popular personalities of there and through them the facilities were started sanctioning those who had favourable attitudes to government. Inspite of all this the political unrest had been started there and the social reform was had to be cracked and power fighting between and among the groups or tribes had to be seen also there.
Red Sea-Subway

This region is a cross road between Asia, Africa and Europe; through it passes the shortest route between Europe and the East. Economically the Red Sea itself has been found on exploration to have considerable mineral wealth. It is located in close proximity to the world’s richest oil source, the Persian Gulf and its value as a means of transportation of Middle East oil to Europe is considerable. Politically it is split into ten independent states. Here, there has been a civil war between the two Yemens, Guerilla war in Ethiopia and the great wars between Israel and Arabs. Religions variations, differentials of size and economic resources, dissimilar political norms, and clashing ideologies are emerging. Here mutual confrontation, bick rings, suspicious and backdoor politics occur on a scale unparalleled in the world.

India and the Red Sea zone have had connected with each other for over 3000 years. Curiosity, desire for trade and pursuit of maritime power were the chief incentives. More recently, the two outstanding developments have been the opening of the Suez Canal and the breakup of the sub-region into several political units.

The powerful influence of the 151 km long waterway upon India dates from the days of the British for whom it cut the distance from home bare to India by seven thousand miles. The Suez became an inseparable link that bound India to Britain. After the British the main value of the canal has been as an ocean high-
way that provides India the shortest route to Europe. However, the changing fortunes of the region have rendered it unreliable. It was little used during W.W. II, was closed in 1956 with the outbreak of hostilities between Egypt and Anglo-French combine, reopened, then closed again in 1967 till 1975, when over 10,000 bombs and mines were spotted and cleared and it came into use again. 63 India like the rest of the world, has now learnt to live with a situation in which the canal is as good as non-existent. The route via South Africa is long and expensive but not prohibitive. Besides if Indian goods can not go to Europe via the Canal, neither can the goods from Europe arrive by the same route. Thus, India's trade with the middle East and upper African encounters less competition.

Other forces are at work, barring Israel and Ethiopia the region is Muslim. The movement of Islam west of the Middle East into Africa has been an old phenomenon. The movement is faster and goes deeper. Whatever the outcome of the external thrusts against Israel and internal struggle in Ethiopia. These two states have no place in the Islamic or at least Arabian scheme of things. A religiously motivated struggle must be reckoned as a long-term affair.

But the Red sea is more than a conglomeration of sub-regional states. The two super powers have interests. The NATO and

63. M.K. Chopra, India & The Indian Ocean, P. 116
Warsaw pact powers have interests. This would become an arena of world power confrontation in inevitable. It is likely to take two forms, one marked by actual presence of the powers and the other by proxy. Eastern Mediterranean to the north and Arabian sea to the south witness continuous jostling for commanding positions on the part of super powers, in the course of which alignments take place between them and the local powers, making confusion worse confounded. 64

There is no single power in the sub-region that can tower over the rest. Egypt's attempts in this field is now an old tale. The imperatives of power balance operate both in the sphere of local powers and that of the super powers. In neither case the equilibrium has been established. The Arab-Israeli conflict is far from settled, but even if it were the inter-Arab feuds could continue to stoke fires in this part of the world. And as for the super powers, their future in the area fluctuates under the stresses of global strategy, the ebb and flow of influence in the region, and domestic policies.

One envisages the Red Sea as an amazingly complex zone, to remain a witches, cauldron in the foreseeable future. India can do little about it, but that really does not matter. Apart from providing a good communication line, which again can be dispensed

64. Ibid, p. 117.
with, the Red sea is of no direct interest to India, although the
shock waves of events happening here do reach the Indian shores.
Because of the distance and the interplay of extra-ordinarily
varied and powerful forces, India is not capable of exercising
maritime influence in the subregion. And so far as the regional
states are concerned, none of them is powerful enough to be eff-
ective in the Arabian sea and is no threat to India located so far
away.

The development of a crisis area at the entrance to the Red
sea did not come as a surprise. In past years, there have not
only been occasional open conflicts and incidents of fighting,
which to be sure were for the most part restricted to regional
importance. This region has provided a veritably classical stage
for the development of regional conflicts in general in terms of
the multiplicity of potential factors which could lead to conflicts
since these formerly colonial regions became independent.

As long as this area was only considered to be an appendix
to other, more important, stages of international political and
economic importance, it was possible to ignore the storm warnings
over the entrance to the Red Sea and assume that they did not
constitute any threat. However, this situation has changed since
1973 by various factors which are extremely different in terms of
origin, political importance and ramifications:

(a) The reopening of the Suez Canal in June of 1975 trans-
formed the Red Sea from an appendix to the Arabian sea
into a major artery in terms of economic and strategic importance between the Arabian sea and the Mediterranean. Its economic importance with respect to the Transport of oil and freight, to particular aspects of its military importance, must also be taken into account - Istly, a link has been provided between the Mediterranean and the Arabian sea which permit the movement of naval vessels between both bodies of water and secondly, the Red sea has also become more important to both parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The naval units from the Mediterranean to the Red sea increases the threat to the Israeli oil route from Iran to Kilat.

(b) Since 1973, Arab pretensions of making an Arab sea out of the Red Sea have led to an active security policy on the part of the Arab countries lying on the shores of Red sea. This should be seen against the background of the Arab world's attempts to appear as a guarantor of political order in all areas of immediate interest to these countries in the wake of the increase in power resulting from the energy crisis and the attempts to exclude the superpowers.

(c) The growth and the political importance of the Red sea is in the end a reflection of the importance in terms of international politics which the Arabian sea has attained in the context of the world wide balance of power between East and West.

Rann of Kutch

From January 1965 manoeuvres by Pakistan army were noticed in the district of Kutch. Soon after, the Indian Foreign Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh, informed the Parliament that Pakistan had built a new track to facilitate movement of their vehicles south of Kanjarkot fort in the Kutch which according to him "was well within Indian territory." He also disclosed that Pakistan border forces were putting obstructions of India patrols proceeding North of this track. Pakistan on the other hand stated that in February 1965 Indians had started building up forces in this area and in spite of Pakistani efforts to dissuade India from having recourse to fighting, it appears that Indian leaders were, 'itching to plunge their country into war, no matter what the consequences were." However it appeared that both India and Pakistan were not prepared to surrender their stands on Kutch Border dispute and would not hesitate to resort to force if necessary. The Kutch affair was a warning of the intentions and events likely to follow.

The area of Rann of Kutch is nearly 320 miles long and approximately 50 miles wide with a total area of nearly 8000 sq. miles. This is nearly one-half of the Kutch (17600 sq.miles). The Rann is submerged by the waters of the Arabian sea from May


to October and for remaining six months it becomes a salry and sandy desert. The bed of the Rann is dry and hard and there has been no sign of vegetable life. The area is barren and uninhabitable even during the six dry months because during this period it transorms into a salty and sandy desert. The region is better accessible from Sind than from Indian side. Politically the Rann of Kutch is a border area of Indian with Pakistan, and border lands however difficulties its terrain may be are always of strategic and political significance. They mark the terminus of territorial jurisdiction of two or more sovereign states. From this view they have international status.3 The strategic importance of the area according to Pakistani view was that as the Rann was close to Karachi it was vital for Pakistan to hold this area and any Indian control in this region would permit an advance deeper into Sind and cut-off West Pakistan in two as the only rail and road communication between Lahore and Karachi were along the eastern bank of India.4 This view clearly indicated Pakistani apprehensions and hence it was logical for Pakistan to strengthen her line of communications in the area and also occupy strategic points. It was in this background that Brig. Gulzar Ahmad in his book "Pakistan Meets Indian Challenge" observed that "it is regrettable that Pakistan has so

far only claimed north half of the Rann...." He further justified his statement by saying "the reason is that Pakistan has always contended that Rann is an inland area and as such should be divided equally between the bordering states. He writes that in actual practice the Sind Government held administrative control of the whole of Rann throughout the British period."

The Indian view on the other hand was that before independence, the Rann formed part of the territory of the princely state of the Kutch. (This is substantiated by the preparation survey of Indian maps). Following the partition and separation of Sind as the part of the newly created Pakistan, the need arose for the demarcation of the international boundary between Kutch and Sind. Accordingly the ruler of Kutch sought from Karachi such a demarcation on the recognized and de facto boundary between Sind and the Rann. Pakistan took the stand that the entire northern half of the Rann was a territory in dispute. Between 1947 and 1965 the Government of India and Pakistan exchanged various notes on the question without any result. Pakistani contention was that as the border between India and Pakistan ran through the middle of the Rann, the dispute involved some 3500 sq. miles of the territory. The dispute was first discussed at diplomatic level in January 1960, when it was decided that both sides would collect further data and discuss the question. No further effort, however, was made to solve the dispute, until January 1965.

5. Ibid. P. 65.
Border incidents began to take place with increasing frequency from January 1965. On 25 January, 1965 an Indian police patrol noticed a recently laid out 20 mile track by Pakistanis north of the Kanjarkot for which according to the Indian claims was over a mile inside the Indian Border. Between January and April strong protests and statements both from Indian and Pakistani leaders were made to confirm that both sides were preparing for a showdown. To make matters worst Pakistan in March 1965 save away over 2000 sq. miles of Indian territory in the state of Jammu & Kashmir to China which further annoyed India as she treated this as an act of aggression against her territories.\(^7\) Pakistan Foreign Minister Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutta alleged and made strong protests against India also for organising provocations on the East Pakistan border.\(^8\) However, till 9th April, the Kutch episode remained confined to probing patrols and an exchange of angry notes. On 10th April Pakistani forces launched a major attack in brigade strength of Indian posts in the Rann area. Simultaneously the Pakistan Foreign Minister also stated that "he was not happy over the border conflicts and wanted the two sides to negotiate for a settlement."\(^9\) The Indian Prime Minister also favoured negotiations but warned Pakistan that, "India would not permit aggression on her frontiers and may have to adopt other means

\(^7\) The Time of India, March 7th, 1965.  
\(^8\) Times (London), March 18th, 1965.  
to get "the aggression vacated." This statement of Shastri was interpreted by Pakistan as a challenge. In its editorial dated 17th April Pakistan, leading daily 'Dawn' wrote that the motive behind the habitual belligerency of India as of course the big nation chauvinism which finds its expression in the ever increasing tendency to bully India's smaller neighbours. It blamed India for a series of aggression into Pakistan's Borders, and regarded it as New Delhi's impatience to put the country's bloated strength to the test. The editorial comment that to boost the morale of armed forces after bitter memories of the 1962 India-China Conflict to divert the attention of her people from the miseries due to failure of Congress Government, language issue, lower international prestige, India has resorted to an easy alternative of creating border tensions. The editorial further commented that as arguments for continuing the 1962 emergency were wearing thin. New Delhi was trying to stroke up conflicts along the border to create fresh justification for prolonging the emergency.

In early April, there were ding-dong battles in the Rann of Kutch punctuated by peace overtures. On April 13th Pakistan proposed a cease-fire. Five days later, the Indian Prime Minister renewed the No-war pact offer to Pakistan. India felt that what Pakistan chooses unilaterally to call a disputed territory is in fact undisputably Indian. With this stand

the diplomatic stalemate was complete. Shortly after, both India and Pakistan announced alert for their armed forces followed by major clashes in which even tanks were used. In the last week of April Pakistan stepped up concentration of forces on Rajasthan border as well as on the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir area. This was followed by the Indian counter action. 13 It was during this period that Ayub chose to make a statement that India is unnecessarily making a fuse about the Kutch and urged negotiations to settle the "useless quarrel. 14 Bhutto also accused India for aggravating the trouble and stated that Indian action in Rann closely followed a familiar pattern adopted by her in case of Hyderabad, Junagarh and Jammu and Kashmir. 15 On May 1st President Ayub also made a reference to Shastri's threat, "to fight Pakistan on the battle-ground of India's own choice and declared that this would result in a general and total war between two countries. While the fighting in the Rann of Kutch area was on allegations and counter allegations were being made, the foreign powers were too initiative and made efforts to end the hostilities. Both India and Pakistan knew fairly well that the Rann, worthless in itself, almost uninhabited and due for submergence soon, cannot be a battle-ground for long. This was obvious from the Indian attitude as she was giving a low military

14. Ibid.
priority to the Kutch affair inspite of Pakistan's repeated large-scale attacks and use of tanks in this terrain. The British initiative and efforts to press India and Pakistan to agree to a ceasefire in the Rann of Kutch appeared optimistic as these were communicated to the two governments on 4th May. The Soviet Union did not appreciate the British mediation and on 8th May appealed to India and Pakistan to settle the conflict in the Rann of Kutch through bilateral negotiations without interference from any outside power. The Americans endorsed the British proposal but were unhappy that Pakistan preferred to use the American Aid military hardware in Kutch operations. The Chinese, however, blamed India for carrying out the U.S. scheme of making, "Asians fight Asians and disrupting Afro-Asian solidarity." 18

Although the two countries in the first week of April had virtually decided not to indulge in further hostilities in the Rann of Kutch area but officially an agreement for a ceasefire was signed on 30th to be effective from 6 A.M. on July 1st. The preamble of the agreement said, that within a month of the ceasefire ministers of the two governments would meet to determine the border in the light of their respective claims and make arrangements for its demarcation. If no agreement was

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
reached between the ministers within two months of the ceasefire, the two governments would proceed to set-up a tribunal to decide the issue. This tribunal was to have three members, none of whom would be an Indian or a Pakistani. As the Foreign Ministers of two countries could not meet within two months the matter was left to be decided by a tribunal consisting of Nasrulla Entzan, and Irani diplomat (nominated by Pakistan) L.S. Sebler, a Yugoslav Judge (nominated by India), Judge Gunnar Lagergren of Sweden as Chairman (nominee of Secretary General). This tribunal gave its verdict on 19th February, 1969 awarding about 350 sq. miles in the northern part of the disputed Rann of Kutch to Pakistan and the rest to India. The area which India got in award was mostly sea-marsh, often under water, while Pakistan's share included some crucial elevation points. Though neither side had got all it wanted there was much more criticism of the tribunal's decision in India than in Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi who had succeeded late Lal Bahadur Shastri as Prime Minister in January 1966 resisted all suggestions to nullify the award or to delay its implementation. The curtain on this episode was rung down at Islamabad on 4th July 1969 when Indian and Pakistani pleni-potentiaries signed the last documents and maps, in token of finally ending this dispute.

19. S.M. Burke : Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, pp.325-326.
A large section of the Indian intelligentsia did not appreciate the Indian decision of referring the Kutch issue to an International Tribunal. They had earlier seen the Pakistani game in the Kutch. In fact it was expected that Pakistan will certainly be a grainer in the bargain however small it may be. It was also realised that Kutch was simply a stepping stone of what was to follow in Kashmir. India in fact played in the hands of foreign powers by agreeing to refer the issue to an international tribunal. Pakistan, on the other hand succeeded in her game to gain elevated points in the Rann of Kutch through the International Tribunal. She was confident that if similar conditions can be created in Jammu and Kashmir also her Western friends may once again succeed in referring the Kashmir issue also on the Kutch pattern.

Infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir

Although the Kutch ceasefire agreement was signed on 30th June, 1965. Pakistan's troops were concentrating in aggressive posture all along the India-Pakistan border on the western front from April onwards. This fact was brought to the notice of U.N. Security Council on 28th May as it posed a serious threat. India by that time had information that Pakistan for some time have been preparing for action in Kashmir. Pakistan in fact had planned 'Operation Gibraltar' across

the ceasefire line in Kashmir in May 1965 with a aim to infiltrate large-scale regular army and armed civilian Mujahids (fighters for the faith). The headquarters of this operation was to be Murree under the command of Major Gen. Akhtar Hussain Mallik, G.O.C. 12 Division. President Ayub Khan also addressed the officers of the 'Operation Gibraltar'. Gibraltar force was given intensive training in guerrilla tactics and was instructed to raid across the border headquarters of Indian army formations, supply and ammunition dumps, destroy bridges, lay ambushes disrupt line of communication and attack troops convays and pro-Indian leaders. These infiltrators were to cross all along the 470 mile ceasefire line, and

Time, the international weekly news magazine of the U.S., in its issue of September 10, 1965 wrote:

"Indian army is the larger (387,000 253,000). But the Pakistanis are much better equipped. In a contest of quantity versus quality, India could probably overrun populous but poorly defended East Pakistan in a matter of weeks, but might meet disaster in the arid uplands of West Pakistan... It might well move with caution, since India's armoured equipment consists mostly of aged British Centurions and U.S. World War II Shermans to much for Pakistan's Patron tanks."

Rann has got rich reservoirs of petroleum and crude oils. It is this wealth which attracts Pakistan to claim the Rann. In the beginning of 1956 Pakistani troops penetrated into the northern part of Rann called Chhadbet. Pakistanis might have been roaming about into the Rann of Kutch since then. On January 25, 1965 Indian border police found Pakistani troops in occupation of the Rann territory along the international borders for about 18 miles to a depth of nearly 1.5 miles. Pakistan drew up the plan of attack on the Rann in the second week of March and the assault was launched in the early hours of April 5, 1965.

Pakistan concentrated its forces on the Kutch border. On April 15, 1965, Pakistan Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, stated this was 24th parallel was but he claimed about 500 square miles of it for Pakistan. The intensive fighting was going on in the Rann of Kutch, the Communist China separated on the scene as Pakistan's champion, and supported Pakistan's aggression against India. Pakistan police should be allowed to patrol the entire territory of the Rann of Kutch of the norm of 24th parallel. The agreement was signed on June 30, and ceasefire became effective from the morning of July 1, 1965.

The Agreement was criticised by the public on several grounds. This arrangement will last only till the boundary has been demarcated*, he said. Mujahids and Razakars, trained armed civilian fanatics, as well as regular soldiers in civilian clothes to continue their raids across the ceasefire line into
Kutch. Pakistan claimed in the Rann of Kutch, not only territory in the north but also some areas south of the 24th parallel.