CHAPTER V

Arabian Sea in the Regional Security Environment
The strategic situation in the region of the Arabian sea evolves from the operation of three interrelated factors - 1st the political and military interests of external powers in the region, 2nd asymmetries between the intra-regional littoral/hinterland powers, and 3rd the interaction between political/military interests of external powers and intra-regional asymmetries. It needs further appreciation that the Arabian sea region, in general, falls within the developing world. The majority of these states have a shared colonial experience and were at low stages of economic and technological development on achieving their independence. A strong undercurrent of nationalism influences the political behaviour of the littoral/hinterland states of the Arabian sea in the international system, but they were cognizant of their compulsion to seek external assistance for their programmes of socio-economic reconstruction.

The Arabian sea is a region of low solidarities or community of interests. There are few cooperative links between countries in the region and these are either bilateral or subregional. Cooperative efforts are tried by diversities obtaining within the Arabian sea region. No racial or cultural links bind the area. Religion and political institutions are diverse. They could be exacerbated by external powers seeking to either enhance their strategic interests or diminish the strategic interests of their adversaries in the region.
The current super power rivalry in the Arabian sea has been created by the Anglo-American plan to dominate the sea and influence the political, economic and military course of events in this region. The military presence of the great powers in this sea is an old story. The naval arms race between the two super powers got triggered off from the early 1960s by the advent of FRAS and SLBM systems. Upto the end of 1960s, the naval presence of both the super powers in the Arabian sea had remained at a fairly low level but the seventies intensified their rivalry. The beginning was made in 1965.

It is obvious that the Arabian sea will be one of the major problems of the future. The security it has enjoyed for over 150 years (from 1784-1941) has been completely shattered by the events of the last few years. The old conception of this sea as a preserve has to be given up with the major powers developing so near the area. America, China and Russia have started to access the sea, in a manner totally different from what the European nations had in the centuries that followed Vasco da Gama's arrival. Then the nations of Europe alone counted on the sea.

An exclusively land policy of defence for India will in future be nothing short of blindness. Before 1941, Arabian sea was protected British take and Britain was totally responsible for the safety of India, but today the position is different. The partition of India into India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq war (Sept. 1980), the move of Russian army into Afghanistan in Dec. 79 and the oil of the Gulf have made this Indo-Pak coastal region
more tense and vulnerable. The rivalries among outside powers and
the internal confrontation between the neighbouring countries have
come in appearance due to their interests and border disputes.

India has vital stakes in the stability and security of the
entire subcontinent as it forms a strategic entity. Pakistan is
jealous of India being the decisive power proved in Indo-Pak wars
(1965 and 1971). It has fears that India has ambitions to dominate
its small neighbour. It therefore, sought the establishment of a
machinery to settle regional disputes which it considered more
serious problems than the presence of great powers naval forces in
the region. Once partition in 1947 was agreed to, Indian leaders
demanded that there should be only two dominions based on the geo-
graphical contiguity factors and wishes of the people concerned.

But this formula has not been accepted by Jinnah and his colleagues
and Kashmir problem has taken place and confrontation with India at
the basis of Kashmir dispute is continued till today. 34

Early in the fifties, despite India's plea, Pakistani lead-
ers brought the cold war into the subcontinent by joining CENTO and
SEATO. This was at a time when India had not developed any close
relations with the Soviet Union and Pakistan was obtaining arms
from the United States to build its forces for an attack on India.
Pakistan's value in this region has been enhanced because of China's
increased interest in this sea. China has secured access to the
Arabian sea at Karachi through the Karakoram highway which was built

34. Bhupendra Singh, Indian Ocean & Regional Security, B.C. Pul-
shers, 9 C Ameet Nagar, Patyala, p. 44.
by them a few years back in collaboration with Pakistan. The Sino-
US approach has further added value to Pakistan’s role in this
region. Indian policy was consistent in this respect. Inspite of
having supported the concept of peace zone, Pakistan shows no eagerness
to keep the super power rivalry away from it. It ignores the
fact that it has a 960 kms. coastline on this sea, exposing it to
the powers that might be having military presence in the sea. Its
policy is primarily based on its imaginary fear of a naval threat
from India. It has, at every opportune moment, been exaggerating
this threat and voicing its concern about the smaller countries of
the region being the targets of Indian Navy. Pakistan's aim in
creating this bogey of fear from India is to get maximum possible
military aid from China and U.S.A. Having dumped all sorts of sophis-
ticated weapons including F-16, aircraft tanks, artillery and
naval ships in Pakistan, the U.S.A. now (August 1983) proposes to
provide 40 Harpoon missiles having a range of 90 to 110 km and 20
AH-1S attack helicopter gunships, and high explosive warheads with
a heavy blast effect and can be extremely damaging to its targets.
The supply of Harpoons to Pakistan opens the possibility of a genuine
Pakistani attack along the Indian coastline for engaging on-shore
and off-shore targets. Vital Indian establishments like the Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre and the Sagar Samrat offshore oil platform on
the Bombay High will become highly vulnerable targets. INS Vikrant
will also be constantly under serious threat. These missiles will
make the Pakistani Navy capable of interfering with Indian ship

35. Ibid, p. 45.
36. Ibid, p. 45.
movements and blocking its trade sea routes on the Arabian sea. The induction of this weapon in Pak Navy will bring about strategic change in Arabian sea power balance and would dangerously precipitate a new arms race and destabilise the entire region. The process of demilitarization of sea thus has been made nullified and countered all the attempts to make it possible. The U.S.-China-Pakistan collusion has further intensified the existing rivalries in the sea. This is against India's interests and security. 37

The influence of the Arabian sea is far greater for the security of India than for any other littoral country. Other littoral countries, due to their own domestic problems and size, are not in a position to meet the challenges of the great powers or adversaries in the sea. 38 In view of its dominant position in the region, India is the only country which may be able to bring together other nations in an effort to counter super powers. The dangers to peace and security in its immediate neighbourhood and also to the world peace have been the cause of increasing concern to India. Arabian sea has, therefore, assumed a vital importance for India. India has no desire whatsoever of dominating the Arabian sea and converting it into an Indian lake, but must take all necessary and suitable steps to safeguard its own security from any aggression from the sea. U.S. naval build up in the distant southern coast of Arabian sea adds to India's worries. Although the main US object in

37. Ibid, p. 46.

this presence is to protect supply of oil from the Gulf it will also enable them to support Pakistan in case of future war between India and Pakistan, there can be a repetition of what US 7th fleet did in 1971 by appearing in the Bay of Bengal, in view of the on the spot presence of US task force in the region. Pakistan is in a position to avail the U.S. naval help at short notice. India can never forget that it was submerged only after it lost dominance over the Arabian sea and Bay of Bengal both.

In the Indian Mind, Pakistan is identified as an instrument for external intervention in the sub-continent to countervail India. India is not worried of Pakistan but has to worry about the super powers or great powers, the influence or intervention of which Pakistan and other like Iraq, Iran etc. bring into the region. Pakistan has reconciled itself to coexisting in the region with India without being able to claim an artificial parity. Pakistan obsession with parity comes out clearly when its leadership demands mutual force reduction or a joint declaration of nuclear weapons. Pakistan will not make such demands on China because Pakistan has no claim of parity with China.

The outside nations interested in the Arabian sea Indo-Pak coastal region are mainly U.S.A., China, Soviet Union, Britain and other west European nations. They have a number of common as well as varied interests. It may be asserted that the Big powers policy towards the Arabian seas aimed primarily at securing better shore facilities, staging posts, communication bases, and if possible, the use of airfields in the islands or adjoining countries on this coastal border of Arabian sea for land based air support. American naval
The political tension in this region provided opportunity to the external powers to exploit them to achieve their aims. The internal political instability, inter-state differences, social disequilibrium, accompanied by the technological lag, make the outside interference inevitable. The military equipments are supplied to Pakistan by U.S.A. on a lavish scale. The Pakistani port of Gwadar is being secretly developed with U.S. backing to take the most sophisticated U.S. vessels and it is also apprehended that the U.S.A. will be able to depend upon Pakistan for facilities, it may extend to them the use of Karachi in event of a global war. A project for improving naval base facilities in Karachi from 1981 is started and along the wast of Baluchistan so as to make possible the storage of ammunition, heavy equipment and fuel necessary for transferring
the U.S. RDF to the Gulf area. This would also facilitate direct American aid to Afghan rebels, thus keeping Soviet resources and attention engaged in Afghanistan and away from areas of great interest to the U.S., like Europe. Pakistan could be induced to cooperate if the U.S. undertakes to protect Pak from the consequences of such decision. It appears that Pakistan is likely to be turned into an American aircraft carrier.

Between 1970 and 1972, the Soviets concluded a number of treaties with nations of the Arabian sea littoral states for port and airfield facilities in important strategic points in the region and acquired port facilities in some of them. Soviet bases were strongly established in Iraq and Aden by 1977. Russians are reported to have attempted to obtain a long term base on the island of Gan in the Maldives to counter the activities started by any external power from central zone of Indian Ocean towards this region. Anyhow, the Soviet Navy has succeeded in cutting deeply into the Anglo-American hegemony in this region.

Pakistan is an extremely important entry point for the RDF moving into the Gulf from the east. If U.S.A. succeeds in establishing its naval bases along the Baluchistan coast at Gwadar and in re-establishing its spying facilities at Peshawar, the implications of U.S. naval build-up in this region will be further aggravated. By the end of 1982 President Zia of Pakistan has been desperately keen to set up an independent arms manufacturing base that could serve Arab needs. Pakistan has signed some agreements with Arab countries and the Gulf money is pouring into Pakistan to build up an
effective infrastructure in Baluchistan which is of great strategic importance because of its closeness to the Gulf. Pakistan has close ties with all the six member-countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.). Pakistan may become the Gulf defender to the advantage of the U.S.A.

The radical alteration in the balance of power in this region would have been acknowledged by the least notable of observers. Nevertheless, the profound alteration in the global situation by the British loss of the indigenous power that was available to be projected in any direction from a central position in support of her worldwide interests. Indian army was now expected to be employed in the regional interests to provide stability in the area. The stability that had been hoped for did not in fact materialize due to stronger nationalistic forces and the withdrawal of British resulted in a vacuum of power in this region of Arabian sea. Immediately following their gaining independence Pakistan confronted India over the future states of the state of Kashmir. This confrontation which has continued unabated has completely neutralised the power left behind by the British on this region. The animosity that developed over Kashmir created unstable conditions finally encouraging China to adopt a belligerent attitude to India and middle in the affairs of the region.

India's failure in 1962 Chinese attack added to China's prestige in the Arabian sea coastal region at the expense of India. Though India's failure was due to her own unpreparedness, the massive
military and naval aid of over one billion dollars that Pakistan had received from the U.S. prior to Oct. 1962 forced upon India the necessity to maintain forces to counter a dual threat. The armament race currently in progress between India and Pakistan is likely to add to the instability of the region and assist the achievement of China's aims. The most important aspect of the situation is that India's inability to act as a stabilising influence in the Afro-Asian world has enabled the Chinese presence to cause instability in it. In terms of the global balance of power this instability is against the interests of both the super powers in common with the nations of the region and is welcome by China whose outspoken aims are to make countries ripe for communist subversion.

The major interest of the western powers in Iran and other Arab states is to maintain the oil supply regularly from the area. Any serious disruption of this supply would alter the balance of world power in any future war sufficiently to make the western position untenable for a protracted conflict. Taking advantage of her religious affinity with the people of the area, Pakistan is making a major effort to replace British and Indian influence and has met with some success with the royalists. While Pakistan's long term aims are to form an Islamic block, she would be satisfied with

---

loans or grants from the surplus foreign exchange obtained from oil royalties for the purchase of sophisticated defence equipment.

India today has the fourth largest armed forces in the world. The explosion of a nuclear device would give her immediate great power membership with attendant influence in international councils. It will be undoubtedly welcomed by the smaller nations who will have greater freedom to manoeuvre instead of living in constant fear of the dragon. By restoring a balance of power which will in future be maintained by India it will provide a welcome stability to this coastal region and also to the whole continent. Pak and China both have felt some worry about India's this achievement.

The scramble for the natural resources of the Arabian sea and especially the oil resources and uranium reserves in this Indo-Pak coastal region added to its strategic importance. India has become approximately 60 percent independent in oil due to Bombay high reserves and her quantity required is met with Gulf oil; for their purposes. Pakistan is, for the Soviet Union, strategically as important as India. Because of its armed potential along the frontiers of the littoral states of the Arabian sea and only a few hours away by air from the Arabian sea, the Soviet Union is now on the verge of becoming the most powerful Arabian sea hinterland state. 40 After the Afghanistan occupation, the Indo-Pak coastal

40. A Majeed, Indian Ocean Conflict & Regional Cooperation, P.11.
region has become more tense and afraid of due to the aggressive nature of the Soviet policy.

The Soviet Union is trying its best to secure a zone of Soviet penetration in this region by exploiting the regional instability and a general resentment against the West. Added to this is the advent age that Afghanistan occupation provides to the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the Gulf region. The Soviet Union is making increasing use of its strategic position and is leaving it to the other side to make itself politically vulnerable through its endeavours to obtain facilities in this region. 41

There was no doubt that Pak has constructed a plant for producing enriched uranium. Pakistani attempts to go nuclear were certainly of a highly enterprising character. India was one of the countries which reacted to the syndrome of the Islamic bomb sharply suspecting that a military regime such as Pakistan was prone to be swayed more by military considerations than political. 42 And if the bomb did materialise, it was certain India would shed all inhibitions in regard to the building of the device itself. Such the Indian subcontinent might plunge yet again in the vortex of confrontation. All talk of making the region a de-nuclearised peaceful area would receive a final burial. 43

41. Ibid. p. 12.


43. Ibid. p. 156.
Even though the bomb is being built in Pakistan, particularly into the countries which have financed it heavily. Only an atom bomb could provide the necessary counterweight to this uneven predicament. In this Pakistani process the European and some Afro-Asian countries are busy to provide financial and material help to solve their purposes, imposing a threat on India. The sino-American collusion and support to Pakistan against India continues. There are distinct possibilities that the two powers might not only help Pakistan make good its losses in military hardware but also strengthen it still further. Such a policy would compel India also to invest more and more in its defence. It might even pose serious challenges to its policy of non-alignment. In return for their support to Pak, the U.S.A. and China hope to obtain facilities which would permit them to operate more freely in this area of Arabian sea and to balance the increasing presence of India in the region. China, which maintains a direct road link with Pakistan through the occupied Kashmir might also seek military advantage against India in the western region. Such a situation would make it all the more difficult for India to resolve its differences with Pakistan. India is seriously concerned with the grave deterioration in the international situation as well as its impact on this coastal region. A new cold war has developed between the super powers and the actions of tension in the cold war is mostly Arabian sea and Gulf region. Because of this a danger of nuclear war has

44. Rajendra Singh, Politics in the Indian Ocean, p.129.
been created in this region. Therefore, the Indian attempt has been to resist moves to convert Afghanistan into a new cold war issue or a confrontation between Islam and Marxism. The ruling groups of this region have become attractive targets for external intervention and subversion, because by changing a few people at the top or by changing their alignments, foreign policies of countries could easily be changed such as Pakistan and Iran. This change of policies or such a non-structured situation among the nations in this region caught in cold war may easily land the super powers in an escalatory confrontation.

The leaning towards super powers of these countries, militarily for their own national interests than preservation of international or regional peace and security may be proved dangerous for this coastal region. It is in pursuance of this policy that India had always in the past advocated negotiation, instead of confrontation. Pakistan has become a running sore in India’s national life and China has become her ally or friend since 1962 which compelled India to seek treaty alliance with the Soviet Union. It is fact that after 1962, India has become much strong militarily and its security perceptions now extended beyond its geographical frontiers. India has border problems with all the neighbouring states but especially with Pakistan and China. 46 India felt like an old

45. M.K. Chopra, India & Indian Ocean, p. 73.

46. Ibid, p. 74.
man out, isolated without a genuine dependable friend. The scars of defeat by China were still there and Pakistani attacks should no signs of diminishing; here were powers, big as well as small, brow beating India. Then in 1971 India cut the Gordian Knot. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation has been signed. This contained a provision of support in the event of attack.

India was convinced that its old outlook on security, largely focused on the subcontinent, was completely outdated, but returned dramatically when Indo-Pak coastal region has become tense due to oil. Because India gets over 90% of its imported petroleum from Persian Gulf region linked with this region, hence the critical importance of this region for its industry, common needs and defense. Conflicts in this region are endemic, of which the plight of the Shah of Iran and capturing the thrown by A.R. Khomeini is typical, the intervention in Afghanistan and internal disturbances in Pakistan, caused instant repercussions in India's economy and defense also. A point directly concerned with India's security perceptions related to the arms build up in the region of which the naval and air components were powerful enough to excite dominance overlooking maritime state.

India has made it quite clear that the Soviet forces must
leave the Afghanistan and this has been accepted by the Soviet Union itself. But Pakistan remained worried of this and tried to raise the issue of legitimacy of the Govt of Afghanistan. The presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan has an adverse impact on the security of this region, just as the establishment of naval base at Diego Garcia by U.S.A. But Pak has little credibility in talking about external threat to the region when it had been seeking Chinese help and constructed the Karakoram highway. A hostile Afghanistan under Soviet occupation presented Pakistan with some long-range problems. There is one way of ensuring the security of all the three powers i.e. U.S.A, China and U.S.S.R., out of the subcontinent. Due to heavy arms supply to Pak a active U.S. involvement in the region is going to increase. If the influence of distant U.S.A is brought into the subcontinent, the neighbouring U.S.S.R. will have to seek to intervene in the affairs of the region and has greater relevance to its security. The armed strength and naval capability of Pak, India and Iran in general and naval presence of U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. in this region, which is shown in the table, is almost able to change the strategic balance of the region.

India has great stakes in Pakistan's stability and territorial integrity, because if Pak were to break up, or external powers extended their dominance over a part of the region, it would be against Indian interests. These considerations generate very

49. List of Strength should be attached.
grave risks in Pak getting into the super powers confrontation, relying on the U.S.A., China and some Islamic countries. Its war with India in 1965, culminating in protracted guerrilla activity and gunfire exchanges across the borders, was essentially an attempt to occupy the whole of Kashmir by force. It did not succeed, but the ambitions were still sustained. These were crushed in 1971 when the east wing broke away but could not be said to have been wiped out totally.50 The simla accord of 1972 was made to envisage normalization of relations with stress on co-existence. The Pakistan leadership still harped on the settlement of Kashmir issue.51 Thus the Kashmir issue continued to be the explosive peg. After 1971 came the upheavals in Iran and Afghanistan and Pakistan's strategic value rose in the U.S.A. market. Pak received massive financial assistance.

After 1962 close sino-Pakistani relations began. China granted substantial military aid to Pakistan. Most important, from China's viewpoint, was the overflight facility which enabled Chinese airlines to operate by the shortest route to the Arabian sea's this region and Europe. To this was added the Karakoram road important for commercial and strategic reasons.

The geopolitical community of interests is largely of anti-India, anti-soviet character, with the attendant risks of shift in

51. Ibid, p. 156.
the diplomatic fields. Sino-Pakistani mutuality of interests would remain an important factor in the subcontinent's power equation and detente between India and U.S.A. would be considered acceptable perhaps in this connection. Pak connection with CENTO is now history but may be mentioned for record that it had never been a happy with CENTO because it can not do much help to themselves. From Khomenei of Iran Zia learnt how Islamic fundamentalism could be an answer to democratic radicalism. Pakistan's leanings towards the west are a complex phenomenon. But the revolution in Iran has become successful to change all this certainly. 52

The picture of this region changes when U.S.A and Soviet Union both operating as super powers in the Arabian sea. The emphasis, strategy and deployment here moves to a different plane. With Diego Garcia as a forward base, U.S. missile submarines could operate easily in the Arabian sea.

The Indian response to Arabian sea developments can be either defensive, limited to strengthening coastal defence or more substantive, whereby the Indian presence will be felt in the Arabian sea. Iran and Pakistan tough the northern fringes of the sea. It occupies immense geostrategic advantage. It has made special relationships with countries like Mauritius and the Maldives. India is also sensitive about a Chinese presence in this region. 53

52. 161d. P. 152
53. 161d. P. 157
The nature of issues that India faces in this region however vary considerably with others and it may be relevant to look at them briefly in a separate manner beginning with Arabian sea flank of the Indian peninsula. It has the largest navy in this region, larger than Iran and Pakistan. This force is now being expanded given the new importance of sea power in the Arabian sea. Pakistan has a small coastline from Karachi to the Iranian border that makes the Arabian sea frontage. Even though Pakistan may increase its navy in the coming years, Pak's role in Arabian sea developments is likely to be confined to its own vicinity.

The Arabian sea front is of more importance to India than eastern coast for two significant factors - (a) It does not have a physical hold on the area and (b) It could be a possible invasion route. India has not paid adequate attention in the past but today it not only has to provide protection for its coast but also it is to be part of the great scramble for regions of influence in the sea, be more energetic and forceful.

The western coastline of India stretches from the Gulf of the Gulf of Khambhat in the north west down the Malabar coast to cape Comorin. There are several important ports and naval establishments including Bombay and Cochin where a shipyard is being built. India's own oil route from the Persian Gulf is through the Arabian sea and it has important trading links with middle East states. But all these countries have adversary attributes for India, expressed through solidarity with Pak in times of conflict.
The benefits of this coastline could only be made effective use of if there were a proper naval force to take advantage of the strategic benefits that a coastline has to offer. It is the northwestern coast of India which is the most sensitive for India, as it is there that it shares with Pakistan and Iran, in case of conventional attack. In 1971, this was an area of naval action between the Pak and Indian Navies. A future naval conflict between the two countries would be of a more sophisticated nature and with greater distractive possibilities on both sides. The region is tension because of the Chinese nuclear tests at Lop Nor just north of Kashmir and the Pak approach to get nuclear capability. In India, the peaceful nuclear explosion was handled as part of their overall programme by the scientists at BARC. Pak denounced its PNE and said that there was no difference between PNE and nuclear weapon. While India has always argued that PNE should be distinguished from weapons, they relate to struggle for power. Conflicts of interests and conflicts of culture and values. Pakistan accepted the legitimacy of the use of nuclear weapons in this region and refused to participate in the non-proliferation Treaty. It can be said that the cult of terrorism today has been sanctified and dogmatized by those nations which espouse nuclear strategy. The internal developments of Afghanistan and Iran have led to a situation in which Afghanistan has lost its buffer status and Iran is very near losing it. From the Indian point of view the Afghan situation represents

a deterioration in over all security environment. The status of buffer states in the subcontinent has been disappeared mostly. The sub-continent, which has a strategic unity is now subjected to direct rivalry and confrontation among the major powers of the world and regional itself.

In matters of security of this Arabian sea coastal region India and Iran are also in rival positions like as Pakistan. Iran has taken upon itself the role of Pakistan's protector after the defeat of the country in 1971 and there has been stepped up political, military and economic cooperation between the two countries. There have been also a recent attempts at establishing a non-Arab Islamic alliance between Iran, Pak and Turkey. On a regional plane Iran's support to Pak after 1971 is motivated by fear of its own balkanization. The Baluchi independence movement in the Iran bordering Pakistan province of Baluchistan has direct ramifications for Iran. There are Baluchis living on the Iranian side of the border who along with those in Pakistan have been demanding an independent Baluchistan. Tehran feels that if the Baluchi break from Pakistan they will almost certainly be joined by kinmen in Iran leading to succession movements in its eastern extremity. Iran has also supported Pakistan on the Pushtu question against Afghanistan (Independent Pakhtunistan Karen). India's military and naval predominance in the region also gives Pak a shielding role between

55. R. Gupta, Indian Ocean, P. 77.
Iran and India which would not be possible if Pakistan ceased to exist as a country or existed in a greatly truncated form. Iran has as a result of these factors poured military and economic aid to Pakistan making it a constant threat to India in this region. Iran has been constantly worried by India's size and potential in the area but can try to move ahead up to or till this region without coming into direct conflict with India.

Iran has ambitions to dominate the Arabian sea nevertheless go against India's interests. It would appear that there is quiet rivalry between Iran and India to maintain naval supremacy in the region. 57

Soviet Union has made withdraw from Afghanistan after establishing a local government there, but external support to rebel groups in Afghanistan against local government from the territory of Pakistan would, however exacerbate the situation by perpetuating the Soviet presence and lead to an extension of the area of conflict into the South Asian and Gulf regions. Like this the terrorism has to increased and supported by the Pakistan and other external powers in India also. Thus the rebel and terrorist activities in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and India may create greater tension and instability in this region. Soviet Union has an identity of interests with India on larger global issues, her present commitments in Afghanistan are likely to enlarge her interests in the region. Therefore China wants to maintain politica-

---

57. Ibid. P. 169.
military ties with India neighbours to reduce soviet-Indo influence in the region.

Iran's relations with U.S.A. were very intimate during Shah regime. The U.S. installed Shah was ousted in 1979 and since then its relations with U.S.A. have become worsening. Iran's Revolutionary Government is anti-Communist. Its strong economy during Shah regime has received a set-back because of its war with Iraq. It has started thinking not only about the defence of Persian Gulf but also about the defence of its coast on this Arabian sea region from that time (Iran-Iraq war), because Iraq has friendly relations with Soviet Union (a treaty concluded in 1972) and her ally India. Iran declared that its frontiers were not confined to the Gulf but extended to the Arabian sea and Red sea. Iran may work with Britain and U.S.A. for establishing its influence in the Arabian sea and may once again collaborate with the U.S.A. It has acquired certain facilities of its ships and personnel in Mauritius, these may later be shared with or passed on to the western powers.

In 3 Oct. 1973, the Shah proposed a cooperative scheme in the field of economy, politics and naval for regional states but it is felt by India that his scheme appeared to be directed against U.S.S.R. Many events have taken place in Iran as the seizure of us embassy, ban on arms supplies by U.S.A. and feelings of Islamic nations grouping or Islamic front.

India's close ties with Iraq were a primary cause of Iran's hostility towards New Delhi. Indian pilots were training Iraqi airmen to fly and maintain Soviet supplied MiG planes. India's military assistance was seen in the context of bitter conflict between Iran & Iraq over their mutual border on the Shatt-al-Arab waterway and Iran's support for the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq. The several outstanding grievances that the Shah had against Iraq would have been regarded with far less concern were it not for the Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty of 1972 and the subsequent intensification of bilateral ties between Baghdad and New Delhi. Tehran followed Washington rapprochement with China by recognising the Peking regime. By 1973 the Shah had both exchanged ambassadors with Peking, and reiterated his determination to see Pakistan remain intact. A mutually defence arrangement was worked out between Islamabad and Tehran. India and Iran continue to extend their naval capabilities into the Arabian sea, other points of conflict may arise. The series of accords reached throughout the mid-1970s but remained fruitless.

India was faced with the possibility of war with Pak and/or China, and had a reasonable prospect of defending itself if its investments in weapons and training continued at high levels. The presence of superpowers in the region contributed little or much to India's regional security. The negotiations served as a forum for India's drive for major power status and its desire to isolate

itself from any future superpower conflict, for Pak efforts to find regional security in the aftermath of its 1971 defeat, and for Iran more ambiguous position as a militarily dependent power with independent ambitions.

The Islamic fundamentalists hoped to build strong armed forces with the latest weapons and strengthen the country. This would also deter any threat from communist insurgency to their rule, whilst protecting the free flow of oil through the straits of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.

The overthrow of Shah and Ayatollah Khomeini’s coming to power in Feb 1979 considerably changed the security role of Iran. He tried to evolve a new power equation with the Soviet Union and ordering the closure of United States. He declared that the safety of oil tankers passing through the straits of Hormuz was no more the responsibility of Iran and the country would not act as the policeman of the Gulf. This policy defused the Soviet threat to Iran but exaggerated threat was imposed possibly by U.S.A.


60. IDSA, Vol. XII, No. 3, Jan-March 1980, p. 299.
party had tied down the USA and its allies to Iran in terms of responding to the Afghan development.

The hostile Anti-US attitude of the Post-revolutionary leadership in Iran and USA anxiety to minimise deterioration of their bilateral relations with Iran, provided an ideal cover for the Soviet Union to intensify its build up in Afghanistan.

While Iran and the USA were pre-occupied with evolving a new relationship, Afghanistan's other neighbours were also pre-occupied with their domestic affairs - Pakistan with its internal dissent, China with rebuilding its shattered economy and India with its seventh General elections. The objectives for the USSR military intervention in Afghanistan can be many and varied but it was mainly to contain the Afghan insurgency movements.

They also claim that under Afghan-Soviet peace and friendship Treaty. The Afghan Government had invited them but there are many other intentions to the Soviet action, as to gain access to the Soviet action warm waters of the Arabian Sea through Pakistan and Iran, to demonstrate to the Islamic fundamentalists in Iran that the USSR disapproves of their exporting the Islamic revolution, to demonstrate other governments in the region and to control the straits of Hormuz.

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan enables them to support insurgency movements by Baluchis and Pakhtoons in both Pakistan and Iran. A concerted attempt is being made by the ruling elites in the Gulf countries to stop further Soviet expansionism, but the
limited military capabilities of these countries make such efforts ineffective. Due to political dissent a potential threat arises to many of the ruling monarchies in the coastal border region of Arabian sea and Persian Gulf affected to each-other. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in Dec. 1979, gave legitimacy to US efforts to increase their presence in the Gulf and Arabian sea. Because of this, the littoral states of this region felt fear and doubtful about their security and integrity from the superpowers presence and confrontation in this coastal region.

China was in a view that this Soviet intervention would also affected the China's security in other words that the invasion posed a threat to China's security. Beijing's concern for Pak's security is only part of its current strategy.

Naval Presence & Interests of Littoral States in the Sea

The Arabian sea came under sharp focus by events that happened in another sphere of the world ocean activity. The super powers rivalry and the confrontation among the inter-regional countries have become historical lesson to the Arabian sea population or generation. Atmosphere of instability is always experienced in the region after 1968s. The big powers intervention is erupted in this region of the sea because of their economic, political and strategic interests. The fear of their regular naval presence and terror of their big and technical strength, which is permanently trying to establish in the region, have entered in the regional states or littorals of the Arabian sea. The tension, which is created by the malafied intentions of the pro-western and communist power states of the region to safe their interests, has generated instability in the region and always the clouds of contest could be seen here. Military pacts with external powers and inadequate claims are also the cause of their conflicts. In a way, of course there was nothing abnormal about the contest, for it was worldwide and quite a familiar affair. Due to all these happenings some peace loving nations demanded world attention for converting the region into a zone of peace and demilitarization of the sea. The heavy flow of arms and receiving of modern military facilities provided by external powers, is a source of deterrence and terrorism.

It was true that from the viewpoint of war and peace the Arabian sea was strictly speaking no different from other seas. So many external powers had their bloody innings in its vast expanses. But it was also true that conflicts in the region had been few and
far between and mild in dimension and intensity. The more recent history of the region had left a trail of suspicion and fear. The net work of bases, and of influence, presence and dominance, even threat of intervention, conquest and occupation all these have affected the lifelines through the sea, domestic stability and external relations.

Fears caused by big power manoeuvres and by the range and lethality of modern arms spread among all the states with oceanic character. The Arabian sea has been subjected to their trust heavily and the chances are that the threat might be sharp. In this respect all the littoral states are determined to upon the declaration of some area of peace and enjoined the great powers to halt further escalation of their naval presence in the area and eliminate their bases and naval facilities that existed within it and remove all weapons of mass destruction. In this way they can save their independence by the external threat and get solidarity and integrity of their territories.

Any sino-Pak collusion and U.S.A.-China-Pak axis, Iran-Pak-Turkey treaty, Iraq-Ussr Pact and Indo-soviet peace treaty can create a state of danger for the littoral states including Iran, Iraq, Pak and India and for the big powers in the Arabian sea. Littoral states of the sea have always reacted about the fear of these big powers naval presence and tension among the littoral states in this region. For this purpose the local powers like India will have to face the task of neutralizing the joint presence of

1. K.R. Chopra, India & the Indian Ocean, p. 143.
China and Pakistan the Arabian sea.

Big powers have maneuvered to exploit the dangerous problems of sub-continent and the Gulf Islamic world. These powers rivalry has been intense in the region with respect to the liberation movements and in the field of state relations in the Arabian sea.

Fearing Iraq and the disintegration of Pakistan under Soviet-India pressure, Iran has been rapidly expanding its naval forces. The July 1973 coup in Afghanistan and the irredentist 'Pushtunistan' policy of the new regime aimed at Pakistan, automatically aligned Kabul with Moscow and Baghdad against Peking and Islamabad. An enlarged Afghanistan actually incorporating the Pushtu areas of Pakistan would have access to the sea, however and thereby would presumably be less dependent on the USSR. Moreover, if India could push up to the Indus, it too would have no reason to depend on Moscow, as at present, for support against Pakistan and its allies. Of course, a reconciliation among Pak and India achieve the same effect.

The Arabian sea area was a hot-bed of piracy. Hijacking of the present day version of piracy, despite the fact that it has succeeded in gaining some potential legitimacy because of its association with liberation movements still remains in international menace. Such a thing would create serious pollution problems apart

from the political and economic tensions that might be generated in the sea. Regional coordination in naval patrolling and joint operations directed against smuggling or illegal immigration would go a long way in frustrate such attempts. It would also ensure free navigation for all commercial vessels and invalidate one of the arguments used by the maritime powers to justify their naval presence in the sea.

The littoral states of the Arabian sea cannot be called naval powers. Those states which have a naval arm worth the name, can not cope, etc., either in the number of naval vessels or in the degree of sophistication in the weapon system, with any of the major naval powers. But while evaluating the naval capabilities of the small states a few facts should be borne in mind. First, the navies of the big powers are spread all over the world due to strategic considerations, the cold war confrontation and naval commitments. Second, in any major naval confrontation between a big power and a small state, the big power will have to reckon with the cold war politics. Thirdly, the navy of a small state is generally equipped with the weapons of big power origin and not all of them are outdated. In fact, the navies of many of the Arabian sea littorals are equipped with fairly modern vessels and more are being acquired to suit their particular needs. India, Pakistan and Iran have a sizable naval capacity in the Arabian sea area.

Indian navy is hardly adequate to handle its security problems in the Arabian sea. Iran is building up its naval strength.
but it is still in the formative stage. Pakistan will take some
time to recover from the losses suffered during the Dec. 1971 con-
flict. Other littoral states navies are living in infancy stage.
Thus no littoral power is in such a strong position as to dominate
the Arabian sea.

Many littoral states are fairly well equipped with vessels
designed for shore defence and patrolling. Almost all the litto-
ral states have medium and small sized vessels like frigates, cor-
vettes, submarine chasers, torpedo-boats and coastal defence
craft. The Iranian navy has 10 hovercraft and India has one hover-
craft with its customs department. India and Iran have missile-
firing boats and Pakistan is going to acquire them from China. 3

Though there is a fairly wide range in the displacement and
the armament of these vessels they have been grouped together
because their primary function, especially in the context of the
small navies of the area, can be broadly generalized as shore
defence. None of these can become the nucleus of an ocean fleet.
These small states with their small navies can therefore, play a
significant role in regional security if they coordinate their
activities. In this way they can acquire the capacity to keep their
security zone under surveillance, ensure freedom of innocent passage
and cooperate in the regional security.

This effort can be supplemented to some extent by their naval
air-arms India has a limited naval air capability. It has one air-

3. Ibid. p. 218.
craft carrier, INS Vikrant and now accompanied with Khukari INS Vikrant is basically an anti submarine aircraft carrier, though it was used for shore bombardment in 1971 conflict. It carries 10 Sea Hawks, 4-5 Alizes (ASW) and 2 Alouette III helicopters, dominates the Indian naval air-arm. India possesses one maritime reconnaissance squadron of super-constellations, but it has no shore-based ASW aircraft, a serious deficiency which India will have to rectify if it has to balance its naval capability in the Arabian Sea.

Pakistan does not possess any naval air-arm but has 4 squadrons of long-range IL-28 and B-57B 2 squadrons of Mirage III and several squadrons of Sabre-jets, starfighters, MiG-19 and helicopters. Iran does not possess naval-air arm but has a fair capacity to influence the naval activities in the Persian Gulf & Arabian sea. Iraq, Fendi Arabia. Both Yemens have limited naval capabilities.

Thus it can be said clearly that no any littoral of Arabian sea has a capacity either to confront the big powers single handedly, or to influence the politics of the Arabian sea. But the Indian navy, which probably, is the best-trained local force, at the moment, possessed the capacity to operate a small fleet without jeopardizing its main task of safeguarding the security of its coast and the islands. The fact is that most of the littoral states possess the capacity to keep the sea near their coast under some sort of surveillance. Undoubtedly, each of these littorals

---

4. Ibid, p. 219
conducts these operations separately. They jointly can try to reduce the outside pressures against them in the region.

The super powers are still continuing their neo colonial onslaught against these newly independent littoral states of Arabian sea.

To fulfil India's requirement for filling the Vacuum in the area it shall be necessary to strengthen the Indian Navy by the launching of an indigenous construction programme for more rapidly than is currently planned. India continues to have the use of all the trade routes in this Sea for the uninterrupted flow of the sinews that feed her industries and also the export of commodities that enable her to continue her imports. Our immediate aim should be to achieve a level of maritime power capable of meeting a combination of any two powers whose shores are washed by the Arabian Sea. It will not be possible to exercise control of the western approaches to the Arabian Sea by land based maritime aircraft, hence air craft carriers become necessary for this area. India acquired the V-class submarine has a range of 20000 miles which is only marginally suitable for the Arabian Sea. Indian naval presence is due to hostile submarine counter tactics and security of the home waters. India has over the years built four shipyards at the Cochin, Goa, Bombay and

5. Ibid. p. 220.
6. Ibid. p. 221.
One specific area of complementarity is that of the maritime regime in the Gulf and the Arabian sea. In the pursuit of the regional security, a major role has been attributed to sea power. In fact, Gulf politics expands into the Arabian sea to the extent that the national security views of the Gulf states and outside powers rely upon maritime strategies. This applies to the regional states especially India and Iran, as it does to the superpowers. Maritime strength contributes to commercial and military power.\(^7\) Regional states are expanding their fleets accordingly. India through its domestic shipbuilding industry and purchases from the Soviet Union and Iran through imports from the United States and Britain likely to Pakistan.

Open shipping lanes are important to the states that are economically dependent upon transit or trade and to those that include naval capabilities in their overall military strategic doctrines. Nuclear deterrence and the oil trade keep the major outside powers among this number. Among the regional powers, both India and Iran have used their navies for offshore bombardments of military targets. Each also plans to move toward acquiring significant civilian shipping fleets. Littoral states demand that there should be freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage.

The Soviet Union has tested the principle of innocent passage by making shipcalls at all the major regional ports including those in India, Pakistan and Iran and now USA has decided to test

\(^7\) IBID, P. 222
this principle in December 1969. In 1973, Soviet ships deployed around the strait of Hormuz encouraged the United States to send its aircraft carrier Hancock through Hormuz in an official CENTO exercises.

The impact of the growth of maritime interest in the region is more likely to support the existing regime than any dramatic changes. An attempt by any states to use the strait of Hormuz as a choke point to interrupt shipping, would enlist the opposition of India and Iran, as well as of the outside naval powers. The Gulf and Arabian sea region are becoming community property even though the community members have their own individual interests.

Iran has plans not only to expand its navy but also to construct or enlarge bases at Bandar Abb as, Chah Bahar and Jask for the purpose of dominating strait of Hormuz and the Arabian sea. Naval weapons acquisition programme is continued till today, in other side the Iraq, Oman, Yemen have no meaning in the sense of possessing capable naval wing to support their military penetration capacity. Iran has plans to construct chah Bahar near Pakistani coast with USA help as the biggest base in the area. Iran with heavier vessels like frigates and destroyers along with anti submarine and maritime reconnaissance aircraft and long range Phan-

8. ibid. p. 212

9. ibid. p. 223
Tomcat has got the capacity to operate deep in the Arabian sea. Kuwait and Yemen and Saudi Arabia have no naval capability even to patrol its coast line. Iran alone is a state or littoral in the Gulf who possesses capable naval strength in the region and the Arabian sea. Iran has placed orders for the Spruance class American destroyers of 7800 tonnes, armed with latest electronic anti-aircraft, anti-missile and anti-submarine weapon systems with five inch rapid fire gun and torpedo tubes. \(^{10}\) It has acquired 12 French missile boats armed with the Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles, 4-6 Lockheed Orion anti-submarine and maritime recce planes. It has about 200 cobra gunships. It has 4 destroyers, 4 frigates 12 patrol boats armed with Harpoon missiles and 14 hovercraft besides other smaller vessels. It also has planned to acquire through-deck cruisers, anti-submarines helicopters and submarines. \(^{11}\) All these weapons would project Iran as the most powerful naval power in the Arabian sea, which could pose a challenge not only to the local powers but also to the big powers, if they decide to intervene in the area. But besides Iran other Gulf and sea states are also busy in acquiring new weapons for their navies also, if they have naval wing with their military. Most of these littorals are oil-producing states and are expected to take steps to keep their sea-lanes open, so their naval presence is needed and if not they are trying to keep that.

---

10. \[161\text{d}. P. 223\]

11. \[161\text{d}. P. 224\]
India wanted to project itself as a local naval power and also till recently, the capabilities of the Indian Navy had not been fully tested but there were no doubts about its capacity to take effective action. India supported the idea of regional economic cooperation, as a better way of preventing the incursions of foreign powers in the area and Pakistan has opposite idea on this against India. The Indian Navy has proved itself capable of fulfilling its task effectively. The Pak naval presence in the area has no meaning to Indian Navy.

India, Pakistan and Iran are the three regional naval powers in the Arabian sea, which have some naval capability. India as well as Iran can raid quickly in the sea. Indian navy raided as far away as Gwadar a Pak port near Iran which is within easy reach of the Iranian Phantoms. Pakistan has surface-to-surface, air launched and submarine-launched Harpoon missiles. It has a high explosive warhead with a heavy blast effect and can be extremely damaging to its targets. Harpoon missile is a sophisticated long-range all weather cruise missile, can be fired from air, surface and underwater. It would be possible to fire it from the torpedo tubes of conventional submarines - a great advantage to Pakistani Navy which will not have to modify the launchers of its Agosta class submarines. These missiles can also be fired from anti submarine launchers of the US Gearing class destroyers two of which

Pakistan has already got and one more has been ordered. The
missile can also be integrated with Pakistani Navy and Sea King
helicopters. The supply of 40 Harpoons to Pak opens the possi-
Bility of a genuine Pak attack along the Indian coast line for
engaging on shore and offshore targets. 13 Vital Indian establi-
she~ents like the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and the Sagar Sam-
rat off-shore oil platform on the Bombay high will become highly
Vulnerable targets. INS Vikrant will also be under serious
threat. These missiles will make the Pakistani Navy capable of
interfering with Indian ship movements and blocking its trade sea
routes on the Arabian sea. The induction of this weapon in Pakis-
tani Navy will bring about strategic change in Arabian sea power
balance and would dangerously precipitate a new arms race and
destabilise the entire region. 14 This gives a dimension to the
Arabian Sea strategy.

The USA has helped Pak to a great extent increasing and
strengthening its Navy. Pakistan has got 4 Daphne class French sub-
marines and 5 destroyers and one more ordered. Consequently, these
has been a build-up of Pakistan's Navy also in Arabian Sea mili-

tifying and countering all the attempts made to demilitarise the
sea. The US-China-Pak collusion has further intensified the ex-
isting rivalries in the sea. 15 This is against India's interests
and security.

13. Bhupender Singh, Indian Ocean & Regional Security, B.C. Pub-
lisbers, Patiyala, p. 46.
15. Ibid, p. 46.
It is however reported that the Pakistan port of Gwadar is being secretly developed with us backing to take the most sophisticated us vessels. It is possible that Karachi may be used in the event of a global war. A project is started in 1981 with the help of us for improving naval base facilities in Karachi and along the coast of Baluchistan. It has 20 AK-IS attack helicopter gunships. It also has in total 31 submarine, one cruiser, 8 destroyers/frigates, 13 patrol boats more than 60 tons, 5 patrol boats less than 60 tons, 7 sweepers and 3 support vessels.\(^{16}\)

Kuwait has 2 patrol boats. The Iranian Navy is also growing in strength and sophistication. Iran possessed 7\(^{5}\) destroyers, 5 sweepers, escort sweeper, 16 patrol boats, 4 corvettes, 6 coastal and in-shore mine sweepers, 1 repair ship, one water tanker, one \(24\) 4 SAM class frigat which have been equipped with the sea-killer Mk2 surface-to-surface anti-shipping missiles as well as the sea-cat SAM missiles. It has 14 hovercrafts and ordered to some others. It has planned to buy shore-based anti-submarine aircrafts.\(^{17}\) The Iranian Navy is being gradually built up as a powerful force, not only for the Gulf but also for the Arabian sea area. It has 8 support vessels also. The naval weapons combined with powerful airforce would enable Iran to play a significant role in the defence of some parts of the Arabian sea. Heavier vessels and


\(^{17}\) Rajendra Singh, Politics of the Indian Ocean, Thoson Press Press India Ltd. Publication Division, p.142.
long range Phantoms would permit Iran to operate in the Arabian sea. It has possessed an oiler and a water tanker which enable the heavier vessels of the Iranian Navy to operate on the sea for a longer period. Iran has plans to double its Navy in the near future.

It will be interesting to note how the local Arab states and the big powers react in future to Iran's claims to control the Gulf. Iran's army, Navy and air force have been strengthened by Britain and the USA. Iran is a member of CENTO and has close relations with Pakistan which is also a CENTO partner. Till now Iran has been against the presence of any foreign power in the Gulf but there can always be temptations. But USA has maintained a small naval presence at Bahrain after the British withdrawal.

The Iranians have been talking about extending their so-called security perimeter. Iran was more concerned with the security problems arising out of its land confrontation with Iraq. The Iranians made a common cause with Oman to extend their security perimeter beyond the Gulf, deep into the Arabian Sea. Iran is keen to have a good understanding with Pakistan and others, to define the future role of Iran in this area. In this connection, the P.M. Ranghoolan in 1972 said that Mauritius would offer naval facilities to Iran, is a significant. There are possibilities that Iran's increasing military potential, its links with CENTO and the continuing Anglo-American presence in the Gulf and the Arabian sea may not be appreciated, either by the USSR or by
local states like Iraq which are in conflict with Iran. Though Iraq is not a naval power but possess es some capacity for a land confrontation. Iraq has 3 small ex-USSR submarinechasers, 12 P-6 PT boats and about 10 small patrol boats. Now the Iraqi navy accompanied with few fast patrol boats equipped with surface to surface missiles to counter the SAM class frigates acquired by Iran. Iraq however, remained a land force and did not seek to develop its naval wing. The USSR has established naval base at Umm Qasr in Iraq to counter American presence in Bahrain likely to Arabian sea also. There are border disputes between the countries in this area since the retirement of British Empire here. Iran had emerged as the dominant power in the Gulf and in the Arabian sea also in the regime of Shah. It acquired 202 sea cobra AH-66s armed with TOM missile launchers, 3 Tang class submarines, 12 missile boats armed with Harpoon SAMs, 2 store ships (logistic support ships), 2 supply ships (tanker and dry fr eighter), one fleet replenishment ship and one fleet tanker, 6 P-3 Orion planes, 20 anti submarine warfare (AS W) helicopters and 6 mine-countermeasure helicopters (sikorsky RH-53D). Its newly developing naval/air capability, especially its heavier fighting ships, support vessels, submarines, airtankers, Orion planes, and missile boats would have provided Iran with a very powerful force to play a crucial politico-military role in the Arabian sea.

18. Ibid. p. 144 .

19. Ibid. p. 145.
The Iraqi Navy operated 12 PT boats able to seriously threaten the Iranian oil terminal and port or the passage of oil terminal and port or the passage of oil tankers. Iraq has also strengthened its navy considerably. It has obtained 12-14 OSA I/II boats armed with Styse SSMS, 5 mine-sweepers and 4 landing crafts. According to Jane's Fighting ships, Iraq and the USSR signed a treaty in August 1976 which has been kept secret. 20 It is reported that, from the naval point of view, it included provisions for the Soviet occupation of Umm al - Qaab in return for the provision of 10 missile frigates to Iraq.

Kuwait was a British protectorate till 1961. Although it did not have a navy but it had 13 small patrol craft and 3 landing craft (for looking after off-shore oil rigs) which were operated by the coastguard. During 1973-74, Kuwait placed orders of planes, tanks etc. to strengthen her armed forces and Airforce and also try to give support by a navy to their air/armed forces if necessary in the conflict against her opponents. Therefore it had Wespar fast patrol boats armed with Exocet SSMS. The Kuwaiti navy would graduate from its earlier coastguard role and would have an effective anti-ship capability in the Gulf and the sea. 21 The OAE Navy, however, continued to be a coastal navy operating small patrol boats. It has strengthened its military capability but the navy continued to be neglected until recently but there were reports that 4 Jaguar-

class fast patrol boats have been acquired which are equipped with SSMs. Qatar has limited military and sea/air capability in the region. It has 6 large patrol boats and 31 patrol craft in 1976 and ordered for some others.

The most dramatic change was seen in the growth of the navy in Oman. Oman's Navy was composed of some small patrol boats, powered downhs and the sultan's yacht in 1972 but now it has acquired 7 Brocoke Marine large patrol crafts armed with Exocit SSMs, 2 minesweepers for patrol duty, 4 Wasp patrol boats, 6 small patrol crafts, one logistic support ship (oiler and supply vessel), 3 small landing craft and one training ship. Oman had a fine naval tradition in the past and this might indicate a revival of that tradition getting above packages in the region of Arabian sea. But this shows that the above states except Iran have not have their effective naval presence in the Arabian sea area, though they have tried to show their naval presence in the Gulf effectively. 22

The super powers interventions in the littoral states affairs, Indo-Pak conflict Iran-Iraq conflict, Afghanistan occupation etc. and Iranian revolution will probably dampen the naval arms race in the Arabian sea littoral states to some extent; but this could not be afforded and arms race and naval presence theory is continue date to big powers naval strategy there in the sea to

---

protect their interests and sovereignty and freedom. 23

The Indian subcontinent occupies a pivotal position in the Arabian sea and the Indian Ocean. This area is rich in minerals, energy and food resources. As the largest state in the region, India is the natural locus for technological, economic and military resources with respect to the small states in the littoral. In addition to the emotional elements affecting Indian security concerns, India's crucial oil links with South-west Asia and its trading routes to the Gulf markets traverse the Arabian sea. 24

India always had been remained a maritime nation, there by legitimizing the creation and modernization of a balanced naval fleet. It is argued that while to other countries the Arabian sea is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India, her life lines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected.

In view of India's mission as a nation, its maritime interests have been summarized as the protection from threats via the sea to India's independence. India's new capabilities for exploitation of the vast mineral and fish resources of the seabed, India's growing seaborne trade and its particularly heavy reliance


and today we find it churning with danger. The increasing pace of militarisation in the Arabian sea and the ocean makes the 3500 miles of our coastline more vulnerable. How can we acquiesce in any theory which tries to justify the threat to our own security environment or condones the existence of foreign bases and cruising fleets?

With such perceptions, the orientation of the Indian Navy itself underwent a serious alteration. The navy is prepared to defend the entire gamut of India's economic and political interests in the Arabian sea littoral. The GoI of India seemed determined to acquire at least the harbingers of a blue sea capability that would raise the threshold of naval interdiction. In effect a minimal deterrence that might prevent a foreign power from embarking on a course of action inimical to Indian national interests was sought to be created, and hence the Indian Navy was assigned the very important roles of maintaining the dominance of the sea in the event of a conflict with Pakistan and possessing at least a modest minimal deterrence capability that would be capable of showing the flag. In ascending order of ease of execution, these are maritime surveillance of alien navies, presence and show – the flag, minimal deterrence, and power projection.

**Maritime surveillance of alien vessels constitutes the most benign and elementary form of assertive naval operations and the**

27. Ibid. p. 1192.
Indian Navy's use of its super constellations and IL-38 Mays for the task is premised on the practical consideration that, in the near future, it is beyond its capabilities either to police the sea seriously in a sustained manner or to keep alien navies out of it. In a situation where a more assertive form of naval containment is ruled out from an operational point of view a necessary precondition for undertaking any larger defensive naval maneuvers should conditions warrant.

Presence and show-the-flag missions in the Arabian sea littoral capitalize on the fact that there are large Indian communities in the region and that India has tended to perceive safeguarding their welfare vaguely as part of its extended responsibilities. Such missions constitute visible dimension of the armed situation that characterizes Indian ascendancy and helps underwrite its aspirations as a rising middle power. Consistent with this rationale, Indian Navy ships have made port calls in virtually every country in the Persian Gulf Arabian sea littoral and have participated in occasional joint naval exercises.

Minimal deterrence is the low cost translation of defense of the nation's maritime interests. 28 whereby the Indian Navy has not sought to develop a force posture that would allow it complete domination at every level of conflict, which would be costly, but instead allows it to convey to a potential adversary that the costs India could extract in any conflict would be so disproportionately
high as to dissuade an opponent from committing naval forces in the first place. In present circumstances, minimal deterrence is an attractive product of both economic and political compulsions\textsuperscript{29} since 1974. The Indian Navy has consistently ranked first from budget expenditure point of view. The force posture entailed by minimum deterrence allows the Indian Navy to acquire an interdiction capability sufficient or to complicate the mix of naval planning of a potential adversary without permitting it to grow in so gargantuan a fashion as to become a cause for undue concern to India's neighbours, who are even now suspicious of India's security objectives.

To answer the queries, about the transformation of the area into a area of peace, about a new global order based on peace, justice and the right of self determination of nations, and about the necessities for its own national security with the fears and apprehensions of its smaller neighbours in the littoral who might perceive such forces as threatening and restrictive of their own national independence, the Indian Government proceeds with a program of major naval expansion.\textsuperscript{30}

The reassuring tradition required both nations (India and Pak) for the development and maintenance of requisite naval forces. Currently, the increased concerns relating to the South west Asian
'are of crisis' and the US-Pakistani strategic consensus arising from the same ensure that naval forces are once again at the forefront of Pakistani strategic thought. Similarly, the Indian concerns relating to the naval competition in the Arabian sea coupled with its own growing political confidence and military resurgence will ensure that there is no looking back where naval forces are concerned. The naval rearmament in the Arabian sea has taken place by both the nations due to mere adversarial competitiveness and adverse voice by the respective leaderships of both countries. Anyone can understand that security is best preserved when each competitor has sufficient forces to guarantee the successful execution of its objectives. The mission of all the navies is identical and thus suggests that numerical asymmetries alone can illuminate shifts in the naval balance of power. Every nation of the sea want sea control for gaining and maintaining naval supremacy with a view to controlling vital sea areas in order to protect lines of communication and commerce by ensuring local superiority in an area of naval operations, sea control can be ensured by destroying the navy at sea, by blockading the navy in its bases, by destroying the key installations with naval and air forces.

Pakistani naval strategy is different from the Indian naval strategy of sea control, but rather it might be proposed as a sea control strategy for a navy of modest means & aspirations. It has ambition of naval superiority that is traditionally ascribed to

31.
India in view of its geography and general pre-dominance. The threat to the Indian Navy comes not from massed seapower but from numerous cruise missiles at varying from different directions, ranges, attitudes and speeds in attack. Pakistani Navy always is trying to get a opportunity in a conflict to effect the interdiction of Indian ship movements. Sea denial strategy of Pakistan is more attractive in theory but not in practice.

In fact, the Pakistan's naval objectives against India would be to use its cruise missile equipped surface/subsurface forces to deny India use of the Arabian sea in particular, and freedom of naval maneuver in general and in doing so to protect the Pak coastline, territorial waters and its maritime assets and to conduct highly conspicuous attacks against Indian shipping, offshore installations and coastal targets for which it midget submarines are optimized. Pak Navy has no capacity of preventing Indian Navy from using them in tandem in open sea exercises.

32.
33.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Aircraft carrier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Cruiser Missile Boats</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Destroyer/Frigates</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Corvette/Patrol Vess.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Patrol Boats</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Minesweepers</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Hovercrafts</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Support vessels (oiler, supply and repair ships)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Landing Crafts</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Aircraft carrier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>US Mission tanker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Tarpeds</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Fast attack gun</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Zig</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Coastguard cutter</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
<td></td>
<td>order</td>
<td>order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The Naval Air Force Balance of India and Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 attack squadron</strong></td>
<td>15 Sea Hawk, 8 Sea Harrier, FRS (2 Training)</td>
<td>1 ASW/MR Squadron: 3 Atomic (Exocet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 ASW Squadron</strong></td>
<td>5 Alize 1050</td>
<td>2 Rotary ASW/ARS Squadrons: 6 Sea King (Exocet), 4 Alouette III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 MR Squadrons</strong></td>
<td>4 Super Constellation, 3 IL 39 - May.</td>
<td>ASW: AS-39 Exocet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Rotary ASW Squadrons</strong></td>
<td>10 Sea King, 5 Ka-25, 8 Alouette III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Rotary ASW Squadron</strong></td>
<td>10 Alouette III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Communication Squadron</strong></td>
<td>13 Defender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Training Squadrons</strong></td>
<td>6 Kiran, 2 Sea Hawk, 3 Alouette III, Hughes, 209 helicopters.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**On Order**
- 10 Sea Harrier, M201, IT60, 3 IL39MR
- 12 Sea King MK 429 Sea Eagle SSM Exocet AM 39 ASM