CHAPTER III

POLICIES IN POLITICS
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A study of the origin of Indian nationalism would reveal too clearly that it emerged against the background of changes associated with British imperialism, notably as they impinged upon the political structure, economy and education of the country.¹ The British East India Company in the tradition of despotic rule formulated policies, enacted laws, collected taxes, raised armies and recruited officials without much taking into account the feelings of the subjects.² Trade monopolies, bribery on an extensive scale and seizure of treasures were carried out in a fashion that emulated the ways of the earlier conquerors of the sub-continent.³

Another important idea was the belief in representative institutions. Liberalism as the prevailing ideology during the 19th century had among other things emphasised the virtues of actively associating the people in the affairs of the Government. In the initial years at least till 1857 upheaval the demands for representative institutions in India had been resisted on grounds that conditions were unsuited for its application. Hence, even when the Imperial Legislative Council was set up in 1853, the right of Indian representation
was not conceded. The legislature set up by the Indian Councils Act of 1861, allowed for non-official representation and conferred on these representatives the right to ask questions and debate bills, and even if these concessions proved to be a far cry from a truely representative Government as Indian critics soon found out, yet the reform contained the seed of such a system which in time could alter the autocratic political structure of British India and corrode the legitimacy of imperial rule founded upon the right of conquest. Nationalism as a creed, since 19th century, had given currency to the belief that the world was divided into nations that were separate but equal.

A.K. Desai says that the necessary conditions for the rise of nationalism, in India were supplied by British imperialism through the destruction of pre-capitalist forms of production prevailing in India and the substitution in their place of the modern capitalist economic forms. He claims that classes like zamindars, tenants, peasant proprietors, merchants, capitalists and proletariat were products of British policy and had come to exist on a national scale for the first time. These classes had turned against the British Raj because the latter had subordinated India's interests by trying to make the country "an agrarian raw material producing colony of Britain and as market for British Industries." Resentment created by British attitude led these classes to establish their own organisations as well as to contemplate national collaboration to foster the
common interests of all classes. Desai asserts that it was out of such collaboration that Indian nationalism emerged to challenge British imperialism. 6

During the century, which followed the establishment of the congress the spirit of nationalism was increasing in intensity, constantly outstripping constitutional development leaving in its frail frustration after every instalment of reform. It was a period of challenge and response and India produced several remarkable men who provided leadership in the struggle for freedom and one among them was C.R.

Pre-independent period:

When C.R. settled down to political career, other conceptualisation often rested upon faulty or questionable premises were beginning to have a mischievous impact upon the politics of South India, specially the Hindu majority. 7 The whole idea of such an entity as a majority came on the twin process which were accelerating at the end of 19th century but which were also lending to become more and more unsynchronised in relation to each other:

1. progressive cultural integration or Indianisation as a form of growing national self-consciousness.

2. progressive expansion of participation in the bureaucratic constitutional democratic forms of governing institutions, which were themselves parliamentary or representative. 8
C.R. was an ordinary member of Indian national Congress from 1907. It was as an old time Tilakite that C.R. made his political début at the provincial conference held from May 9-11 at Conjeevaram, where C.R. stood out as one of Mrs. Besant's Chief opponents. His proposition that Tilak should be invited to preside over the meeting of I N C, was unanimously accepted. C.R. had a shrewd grasp of political realities to suppose that at the stage Tilak's cause was in ascendant. Tilak though no longer was the man for new political situation. C.R. used him to push Mrs. Besant aside and thereby facilitate ascendancy in the South. C.R. was aloof from the Home Rule due to dislike of Besant Policy and had a scepticism about theosophy.

C.R. was attracted to the Gandhian ideas long before their first meeting in Kasthuri Ranga Iyengar's house in March 1919. It was Thoreau's book on civil disobedience and Gandhi discovery of the application of Thoreau's and Tolstoy's doctrines to Indian politics, he discovered the truth that a foreign people cannot govern us unless we cared to be governed. He also read the baptist missionary J. Doke's account of Gandhi's South African career. It revealed to him completely Mahatma's mind. The lack of stability in the Tilakite group precipitated C.R's shift of allegiance to Gandhian policies. It was also the policy of Sathyagraha based on nationalism which, "he began to follow when it was first commenced in South Africa and knew the Science of Sathyagraha as no one else perhaps did."
The Rowlatt Satyagraha Sabha set up in Madras was unpopular and C.R. was almost above in his commitment to the Gandhian strategy. C.R.'s role in Khilafat movement was based on the same principle, that he volunteered to persuade the Hindu to cooperate with the Muslim and it was at Khilafat meeting in Delhi on 23, 24, November 1919, that Gandhiji first verbalised the ideas of non-cooperation.

C.R.'s intellect however had been during the Khilafat movement, the Achilles heel of the Congress; Khilafat alliance the incompatibility between Congress Indian Nationalism and Khilafat Pan Islamism.

C.R.'s political authority in the south depended on the success of the civil disobedience movement. Non-cooperation is not a means to a political end, but a Dharma in itself to abstain from cooperating with wrong it is an absolute duty. He packed the Tamil Nadu provincial congress committee with his own men by 1921, including Dr. Rajan, K. Santhanam, E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, with the support of muslims, through Khilafat movement the support of untouchables mobilised by the prohibition campaign.

The aim of the Congress was freedom within the empire if possible; outside the empire if necessary. The former meant dominion status. In C.R.'s view, there were, "two great impediments for Swaraj within the empire — the spirit of
inequality under which India in the white colonies suffered and the risk, that the Commonwealth might drag India into wars with the Muslim status if the blocks were removed." C.R. a nationalist himself thought that the liberals and the nationalists were complementary, the moderation of one balancing the impatience of the other. The liberals were content to petition the proper authority, the nationalists were idealists who saw the need for fundamental rights. Non-Cooperation was never to be widespread in the South under which situation C.R. "asked for the highest penalty" and got three months simple imprisonment and his state of mind was something unreal but his attitude was undoubtedly nationalistic.

The task of sustaining the enthusiasm for Gandhiji's programme fell on C.R. after his release from prison on 26th March 1922. As member of AICC, civil disobedience enquiry committee he with Kasthuri Ranga Iyengar favoured a continuation of boycott of legislatures but under the leadership of C.R. Das of Bengal and Motilal Nehru of U.P., a counter movement gained strength which claimed that non-cooperation could be conducted most effectively from inside the legislature. 

At the Gaya Congress session at the end of 1922, C.R. and the Gandhian followers were termed as no changers rejected the new creed and clung dogmatically to the boycott of legislature. C.R. believed that non-cooperation was a law
of national life and even if did not produce immediate Swaraj, civil disobedience was still a constructive school for self-government, through the difficult process of organizing non-violent operations with success. He argued that a series of progressively more powerful Sathyagraha agitational waves would allow for a quiet recovery of strength and the rebuilding of the Congress organisation. In the process of strengthening the national spirit and preparing for the mass movement, individual civil disobedience was to play a major part. The same Gandhian policy of non-violence was initiated by C.R. before the adoption of the boycott of legislature in Madras Presidency. He asked the brahmins to willingly concede to non-brahmins all their demands for reserved seats in the legislature in the belief that good will between the communities was of greater importance than absolute justice, keeping in mind the Hindu-Muslim rivalry. On the suggestion that Gandhiji should participate in the round table conference to secure a negotiated settlement C.R. opposed with a view that a premature settlement would end unsatisfactorily for the Congress as it has not shown sufficient strength. C.R. believed in the process of strengthening national spirit to achieve freedom.

C.R.'s role in mass civil disobedience movement by collecting salt at Vedaranyam was tremendous. Vedaranyam was chosen as the battle field, because it was a small, unimportant and out of the way town, situated on the coast in a sandy unproductive
C.R. with the marchers of Salt Sathyagraha o:
Vedaranvam 1930.
region, it had certain advantages. It was favourably situated for a salt campaign as it was near the Agasthiampalli salt factory and the swamps near Vedaranyam were the largest in the Madras Presidency and were covered with lakhs of mounds of salt from May 1930 onwards. Besides other reasons to choose Vedaranyam, C.R. expected the assistance of Vakils, Mirasdars and merchants of the town. C.R. selected volunteers who were young clerks, students and graduates who had some education and had shown an interest in Khadi work in recent years.

In conformity with Gandhiji's insistence on strict discipline C.R. announced a code of conduct for the volunteers and required them to adhere to the code strictly. The code mentioned a few habits which were considered to be unhealthy and unhygienic and wanted their avoidance and such a code and its strict adherence were meant for earning a good name for the volunteers and to enhance the dignity and solemnity of the march. C.R. programmed a daily routine to rouse nationalism among people and to serve the purpose of helping the socially backward and he was cautious and anticipated communal disputes as it was given a semi-religious colour due to the fact that the march was blessed by priests and accompanied by Hindu hymns along with patriotic songs, which emphasised nationalism and need for freedom. C.R. was successful in arousing public interest and nationalist enthusiasm and provided new stimulus to the movement and
propogated prohibition. Following Gandhian principles in true spirit it excluded violence and hatred and it brought about more converts to the national cause.

Following the Gandhi-Irwin Truce of 5th March 1931, C.R. applied another tactic: a reliance on the traditional weapon of social ostracism encouraged local caste organisations to outcast drinkers, the fines they paid for reinstatement to be credited to local congress committees. When the revival of Swarajist party did not materialise C.R. wrote to Gandhi, not to insist on any resolution of the Congress working committee giving a ceremonial sanction to his complete withdrawal of civil resistance, strongly pleaded that the parliamentary programme should be done in the name of Congress and not in the name of a separate party. He feared that a loosely affiliated Swarajist party could not provide the cohesive force and discipline necessary for counter-acting such influences. Without the advantage of Congress control of the Swarajist party be cautioned, would certainly be wrecked on the rocks of communism and personal ambitions. Between 1934 and 1936, C.R. made an alliance with Sathyamurthi only with an aim of bringing the Swarajaists closer to nationalists to obtain unity as it was the case of Sanatanists supporting Congress. He wanted the regional Congress to expand to include as many nationalists as possible to avoid communal disputes. Frustrated by the political deadlock C.R. persuaded
the Congress working committee at Bardoli to offer the Cooperation of India in defence of the country on a national basis. He wanted the Congress to give the Government an inkling of the party's desire to return to office and to cooperate with war effort so that the Government could make an offer.

The major task between 1941-1944, was to prepare a defence against Japan and to continue to demand freedom from the British. C.R. spent ceaseless energy to generate a response and proved to be a patriot on fire. He untiringly communicated with the people, made speeches which were direct and simple pointing out the need to defend the nation’s territories. These speeches on 'defence and deadlock' were of intrinsic importance and had such bearing on the critical situation of the country. He said the defence of India meant defence against disorder, internal conflicts and external aggression. He felt that a demand for a national government and the termination of India's dependent status should reverberate all over India. There must be self-sufficiency in each village and there must be Hindu-Muslim Unity. He insisted on national government as it would establish stable responsible Government in which every unit should be made self-sufficient and not be dependent on the centre and national government should be formed consisting of all parties. The essence of nationalism found in the appeal of C.R. was best conveyed by Governor Hope's words to the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow.
When Cripp's proposals were made "C.R. alone of the working committee was first in favour of accepting the plan because he felt that except for defence and war, Indians would have full power in all other departments." But the majority of the Congress was against the proposals. C.R. had blamed the British and Cripps himself for the collapse of the negotiations. Reckoning that Hindu-Muslim Unity would have altered the outcome, C.R. reached a controversial conclusion, be ready to give the Muslim League more or less what it wanted lest it obstruct any and every constitutional advance.

C.R. justified the proposals of Cripps by stating that if there had been a Gandhi-Jinnah meet in May 1943, there would have been a Congress League pact with far-reaching potentialities resulting in the constitutional issue and the transfer of responsibility of administration. He felt that if the Congress was using the weapon of non-cooperation against British power, the League was using the same against the Congress. Criticising the Congress attitude to the War, C.R. pointed out that the Congress claim of 'moral neutrality'. Referring to the failure of the Cripps' mission C.R. said, "the true causes of the break down were two fold. One indirect was the lukewarm attitude of the Viceroy towards the negotiations that were initiated by Sri Stafford Cripps and the other direct cause was the exaggerated importance attached on both sides to the Viceroy's Veto during the interim Government. To quote C.R. "The British Government took the risk of having to
transfer power during the War—besides committing themselves to a declaration of Indian freedom after the War—because they saw also that even if the negotiations failed it would stand them in good stead when explaining their position to America and to the rest of the world. C.R. viewed in favour of separate state for Muslims from the point of view of establishing national unity among Hindus. The basis for his view was the historical background. Lokamanya Tilak the major architect of Lucknow pact took an effort to unite the leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League in order to be able to put pressure on the colonial authorities. Gandhi’s unity with leaders of the Khilafat was also successful effort at the Hindu-Muslim unity in the course of the national struggle. The basic aspect of the Gandhian strategy lay in the promotion of an agreement with the middle and upper class Muslim leaders. The Khilafat movement was popular because of its religious connotation and did not even bring before them the aspect of the clash of their economic and social interests with imperialism as had been done earlier by moderate and extremist nationalists or was being done by Gandhi in his non-cooperation agitation. The result was that the mass of Muslims who took active part in the Khilafat movement remained unacquainted with modern anti-imperialist ideology or the modern principles of political organisation such as secularism and democracy. Hence, the top national and communal leaders began to have ideological differences later, while the former wanted the communities to
unite and fight, the latter wanted to shun and fight each
other. Secondly the nationalists refused to fight imperialism
militantly and after 1937, the colonial authorities extended
all out support to the communalists when the nationalists
failed to organise consistent and principled fight against
communalism. The soft policy towards the communal nationalists
and the communal ideology became a major barrier in the
national leadership's efforts to solve the communal problem.

In regard to the views stated above, C.R. had become a
staunch supporter of the Muslim League's contention of
separate province. He said, "It is surely better for the
growth of freedom and democracy in the vast country that those
who insist on a separate existence should be allowed to try
it out?" To C.R., change becomes possible when democratic
forces and ideal of freedom gain ascendancy over imperialistic
tendencies. Concessions to a revolting population was only
a device to save an empire when it is in distress. Churchill
and Cripps had not differed in their desire to continue the
empire they differed in their emphasis on organic vitality
of moral choice. C.R. was against fanaticism and said that
the Hindus wanted freedom on the basis of a united country,
and the Muslims wanted freedom on terms what would give them
a separate state.

C.R. pointed out what he presumed to be the weaknesses
in Indian nationalism, the Muslim League opposition to the
Congress and Indian Capitalism and in regard to the former he said that the politically conscious section of the Muslims had set up a rival feeling to nationalism based on religion which had the widest appeal to the Muslim masses.\textsuperscript{75} He attacked the Indian industrialists, because they "while shedding copious tears for nationalism were making their way by quiet and uninterrupted services at the call of the bureaucratic government."\textsuperscript{76} The appeal of C.R. to accept the proposal was condemned\textsuperscript{77} as impracticable and inconsistent but to C.R., the situation in the country demanded not non-violent individual civil disobedience leading to futile martyrdom but an intelligent appreciation of facts, political and material and the willingness to adapt themselves to changed and changing circumstances. He believed that the Congress ought to participate in the War effort not in the interests of Britain, but in the interests of India and her people at a critical time.\textsuperscript{78} The proposals suggested the establishment of national government\textsuperscript{79} and C.R. felt that national government was possible only with a permanent settlement or acceptance of the demands of the Muslim League.\textsuperscript{80} He was proved right in 1947, with British Governments plan of 1947, which was a revised edition of Cripp's proposal and a faithful copy of C.R's basis of settlement of 1944.\textsuperscript{81}

The formula of C.R. was based on nationalism. The insistence of the Muslim League on the division of the country
was becoming highly pronounced. Several vital facts were insisted by the champions of Pakistan movement firstly judged in the light of consideration of unity between Pakistan and Hindustan which was calculated as a myth, the unity between Hindustan and Burma was more spiritual than between Pakistan and Hindustan. When cessation of Burma was not objected to there was less reason for the Hindus to object to the separation of Pakistan which was politically detachable, socially hostile and spiritually alien to the rest of India. Secondly, the contribution made by Pakistan to the Central exchequer was very little. The Revenue of the Central Government amounts to 121 crores, of this about 52 crores were annually spent on the Muslim army drawn from Pakistan area and the bulk of the amount was contributed by the Hindu provinces and hence the separatists argued in favour of putting an end to it and form a separate province. Thirdly, the population distribution was taken to consideration. Again in the provinces of Bengal and Assam the Hindus and Muslims predominate in certain districts which could make the creation of homogeneous Muslim states possible. The problem of allocation of the financial assets and liabilities of the British Government of India the problem of the delimitation of the areas, the problems of the transfer of population from Pakistan to Hindustan and vice versa were also to be taken to consideration. C.R. studied the entire problem with a purely national outlook. Thus was launched the much discussed, much
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Rupees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>1,81,01,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWP</td>
<td>9,28,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>5,86,46,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,76,76,594</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other provinces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Rupees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>9,53,26,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>22,53,44,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>12,00,00,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>4,05,53,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>1,54,37,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.P. &amp; Berar</td>
<td>31,42,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>1,87,55,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>5,67,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>51,91,27,729</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities</td>
<td>British India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>150,890,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>79,398,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>39,920,807</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>16,713,256</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sikhs</td>
<td>4,165,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Christians</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Xians</td>
<td>1,655,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo Indians</td>
<td>113,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>75,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jains</td>
<td>578,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>101,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>167,413</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>19,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>371,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>294,171,961</td>
</tr>
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</table>

revealed and prophetic C.R. formula. C.R. submitted a resolution on 29th April 1942, at the All India Congress Committee meeting on the issue of self-determination for Muslims which urged that it was "absolutely necessary in the best interests of the country to remove every obstacle in the way of the establishment of a national administration." His formula insisted on cooperation of Hindus and Muslims in the war period, demarcation of Muslim provinces by a plebiscite on condition of full transfer of power by Britain and in the event of separation, mutual agreement between Hindustan and Pakistan for safe-guarding defence and commerce and communication for essential purposes. This was ridiculed by Jinnah as "a shadow and a husk, marred, mutilated and moth eaten Pakistan and thus trying to pass off having met Pakistan Scheme and Muslim demand." Jinnah objected because the proposal did not delink Pakistan totally from India. C.R. envisaged a treaty of separation providing common foreign affairs, commerce and communication which Jinnah feared would abridge Pakistan's sovereignty and also opposed to the plebiscite. In C.R.'s unemotional view a plebiscite of all adults was a legitimate preliminary to separation. "To agree to partition without ascertaining the wishes of the people was inconsistent with all modern notions of constitution making" according to C.R. The correspondence between Jinnah and C.R. published were curious, but C.R. was adjudged as a figure to hold the scales evenly between the Congress and the League. C.R.'s attitude
was clearly aiming at the settlement of contradicting religious interests between the two communities for a balanced national government in the interest of national unity\(^93\) which though objected by Jinnah and other Congress leaders then\(^94\) it was the same decision accepted in 1947. Where reason failed, circumstances triumphed later in 1947. The Mountbatten plan was merely another name for the C.R. formula. Both gave Pakistan an identical territory but unlike C.R's the Viceroy's plan envisaged no formal bonds between the two nations.\(^95\) The common military system suggested by C.R. would have successfully contributed to the defence of India.

The C.R. formula reflected C.R's belief that an agreement with Jinnah was a necessary precursor to the establishment of a national government\(^96\) and to bring a final settlement to the unfortunate problem.\(^97\) His proposals aimed at bringing the Hindus in these two provinces under one Hindu fold and only contiguous districts of those provinces in which Muslims were in a majority would be given the right of self determination and his formula would keep the Sikhs in better position in free India and a strong force on the side of Hindus.\(^98\) He was convinced that the British would not resist the Japanese in II World War and the people of India had not the means of effective resistance. Only a national government could save the country, but the British were not willing to part with power. Therefore power had to be wrested from them. How could
it be done? Only he argued, by coming to terms with Jinnah and Muslim League. Their demand for Pakistan after the war was lesser of the two evils since, refusal would mean invasion of India by Japanese. He put forward his view with courage, lucidity and persistence. C.R. insisted on partition as he felt it necessary to remove every grave danger in the way of establishment of national administration, and felt that to sacrifice the chances of formation of national government for the doubtful advantage of maintaining a controversy over the Unity of India was a most unwise policy and was necessary to choose a lesser evil and acknowledge of League's claim for separation to save the honour of Indian nationalism. 99

It was the same sense of nationalism that invigorated C.R. to oppose the elements of separation when it was applied on achieving separate electorate for minority community. Dr. Ambedkar's disillusionment with the Congress under Gandhi led the Scheduled Castes under his leadership to reject the INC and its ideology what the untouchables wanted were safeguards in the constitution itself which would prevent the tyranny of a Hindu communal majority from coming into being, 100 (i.e.) guaranteed minimum representatives in legislature, executive and public services. C.R. on Gandhian lines objected strongly as this communalism would ultimately cut the very root of Indian tradition and unity. 101 C.R.'s ideology and policy of consolidating India was doubted by E.V.R., who represented the need for separate Dravidanadu. 102
separatist tendencies started due to the evolving of theories regarding Dravidian culture. Caldwell formulated certain theories about the origin and nature of Tamil Dravidian culture and he denied that the Dravidian languages were derived from Sanskrit.\textsuperscript{103} His theory stated that Sanskrit had been brought to South India by Aryan Brahmin colonists and with it a peculiar type of Hinduism which embodied the worship of idols.\textsuperscript{104} The formulation of the concept of Dravidian civilisation quickly became involved not only with a full scale attack on Brahmins' cultural position but also with political issues. The Justice party condemned the Aryan Brahmin domination on language and literature.\textsuperscript{105} Efforts were made to find equivalent terms of Scientific terms in Tamil which C.R. considered a waste as Sanskrit formations were preferable which could be used without ambiguity.\textsuperscript{106} Tamil Brahmins long renounced for their Sanskrit learning reached to the threat of Dravidianism by seeking to emphasise their connection with Tamil and with Tamil region. Other deeper and more elemental forces were at work which assisted in giving currency to the belief that Tamil was the sole possession of the non-brahmins. They found the Brahmins their target\textsuperscript{107} and as a result the forces of Tamil separatism became involved in a series of battles.

E.V.R., the Champion of Tamil separatism poured attacks on Congress and C.R., whom he considered favour only Brahmin domination in all aspects and demanded a separate state of
Southern Region for Non-brahmin, to remove disparities between North and South in socio economic fields and to remove the impact of British administration. He pointed out C.R.'s tactics to approve of Pakistan demand as a measure to gain self importance and cited the example of Pakistan for obtaining separate Dravidanadu for Tamils. C.R. objected as it cut the very basis of nationalism.

C.R. made an attack on Ambedkar's ill-conceived plan for a separate state for the untouchables to indicate that his support for Pakistan was the limit of his acceptance of any territorial fragmentation of India. He stated that it is idle to talk of separate nationalities or distinct elements of the population when the persons claiming the benefit of the principle of national self determination do not occupy a definable and divisable territory, so as to be capable of being formed into a separate state or sub-state and hence Ambedkar's attempts to imitate Jinnah were inadmissable. While C.R. accepted the principle of Pakistan he rejected the Tamil separatism and linguistic divisions. The Muslim communal feeling had a foreign origin due to political invasions and conversions and based on social religious differences with Hinduism and became deep rooted due to the role of British imperialism in India. In the face of threat to Indian unity at a time of danger of Second World War and political deadlock, partition according to C.R. would help India moving
forward to freedom and safeguard nationalism.\textsuperscript{114} On the other hand, linguistic, separatism would only divide people, and it was based on caste which indicated narrow regionalism. Regional barriers for trade, communication, would affect, socio economic facilities of India, and administration which might endanger the national feelings of the people of India in the event of foreign threat.

\textbf{Post-independent period:}

C.R. occupied two posts from 1946-1948 i.e., the Governor of Bengal and Governor-General of India. In the exercise of these two offices of High Command cast C.R. in the role of integrated nationalist.\textsuperscript{115} There was the last flicker of Bengal nationalism, belated plans for a united and independent Bengal, drawn up by Sarat Bose and true to the High Command's expectation. C.R. did dispense a great deal of rhetoric on the need for restoring reverence for law and discipline.\textsuperscript{116}

As Governor-General, C.R. introduced high ideals of integral nationalism where class struggle was concerned which endangered national life. The Razaka communist alliance alienated C.R. and by August 1948, he told the Nizam to ban the Razakars and to invite the Indian Government to station troops at Secunderabad.\textsuperscript{117} It was C.R's unique display of establishment of nationalism that led to the introduction of the Press (objectionable matter) bill on 31st August 1951, when he was the Home Minister. The provisions of the Bill were
directed against the encouragement of violence or sabotage, and other grave offences against the publication of scurrilous matter. He stated that the written matter considered objectionable was different from what was considered objectionable in the ordinary penal code. A writing is objected to because it has had a tendency. The bill created a breakdown on communication between C.R. and Nehru, due to controversy over the Bill. But, C.R. was unmindful of the forced circumstances leading to his exit as he stated "moral leadership as distinguished from playing to the gallery is not dictatorship, but the true and stable foundation of democracy."

Bitter controversies over the reorganisation of states sharpened C.R.'s concern. He has not liked the new boundaries decided upon. He was sad that the Malayalam and Kannada districts of Madras would be detached as the Telugu districts had been in 1953. It's mix of languages and cultures which had been Madras' strength, and he feared that the province, "once so big and important and progressive will grow narrow minded and intensely anti-culture." His solution was a single southern state of a Telugu, Tamil, Kannada and Malayalam areas a large Dakshina Pradesh that would retain the political significance of the South.

B.R. Ambedkar brought forth two reasons for want of linguistic states. One is to take easy the way to democracy and to remove racial and cultural tension. He emphasised that
### Table III

**Relative Population of Different Communities**

Distribution by Religion of 10,000 persons in India in the provinces and in the States, 1921 and 1931.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province etc.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Buddhist</th>
<th>Tribal</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Sikh</th>
<th>Jain</th>
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<td>2,174</td>
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<td>365</td>
<td>236</td>
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<td><strong>Provinces</strong></td>
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<td>159</td>
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<td>1,299</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1931</td>
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<td>1,347</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>141</td>
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</table>

Source: Census Report of India, 1921, 1931.
every state must be an unilingual state but all people speaking one language should be brought under one Government irrespective of area, population, and dissimilarity of conditions among the people speaking the language would not be valid and they should be cut up into many states depending upon
1. the requirement of efficient administration;
2. the needs of the different areas;
3. the sentiments of the different areas;
4. the proportion between majority and minority.

The minority must be given protection to prevent the tyranny of the majority and to get it done the constitution must be amended and provisions must be made for a system of plural member constituencies with cumulating voting. On the basis of relative population of different communities creation of smaller states is a safeguard to the minorities.

C.R. had expressed positive views against the establishment of linguistic states. He strongly felt that in the new federation of India linguistic states instead of helping the development of nationalism create language barriers in the nation. The danger was that this growth of state nationalism might result in the incidents of other states being treated like foreigners and might also come in the way of the flow of easy communication between the residents of different states because of linguistic difficulties. In a country in which the
concept of federalism had been newly introduced, such growths of disparity instead of creating national integration might lead to the growth of disintegrating factors. C.R.'s doubts and fears have since been borne out by what has happened in the country. Numerous disputes between the states on small areas of territories, and thimblefuls of water, growth of regionalism, the sons of soil concept have created a vicious atmosphere in the country endangering the very existence of the nation as an integral whole.

The power that came to Congress in 1947 had been tremendously increased in the shape of a by-product of the welfare state, further augmented by the official adoption of socialism as a means to welfare ¹³¹ and he warned no freedom can survive if a statist policy is installed in power, gets strong hold on the economy of the nation and alters the constitution to suit its policies.¹³² The transformation of licensed capitalists into party exchequer is the biggest and most pernicious phenomenon of Congress rules in India.¹³³ He voiced his opinion against totalitarianism.¹³⁴ He said laws must be made by the legislature and policies must be laid down by the party in office, but the judgement as to whether a man should be convicted or acquitted should be left to the court and not taken up by the legislature.¹³⁵ He viewed strongly against constitutional declaration of emergency as it could give power to everyone in the party.¹³⁶
Less taxation, less inflation, abandonment of the wholly wrong plan of finding industrial capital by oppressive taxation, and release of private capital and private initiative would only help to a large extent in clearing the air of the poisonous fog of corruption. He lamented that the state governments no longer represent the people of the states or the majority of them, but only function as powerful agencies of the Central party Organisation. He felt that there should be a political movement for greater autonomy for the states and for the functioning of the Central Government as a free federal organisation. He said the party system is an essential part of parliamentary democracy but it should not be made into a machine that suppresses freedom of opinion, political ideologies and dogmas may divide parties, but when entrusted with government by majority vote what democracy calls for is not merely fulfilment of electoral promises made to the majority, but just rule and just democratic procedure, in all matters.

He advocated on two factors: firstly on a broad based agreement among all classes of citizens about the objectives of the Government and secondly on the existence of two partly system in which each of the big political groups possess effective leadership. He expressed his views boldly on the corrupt election system and quoted the expensive election system was detrimental to democratic principles and added
a few suggestions on nationalisation of elections by which the government in office should resign at the time of election and a caretaker government should be installed. He pointed out the value of proportional representation on by functional representation.

C.R.'s nationalism and a deep sense of attachment to democratic ideas made him strongly resent the Congress rule, and to organise an opposition party in 1958, the year in which a socialist twist was given to the economic thinking in the country. The famous Avadi resolution of the Congress in 1955 declared the beginning of socialist pattern in order to speed up production and equitable distribution of national wealth. Marx's own ideal is a society in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. But what he taught has led to such means being adopted in current communists practice, as to yield the opposite result the complete ruthless destruction of the sense of value of the individual by the party and the state and their officials. C.R. agreed that socialism was an ideal worthy of implementation in bridging the gulf between the haves and have-nots, but he differed with regard to its fulfilment. The free way of life as against life under totalitarian rule is not possible if the properties of citizens earned or inherited are not guaranteed against expropriation by state without just cause to review by an independent judiciary.
is not merely a right arising out of birth or domicile. It is a culture developed by training, and right emotional direction, without it democracy would be chaos. The citizenship is a pattern of individual conduct which alone can help democracy to produce social happiness.149

The second five year plan was an open expression of the same socialistic policy,150 but at the end of the plan the Government fell short of the targets by about thirty per cent the unemployment picture was darker at the end of the plan. India's need for foreign exchange was greater than anticipated. Deficit financing and the expenditure, in the public sector were more than twice as great as during the first plan. At the 64th Annual Session convened at Nagpur in January 1959, the Congress party declared "the future agrarian pattern should be pooled for joint cultivation. Further those who actually work on the land will get a share in proportion to the work put in by them and accordingly the Government. The Government proceeded to the practice of land ceiling state trading in food grains and the establishment of service cooperation with an ultimate aim of converting them into voluntary farming cooperatives.151 In this type of mixed economy the balance must be inevitably be tilted in favour of the Government.152

J.R. strongly objected to the corrupt Government practices, anti-democratic socialistic views, and the cooperative farming, and to fight against them, and to re-establish nationalist
trends which was gradually waning in India, initiated the Swatantra party.

The Swatantra party was the outcome of the efforts of C.R., M.R. Masani, and N.G. Ranga and the party opposed communism, aimed at prosperity through freedom, increased production and to develop the growth of conditions in which the peoples' enterprise will find full and unfettered scope. The party insisted on respecting the property rights of the peasant in their holdings, to adopt corrective and regulative measures, to curb anti-social activities, expansion of mixed economy where the State and free enterprise work side by side. The party was opposed to foreign capital coming in the form of loan which it considered as a burden on the country, but favoured the foreign capital in the form of equity capital. It insisted on spiritual element in education with a view to providing an adequate background of human values for future citizens. Establishment of Central Universities maintenance of common academic standard and Gandhian doctrine of trusteeship were some of the ideas expressed by the party. The Chief spokesman was C.R., who contributed largely to the restoration of the right to every citizen and to set up a strong opposition party so that the wheels of democracy may run on the straight road. The Swatantra party and the Swatantra movement have often been classified by observers as conservative. But, what C.R. spoke through the party and the
Government were fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution. Less government interference, security, and opportunity to workers both rural and industrial and it was more constitutional and national in approach. C.R. opposed through the party excessive expansion of bureaucratic services with a hierarchy of officials and arrived at breaking the charismatic aura surrounding the Congress party based on definite firm principles to balance the Congress party. Two years after the formation of Swatantra party C.R. gave his version on the nature and history of the ideological cleavage. He said “Nehru continually possessed his bias on the Gandhian Congress, but failed until he came to occupy the seat of power as sole, inheritor of the prestige of liberation. He believes that the State can force people into happiness and prosperity through socialism and he sticks to this bias in spite of the demonstration of world experience against it.”

C.R. vigorously advocated a ban on company donations to political parties, but, Nehru refused to entertain the suggestion. Though C.R. founded Swatantra he had not become pro American, anti communist or anti Nehru, in any consistent sense. He believed that “Government by virtue is better than Government by law” as Confucius put it. To distrust the people and to put all civic life under regulations to deliver the people to tender mercies of officials would end in the enunciation of the people and in killing all initiative to creative effort. He said that
it was wrong to ignore the charitable endowments and to imagine that the poverty of the people is due to enemies of the rich. He emphasised on policy of Dharma a basic Hindu traditional belief which would make the nation benevolent, and provide increasingly national life and it is here C.R. differed from Nehru who was influenced by European socio-economic ideals.

The Congress party leaders betrayed their trust and misruled the country in the face of C.R's opposition. The Anti Hindi movement and the arrest of C.N. Annadurai or C.R's accusation of DMK and DK of "openly preaching a creed of hatred based on ethnological conjectures and unrecorded and unproved historical conflicts" did not come in the way of extending hands to DMK mainly to oppose Congress misrule, working in favour of introduction to English as the official language crusading against gold control, in which the Congress ministers were helpless advocating reservation of clothes to the handlooms on exclusive basis fighting against inconsistent land policies and devaluation and above all find a failure in stirring the people through Swatantra party. C.R. decided to win the support of DMK which was popular among people and to promote and preserve integrity in public life which was the most important mission of his life. Though the Swatantra influence was feeble, the influence of C.R. on the Tamil people was considerable and he held a magic spell on the middle classes throughout the state. He consistently
### TABLE IV

**POLL ANALYSIS 1962**

**PERFORMANCE OF SWATANTRA PARTY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Total No. of seats</th>
<th>No. of seats contested</th>
<th>No. of seats carried</th>
<th>No. of seats lost</th>
<th>Votes Polled</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td><strong>1038</strong></td>
<td><strong>166</strong></td>
<td><strong>872</strong></td>
<td><strong>78,26,517</strong></td>
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**TABLE V**

**IV GENERAL ELECTIONS - MADRAS LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY - ANALYSIS OF VOTING**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. contested</th>
<th>No. elected</th>
<th>No. defeated</th>
<th>No. of valid votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>No. of seats secured</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>7,58,819</td>
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<td>Left Communists</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>5,92,577</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.72</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,36,188</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.72</td>
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<td>SSP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>84,188</td>
<td>0.55</td>
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<td>0.86</td>
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<td>Independent supported by alliance</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,46,799</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
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supported the DMK during the years period, and C.N. Annadurai openly acknowledged that his guidance was of immense value. C.N. Annadurai was convinced of two facts that the great leaders of the Congress were motivated men towards great ideals and objectives and the other was that the Indian Constitution gave enough scope for regional development almost as if it were independent of the centre. He must have also got in his mind the essential requirements of people of South like wheat, cotton, pulses, steel, jute for which they had to depend on the North. So he gave up the party's separatist ideology and admired C.R.'s courage and will power to persist and that the elder statesmen's motivation had always been that Dharma should triumph.

In the autumn of 1961, a mighty 50 megation bang by the Soviet Union broke a pause in nuclear testing by the super powers. Weapons of mass destruction had altered the perspective of all powerful nations. During the cold war, a hot war was being waged against the world by the nuclear powers. It seemed as if even in the countries depending on nuclear weapons, there was scepticism among the people as to the efficiency of such weapons in defence or for deterrance and there were some sections of political opinion who could be encouraged into greater activity to change governments' nuclear policy. C.R. felt that only strategy that could serve the people in the battle to end the cold was unilateral action.
His voice against the nuclear weapons was only an outward manifestation of a mind and heart imbued with spiritual and moral values and boundless love for humanity.\(^{179}\) He complemented Bertrand Russell’s wise and moderate advice that the Russians and the Americans should both revert to the official courtesy which used to be observed between the Governments and should abstain from publicly imputing tortuous motives to all moves that appear prima facie to the conciliatory.\(^{180}\) He warned about the pollution of world’s air, water and food caused by the testing of the nuclear weapons for adaptation for the various strategic purposes of war was cumulative and unlike other pollutions this could not be washed by water or removed by exposure to air. The worst feature of the nuclear policy was to cause fatal damage to man’s environment, irrespective of the natural and national rights of other people of the world which was graver and more immediate danger than communism.\(^{181}\) C.R. suggested India’s withdrawal from Common wealth\(^ {182}\) as a measure of protest, and appealed to U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.\(^ {183}\) to take unilateral action. He also attended the anti nuclear arms convention at New Delhi, under the auspices of Gandhi Peace Foundation and spoke on the need for India to take steps bring the issue before the United Nations and carry out passive resistance.\(^ {184}\) He said that it appeared that between the fear of Communist aggression and what the scientists had warned about the radioactive pollution as a consequence of test explosions governments had
deliberately chosen the latter as a lesser evil.\textsuperscript{185} C.R. was earlier shocked at the atomic explosion at Hiroshima referred to Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy who in his book "I was there" had quoted that the use of the barbarous weapon at Hiroshima was of no material assistance in the War against Japan.\textsuperscript{186}

C.R. held correspondence\textsuperscript{187} with Nehru to emphasise on Russell's suggestion of civil resistance and to send an Indian ship to Christian Island. C.R. representing the Gandhi Peace Foundation mission met Kennedy to whom he delicately introduced the argument that the world as a whole had a right to say to the nuclear powers that they could not in the name of testing poison the atmosphere, and endanger humanity now and in the future.\textsuperscript{188} In the final moments of the interview with Kennedy C.R. said "if nuclear weapons can be excluded, the character of war will change. At any rate, there will not be the terrible prospect of mass destruction which is a matter of great concern.\textsuperscript{189} Kennedy appeared to have remarked that the interview with C.R. had a civilising quality about it. In a gesture rarely accorded to one who is not the head of state or government, the White House issued a communique on the talk between the President and C.R.\textsuperscript{190}

C.R. suggested rapprochement with Pakistan.\textsuperscript{191} He admitted that born out of hatred for India, Pakistan could never develop friendly feelings towards India, and Pakistan is a theocratic state, accepting dictatorship, under which situation developing
friendly relations was a real issue. He suggested no resort to either party to direct or indirect armed violence, a two-nation planning committee to investigate and lay down the plan of production, removal of all trade barriers between Pakistan, and India excise duties, and custom levies to be fixed in either country and mutual departmental consultations. This dream and wish of C.R. was fulfilled by Lallbahadur at Tashkent. C.R. remarked on Tashkent truce as a beginning of a plan of friendship between India and Pakistan. The removal of trade barriers, adjustment of commodity production, in the two countries so as to make each a source of supply, and at the same a market for the others' requirement is what will bind the two countries and the two people together. C.R. viewed that India's foreign policy had greatly defaulted from one point of view; when the world was divided for reasons beyond our control into two camps the essential step could be to drop international ambiguities to which we give the plausible name of non-alignment. He felt that our foreign policy must be related to: (1) our internal sources the material condition and our capacity for defence expenditure, (2) to the political conditions in Asia, (3) to the political conditions in the outerworld. All these definitely point out to a clear firm and unambiguous bond of alliance with (1) our old collaborator Britain, (2) America, the present Western leading power, (3) their allies. A firm and unambiguous alliance with America and Britain and their allies will assist our friendship with
Pakistan which is first priority in our affairs and non-alignment is no longer, a foreign policy with a meaning. He substantiated his view by pointing out that the goal of non-alignment however laudable in terms of achieving world peace should be deemed to have no meaning a mere delusion hugged fondly without any redeeming feature after China had invaded India's northern border while Soviet Russia merely looked without taking concrete steps. He stated that as for India's non-alignment in the cold war was an admirable policy and helped world peace as long as neither party used violence against India's territory. But, when an act of aggression had happened it should be time to recognise and notify that non-alignment had ended. Prescribing a more dynamic military policy and a strategy that will wrest on the initiative from the enemy even if it carries with it many dangers. He suggested that it would be fitting to forge an agreement with Taiwan and told Jawahar "we can bomb Peking from Taiwan, which served as a base for American nuclear force, which openly kept threatening the Chinese mainland." He indicated that security must come only through trust. National Integration is rendered more difficult by differences in creed or denomination, but national stability would be fully endangered if all religious forces should gradually disappear what the Indian constitution makers aimed at was not a general
indifference to religion but a tolerant and broad-minded appreciation of all creeds and secularism should not lead to indifference to nation in preserving democracy, traditional and cultural security, which might in due course affect her political and territorial security. 203

Chinese success in drawing Pakistan made C.R. troubled who wrote, "A China-Pak combination is a foot with all its serious consequence." 204 Recalling the virtues of Indian-Pak settlement and the short sightedness of Indian rigidity over Kashmir, he said, let there be no dogmatism about the liquid truth in political life. 205 C.R. supported Jinnah in 1942, and advised Congress to accept his demands for partition. He was bitterly refuted. C.R's views were sound and had India acted upon his advice at that time, she would not have experienced the blood bath, and the bitterness would not have engulfed India and Pakistan. 206

C.R. was a strong supporter of fundamental rights laid down in the constitution. He said we should defend the constitution as Winston Churchill defended Britain against Hitler. 207 To him the rights the constitution had given were India's Magna Carta. 208 He raised his powerful voice against the continued detention of Sheik Abdullah and against Naxalbari violence and gheroes. He expressed his horror of Shivsena, and communal violence and at the same time advised...
people not to adopt rehabilitory measures. He pleaded for
equality of treatment for the blacks of U.S.A. and warned them
against indulgence in violence out of impatience. 209

C.R. fully appreciated the meaning of Ahimsa as expounded
by Gandhiji. A man whose powers of reasoning was sharp as a
razor’s edge he gave up everything to follow his master’s dream
of realising Rama Rajya and proved the truth of Gandhiji’s
words, “faith transcends reason”. He became the living symbol
and embodiment of the Gandhian way of life interpreting the
master’s message to his people. 210

To sum up, C.R.’s political policies act as unequivocal
pointers to a single fact. They sprang from and supported an
urgent and felt need for the unity and integration of India
and her people. None of his theories and principles could
ever be considered as cerebral, calculated move of a political
animal. No doubt C.R. was pragmatic to the core and his
decisions were always motivated by cool intellectual reasoning
rather than emotions. But, underlying the star intellect was
a spring of warmth and love for his countrymen and their well
being. In a broader sense, C.R. loved humanity and felt that
the world should be preserved primarily as a planet inhabited
by men whose core of existence was made of love for their
fellowmen. He decried the idea of transforming the world into
a well oiled faultless machine, in which man play the role of
different parts. This is borne out by his advocacy of theories like nuclear disarmament, the need for Hindu-Muslim unity, unity among various linguistic and communal groups, a natural and spontaneous absorption of different economic groups into an unified whole. The disparity in the issues is only skin deep. The hinge on which the logic behind these arguments is the fact that not only was G.R. a lover of peace, and mankind but was also a nationalist in the truest sense of the word.
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11 Home, Political, Proceedings, August 1918, No. 29 FR, June 1918.

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26 AIIG Papers, Vol. XXI, p. 3121.


29 Ibid., pp. 108-09, 126, C.R., Young India, 30 Nov. 1922.

30 Ibid., p. 53.


33 Suthantrira Sangu (Tamil), 12 April 1930.

34 Masterman the Salt Collector Madras to the Chief Secretary (Strictly Confidential), 6 April 1930, Under Secretary Safe File No. 699 (A), 19 April 1930.

35 Vedaranyam was the home town of Vedartnam Pillai an active Congress worker and a licensee of the Agasthiampalli Salt Factory. It was the holy place where Maharishi Nishigeth observed his penance. It was the birth place of Paranjotti and Thayumanavar. The Shaivite Saints Appar and Gnana Sambandar had visited Vedaranyam and had sung hymns in praise of Lord Shiva enshrined at Vedaranyam temple. D.J. Arnold, Congress in Tamil Nadu, New Delhi, 1977, p. 119.


38 Ibid., p. 25, K.S. Venkataraman, Rajaji, Madras, 1949, p. 43


41 Popular song sung during the course of the march was the following:

\[ \text{कृष्ण के रामदास में हमें जीना,} \\
\text{आज तक हमें ऊँचाई में पटना गइल।} \]

Composed by Namakkal Ramalingam Pillai.

"A war without Sword and bloodshed is to commence.
Those who believe in the ultimate victory of truth come and join."

Other Bharathi songs sung were:

'एक विश्वास विचार' - Vandhe matharam enbom.
'दया के दुर्भागीय नाचने' - Achhamillai Achhamillai.
'हूँ भारत के गति' - Valga Bharatha Samudhayam.
'हूँ भारतीय' - Veera Sudhankhirm.
42 U.R., Mail, 9 March 1931, 12 March 1931; Daily Routine:
4.00 A.M. Volunteers rising from bed, prayer.
4.30 A.M. Light refreshment
5.00 A.M. to start for the next halting place.
7.00 A.M. Halt after reaching the place of destination for the morning march
10.30 A.M. Meals and rest.
12.00 noon to 2.00 P.M.
   1. Few volunteers to go to the Adi Dravida Cheris and clean them.
   2. Volunteers detailed for Hindi teaching to carry on their work.
   3. Volunteers to preach abstinence from drinking
   4. Others to observe silence as a vow:
      "Ghosha Aghodh"
2.00 P.M. to 3.00 P.M.
   the propaganda committee to read and explain to the volunteers the news of the day.
4.00 P.M. Lunch
5.00 P.M. To start for the next halting place.
7.00 P.M. to halt after reaching destination for the evening march.
8.00 P.M. Addressing a public meeting at the halting place.
10.30 P.M. Volunteers retiring to bed.


44 Hindu, Editorial, 15 March 1931.


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60 "His attitude that Britain can no longer defend India and that if freedom were guaranteed the nation would miraculously be able to defend itself is causing lot of harm" Hope's letter to Linlithgow 22-3-42, Linlithgow papers.


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127 Ibid., p. 32.

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129 B.R. Ambedkar, Occit, p. 35.


133 C.R., Swarajya, 7 March 1964.


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