in error analysis, the latter provides a check on the predictions of the former.

1.3 Mood, modality and modals

The influence of Latin and Greek grammars has been a major source of confusion as well as controversy in the treatment of most categories of traditional English grammar. The situation has often been complicated by the mixing up of formal and notional criteria in defining grammatical categories. It is indeed a serious problem for grammarians and linguists to say whether grammatical categories should be defined in terms of formal criteria, or the notional ones.

Discussing the problem of criteria, Jespersen (1924: 56-7) says, "Syntactic categories thus, Janus-like, face both ways, towards form and towards notion. They stand midway and form the connecting link between the world of sounds and the world of ideas". The view of Lyons (1966: 234) on this issue is moderate: "...it seems evident that neither extreme nominalism nor extreme realism is an acceptable approach to this question. There must be some point at which categories of logic, epistemology and syntax are in correspondence with one another". What Lyons seems to imply here is that notional criteria, if employed in defining a syntactic category, should have some formal reflexes. In the light of this discussion, mood, modality and modals will be defined in this section.
1.3.1 Mood

In traditional grammars, 'mood' is a unique category by virtue of its controversial nature. Like many other grammatical categories it originated in classical Greek and Latin, and has been borrowed freely into many languages with conflicting defining criteria. "In traditional usage, 'mood' is applied to such subsets of inflected forms of verbs as are distinguished one from another by means of the terms 'indicative', 'imperative', 'subjunctive', etc." (Lyons, 1977: 648). Thus, moods are certain attitudes of the mind of the speaker towards the content of the sentence expressed by means of verbal inflections. To quote again from Lyons (1977: 746):

For example, the second-person singular imperative form of the Latin verb dícere 'to say' is díc and the second-person singular of the present indicative is dícís.

Díc mihi quid fecerit. 'Tell me what he did'.
Dícís mihi quid fecerit. 'You are telling me what he did'.

A change in the mood here is realized by inflecting the verb and hence mood is a grammatical category. This category is to be found in some, but not all languages. However, in many languages, there are misleading discussions of mood motivated purely by notional considerations. For example, a sentence that expresses 'commands and requests' cannot be said to be in the imperative mood, unless it has a verbal inflection solely for that purpose.

Halliday's (1970a: 159-60) conception of mood is entirely different from the traditional. The moods he talks
about are syntactic in nature, mainly concerned with various sentence types doing different interpersonal functions. Since moods as such do not fall within the scope of this study, they will not be considered any further.

1.3.2 Modality

The term 'modality' is drawn from modal logic, especially that of von Wright (1951, 1968). 'Modality' in logic is a way of classifying propositions; but in linguistics, it is a semantic label used to denote notions like 'possibility', 'necessity', 'permission', 'obligation', 'volition', 'command', 'request', etc., which are usually associated with mood. Khlebnikova (1976: 3) defines modality as "a conceptual (semantic) category, a type of meaning or a complex of meanings with various reflexes in language". He stresses further that "modality is not a syntactic, grammatical or 'linguistic' category, but a semantic category, a form of meaning..." (p. 5).

For Palmer (1979b: 4-5), 'modality' simply refers to the meanings of the moods. He has no need for the term 'mood', as he establishes the act of modal verbs as the relevant grammatical category. Following Lyons (1977: 848), he reserves the for inflectional categories that express modality - the subjunctive, optative, etc. Theoretically speaking, he has no objection to describing each mood as one of the 'moods' of English. Moods are the principal devices expressing modality
both in English and Tamil, but it can be expressed by a few other categories as well (cf. 1.6).

1.3.3 Models

Models are auxiliary\(^3\) verbs which denote different kinds of modality. They have various syntactic and semantic constraints, and they form a closed set. Palmer (1974: 15) calls English modals as secondary auxiliaries because they do not mark subject-verb concord and full 'Past' syntax, whereas primary auxiliaries do.

The English modals WILL, SHALL, CAN and MAY mark past tense, but the function of past tense in such cases is to mark tentativeness and not past time. In reported speech, however, they form the sequence of tenses. Tamil modals with the exceptions of MUTIYUM and IYALUM do not mark tense, and with the exception of MA:TI- do not mark subject-verb concord. However, participial forms of WE:NTUM, MUTIYUM, IYALUM and KU:NTUM mark tense.

1.4 Kinds of modality

Modal logic is concerned with the study of logical features of necessity, possibility, obligation, permission, and

---

\(^3\) Originating in Ross (1969), it has become a much debated linguistic controversy whether auxiliaries are auxiliaries, or main verbs (cf. 3.1.4, 5.1.2).
other related concepts. Though it was initiated by Aristotle, it was not studied consistently until the early 1930's. Now it is one of the most actively pursued branches of logic (The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vols.5&6,1967: 5). It is practically impossible to give an exhaustive list of modalities. However, logicians have distinguished between different modalities to analyse their logical structures. Modal logic as standardized by von Wright (1951) consists of four kinds of modality: alethic, epistemic, deontic, and existential. Dynamic modality is another kind which he just mentions.

1.4.1 Alethic modality

The term alethic is derived from the Greek αἰθέης, 'truth'. Alethic modality is concerned with issues of truth: i.e., with what is actually or must necessarily or can possibly be true. The basic concepts of alethic modality are 'necessity' and 'possibility' which are expressed by certain adverbs, auxiliary verbs, and verb phrases.

'Possibility': possibly p/ it is possible that p/
   it could be that p.

'Necessity': necessarily p / it is necessary (necessarily true) that p / it is bound to be the case that p / it must be that p.

If we utter the sentence,

(7) It is possible that it will rain tomorrow
it means that we do not normally know for sure what the weather will be like tomorrow. There are several ways in which the world can be tomorrow, as far as the weather is concerned. To put it in logical terminology, these several "ways" denote several 'possible world states' or 'possible worlds'. Thus in alethic modality,

\[
\text{possible} = \text{true in some possible world} \\
\text{necessary} = \text{true in all possible worlds},
\]

1.4.2 Epistemic modality

Epistemic is derived from the Greek word meaning 'knowledge'. Epistemic modality is concerned with such epistemological concepts as knowledge, belief, assertion, doubt, question-and-answer, etc. Instead of dealing with what is logically 'true' or 'false' (alethic modality), it speaks about what people know or believe or doubt or maintain to be true, or false. It expresses the speaker's attitude to the truth of the proposition in the light of his personal knowledge of facts.

The speaker's propositional attitudes are denoted by predicates like doubt, think, know, imagine, believe, suppose, etc. Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1970) distinguish between factive and non-factive predicates. Factive predicates like odd, tragic, amazing, bothers, amuses, etc., commit the speaker to the truth of the proposition, whereas non-factive predicates like suppose, assume, assert, seem, appear, etc., commit the speaker
to neither the truth, nor the falsity of the proposition.

(8) I deplore that my telephone is bugged. (factive)

(9) It seems Nancy will be his next victim. (non-factive)

There are also contra-factive utterances which commit the speaker to the falsity of the proposition.

(10) I wish he had been sensible in this matter.

(contra-factive)

Epistemic modality can be subjective or objective. Lyons (1977: 797-8) says that neither can this distinction be drawn sharply in everyday use of language, nor is its epistemological justification certain. Also it is very difficult to distinguish between objective epistemic modality and alethic modality. Nevertheless, Lyons feels that the subjective-objective distinction is of some theoretical interest. Consider the following sentences.

(11) Sylvester may be unmarried.

(12) Sylvester must be unmarried.

(11) may be interpreted as a statement expressing the speaker's own uncertainty of the possibility of Sylvester's being unmarried. That is, the speaker subjectively qualifies his commitment to the possibility of the proposition. The subjectivity of the speaker's commitment can be shown clearly by adding to (11) a clause like but I doubt it, or and I am inclined to
think that he is. Thus (11) would be more or less equivalent to

(13) Perhaps, Sylvester is unmarried.

Under a second interpretation, (11) may express an objec-
tive possibility which is quantifiable. The speaker might
reasonably say that he knows (instead of merely thinking or beili-
cing) that there is a possibility of Sylvester's being unmarried
his commitment to the possibility of the proposition is not
qualified or coloured by any personal element. For him the
possibility of the proposition is an objective fact. Lyons illus-
trates this situation as follows. Consider a community of
ninety people of whom one is Sylvester. Say, we know that thirty
of these people are unmarried, but we are not sure of whom are
married and whom are not. In this case the objective possibility
or degree of probability is one-third of its truth. Hence, (11)
can express objective epistemic modality, whereas (13) cannot.
If the marital status of every member of the community except
Sylvester has been established, then it would be appropriate to
utter (12) in the alethic sense. But in everyday use of lang-
ue, it would be more natural to interpret (12) in terms of
subjective epistemic modality.

Lyons perceives three different degrees of factuality
in English expressed by the modal adverbs 'certainly', 'probably'
and 'possibly'. Objective epistemic modality is quantifiable on
a scale with the extremes necessity and impossibility. Different
languages may grammaticalize or lexicalize distinctions along this scale in terms of more or fewer degrees. Lyons also observes that subjective epistemic modality seems to be more basic than objective epistemic modality in English, and this appears to be true of Tamil as well.

1.4.3 Deontic modality

The term **deontic** is derived from the Greek *deontos* 'of that which is binding'. Deontic modality deals with acts or states of affairs such as permission, obligation, prohibition, etc. "It seeks to systematize the abstract, purely conceptual relations between propositions in this sphere, such as the following: if an act is obligatory, then its performance must be permitted and its omission forbidden. In given circumstances, any act is either permitted itself or its omission is permitted" (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropedia, Vol-11,1978: 33).

Obligation denotes deontic necessity, and permission, deontic possibility. Lyons (1977: 823-31) compares alethic and epistemic necessity with deontic necessity, and notes down three main differences. Deontic necessity is less directly concerned with the truth of the proposition than alethic and epistemic necessity. It imposes upon someone the obligation to make a proposition true (or to refrain from making it true), by carrying out (or not carrying out) the propositional content. The second difference is that there is an intrinsic connection
between deontic modality and futurity. An obligation is meaningful and can be fulfilled only with reference to a future world state. The third difference is that deontic necessity typically proceeds or derives from some source or cause. Usually someone or something is responsible for holding a person under an obligation to perform some act. It may be an individual, an institution, a system of rules of ethics or law, or even requirements of manners and etiquette. Logicians are mainly concerned with moral and legal obligations, while linguists take into account other kinds as well. There may be different degrees and different kinds of deontic necessity variously categorized or lexicalized in natural languages.

Obligation implies permission as much as necessity implies possibility. Whatever is obligatory is permissible and we are obliged not to do what is forbidden (not permissible) (The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vols 3 & 4 1967: 509). Deontic modality is mostly subjective in nature, as epistemic necessity is. This is because the speaker is the authority who imposes an obligation/prohibition on, or grants permission to the hearer. "Von Wright's modality is 'absolute', but he recognizes that it can be 'relative', i.e., to some moral code or some person. Deontic models are, thus, usually performative in the sense of Austin (1962: 4-7)" (Palmer, 1979b: 3).

1.4.4 Existential modality

Existential modality is properly part of quantificational
logic than of modal logic. Linguists have observed recently functional similarities between logical quantifiers and words like all, some, each, every and any. Palmer (1979b: 3) gives two reasons why existential modality is of interest to us: "First, CAN is used in an existential sense to mean 'some' (though more commonly 'sometimes') eg. Lions can be dangerous... Secondly, the rules for logical equivalence with negation in existential modality are closely paralleled in the other modalities, especially the epistemic...".

1.4.5 Dynamic modality

In a footnote von Wright (1951: 28) talks about another type of modality, viz., the dynamic modality. This deals with the speaker's capacity, ability, potentiality, desire, etc., to do something in a future state of the world. It seems, dynamic modality is entirely subject-oriented. Palmer (1977: 2) says it is very difficult to distinguish between epistemic and dynamic modality (i.e., between what is possible for one to do and what one is able to do) in the analysis of ordinary language, although the distinction is clear in a formal system. He considers that epistemic modality is "a more basic or wider concept, since what is (epistemically) possible includes what can (dynamically) be done".

Palmer (1979b: 37) distinguishes two sub-kinds of dynamic modality: neutral (or circumstantial) and subject
oriented. Dynamic modality is not the concern of logic but it is relevant to the study of language.

1.5 Aspects of modality in language

This section discusses briefly certain aspects of modality in natural languages such as the core of the modality system, the interrelations of modality and futurity, the distinction between modality and event, and the implications of actuality in modality.

1.5.1 Modality in logic and language

Von Wright (1951: 1-2) gives a table of different modalities in logic and their basic notions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alethic</th>
<th>Epistemic</th>
<th>Deontic</th>
<th>Existential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>necessary</td>
<td>verified</td>
<td>obligatory</td>
<td>universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>possible</td>
<td></td>
<td>permitted</td>
<td>existing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contingent</td>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>indifferent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impossible</td>
<td>falsified</td>
<td>forbidden</td>
<td>empty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commenting on this table, Palmer (1979b: 2-3) says that the categories are essentially those of logic. Von Wright sets them up in order to investigate their formal structure in terms of truth tables, etc., as for quantification theory. Logical systems are absolute and highly idealized. They have a set of rigorously formalized rules within a rigid framework. Rules of natural languages, on the other hand, are liberal and highly
flexible. There just can't be a one-to-one correspondence between rules of logic and those of natural languages. The logic of language, if any, tends to be fragmentary and inconsistent. It is the business of the linguist to analyse the kinds and degrees of modality grammaticalized and lexicalized in language and also the systems they exhibit.

Not all the kinds and notions of modality shown in von Wright's table are relevant to language. Alethic modality has aroused the interest of logicians more than any other kind, though it is hardly relevant in natural languages. Similarly existential modality is important in quantificational logic, but it is just confined to the words *some, any* and *all* in ordinary language. Epistemic modality is usually subjective in language, whereas it is always objective in logic. Deontic modality is absolute in logic, but is usually subjective in language. Dynamic modality merits only a footnote in logic (von Wright, 1951: 28), whereas it has to be discussed at length in language.

Notwithstanding the lack of rigour, there are some logical or semi-logical relationships in the modality of language. This can provide a sort of common conceptual framework within which two languages can be compared. Adopting Palmer's (1979b) framework, the present author has set up for this contrastive study, epistemic, deontic and dynamic modalities (with further sub-kinds) as the common conceptual categories. Thus the modal systems of English and Tamil that evolve in the
course of this study are notional rather than grammatical in character.

1.5.2 The core of the modality system

Necessity and possibility are the two basic notions of the modality system (Lyons, 1977: 787). There are different kinds of necessity and possibility which are variously realized in languages. Epistemic necessity and possibility reflect the speaker’s propositional attitudes or his attitudes to the truth of the proposition, in the light of facts known to him. Deontic necessity and possibility denote the obligation under which, or permission with which, morally responsible agents perform acts, to make or refrain from making a proposition true. Dynamic necessity and possibility show neutrality or subject orientation. Hence, possibility and necessity are the two central notions that form the core of the modality system (Pelmer, 1979b: 8).

1.5.3 Modality and futurity

Tense logic can be treated as a branch of modal logic, but this is not directly relevant to the study of language. What is important is the close connection between forms that denote various kinds of modality and forms that denote futurity. Pelmer (1979b: 5) observes that 'modal' forms and 'futuro' forms are identical very often. Lyons (1977: 814-5) says that it remains a great philosophical controversy whether 'statements' could be made at all to describe or predict future events or
world-states. Many philosophers proclaim that we cannot make 'statements' about the future because we cannot have knowledge, but only beliefs about a future event or world-state. Therefore, a 'statement' describing a future event or world-state is, in fact, a subjectively modeled utterance - a prediction rather than a statement. "There is a good deal of diachronic evidence to support the view that reference to the future, unlike reference to the past, is as much a matter of modality as it is of purely temporal reference" (Lyons, 1977: 816).

Lyons also points out that throughout the history of Indo-European languages, the so-called future tenses have invariably been created (independently in different languages) from word-forms or phrases that originally denoted not futurity, but non-factivity. There was no future tense in Proto Indo-European, but there was a rich system of moods. It was subsequently developed especially from the subjunctive and desiderative moods. Also there are languages in which temporal references are derived from moods. For example in Hopi, an American Indian language, a triple distinction of contra-factivity (optative), non-factivity (subjunctive), and factivity (indicative) is grammaticalized; it lacks entirely the category of tense.

In the light of this discussion a hypothesis is proposed that the so-called future tense in Tamil is, in fact, a modal suffix (cf. 5.1.3).
1.5.4 Modality and event

The implications of negation in a modal sentence are complex and subtle, as evident in the following sentences.

(14) mallaq:va:i l taniya:kap payanam ceyya mutiya:tu.
'Malliga can't travel alone.'

(15) mallaq: taniya:kap payanam ceyyk ku:ta:tu.
'Malliga shouldn't travel alone.'

Both in (14) and (15) the modal is formally negated as it carries -a:- the negative marker. But at the semantic level, what is negated in (14) is the modality or the meaning conveyed by the modal, viz., 'ability' or 'possibility'; in (15) the meaning conveyed by the main verb is negated, since ku:ta:tu places Malliga under the obligation of not travelling alone.

Quirk et al (1972: 384) use the labels 'auxiliary negation' and 'main verb negation' to capture the above distinction. According to Palmer (1979b: 25), these labels are misleading as it is the modal that is formally negated in both the sentences. He prefers the terms 'negation of modality' and 'negation of event', borrowing the label 'event' from Jespersen, for whom it is a "key technical term...signifying....relations (RESEMBLE etc.), and states (WORRY, BE COLD), as well as deeds (SHOW)" (Jespersen, 1964: 149,151). Further, Palmer uses the term 'event' to refer to propositions of epistemic modality also. The distinction
between modality and event is found useful while discussing the
grammar of the modals in English and Tamil.

1.5.5 Modality and actuality

There is always an implication of actuality with dyne-
mic modality, wherever it relates to specific actions (Palmer,
MUTIYUM and the volitional -P- in Tamil and the volitional WILL
in English imply actuality. At least in some of their uses,
these forms indicate that the event took place, takes place and
will take place.

(16) Liverpool can win the cup next year.
(17) Anyway I will write as soon as I get to Nigeria.
muti:yum.
 'Kala was able to/is able to/will be able to draw
pictures beautifully'
'I'll wait for you in the park.'

The modal forms in (16) - (19) have implications of
actuality. (18) is particularly interesting as MUTIYUM, even
in its past form, implies actuality unlike the English modals
which cannot be used in their past forms where the actuality
is clearly factual.

(20) *I ran fast, and could catch the bus.
(21) I ran fast, but couldn't catch the bus.
(22) I ran fast and was able to catch the bus.
(23) *I asked him, and he would come.
(24) I asked him, but he wouldn't come.
(25) I asked him, and he was willing to come.

Could and would do not normally imply actuality when they refer to a single past action. Couldn't and wouldn't clearly deny actuality. However, past forms of the semi-modal is "able to" and "willing to" carry implications of actuality.

1.6 Methodological notes

Usually treatments of modals tend to be sketchy in the sense that they list the various meanings and surface characteristics of modals, without attempting a systematic correlation between form and meaning (See Diver, 1964; Coes, 1964; Zandvoort, 1962; Ehrman, 1966; Quirk et al, 1972). The few attempts at such a correlation have their own limitations (See Anderson, 1971; Russ, 1969). This seems almost inevitable due to the controversial and complicated nature of modality and modals in general. Modality can be expressed not only by auxiliary verbs and other verbal forms, but also by lexical verbs, adverbs, adjectives, nouns, word-order, stress, intonation and punctuation. These diverse ways of modalizations with their diverse meanings make it impossible to arrive at a unified systematic account of modality. But in practice, linguists set up arbitrary limits
to characterize some system or other of some aspects of modality (see Jees, 1964; Diver, 1964; Loosch, 1969; Ehrman, 1965; Palmer, 1974, 1979b).

1.6.1 Limitations of theoretical models

The present study is not committed to any specific theoretical model, either syntactic or semantic, as none has developed fully to account for all the facts of language. It would be pointless to manipulate or sacrifice facts of language for the sake of conforming to a theoretical model. Moreover, modality by itself is a subject not amenable to any such single neat description. Therefore, the approach adopted here is mainly that of a data-centered descriptive study. However, insights of certain theories have been made use of, wherever found relevant.

1.6.2 Framework for analysis

The framework employed for this study is semantico-syntactic in nature. The analysis starts from meaning which is related to form later. For two languages to be compared, there should essentially be some 'common frame of reference' or 'identity condition' (Van Eman, 1974: 282)/ 'concept equivalence' (Kachru, 1976: 2)/ '(contextual) comparability' (Halliday et al, 1964: 114). If this condition is not fulfilled, they are not worth comparing.
Many linguists (Corder, 1973: 233; Van Buren, 1974: 282; Kachru, 1976: 2; among others) are agreed that categories common to two languages can be established only at the conceptual or semantic level. Here we may not arrive at an absolute identity condition, and the conceptual categories set up may be arbitrary. Nevertheless, such ad hoc categories do form a useful basis for a contrastive study. It would be interesting to investigate how different and similar the form is while meaning remains almost the same in the two languages.

1.6.3 Scope of the study

The scope of the present study is limited to modality as signalled by modal auxiliary verbs in English and Tamil. Other modal forms and devices do not fall within the direct purview of this work.

1.6.4 Plan of the work

Setting up epistemic, deontic and dynamic modalities as the common conceptual categories, this semantic-syntactic study describes modality in English in chapter 2. The grammar of the English modals is studied in chapter 3 with reference to negation, interrogation, tense, time, unreality and voice. Chapters 4 and 5 examine modality and the grammar of modals in Tamil respectively. Chapter 6 is a contrastive study of modality in English and Tamil, and chapter 7, that of the modal
forms in the two languages. The final chapter deals with some pedagogical uses of this work.

1.6.5 Data for analysis

For the study of modality and modes in English, the present author has adopted mostly the authentic data of the Survey of English Usage located in the Department of English at University College, London and as quoted in Palmer (1979). Also he has partly made use of the data collected by the Linguistics Department at Brown University and as quoted in Ehrman (1966). For the purposes of this contrastive study, the two varieties of English, the British and the American, as attested in the data used have been treated as the same, ignoring the possible stylistic and linguistic variations between them. The examples adopted do not carry any citation references as it will be cumbersome serving no useful purpose. The author has also supplied a few examples of his own similar to those of Palmer and Ehrman.

As for Tamil, the study is based on the extensive data, standard and colloquial, drawn by the author from short stories, essays, novels, and advertisements, religious, political, biographical, autobiographical, technical, and scientific writings, etc., which are fairly representative of modern Tamil. Colloquial data have also been taken for analysis for two reasons: (i) they are not different from the standard ones at the
semantic and syntactic levels; (ii) they are richer and wider in usage. Some spoken texts were also recorded from radio plays to examine the relevance of intonation to the study of the Tamil models. Intonation in English has not been examined as it is "almost completely irrelevant to a study of the models" (Palmar, 1979b: 19).

1.7 Summary

This introductory chapter studied briefly certain aspects of contrastive and error analyses such as universals of language, motivation for the present study, contrastive analysis and pedagogy, the notion of error and the relevance of contrastive analysis to error analysis (1.1, 1.2). Mood, modality and models were defined (1.3). The various kinds of logical modality, viz., alethic, epistemic, deontic, existential and dynamic were discussed (1.4). Of the different kinds of logical modalities the epistemic, the deontic and the dynamic were found relevant to natural languages, and they were set up as the common conceptual categories for this contrastive study (1.5.1). The core of the modality system (1.5.2), and modality with reference to futurity (1.5.3), event (1.5.4), and actuality (1.5.5) were considered. Finally some methodological notes were given to state the limitations of theoretical models, framework for analysis, scope and plan of the study, and particulars of the data for analysis (1.6).