Chapter -2

VIEWS OF THE EMINENT INDIAN AND WESTERN THINKERS ABOUT THE "PROPRIETY".

Indian Thinkers:-

Introduction:-

The name of Bharta, Anandverdhana and Kesmendra etc, are mentionable thinkers as an 'Eminent Indian -Thinkers', who have thoroughly described this element 'the Propriety' by using the different synonyms (opithets) for it. However the great poets Bhamah, Dandia etc, have also occasionally described this element in their compositions.

The sage Bharta considered the eminence of the 'Propriety' about the performance of the drama, Anadverdhna, comprehended its dominace both in drama and poetry and Ksemendra placed it as an extensive poetic element. A brief account of these emiment thinkers is being given as under:-

BHARATA

BHARTA AND HIS NATYA SHAstra :-

In the available compositions (literary-documents) the 'Natyasastra' (the dramatic sciences) of Bharata is an oldest composition,
however, the time of its compilation is not certain, but according to the sources available it is the composition of between 200 to 300 B.C. Moreover while doing the study of any composition (literary-documents) and the sequence of its development, we have to take heed about the 'Natyasastra' (a dramatic science) of Bharta, because of it being an oldest composition. Therefore the study of sequence of the development of the Propriety has also commenced with this very Natyashatra (a dramatic science) of Bharta.

Bharta in his composition 'Natyasastra' has done generally universally-honoured principle of the 'Art'. However mainly his aim was to define the form and performance of the drama, but besides it he has given a description of all the inevitable beautiful 'Arts'. Regarding the form of the drama Bharta says that ,neither the characters of the worldly people are equal nor their ages are equal, such as, somebody is religious-minded and some body sinful, and somebody is generous; and somebody selfish, somebody spends his life with sweet experiences (of life) and somebody spends his life with full of tears. The worldly people are endowed with the different emotions and their ages are different moreover there is difference in there emotions and the ages among the worldly people so the drama is the imitation of these types of the different instinct of the worldly-beings.

The sage Bharata in his 'Natyasastra' (the dramatic science) considered to the drama as the imitation of the (activities) of the three universes--- 'Triloka,' that is to say Bharta considered that the drama is
the imitation of the activities of the persons who are of different natures (instincts). Bharta has mentioned two particular qualities about the performance of the drama as under:

(1) The particular qualities of the worldly objects.
(2) The particular qualities of the dramatic-object i.e. the objects which are traditionally used in the performance of the drama.

The former quality i.e. the particular qualities of the worldly objects confirms the 'Realism' whereas the latter i.e. the qualities the dramatic objects confirms the 'Idealism'. Bharta has done the study of different types of persons, their ideas and natures (instincts) within his principle of nature (the different instincts of the worldly beings) and besides it, about the dress and about different performances, he has done the study of different characteristics of the (different) regions, castes and nations, within his principle of the nature (the different instincts of the worldly beings).

While describing the 'Propriety' of dress, and the bodily-appearance (features) Bharta has said that all these (objects) should be appropriate to the sentiments and emotions. about the performance his views are as under: -

Vyoanurupa prathamasta veso vasaanurupasca Gati-pracara,
Gati-pracaraanugatam ca pathyam, pathyaanurupoa-bhinayascakarya.
That is to say first of all the dress of the (dramatic characters) should be in accord with the age, and the manner of movements (conduct) should be appropriate to the dress and the (sense of talking) (legibility) should be similar to the manners of the movements, Bharata further says about the dress that, it should be according to the particular reason, and the dress which might contrary to the particular region, never creates the glory. Likewise the girdle (a sacred thread in Hinduism which is borne from the neck to the down-wards) ; and if one who might bear the same (girdle) in the waist then the same creates the laughter and becomes extremely ridiculous such as he (Bharta) has described it as under:-

Adesjo hi vesastu na sobham janyisyati
Mekhlorasi bandhay ca lasyaevopjayatey.

That is to say : that the dress of the different characters which is not in accord with the particular region do not creates the glory, likewise as to bind the girdle (a sacred thread in Hinduism) in the waist, which becomes extremely ridiculous.

In this way, Bharta has brought out the spirit of the Propriety in the drama and on the basis of this spirit later on the rhetorician has done an extensive study of this element i.e. the element of propriety moreover we can say that the sage Bharta is the originator of the element of the propriety.
Although Indian tradition glorifies Bharata, the reputed author of the Natya-Sastra, with the title of Muni and places him in a mythic age, the widest possible divergence of opinion exists among scholars as to his actual date; and he has been variously assigned to periods ranging from the 2nd century B.C. to the 2nd Century A.D. That he is the oldest writer on dramaturgy, music and kindred subjects, whose work has survived, is generally admitted; but at the same time the question arises as to how far the extant version of his work represents his original text. Abhinavagupta in the second introductory verse of his commentary on Bharata informs us that Bharata's text, as known to him, consisted of thirty-six chapters (Sattrimsakam Bharata-Sutram Idam); and he is aware of two recensions (dvividhah patho drsyate on ch. xv) of some chapters.

A comparison of the different printed editions mentioned in our Bibliography below, as well as available MSS, would go to show that they do not agree about the number and sequence of chapters, nor about the number of verses in each chapter. The text is, thus, very uncertain and unsatisfactory. It is clear from these indications that it had been subjected to considerable rehandlings in later times before it assumed its present shape, and this fact has an important bearing on the date of the supposed author.

There are several passages in the present-day text which probably throw some light on this process of gradual interpolation and recasting. The curious colophon at the end in the Kavyamala edition,
which appears to have puzzled its editor, designates the latter portion of the work as Nandi-bharata. Rice mentions a work called Nandi-Bharata on music; while a chapter, apparently from a work on dramatic gesture, is referred to as NandiBharata Samkara hastadhya in a manuscript of a treatise on music and Abhinava, notices in Madras Catalogue xii, No. 13009. These works, probably late compilations, are named after Nandi or Nandikesvara whom tradition acknowledges as an ancient authority on music, erotics and histrionic art. A Nandin is quoted by Vatsyayana(i.1.8). Aufrecht is inclined to identify him with Nandikesvara cited as a writer on Erotics in the Panca-sayaka I.13 and Rati-rahasya I.5. Nanyadeva mentions him as Nandin. Again, a work on histrionic art, attributed to Nandikesvara, is known as Abhinaya-darpana; as this work refers to Bharat and his views several times (e.g. st.12 128,149,159,162) it must be a later compilation. Rajasekhara, as we have seen above, mentions Nandikesvara as a writer on Rasa. But Nandikesvara is better known as an authority on music and is cited as one of his sources by Sarngadeva (13th Century) in his Sangita-Rataakara (I.1.17) and by his commentator Kallinatha (p.47) besides the reference given above, works on music attributed to Nandikesvara are: Nandikesvara-mate Taladhyaya (Weber 1729) and Bharatanava supposed to be a condensed version Nandikesvara's work by Sumati, dealing with dramatic gestures and Tala. A Natyarnava of Nandikevara is cited in Allaraja's Rasa-Ratna-Pradipika. Abhinavgupta (comm. on Bharata, ed. GOS, ch. xxix says that he had not himself seen (saksan na drstam) Nandikesvara's work, but relying on Kirtidhara (Yat tu Dharena Darsitam..... Tat - Pratyayat) he would briefly refer to
Nandikesvara-Mata. But he knows (p. 171) a work is called Nandi-Mata from which he quotes a verse on the Angahara called recita or recaka. Elsewhere he tells us that by Nandi-Mata is understood the views of Tandu; for the names, Nandi and Tandu are, in his opinion, identical. The designation, therefore, of the latter part of Bharata's text, a part of which deals, among other things, with music probably implies that it was compiled or recast at some later period in accordance with the views of Nandikesvara.

Similarly, we hear of a work called Matanga-Bharata (of uncertain date) by Laksmana Bhaskara, which apparently sets forth the views of Matanga. This is another old authority cited by Abhinavagupta (as Matanga-Muni) who quotes (ch. xxx) two of his Anustubh verses; by Sarngadeva and his comentator (On I. 3 24-25; I. 4.9; I. 8, 19 etc.) ; by Singabhpala (1.51) ; and by Arunacalanatha on Raghu (p. 100) with Tatha ca Matange. A work called Brhad-Desi ascribed to Matanga has been published.

The last chapter of the Natya-Sastra, to which the colophon mentioned above is appended, contains a prediction that the rest of the topic will be treated in detail by Kohala (who apparently belonged to the same school), plainly shewing that the rewriting of the portion in question was done some time after Kohala as well as Nandikesvara had spoken on the subject. Nandikesvara's date is unknown; but Kohala, side by side with Bharata is recognised as an ancient authority as early as the end of the 8th century A.D. in Damodara-Gupta's Kuttani-Mata (sl. 81).
It is interesting to note in this connexion that Abhinavagupta, commenting on Bharata vi. 10, says that although Natya is usually said to consist of five angas, the enumeration of eleven angas in the text is in accordance with the view of Kohala and others, to whose opinions the commentator makes many other incidental references mostly on the topics of Nāṭya and Geya. Kohala is cited also by Manikya-Candra (p.65) on Mammata, by Samgadeva (I. 1, 15) by Saradatanaya who frequently quotes his views (pp. 204, 210, 236, 245, 251), by the authors of the Natya-Darpana (pp. 25,38,132), while Singabhupala (I.51) acknowledges him as an authority on drama and allied arts, Hemachandra, with reference to the classification of the drama, says (p. 329; also p. 325): Prapanacas tu bharata-kohaladi-sastrebhyovagantavyah. Kohala is credited by most writers on Dramaturgy with the introduction of Uparupaka. Mallinatha on Kumara vii. 91 quotes Kohala on the subject of Tala. A work on music called Tala-Laksana. Probably a later compilation is attributed to him, and a Kohaliya Abhinaya-Sastra, purporting to embody his views, is also known. A work, called Kohala-Rahasaya in at least thirteen chapters, dealing with musical modes, is ascribed to the sage Kohala (described as son of Bharata) who reveals the subject on being requested by Matanga. The description that he was son of bharata is perhaps due to the indication in Natya - Sastra I. 26 (ed. Chowkhamba 1929, ed. GOS, Baroda 1956; but not included in the NSP ed. 1894) that Kohala, along with Sandilya, Dhurtila and others, are spoken of as sons of Barata. Since Abhinavagupta says (Abh. bh. p. 25) that Kohala describes the verse Jitam Udupalina from Ratnavali (I. 5) as an example of Nandi in
accordance with the rules of Bharata P.V. Kane is of opinion that Kohala was later than Ratnavali, i.e. than 650 A.D. but this conclusion cannot be very well reconciled with the fact that Bharata and Kohal are already recognised as ancient authorities in the 8th century A.D. From Abhinavagupta's references and citations Kohala's lost work appears to have been mostly in verse.

A work on music, entitled Dattila-Kohaliya, is mentioned by Burnell (p. 606), apparently a compendium of the opinions of Kohala and Dattila. The latter, whose name occurs variously as Dantila and Dhurtila, is mentioned by Damodaragupta (sl. 123) and is cited as an old authority by Abhinavagupta (as Dattilacarya, chiefly on music) who quotes on Bharata xxviii, also p. 205) a verse of his in Anustubh; by Sargadev (I. 1.16) and his commentator Kallinatha (p.49); by Singabhupala (I. 51), as well as in various works on music. A work called Dattila on music is also published.

In the same way Sandilya is mentioned as Natya-Satra-Kara by Singabhupala (I. 51), Kaasyapa or Kasyapa as a Muni who preceded Bharata and his opinion on Ragas are cited by Abhinavagupta (on xxix, p. 394), as well as by Nanyadeva. Saatakarni is is cited as a writer on dramaturgy by Sagaranandin (on Sutradhara, 1, 1101). visakhila is also cited as an authority on Kala-Sastra by Vamana (I. 3,7) by Abhinavagupta (on xxviii, xxix 31-33) and by Nanyadeva as an authority on music. Paraasara or Parasara, mentioned by Rajasekhara, is also cited as a Bharat-putra in Natya- shastra (I. 32); his views on Nandi
and Totaka are quoted by Sagaranandin (II. 1091,2770 3202-3). Similarly, another Bharat-Putra is Nakhakutta, who is also cited by Sagaranandin (II. 2668,2994). Even the mythical Narada is regarded as propounder of Gandarva-Veda; and the Bhava-Prakasana says that Narada taught Bharata the subject of evolution of Rasa, having learnt it from Brahma itself.

From these indications it is likely that between Bharata's original text and its existing version, there came "Kohala and others" whose views found their way into the compendium, which goes by the name of Bharta and which indiscriminating posterity took as genuine and unquestionable. The text problem of the Natya-Shastra, therefore, cannot be solved until the works of Kohala and other early writers, some of which appear to have been available to Abhinavagupta, are recovered.

The process of incorporation must have occurred very early and was apparently complete by the end of the 8th century, when the work assumed more or less its present shape. Udhata, about this time, actually appropriated (iv. 4) the first-half of the verse vi. 15 of the Natya-sastra, and makes only enough verbal change in its second half to admit Santa as the ninth Rasa in the category of eight recognised by Bharata. Abhinavagupta, who commented on the existing text at the end of the 10th century, himself mentions several other previous commentators, of whom Lollata and Sankuka in all probability belonged to the 8th and
9th centuries, These indications will make it clear dai any rate that the

text existed in its present form in the 8th century A.D. , if no earlier.

We have , on the other hand, the tradition as well as the statement

of Bhavabhuti, who refers to the mythical Bharata as the Tauryatrika-

Sutra-Kara , that Bharata's work existed originally in the sutra-form ;

and this is also made likely by Panini’s early reference to such Nata-

Sutras in his own time. reminiscences of the Sutra - Style may indeed be

presumed in the Natya - Sastra vi and vii, which deal with Rasa and

Bhava ; for in ch. vi we find a dictum on the genesis of Rasa , put in

concise form of a Sutra, to the elucidation of which, after the manner of

a bhasya or vriti, the rest of the chapter (written in also be noticed that a

preliminary explanation is added at commencement of the chapter to

reconcile this curious portion of the text with the rest of the work.

Bharata , we are told , being requested by the sages, explains the

characteristics of a Samgraha, Karika and Nirukta, and incidentally

gives an illustration of sutra - grantha by putting a part of the text in

Karika, Nirukata and Sutra would not have been relevant to the subject

in hand but for this somewhat flimsy explanation, which, however,

affords a device, far-fetched as it is, to introduce into the Kartika-text

some vestiges of the older sutra-formIt is not maintained that a sutra -
text is necessarily older than a text in the karika-form; for in our sutra-
text itself there betokening the existence of earlier teachings on the

subject , and disproving at the same time the orthodox belief that the

tradition that Bharata was the earliest teacher of the Natya-veda. But if

the sutra - form be accepted , then this portion of the existing original
form. Similar fragments of the Sutra-Bhasya style are seen in Ch. xxviii-
xxxi in such passages as beginning with Atodya-vidhim idanim
vaksyamah (xxviii. 1); also in xxxiii 212 vadya-vidhanam vaksyani; in
xxiv. 93atr sutra dhara-gunan Vaksyamah etc.

If we get the lower limit to the date of Bharata's work at 8th
century A.D., the other limit is very difficult to settle, when we consider
that there were apparently two versions, either independent or one
based on the other. But it is not clear what weight should be placed on
the testimony of Bhavabhuti; for if in the first quarter of the 8th century
Bharata was known to him as a sutra -kara, it is not intelligible how at
the end of the same century Udbhata makes use of Bharata's Karika, and
Lollata and others, immediately following, apparently comment on the
same text. The short space of less than half a century is not enough to
obliterate all signs of the older version and replace it entirely with a new
Karika-Text which, to all intents and purposes, is taken as the only
authoritative version in later times, and in which, strangely enough, we
find still lingering traces of the earlier sutra-text. The only possible
explanation of Bhavabhuti's reference is that historical Bharata, who
was (the sutra-kara on the three arts of dancing, singing and instrumental
music, had already in Bhavabhuti's time become identified with the
mythical Bharata; for the passage in the Uttara-Carita gives an obviously
mythical account, through the mouth of Lava, that Bhagavan
Valmikimi, having composed his story of Rama, gave it to parently the
Natyacarya or ghê gods) who revised it and got it acted through celestial
nymphs.
But this does not exhaust all our textual difficulties. Independent prose-passage also survive, in the midst of Karikas, in Chs. xvii, xxviii, xxix, xxx and xxxiv which, forming an integral part of the text, cannot be taken as mere vriti, but which resemble, in some respects, the prose Smriti-fragments or more closely, the prose-fragments in the apocryments Bhela-Samhita. Again, The Anubaddha or Anuvamsya slokas, referred to above, correspond to the parikara-or samgraha-slokas in later writings, and certainly indicate the probabilities of earlier speculations on the subject. These verses are generally taken from two distinct sources; for some of them are in aryā, while others are in Anustubh metre. On the Arya-verses Abhinava remarks (on vi. 85, p.328) ; taa etaah, Munina tu Sukha-Samgrahaya Yatha-Sthanam Vinivesitah. In his opinion former teachers composed these Aryas and Bharata inserted them in proper places.

From the facts adduced above, we are confronted with the problem of the inter-relation of these apparent survivals in our text, which contains vestiges of (1) independent prose-fragments (2) Anuvamsya slokas in Arya and anustubh meters and (3) Passages in Sutra-Bhasya style, as well as, (4) the present systematic Karikas. Space is too limited to dilate upon the question here, but an examination of these passages will reveal that but they probably indicate several stages in the growth of particular forms of composition of dramaturgic works in general, each stage betraying its own partiality towards a particular find in it traces of earlier passages in Sutra-Bhasya style, of which it is
presumably a recast. In the Sutra-Bhasya, again, their fragments of the material passages which indicate, in their turn another and still earlier Kartika-Stage; while the independent prose-fragments perhaps represent the earliest form taken by such technical treatises. We can, therefore, distinguish in their order of development (1) a stage of prose treatises (2) a tentative period of Kartika-writing (3) the Sutra-Bhasya stage and (4) the final period of compilation of compendiums, which reverts again to the Kartika-form. This conclusion perhaps finds some support in the repetition more or less, of a similar phenomenon in the sphere of the Dharma-SAstra, Artha-SAstra, Vaidya-SAstra and probably Kama-SAstra, the loss of earlier treatises makes it difficult to dogmatise; but if this conclusion is correct generally, then our text may be supposed to contain remnants of all these styles and forms. It is not argued here that Bharata's work itself passed through all these stages or forms, from a redimentary prose-version into a systematic metrical manual but our text contains enough to betray the existence of previous speculations in prose and in verse, as well as indicate the fact that it might have itself been once written in the Sutra-Bhasya form, which was recast, with considerable additions from other sources, into a convenient metrical compendium.

Taking the substance of the work, apart from the vexing question of different versions, the portion of the Natya-SAstra which deals principally with music, has been conjectured on internal evidence to have been compiled about the 4th century A.D.; and it appears likely that the order portions were also put into their present shape about the
same time. Pischel's argument, however, on the date of the work, derived from the reference to Sakas, Yavanas, Pahlavas and Bahikas (e.g. xxxii. 103, ch. ed.) in a text of such composite character is of doubly value in determining the question finally; but it perhaps makes it probable that the upper limit of its date cannot be put too early.

We are in a position, however, to infer that the substance of Bharat's work is probably much older than that of Bhamaha, who may be assigned to the last quarter of the 7th century. Bhamaha, in his treatment of poetic figures (Kavyalamkaras), groups them in a curious but suggestive way, which probably indicates the different periods in the growth and multiplication of such figures. At the outset, he names and defines only five Poetic figures (ii. 4) recognised Dipaka and Upama. This represents the first stage; but in course of time, six other figures appear to have been added, and Bhamaha mentions and deals with them next in ii. 66. Then he goes on to enumerate, two (or three, including Svabhavokti) more figures admitted by writers like Medhavin (ii. 88), who also appears to have dealt with Upama etc. (ii. 40). Finally, Bhamaha defines and illustrates a further long list of twenty-three more figures in a separate chapter (iii. 1-4). The differentiation and multiplication of Poetic figures with the progress of speculation is a familiar fact in Alamkara literature; and the way in which Bhamaha successively enumerates and groups these figures probably shows others were added in course of time as the study itself advanced. Now Bharata, in his treatment of Alamkaras names (xvi. 41) only four such figures known to him vix. Yamana, Rupaka, Dipaka and Upama. These four in
reality correspond to the five mentioned by Bhamaha; for Anuprasa may be taken as falling in the same class as Yamaka, the one being Varnabhyasa and the other Padabhysa. At the same time the very fact that Anuprasa is thus differentiated from Yamaka may indicate further refinement in these poetic figures. It is clear, therefore, that Bharat’s work belonged to a period when the number of figures had not yet multiplied; and one, if not more, stages must have intervened between it and Bhamaha’s Kavyalamkara in which the number had already swelled into nearly forty in all. To this intermediate stage belonged Medhavin and others, whom Bhamaha cites, and the loss of whose work makes it difficult for us to trace the development thus indicated by Bhamaha.

There are also indications that Bharata’s teachings are probably older than Kalidasa, who generally adheres to Bharat’s dramaturgic prescriptions. Kalidasa refers, in Vikramorvastya ii. 18, to Bharta as the mythical Natyacarya. In Raghu xix. 36, again, Kalidasa speaks of Anga-Sattvavacanasraya Nṛtya which, as Mallinatha rightly points out, agrees with Bharata’s dictum: Samanyabhinayo Nama Jneyo Vag-Anga-Sattvajah; while in Kumara vii. 91 mention is made of Samdhis, as well as of Lalitangahara mentioned in Natya-Sastra xx. 17 (ed. chowkhamba xxii. 17).

The lower limit of the date of Bharata’s work, therefore, can be provisionally shifted back to the fourth or fifth century shape in the 8th century A.D. The upper limit cannot be put too early, because of the mention of Sakas, yavanas, the commencement of the Christian era;
but we have already pointed out (p. 28 above) that their mention in a composite text is hardly a conclusive value. It is difficult to settle the relative age of the Sutra and the Karika-Texts; but if the tendency towards sutra-Bhasya style may be presumed to have been generally prevalent in the last few centuries B.C., then the presumed Sutra-text of Bharat belongs apparently to this period. It was certainly much earlier than the present sage as an expounder of the Natya-Veda.

ANANDVARDHANA

ANANDVARDHANA AND HIS DHAVANYALOKA
(The clarification of the sounds)

The exact biography of Anandverdhana is unknown, but according to the sources available he was born about in 850 A.D. Anandverdhana in his composition "Dhavanyaloka" has extensively deliberated the element of propriety and has used the word 'Aucitya' (propriety) in it (Dhavanyaloka), and somewhere he has manifested this element extensively and somewhere occasionally. The former rhetoricians (as that of Anandvardhan) has deliberated this element in a few dispersed (miscellaneous) parts of the rhetoric, but Anandvardhana has exposed its intimate connection with all the parts of the rhetoric and in the Poetics situated it as an extensive and an illustrious elements.

Ksemandra also was impelled merely with the views of anandverdhana, and flourished this element in his famous (celebrated)
composition the Aucityavicarcarca" (the discussion about the poetry). The study of Anandvardhana's "Dhavanyaloka is requisite to know the elementary sources of the Propriety. Anandverdhna has considered that only the sentiments are the essential objects of the Poetics and according to him this sentiment is inexpressible and only with the sound it can be manifested. The essential object in this sentiment is (only) the Propriety and the (Poetic) Ornaments etc., are only the outward objects moreover these Ornaments are like the dress.

Anandhverdhana in his epoch-making composition the Dhavnyaloka has clearly defined the Propriety of the Merits, the Propriety of the Diction especially compilation of the words and the Propriety of the Meanings of the 'Systematic- Arranged-Composition;and the Propriety of the Sentiments and the Propriety of the Manners.

The Rhetorics has not any worth without the adornable objects and in the 'Poetics Pentiments' etc. are the adornable objects. In this way, Rhotorics are used to nourish the Sentiments etc. and the Rhotorics accomplistes their Rhetoricness. Moreover when the a said Rhetorics are used (mixed) with the Sentiments etc., adornable objects then they Rhetorics show their worth or existense.To accomplish the Propriety in these Rhetorics Anandverdhana has enumerated the excellent norms such as ; to show the similarity of the Literal-Rhetorics with the Sentiments he has described that for the Vipralambha (Sepration of lovers etc. delecate Rhetorics theuse of the Yamaka-named Rhetoric ie. -
The repetition of the words or syllables in the same stenza of the similar sound but different in meaning. The Rhetoricians has considered it totally prohibited. The main secrecy of this principle is that the objects which are composed in the Poetics by the poet should incite the Sentiments.

Further Anandverdhana says that whether if in the poetry, the usefulness and the unusefulness, the connectedness and the disconnectedness handsomeness (wellformness) and the ugliness (deformity) etc. objects do nurture the sentiments then they are acceptable, and if they absorb (destroy) these Sentiments then are totally prohibited. Regarding the propriety of the Rhetorics Anandverdhana's statement is extremely apparent and touching, further he says that the Rhetorics should be as natural (innate) that they should just appear naturally (involuntarily). They (Rhetorics) should not be External but should be Internal while composing there Rhetorics poets should not do any effort and (besides it), the splendour of the Rhetorics should not be too - much impressive that, the reader might not get (grasp) the beauty of the natural (innate) sentiments but might impress with its (Rhetorics) impression. Moreover the reader should get (apprehended) the pleasure of the sentiments, but should not impress himself with its (Rhetorics) splendor.

Anandverdhana has considered that, the poetic merits has apparently related with the emotions etc. Poetic-Sentiments. The merits are 'Dharma' --- an subject of 'Comparison' and the 'Sentiments' etc.
are the objects of comparison. Moreover the merits has in itself the basic quality (recourse) and the sentiments etc. glorifies only while mixing with these Merits. Such as the Sweet –Poetic- Merit has intimate relation with the 'Amour' ---'Vipralambha'--- the separation of lovers and the compassionate etc. Poetic Sentiments and the Vigour –Poetic- Merit has intimate relation with the 'Fearsome ' Heroic' and 'Terrible' Public –Sentiments.

In this situation the Dictious' ---the joining of the words together should be of this type that , it (dictions) should co-ordinate with the Natural Merits, and the Sentiments Anandverdhana further says that the alphabets has its own impression such as some alphabets illuminates naturally the delicacy and some brings about naturally the harshness. The use of the alphabets in the poetics is entirely praiseworthy only in that situation when these alphabets are used after due consideration.

Further Anandverdhana says about the 'Sanghatana' - Diction that distinctively, joining together of the worlds is called the 'Sughatna -Diction' moreover the choice and the use of the world is called the Sanghatana (Diction) the Sanghatana ---Diction is of four kinds as under:-

1. I without having the compound - words
2. II with a few compound - words
3. III with long (sufficient) compound – words
The Merits has intimate relation with the Sanghatana— the Diction. Anandverdhana has said that the Sanghatana --- Diction depends upon the merits and it (Sanghatana --- Diction) expresses the sentiments.

In connection with Sanghatana --- Diction Anandverdhana has considered that it is essential to take into consideration the four kinds of the Propriety about the Saghatana --- Diction.

The main (Propriety) is the Propriety of the Sentiments and besides it one should keep in view the Propriety of the 'Speaker' expressible object and 'Subject' etc. secondary objects the meaning of the speakers is the character of the Poetics or the Drama and the expressible object means the objects which is to be expounded and the Subject means the type of the Poetics such as; Drama Epic, Prose, Verse, and Campu --- a type of composition treating the same subject in alternate passages of Prose and Verse. While compiling the Sanghatana -Diction one should take heed entirely of the Propriety of these four subjects.

This statement of Anandverdhana is entirely true that first of all only he has given the consideration, about these four kinds of the Propriety of the 'Sanghatana --- Diction'. Further Anandverdhana's views about the Propriety of the meaning of Systematic-Arrangement-Composition is very touching. Anandverdhana has also mentioned the Propriety of the (Nature) Manner and Conducts and of the Poetic Sentiments.
In the third 'Udyota' chapter of 'Dhavanyaloka' he has done an extensive illustration about the deliberation and development of the Poetic Sentiments and he has also described those devices which one can repel those opposed elements which are against the Poetic-Sentiments. Conclusively he has given the substance of all subjects as under following lines:-

Aaucityadrite naanyad rasbhangasya karnam  
Prhsiaaucityatandhastu rasayopnistpara

That is to say, that the Impropriety is only the repellent (opposer) of the Poetic Sentiments and like the Impropriety there is not anything which is excessively against the Poetic Sentiments. The main secrecy about the poetic sentiments is (only) the Propriety, moreover (sentiments) become (occur) worthy only in that situation when they are used properly otherwise they loose their importance. In this way Anadverdhana is requarded for situating the Propriety in the poetic element

Anandavardhana has been assigned by bhuller and jacobi to the middle of the ninth centruy on the strength of Rajatarangini v.35 which mix him one of the ornaments of the court of Avantiverman (855-84 A.D.). We are pretty certain of the time of Abhinavagupta, Anandavardhana's commentator for as he himself state his Brhati Vrtti on the Isvaraprayabhijna was written in 1015 A.D. while in Krama-stotra was composed in 990-91 A.D. and his Bhairava-stotra or Isvara-
Stotra in 992-93. From Abhinavagupta's remarks at the end of his "Locana commentary on Uddyotasa I and III of the Dhavanyaloka, it appears that the study of this famous work was traditional in his family and that his own commentary was composed as a rejoinder to another called the Candrika (p-60) written by one of his predecessors in the same Gotra and four times in his Locna (pp. 123, 174, 185, 215) he discusses or controverts the views of this earlier commentator, who is specifically refer to as the Candrikakara at pp. 178 and 185. This should certainly allow some generations to lie between Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and negative completely Pischel's contention that in three passages Abhinavagupta speaks of Anandavardhana as one of his teacher. These passages occur at pp. 37, 183 & 214 of the printed text, but a perusal of them with reference to their context will show that the honorific word Guru, if it at all refers to Anandavardhana, must refer to him not literally but figuratively, as parampara-guru, whose work was handing esteem in his family or (which is more likely the reference is to one or other of Abhinavagupta's teacher, such as Bhatta Tauta or Bhattenduraja, the former of whom is cited as Asmad-Upadhayayah or Asamg-Guravah very often in Abhinava's commentary on Bharata. Again, Kayyata states that he wrote his commentary on Anandavardhana's Devi-sataka (ed. Kavyamala, Gucchaka ix) at about 977 A.D., so that by the end of 10th century Anandavaradhana was well enough established in fame to have two such learned commentators. Finally, Rajasekhara, who lived about the end of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth century, mentions and cites Anandavardhana by name in his Kavya-Mimamsa (p. 16), and this
should certainly clear up any doubt as to the authenticity of the date assigned by Kahlana and accepted by Buhler and Jacobi.

The celebrated work on Poetics known as Dhvanyaloka (also called Kavyaloka or Sahrdyoloka) of which or a part of which Anandavardhana is reputed to be the author, may be distinguished into two parts, viz. (1) the Karika, consisting of verses and treating of Dhavani and (2) the Vritti or exposition, generally in prose with illustrative verses, of the Karika. Now the question has been raised whether the Karika and the Vritti are of the same authorship or should be attributed to different authors. Abhinavagupta, who is follower in this respect by several latter writers on Poetics, carefully distinguishes between the Karikarkara and the Brittikara, by directly opposing them, and also by using the term Vrtt-Grantha in contradistinction to the Karika. In three of these passages (pp. 123, 130-1; ch. iv p.29) Abhinavagupta expressly tries to reconcile the conflicting views expressed by the Karikarkara and the Vrittikara.

Buhler first drew attention to this point; and Jacobi relying on Abhinavagupta’s testimony, put forward the suggestion that the Dhvani kara, the supposed author of Karika was different and older writer who should be distinguished from Anandabardhana, the author of the Vritte. In support of this, it has been pointed out that one does not find complete agreement of opinion between the two parts of the work, although the one is an exposition of the other. On the other hand it seems that the system as given in its bare outline by the Karikakara in
his concise verses has been considerably expanded, revised and modified by the Vrttikara; and may problems not discussed or even hinted at by the former are elaborately treated of by the letters in one place for instance (p.123) Abhinava gupta clearly points out that the classification of Dhavani according to Vastu, Alamkara, and Rasadi is not expressly taught in any Karika; while in another place in ch.-iv Abhinavagupta states that the question as to the source of the endless variety of artha in poetry is mentioned by the Vritti but not touched upon by the Karikakara. Indeed it seems that Anandavardhana in his classical Vritti attempted to build up a more or less complete system of Potics upon the loosely joined ideas and materials supplied by the brief Karikas; and his success was probably so marvellous that in course of time the Karikakara receded to the background completely overshadowed by the more important figure of his formidable expounder; and people considered as the Dhavanikara not the author of the few memorial verses but the commentator Anandavardhana himself, who for the first time fixed the theory in its present form. The term “Dhavankara” itself came gradually to be used in the generic sense of “the creator of the Dhavani School” and therefore indiscriminately applied by later writers to Anandavardhana, who might not have been the founder of the system by who came to receive that credit for having first victoriously introduced in the struggle of the schools.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in the apocryphal verse ascribed to Rajasekhara in Jahalan, Anandavardhana is regarded as the founder of the dhavani-theory. Similarly, Samudrabandha (p.4) passing
in review the five schools of the Poetics before Ruyyaka, mentions Anandavardhana as the founder of the fifth and or last Dhvani School. This would also explain the two groups of apparently puzzling citations from the Dhvanyaloka met with in the works of later writers, in which they either confuse or identify Anandavardhana with the Dhavanikara. On the one hand, we have several Karkas cited under the name of Anandavardhana, while on the other, several passages which occur in the Vrtti are given under the name of the Dhavanikara. This confusion was so complete in later writers that even in the latter part of the eleventh century Mahimabhatta, who professed to demolish the new theory by his fierce onslaught in the Vyakti-Viveka, quotes from the Karika and the Vrtti indiscriminately under the generic appellation of the Dhavanikara. In the same way Ksemendra, in the last quarter of the eleventh century, and Hemcandra, in the first quarter of the twelfth, make Anandavardhana responsible for Karika's III.24 and I.4 respectively, while still later writers like Jayaratha, Visvanatha, Govinda and Kumarasvamin regard Anandavardhana himself as the Dhavanikara, to who the Karika, as well as the Vrtti, is indiscriminately attributed. Mammaja, generally a careful writer, distinguishes Anandavardhana from the writer of the Karikas, whom he styles Dhavanikara or Dhavanikrt (pp.213 and 214), but in one place (p.445) he apparently falls into confusion and ascribes to the Dhavanikara a verse which undoubtedly belongs to the Vrtti. The question, however, of the differentiation of the Karikakara and Vrittikara cannot yet to be taken as finally settled.
If the Dhvanikara, however, is distinguished from Anandavardhana, the question naturally arises—-who was this Dhvanikara, and what date should be assigned to him? Abhinabagupta does not give us any information on this point. Jacobi, in the learned introduction to his translation of the Dhabanyaloka, poses the question very ably without, however, furnishing a precise solution. Sovani's hypothesis that the name of the unknown Karikarkara was Sahrday, is hardly convincing; for his grounds for this presumption are that (1) one of the alternative names of the work itself is Sahrdayaloka and that (2) the use of the words Sahrdaya and Kavi-Sahrdaya at the end of chapter iv of the Dhvanyaloka and in the beginning of Abhinabagupta's commentary is significantly corroborative. It is well known, however, that the word Sahrdaya (lit a man with a heart) is used in innumerable places in Alamkara literature, as in the verses in question, to designate a man of taste, a judge of literary beauty, a connoisseur of Rasa. Anandavardhana himself discusses Sahrdayatva at some length in his Vrtti (p. 160) and Abhinabagupta arrives at a concise definition of a Sahrdaya thus (p. 11) yesam Kavyanusilanabhyasa-vasad visadibhute mano-mukure varnaniya-tanmaya-bhavana yogyata, i.e hrdoyasamvadabhajah Sahrdayah, a definition which became so much standardized that Hemachndra does not scruple to copy it literally (Comm. p. 3).

In the absence of material it is very difficult to decide the question finally. Jacobi maintains, on the indication of a passage in Abhinava, that this unknown Dhvanikara was a contemporary of
Manoratha, who is placed by Raja-Tarangini (iv. 497 and 671) in the reign of Jayapida and his successor Lalitapaida i.e. at the third quarter of the eighth and the first quarter of the ninth century (about 780-813 A.D.); but there are difficulties which seriously stand in the way of our arriving at a definite decision on this point. While discussing the various theories which deny the existence of dhavani, Anandavardhana quotes a verse anonymously with the remark: Tatha Canyena Kṛta Evatra Slokah, upon which Abhinavagupta in his gloss remarks: tatha canyena iti. Granthakrt-Samana-Kala-Bhavina Manoratha- Namna Kavita. If we suppose that by Granthakrt Abhinavagupta means Anandavardhana, then Manoratha, who is thus made a contemporary of the letter lives in the middle of 2nd part of the ninth century i.e. somewhat later than the date assigned to him by Kahlana, presuming of course that both the Manorathas are identical persons if on the other hand we suppose that Granthakrt refers, as Jacobi conjectures, to the anonymous Dhavanikara, we are confronted with the fresh difficulty that by the term Granthakrt Abhinavagupta invariably means Anandavardhana (pp. 12 37, 90 etc.). To remove this difficulty we must suppose either (1) that Kahlana is wrong, as Pischel argues, in assigning Manoratha to the reign of Jayapida and Lalitapida (2) that the two Manoratha were not identical person or (3) that Abhinavagupta himself has confused the Karikarkara with the Vrittikara in a manner not usual with him. As there are not definite means of deciding any one of these equally plausible propositions, the conjecture that the original Dhavanikara was a contemporary of the Manoratha of Kahlana cannot be taken to have been definitely proved.
It seems, on the other hand, that the Karikas date back to an earlier time than the first quarter of the ninth century; in which the Dhavanikara is placed by Jacobi as a contemporary of Manoratha. The allusion to Manoratha and the apparent discrepancy in Kahlana's statement need not trouble us, nor need we challenge the otherwise trustworthy testimony of Abhinavagupta; for it is quite reasonable to suppose that the Manoratha under discussion is perhaps a poet who was Abhinavagupta says, contemporaneous with Anandabardhana, and therefore quite different person from the well known Manoratha of Kahlana. This is perhaps a much simpler explanation than straining the word Granthakrt to mean the Karikakara in the face of Abhinavagupta's own distinct indication to the contrary; and in this way we are not affected in the list by Kahlana's Manoratha, with whom we have nothing to do. If, on the other hand, we place the Dhavanikara in the time of Kahlana's Manoratha, this would leave only a bare margin of one or two generation between the Karikakara and the Vrittikara, which does not seem to be enough to make room for a period of scholastic exposition of the subject. But undoubted traces of such activity are preserved to us in the few memorial verses -Parikara-Slokas (pp 34, 130, 137, 147, 163), Samgraha-Salokas (pp. 87, 223), Samksepa-Salokas (pp. 44, 74, 243) - : incorporated by Anandavardhana in his Vrtti which itself, therefore, is not likely to be the first of its kind. These Slokas are a sort of recapitulation -Stanzas which are adduced by the Vrttikara from unknown sources, sometimes to explain the meaning of the Karikas, but more often to amplify and supplement them. But at the same time we need not suppose a very long intervening period between
the original dogmatic formulator of a theory and its first thoughtful expounder; for it is not necessary that a system should always require a long stretch of time in forming itself. The phenomenon is not unusual that if a literary or intellectual movement is already afoot and is, at it were, in a effervescent state, a few generations, or at most a century, are enough to bring it to the inevitable culmination, or at least to some preliminary completion. If we suppose that a system of Dhavani had been existence at a very early period, we should expect to find, so we do find to a certain extent in the case of the Rasa-Theory, its influence working, at least indirectly, on the earlier writers who preceded Anandvardhana, although this argument in itself does not carry with it a decisive force. It may be admitted, on the other hand, that the Dhavanikara apparently shows himself conversant with some theories of Rasa, Riti and Alamkara. But this neither proves nor disproves his own antiquity or that of his system, for there is no evident to show that he was aware of the particular views of Bhamaha, Dandin or Vamana who championed these theories; nor are these writers to be taken, like the Dhavanikara himself as the absolute founders of the systems they individually represent. It only goes to establish that the theory, enunciated by the Dhavanikara, might have existed side by side with these systems as we find them in the extant works; for it could have been much later, inasmuch as such a supposition would bring it too near the time of Anandvardhana himself. If the Dhavanikara was contemporaneous with Dandin or Vamana, he may be placed at most century earlier than his commentator in the first half of the century.
If Anandavardhana gave the final authoritative shape to the Dhavani-Theory (only the details of which were worked out by Abhinavagupta and others), the anonymous Dhavanikara was not its absolute creator. This is made clear by the first Karika, which tells us that the theory was already taught by earlier thinkers, and that it existed even at the time of the Dhavanikara himself in various forms, handed down as Anandavardhana explains, in unbroken tradition (Paramparaya Yah Samamnatah), although it may not have explained as Abhinava adds in his gloss, in particular books (Avicchinnena Pravahena tair etad uktam, Vinapi Visista-Pustakesu Vivecanad ity Abhiprayah, p-3). This implies without doubt that school existed from a very early time, but some unknown writer gathered together summed up, and fixed the theory in a form which obtained considerable literary esteem for his work and the honoured but somewhat vague appellation of the Dhvanikara for himself. But his name and fame in course of time, were eclipsed by those of his great Vrittikara who succeeded in establishing the theory for all time and to whom posterity began to ascribe, not altogether undeservedly, all the honours of his predecessor, so that one of the latest writers on Alamkara, Kumarasvamin (P-228), glorifies him with the curious but significant epithet --- Dhavanyacarya.

Very little is known of Anandavardhan’s personal history. The colophon at the end of ch. iii of his work in the India office MS calls him Nonopadhyatmaja, while the colophon to ch. -iv gives the form Jonopadhyaya. Of these two forms of the name of his father, the former seems to be correct for referring to Anandavardhana's Devi-
Safaka, Hemacandra (Comm. p-225) cites its author as Nona Sutah Srimad-Anandavardhana-Nama. Kayyata also, commenting on the last punning verse of the same work, refers to the author as the son of Nona, and mentions his two works the Visamabanalila and Arjuna-Carita, supposed to have been punningly alluded to in that verse. Both these works are cited in Anandavardhana’s Vrtti, by Abhinavagupta (pp. 152, 176, 222), by Hemacandra (pp. 15, 213); and the first work appears to be a Prakrit poem. Anandavardhana himself refers to another work of his own at p.233, on which Abhinava adds the gloss: Granthantara Iti Viniscaya-Tikayam Dharmottamayam Ya Vivrtir Amuna Granthakrta KrtA. This is apparently a work called Dharmottama a commentary on the (Pramana-) Viniscaya of Dharmakirti. Abhinava in Locana-iv (p. 31 refers to another work of Anandvardhana’s called Tattvaloka, in which the latter is said to have discussed, among other things, the relation between Kavya-Naya and Sastra-Naya.

3. KSEMENDRA

The exact Biography of the Ksemendra is not known but according to sources available he was born after 990 A.D. and died in about 1065-66 A.D. However the detailed description about Ksemendra and about his famous composition ‘Auchitya - Vicharcharcha’ --- the discussion about the ‘Propriety’ is being given in the subsequent chapters, but some acquaintance about Ksemendra is as it, that
Ksemendra was not only the 'Originator' but also the Adjudicator—Propounder of the theory of the 'Propriety'.

Ksmendra was impelled with those principles of Anandvardhana etc. thinkers, which are related with the 'Propriety' and established an independent doctrine of the 'Aucitya'—properly in his excellent composition 'Aucityavicharcharcha'—the discuss about the Propriety.

VIEWs OF THE WESTERN THINKERS ON THE PROPRIETY

1. ARISTOTLE
2. LONGINUS
3. HORACE

1. ARISTOTLE

On the Art of Poetry

INTRODUCTION

Poetry as Imitation

Under the general heading of the art of poetry, I propose not only to speak about this art itself, but also to discuss the various kinds of poetry and their characteristic functions, the types of plot-structure that are required of a poet is to succeed, the number and nature of its constituent parts, and similarly any other matters that may be relevant to a study of this kind. I shall begins in the natural way, that is, by going back to first principles.
Epic and tragic poetry, comedy too, dithrambic poetry, and most music composed for the flute and the lyre, can all be described in general terms as forms of limitation or representation. However they differ from one another in three respects: either in using different things, or in representing them in entirely different ways.

The Media of Poetic Imitation:

Aristotle says that, some artists whether by theoretical knowledge or by long practice, can represent things by imitating their shapes and colours, and others do so by the voice; in the arts I have spoken of the limitation is produced by means of rhythm, language, and music, these beings used either separately or in combination. Thus the art of the flute and of the lyre consists only in music and rhythm, as does any other of the same type, such as that of the pipes. The imitative medium of dancers is rhythm alone, unsupported by music, for it is by the manner in which they arrange the rhythms of their movements that they represent men's characters and feelings and actions.

The form of art that uses language alone, whether in prose or verse, and verse either in a mixture of metres or in one particular kind, has up to the present been without a name. For we have no common name the we can apply to the prose mimes of Sophron and Xenarchrus and the Soratic dialogues, or to compositions employing iambic trimeters or elegiac couplets or any other meters of these types. We can
say on that people associate poetry with the metre employed, and speak for example of legiac poets and epic poets; they call them poets, however not from the fact that they are writing in metre. For it is customary to describe as poets even those who produce medical and scientific works in verse. Yet Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common except their metre, and therefore while it is right to call the one a poet. In the same way an author composing his limitation in a mixture of all the metres, as Chaeremon did in his Centaur, a rhapsody a poet. Such are the distinctions I would make.

Again, there are some arts which make use of all the media I have mentioned, that is rhythm, music and formal metre; such are dithyrambic and comic poetry, tragedy and comedy. They differ, however in that the first two use all these media together, while the last two use them separately, one after another.

These, then are what I mean by the difference between the arts as far as the media of representation are concerned.

The Objects of Poetic Imitation

Aristotle further says that, since imitative artists represent men in action, and men who are necessarily either of good or of bad character (for as all people differ in their moral nature according to the degree of their goodness of badness, character almost always fall into one or other of these types), these men must be represented either as better than we
are, or worse, or as the same kind of people as ourselves. Thus among the painters Polygnotus represented his subjects as better, and Pauson as worse, while Dionysius painted them just as they were. It is clear that each of the kinds of imitation I have referred to will admit of these variations, and they will differ in this way according to the differences in the objects they represent. Such diversities may occur even in dancing and in music for the flute and the lyre; they occur also in the art is based on language, whether it uses prose or verse unaccompanied by music. Homer, for example, depict the better types of men, and Cleophon noraml types, while Hegemon of Thasos, the first writer of parodies and Nicocharae, the autho of the Deiliad, show them in a bad light. The same thing happens in dithrambic and nomic poetry; for instance, the Cyclop might be represented in different ways, as was done by Timotheus and Philoxenus. This is the difference that marks the distinction between comedy and tragedy; for comedy aims at representing men as worse than they are now a day, tragedy as better.

The manner of Poetic Imitation

Aristotle says that, there remain the third point of difference. In these arts, that is the manner in which each kind of subject may be represented. For it is possible using the same medium, to represent the same subjects in a variety of ways. I may be done partly by narration and partly by the assumption of a character other than one owns which is Homer’s way; or by speaking in one’s own person without any such
change; or by representing the characters as performing all the actions dramatically.

These, then as all pointed out at the beginning are the three factors by which the imitative arts are differentiated: their media, the objects they represent, and their manner of representation. Thus in one sense Sophocles might be called an imitator of the same kind as Homer for they both represent good men; in another sense he is like Aristophanes, in that they both represent men in action. Men actually doing things. And this some say, is why their works are called dramas, form their representing men doing things. For this reason too the Dorian claim the invention of both tragedy and comedy. Comdy s claimed by the Megarians, bot by those here in Greece on the grounds that it came into being when they became a democracy, and by those in Sicily because the poet Epicharmus, who was much earlier than Chionides and Magnes, came from there; certain Dorians of the Peloponnese aly claim also to tragedy. They regard the names as proof of their belief, pointing us that, whereas the Athenians can outlying village, hey themselves call ; so that comedies take their name , not them, but form their touring in the when lack of appreciation drove them form the city. Furthermore, their word 'to do' is drain, whereas the Athenian word is pratte in.

So much then for the number and character of the different kinds of imitation.
The Origins and Development of Poetry

Aristotle says that, the creation of poetry generally is due to two causes, both rooted in human nature. The instinct for imitation is inherent in man from his earliest days; he differs from other animals in that he is the most imitative of creatures, and he learns his earliest lessons by imitation. Also inborn in all of us is the instinct to enjoy works of imitation. What happens in actual experience is evident of this; for we enjoy looking at the most accurate representations of things which in themselves we find painful to see, such as the forms of the lowest animals and of corpses. The reason for this is that learning is a very great pleasure, not for philosophers only, but for other people as well, however limited their capacity for it may be. They enjoy seeing likeness because in doing so they acquire information (they reason out what each represents and discover, for instance, that this is a picture of so and so); for if by any chance the thing depicted has not been seen before, it will not be the fact that it is an imitation of something that gives the pleasure but the execution or the colouring or some other such cause.

The instinct for imitation, too, is natural to us, as is also a feeling for music and for rhythm: and metres are obviously detached sections of rhythm. Starting from these natural aptitudes, and by a series of for the most part gradual improvements on their first efforts, men eventually created poetry from their improvisations.
However poetry soon branched into two channels, according to the temperaments of individual poets. The more serious minded among them represented noble actions and the doings of noble persons, while the more trivial wrote about the manner sort of poetry; thus while the one type wrote hymns and panegyrics, these others began by writing invectives. We know of no poems of this kind by any poet earlier than Homer, though it is likely enough that many poets wrote them; but from Homer onwards examples any me found, his own Margites, for instance and poems of the same type. It was in such poems that the iambic metre was brought into use because of its appropriateness for the purpose and it is still called iambic today, from being the metre in which they wrote ‘iambs’, or lampoons, against one another.

In this way it came about that some of our early poets became writers of heroic, and some of iambic verse. But just as Homer was the supreme poet in the serious style, standing alone both in excellence of composition and in the dramatic quality of his representations of life, so also in the dramatic character that he imparted not to invective but to his treatment of the ridiculous, he was the first to indicate the forms that comedy was to assume; for his Margites bears the same relationship to our comedies as his Iliad and Odyssey bear to our tragedies. When tragedy and comedy appeared those whose natural aptitude inclined them towards the one kind of poetry wrote comedies instead of lampoons, and those who were drawn to the other wrote tragedies instead of epics; for these new forms were both grander and more highly regarded than the earlier.
It is beyond my scope here to consider whether or not tragedy is
developed as far as it can be in its various forms, and to decide this
both absolutely and in relation to the stage.

Both tragedy and comedy had their first beginning in
improvisation. The one originated with those who led the dithyramb, the
with the leaders of the phallic songs which still survive today as
traditional institutions in many of our cities. Little by little tragedy
advanced, each new element being developed as it came into use, until
after many changes it attained its actual forms and came to a standstill.
Aeschylus was the first to increase the number of actors from one to
two, cut down the role of the chorus, and give the first place to the
dialogue. Sophocles introduced three and painted scenery. As for the
grandure of tragedy, it was not until late that it acquired its characteristic
stateliness, when progressing beyond the methods of satyr-drama, it
discarded slight plots and comic diction, and its metre changed from the
trochaic tetrameter to the iambic. At first the poets had used the
tetrameter because they were writing satyr-poetry, which was more
closely related to the dance; but once dialogue had been introduced, by
its very nature it hit upon the right measure, for the iambic is of all
measures the one best suited to speech. This is shown by the fact that we
most usually drop into iambic in our conversation with one another,
whereas we seldom talk in hexameters, and then only when we deaprt
form the normal tone of conservation. Another change was the increased
number of episodes, or acts. We must pass over such other matters as the
varius embellishments of tragedy and the circumstances in which they are said to have been intorduced for ti would probably be along business to go into them in any detail.

The Rise of Comedy. Epic Compared with Tragedy

The Aristotle says that, as I have remarked, comedy represents the worse typs of men; worse however not in the sense that it embraces any and every kind of badness, but in the sense that it embraces any and every kind of badness, but in the sense that the ridiculous is a species of uglines s of badness. For the ridiculous consists in some form of error or ugliness tha is not painful of injurious; the comic mask, for example is distorted and ugly but causes no pain.

Now we know something of the successive stages by which tragedy developed and of those who were responsible for them; the early history of comedy however is obscure because it was not taken seriously. It was a long time before the archon granted a chorus to comedies; until then the performers were volunteers. Comedy had already acquired certain clear cut forms before there is any mention of those who are named as its poets. Nor is it known who introduced masks, or prologues, or a plurality of actors and other things of the kind. Properly worked out plots originated in Sicily with Epicharmus and Phormis; of athenian poets Crates was the first to discard the lampoon pattern and to adopt stories and plots of a more general nature.
Epic poetry agrees with tragedy to the extent that it is a representation, in dignified verse, of serious actions. They differ, however, in that epic keeps to a single metre and is in narrative form. Another point of difference is their length: tragedy tries as far as possible to keep within a single revolution of the sun, or only slightly to exceed it, whereas the epic observers no limits in its time of action — although at first the practice in this respect was the same in tragedies as in epics. Of the constituent parts, some are common to both kinds, and some are peculiar to tragedy. Thus anyone who can discriminate between what is good and what is bad in tragedy can do the same with epic; for all the elements of epic are found in tragedy, though not everything that belong to tragedy is to be found in epic.

A Description of tragedy

Aristotle says that, I SHALL speak later about the form of imitation that uses hexameters and about comedy, but for the moment I propose to discuss tragedy, first drawing together the definition of its essential character from what has already been said.

Tragedy, then, is a representation of an action that is wroth. I Herein, it is perhaps worth pointing out, lies the justification of the fuller treatment that Aristotle gives to dram. In charge of the religious
festival at which he hoped to have it performed. If the play was chosen for performance, the archon 'granted it a chorus'; that is, he provided a choregus, a wealthy citizen who, as a form of public service, paid the expenses of the production. The earlier 'volunteers' presumably paid their own expenses. Serious attention, complete in itself, and of some amplitude; in language enriched by a variety of artistic devices appropriate to the several parts of the play; presented in the form of action, no narration; by means of pity and fear bringing about the purgation of such emotions. By language that is enriched I refer to language possessing rhythm, and music or song; and by artistic devices appropriate to the several parts I mean that some are produced by the medium of verse alone, and others again with the help of song.

Now since the representation is carried out by men performing the actions, it follows, in the first place, that spectacle is an essential part of tragedy, and secondly that there must be song and diction, these being medium of representation. By diction I mean here the arrangement of the verse; song is a term whose sense is obvious to everyone.

In tragedy it is action that is limited, and this action is brought about by agents who necessarily display certain distinctive qualities both of character and of thought, according to which we also define the nature of the actions. Thought and character are, then, the two natural causes of actions, and it is on them that all men depend for success or failure. The representation of the action is the plot of the tragedy; for the ordered arrangement of the incidents is what I mean by plot.
Character, on the other hand, is that which enables us to define the nature of the participants, an thought comes out in what they say when they are proving a point or expressing an option.

Necessarily, then, every tragedy his six constituents, which will determine its quality. They are plot, character, diction, thought, spectacle, and song. Of these, two represent the media in which the action is represented, one involves the manner of representation, and three are connected with the object of the representation; beyond them nothing further is required. These, it may be said, are the dramatic elements that have been used by practically all playwrights; for all plays alike possess spectacle, character, plot, diction, song, and thought.

Of these elements the most important is the plot, the ordering of the incidents; for tragedy is a representation, not of men, but of action an life, of happiness and unhappiness – and happiness and unhappiness are bound up with action. The purpose of living is an end which is a kind of activity, not a quality; it is their character, indeed, that make men what they are, but it is by reason of their actions that are happy or the reverse. Tragedies are not performed. Therefore, in order to represent character, although character is involved for the sake of the action. Thus the incidents and the plot are the end aimed at in tragedy, and as always, the end is everything. Furthermore, there could not be a tragedy without action, but there could be without character; indeed the tragedies of most of our recent playwrights fail to present character, and the same might be said of many playwrights of other periods. As similar contrast could
be drawn between Zeuxis and Polygnotus as painters, for Polygnotus represents character well, whereas Zeuxis is not concerned with it in his painting. Again, if someone writes a series of speeches expressive of character, and well composed as far as thought and diction are concerned, he will still not achieve the proper effect of tragedy; this will be done much better by a tragedy which is less successful in its use of these elements, but which has a plot giving an ordered combination of incidents. Another point to note is that the two most important means by which tragedy plays on our feelings, that is, 'reversals' and 'recognition', are both constituents of the plot. A further proof is that beginners can achieve accuracy in diction and the portrayal of character before they can construct a plot out the incidents, and this could be said of almost all the earliest dramatic poets.

The plot, then, is the first essential of tragedy, its life-blood, so to speak, and character takes the second place. It is much the same in painting; for if an artist were to daub his canvas with the same beautiful clours laid on at random, he would not give the same pleasure as he would by drawing a recognizable portrait in black and white. Tragedy is the representation of an action, and it is chiefly on account of the action that it is also a representation of persons.

The third property of tragedy is thought. This is the ability to say what is possible and appropriate in any given circumstances; it is what, in the speeches in the play, is related to the arts of politics and rhetoric. The older dramatic poets made their character talk like statesmen,
whereas those of today make them talk like rhetoricians. Character is that which reveals personal choice, the kinds of thing a man chooses or rejects when that is not obvious. Thus there is no revelation of character in speeches in which the speaker shows no preferences or aversions whatever. Thought, on the other hand, is present in speeches where something is being shown to be true or untrue, or where some general opinion is being expressed.

Fourth comes the diction of the speeches. By diction I mean, as I have already explained, the expressive use of words, and this has the same force in verse and in prose. Of the remaining elements, the music is the most important of the pleasurable additions to the play. Spectacle, or stage-effect, is an attraction, of course, but it has the least to do with the playwright's craft or with the art of poetry. For the power of tragedy is independence both of performance and of actors, and besides, the production of spectacular effects is more the province of the property-man than of the playwright.

The scope of the plot: Aristotle says that, now that these definitions have been established, I must go on to discuss the arrangement of the incidents, for this is of the first importance in tragedy. I have already laid down that tragedy is representation of an action that is complete and whole and of a certain amplitude— for a thing may be whole and ye lack amplitude. Now a whole is hat which has a beginning, a middle, and an end. A beginning is that which does not necessarily come after something else, although something else
exists or comes about after it, An end, on the contrary, is that which naturally follows something else either as a necessary or as usual consequence, and is not itself followed by anything. A middle is that which follows something else, and is itself followed by something. This we; 1;1 constructed plots must either begin nor end in a haphazard way, but must conform to the pattern I have been describing.

Furthermore, whatever is beautiful, whether it be a living creature or an object made up of various parts, must necessarily not only have its parts properly ordered, but also be of an appropriate size, for beauty is bound up with size and order. A minutely small creature, therefore, would not be beautiful, for it would take almost no time to see it and our perception of it would be blurred up nor would an extremely large one, for it could not be taken in all at once, and its unity and wholeness would be lost to the view of the beholder – if for example, there were a creature a thousand miles long.

Now in just the same way as living creatures and organisms compounded of many parts must be of a reasonable size, so that they can be easily taken in by the eye, to too plots must be of a reasonable length, so that they may be easily held in the memory. The limits in length to be observed, in as far as they concern performance on their stage, have nothing to do with dramatic art; for if a hundred tragedies had to be performed in the dramatic contrasts, they would be regulated in length by the water clock, as indeed it is said they were at one time. With regard to the limit set by the nature of the action, the
longer the story is the more beautiful it will be provided that it is quite clear. To give a simple definition a length which, as a matter either of probability or of necessity, allows of a change from misery to happiness or from happiness to misery is the proper limit of length to be observed.

UNITY OF PLOT

Aristotle says that, a plot does not possess unity, as some people suppose, merely because it is about one man, and some of them will not contribute to any kind of unity; and similarly he may carry out many actions from which no single unified action will emerge. It seems therefore, that all those poets have been on the wrong track who have written a Haracleid, or a Theseid, or some other poem of this kind, in the belief that Heracles being a single person, his story must necessarily possess unity. Homer, exceptional in this as in all other respects, seems, whether by art or by instinct, to have been well aware of what was required. In writing his Odyssey he did not put in everything that happened to Odysseus, that he was wounded on Mount Parnasus, for example, or that he feigned madness at the time of the calls to arms, for it was not a matter of necessity or probability that either of these incidents should have led to the other; on the contrary, he constructed the Odyssey round a single action of the kind I have spoken of, and he did this with the Iliad too. Thus, just as in the other imitative arts each individual representation is the representation of a single object, so too the plot of a play, being the representation of an action, must present it as a unified whole; and its various incidents must be so arranged that if any
one of them is differently placed or taken away the effect of wholeness will be seriously disrupted. For if the presence or absence of something makes no apparent difference, it is no real part of the whole.

Poetic truth and Historical Truth

Aristotle says that, it will be clear from what I have said that it is not the poet's function to describe what has actually happened, but the kinds of thing that might happen, that is, that could happen because they are, in the circumstances, either probable or necessary. The difference between the historian and the poet is not that the one writes in prose and the other in verse; their work of Herodotus might be put into verse, and in this metrical form it would be no less a kind of history than it is without meter. The difference is that the one tells of what has happened, the other of the kinds of things that might happen. For this reason poetry is something more philosophical and more worthy of serious attention than history; for while poetry is concerned with universal truths, history treats of particular facts.

By universal truths are to be understood the kinds of thing a certain type of person will probably or necessarily say or do in a given situation; and this is the aim of poetry, although it gives individual names to its characters. The particular facts of the historian are what, say, Alcibiades did, or what happened to him. By now this distinction has become clear where comedy is concerned, for comic poets build up their plots out of probable occurrences, and ten add any names that
occur o them; they do not, like the iambic poets, write about actual people. In tragedy, on the other hand, the authors keep to the names of real people, the reason being that what is possible is credible. Whereas we cannot be certain of possible is credible. Whereas we cannot be certain of the possibility of something that has not happened, what has happened is obviously possible, for it would not have happened if this had not been so. Nevertheless, even in some tragedies only one or two for the names are well known, and the rest are fictitious; and indeed there are some in which nothing is familiar, Agathon's Antheus, for example, in which both the incidents and the names are fictitious, and the play is none the less well liked for that. It is not necessary, therefore, to keep entirely to the rational stories which form the subjects of our tragedies. Indeed it would be absurd to do so, since even the familiar stories are familiar only to a few, and yet they please everybody.

What I have said makes it obvious that the poet must be a maker of plots rather than of verses, since he is a poet by virtue of his representation, and what he represents is actions. And even if he writes about things that have actually happened, that does not make him any the less a poet, for there is nothing to prevent some of the things that have happened from being in accordance with the laws of possibility and probability, and thus he will be a poet in writing about them.

Of simple plots and actions those that are episodic are the worst. By an episodic plot I mean one in which the sequence of the episodes is
neither probable nor necessary. Plays of this kind are written by bad poets because they cannot help it, and by good poets because of the actors; writing for the dramatic competitions, they often strain a plot beyond the bounds of possibility, and are thus obliged to dislocate the continuity of events.

However, tragedy is the representation not only of a complete action, but also of incidents that awaken fear and pity, and effect of this kind are heightened when things happen unexpectedly as well as logically, for then they will be more remarkable than if they seem merely mechanical or accidental. Indeed, Even chance occurrences seem most remarkable when they have the appearance of having been brought about by design—when, for example, the statue of Mitys at Argos killed at a man who had caused Mitys’s death by falling down on him at a public entertainment. Things like this do not seem mere chance occurrence. Thus plots of this type are necessarily better than others.

Simple and complex Plots

Aristotle says that, some plots are simple, and some complex, for the obvious reason that the actions of which they are representations are of one or other of these kinds. By a simple action I refer to one which is single and continuos in the sense of my earlier definition, and in which the change of fortune comes about without a reversal or a discovery. A complex actin is one in which the change is accompanied by a discovery or a reversal, or both. These should develop out of the very structure of
the plot, so that they are the inevitable or probable consequence of what has gone before, for there is a big difference between what happens as a result of something else and what merely happens after it.

Reversal, Discovery, and Calamity

Aristotle says that, as has already been noted, a reversal is a change from one state of affairs to its opposite, one which conforms, as I have said to probability or necessity. In Oedipus, for example the Messenger who came to cheer Odipus and relieve him of him who he was. In the Lynceus, again Lynceus is being led off to execution, followed by Danaus who is to kill him, when as a result of events that occurred earlier it comes about that he is saved and it is Danaus who is put to death.

As the word itself indicates, a discovery is a change from ignorance to knowledge, and it leads either to love or to hatred between persons destined for good or ill fortune. The most effective form of discovery is that which is accompanied by reversals, like the one in Oedipus. There are of course other forms of discovery, for what I have described may happen in relation to inanimate and trifling objects, and moreover it is possible to discover whether a person has done something or not. But the form of discovery most essentially related to the plot and action of the play is the one described above, for a discovery of this kind in combination with a reversal will carry with it either pity or fear, and it is such actions as these that, according to my definition tragedy
represents; and further such a combination is likely to lead to a happy or an unhappy ending.

As it is persons who are involved in the discovery it may be that only one person's identity is revealed to another it that of the second being already known. Sometimes, however a natural recognition of two parties is necessary, as for example, when the identity of Iphigenia was made known to Orestes by the sending of the letter, and a second discovery was required to make him known to Iphigenia.

Two elements of plot, then, reversal and discovery turn upon such incidents as these. A third is suffering or, calamity. Of three reversal and discovery have already been defined. A calamity is an action of a destructive or painful nature, such as death openly represented, excessive suffering, wounding, and the like.

The Main Parts of Tragedy

Aristotle says that, I spoke earlier of the various elements that are to be employed as the consityents of tragedy. The separate sections into which the work is divided are as follows: prologue, episode, exode, and choral song, the last being subdivided into parode and stasimon. These are common to all tragedies; songs from the actors and 'commoi', however are a characteristic a only of some tragedies.
The prologue is the whole of that part of a tragedy that precedes the aprode, or first entry of the Chorus. An episode is the while of that of a tragedy that comes between complete choral songs. The exode is the whole of that part of a tragedy which is no followed by a song of the Chorus. In the choral sections the parode is the whole of the first utterance of the Chorus, and a stasimon is a choral song without anaphase of trochees. A 'commos' is a passage of lament in which both Chorus and actors take part.

These then are the separate sections into which the body of the tragedy is to be divided; I mentioned earlier the elements of which it must be composed.

Tragic Action

Aristotle says that, following upon the points I have already made, I must go on to say what is to be aimed at and what guarded against in the construction of plots, and what are the sources of the tragic effect.

We saw the structure of tragedy at its best should be complex not simple and that it should represent actions capable of awakening fear and pity- for this is a characteristic function of representations of this ty[w. It followed in the forst place that good men should not passing
form prosperity to misery for this does not inspire fear or pity, it merely disgusts us. Nor should evil men be shown progressing for misery to prosperity. This is the most untragic of all plots, for it has none of the requisites of tragedy; it does not appeal to our humanity or awaken pity or fear in us. Nor again should an utterly worthless man be seen falling from prosperity into misery. Such a course might indeed play upon our humane feelings, but it would not arouse either pity or fear; for our pity is awakened by undeserved misfortune, and our fear by that of someone just like ourselves—pity for the undeserving sufferer and fear for the man like ourselves—so that the situation in question would have nothing in it either pitiful of fearful.

There remain a mean between these extremes. This is the sort of man who is not conspicuous for virtue and justice, and whose fall into misery is not due to vice and depravity, but rather to some error, a man who enjoys prosperity and a high reputation, like Oedipus and Thyestes and other famous members of families like theirs.

Inevitably, then, the well-conceived plot will have a single interest, and not, as some say, a double. The change in fortune will be not form misery to prosperity, but the reverse, form prosperity to misery, and it will due not to depravity, but to some great error either in such a man as I have described or in one better than this he poets treated any stories that came to hand, but nowadays the best tragedies are written about a handful of families, those of Alcmaeon, for example, and Oedipus.
Orestes and Meleager and Thyestes and Telephus, and others whom it as
befallen to suffer or inflict terrible experiences.

The best tragedies in the technical sense are constructed in this
way. These cities are on the wrong tact, therefore who criticize Euripides
for following such a procedure in his tragedies, and complaint that many
of them end in misfortune; for as I have said this is the right ending. The
strongest evidence of this is that on the stage and in the dramatic
competitions plays of this kind, when properly worked out are the most
tragic of all and Euripides faulty as is his management of other points is
nevertheless regarded as the most tragic of our dramatic poets.

The next best type of structure, ranked first by some critics, is that
which, like the Odyssey, has a double thread of plot, and ends in
opposite ways for the good and the abd characters. It is considered the
best only because of the feeble judgement of the audience, for the poets
pander to the taste of the spectators. But this is not the pleasure that is
proper to tragedy. It belongs rather to comedy, where those who have
been the bitterest of enemies in the original story, Orestes and
Aegisthus, for example, go off at the end as friends, and nobody is killed
by anybody.

Fear and Pity

Aristotle says that, fear and pity may be excited by means
of spectacle; but they can also take their rise from the very structure of
the action, which is the preferable method and the amrk of a better
drammatic poet. For the plot should be so ordered that even without seeing it performed anyone merely hearing what is afoot will shudder with fear and pity as a result of what is happening – as indeed would be the experience of anyone hearing the story of Odeipus. To produce this effect by means of stage-spectacle is less artist, and requires the cooperation of the producer. Those who employ spectacle to produce an effect, not of fear, but of something merely monstrous, have nothing to do with tragedy, for not every kind of pleasure should be demanded of tragedy, but only that which is proper to it; and since the dramatic poet has by means of his representation to produce the tragic pleasure that is associated with pity and fear, it is obvious that this effect is bound up with the events of plot.

Let us now consider what kinds of incident are to be regarded as fearful or pitiable. Deeds that fit this description must of course involve people who are either friends to one another, or enemies, or neither. Now if a man injures his enemy, there in so far as suffering is inflicted; nor is there if they are indifferent to each other.

But when the sufferings involve those who are near and dear to one another, when for example brother kills brother, son father, mother son, or son mother, or if such a deed is contemplated, or something else of the kind is actually done, then we have a situation of the kind to be aimed at. Thus it will not do to tamper with the traditional stories, that of Eriphyle by Alcmaeon; on the other hand, the poet must use his imagination and handle the traditional material effectively.
I must explain more clearly what I mean 'effectively'. The deed may be done by characters acting consciously and in full knowledge of the facts, as was the way of the early dramatic poets, when for instance Euripides made Medea kill her children. Or they may do it without realizing the horror of the deed until later, when they discover the truth; this is what Sophocles did with Oedipus. Here indeed the relevant incident occurs outside the action of the play; but it may be a part of the tragedy, as with Alcmaeon in Astydamas's play, or Telegonus in The Wounded Odysseus. A third alternative is for someone who is about to do a terrible deed in ignorance of the relationship to discover the truth before he does it. These are the only possibilities, for the deed must either be done or not done, and by someone either with or without knowledge of the facts.

The least acceptable of these alternatives is when someone in possession of the facts is on the point of acting but fails to do so, for this merely shocks us, and, since no suffering is involved it is not tragic. Hence nobody is allowed to behave like this, or only seldom, as when Haemon fails to kill Creon in the Antigone. Next in order of effectiveness is when the deed is actually done, and here it is better that the character should act in ignorance and only learn the truth afterwards, for there is nothing in this to outrage our feeling, and the revelation comes as a surprise. However the best method is the last, when for example, in the Crephontes Merope intends to kill her son, but recognizes him and does not do so; or when the same thing happens.
with brother and sister in Iphigenia in Tauris; or when, in the Helle, the son recognizes his mother he is just about to betray her.

This then is the reason why, as I said before, our tragedies keep to a few families. For in their search for dramatic material it was by chance rather than by technical knowledge that the poets discover how to gain tragic effects in their plots. And they are still obliged to have recourse to those families in which sufferings of the kind I have described have been experienced.

I have said enough now about the arrangement of the incidents in a tragedy and the type of plot it ought to have.

The Character of Tragedy

Aristotle says that, in characterization there are four things to aim at. First and foremost the characters should be good. Now character will be displayed, as I have pointed out, if some preference is revealed in speech or action, and of it is a preference for what is good the character will be good. There can be goodness in every class of person; for instance, a woman or a slave may be good, through the one is possible an inferior being and the other in general an insignificant one.

In the second place the portrayal should be appropriate. For example a character may possess manly qualities, but it is not
appropriate that a female character should be given manliness or cleverness.

Thirdly he characters should be lifelike. This is not the same thing as making hem good, or appropriate in the sense in which I have used the word.

And fourthly, they should be insistent. Even if he person who is being represented is inconsistent, and this trait is the basis of his character, he must nevertheless be portrayed as consistently inconsistent.

As an example of unnecessary badness of character, there is Menelaus in the Orstes. The character who behave in an unsuitable and inappropriate way is exemplified in Odysseus lament in th Scilla, and in Melanipp's speech. An inconsistent character in shown in Iphigenia at Aulis, for Iphigenia as a suppliant is quite unlike what she is later.

As in the arrangement of the incidents so too in characterization one must always bear in mind what will be either necessary or probable; in other words, it should be necessary or probable that such and such a person should say or do such and such a thing, and similarly that this particular incident should follow on that.

Furthermore, it is obvious that the unraveling of the plot should arise form the circumstances of the plot itself, and not be brought about ex machna, as is done in the Medea and in the episode of the embarkation in the Ilaid. The deux ex machine should be used only for
matters outside the play proper, either for things that happened before it and that can not be known by the human characters, or for things that are yet to come and that requires to be foretold prophetically- for we allow to the gods that power to see all things. However there should be noting inexplicable about what happens, or if there must be, it should be kept outside the tragedy, as is done in Sophocles’s Oedipus.

Since tragedy is representation of people who are better than the average, we must copy the good portrait- painters. These, while reproducing the distinctive apperance of their sitters and making likenesses. Paint them better- looking than they are. In he same way the poet in portraying men who are hot- tempered, or phlegmatic, or who have other defects of character, must bring out these qualities in them, and at the same time show them as decent people, as Agathon and Homer have portrayed Achilles.

These points must be carefully watched, as too must those means used to appeal to the eye, which are necessary dependent on the poet’s art; for here too it is often possible to make mistake. However, enough has said about these matters in my published works.

The Different Kinds of Discovery

Aristotle says that, I have already explained what I mean by discovery. Of the different kinds of discovery , the first is the least artist , and is mostly used from sheer lack of invention; this is discovery b
means of visible signs or tokens. These may be congenital marks, like the spearhead that the Earthborn bear, or 'stars' such as those that Carcinus uses in his Thyestes; or they may be acquired whether marks on the body such as scars, or external objects such as necklaces- or, in the Tyro the discovery by means of the cradle. However some ways of using these tokens are better than others; for example the discovery of Odysseus through his scar is made in one way by his nurse and in another way by the swineherds. These discoveries, when made merely to gain credence, are less effective, as are all types of discovery used for such intentions; better are those that are unexpected, as happens in the Washing Episode I nthe Odyssey.

The second class of discoveries are those which are manufactured by the poet, and which are inartistic for that reason. An example occurs in Iphigenia in Tauris when Orestes reveals who he is. While the identity of Iphigenia is revealed by means of the letter, Orestes himself is made to say what the poet here requires instead of its being done through the plot; and this is not far removed from the fault I spoke about a moment ago, for he might have brought some tokens as well. Another example is 'the voice of the shuttle' in Sophocles's Tereus.

A third kind is the discovery that is due to memory, when the sight of something leads to the required understanding. Thus in The Cyprians, by Dicaeogenes, Teucer bursts into tears on seeing the portrait, and in The Tale of Alcinous Odysseus also weeps when the
sound of the minstre's harp reqakens the past for him ,and this it how these two are recognized.

The fourth kind is the result of reasoning, such as is found in The Choephori;' Someone who is like me has come; no one is like me except Orestes; therefore it is Orestes who has come.' another example is what the sophist Poluidus suggests for the Iphigenia, for it is likely enough that Orestes should reason that as his sister ws sacrificed, so too it was his fate to be sacrificed. Then there is the episode I the Tydeus of Theodectes when the father has come to find his son, and realizes that he is himself to die; or that in the Phineidae where, on seeing a particular place, the women infer that they are fated to die there , for it was thee that they ha been exposed at birth.

There is also a fictitious form of discovery arising form the fallacious reasoning of the parties concerned as in Odysseus the False Messanger; he said that he would know the bow, which he had not seen; but it was false reasoning to suppose from this that he would know it again.

Of all forms of discovery, the best is that which is brought about byt theincidnet thenselves, when the startling disclosure results from events that are probable, as happens in Sophocles's Oedipus, and again in the Iphigenia- for it was quite probabale that she should wish to send off a letter. Discovery scenes of this kind are the only ones that dispense
with such artificial aids as tokens and necklaces. The next best are those that depend on reasoning.

Some Results for the Tragic Poet

Aristotle says that, in putting together his plots and working out the kind of speech to go with them, the poet should as far as possible keep the scene before his eyes. In this way seeing everything very vividly as through his eyes. In this way seeing everything very vividly as through he were himself an eyewitness of the events, he will find what is appropriate, and will be least likely to overlook inconsistencies. Evidence of this is the censer laid on Carcinus, by whom Amphiaraus was made to come out of a temple; this would have escaped notice if the episode has not been actually seen, but the audience took offence at it, and the play was not a success on the stage.

As far as possible, too, the dramatic poet should carry out the appropriate gestures as he composes his speeches, for of writers with equal abilities those who can actually make themselves feel the relevant emotions will be the most convincing agitation or rage will be most vividly reproduced by one who is himself agitated or in a passion. Hence poetry is the product either of a man of great natural ability or of one not wholly sane; the one is highly responsive, the other possessed.

As for the stories, weather he is taking over something ready-made or inventing for himself, the poet should first plan in general
outline, and then expand by working out appropriate episodes. What I mean by planning in outline may be illustrated from the Iphigenia, as follows: A young girl was offered as a sacrifice, and mysteriously disappeared from the view of their sacrifices; she was set down in another country. Where it was the custom to sacrifice strangers to goddess, and became the priestess of his rite. Some time later it happened that the priestess' brother arrived (the fact that the oracle had for a certain reason told him to go there and the porpoise of his journey are matters that lie outside the plot). On his arrival he was seized, and was about to be sacrificed, when he revealed who he was, either in the way that Euripides makes it happen or, as Polydus suggests, by making the not unnatural remark that not only his sister, it seemed, was fated to be sacrificed, but himself too; and thus he was saved.

When he has reached this stage the poet may supply the proper names and fill in the episodes, making sure that they are appropriate, like the fit of madness in Orestes which led to his capture, and his escape by the device of the purification.

In plays the episodes are of course short; in epic poetry they are what supply the requisite length. The story of the Odyssey, for example, is not a long one. A man is kept away from his home for many years; Poseidon is watching him with a jealous eye, and he is alone. The state of affairs at home is that his wealth is being squandered by his wife's suitors, and plots are being squandered by his wife's suitors, and plots being laid against his son's life. After being buffeted by many storms be
returns home and reveals his identity; he falls upon his enemies and destroys them, but preserves his own life. There you have the essential story of the Odyssey; the rest of the poem is made up of episodes.

Further rules for the Tragic Poet

Aristotle says that, every tragedy has its complication and its denouement. The complication consists of the incidents lying outside the plot, and often some of those inside it and the rest is the denouement. By complication I mean the part of the story from the beginning to the point immediately preceding the change to good or bad fortune; by denouement the part from the onset of this change to the end. In the Lynceus of Theodectes, for instance, the complication is what happened before the events of the play proper, together with the seizure of the boy and that in turn of the parents, and the denouement extends from the accusation of murder to the end.

Properly speaking, tragedies should be classed as similar or dissimilar according to their plots, that is to say, according to their similarity in complication and denouement. Many poets are skilful in complicating their plots but clumsy in unravelling them; a constant mastery of both techniques is what is required.
There are four kinds of tragedy, a number corresponding to that of the constituent parts that I spoke about. There is complex tragedy, which depends entirely on reversal and discovery; tragedy of suffering, as in the various plays on Ajax or Ixion; tragedy of character, as in The Phthiotides and the Peleus; and fourthly, spectacular tragedy, as in The Phorcides, in the Prometheus, and in plays with scenes in Hades. The poet should try to include all these elements, or, failing that, as many as possible of the most important, especially since it is the fashion nowadays to find fault with poets; just because they have been poets who excelled in the individual parts of tragedy, the critics expect that a single man should outdo each of them in his special kind of excellence.

Bearing in mind what has often been said, the dramatic poet must be careful not to give his tragedy an epic structure, by which I mean one with multiplicity of stories — as though one were to attempt a plot covering the whole story of the Iliad. By reason of its length, the Iliad can allow the proper development of its various parts, but in plays the results of such attempts are disappointing, as is proved by experience. For all the poets who have dramatized the destruction of Troy in its entirety, and not, like Euripides, only parts of it, or the whole of the story of Niobe, and not as Aeschylus did it, have either failed utterly or done badly in the dramatic competitions; and indeed even a play by Agathon was a failure for this alone. And yet in the handling of reversals and of simple plots these poets may succeed wonderfully in getting the effect they want, that is, one which is tragic and appeals to our humanity. This happens when the clever man who is also wicked is
outwitted, as Sisyplus was, or when the braveman who is also unscrupulous is worsted; and this is a likely enough result, as Agathon points out, for it is quite that many things should happen contrary to likelihood.

The Chorus should be regarded as one of the actors; it should be a part of the whole, and should assume a share in the action, as happens in Sophocles, but not in Euripides. With other playwrights the choral songs may have no more to do with the plot in hand has with any other tragedy; they are mere choral interludes, according to the practice first introduced by Agathon. But what difference is there between the singing of interpolated songs like these and the transference of a speech or a whole episode from one play to another?

Thought and Diction

Aristotle Says that, now that the other parts of tragedy have been dealt with, it remains to say something about diction and thought. As far as thought is concerned, enough has been said about it in my treatise on rhetoric, for it more properly belongs to that study. Thought includes all the effect that have to produced by means of language; among these are proof and refutation, the awakening of emotions such as pity, fear, anger, and the like, and also exaggeration and depreciation. It is clear, too, that in the action of the play the same principles should be observed whenever it is necessary to produce effects of pity or terror, or of greatness or probability- with this difference, however, that here the
effect must be made without verbal explanation, while the other are produced by means of language coming from the lips of a speakers, and are dependent on the use of language. For where would be the need of a speakers if the required effects could be conveyed without the use of language?

Some Linguistic Definitions

Aristotle says that, language in general is made up of the following parts: the letter, the syllable, the connecting word, the article, the noun, the verb, the inflexions or case, and the prase or proposition.

A letter in an indivisible sound, not just any such sound, but one from which intelligible language may be produced; animal also, it is true, utter indivisible sounds, but none that I should describe as a letter. The different sounds, but none that I should describe as a letter. The different forms of this sound are the vowel, the semi-vowel, and the mute letter or consonant. A vowel is a letter which has an audible sound without any contact between two of the organs of speech. A semivowel (S or R, for instance) is given audible sound by such a contact. A mute is a letter which even with such contact as no sound of its own, but which becomes audible when combined with letters which possess sound; examples are G and D. The letters differ in sound according to their length or shortness; according as they have an acute, a grave, or a circumflex accent. However, the detailed study of these matters is the province of the metrist.
A syllable is a sound-unit without meaning, made up of a mute and a sounded letter; for GR without an A is as much a syllable the concern of metrical theory.

A connecting - word is a sound-unit without significance which neither hinders nor helped the production of a single significant utterance form the combination of several sounds, and which should not be put at the beginning of a phrase standing by itself; example are; Alternatively it is a sound without significance capable of producing a single significant utterance form the combination of several sounds which are the,mselves significant; example are and similar aords.

An article is a sound without significance which indicates the beginning or the end of a speech, or a dividing-point in it, and its natural position is at either end or in the middle.

A noun is a composite of sounds with a meaning ; it is independent of time, and none of its individual parts has a meaning in its own right. For in compounds we do not give separate meanings to the parts; in the name ‘Theodore’, for instance, the ‘dore’ part has in itself no meaning.

A verb is a composite of sounds with a meaning; it is concerned with time, and as, was the case with nouns, none of its individual parts has a meaning in its own right. The words ‘man’ and ‘white’ give no
indication of time, but 'walks' and 'ahs walked' indicate respectively present and past time.

Case or inflexion in a noun or verb is that which gives the sense of 'of' or 'to' a thing, and the like, or indicates whether it relates to one or many, as with 'amn' and 'men'. Alternatively it may signify types of intonation, as in question or command; 'walked?' and 'walk' represent verbal inflexions of this kind.

A phrase proposition is a composite of sounds with a meaning, and some parts of it have a meaning of their own. Not every proposition is made up of verbs and nouns; the definition of a man, for example; it is possible for a proposition to exist without verbs, and yet some part of it will always have a meaning of its own, as 'Cleon' has in the proposition 'cleon' walks'. A proposition may represent unity in one of two ways, either in that it implies one thing, or in that it achieves unity by a conjunction of several factors; the unity of the Iliad, for example, results from such a conjunction, that of the definition of man form its signifying one thing.

Poetic Diction
Aristotle says that, nouns may be classified as simple, by which I mean those made up of elements which individually have no meaning, like the word 'earth', or as double or compound. These compounds may take the form either of a part which has a meaning combined with one which has no meaning, although within the compound no part has a separate meaning, or of parts which all have meanings. A noun may be triple or quadruple or multiple in form, like many of our more grandiose names, for example, Hormocalcuths.

Every noun is either a word in current use or a foreign loanword, a metaphor or an ornamental word, a poetic coinage or a word that has been expanded or abbreviated or otherwise altered.

By a word in current use I mean a word that everybody uses, and by a loan word one that other people use. Obviously the same word can be both current and loan word, though not in relation to the same people; to the Cypriots, for example, sigunon is the current word for a spear, but to us it is a loan-word.

Metaphor is the application to one thing of a name belonging to another thing; the transference may be from the genus, or from one species to another or it may be a matter of analogy. As an example of transference from genus to species I give 'Here lies my ship', for lying at anchor is a species of lying. Transference from species to genus is seen in 'Odysseus has indeed performed ten thousand noble deeds', for 'ten thousand', which is a particular large number, is used here instead of the
word many. Transference from one species to another is seen in ‘Draining off the life with the bronze and Servig with the unyielding bronze’; here draining off is used for servering and severing for draining off, and both are species of taking away.

I explain metaphor by analogy as what may happen when of four things the second stands in the same relationship to the first as the fourth to the third; for then one many speak of the fourth instead of the second, and the second instead of the forth. And sometimes people will add to the metaphor a qualification appropriate to the term which has been replaced. Thus, for example, a cup stands in the same relationship to Dionysus as a shield to Ares, and one may therefore call the cup Dionysus as a shield to Ares, and one may therefore call the cup Dionysus;’s shield and the shielsd Arca’s cup. Or again, or age is to fofe as evening is to day, and so one may call the evening the old age of the duya, or name I is Empedocles named it; and one may call old age the evening of life or the sunset of life. In some cases there is no name for some of the terms of the analogy, but the metaphor can be used just the same. For example, to scatter corn is called sowing, but there is no word for the sun’s scattering of its flame; however, this stands in the same relationship to sunlight as sowing, nuty there is no word for the sun’s scattering of its flame; however , this stands in the same relationship to sunlight as sowing does to corn, and hence the expression, sowing his god-created flame’. 

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This kind of metaphor can also be used in another way; having called an object by the name of something else, one can deny it one of its attributes - for example, call all the shield, not Ares's cup, but wineless cup.

A poetic coinage is a word which has not been in use among a people, but has been invented by the poet himself. There seem to be words of this kind, such as 'sprouters' for horns, and 'supplicator;' for priest.

A word is expanded when it uses a longer vowel than is normal to it or takes on an extra syllable, and it is abbreviated when some part of it has been removed, examples of expansion are of the nouns themselves some are masculine, some feminine and some neuter. Masculine are all that end in N(n), P( r ), and (s), and in the compounds o, that is, the two letters (ps) and (x). Feminine are all those ending in the vowels that are always long, such as H(e) and (o), and in A among the vowels which may be lengthened, thus there are equal numbers of masculine and feminine endings for and are equivalent to, no noun ends in a mute consonant or in a short vowel. Only three end in I: (honey), (gum), and (pepper); and five end in (u). The neuters may end in the vowels, and in N(n), P( r ), and (s).
Aristotle says that, the greatest virtue of diction is to be clear without being commonplace. The clearest diction is that which consists of words in everyday use, but this is commonplace, as can be seen in the poetry of Cleophon and Sthenelus. On the other hand, a diction abounding in unfamiliar usages has dignity, and is raised above the everyday level. By unfamiliar usage I mean loan-words, metaphors, expanded forms, and anything else that is out of the ordinary. However the exclusive use of forms of this kind would result either in a riddle or in barbarism- a riddle if they were all metaphorical, barbarism if they were all impossible combination of language. This cannot be done by a mere succession of ordinary terms, but it can by the use of metaphors, as in the riddle, 'I saw a man welding bronze on another man with fire and similar examples In the same way, the use of importations leads to barbarism. What is indeed, then is some mixture to these various elements. For the one kind will prevent the language for being mean and commonplace, that the other figures I have described, while the everyday words give the necessary clarity.

Among the most effective means of achieving both clarity of diction and a certain dignity is the use of expanded, abbreviated, and altered forms of words; the unfamiliarity due tothis deviation from normal usage will raise the diction above the commonplace, while the retention of some part of the normal forms will make for clarity. It is nor good criticism, therefore, to censure this type of language and to ridicule the poet for using it, as the elder Eucleides did when he said that it
would be easy to write poetry if one were allowed to lengthen syllables whenever one liked, and when he burlesqued this style in the lines.

The too obvious use of these ticks, then is ridiculos; moderation is necessary in all kinds of writing alike. The same effect would be produced by anyone using metaphors, unfamiliar loan-words and other such devices ineptly and for the mere sake of raising a laugh. How great a difference is made by their being used properly may be seen ineptic poetry if one replaces them with ordinary everyday words in the verse; any one substituting common words for he unfamiliar words of for the metaphors and other devices mentioned would see the truth of what I am saying. For instance, aeschylus and Euripides wrote the same line of iambic, with the change only of a single word; an unfamiliar word was substituted for an ordinary one, and the new line is beautiful where the old was commo place. This was the line as Aeschylus wrote it in his Philoctetes:

The again Ariphrades ridiculed the tragedies for using expressions that no one would use in ordinary speech, such as from the houses away instead of away form the houses and thine and married. By the very fact of not being normal idiom, all such usage as these raise the diction above the level of the commonplace; but Ariphrades failed to see this.

It is fine thing to be able to make roer use of all the devises I have mentioned, as also of compound words and unfamiliar importations, but far the most important thing to master is the use of
metaphor. This is the one thing that cannot be learnt from anyone else, and it is the mark of great natural ability, for the ability to use metaphor well implies a perception of resemblance.

Of the different types of words, compound forms are best suited to dithyrambs, unfamiliar borrowing to heroic verse, and metaphorical usage to iambic verse. All these may, indeed, be fittingly used in heroic verse; but in iambic verse, which as far as possible models itself on speech, the only appropriate terms are those that anyone might use in speeches, and these are words in current use, metaphors, and ornamental words.

I need say no more now about tragedy and the art of representation by means of action.

Epic Poetry

Aristotle says that, as for the art of representation in the form of narrative verse, clearly its plots should be dramatically constructed, like those of tragedies; they should centre upon a single action, whole and complete, and having a beginning, a middle, and an end, so that like a single complete organism the poem may produce its own special kind of
pleasure. Nor should epics be constructed like the common run of histories, in which it is not the exposition of a single action that is required, but of a single period, and of everything that happened to one or more persons during this period, however unrelated the various events may have been. For just as the sea-battle at Salamis and the engagement with the Carthaginians in Sicily took place at the same time, but did not work towards the same end, so too in any sequence of time events may follow one another without producing any one single result. Yet most of our poets use the methods of the historian.

In this respect, too, Homer seems, as I have already described him, divinely inspired beyond all other poets, in that, although the Trojan War had a beginning and an end, he did not attempt to put the whole of it into his poem; it would have been too large a subject to be taken is all at once, and, if he had limited its length, the diversity of its incident would have made it too complicated. As it is, he has selected one part of the story, and has introduced many incidents from other parts as episodes, such as the Catalogue of Ships and other episodes with which he gives variety to the poem. Other epic poets write about one man, or a single period of time, or a single action made up of many separate incidents; among such poets are the authors of the Cypria and The Little Iliad. Thus, while only one tragedy could be made out of the Iliad or the Odyssey, several might be made out of the Cypria, and more than eight out of The Little Iliad: an Award of the Arm, a Philoctetcs, a Neoptolemus, an Eurypylus, an Odysseus the Beggar, a Laconian
Women, a Sack of Troy, and Departure of the Fleet, not to mention a Sinon and Trojan Women.

Epic Poetry (Continued)

Aristotle says that, further more, epic poetry must divide into the same types as tragedy, that is, the simple, the complex, that which turns on character, and that which turns of suffering. With the exception of song and spectacle, its constituent must also be the same, for it needs reversals and discoveries and tragic incidents, and moreover the thought and diction must be of good quality. All these thins Homer was the first to use, and he did so with skill. Of his two poems the one, the Iliad, is simple is structure and story of suffering, the other, the Odyssey, is complex (for it has discovery scenes throughout) and turns on character; moreover, they surpass all other poems in diction and in quality of thought.

Epic differs from tragedy both in the length of the composition and in the metre used. The limitations as to length tat have already been indicated will suffice; that is to say, it must be possible for the beginning and the end to be embraced within a single view and this will be the case of the poems are shorter than the ancient epics, but stretch to the length of a group of tragedies offered at a single hearing. It is the special advantage of epic that it may be of considerable length. In tragedy it is not possible to represent several parts of the story as taking place simultaneously, but only the part that is actually being performed on the stage by the actors; epic poetry, on the other hand, being narrative, is

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able to represent many incidents that are being simultaneously enacted, and, provided they are relevant, they increase the weight of the weight of the poem, and give it the merits of grandeur, variety of interest, and diversity in its episodes. Monotony will soon bore an audience and ruin the effect of a tragedy on the stage.

Experience has shown that the heroic hexameter is the right metre for epic. If anyone were to write a narrative poem in some other metre, or in a variety of metres, the incongruity would be glaring, for of all metres, and heroic hexameter has the greatest weight and stability, which enables it most readily to admit unfamiliar borrowings and metaphorical usages; and in this respect, too, the narrative from of movement, the latter being a dancing measure, while the former lends itself to the dramatic representation of action. However, it would be even more out of place to mix several metres, as Chaeremon did. And so on one has ever written a poem on the grand scale in any other the heroic measure; as I have said, nature herself teaches us to choose the right metre for our purposes.

Admirable as he is in so many other respects, Homer is especially so in this: he is the only poet who recognizes what part he himself ought to play in his poems. The poet should speak as little as possible in his own person, for it is not in that way that he represents actions. Other poets appear in their own character throughout their poems, and little of what they write is impersonal representation. But after a few prefatory words, Homer at once introduces a man, a woman, or some other
person, no one of them lacking is character but each with distinctive characteristics.

The marvellous should of course be represented in tragedy, but epic poetry, where the persons acting the story are not before our eyes, may include more of the inexplicable, which is the chief element in the marvellous. If it were brought on to the stage there would be something ridiculous about the pursuit of Hector, with the Greeks merely standing there instead of pursuing him, and Achilles restraining them with a shake of the head; in the poem the absurdity is not apparent. The marvellous is a source of pleasure, as is shown by the fact that in passing on a piece of news everyone will add something of his own as an agreeable extra.

Above all, Homer has taught other poets how to tell untruths as they ought to be told, that is, by the use of fallacy. If one thing exists because another exists, or happens because this other happens, people think that, if the consequent exists or happens, the antecedent will also exists; but this is not the case. Thus if a proposition were untrue, but there was something else which must be true or must happen if the proposition were true, then it is this something else that we should lay down as a fact; for the mind, knowing it to be true, may fallaciously infer the truth of the original proposition. There is an example of this in the episode of the Washing in the Odyssey. Probable impossibilities are to be preferred to improbable possibilities. Stories should not be mad up of irrational incidents; anything irrational should as far as possible be excluded, or if not, at least kept out of the tale proper. Like Oedipus's not
knowing how Laius died; not admitted into the play, as in the Electra we have the messenger’s report of the Pythian Games, or in the Mystans the business of the man’s coming from Tegea to Mysia without speaking. To say that otherwise the plot would have been spoilt is ridiculous; plots like these should not be devised in the first instance, but if a poet does employ such a plot and it appears that it could have been worked out more reasonably, then his endeavour is entirely misplaced. Even in the Odyssey the irrational elements in the episode of Odysseus’s being set ashore in Ithace would obviously not have been acceptable if they had been treated by an inferior poet; as it is, Homer has managed to disguise their absurdity, charming it away by this other excellences.

The diction should be elaborated only in ‘neutra;’ sections, that is, passages where neither character nor thought is in question, for diction that is too brilliant may obscure the presentation of character and thought.

Critical Objections and their Answers

Aristotle says that, the way to get a clear idea of the various critical problems — their number, their nature, and the solutions to be offered — is to look at them as follows. Like the painter or any other artist, the poet aims at the representation of life; necessarily, therefore, he must always represent things in one of three ways: either as they were or are, or as they are said to be seem to be, or as they ought to be. His medium is language, with the possible admixture of unfamiliar
terms and metaphors and the various other modification of language the
we allow to poets. We must remember, too, that there are not the same
standards of correctness in poetry as in political theory or any other art.
In poetry there are two kinds of fault, the one kind essential, the other
incidental. If the poet has undertaken to represent some particular fact,
and has gone astray through sheer lack of skill, that is an essential fault.
But if his error lies in what he sets out to do, if for instance forward,
then that is an error in some special branch of knowledge (it could
perhaps be medicine or some other technical subject); or alternatively
impossibilities of some other kind may have been depicted, but no
essential fault is involving. These then are the points to be considered
in resolving problems of criticism.

Taking first problems relating to the essentials of the poetic art: if
the poet has depicted something impossible, he is at fault indeed, but he
is justified in doing it if it is doing it as long as the art attains its true end, as
I have described it. That is, as long as it makes this or some other part of
the poem more striking. The pursuit of Hector is a case in point. If,
however, this end could have been achieved just as well, or better, by
conforming to the requirements of the art, then there is no justification
for the fault, for if possible a poem should be entirely free of faults.
Then again, which of the two kinds of fault is actually in question, one
that concerns the essentials of the poetic art or one that is merely
incidental? It is a less serious fault not to know that a female deer has
no horns than to make an unrecognizable picture of one.
Suppose next that a description is criticized as not being true. The answer might be, 'No, but it ought to be like that'—just as Sophocles said that he drew men as they ought to be, whereas Euripides drew them as they are. However, if neither of these claims fits the case, then an appeal might be made to tradition, as for example with the tales about the gods. Now it is possible that these tales are neither true nor improve on the truth, but are what Xenophanes said of them; nevertheless they are in accordance with tradition. In other cases the answer might be, not that it is better than truth, but that it represents things as they used to be—for instance in the matter of the spears: 'Their spears stood upright on their but ends'; for that was then the custom, as it still is among the Illyrians.

In deciding whether something that has been said or done is morally good or bad, not only should we pay regard to the goodness or badness of the saying or deed itself, but we should also taken into account the persons by whom and to whom it was said or done, the occasion, the means, and the reason—whether, for example, to bring about a greater good, or to avert a greater evil.

Some criticism may be answered by examining the diction; an example is the rare word in , where it is possible that by Homer means 'sentinels', not 'mules'. The there is Dolon, ('who indeed was evil of form'); here in reference is perhaps not to his deformed body but to his ugly face, for the Cretans use ('fair-formed') with the sense of ('fair-faced'). Then again, ('stronger mix the wine') may mean 'more
quickly mix the wine', and not have the sense of 'unmixed', as though for drunkards. Other expressions are metaphorical. For example, in Homer's words, bearing in mind that he also says, the word ('all') is metaphorically used instead of ('many'), ('all') is a species of ('much'). So too ('alone without a share') is metaphorical, for the best-known representative is reference to as the only one.

Again, the solution of the difficulty may be a matter of how to read a word, as with the changes of Hippias of Thasos is ('and we grant him') and ('part of which rots in the rain'); or again of word-grouping, as in Empedocles; or of ambiguous; or, finally, of normal linguistic usage—wine mixed with water, for example, is normally called wine, and so one finds the phrase 'a greave of newly-wrought tin' and workers of metal are called blacksmiths, and so too Ganymede is said to pour wine for Zeus, although the gods do not drink wine. But this may perhaps be explained as a metaphorical usage. Whenever a word seems to involve some inconsistency of meaning, we ought to consider in how ways it may be interpreted in the context—in, for example, ('there the brazen spear was stopped'), how many ways there are of taking 'there... was stopped. We should think how best we shall avoid the fault described by Glaucon when he says that critics make unreasonable presuppositions, and go on to draw conclusion from their own adverse comments on the poet; if his words conflict with the conclusions they have thus reached, they censure him as though he had actually said what they ascribe to him. This is what has happened in the case of Icarius. Some critics believe that he was a Spartan, and therefore think it strange that Telemachus should not have met him when he went to Sparta. But
the truth of the matter may be, as the Cephalenians say, that Odysseus married in their country, and that the name was Icadius, not Icarius. Thus it is probably through a mistake that this particular difficulty has arisen.

Generally speaking, then, the 'impossible' has to be justified on grounds either of poetic effect, or of an attempt to improve on reality, or of accepted tradition. As far as poetic effect is concerned, a convincing impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility. Even though it is impossible that there should be such people as Zeuxis used to paint, yet it would be better if there were, for the ideal type ought to be surpassingly good.

Accepted tradition may justify the use of the irrational, as may the plea that there are times when it is not irrational, for it is probable enough that things should happen contrary to probability. Verbal inconsistencies should be examined in the same way as refutations in dialectical exercise in order to see whether the poet means the same significance as you mean yourself, before you blame him for contradiction either what he has himself said or what an intelligent men would assume to be true. However, irrationality and depravity are rightly censured when there is no need for them and they are not properly used, as no good use is made of the irrationality in Euripides's introduction of Ageus in the Medea, or of the depravity of Menelaus in the Orestes.
There are, then, five grounds on which a passage may be censured: that it is impossible, irrational, immoral, inconsistent, or technically at fault. And the answers are to be studied in the light of the twelve criteria that I have already enumerated.

**Epic and Tragedy Compared**

Aristotle says that, it may be asked which of the way forms of representation is the better, the epic or the tragic. If the better form is the less vulgar, and the less vulgar is always that which is designed to appeal to the better type of audience, then it is obvious that the form that appeals to everybody is extremely vulgar. And indeed, as though you will not see them unless they thrust themselves on your notice, performers are apt to go in for a great deal of unnecessary movement; bad flute-players, for instance, throw themselves about if they have to represent throwing a discus, and keep pulling at the leader of the Chorus if they are performing 'Scylla'. This is what tragedy is like, we are told; it corresponds with what the older actors thought of their successors—Mynniscus used to call Callipides 'the Ape' on the grounds that he overacted grossly, and then, stands in the same relationship to the epic as these more recent actors do to the earlier. Thus epic is said to appeal to cultivated readers who do not need need the help of visible forms, while tragedy appeals to meaner mends. If then it is a vulgar art, it is obviously inferior to epic.
Now in the first place, this way of arguing is a criticism of acting, not of poetry, for it is also possible for a bard to exaggerate, not gestures while reciting, as Sosistratus used to do, and for a singer too, like Mnasitheus the Opuntian. No more than every kind of dancing is every kind of movement to be rejected, but only that of the meaner types of people; Callipides was subjected to the same criticism that is levelled against some modern actors, that is, they cannot act the parts of respectable women. For another thing, tragedy fulfills its own special function even without the help of action, and in just the same way as epic, for its quality can be seen from reading it. So that if tragedy is in other respects the higher of the two arts, this disadvantage is not necessarily inherent in it.

In the second place, tragedy has everything that epic has, and it can even use the epic measure; and as a not inconsiderable addition, it offers scenic effects and music, the source of a distinct feeling of pleasure. Then the effect is as vivid when a play is read as when it is acted. Moreover, this form of imitation achieves its ends in shorter compass, and what is more compact gives more pleasure than what is extended over a long period. Just imagine the Oedipus of Sophocles spread out over as many lines as there are in the Iliad. Then there is less unity in the imitation of the epic poets, as is shown by the fact that any one work of this kind contains matter for several tragedies, so that, if these poets deal with a single plot, either it will appear truncated if it is briefly set out, or it will give the impression of being watered down if it observes the usual length of such poems; I mean one composed of
several actions, such as the Iliad or the Odyssey, which have many parts, and each of a certain amplitude – and yet these poems are constructed as well as they could be, and each is, as far as this is possible, the representation of a single action.

If, therefore, tragedy is superior to epic in all these respects, and also in fulfilling its artistic function—for these forms of art ought to give, not just any kind of pleasure, but the kinds I have described—then obviously, in achieving its ends better than epic, it must be the better form of art.

This is all I have to say about tragedy and epic poetry, whether in general terms or in relation to their various forms and constituent parts; about the number and the characteristic of these parts; about the causes of their success or failure; and about the various critical problems and their solution.
2. LONGINUS

On the Sublime

INTRODUCTION

Cecilius's Treatise and Its Shortcoming.

As you will remember, my dear Postumius Terentians, when we were working together on Cecilius's little treatise on the sublime, it seemed to us too trivial a handling of the subjects as a whole; it showed no grasp of the main points, and offered its readers little of the practical help that it should be the writer's main objects to supply. In any systematic treatise two things are essential First there must be some definition of the subject; second in order of treatment, but of greater importance, there must be some indication of the methods by which we may ourselves reach the desired goal. Now Cecilius, assuming us to be ignorant, sets out to establish the nature of the sublime by means of innumerable example; but he leaves out of account, apparently considering it unnecessary the means by which we may be enabled to raise our faculties to the proper pitch of grandeur. However, we ought perhaps rather to praise him for the industry he has shown in carrying out his purpose than find fault with him for his deficiencies.
First Thought on Sublimity

Longinus says that, since you have urged me in my turn to write down my thoughts on the sublime for your gratification, we should consider whether my views contain anything of value to men in public life. And as your nature and your sense of fitness prompt you, my dear friend, you will help me to form the truest possible judgement on the various details; for it was a sound answer that was given by the man who, when asked what we have in common with the gods, replied, 'Benevolence and truth'.

As I am writing for you, Terentianus, who are a man of some erudition, I almost feel that I can dispense with a long preamble showing that sublimity consists in a certain excellnce and distinction in expression, and that it is from this source alone that the greatest poets and historians have acquired their preeminece and wo for themselves an enternity of fame. For the effect of elevated language is, not to persuade the hearers, but to entrance them; and at all times, and in every way, what transports us wth wonder is more telling than what merely persuades or gratifies us. The extent to which we can be persuaded is usually under our own control, but these merely persuades or gratifies us . The extent to which we can be persuaded is usually is under our own ocntrol, but these sublime passages exert an irresistible force and mastery, and get the upper hand with every hearer. Invective skill and the proper order and disposition of amterial are not manifested in a good touch here and there , but reveal themselves by slow degrees as they run
through the whole texture of the composition; on the other hand a well-timed stroke of sublimity scatters everything before it like a thunderbolt and in a flash reveals the full power of the speaker. But I should think, my dear Terentianus, that you could develop these points and other of the same kind from your own experience.

Is There an Art of The Sublime?

Longinus says that, before going any farther, I must take up the question whether there is such a thing as an art of sublime or profundity, for some people think that those who relate matters of this kind to a set of artistic precepts are on a completely wrong track. Genius, they say, is innate; it is not something that can be learnt, and nature is the only art that begets it. Works of natural genius are spoilt, they believe, are indeed utterly based when they are reduced to the bare bones of rules and systems. However I suggest that there is a case for the opposite point of view when it is considered that, although nature is in the main subject only to her own laws where sublime feelings are concerned she is not given to acting at random and wholly without system. Nature is the first cause and the fundamental creative principle the degree and the right moment for each and to lay down the clearest rules for use and practice. Furthermore sublime impulses are exposed to greater dangers when they are left to themselves without the smallest and stability of knowledge; they need the curb as often as the spur.

Speaking of the life of mankind as a whole demons these declares that the greatest of all blessings is good fortune and that next to
it comes good counsel, which however is no less important since its absence leads to the complete destruction of what good fortune brings. Applying this to diction we might say that nature fills the place of good fortune and art that of good counsel. Most important we must remember that the very fact that certain linguistic effect derives from nature alone cannot be learnt from other source than art. If then the critic who censures those who want learn this art would take these points into consideration he would no longer, I imagine regard the study of the point I am treating as superfluous and unprofitable.

Defects that Militate against Sublimity

.... Quell they the oven's far flung splendour glow!
Ha, let me but one heart abider mark-
One flame wreath torrent-like I'll whirl on high
I'll burn the roof to cinders shrivel it! -
Nay, now my chant is not of noble strain.

Longinus says that, such things as this are not tragic but pseudo-tragic the flame wreaths the vomiting forth to heaven the representation of Boreas as a flute player and all the rest. They are turbid in expression, and the imagery is confused rather than suggestive of terror; each phrase when examined in the light of da sinks gradually form the terrible to the contemptible.
Now even in tragedy which by its very nature is majestic and admits of some bombast, misplaced tumidity is unpardonable; still less, I think would it be appropriate to factual narration. This is why people laugh at Gorgias of Leontini when he enunciates of ‘Xerxes the Zeus of the Persians’, or of ‘vultures animated sepulchres’. Similarly certain expressions of Callisthenes are ridiculed as being high flown and not sublime still more are some of Cleitarchus— a frivolous fellow who in the words of Sophocles blow on wrecked pipes without control of breath. Such effect will found also in Amphicrates and Hegesias and Matris they believe themselves to be inspired are not really carried away but are merely being puerile.

Tumidity seems on the whole to be one of the most difficult faults to guard against. For somehow or rather all those who aim at grandeur in the hope of escaping the charge of feebleness and aridity fall naturally into this very fault putting their trust in the maxim that to fall short of a great aim is at any rate a noble failure’. As in the human body so also in diction swellings are bad things mere flabby insincerity that will probably produce an effect opposite to that intended; for as they say there is nothing drier than a man with dropsy.

Tumidity then arises from the desires to outdo the sublime. Puerility on the other hand, is the complete antithesis of grandeur for it is entirely low and mean spirited, and is indeed the most ignorable of faults. When then is puerility? It is not surely a thought which is pedantically elaborated until it tails off into unusual and well wrought
effects, and above all for attractiveness, and instead into tawdriness and affectation.

Related to this there is a third type of fault in impassioned writing which Theodorus called paranthyrsus, or false sentiment. This is misplaced hollow emotionalism where emotion is not called for or immoderate passion where restraint is what is needed. For writers are often carried away as though by drunkenness, into outbursts of emotion which are not relevant to the matter in hand, but are wholly personal, and hence tedious. To hearers unaffected by this emotionalism their work therefore seems atrocious, and naturally enough, for while they are themselves in an ecstasy, their hearers are not. However I am leaving this matter of the emotions of treatment in another place.

Frigidity

Of the second fault I mentioned that is frigidity there are plenty of examples in Timaeus in other respects a writer of some ability and not incapable of occasional grandeur a man indeed of much learning and inventives. However while he was very fond of criticizing the failing of others he remained blind to his own and his passion for continually embarking upon odd conceits often led passion for continually embarking upon odd conceits often led him into the most trifling puerilities. I shall give you only one or two examples from this author since Cecilius has anticipated me with most of them. In his eulogy of Alexander the Great he says of him that he gained possession of the
whole of Asia in fewer years than Isocrates took to write his Panegyric advocating war against the Persians. How remarkable is this comparison of the great Macedonian with the rhetorician! For it is obvious that Timaeus that seen in this light the Spartans were far inferior in prowess to whereas he took no more than ten over the conquest of Messene whereas he took no more than ten over the composition of this Panegyric. Then look at the way in which he speaks of the Athenians captured in Sicily: 'They had behaved sacrilegiously towards Hermes and mutilated status of him and it was for this reason that they were punished very largely through the efforts of a single man, Hermocrates the son of Hermon, who on his father's side was descended from the outraged god.' I am surprised my dear Terentianus that he does not write of the tyrant Dionysius that 'having been guilty of impious conduct towards Zeus and Heracles he was therefore deprived of his sovereignty by Dion and Heracleides.

But why speak of Timaeus when even such demigods as Xenophon and Plato trained as they were in the school of Socrates forget themselves at times for the sake of such trivial effects? In his Constitution of Sparta Xenophon writes: 'In fact you would hear their voices less easily than those of marble statues, and would turn aside their gaze less easily than those of bronze figures; and you would think them more modest even than the maidens in their eyes.' It would have been more characteristic of Amphicrates than Xenophon to speak of the pupils of our eyes as modest maidens. And good heavens, to ask us to believe that every single one of them had modest eyes, when it is said
that the shamelessness of people is revealed in nothing so much as in
their eyes! 'You drunken sot with the eyes of a dog,' as the saying
goes. However, Timaeus could not let Xenophon keep even this frigid
conceit to himself, but laid his thieving hands on it. At all events,
speaking of Agathocles, and how he abducted his cousin from the
unveiling ceremony when she had been given in marriage to another
man, he ask, 'Who would have done this if he had not had strumpets in
his eyes instead of madien's?'

As for the otherwise divini Plato, he says, when he means merely
wooden tablets. 'They will inscribe memorials of cypress-wood and
place them in the temples; and again, 'With regards to walls, Megillus, I
would agree with sparta that the walls be allowed to remain lying asleep
in the ground, and not rise again.' And Herodutus's phrase for beautiful
women, when he calls them 'tortures for the eyes,' is not much better.
However, Herodotus can in some measure be defended, for it is
barbarians who use this phrase in his book, and they in their cups. All
the same, it is not proper to put low terms into the mouths even of such
people as these, and thereby lay oneself open to the censure of later
ages.

The Origins of Literary Impropriety

Longinus says that, all these ignoble qualities in literature arise
from one cause from that passion for novel ideas which is the dominant
craze among the writers of today; for our faults spring, for the most part,
from very much the same sources as our virtues. Thus while a fine style, sublime conceptions, yes, and happy urns of phrase, too, all contribute towards effective composition, yet these very factors are the foundation and origin, not only of success, but also of its opposite. Something of the kind applies also to variations in manner, to hyperbole, and to the idiomatic plural, and I shall show later the dangers which these devices seem to involve. At the moment I must cast about and make some suggestions how we may avoid the defects that are so closely bound up with the achievement of the sublime.

Criticism and the Sublime

Longinus says that, the way to do this, my friend, is first of all to get a clear understanding and appreciation of what constitutes the true sublime. This, however, is no easy undertaking, for the ability to judge literature is the crowning achievement of long experience. Nevertheless, if I am to speak by way of precept, we can perhaps learn discrimination in these matters from some such considerations as those which follow.

The True Sublime

Longinus says that, it must be understood, my dear friend, that as in everyday life nothing is great which it is considered great to despise, so is it with the sublime. Thus riches, honours, reputation, sovereignty, and all the other things which possess in marked degree the external
trappings of a showy splendour, would not seem to a sensible man to be great blessings, since contempt for them is itself regarded as a considerable virtue; and indeed people admire those who possess them less than those who could have them but are high-minded enough to despise them. In the same way we must consider, with regard to the grand style in poetry and literature generally, whether certain passages do not simply give an impression of grandeur by means of much adornment indiscriminately applied, being shown up as mere bombast when these are stripped away - passages which it would be more noble to despise than to admire. For by some innate power the true sublime uplifts our souls; we are filled with a round extern and sense of vaunting joy, just as though we had ourselves produced what we had heard.

If an intelligent and well-read man can hear a passage several grandeur or leave more food for reflection in his mind than the mere words convey, but with ling and careful examination loses fiore and more of its effectiveness, then cannot be an example of true sublimity - certainly not unless it can stand up to repeat examination, and if it is difficult, or rather impossible to resist its appeal, and it remains firmly and ineffaceable in the memory. As a generalization, you may take it that sublimity in all its truth and beauty exists in such works as please all men at all times. For when men who differ in their pursuits, their ways of life, their ambitions, their ages, and their languages all think in one and same way about the same works, then the in one and the same way about the same works, then the unanimous judgement, as it were, of
men who have so little in common induces a strong and unshakable faith in the object of admiration.

Five Sources of Sublimity

Longinus says that, it may be said that there are five particularly fruitful sources of the grand style, and beneath these five there lies as a common foundation the command of language, without which nothing worth while can be done. The first and most important is the ability to form grand conceptions, as I have explained in my commentary on Xenophon. Second comes the stimulus of powerful and inspired emotion. These two elements of the sublime are very largely innate, while the remainder are the product of art - that is, the proper formation of the two types of figure, figures of thought and figures of speech, together with the creation of noble diction, which in its turn may be resolved into the choice of words, the use of imagery, and the elaboration of the style. The fifth source of grandeur, which embraces all those I have already mentioned, is the total effect resulting from dignity and elevation.

We must consider, then what is involved under each of these heads, with a preliminary reminder that Cecilius has left out of account some of the five divisions, one of them obviously being that which relates to emotion. Now if he thought that these two things sublimity and emotion, were the same thing, and that they were essentially bound upon other, he is mistaken. For some emotions can be found that are
mean and not in the least sublime, such as pity, grief, and fear; and the other hand many sublime passages convey no emotion, such as, among countless examples, the poet's daring lines about the Aloadae:

Keenly they strove to set Ossa upon Olympus, and upon Ossa the forest-clad Pelion, that they might mount up to heaven; and the still greater conception that follows: And this would they head accomplished.

With the orators, again, their eulogies, ceremonial addresses, and occasional speeches contain touches of majesty and grandeur at every point, but as a rule lack emotion; thus emotional speakers are the least effective eulogists, while on the other hand, those who excel as panegyrists avoid emotionalism. But if Cecilius believed that emotion contributes nothing as all of the sublime, and for this reason considered it not worth mentioning, once again he was making a very serious mistake; for I would confidently maintain that nothing contributes so decisively to the grand style as a noble emotion in the right setting, when it forces its way to the surface in a gust of frenzy, and breathes a kind of divine inspirit into the speaker's words.

Nobility of Soul

Longinus says that, now since the first of these factors, that is to say nobility of could, plays the most imp. Part of them all, here, even though it is a gift rather than an acquired characteristic, we should do all
we can to train our minds towards the production of grand ideas, perpetually impregnating them, so to speak, with a noble inspiration. By what means, you will ask, is this to be done? Well, I have written elsewhere to this effect: 'Sublimity is the echo of a noble mind.' Thus, even without being spoken, a simple idea will sometimes of this own accord excite admiration by reason of the greatness of mind that it expresses; for example, the silence of Ajax in 'The Calling Up of the Spirits' is grand, more sublime than any words.

First, then it is absolutely necessary to indicate the source of this power, and to show that the truly eloquent man must have a mind that is not mean or ignoble. For it is not possible that those who throughout their lives have feeble and servile thoughts and aims should strike out anything that is remarkable, anything that is worthy of an immortality of fame; no, greatness of speech is the province of those whose thoughts are deep, and stately expressions come naturally to the most high-minded of men. Alexander's reply to Parmenio when he said, 'I would have been content.....' 1

(here six pages of manuscript are missing)

.....the distance from earth to heaven; an it might be said that this is the stature of Homer as much as of Strife.

Quite different from this is Hesiod's description of Trouble— if indeed The Shield is to be ascribed to Hesiod:
Rheum was running from her nostrils.

The image he has presented is not powerful, but offensive, but see how Homer exalts the heavenly powers:

And as far as a man can see with his eyes into the hazy distance as he sits upon a mountain-peak and gazes over the wine-dark sea, even so far is the leap of the loudly-neighing steeds of the gods.

He measures their mighty leap in terms of cosmic distances. Might one not exclaim, from the supreme grandeur of this, that if the steeds of the gods make two leaps in succession they will no longer find room on the face of the earth? And vast also are the images he conjures up for the Battle of the Gods:

And round them rolled the trumpet-tones of the wide heavens and of Olympus. And down in the underworld Hades, monarch of the realm of the shades, leapt from his throne and cried aloud in dread, lest the earth-shaker Poseidon thereafter should cleave the earth apart, and reveal to the gaze of mortals and immortals alike those grim and festering abodes which the very gods look upon with abhorrence.

You see, my friend, how the earth is split from its foundations upwards, how Tartarus itself is laid bare, how the whole universe is turned upside down and torn apart, and everything alike, heaven and hell, things mortal and immortal, shares in the conflict and peril of the combat.
And yet, awe-inspiring as these things are, from another aspect, if they are not taken as allegory, they are altogether ungodly, and do not preserve our sense of what is fitting. In his accounts of the wounds suffered by the gods, their quarrels, their vengeful actions, their tears, their imprisonment, and all their manifold passions, Homer seems to me to have done everything in his power to make gods of the men fighting at Troy, and men of the gods. But while for us mortals, if we are miserable, death is appointed as a refuge from our ills, Homer has given the gods immortality, not only in their nature, but also in their misfortunes.

But far superior to the passages on the Battle of the Gods are those which represent the divine nature as it really is, pure, majestic, and undefiled; for example, the lines on Poseidon, in a passage on which many others before me have commented:

And the far-stretched mountains and woodlands, and the peaks, and the Trojan city and the ships of the Achaeans trembled beneath the immortal feet of Poseidon as he strode forth. And he went on to drive over the swelling waters, and from all round the monsters of the deep came from their hiding-places and gambol-led about him, for they their lord. And in rapture the sea parted her waves, and onwards they flew.

So too the lawgiver of the Jews, no ordinary person, having formed a high conception of the power of the Divine Being, gave expression to it when at the very beginning of his Laws he wrote: ‘Gods
said' – what? 'Let there be light, and there was light; let there be land, and there was land.'

I should not, I think, seem a bore, my friend, if I were to put before you still one more passage from Homer – one dealing with human affairs – in order to show how he habitually associates himself with the sublimity of his heroic themes. All of a sudden the battle of the Greeks is plunged into the impenetrable darkness of night, and then Ajax, utterly at a loss what to do, cries out:

Father Senus do but rescue the sons of Achaca from out of the gloom give us fair weather and grant that we may see with our eyes. So long as it be in the light of day even destroy us.

These are truly the feelings of an Ajax. He does not beg for life for this plea would be too base for the hero: but since in the crippling darkness he can turn his valour to no noble purpose, he is annoyed that this prevents him from getting on with the fight and prays for the immediate return of daylight resolved at least to find a death worthy of his courage even thought Zeus should be fighting against him. Here indeed Homer breathes in the inspiration of the fray, and is affected by it just as if he himself is raging madly like Ares the spear hurler, or as when ruinous flames rage among the hills in the thickets of a deep forest and foam gathers about his lips.
However throughout the Odyssey, which for a number of reasons must be taken into consideration, Homer shows that when a great genius is falling into decline, it is a special mark of his old age that he should be fond of fable. For it is clear on many grounds that he produced this work as his second composition, besides the fact that throughout the Odyssey he introduced remnants of the experiences at Troy as episodes from the Trojan War. And indeed he there pay a debt of mourning and lamentation to his heroes as something long due to them. In fact the Odyssey is nothing more than an epilogue to the Iliad.

There lies Ajax the great warrior, there Achilles, there too Patroclus peer of the gods in counsel; and there too my own dear son. It was, I suppose for the same reason that, writing the Iliad in the prime of life, he filled the whole work with action and conflict, whereas the greater part of the Odyssey is narrative, as is characteristic of old age. Thus in the Odyssey Homer may be likened to the setting sun, whose grandeur remains without its intensity; for no longer does he maintain the same pitch as in those lays of Troy. The sublime passage have not that consistency which nowhere lapses into mediocrity, nor is there the same closely-packed profusion of passions, not the versatile and oratorical style studded with images drawn from real life. As through the ocean were withdrawing into itself and remaining quietly within its own bounds, from now on we see the ebbing of Homer’s greatness as he wanders in the realms of the fabulous and the incredible. In saying this I have not forgotten the storms of the kind. I am speaking indeed of old age, but after all it is the old age of a Homer.
Nevertheless, in every one of these passages the fabulous predominates over the actual.

As I said, I have digressed in this way in order to show how very easily a great spirit in his decline may at times be misled into writing nonsense; examples are the episodes of the wineskin, of the men whom Circe fed like swine, and whom Zoilus described as ‘wailing piglets’, of Zeus nurtured by the doves like a nestling, and of the man incredible story of the killing of the suitors. For how else are we to describe these things than as veritable dreams of Zeus?

There is another reason why these comments should be made on the Odyssey, and that is that you should understand how the decline of emotional powers in poets and prose-writers leads to the study of character. For of this kind are the facts, given from the point of view of character, of the way of life in Odysseus’s household; they constitute what is in effect a comedy of character.

The Selection and Organization of Material

Longinus says that, next we must consider whether there is anything else that makes for sublimity of style. Now as we naturally associate with all things certain elements that are inherent in their substance, so it necessarily follows that we shall find one source of the sublime in the unerring choice of the most felicitous of these elements, and in the ability to relate them to one another in such a way as to make of them a single organism, so to speak. For one writer attracts the hearer
by his choice of matter, another by the cumulative effect of the ideas he chooses. For example, Sappho in her poetry always choose the emotions attendant on the lover's frenzy from among those which accompany this passion in real life. And wherein does she demonstrate her excellence? In the skill with which she selects and fuses the most extreme and intense manifestations of these emotions:

A peer of the gods he seems to me, the man who sits over against you face to face, listening to the sweet tones of your voice and the loveliness of your laughing; it is this that sets my heart fluttering in my breast. For if I gaze on you but for a little while, I am no longer master of my voice, and my tongue lies useless, and a delicate flame runs over my skin. No more do I see with my eyes, and my ears are filled with uproar. The sweat pours down me, I am all seized with trembling, and I grow paler than the grass. My strength fails me, and I seem little short of dying.

Are you not astonished at the way in which, as though they were gone from her and belonged to another, she at one and the same time calls up soul and body, ears, tongue, eyes, and colour; how, uniting opposites she freezes while she burns, is both out of her sense and in her right mind? For she is either terrified or not far from dying. And all this is done so that not one emotion alone may be seen in her, but a concourse of emotions. All such emotions as these are awakened in lovers. But it is, as I said, the selection of them in their most extreme
forms and their fusion into a single whole that have given the poem its distinction.

In the same way Homer in describing storms singles out their most terrifying properties. The author of the Arimaspeia think the following passage to be awe-inspiring:

This also to our minds is a great marvel. There are men dwelling in the waters of the ocean, far away from land. Wretched creatures they are, for grievous is the trouble they undergo, fixing their gaze upon the stars and their spirit upon the water. Often, methinks, they lift up their hands to the gods, and with their hearts raised heavenwards they pray in their misery.

It is obvious to anyone, I imagine, that this passage is more flowery than terrifying. But how does Homer set about it? Let us choose one out of many possible examples.

Concluding Longinus' views on his theory --- On the "Sublime", i.e. (Sublimity), the subsequent chapters are as under following heads.—Chapter No-11 Amplification, Chapter No-12 Amplification Defined Chapter No-13 Plato and the Sub-Line. Imitation Chapter No-14 Some Practical advice Chapter No-15 Imagery and the Power of the Imagination. Chapter No.-16 Rhetorical Figures: Adjuration Chapter No-17 Rhetorical Figures and Sublimity Chapter No.-18 Rhetorical Question Chapter No-19 Asyndeton, or the Omission of Conjunction, Chapter No-20 The Accumulation of Figures Chapter
No-21 Conjunction: Some Disadvantages

Chapter No-22 The figure of Hyperbaton, or Inversion

Chapter No-23 Polyptoton: Interchange of Singular and Plural

Chapter No-24 Polyptoton: Conversion of Plural to singular

Chapter No-25 Polyptoton: Interchange of Tenses

Chapter No-26 Polyptoton: Variations of Person, or Personal address

Chapter No 27 Polyptoton: Conversion to the first Person

Chapter No 28 Periphrasis

Chapter No 29 The Danger of Periphrasis

Chapter No 30 The proper choice of Diction

Chapter No 31 Familiar Language

Chapter No 32 Mataphore

Chapter No 33 Superiority of Flawed Sublimity to Flawless Mediocrity

Chapter No 34 hyperides and Demosthenes

Chapter No 35 Plato and Lysias

Chapter No 36 Sublimity and Literary fame

Chapter No 37 Comparison and Similes

Chapter No 38 Hyperboles

Chapter No 39 Composition or disposition of material

Chapter No 40 the structure of the sentence

Chapter No 41 Some Impediment of Sublimity

Chapter No 42 Conciseness

Chapter No 43 Triviality to Expression and Amplification

Chapter No 44 Decay of Eloquence.

Ultimately we can say that the main body of the tretise is concerned with the discussion and illustration of five sources of the sublime. The first and most important source chapter 8-15 is grandeur of thought the ability to form grand conception this takes its rise in nobality of soul or character, and Longinus illustrate it form Hommer and from the Book of Genesis. In this way we can say that the western thinkers also emphasised the value of the Propriety. However, they used the different Synonyms for it (Propriety).
3. HORACE

Horace, whose full name was Quintus Horatius Flaccus, was born at or near Venusia, in the south-east of Italy, in 65 B.C. From his early education in Rome under the famous flogging schoolmaster Orbilius Pupillus he proceeded to Athens in order to study philosophy. While he was there Julius Caesar was assassinated, and Brutus, on his way to Macedonia, offered Horace a command in the Republican Army, which he accepted, and fought on the losing side at Phillippi. Although his Italian estates were confiscated, he was allowed to return to Rome, where he served as a clerk to the treasury. Later he was introduced by his friends who in the course of time became his close friend and conferred many benefits on him, including a fine estate near Tivoli. Although much courted by the Emperor Augustus, he held aloof from him for several years, but eventually gave him his warm friendship and admiration, and addressed several of his finest poems to him. Horace died in 8 B.C., a few weeks after his friend Maecenas.

One of the fruits of Horace's friendship with the Emperor is the Epistle to Augustus (Epistles II.1). After the courtly compliments of the opening, the first ninety lines or so are an attack on those who, giving their admiration - or lip-service-to the ancients, express disapproval of contemporary literature. This attack is followed by a perceptive comparison between the origins of Greek and of Roman poetry, on much the same lines as that in the Ars Poetica ('Grais ingenium... dedit Musa') and by an instructive outline history of Roman poetry. In line
Horace turns to the theatre audiences of the day, and reproves them for preferring mere spectacle to good plays and good acting. Finally he praises the Emperor's good taste, and asks him to give his patronage to other kinds of poetry than the dramatic. The epistle displays a fine independence of judgement. In the critical sense it is important for its historical retrospect; for the view it expresses that poetry should be judged by its intrinsic merits, and not for its antiquity; for its argument that the conditions in which Roman literature developed made it inevitable that it should not achieve greatness until a comparatively late period; and for its claim that such poets as Virgil and Varus were working on the right lines in their progress towards poetic immortality.

The Epistle to Julius Florus (Epistles II, 2) is to some extent autobiographical, and Horace half-playfully gives his reasons for not writing much poetry, especially lyrical poetry, at this period of his life - perhaps round about 16 or 15 B.C. For literary criticism the most important part of this poem is the section near the end in which Horace satirizes the popular but shallow poets of the day and gives his own views on poetic technique, especially the need for the most careful revision in order to ensure that the best words have been found and set down in the best order.

Like these two works, the Ars Poetica is a verse epistle - Epistula ad Pisones; but already within a century of Horace's career, to some time between 12 and 8 B.C. If this dating is correct, the father whom Horace addresses (Piso, pater) would probably be Lucius Piso, who was born in 174.
50 or 49 and who was consul in 15. If this Piso had married fairly young, he could have had, in the last years of Horace's life, two sons growing towards manhood (iuvenes), and capable of having formed the literary ambitions which Horace attributes to the young men in the poem.

It is clear that the epistle was written primarily for the guidance of the elder son, who had in hand, or at least in mind, some literary project. The father emerges as a man of mature judgement to whom the young man may turn for advice and criticism; and the younger son figures merely as the third member of the family, no doubt also possessing literary potentialities, but too young to show any particular bent. Since so large a proportion of the poem relates to drama, it may be inferred that the elder son was engaged upon or planning some form of dramatic composition. Horace not only gives him specific advice on procedure, but also, like previous critics and like Longinus later, demonstrates that nature ability must be supplemented by careful study and guided by discipline - that literary success depends on a combination of nature and art. Furthermore, the poet must submit what he writes to rigorous criticism, and not give it to the world without the most meticulous revision.

Horace gives us in the Ars Poetica no streakingly profound or basically new critical doctrines. He draws freely on the Greeks and on earlier Roman writers, including Cicero. But we should not on these grounds be led to depreciate his worth as a literary critic; nor should we
be deceived be his informal epistolary manner - his discursiveness, his comparative lack of method, his occasional light-heartedness. His importance lies in his consistently reasonable and practical approach to literary problems, and, it may be added, in the memorable quality that he imparts to his literary judgements.

Although the Ars Poetica contains no discussion of poetry as an imitative art, Horace shows an awareness of the place of imitation in its genesis. 'I would lay down,' he says, 'that the experienced poet, as an imitative artist [doctum imitatorem], should look to human life and character as his models, and from them derive a language that is true to life' (317-18). But just as important to give pleasure (388). He makes more of the aims and functions of poetry, and the terms in which he does so illustrate the memorable quality of his utterance to which I referred in the last paragraph:

\[
\textit{aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae,}
\]
\[
\textit{aut simul et lucunda et idonea dicere vitae (333-4)}
\]

'Poets aim at giving either profit or delight or at combining the giving of pleasure with some useful precepts for life.' And a few lines later:

\[
\textit{omne tuit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci,}
\]
\[
\textit{lectorem delectando pariterque monendo (343-4)}
\]

The man who has managed to blend profit with delight wins everyone's approbation, for he gives his reader pleasure at the
same time as he instructs him.' This doctrine was endlessly echoed and developed by Renaissance critics.

Horace also has strong views on another function of poetry, the power it possesses, or at least has manifested in the past, of advancing civilization. The clearest expression of this view is found in lines 391-407; and there is a parallel in lines 126-38 of the Epistle to Augustus.

Cicero had advocated the imitation of ancient models, as Longinus was also to do later, but Horace was the first critic to lay down this doctrine with regard to poetry. 'You must give your days and nights to the study of Greek models,' he says (268-9); and his mentioning only Homer and the Attic tragic playwrights makes it clear that he is thinking especially of the great writers of the classical period of Greek literature. This doctrine of imitation of the ancients was also much canvassed at the Renaissance. Other topics on which Horace lays emphasis are the need for organic unity, which had already been stressed by Plato and Aristotle; the need for sound and appropriate subject-matter; and the correct choice of diction and metre.

All these points may be applied to poetry generally. What Horace says specifically about drama and its techniques, although it takes up a large part of the epistle, seems clear enough, and is to some extent familiar from Aristotle; it needs no analysis here.
However, one further matter demands attention, and this is the principle of decorum, which is fundamental to Horace's literary theory, and which is touched on at intervals throughout the Ars Poetica. This doctrine of fitness, or literary propriety, had been discussed by Aristotle, and Cicero made much of it in his rhetorical theory, especially in the De Oratore; but for Horace it constitutes, in the words of J.W.H. Atkins, 'a guiding and dominating Principle'. Horace applies it here particularly to poetry, and especially dramatic poetry. Every part and every aspect the presence of the audience...' The principle of decorum is yet another of Horace's doctrines which pervade the literary criticism of the Renaissance. However a detailed description about him and about his famous composition Ars-poetica. ---The art poetry is being given in the subsequent chapters.