KANT'S THEORY OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENTS

Kant's view of the nature of aesthetic judgments provides the most effective entry point into his aesthetics. In fact, such a view functions as the *leitmotif* of his aesthetic system. This is because it is his position on the nature of aesthetic judgments that determines his departure from the views of his predecessors. In fact this theme is so central to his aesthetic theory that, as Allison points out with some exaggeration, “In spite of its title, the *Analytic of the Beautiful* is concerned not with the nature of beauty *per se*, but rather with the *judgement* through which the beauty (or lack thereof) of a particular object of nature or art is appraised” (2001, 68).

I I.1 Aesthetic Judgements as Reflective Judgements

We may begin by pointing out that Kant speaks of faculties of mind in working out his whole philosophy. The problem here is that not only contemporary philosophers are allergic to the locution of ‘faculty’ but also Kant overuses the term. He even speaks of desires and tastes as faculties, apart from many other mental phenomena. Overlooking Kant's ubiquitous use of this term, we may confine it to what he might have considered to be the four fundamental faculties, namely, Sense, Understanding, Reason and Judgment. Of these, sense is a passive faculty since it only apprehends *a posteriori* particulars by receiving perceptions in space and time and *a priori* particulars, *viz.* space and time.
themselves. Because of its passive nature sense can be called a faculty only nominally. As against sense, understanding is an active faculty which, among other things, applies \textit{a priori} concepts called 'categories' to perceptions so as to make our experience objective. Reason which is the third faculty is responsible for regulating, by means of theoretical ideas, our thinking about matters of fact and, by means of practical ideas our thinking about matters of conduct. Reason is thus an active faculty though it tends to be hyperactive by pretending to apply theoretical ideas to alleged objects of experience and thus producing metaphysical hallucinations. Judgment (used with capital J) is the fourth fundamental faculty of mind; it is a capacity for making judgments. According to Kant, to judge is to think a particular as being contained in a universal. A universal may be a law or a principle or a theory or a rule. In other words, a judgment concerns the relation between a particular and a universal. If the universal which may be a rule or a law or a theory or a principle, is given, then the faculty of Judgement seeks to subsume the particular under it and when Judgement does so, it is called by Kant 'Determinant Judgement'. If the particular is given to which Judgement seeks to find the universal then Kant calls it 'Reflective Judgement'. Hence, we may say that Judgement which is the capacity to produce judgements can be either Determinant or Reflective. We may also say that judgements produced by Determinant Judgement may be called 'determinant judgements' and judgements produced by Reflective Judgement may be called 'reflective judgements'. Thus, judgements can be broadly classified into determinant judgements and reflective judgements which are traceable to Determinant Judgement and Reflective Judgement respectively.

A judgement like “This stone is heavy” which Kant calls an 'objective empirical judgement' (as distinct from “This stone seems to be heavy” which is the corresponding
subjective empirical judgement and which is only nominally a judgement because of its being subjective) is a determinant judgement. This is because in making this judgement we subsume manifold of perceptions under categories which are prior to those manifolds of perceptions. That is to say, we are first given the universals called 'categories' under which we subsume a manifold of percepts by employing Determinant Judgement. It is by such a subsumption that a manifold comes to constitute an object whose description is an objective empirical judgement. Similarly, moral judgements, that is, judgements about rightness or wrongness of a particular action can also be considered determinant judgements. This is because they involve subsumption of a particular act under a universal, namely, the moral law (via the maxim on which the action is based). The moral law is given to us prior to the action because it has its locus in our rational nature. Like objective empirical judgements such moral judgements are also objective, though their objectivity is different from that of the former. The objectivity of latter is due to the practical objectivity of the moral law since the moral law determines our will whereas the objectivity of the former is due to the application of categories in them, and the objectivity resulting from the application of the categories is theoretical. Of course, moral judgement may be false even though they are objective just as empirical judgements can be false though they may be objective.

The scheme of reflective judgements is not simple. This is because there is a variety of reflective judgements. By and large they are: (1) Laws of Nature- empirical or theoretical laws-which Reflective Judgement seeks to identify when particulars are given; (2) Aesthetic judgements or judgements of taste; and (3) Teleological judgements.

Before we proceed further, a couple of points need to noted:
(1) In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant has identified the *synthetic a priori* principles corresponding to one kind of determinant judgements *viz.* objective empirical judgements. Kant also has identified how those principles which he calls 'principles of pure understanding' govern the application of categories. The question is, “What is/are the *synthetic a priori* principle/s corresponding to Reflective judgements? The central question of the *Critique of Judgement* is to answer this question.

(2) The three active faculties of mind, namely, Understanding, Reason (that is practical reason), and Judgement (that is ReflectiveJudgement) Kant relates to what he calls Cognition, Desire and Feeling respectively. The *synthetic a priori* principles of pure understanding which figure in the *Critique of Pure Reason* legislate or determine our cognition and the principle/s which figure in the *Critique of Practical Reason* do so for desire. The task of the *Critique of Judgement* is to identify the principle/s which determine or legislate for feeling (of pleasure or displeasure). However, Kant's association of Reflective Judgement with feeling should be taken with a major qualification. As mentioned above, there are, by and large, three kinds of reflective judgements, that is, judgements produced by Reflective Judgement. Associating Reflective Judgement with feeling sets at naught both general laws of nature as well as teleological judgements. The third *Critique* should have been titled *Critique of Reflective Judgement* because Kant deals with determinant judgements only in the first two *Critiques*. Even here, going by the central task of the third *Critique* its title should have been the *Critique of Aesthetic and Teleological Judgement*, that is, a critique of the faculty of Reflective Judgement as confined to the aesthetic and teleological domains. In this sense, the title of third critique overshot the content of the work.
Yet, we must not forget the reason why Kant brings these disparate kinds of judgements under the rubric 'reflective judgements'. No doubt, on the one hand, he not only recognizes the distinction between these three kinds of reflective judgements but even seeks to identify distinct synthetic a priori principles corresponding to them to account for their distinctness. On the other hand, he traces the common thread that runs through such disparate judgements which makes all of them the result of one and the same faculty called 'Reflective Judgement'. How does he do so?

Slightly modifying Kant's own position on this question, we can say that the judgements produced by Reflective Judgement concern Purposivity. Purposivity expresses itself in three ways:

1. Purpose and purposiveness;
2. Purposiveness without purpose; and
3. Purpose without purposiveness

The first kind of judgements produced by Reflective Judgement which are the universals like laws of nature-empirical or theoretical-concern Purposivity of the first variety, namely, purpose and purposiveness. This needs some elaboration. According to Kant, the “particular empirical laws must be regarded … as if an understanding (though it be not ours) had supplied them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a system of experience according to particular natural laws” (1952, Introduction, IV, 19/180 AE). In other words, the synthetic a priori principles underlying the first kind of judgements (which constitute the body of natural science which according to Kant is Physics) pertains to the harmony between nature and our capacity i.e. understanding. It is an assumption that nature purports to fit itself to the need of our discovering the network
of natural laws. Without this assumption we have to admit the futility of our search for natural laws. Equally important assumption is that nature has a purposiveness i.e. a certain design that express itself through the laws which are being discovered by us. That is to say, as Körner remarks “In [ so ] employing Reflective Judgement we demand purposive organization and proceed as if nature and its contents were so organized”(1955, 180). The two assumptions regarding purpose and purposiveness mentioned above are not unrelated. The requirement that nature adopts itself to our purpose of understanding her implies, as Körner brings to our notice, that according to Kant there is a further requirement “that nature specify its general laws in conformity with a principle of purposiveness for our cognitive faculty, that is to say, a principle of adaptation to the human understanding in its necessary function” (Ibid). That is what Kant called ‘finality in nature' i.e. the purpose of nature to fit into our need for understanding her. Discovering the laws of nature is organically linked to nature’s design i.e. its purposiveness displayed in its lawful structure. The word 'as if ’ which figures in the above quote from Kant clearly indicates that such a principle is neither theoretically necessary nor is a description of an empirical fact i.e. it is not a judgement produced by Determinant Judgement. Kant calls such a principle “merely a subjective a priori” (1952, Introduction, III, 15/177 AE). In other words, according to him, such a principle is only heuristic. As Körner says “It embodies the fundamental and indispensable As-If of any search for a scientific system” (1955, 179).

The second kind of judgements produced by Reflective Judgement are judgements of taste or aesthetic judgements which involve the notion of purposivity as purposiveness without purpose- a point which we discuss in the third chapter. Here we are confining ourselves to only one kind judgements of taste viz. pure judgement of taste or judgement
about the beautiful. We will see shortly how they are distinct from other kinds of judgement of taste. Equally importantly, they, like the first kind of reflective judgements, involve the notion of *as if*, as we see in the next section.

The third kind of judgements produced by Reflective Judgement is the judgements that figure in teleological explanations provided most notably for biological phenomena. Such judgements involve the concept of purposivity as purpose without purposiveness. Kant deals with such judgements in the second part of the *Critique of Judgement* called 'Critique of Teleological Judgement' wherein he seeks to reconcile his mechanistic theory of explanation in science with the prevalence of teleological explanations in biology of his times which was pre-Darwinian. But this reconciliation was in favor of the mechanistic theory of explanation which Kant accepted in toto as displayed in the first *Critique*. According to Kant, teleological explanations of biological phenomena, unlike mechanistic explanations, are not constitutive of the objects of explanation since they have only a regulative function. In other words, though there are no purposes in nature since nature is a mechanistic system, it is necessary to act in our scientific inquiry into the biological word 'as if' there are purposes in nature. Such an *as if* thinking facilitates our inquiry by identifying relevant questions and plausible answers. The notion of *as if* associated with teleological judgements reminds us of the connection this notion has with *synthetic a priori* principles of theoretical reason that correspond to the theoretical ideas of Soul, World (totality) and God. As we shall see, the notion also appears in relation to one kind of judgements of taste which concern beauty. In view of the significance the notion of *as if* possesses in the Kantian system Vaihinger explicitly acknowledges his debt to Kant in working out his *Philosophy of As If*. However, it is necessary to note that Kant does not associate the notion of *as if* with the practical ideas like moral freedom,
immortality of the soul and God as a morally perfect being and so with the postulates of practical reason. No doubt, some scholars think that according to Kant these ideas are useful fictions and thus involve the notion of *as if*. As Körner has shown such an interpretation is wrong. This is because “To state that freedom, immortality, and God *exist* is to say that our having duties implies that the notions have instances which, since they cannot be phenomenal, must be *noumenal* and therefore unknowable” (*Ibid*, 164). That is to say, the practical ideas correspond to entities in the realm of faith, whereas this is not so in the case of objects of either teleological judgements or aesthetic judgements, and hence they should not be construed in term of 'as if'.

To sum up the above discussion, the three kinds of reflective judgements, namely, laws of nature, pure judgements of taste or pure Aesthetic Judgements and Teleological Judgements used to explain human behavior and biological phenomena constitute a unity. This unity is grounded in the concept of purposivity which, therefore, is the common thread that runs through all the three kinds of reflective judgements though the concept of purposivity figures in the three kinds of reflective judgements in three different ways. This unity is reinforced by the fact that the notion of *as if* is organically linked to all the three kinds of reflective judgements. That is to say, in making the first kind of reflective judgement namely, laws of nature we think as if nature purports to fit itself to our understanding and as if nature has a design to express in terms of a lawful structure. In making a teleological judgement we assume as if nature has purposes. Finally, in making a pure judgement of taste which is a judgement of taste proper we believe as if beauty is an objective features of a thing described as beautiful.
It is necessary in this connection to point out that Kant seeks to cement the relation between the two kinds of reflective judgements; *viz.* pure aesthetic judgements and teleological judgements both of which constitute the foci of Kant's attention in the *Critique of Judgement*. To do so Kant invokes the notion of 'teleological' in a broad sense. Taking 'Teleological' in a broad sense Kant distinguishes between four kinds of teleological judgements. Such a classification of teleological judgements is made by him by invoking the notions of formal, material, subjective and objective, though his use of these concepts is somewhat opaque and does not square with his use of these concepts in other parts of his philosophy. Teleological judgements are material if they refer to existing things and formal if they don’t; teleological judgements are subjective if they refer to feelings and objective if they don’t. Thus, we have four kinds of teleological judgements:

1. Formal and subjective teleological judgements of which pure aesthetic judgements are paradigmatic cases.

2. Material and objective teleological judgements, that is, judgements about purposes in nature that figure in our explanation of biological phenomena.

3. Material and subjective teleological judgements which are judgements explaining purposive human behavior.

4. Formal and objective teleological judgements of which certain judgements in pure mathematics are his only examples.

It is obvious that the second kind of teleological judgements are teleological judgements in a narrow or specific sense in which Kant uses the term to describe the
judgements with which he deals in the second part of his *Critique of Judgement*. In fact, teleological judgements of the type of (2) and (3) are teleological judgements in the specific sense. They both involve the notion of purpose in relation to the biological world in the case of (2) and human world in the case of (3). The distinction between them is important for Kant because his aim in the second part of the third *critique* was to accommodate the prevalence of purpose-oriented explanations (that is explanations which are 'teleological' in the narrow sense) with his commitment to a full-fledged mechanistic philosophy of nature. Of course, Kant did anticipate the possibility of mechanistic explanation of even biological phenomena in future.

Secondly, he brings pure aesthetic judgements and teleological judgements (two of the three kinds of reflective judgements) under the rubric designated by the term 'teleological' used in a broad sense, so as to bind them together even while considering differences between them so crucial as to constitute two distinct parts of the third *Critique*.

Thirdly, he also brings judgements of pure mathematics and judgements about human purposes under the umbrella of 'teleological judgements' understood in a broad sense. As Körner rightly points out “Whether or not this classification is as neat as he believed, Kant makes it quite clear why he regards all aesthetic judgements, some mathematical judgements, and all judgements about human and non-human purposes as teleological. In the illuminating modern fashion of speaking, introduced by Wittgenstein, we might say that by calling all the above-mentioned types of judgements 'teleological' Kant has drawn attention to important general family resemblances between all of them and to even closer resemblances between those which he classifies under the same
heading” (1955, 200). Of course, one wishes that Kant had included the first kind of reflective judgements, namely, laws of nature, instead of some judgements of pure mathematics so as to provide a further glue binding all the three kinds of reflective judgements. Also, it is somewhat surprising that Kant treats (some) judgements of pure mathematics as objective just because they don’t concern feelings. (In fact, it is somewhat artificial to treat them as teleological judgements). After all, according to Kant mathematical judgement concern space and time which according to him are subjective- a point on which he differed from Newton with whom he sided against Leibniz in claiming that space and time were absolute.

I I.2 the Logical Features of Pure Judgements of Taste

As we have seen till now, aesthetic judgements or judgements of taste are the products of the Reflective Judgement. They are one of the three kinds of judgements which we owe to the faculty of mind called 'Reflective Judgement'. Aesthetic judgements or judgements of taste have the characteristic of appearing to be involving a determination of the object whereas as a matter of fact they involve the determination of subject and its feeling. Aesthetic judgements or judgements of taste can be of four types. They can be about the agreeableness or the beautiful or the sublimity or the goodness, the last one to be taken in non ethical sense. “What these judgements have in common is that in them we discover what is purely subjective in the representation of an object, that is, what constitutes its reference to the beholder, independent of any determination of the object for the purpose of knowledge” (Kirwan 2004, 13-14). Of these four kinds of judgements of taste, judgements of beauty and judgements of sublimity are considered by
Kant to be pure judgements of taste or pure aesthetic judgements. However, our discussion of Kant's theory of pure judgements of taste or pure aesthetic judgements basically concerns Kant's view of judgements of beauty. Kantian scholars differ over the question whether the class of pure judgement of taste is confined to the judgements about the beautiful, or can include judgements about the sublime David Whewell adopts the former position (cf. 1992, 250) whereas Henry Allison adopts the latter position. This thesis accepts Allison's position. Of course, taking into account the reasons Whewell has given one can consider judgements about the sublime as quasi-pure judgements of taste. However, in this chapter and the next, by 'pure judgements of taste' or 'pure aesthetic judgements' we mean judgements about the beautiful. What distinguishes a pure judgement of taste from the judgement of good and agreeableness is that though all of them concern the feeling of pleasure and displeasure; in the case of pure aesthetic judgements the pleasure stands independent of any interest in the object. According to Kant, in contrast to pure aesthetic satisfaction “any satisfaction that we associate with the idea of the object's real existence is interest and, as such, is always connected with desire. In this way Kant sets beauty in contrast to both the agreeable, which gratifies, and the good which is esteemed” (Kirwan 2004, 14). This means pure aesthetic judgements unlike non pure aesthetic judgements do not concern objects and hence are unrelated to interest. What does this mean?

A judgement of taste about the good may be about a thing which is good for something when i.e. it is pleases as a means or it may be good in itself i.e. when it pleases on its own account. In either case, according to Kant, the pleasure is mediate because the object pleases us by means of a concept and therefore is related to an interest. The judgement of taste which is about what is agreeable concerns an object that, no doubt,
gives immediate pleasure but like the good it is determined by the relation between the subject and real existence of an object. Hence, it is “only in the apparently contemplative satisfaction associated with the beautiful that no concept is involved, and only this satisfaction, in contrast to the pleasure we take in either the agreeable or the good, can be properly termed 'immediate', in the sense of disinterested and aconceptual” (Ibid, 14). This means that pure aesthetic judgements which primarily concern the beautiful are connected with the feeling of the pleasure which is necessarily characterized by disinterestedness and this is ensured by the fact that the judgement is not about an object but its representation. This does not mean that the aesthetic subject (that is the experiencer of the beautiful) is completely indifferent to the object. That is, it is not necessary that the subject of aesthetic experience should not desire it; in other words, a particular object may be at the same time both desired by and be beautiful to a subject provided that the pleasure experienced by the subject is not related to the satisfaction of the desire but is related to the representation of the object. One can find a parallel to this in Kant's account of moral experience. According to Kant moral experience is the experience of the categorical imperative. Suppose I help someone. My act can be moral only if I do it as my duty and for the sake of duty and not because I love that someone. This does not mean one cannot act morally towards others if one loves them. It may be that when one acts for the sake of duty, he may also have love for the other. All that Kant says is that the moral worth of an act is determined by our sense of duty and not whether we love the person we are acting towards. Similarly, even if we desire an object while getting pleasure out of its representation our experience being aesthetic has nothing to do with our desire for the object. In other words, just as we can experience duty with or without the desire to help someone in need, we can experience beauty with or without the
desire to possess that object of beauty. This is what is meant by saying that aesthetic experience has to be disinterested unlike the experience of the agreeableness or the good.

A question may arise regarding why Kant considers the three types of judgements, namely, about agreeableness, good (in the not ethical sense) and beauty under the same rubric of 'judgements of taste'. All the three kinds of judgements are judgements of taste because they concern pleasure. The pleasure associated with the agreeable is effected by the stimuli that act upon the sense organs and it concerns personal joy and aversion. The second kind of pleasure related to the good concerns a things being a means for an end or an end in itself. As Crowther remarks, “pleasure in the good … always presupposes that the particular item is judged in relation to its utility for, or conformity to, some function or standard which is, in a sense, *external* to it” (1996, 110). The third kind of pleasure which concerns the judgement about the beautiful is disinterested in the sense unlike the other two, it does not pertain to the real existence of the objects of pleasure but their representation. The nature of the object or its bearing on our practical interest and even whether it is real have no relevance to our pleasure which has its source in its mere appearance. To quote Crowther, “Kant’s major point of philosophical substance … is that disinterestedness is a *logical* characteristic which separates pure aesthetic judgements from those of the agreeable and good. Such aesthetic judgements are, in logical terms, indifferent to the real existence of the object” (*Ibid*, 111). The concept of disinterestedness, it must be noted, is not a psychological concept in spite of Kant's additional characterization of pure aesthetic judgements as contemplative. That is, Kant has not given a psychological account of pure aesthetic judgements. To quote Crowther again, “The key *logical* significance of the pure aesthetic judgement lies in what it does *not* presuppose in order to be enjoyed” (*Ibid*, 112). Psychological factors and even
physical factors as well as practical considerations may impinge upon our aesthetic pleasure. But, “such factors are not logical preconditions of our enjoying beauty. They are contingent elements. We do have to take account of them in appreciating formal qualities for their own sake” (Ibid, 112). But they have whatsoever no bearing on the judgement's logical status \textit{qua} purely aesthetic. In what follows we try to identify the nature of pure aesthetic judgements in term of their further logical features.

According to Kant, aesthetic judgements are subjective. However well Kant might have distinguished the kind of pleasure corresponding to the pure judgement of taste from the kinds of pleasure associated with impure judgements of taste, the pure judgements of taste remain subjective for the simple reason that they concern feeling of pleasure. This is clear from Kant's own words, “the judgement of taste …[is] aesthetic-which means that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective” (1952, §1, 41-42/203 AE). In considering judgements about the beautiful to be judgements of taste, Kant stands squarely within the tradition he inherited. That tradition, best articulated by Hume, refuses to draw the line between what Kant calls judgements about the agreeable and judgements about beautiful. In an important sense, according to that tradition, there can be no such things of judgement of the beautiful. This is because judgements expressing our praise are constituted by the feelings themselves. In fact, feelings and judgements concerning them are inseparable. In that sense pure aesthetic judgements are mere exclamation and therefore are judgements within quotes. As Graham points out “Kant locates aesthetic judgement halfway between the logically necessary (an example would be mathematical theorems) and the purely subjective (expression of personal taste)” (2000, 12). This shows how Kant breaks away from the tradition he inherited. According to Kant, judgements of taste or aesthetic judgements can be expressions of a
mere liking or can be something more than that. For example, when referring to a flower or a picture I say “It is beautiful” by which I mean “I like it”, I am making an aesthetic judgement of the first type. When I say so I do not mean that others too like it, or if someone does not like it something is wrong with him. But if I say “it is beautiful”, I mean others also like it or if someone does not like it something is wrong with him. The pure aesthetic judgement I am putting forth is of the second type.

That according to Kant judgements about the beautiful are subjective is clear from the very fact that he calls them ‘judgements of taste’. But even in Kant's own time 'taste' did not merely mean personal like and dislike. In other words, he was not radically departing from the thinking current in his time that taste is something more than personal like or dislike. In this respect “he was very much a man of his time, even though …this did not prevent him from breaking with the orthodoxy of the day on a number of crucial points regarding taste” (Allison 2001, 1). Thus, Kant's departure from the dominant view of aesthetic judgements as judgements expressing personal likes, was facilitated by the prevailing ideas of taste as something more than personal like and dislike. Kant's crucial break from the orthodoxy consists is not giving a new content to the concept of taste but in demonstrating how taste as something more than personal like or dislike can deserve a critique.

Be it as it may, the distinction between a judgement of taste as a judgement about agreeable or liking and the judgement about the taste which is the judgements about the beautiful which Kant calls 'pure judgements of taste', corresponds to the distinction between a subjective empirical judgement like “This stone seems to be heavy to me” and objective empirical judgement like “This stone is heavy” which Kant's makes in the first
Critique. According to him, the objective empirical judgements, unlike subjective empirical judgements, possess objective reference and (therefore) universal validity. This is a result of the application of a priori concepts which Kant calls 'categories'. The pure aesthetic judgements too have universal validity like the objective empirical judgements. But their universal validity is not due to objective reference involved in them. Thus, though 'This rose is beautiful' is similar to 'This stone is heavy' (just as 'This stone seems to be heavy to me' is similar to 'I like this rose'), they are dissimilar in the sense the former, unlike the latter is not objective and, is therefore, subjective.

Before we proceed further it is necessary to note what Kant means by characterizing pure aesthetic judgements as subjective. At the first level, as we have seen, for Kant aesthetic judgements are subjective because their determining ground can only be subjective. By this he means that a pure judgement of taste is not about an object but its representation. Kant, while agreeing that “Every reference of representations is capable of being objective”, makes it clear that “the one exception to this is the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. This denotes nothing in the object, but is a feeling which the Subject has of itself and to the manner in which it is affected by the representation” (1952, §1, 42/204 AE). Organically related to this point is Kant's contention that pure aesthetic judgements are not based on concepts and, hence, there are no objective criteria to determine whether or not an object is beautiful. The person who makes the judgement has to feel the pleasure himself. The reference to his own pleasure or displeasure is decisive. The judgement of others even if backed by reason has no bearing on the judgement of the concerned individual making a judgement that something is beautiful. To quote Kant again “If any one reads me his poem, or brings me to a play, which, all said and done, fails to commend itself to my taste, then let him adduce Batteux or
Lessing, or still older and more famous critics of taste, with all the host of rules laid down by them, as a proof of the beauty of his poem … I stop my ears: I do not want to hear any reason or any arguing about the matter” (Ibid, §33, 140/284 AE). In other words, one can legitimately claim that an object is beautiful only if he or she experienced it himself or herself. Pure aesthetic judgements are in this sense subjective.

But, what is it which distinguishes a pure judgement of taste, that is, a judgement about the beautiful, from a judgement about the agreeable, though both of them are subjective? According to Kant a pure judgement of taste has universal validity in spite of its being subjective. The concept of universal validity is extremely crucial for Kantian aesthetics and hence needs to be elucidated. Characterization of a pure judgement of taste as possessing universal validity is so basic in Kantian aesthetics that it constitutes the first phase of his engagement with the nature of pure aesthetic judgement. Guyer characterizes this phase as 'analytic phase' which is followed by an explanatory and a justificatory phase. In the second phase the pure judgement of beautiful is treated as being about a pleasure produced by the free play of imagination and understanding and the third phase concerns demonstrating that the free play accrues to all persons under the same condition stated by synthetic a priori principle of taste, that is, the principle that underlies aesthetic experience whose articulation is not as clear or convincing compared to Kant's articulation of the synthetic a priori principles underlying cognitive or moral experience.

To claim that a pure judgement of taste is universally valid is to claim that the pleasure one gets and expresses in terms of such a judgement can be universally communicated and thus can be shared by others. Such a shareability has necessity about it; that is, the agreement is not contingent and thus the pleasure is a necessary pleasure.
As Kirwan points out, “there is a sense in which the very making of this claim to universality (though not its legitimation) is implicit in the way in which we experience the beautiful as an object of necessary pleasure. Since the satisfaction the subject feels in beholding beauty is ‘not grounded in any inclination of the subject (nor in any other underlying interest), but rather the person making the judgement feels himself completely free with regard to the satisfaction that he devotes to the object, he cannot discover as grounds of the satisfaction any private conditions, pertaining to his subject alone”” (2004, 15). The concept of necessity is inseparable from the concept of 'ought'; thus, universal assent associated with pure judgements of taste is not one of prediction of similar reaction in others but is one of requirement. That is, others ought to agree, whether or not they do so. Judgements of agreeable might at best aspire for general validity and do not have 'ought' hidden in them. In addition the pure judgement of taste presupposes a necessary connection between representation and satisfaction.

The philosophical significance of Kant's contention that pure judgements of taste possess universal validity needs to be emphasized here since in making this claim Kant is not simply identifying a logical feature of pure judgements of taste. By means of such identification Kant takes us to the heart of his philosophical anthropology. This is because the question naturally arises “What is the locus of that universal agreement?” Now, Kant himself says “where anyone is conscious that his delight in an object is with him independent of interest, it is inevitable that he should look on the object as one containing a ground of delight for all men” (1952, §6, 50/211 AE). This means that if one's delight in the beautiful is not determined by anything peculiar to himself (unlike in the case of needs and desires) then one must assume that it is grounded on something which one shares with all human beings. It is this common human nature that constitutes
the basis of Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the judgement of the beautiful. This deduction does not establish the objectivity of the pure judgements of taste, unlike the transcendental deduction of categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason* which establishes the objectivity of our empirical judgements thanks to the of application of *a priori* concepts called 'categories'. The transcendental deductions of judgements of taste demonstrates how that judgement is directed towards that subjectivity which can be presupposed in all man. In doing this Kant had hit two birds with one stone: on the one hand, he has shown that the universal human nature which modernity of which Kant was the main spokesman has an aesthetic dimension, apart from a cognitive dimension as demonstrated in the first *Critique* and a moral dimension as demonstrated in the second *Critique*; on the other hand, he frees the aesthetic from cultural/contextual relativism.

However, such a necessity is a subjective necessity which “takes the form of an insistence that everyone ought to agree” (Kirwan 2004, 15) and hence what a pure judgement of taste possesses is a subjective universal validity. The subjectivity of universal validity is obscured by the fact that the subject speaks of beauty *as if* it were a quality of objects. It is significant to note in this connection a point Kirwan makes when he says “the claim to the agreement of others, 'as if ' the judgement were objective, is present, then, only as implicit in the subject's *feeling* that the beauty belongs to the object: it is another way that this feeling of objectivity, definitive of the judgement of taste, could be formulated” (*Ibid*, 16).

From what is said above it is clear that Kant wants pure aesthetic judgement to be subjective. There are two ways in which the subjectivity of a pure judgement of taste is understood: (a) It is about a subject who judges rather than about an object which is
judged, (b) It holds only for the individual who judges and is not binding on others. Obviously, a judgement about agreeable which is not a pure judgement of taste is subjective in the sense of (b) and the pure judgement of taste is subjective in the sense of (a) Thus pure aesthetic judgements can remain subjective without the risk of being arbitrary or idiosyncratic. However, their subjectivity remains intact for the simple reason that “there is a marked absence of general principles to which to appeal when one wants to show that a given aesthetic appraisal, assessment, estimate or judgement is the right one: … Rather, appeal is made essentially to how something is experienced, and this may be expressed by saying that an aesthetic appraisal has a strongly subjective element” (Schaper 1992, 209-210). The subjective principle related to the how in the above quotation concerns what Kant calls 'Form of finality' which can only be felt and not known in the way the properties of a thing can be.

A very interesting and philosophical puzzling point emerges from what Kant has said about the pure judgements of taste, namely, they being both subjective and universally valid. On the one hand as we have seen, the subjectivity demands that one does not change one's a judgement of beautiful even in the face of contrary reason given by others including a specialist. This is what Kant means when he says, “Taste lays claim simply to autonomy. To make the judgements of others the determining ground of one's own would be heteronomy” (1952, §32, 137/282 AE). Yet, the requirement of universal validity is that the judgement be necessarily shared by others. Do not autonomy and necessary shareability contradict each other? Does not a pure judgement of taste involve the satisfaction of opposite conditions? It is difficult to find in Kant an explicit resolution of this contradiction. Perhaps he did not recognize this as a contradiction.
Given that pure judgements of a taste have subjectivity and universal validity, the question arises whether any concepts are involved in them. It is clear that they do not involve the application of categories since they are not objective empirical judgements. But they are not purely subjective in the sense of a judgement about agreeable such as “I like that picture” and hence there must be some concepts involved in them. According to Kant, they are indeterminate concepts. They do not involve determinate concepts. The notion of indeterminate concept is related to the idea of purposiveness which we discuss in the next chapter. It is sufficient here to only indicate the distinction between determinate and indeterminate concepts. A determinate concept has instances in experience such as the concept of a horse. In fact, even the concept of unicorn is a determinate concept, since it can have direct presentation, though it does not have one. As Cohen points out, “Indeed, it is precisely because the concept of a unicorn is what Kant calls a determinate concept that we know just what a unicorn would be if there were any, and hence that we know there are none” (2002, 10). When the concept is indeterminate there is no way to say what would mark its genuine instance. It is a concept that we can apply to know possible experience. Beauty, as we shall see, is necessarily purposiveness without purpose and Kant considers ‘purposiveness’ as an indeterminate concept whereas ‘purpose’ is a determinate concept. Given that purposiveness is subjective, to say that a pure judgement of taste involves only an indeterminate concept is to say that they do not concern “a perceptible property of an object, a property that an object has in its own right, independently of how it is disposed to affect human beings” (Budd 2001, 259). In other words, to call something 'beautiful' is not to describe it in the way we do when we call something 'white'. It is to respond to its presentation as a purposive whole. Malcolm Budd thinks that according to Kant beauty is a relational
property. This is somewhat misleading because many relational properties are designated by determinate concepts such as 'being son of'.

A question arises whether pure judgements of taste are objective in any sense, if not in the sense of objective empirical judgements like 'this stone is heavy'. Before we take up this issue we may note the way Kant resolves what he calls 'antinomy of taste' the antinomy results from Kant's contention that pure judgement of taste do not involve determinate concepts and, hence, the thesis of the antinomy is “a pure judgement of taste is not based on concepts because if it were so it can lead to disputes”. The antithesis is: “a pure judgement of taste is based on concepts for otherwise these could not even be any disagreement about it”.

Kant resolves the antinomy by showing that the contradiction is only apparent. The thesis should be re-formulated as “the pure judgement of taste is not based on determinate concepts”. The antithesis should be re-formulated as “the pure judgement of taste is based on indeterminate concepts”. So re-formulated, the thesis and antithesis seem to be consistent and thus the contradiction disappears.

We now can come to the question whether in some sense or the other the pure judgements of taste are objective. Of course, according to Kant, in a strict and precise sense of the term 'objective' they are not. He emphasizes this point by saying that “they cannot be other than subjective” and explicitly states that they contain “merely a reference of the representation of the object to the subject” (1952, §6, 51/211 AE). However, according to some scholars 'objectivity ' as used by Kant is too narrow as it is confined to empirical judgements like 'This stone is heavy'. According to them, the Kantian distinction between two kinds of aesthetic judgement namely, judgement about
the agreeable (for example: 'I like this painting') and a pure judgement of taste, that is, a judgement about beautiful (for example: 'This painting is beautiful') itself makes room for some kind of objectivity in the sense the latter possesses it unlike the former which is, therefore, purely subjective. For example, Körner speaks of such a non-empirical objectivity as 'aesthetic objectivity' (cf. 1955, 183). This is in spite of the fact that Kant's own distinction between two kinds of judgements of taste is made on the basis of universal validity possessed by the latter and Kant speaks of subjective universal validity in their connection, in opposition to objective universal validity possessed by judgements like 'This stone is heavy' which Kant calls objective empirical judgements. Of course, when we make a pure judgement of taste we speak as if the judgement is about an objective feature of a thing. The question is “Can we speak of objectivity in some sense regarding a pure judgement of taste, even if Kant himself is allergic to it?” Zimmerman, while conceding Kant's point that our judgements about the beautiful “are not objective in that they simply refer to an objective property”, maintains that “they are objective in referring to the power which the art-object has of producing certain emotions in a normal subject” (1992, 165). According to Zimmerman a pure judgement of taste records “not, of course, what is antecedently there in experience but what occurs in the interaction between what is there and the subject who experience what is there” (Ibid). Is not this interaction itself objective? Can we not, therefore, speak of objectivity as being a logical feature of the pure judgement of taste?

There are Kantian scholars who vehemently oppose the view that Kant did make room for objectivity of pure judgements of taste. For example, Vandenabeele opposing Kulenkampff, Amriks, Wiggins and McDowell for whom beauty concerns some aspects of the fabric of the world claims that according to Kant judgements about the beautiful
are not objective since they are not based on (determinate) concepts. In this connection he draws our attention to Kant's claim "The judgement of taste determines its object in respect of delight (as a thing of beauty) with a claim to the agreement of every one, [emphasis in the original], just as if it were objective [emphasis added]" (1952, §32, 136/281 AE). But Kant also says "Proofs are no avail whatever for determining the judgement of taste, and in this connexion matters stand just as they would were [emphasis added] that judgement simply subjective [emphasis in the original]"(Ibid, §33, 139/284 AE). Vandenabeele himself accepts that according to Kant "pure judgements of taste seem to be neither (purely) objective nor purely subjective: they are, as it were, objective and it is as if they were subjective" (2008, 412). This shows that Kant's position on the objectivity of pure judgements of taste is equivocal, if not vague. It must be noted that Kant does not confine 'objectivity' to the objective empirical judgements whose objectivity, according to him, is theoretical. Kant concedes objectivity to moral judgements whose objectivity according to him is practical because the moral law determines the will. Can we not make a claim for another kind of objectivity which we may call 'aesthetic objectivity'? A positive answer to this question may not be found in Kant but is definitely not inconsistent with his overall position. (After all, he does not identify objectivity with theoretical objectivity). In fact, the idea of aesthetic objectivity is neither strange nor incoherent. Many Kantian scholars have invoked it. For instance, Körner says "the nature and justification of the claim to aesthetic objectivity [of a pure judgement of taste as distinct from a judgement of personal taste] can be discovered only by a careful examination of the whole class of judgements which implicitly make that claim" (1955, 183, emphasis added). The idea of aesthetic objectivity fits in well the Zimmerman's view mention above.
Graham makes an important point when he says, as we have already noted, that Kant locates pure judgement of taste halfway between logically necessary judgements such as mathematical theorems and purely subjective judgements which are expressions of personal taste. This means they are not purely subjective. But the question is 'What is it to be not purely subjective?' Is it necessarily to be non objective? That is, is there no sense in which they cannot be objective? No doubt, Kant claims that they 'cannot be other than subjective'. But the specific sense in which they are subjective (which is not the customary sense in which the expression is used as, for example, in the case of judgements expressing personal like and dislike) may be compatible with some sense of 'objective'. Do not empirical judgement possess objectivity in spite of their being result of the application of non-mathematical a priori (subjective) concepts viz. categories? Graham may be right in saying that, according to Kant, “To call something beautiful is not just to describe it but to react to it” (2000, 13). In fact, Graham is right in summarizing Kant's position in this way. But he presumes that such a reaction is in no sense can be objective. After all, he himself says that a pure judgement of taste is not just a description. This means that it is description but also something more than that, namely, it is our reaction or response. It may be noted that Graham does not say that pure judgements of taste are not descriptions at all but only reactions. For he knows that if he says so the line between the pure judgement of taste and judgements about the agreeable virtually disappears. There is no convincing ground for saying that our reactions or responses are merely subjective.

Graham's indirect admission that pure judgements of taste are descriptions. (If not just descriptions) can be connected with the position of Eva Schaper. According to Shaper, Kant's idea that pure judgement of taste do not involve any determinate concepts
such as categories and, therefore, are pre-categorial in nature is to be found in *prolegomena* written earlier than the third *Critique*, but not in the third *Critique* itself. She makes a strong case against Kant's view that the pure judgements of taste are pre-categorial in nature. Her point is that, Kant himself admits that understanding has a role in producing pure judgements of taste. But understanding does not function without the application of categories. Pure judgements of taste “are singular judgements and simply by virtue of that fact must involve categories. What is distinctive about them in contrast to other judgements of sense-perception is that the categories play no *justificatory* role in assessing their validity or invalidity. For, while categories are supposed to underpin the application of empirical concepts to objects, this is not a *determining* feature of the validity of an aesthetic judgement” (Schaper 1992, 229). However, Kant in the *Critique of Judgement* does not characterize pure judgements of taste as not involving categories. According to Schaper “in this respect his later position is a vast improvement on the description of” (*Ibid*, 228) pure judgements of taste provided in the *prolegomena*. Schaper makes a significant point that according to Kant's new description of the pure judgements of taste given in third *Critique*, the distinction between objective empirical judgement and the pure judgements of taste revolves around the direction of reference. A pure judgement of taste has its referential direction towards feelings whereas the referential direction to of an empirical judgement is towards an object. From the fact the feelings are subjective it does not follow that the referential direction towards them and, therefore, pure judgement of taste are only subjective. Hence, Schaper contends that “an aesthetic judgement may be about an object that is also an object available for description” (*Ibid*, 230).
Our contention that objectivity is a logical feature of pure judgement of taste does not conflict with the contention of the Kantian scholars, no doubt faithful to Kant, that the pure judgement of taste have singularity* as their logical feature. They valorized this feature because if the shareability of pleasure “is not to be converted into objective common agreement about classes of things and thereby lose what is distinctive to judgement of taste, a judgement of taste must be 'invariably laid down as a singular judgement upon the object’” (Graham 2000, 13-14). By the feature of 'singularity' they mean that a pure judgement of taste is not a logical judgement, that is, a general judgement in the following sense: when an object is said to be beautiful the judgement has no reference to the kind to which object belongs, that is, the object must not be perceived as falling under a kind. In Graham's words “When I declare something to be beautiful, I am not placing it which a general category of 'beautiful things' as I place 'aspirin' within the category 'painkiller' I am focused upon and 'delighting' in this particular object” (Ibid, 19). This means that though in judging an item as beautiful we may not help recognizing it as being something of a certain kind, such recognition should not figure in our judgement of it as beautiful. In other words, the judgement must concern the form of the object abstracted from the kind of thing it is. The ability for such an abstraction needs training and our cultivation of it is the first lesson in aesthetic education.

An important implication follows from the thesis that the pure judgements of taste are singular. It is that a general judgements like 'All roses are beautiful' or 'Some roses are

* As we have seen in Kant's writing and the writings of the Kantian scholars the word singular is used in two ways: (1) to characterized the subjective nature of pure aesthetic judgements brought by the fact that when someone judges that a thing is beautiful he refuses to alter his judgements by the counter of agreements given by the others; (2) as we see below, as non general (i.e. universal or particular) judgements involving the word 'beautiful'.
beautiful' or 'Roses in general are beautiful' are not aesthetic judgements. This means that 'beautiful' in a pure judgement of taste like 'This rose is beautiful' and a general/logical judgement like 'All roses are beautiful' does not have the same meaning. 'Beautiful' in the latter connotes a concept whereas in the former it does not. If so, according to Kant, 'beauty' can be a concept though it does not function in that way in a pure judgement of taste. But this leads to a problem. Some scholars think that the logical judgements mentioned above can also be taken as pure judgements of taste because they result from generalizing over a number of pure judgements of taste which are singular. But since any generalizations is an objective empirical judgement based on some singular objective empirical judgements 'All roses are beautiful' cannot be said to be a generalization based on pure judgements of taste. In other words, pure judgements of taste are not premises of an inductive argument whose conclusion is a logical judgement. Thus, the pure judgements of taste do not provide inductive grounds for a logical judgement involving 'beautiful'. Of course, Kant himself does not say so. Scholars like Cohen find it very difficult to accept that Kant can be clear on this. In fact they charge Kant with sloppiness Cohen admits that he is “left thinking that Kant's sense of a connection between 'This rose is beautiful' and 'Rose in general are beautiful' is a logical misapprehension” (2002, 8). Townsend is right when he says, “All that Kant is claiming [is] that 'beauty' as it appears in the purely singular 'This rose is beautiful' refers to a judgement of taste, while 'beauty' as it appears in 'Rose in general are beautiful' refers to the aesthetic ground of a logical judgement” (2003, 77). In fact, Townsend connects this idea to Kant's projects itself. It is worth quoting Townsend in this connection “One cannot get from judgements of taste to logical judgements. But one can get from aesthetic experience to logical judgements” (Ibid, 79). According to Townsend there is nothing remarkable about this
from a logical point of view and Kant noticed that. From the point of view of Kant's transcendental philosophy it is remarkable because “it shows the existence of a wholly different kind of universal judgement that is different from the logical judgements produced. That, of course, was the 'discovery' that led Kant to add a critique of judgement to what he had thought to be an already completed critique of reason (Ibid).

Leaving the above point we may now ask the question whether pure judgements of taste are synthetic a priori judgements in view of the fact that they are neither analytical a priori nor synthetic a posteriori. Of course, if they are judgements at all and if there are only three kinds of judgements then it follows that they are synthetic a priori. This claim is not a contrived one because it is consistent with the way Kant defines 'synthetic' and 'a priori' Some Kantian scholars have sought to give a substantial content to this claim. Notable in this connection is the view of Eva Schaper. No doubt, Schaper admits that this may sound bizarre but she takes the support of Kant's own statement “A judgement to the effect that it is with pleasure that I perceive and estimate some object is an empirical judgement. But if it asserts that I think the object beautiful, i.e. that I may attributes that delight to every one as necessary, it is then an a priori judgement” (1952, §37, 146/289 AE). Of course, Schaper acknowledges that Kant has introduced a conception of a priori “for which even his prolific uses of that term in earlier works have scarcely prepared us” (1992, 203). But she also notes that “Kant nowhere suggests that the sense of the term 'a priori' is in any way peculiar to the third Critique” (Ibid). Hence, the test of synthetic a priori character of the pure judgements of taste is whether they have necessity in the way Kantian synthetic a priori judgements have. It is generally recognized that such a necessity being non-analytical can be considered epistemic or epistemological. But Schaper does not explicitly characterize such a necessity as epistemological.
Vandenabeele is one of the Kantian scholars who make a strong claim that necessity embodied by pure judgement of taste is epistemological and strictly so. Vandenabeele brings to our attention an important point that 'ought' in an aesthetic judgement is different from the way it figures in moral judgement. In a moral judgement the 'ought' designates not only a requirement but also a command whereas in the case of an aesthetic judgement it designate only a requirement. Vandenabeele draws our attention to two statements of Kant in this connection:

(1) “The absolutely good (the object of moral feeling), as judged subjectively by the feeling it inspires, is the ability of the subject's powers to be determined by the conception of a law that obligates absolutely. It is distinguished above all by its modality: A necessity that rests on a priori concepts and contains not just a claim but also a command that everyone approve”.

(2) “The judgement of taste itself does not postulate everyone's agreement …, it merely requires this agreement from every one” (quoted in Vandenabeele 2008, 417).

This means the universal agreement is, as Kant himself says, only an idea. So in Vandenabeele's view in the Kantian framework 'necessary' or 'ought' associated with pure judgements of taste is weaker than its ethical counterpart. From this Vandenabeele considers the necessity associated with the former to be only subjective. But this is questionable. Though pure judgements of taste are subjective, thanks to their being about feeling of pleasure, their necessity need not be subjective. The kind of necessity involved in pure judgements of taste may be characterized as, aesthetic sui generis. A pure judgement of taste can be taken to be, as Hannah Ginsborg says “a formal and self-
referential judgement that claims, not the universal validity of an antecedently given feeling of pleasure, but rather is own universal validity with respect to the object” (quoted in Vandenabeele 2008, 422). In other words, a pure judgement of taste is about the normativity of one's own mental state. That is, the 'ought' concerns our need for others' recognition of this normatively, that is, that the object is judged as it ought to be judged.

Whether Ginsborg's way of construing aesthetic necessity is adequate or not, the very idea of aesthetic necessity as non subjective has its philosophical utility. It does justice to the fact that aesthetic experience and therefore an aesthetic claim has a transcendental element. In having aesthetic experience I transcend my individuality in the sense my getting pleasure is inseparable from what others ought to experience as pleasure. That is to say, the pleasure I derive from experiencing what I perceive as a beautiful object is supplemented by the pleasure I get from the fact that others too ought to have it. And these two pleasures are equally constitutive of an aesthetic experience that a judgement of the beautiful is about. In this sense a pure judgement of taste is about something which is self transcending. Secondly, it mitigates ego-centric construal of pure judgement of taste which consists in claiming that a pure judgement of taste expresses two claims, namely, I won't change my judgement whatever others might say and others should ought to share my pleasure and hence judge like me.

Hence, what distinguishes a pure judgement of taste from a mere judgement about the agreeable is this: aesthetic necessity is involved in the former only even though both are subjective. Aesthetic necessity itself cannot be considered to be subjective, unless, one equates 'subjective' with 'aesthetic' which if accepted makes the whole argument about the subjectivity of aesthetic necessity circular and therefore trivial.
I 1.3 the Epistemic Status of Pure Judgements of Taste

In this section we deal with a highly contentious issue. The issue concerns whether the pure aesthetic judgements have any cognitive content at all. An overwhelming number of Kantian scholars claim that they do not. They justify their position taking support from Kant's own statements. They claim that, according to Kant, a pure judgement of taste such as 'This painting is beautiful' has only an appearance of cognitive judgements, that is, judgements about how things actually are. The task is to find out whether this majority view can be sustained.

Before we proceed to consider the majority view which is anti-cognitivist it must be made clear that Kant in spite of some of his anti-cognitivist remarks does recognize the cognitive content of pure aesthetic judgements. This is particularly explicit when speaking about universal delight and it universal communicability in the second ‘moment’ he says “if … the determining ground of the judgement as to this universal communicability of the representation is to be merely subjective, that is to say, is to be conceived independently of any concept of the object, it can be nothing else than the mental state that presents itself in the mutual relation of the powers of representation so far as they refer a given representation to cognition in general” (1952, §9, 57-58/217 AE. emphasis in the original). What does ‘cognition in general’ signify except that the pure judgements of taste have a cognitive status different from the objective empirical judgements which are cognitive in a specific sense. The pro-cognitivist thrust of Kant’s position regarding judgements about the beautiful in object of fine arts is very affectively brought out in the following statement of Kant “The description ‘agreeable art’ applies
where the end of the art is that the pleasure should accompany the representations considered as mere *sensations*, the description ‘fine art’ where it is to accompany them considered as *modes of cognition*” (*Ibid*, §44, 165/305 AE).

Be it as it may, we may start our discussion of anti-cognitivist thesis with the position of Eva Schaper according to whom, as we have noted in the previous section, the pure judgements of taste are objective. But she maintains that they are not epistemic/epistemological claims, that is, they do not have cognitive content since “in appraising the object *aesthetically* we make no epistemological claim” (1992, 230). This means that pure judgements of taste are objective like empirical judgements though they are, unlike the latter, are non-cognitive. Thus, we still can retain the core contention of Kant's epistemology that only empirical judgements are objective in a full-fledged sense. Hence, she assures us that “what the third *Critique* adds cannot therefore, be wholly divorced from Kant's epistemology. On the contrary, it needs that a doctrine in order to show that knowledge-claims, important as they are, are not everything we can express in judgement form about our experience of living in a knowable world” (*Ibid*).

The question “Is there any strong reason in support of the claim that pure judgements of taste are non-cognitive even it we concede that objectivity of pure judgement of taste will not automatically establish their status as cognitive judgements?” The reason which Schaper advances in defense of her claim is that the pure judgements of taste “refer feelings to a subject as their 'determining ground'; descriptive empirical judgements take the objective turn by referring sense representations to an object as 'determining ground'” (*Ibid*, 229). But this reason advanced by Schaper is not convincing. As we have seen in the previous section, she claims that pure judgement of taste can be
akin to empirical judgements in being objective though their objectivity is distinct from that of empirical judgements. If so, can we not say that pure judgements of taste also have cognitive status which is distinct from the cognitive status enjoyed by empirical judgements? The fact that the pure judgements of taste have a referential direction to our feeling of pleasure or displeasure and not objects does not prove their non-cognitive status. After all, to have a feeling of pleasure is to recognize that it is pleasure in a manner to have cancer is not necessarily recognizing the cancer. But can we not say “No recognition without cognition” just as, as Quine's dictum goes, “No entity without identity”? This does not mean that every time we have a feeling of pleasure we recognize it. We may not recognize the feeling when we are completely engrossed in the experience of pleasure or overwhelmed by an object of beauty. All that is meant is that it should be possible for us to recognize a feeling when we have one. This point is analogous to Kant's claim in the first Critique that the necessary condition of the unity of the subject in perceiving and thinking is not that the subject must be aware of manifold of perceptions; all that is required is that it should be possible for the subject to be aware of the manifold which according to Kant consists in the possibility of “I think” accompanying the manifold and Kant calls this relation “pure apperception”.

The above discussion has shown that just because pure judgements of taste are directed towards feelings or are based on them does not itself warrant the claim that aesthetic judgements are non-cognitive. The point that there is no reason to think that pure judgements of taste are non-cognitive can be reinforced by considering Whewell's position that pure judgements of taste do not have, in the Kantian scheme, any cognitive content. Whewell's first argument is that according to Kant “judgements of beauty … are based on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure which denote nothing in the object … such
judgements can be neither true nor false since to discriminate on the basis of feeling alone is to contribute nothing to knowledge” (1992, 251). This argument has been sufficiently countered above. However, Whewell has another argument in favor of his contention that Kant is a non-cognitivist and this argument is fairly typical. According to Whewell “when an object pleases aesthetically in the Kantian sense, it does so apart from any concepts” (Ibid, 253). This argument deserves examination. In this connection the views Paul Crowther are of central relevance.

Crowther takes into account Kant's at least apparently inconsistent characterization of pure judgements of taste as being 'apart from any concept', and as involving 'no determinate concept'. Crowther rightly says “if Kant's theory is to do any useful philosophical work, we must read those contrasting characterizations as differences of emphasis rather than substance” (1996, 113). How does Crowther substantiate his claim?

According to Crowther, in Kant's aesthetic framework a pure judgement of taste has its origin in a harmonious interaction between the cognitive faculties called 'imagination' and 'understanding'. In this connection he quotes the following passage from Kant: “a representation whereby an object is given, involves, in order that it may become a source of cognition at all, imagination for bringing together the manifold of intuition, and understanding for the unity of concept uniting the representations” (Ibid, 112). Though this passage is from the third Critique, it is one of the central tenets of the first Critique. According to Kant such an interaction generates images and hence imagination acts as productive. This is common to both objective experience as well as aesthetic experience. However, “in its normal highly specific employments, it [that is, productive imagination] is tightly directed by a relevant concept, and functions in a fundamentally 'reproductive'
way. For example, in conceptualizing something as a 'dog', our application of the concept will be informed (tacitly or explicitly) by expectations based on associations between the present creature and our previous experience of dog-type appearances and behavior” (Ibid, 112-113). The reproductive function that imagination performs while interacting with understanding is the basis of what Crowther calls 'normal specificatory judgements' and objective empirical judgements are such judgements. The specificatory judgement, according to Crowther, “have definiteness of sense, and are the bases of every day cognitive life” (Ibid, 113). Because they involve definite concepts the context in which they occur are characterized by Crowther as discursively rigid.

But this is not the case with pure judgements of taste. Even though the cognitive faculties called 'imagination' and 'understanding' produce by their interaction the pure judgements of taste, their interaction is one of free play. In other words, such judgements are not normal specificatory judgements. This is not because such judgements do not have conceptual content but they have something more which is what is denoted by the term “apart from any concept”. Crowther very well expresses this point by saying that “such judgements focus on the possibility of a manifold's conceptualizability per se, rather than its relation to a definite concept” (Ibid, 113). What does this mean? It means that when we judge, for example, a bird as 'beautiful' we identify it in terms of formal configurations characteristic of that bird. Hence, our pure aesthetical judgements, Crowther says, entail that the forms of representations “have relations of unity and diversity which are amenable to sustained cognitive exploration” (Ibid, 114, emphasis added). This cognitive exploration involves categories, especially of quantity and quality. However Crowther points out that these categories interact in less explorative ways. No doubt, a configuration which we call beautiful is “cognitively unstable. However, this is
not a loss of intelligibility- a kind of cognitive breakdown. Rather, we have, as it were, cognition in the making” (Ibid, 115).

Crowther’s cognitivist position hinges upon, as we have seen, his idea that the role of understanding lies in the application of categories though the application of categories in the case of pure judgements of taste is different from the application of categories in the case of objective empirical judgements. This point has been strongly endorsed by Ted Cohen. Cohen recognizes that in Kant’s view understanding supplies various concepts and imagination arranges perceptions in a manner that fits them such that the two faculties by mutual agreement produce determinate judgements such as 'This rose is red'. Thus, in the case of an objective empirical judgement imagination is instructed by the understanding. But in the case of pure judgement of taste such as 'This rose is beautiful' the conformity of imagination to understanding is free and not instructed. Since the active role of understanding does figure in aesthetic experience concepts, that is, categories must figure in the case of pure aesthetic judgements. Cohen rightly asks “If the understanding is not proffering concepts, then what is it doing? …. Does it simply refuse to apply any of them, restraining itself?” (2002, 2). As Cohen says ‘That sounds ridiculous … but even if it were the truth, it would be a description of what the Understanding is not doing, not of what it is doing relative to the object engaged in Imagination” (Ibid). Cohen’s own answer to this question is that “in making a [pure] judgement of taste the Understanding accepts the task not of taking the measure of an object by subordinating it to a concept, but of doing full justice to the object in terms of all there is to it, in terms of all the object's aspects” (Ibid, 3). Cohen frames this answer in an alternative way by saying that “in an experience of beauty, one is attending to the absolute and complete particularity of the beautiful object. Beautiful things … are thus
unique” (*Ibid*). What this means is the following: in the case of an objective empirical judgement understanding applies categories via the application of what Kant calls 'objective empirical concepts' that is concepts which imply a category such as 'house' which implies the category of substance. In the case of a pure judgement of taste the categories are applied directly rather than through objective empirical concepts. This means in the judgement 'This rose is beautiful' the subject term 'this rose' does not connote an objective empirical concept. It may be treated as being akin to a place-marker. This means that the way in which the synthetic unity brought about by the application of categories in the case of objective experience is different from the synthetic unity brought about by the application of categories in the case of aesthetic experience which is also 'objective, as we have seen, though in a sense different from that of empirical experience. This point can be related to a significant observation made by Malcolm Budd. To quote Budd “rather than simply pairing off the imagination with manifoldness and the understanding with unity and expecting that to provide the required explanation, it must be a matter of the *manner* in which the manifold is united in a beautiful object” (2001, 257).

The cognitive status of the pure judgements of taste can be reinforced by according important place to the concept of universal communicability of aesthetic experience. After all, it is a central contention of Kant's aesthetics that the aesthetic subject must regard his experience “as resting on what he may also presuppose in every other person; and therefore he must believe that he has reason for demanding a similar delight from everyone” (1952, §6, 51/211 AE). Kant very aptly says that making a pure judgement of taste is speaking with a universal voice. The very locution is a cognitive locution. Guyer rightly points out that Kant's phrase “'speaking with a universal voice' means: it is
'imputing feelings of pleasure to others on the basis of one's own feeling’” (1997, 127). But ‘universal communicability’ that is entailed by ‘universal voice’ presupposes the awareness of others as communicating agents and in that sense as rational beings. The cognitive claim of pure judgements of aesthetic can thus be established on the basis of communicative rationality. It may be noted that Vandenabeele who brings out the centrality of the concept of universal communicability (cf. 2008, 417) rejects the cognitive status of the pure judgements of taste (cf. Ibid, 419, fn.29).

The above mentioned argument in favor of cognitivism in Kantian aesthetics needs to be supplemented with the effective way in which Marcus Verhaegh establishes how the pure judgements of taste can have truth value and thus claim cognitive status. However, in order to clear the grounds for the discussion of such a claim a few words about aesthetic disagreements are in order. It is commonly accepted that aesthetic disagreements cannot be resolved in the usual sense of 'resolution'. Kantian scholars have argued that this is so even for Kant. Whewell brings out this point lucidly when he says on behalf of Kant “an object cannot be judged beautiful or ugly on the basis of a general description of it …Thus aesthetic disagreements cannot be settled by rational argument … this is to say, ‘there can be no rule according to which any one is to be compelled to recognize anything as beautiful’” (1992, 253). This point is very well elaborated or rather supplemented by Kirwan. Kirwan rightly points out that, according to Kant, beauty should please not only immediately but also universally. However, he recognizes that according to Kant “The judgement of taste itself does not postulate the agreement of every one …, it only imputes this agreement to everyone … the universal voice is therefore, only an idea” (1952, §8, 56/216 AE). Kirwan interprets this statement of Kant as meaning “The claim to the agreement of others, 'as if ’ the judgement were objective, is
present, then, only as implicit in the subject’s *feeling* that the beauty belongs to the object” (2004, 16). So interpreted Kirwan's construal of the irresolvability of aesthetic disagreements, as Kant conceives it, becomes clear. According to Kirwan, “Kant must ultimately claim that differences in taste are somehow attributable to some subjects’ failure to recognize that their pleasure is based on an interest …[Hence], interest or ignorance maybe supposed to sometimes distort taste, any taste that is demonstrably disinterested and informed must be 'correct’” (Ibid, 18). But is impossible to demonstrate genuine disinterest and consequently to identify conclusively whether a pure judgement of taste put forth by a subject is true or not.

What Whewell and Kirwan have established is that aesthetic disagreement which involves a clash of two contradictory pure judgements of taste cannot be resolved by demonstrating one of them to be true and the other false. No doubt, sometimes aesthetic disagreements are resolved but that is not by proving that one of the contending judgement is false but by persuading the holder of that judgement to give up his position. What both Whewell and Kirwan point out is that the truth value of the pure aesthetic judgements is not propositional. One who claims that pure aesthetic judgements have cognitive content has to say either that such a cognitive content is devoid of truth-value or that it involves the standard propositional truth-value (characteristically associated with objective empirical judgement ) or it involves non-standard propositional truth-value. Verhaegh chooses the third option in his attempt to make room for truth in the case of pure judgements of taste.

Verhaegh acknowledges that there is much in Kant which supports the contention that pure judgements of taste do not have cognitive content. He also acknowledges that
the customary ways of establishing the claim that Kant makes room for cognitive content of pure judgements of taste do not go very far. For instance, it is argued by some that Kant does not negate the cognitive status of pure judgements of taste because pure aesthetic judgements involve universality and communicability of pleasure. We may interpret Kant as establishing a link between pure judgements of taste and cognition “because he sees a value to sharing in a universally communicable pleasure: for instance, because sharing in such a pleasure might motivate individuals to recognize a commonality that transcends their differing desires and differing conceptions of their own good” (Verhaegh 2001, 374).

Dissatisfied with approaches like the one word above, Verhaegh adopts a different strategy central to which is what he calls 'the principle of the equivalency of cognitive enhancement and truth claims', or 'the essential spectrum principle'. This principle posits a spectrum with “totally general enhancements of cognition on one end, and the determinate enhancement offered by a true proposition at the other. The less general a cognitive enhancement is, the more like a propositional truth claim it is” (Ibid, 375). Thus, at one end of this spectrum we have determinate judgements such as an objective empirical judgement which have a cognitive status in the sense their truth in propositional. These judgements are most determinate and least general. At the other end of the spectrum we have judgements which are most general and least determinant. Verhaegh has probably in mind certain kinds of reflective judgements (other than judgements of taste) such as principle teleological judgements which have cognitive content or what Verhaegh calls 'cognitive enhancement character' but they're not propositions, in any sense “It is the in-between areas of the spectrum that are most interesting in considering a connection between truth and art within the limits of Kantian
aesthetics. These can be thought of as domain-specific enhancements of cognition” (Ibid). The pure judgements of taste in this sense are partly general because “the enhancement identified in a judgement of taste must have a quality of inexhaustibility to it” (Ibid, 377). This means that when we are asked why an object is beautiful when it is judged to be so we can't enumerate a finite set of characteristics. Such an inexhaustibility Verhaegh rightly traces to the idea of beauty that figures in a pure judgements of taste and that has its source in the imagination rather than the understanding. They are partly determinate because they are about an object or more precisely a representation of an object and hence they possess truth. Verhaegh insists that “by no means must the enhancement identified in a judgement of taste be totally general. And to the degree it lacks complete generality, there is room for the enhancement to have qualities of meaning and 'aboutness', and thus of truth: for again, the more specific an enhancement, the more like a propositional truth claim it is” (Ibid, 378). Thus, according to Verhaegh, aesthetic judgements posses a cognitive content which is propositional but the propositionality, unlike determinate judgements, is not a standard one. Hence, a pure judgements of taste expresses a non standard proposition.

Verhaegh's articulation of the nature of the cognitive content of pure judgement of taste has an important merit. It makes clear what Kant means by the expression of 'critique of aesthetic judgement' which is the title of the first part of the third Critique. In the Kantian scheme (and the subsequent uses of the locution by the successors of Kant) 'critique' means 'showing the limits of '. Hence, it is clear that Kant wanted to show the limits of pure judgements of taste, as we can understand from Verhaegh, which are drawn by Kant in terms of determinate judgements on the one hand and the most general judgements like non-aesthetic reflective judgements (teleological judgement) on the
other. Such a demarcation which Kant draws has a positive content as in the case of the first two *Critiques*. That is to say, Kant seeks to display, as Verhaegh points out, the autonomy of the aesthetic. In the first *Critique* Kant established the autonomy of factual knowledge including and especially, scientific knowledge. In the second *Critique* he establishes the autonomy of the moral. The first part of the third *Critique* provides an account of truth-revelatory role of the aesthetic. To quote Verhaegh “Such an account involves respecting the autonomy from morality and knowledge of nature that Kant assigns the aesthetic” (*Ibid*, 374).

We end this chapter by recapitulating the central theses of the Kantian theory of the pure judgements of taste. Aesthetic judgements or judgements of taste are one kind of reflective judgements. Pure judgements of taste are one kind of aesthetic judgements or judgements of taste. Judgements about the beautiful are the paradigmatic cases of pure judgements of taste; that is, they are pure judgements of taste *proper*, whereas judgements about the sublime are not pure judgements of taste *proper*, and they may be called 'semi-pure judgements of taste'. Secondly, the pure judgements of taste are subjective in the sense they concern feelings of pleasure and displeasure. This claim of Kant is logically equivalent to the Kantian position that they do not involve determinate concepts but only indeterminate ones. Thirdly, though they subjective they are universally valid; however, their universal validity is not same as that of the empirical judgements. Fourthly, their universal validity involves the notion of necessity and locus of this necessity is the common human nature. Fifthly, the kind of necessity they involve brings them close to *synthetic a priori* judgements though the notion of *synthetic a priori* when applied to them is stretched beyond what Kant could envisage. Sixthly, they are singular judgements in the sense they are not about a class or subclass of objects. Finally,
the thesis maintains, in spite of opposition by many Kantian scholars that objectively in a non-empirical sense is a logical features of pure judgements of taste. And the thesis substantiates the point that we have to make room for a kind of objectively which can be justifiably call 'Aesthetic' which does justice to the fact that they are not about the objects but about their presentation.

After, delineating the above mentioned logical features of the pure judgements of taste we inquired into the question whether pure judgements of taste have cognitive content at all. After considering various positions and arguments, the chapter concludes that they have cognitive content though 'cognitivity' in their case is not same as the 'cognitivity' associated with empirical judgements.

We end this chapter by noting the crisp manner in which Graham distinguishes pure judgements of taste from other kinds of judgements when he says that a pure judgements of taste is “to be distinguished (1) from a judgement of fact because it is subjective, (2) from the merely subjective because it commands the assent of others, (3) from a judgement grounded in practical rationality because the beautiful has no practical purpose, and (4) from the merely fanciful or superficially attractive because it has the mark of purposefulness” (2005, 18).