CHAPTER IV

THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE COLD WAR CONFLICTS:

The United Nations Charter is based on the assumption of Great Power unity. Yet, the first years of the United Nations were dominated by Cold War politics. The deliberative organs of the Organization were used more as instruments to further policies of one of the parties to these conflicts than as a 'centre for harmonising actions' of these groups of nations. The Security Council was deadlocked by the Soviet veto and in the General Assembly, the uncommitted group of nations was too small and weak to turn that body into a third party in relation to the Great Power conflicts, when they assumed the proportions of acute international crises threatening international peace and security. There was an awareness that a thaw in the Cold War was essential not only for the effective functioning of the United Nations and for averting a third world war but even for resolving conflicts marginally related to the Cold War. For example Trygve Lie remarked:

"Every incident, every conflict must, in my opinion, be met squarely by the United Nations. But the atmosphere of the larger conflicts helps to generate the smaller armed conflicts...... If we had a lessening of tension, if we had a reduction of the Cold War, or cold peace, or deadlock, we would have a corresponding lessening of tension everywhere in the world." 3.

U Thant said:

"In reality, the two superpowers hold the master key to peace in the world. Little wars, or wars by little states can be contained so long as the superpowers do not pose a threat of the big, the nuclear, the ultimate war." 4.

In fact, the importance of harmonious relations between the two superpowers and their allies was stressed by all the three Secretaries General. Trygve Lie for example, was not only convinced that accord between the Great Powers was essential but saw a mediating role for his office in the Great Power conflicts. Hammarskjold and U Thant also, on many occasions, underscored
the importance of harmonious relations between the Great Powers and attempted to use their office in promoting them. The first part of this chapter gives a general survey of Secretary General’s initiatives in relation to Cold War conflicts and in the second part case studies of the Secretary General’s role in two such conflicts are made.

In the Iranian Question - one of the first cases of this type to come before the United Nations - he advised the Iranian Government to enter into direct negotiations with the Soviet Union and promised his help to Iran through Mr. Sobolov, then Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations. The advice was not taken and the Council was summoned. When the Soviet delegate walked out in protest against the Council’s rejection of his plea for a postponement of the debate, the Secretary General was asked to obtain information from the two Governments about the status of negotiations then going on. In April 1946 the Soviet delegate demanded that the question be dropped from the Council’s agenda as an agreement had been reached between the two Governments. Such a move was opposed by a majority of the Council. He chose to express his views through a legal memorandum in which he argued that following withdrawal of its case by the Iranian representative the question be automatically removed from the agenda unless the Security Council voted an investigation or recommended methods of adjustment or if a member brought it up again as a situation or dispute. His opinion, though, did not affect the decision of the Council on the subject.

Two other matters involving the Cold War, in which his interventions in the Security Council had little influence were: his support to the admission of all the applicant nations to the membership of the United Nations and his support of the case for the representation of the People’s Republic
of China in the Security Council. In January 1950, the Soviet delegation threatened a boycott of the Security Council until the Nationalist Chinese representatives were replaced by the representatives of Peoples Republic of China. The Secretary General got a legal memorandum prepared by the Secretariat which argued that representation of Communist China on the Council—a collective act—need not depend on the recognition of the Government by other nations which was an individual decision so far as these were concerned. It argued that under Article 4 of the Charter, Communist China alone could use its resources in fulfilment of its obligations under the Charter as it alone exercised effective authority within the territory of the State and was habitually obeyed by the people. He held negotiations with representatives of the members of the Council on the basis of this memorandum. However, his memorandum was soon widely known and he had to publish it. In the circumstances Lie's intervention did not have much influence on the position of the parties. Similarly, his proposals for a United Nations Guard Force to be recruited by the Secretary General, pending Great Power agreement on a United Nations Force under Article 43 of the Charter, did not meet with encouraging response from the Great Powers.

Mr. Lie took a significant initiative to resolve the Great Power conflict in Berlin (1948). When the question came before the Security Council, meeting in Paris, he kept himself informed of the positions of both the sides through his Assistant Secretaries General: Abraham Feller and William Stone- man for the U.S. and Arkady Sobolov for the U.S.S.R. Lie's good offices were sought by the American delegate to the United Nations to resolve the crisis. His approach to the question was in the form of a compromise involving a simultaneous lifting of the Soviet blockade of Berlin and the acceptance by the Western powers of the Soviet currency in the city. Though he was encouraged
in his efforts by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the British Government turned down his initiative. His proposals leaked to the press and got pre-
mature publicity. Later, he and Dr. Evatt, president of the General Assembly, made an open appeal to the Great Powers endorsing the General Assembly's resolution on the subject urging them to open conversations and to take other steps for resolving the crisis. The appeal and his initiative exposed the Secretary General to the accusation that he was favouring the position of one of the parties. The crisis was finally resolved by direct negotia-
tions between the Soviet and the American delegates to the United Nations.

The most important initiative by Lie for relaxing Cold War tensions was his attempt to get accepted certain procedures by the Great Powers for the improvement of their normal relations. This formed the subject of his 'Memorandum of Points for Consideration in the Development of a Twenty Year Program for Achieving Peace Through the United Nations.' The aim of the memo-
Memorandum was to reestablish the United Nations as a meeting place for the two sides and to encourage its use for conciliation and the promotion of peace. The Memorandum suggested periodic meetings of the Security Council under Article 28 for a general review of the outstanding issues before the United Nations and to promote agreement among the Great Powers; the desi-
rability of universality of membership in the United Nations; reactivation of negotiations for disarmament - both conventional and Atomic; attempt to establish a control system for Atomic energy through a conference of scien-
tists to be convened by the Secretary General and the creation of a small United Nations Force under Article 43 as an interim measure. Five other points in the Memorandum dealt with an active program of technical assistance for economic development, a more vigorous use of the United Nations special-
lized agencies, development of the work of the United Nations for wider
observance and respect for human rights and freedoms; use of the United Nations for advancement of dependent and colonial people to a place of equality, and use of all the powers of the Charter and the United Nations to develop international law towards a enforceable world law. He personally took these proposals to the Governments of the four Great Powers for discussion. The response of the Governments was only 'moderately' encouraging and he observes that in his resolve to continue his efforts he was "fortified more by the support of the "man in the street" than of the Governments." His position in the Korean crisis lost him the confidence of the Soviet Union and, therefore, he found that he could not act effectively as a third party to further the cause of peace between the parties to the conflict. This was one of the considerations which prompted him to submit his resignation.

Dag Hammarskjold's approach to the issue of Cold War conflict was more cautious. He was convinced that the proper role of the United Nations in relation to the Cold War was 'primarily as a center of reconciliation.' He deprecated the tendency to use the United Nations for winning 'voting victories,' and suggested greater use of the United Nations machinery for serious negotiations. To this end he suggested periodic meetings of the Security Council under Article 28 as well as holding of Great Power Summit within the framework of the United Nations. On the whole in his approach to the Cold War issues there was a greater emphasis on 'quiet diplomacy.' He himself did not take any spectacular public initiatives to resolve Cold War conflicts. Instead he tried to limit the areas of Cold War conflicts by practising what he termed 'preventive diplomacy.' This in itself, he believed, would ultimately help in bringing about a relaxation between the Great Powers.
However, there were two cases in which he took an active role: the release of American airmen imprisoned in China and the Hungarian crisis of 1956.

The General Assembly by a resolution late in 1954 condemned the Chinese action - trial and imprisonment of the American airmen - and requested the Secretary General to seek the release of the captured personnel 'by the means most appropriate in his judgment' and to report before December 31, 1954. Hammarskjöld gave a liberal interpretation to the mandate and cabled the Chinese Premier seeking an invitation to Peking. The Chinese Prime Minister accepted the proposed visit of the Secretary General, though he characterised the United Nations resolution as an interference in the internal affairs of China. Hammarskjöld commented later on the contradiction in the resolution, which on the one hand condemned the Chinese Government and on the other hand expected it to be persuaded by the Secretary General to comply with the resolution. This necessitated Hammarskjöld's negotiating with the Chinese Government in his capacity as Secretary General and not as an agent of the General Assembly, whose rights in the case China would not recognise. Hence, also, what he negotiated for was a 'unilateral' action by the Chinese Government to release the detained personnel. The airmen were released in August 1955. This was perhaps one of the best examples of quiet diplomacy. The Secretary General acted as a medium for exchange of information which led to a lessening of tension and more or less frequent ambassadorial contacts between the U.S. and China at Geneva.

Three of the conflicts of this nature which U Thant faced were: the Cuban crisis 1962, the Dominican crisis 1965, and the Vietnam War.

In April 1965 a civil war broke out in the Dominican Republic and on 28th April U.S. marines were landed in the country to protect the U.S.
citizens there. The Secretary General Security Council was convened at the request of the Soviet Union. Even while the Security Council debated the question the Organization of the American States appointed a committee to offer its good offices to restore peace in the area and later the O.A.S. established an Inter-American Peace Force to help restore normal conditions. This Force included the American troops already landed there. The Security Council failed to call for a withdrawal of the U.S. troops and did not condemn the American intervention either. It merely called for a strict ceasefire and invited the Secretary General to "send as an urgent measure, a representative to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of reporting to the Security Council on the present situation." U Thant appointed Jose Antonio Mayobre as his representative. A twenty four hour ceasefire was agreed upon on May 21. The Security Council by a resolution requested a transformation of the suspension of hostilities into a permanent ceasefire. Complaints of violation of the ceasefire by the parties and by the Inter-American Peace Force continued. The O.A.S., however, held that it was not a party to the ceasefire. While the Secretary General kept the Council informed of the political and military developments in the country, the chief initiatives for pacification and for reestablishment of government, law and order were taken by the representative of the O.A.S. A Provisional Government was established on September 3 and later elections were held under the supervision of the O.A.S. Though in his introduction to the Annual Report 1964-65 U Thant expressed the view that the presence of his representative was a seemingly 'moderating factor in a difficult and dangerous situation', in some of his press conferences he admitted that his role was restricted because of the Cold War nature of the conflict.
Since 1963 U Thant has attempted to bring the parties to the Vietnam conflict to a negotiating table. His efforts initially were of the nature of quiet diplomacy. In 1963 they were directed towards the stability of South Vietnam; in 1964 towards holding of private dialogues between the parties primarily concerned, and in 1965 towards bringing about a cessation of hostilities and the holding of informal conferences with the participation of the big powers, including Peking. These efforts were not successful. He did not think that United Nations could play any meaningful role in the resolution of the conflict or that a Security Council debate be of any use. United Nations could not be involved in Vietnam, he argued, because at least two Great Powers were opposed to it, and because the parties directly interested in the Vietnam conflict had openly voiced the view that the United Nations as such had no place in the search for a solution to the problems.

In 1964 he sought to bring about a meeting in Burma of the representative of North Vietnam and the U.S. The U.S. Government did not respond favourably. In 1965 he offered several formulas to the parties for shifting to the discussion table the quest for a solution of the conflict.

Since then U Thant has expressed his opinions more openly through his addresses and press conferences. He has favoured independence and non-aligned movement or neutralization of Vietnam guaranteed by the big powers including Peking, and a reconvening of the Geneva Conference. Specifically, he advocated an unconditional cessation of bombing North Vietnam, scaling down of all military operations and discussions among the participants in the war. In 1966-68 he conducted an almost running debate with the U.S. leaders through his press conferences on the issues involved in the war. He stressed that military methods would not bring a solution of the problem; only the diplomatic method of negotiations might produce some useful results. He denied that
the so called 'fight for democracy' was relevant to the realities of the situation, and considered any description of the conflict as contest between communism and liberal democracy as illusory. Nor did he feel that the National Liberation Front was a stooge of North Vietnam though he admitted that it might have been helped by it. He also rejected the 'Domino Theory'. The motivating force behind the war for the Vietnamese was nationalism and not communism he argued. He rejected the U.S. view regarding aggression by North Vietnam and thought that the origin of the war was related to the 'innermost yearnings of the long suffering people for independence and their determination to fashion their own future without foreign interference.' He repeated his conviction time and again that the bombing of North Vietnam did not affect the rate of infiltration of the North Vietnamese to the South but only hardened their resolve to prosecute the war. He questioned the morality and legality of such bombing and repeated his conviction that once bombing was stopped meaningful talks would take place. He sought to add weight to his views by pointing out that they were supported by the non-aligned Asian nations and by arguing that if a resolution embodying his views were presented to the General Assembly a majority would vote for it and that his views reflected the "collective conscience of international community." He even made lessening of tensions in Vietnam one of the conditions for accepting a second term in 1966.

In 1967 the U.S. representative to the United Nations asked him to take the initiative necessary to reach a ceasefire. In February 1968 on a visit to New Delhi he met the Consul General of North Vietnam and sought clarifications on its stand regarding the holding of talks after a bombing halt. He received the clarifications while he was in Paris which he conveyed to President Johnson and Dean Rusk. However, the President repeated the
St. Antonio formula as the proper solution to the conflict.

U Thant has on several occasions made clear that his initiatives were in a private capacity and that he was "exerting efforts to contribute towards a solution of the Vietnam war as an individual - as U Thant - not as the Secretary General of the United Nations." Yet, it is clear that it is the vantage point of his office which facilitates his contacts with the contending parties and gives prominence to his views on the conflict.

II.

CASE STUDY OF THE HUNGARIAN CRISIS 1956:

France and the United Kingdom and the U.S. brought the 'situation in Hungary' to the notice of the Security Council on October 27, 1956, under Article 34 of the Charter. They claimed that foreign forces were suppressing the rights of the Hungarian people. The Hungarian representative protested against the Security Council's consideration of the issue as it was within Hungary's domestic jurisdiction. However, the question was included as an item on the agenda of the Council on October 28, and was discussed in the Council between October 28 and November 4, 1956. To the charge that the Soviet troops had intervened in Hungary, the Soviet representative replied that the Soviet troops located in Hungary according to the Warsaw Treaty had gone to the help of the Hungarian Government on its appeal. On November 1, the new Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy informed the Secretary General that more Soviet troops were entering Hungary and that he had protested to the Soviet ambassador against it and had demanded their instant withdrawal. He also informed that his Government repudiated the Warsaw Treaty and declared Hungary's neutrality. He demanded a four great powers defence of its neutrality by the four Great Powers and requested that this be included as an item on the General Assembly's agenda. On November 2, the Soviet representative
quoted a Soviet Government statement of October 30 to the effect that it had instructed a withdrawal of its military units from Budapest as soon as the Hungarian Government thought it necessary. He denied that additional Soviet troops were being sent to Hungary. On November 2, Imre Nagy, confirmed that the Soviet troops were being reinforced and wanted the Security Council to instruct the Soviet and the Hungarian Governments to start negotiations immediately. He wanted the Secretary General to call upon the Great Powers to agree recognize Hungarian neutrality.

On November 3, the U.S. representative submitted a draft resolution which called upon the U.S.S.R. to desist forthwith from any intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary and that it should withdraw its forces without delay. The resolution did not entrust the Secretary General with any political tasks but merely asked him to explore the need of the Hungarian people for food, medicine and other supplies. The representative of Hungary informed the Council that talks for Soviet troops withdrawal were taking place on a military level and that according to Soviet proposals no more Soviet troops would cross the border until an agreement was reached. The Soviet representative confirmed this. On the 6th November the Security Council met against amidst reports of new Soviet attacks in Budapest. The Soviet representative had no official information to give and urged postponement of the debate. A revised U.S. draft calling upon the Soviet Union not to introduce additional armed forces and to withdraw without delay all its forces from the country, was vetoed by the U.S.S.R. Thereupon the Council passed by 10 to 1 a resolution, proposed by the U.S., calling an emergency session of the General Assembly under the Uniting For Peace Resolution (Res/A/377(v) ) to consider the Hungarian situation. After its adoption the
Secretary General made a statement that the observations made by him at 751 meeting of the Security Council applied to this case also.

The Second Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly met on 4th November. The Soviet representative opposed the inclusion of the Hungarian Question on the agenda because the Nagy Government had fallen and a new Government had been formed in Hungary. He declared that Nagy's communications to the United Nations were unconstitutional and illegal. What is more the question was within the domestic jurisdiction of Hungary. The item was included in the agenda by a vote of 53 to 8 with 7 abstentions. A draft resolution was introduced which would condemn the use of the Soviet troops to suppress the efforts of Hungarian people to reassert their rights and call upon the U.S.S.R. to desist forthwith from armed attack on Hungary and from intervention in the internal affairs of the country. It called upon the U.S.S.R. to withdraw its forces from Hungary. In its fourth paragraph it requested the Secretary General to investigate the situation caused by foreign intervention in Hungary, to observe the situation directly through representatives named by him, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at the earliest moment. It also requested him to suggest, as soon as possible, methods to bring to an end the foreign intervention in Hungary in accordance with the principles of the Charter. The resolution called upon Hungary and the U.S.S.R. to permit the observers to enter Hungary and give them freedom of movement. Another duty given to the Secretary General was to enquire into the needs of the Hungarian people for food, medicine and similar supplies and report to the General Assembly. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 50 to 8 with 15 abstentions.

The new Hungarian Government of Janos Kadar reiterated the position contained in the declaration of the Hungarian Government of 26th October and
declared Nagy's appeals to the United Nations to be invalid. The legality of the Kadar Government was questioned in the Assembly but the Credentials Committee merely recommended that the Assembly take no decision on the matter.

On November 8 the Secretary General drew the attention of the Assembly to an aide memoire sent by him to the Hungarian Government asking if it would allow observers appointed by him to enter Hungary and carry out their commission. He also reported that he had taken steps to investigate the situation on the basis of information available but admitted that he could not suggest a method to bring to an end the foreign intervention unless he had the cooperation of the Hungarian Government and unless his investigation was completed.

A resolution was sponsored by five nations (Italy, Cuba, Ireland, Pakistan and Peru) which called upon the U.S.S.R. to withdraw its forces and considered that free elections should be held in Hungary under the United Nations auspices. It reaffirmed the earlier mandates to the Secretary General and further asked him to report on compliance of this Resolution. It was passed by a vote of 48 to 11 with 16 abstentions. Another draft resolution sponsored by the U.S. on the subject of relief work which also called upon the U.S.S.R. to stop its actions against Hungary, stigmatized as violations of the standards and principles of international law, justice and morality was also passed.

On 10th November the Secretary General further urged Hungary to reply to his earlier letter and showed his willingness to discuss modalities for the visit of observers. A copy of this letter was sent to the U.S.S.R. Government requesting its support to his efforts. By another aide memoire to the Hungarian Government he sought information about the relief needs of the Hungarian people. In November 12, the Hungarian Government reiterated
its view that the question was within its domestic jurisdiction. It alleged that 'fascist elements and criminals' had taken the lead of the mass demonstrations and so the aid of the Soviet troops was requested. It further stated that after the restoration of law and order negotiations for their withdrawal would be undertaken, and turned down the request for receiving the Secretary General's representatives. By another letter, the next day, Hungarian Government showed willingness to discuss with the Secretary General the best means of providing the relief assistance required and the ways in which his representatives might participate in the programme of assistance on the spot.

The Secretary General refused to be drawn into a discussion concerning the Assembly's decision and invited Hungary to reconsider its refusal to admit his representatives. In a conversation with the Hungarian Foreign Minister in New York Hammarskjöld offered to go to Budapest to evolve the basis of the United Nations' humanitarian assistance — an obvious attempt to establish direct contact with the Government. But the Hungarian Government responded by merely showing willingness to meet the Secretary General in Rome both to discuss relief aid as well as its position on the General Assembly Resolutions.

The Secretary General appointed on the 16th November Judge Oscar Gundersen (Norway), Arthur Lall (India) and Alberto Lleras (Colombia) to investigate the situation caused by the foreign invasion.

In the Assembly debates after November 19th charges were made of deportations of Hungarian citizens. Two draft resolutions were introduced, one by Cuba and the other by Ceylon, India and Indonesia. The former called upon Hungary and to compel the Soviet Union to put an end to deportation of Hungarian citizens and to comply with the Assembly's earlier resolutions.
The three Power draft resolution noted conflicting accounts about deportations and urged Hungary to cooperate with the Secretary General, without prejudice to its sovereignty, in clarifying the situation. On November 21, Hammarskjold stated in the Assembly that he stood by his proposal to go to Budapest to discuss humanitarian activities and the wider aspect referred to by the Hungarian Foreign Minister. The representative of Hungary repeated his Government's willingness to discuss with the Secretary General arrangements for the meetings between him and representatives of his Government. Both the resolutions were adopted by the Assembly.

In his report on 'aspects of the present situation' the Secretary General stated that he had sought information from the U.S.S.R. and Hungary on the points dealt with in the resolutions passed by the Assembly. He had no information to give on the compliance of the Assembly's earlier resolutions relating to withdrawal of troops or political matters. Hammarskjold informed the Assembly that if he was invited he would visit to arrange a visit to Budapest to establish contact with the Government in order to discuss both humanitarian activities as well as the position taken by the Hungarian relating to the resolutions of the Assembly. He hinted that his contacts with the Hungarian Government be considered as "based on his position under the Charter with the wider scope that such a standpoint might give to his approach." He noted that even for presenting the report on investigation direct observation or opportunities were necessary. On December 3, the Acting Foreign Minister of Hungary still maintained his Government's position regarding United Nations observers and reiterated his Government's willingness to have its representatives negotiate with the Secretary General at Rome and New York immediately and have the Secretary General in Budapest at a later date.
The General Assembly continued discussion of the subject. A fourteen nations draft resolution was introduced. It pressed Hungary to comply with the Assembly's earlier resolutions and to permit the Secretary General's observers to enter the State. It asked the Secretary General to send observers to Hungary and other countries for the purpose. In the debate the non-aligned nations pressed Hungary to admit the observers and to agree to a visit by the Secretary General. On 4th December the Hungarian representative showed willingness to discuss with the Secretary General the date and arrangements for his visit. The Assembly was adjourned. Hammarskjöld informed the Assembly after his meeting with the Foreign Minister that he had suggested December 16 for his visit. He proposed to be there from 16th to 18th December. He proposed to send Philip de Seynes to Budapest in the next few days as part of his staff. The Hungarian representative had forwarded the suggestion to his Government. The General Assembly formally accepted his statement. Nevertheless it went on to adopt the fourteen power draft resolution by a vote of 54 to 10 with 14 abstentions.

The Secretary General did not receive a reply from Hungary even by 7th December; and of the other Governments only Austria accepted the request to allow United Nations observers. Discussion in the Assembly continued on 10th, 11th and 12th December. A comprehensive draft resolution sponsored by 2 twenty nations was before the Assembly. It condemned the violation of the Charter by the U.S.S.R. and its intervention in Hungary and called for the withdrawal of its forces under United Nations observation. Amendments were preferred by Ceylon, India and Indonesia to moderate the resolution and to include a request to the Secretary General to negotiate with the Soviet and the Hungarian representatives at the United Nations and to make efforts to visit Budapest and Moscow to promote a speedy solution.
with the cooperation of all concerned. This last suggestion was accepted by the sponsors and so the draft now authorized the Secretary General to take any initiative he deemed helpful in relation to the problem in conformity with the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the Assembly.

Two more draft resolutions - one sponsored by India, Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon and the other by Austria - were introduced. These would have given greater scope to the Secretary General to act as a third party in the crisis. The Australian draft resolution authorized the Secretary General to enter into discussions with Member nations to achieve a constructive solution of the Hungarian problem. The three power draft resolution requested the Secretary General to initiate efforts both with the Hungarian and the Soviet Government through their representatives in New York, and to consider without delay the question of visiting Moscow in addition to the efforts he was making in regard to Budapest, to assist him in promoting a speedy solution with the cooperation of all concerned. The three drafts were discussed by the Assembly on 10th, 11th and 12th December. A majority of the Members wanted the Assembly to pronounce its judgment over the issue. The Hungarian representative boycotted the session during the discussion.

The twenty power draft was adopted by a vote of 50 to 8 with 13 abstentions. The two other drafts were then withdrawn. On December 12 by a note verbale the Hungarian Government postponed the Secretary General's visit indefinitely.

On January 5, 1957, Hammarskjold reported the opinion of the investigatory committee that its work be suspended because of lack of facilities for observation and cooperation of the Government. The Secretary General suggested to the Assembly that it reconsider the form of the investigatory activities through a special committee of the Assembly under broader terms of reference. The General Assembly accepted the suggestion by its resolution 1132 (X).
The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962):

The discovery, in the middle of October, 1962, by the American Intelligence, of a planned build up of offensive weapons in Cuba precipitated an international crisis which resulted in a direct confrontation between two Great Powers and brought the world to the brink of a major war. Earlier, there was widespread agitation in the public mind in the U.S. over the arms build up in Cuba with the help of the Soviet Union. In response to this President Kennedy had, in a press statement, warned that while there was no evidence of the presence of offensive ground to ground missiles or other significant offensive capability in Cuba, "were it otherwise, the gravest issues would arise." The warning was repeated by the President in his statement to the Press on September 13, 1962. He had said that "if Cuba should ever...... become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its security and that of its allies....." To these warnings a Tass communique of September 11, 1962 seemed to reply by assuring that the armament sent to Cuba were designed exclusively for defensive purposes and that there was no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for retaliation or repulsion of aggression to Cuba. Even in his interview with the U.S. President on October 18, Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister assured that the Soviet assistance to Cuba was pursued solely for the purpose of contributing to the defense capability of Cuba. But by this time, the U.S. had irrefutable evidence that preparations for stationing M.A.B.M.s and I.R.B.M.s were being made in in Cuba.

On October 22, President Kennedy, in a radio message to the nation, announced that he had unmistakable evidence that a series of "offensive missile sites" were under preparation in Cuba for installing I.R.B.M.s and
M.A.B.M.s. This, according to him, constituted an explicit threat to the peace and security of the Americas in violation of the Rio Pact of 1947, Charter of the United Nations and repeated Soviet assurances on the point. He pointed out that "nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as definite threat to peace." He charged that the "secret, swift and extraordinary build up" of a communist missile in Cuba constituted an unacceptable provocation and an unjustified change in the status quo. As a first step to meet this threat he had constituted a "strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba." He warned that if the build up continued it would justify the extension of 'quarantine' to other types of cargo and carriers and 'further action.' In the same statement he defined the objective of the U.S. action as being "to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere." To this end he warned that any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union on the U.S. requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union. The President offered to discuss proposals for removal of tension on both the sides including the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba.

The U.S. called a meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Organization of the American States. The Council of the O.A.S. meeting as the Provisional Organ of Consultation on October 23, recommended to the member states to take all measures, including individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba can not continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet
powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent.

A meeting of the United Nations Security Council was called on the same day. It had two draft resolutions before it. The U.S. draft noted with concern the secret introduction of nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons into Cuba and under Article 40 of the Charter called for "the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons." It authorized and requested the Acting Secretary General "to despatch to Cuba a United Nations observer corps to assure and report on compliance with this resolution." It also called for a termination of the quarantine after compliance with the first paragraph and recommended that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world.

The Soviet draft resolution condemned the American action aimed at violating the United Nations Charter and increasing the threat of war. It 'insisted' on a revocation of the American interdiction and 'proposed' to the U.S. Government to 'cease interference' in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba. In its final paragraph the resolution called upon the U.S.A., the Republic of Cuba and the U.S.S.R. to "establish contact and enter into negotiations for the purpose of restoring the situation to normal and thus removing the threat of an outbreak of war." It is significant that both the drafts felt the need for negotiations. A draft resolution sponsored by Ghana and the U.A.R. requesting the Acting Secretary General to confer with the parties in order to normalise the situation was introduced
on October 24. It called upon the parties meanwhile to refrain from any action that might aggravate the situation.

In the Council meetings the main charge of Ambassador Stevenson was that Castro's Cuba had given the Soviet Union a 'bridge head and staging area' in the Western Hemisphere. The Soviet Union on the other hand defended the Soviet arms aid to Cuba by citing threats from the U.S. to Cuba and asserted that its aid was only for improving Cuba's defensive capability.

On 24th October, U Thant speaking in the Security Council noted that there was common ground in the positions of the parties to the conflict viz. the urgent need for negotiations and in the speech of the stopping of the armament of Cuba in exchange for a non-aggression guarantee by the U.S. U Thant informed the Council that he had sent earlier, an appeal to the Governments of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., to allow time for the parties to get together with a view to resolving the conflict. This, according to him, involved the "voluntary suspension of the quarantine measures" for two or three weeks and also a "voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba." He offered his services to the parties. He also called for a suspension of the construction of military installations in Cuba during the period of negotiations. He revealed that he had directed this appeal at the instance of a large number of representatives of member nations of the United Nations.

On 25th October the Soviet Prime Minister accepted the Acting Secretary General's appeal as well as his proposals. President Kennedy showed willingness of his Government to the preliminary talks to determine if satisfactory arrangements could be assured but insisted that the threat was created by the secret introduction of the offensive weapons in Cuba and the answer lay in removing them. On October 25, U Thant further requested the Soviet Premier to instruct the Soviet ships on their way to Cuba to stay away from the
in interception area for a limited time only, in order to avoid immediate confrontation and to provide time for discussions on modalities of a possible agreement to settle the problem according to the United Nations Charter. He expressed confidence that the U.S. would cooperate in avoiding a direct confrontation of ships for the same period. He directed a similar appeal to the U.S. president. The proposal was accepted by the U.S. president on the same day. The Soviet Union conveyed its acceptance on the 25th. Both the parties appreciated the role and endeavours of the Acting Secretary General. When the U.S. reported continued preparation of the missile sites, U Thant appealed to Cuba to suspend the construction and development of major military installations in Cuba during the period of negotiations. However, Castro accepted the proposals only if the U.S. desisted from the naval blockade of the country. In the meanwhile consultations between the Acting Secretary General and representatives of the three countries continued.

In a letter to President Kennedy on 25th October, Khrushchev agreed to remove the offensive weapons from Cuba under United Nations observation and supervision and to undertake to halt the further introduction of such weapons in Cuba if, upon the establishment of adequate arrangements, the U.S. agreed to remove the quarantine and give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. However, by a letter the next day the withdrawal of missiles was made conditional upon a similar withdrawal of U.S. missiles stationed in Turkey. President Kennedy responded favourably to the proposals contained in the letter of the 25th of October. And though he openly rejected the equation between the U.S. missiles in Turkey and the 
SAM missiles in Cuba, Robert Kennedy, the U.S. Attorney General assured Ambassador Dobrynin at the United Nations that the American missiles in Turkey would be withdrawn.
at a convenient date. Accordingly the Soviet Premier gave instructions for dismantling and removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba.

U Thant had accepted an invitation from the Cuban Prime Minister to visit Cuba. He visited Havana to discuss with the Cuban Government a solution to the conflict - especially the part relating to the United Nations observation of dismantling and removal of the weapons from Cuba. In Cuba U Thant gave an impression of being an emissary of the forty-five non-aligned members of the United Nations. The Cuban Prime Minister, however, turned down the suggestions of the Secretary General. A visit by Antas Mikoyan followed. His efforts at persuading the Cuban Prime Minister also were of no avail. More conversations between the Secretary General and the representatives of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. took place. As a result the U.S. was satisfied with inspection on sea of ships returning from Cuba with the Soviet missiles and with counting the IL 28 bombers leaving Cuba. By a joint letter of January 7, 1963 the U.S. and the Soviet Union requested deletion of the item from the council's agenda.

CONCLUSIONS:

The two case studies seek to illustrate clearly the limited role of the Secretary General in dealing with and resolving Cold War conflicts. Hammarskjold and U Thant on the basis of their experience came to the conclusion that there is little scope for mediation and other initiatives in such conflicts.

The U.S. draft resolutions submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly during the 1956 crisis, as well as the statements of its leaders outside the United Nations made it clear that it had no intentions of using military force to check the Soviet intervention in Hungary. The simultaneous Middle Eastern Crisis involving the U.S. allies - Britain and France -
made such a venture highly unlikely. This obviously removed one of the aids which could have been used by a third party to secure the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Hungary. In 1962, on the other hand, the United Nations was caught in a crisis involving a dangerous confrontation between the Great Powers which threatened peace and security. While the Security Council proved inadequate to meet the situation in both the cases its deliberations on the Cuban Crisis enabled the Secretary General to find a common ground in the positions of the two parties on the basis of which he attempted to resolve the conflict.

During the 1956 crisis the General Assembly vacillated between its position as an organ of conciliation and its attempt to sit in moral judgment over the Soviet actions. The result was a schizophrenic attitude in which the United Nations was divided and split by the rival ambitions of the Western bloc which attempted to exploit it for promoting its own ends in the Cold War, and the attempts of the non-aligned nations to use the United Nations as an instrument of conciliation. This is especially well brought out in the later stages of the Assembly's consideration of the Hungarian question, when pressure was being brought on Hungary for admitting United Nations observers and particularly for accepting a visit to Budapest by the Secretary General. Him Fendel and many of the non-aligned nations repeatedly pointed out that the condemnatory resolutions of the Assembly would interfere with the negotiations between the Secretary General and the Hungarian Government and would not help in achieving the goal. India's Krishna Menon put the case very clearly when he said, "it is not possible, except by military intervention, to alter the course of affairs in Hungary, unless we bring... into the relationship of things whatever authority, whatever Government, exists in Hungary... We should try to get international observation and not to seek to sit necessarily in
judgment, not to violate the sovereignty of that country." However, the Assembly went on to record its 'moral' position by adopting the West sponsored resolution. The Secretary General himself seemed as aware of this contradiction when he suggested that his visit to Budapest could be looked at not so much as that of an agent of the Assembly but in his independent role under the Charter. Some of the non-aligned nations also sought to emphasize this aspect of the Secretary General's initiatives. In the process of peaceful settlement a multilateral endorsement of the case of one party against the other is likely to inhibit rather than to facilitate consiliatory processes, the non-aligned nations sought to use the office of the Secretary General for starting the negotiations. However, the subsequent resolutions of the Assembly reverted to the moralistic tones of the earlier condamnatory resolutions. According to Arshina Menon the visit of the Secretary General would have materialised but for such 'moral' resolutions. Unlike the Hungarian crisis, in the Cuban Missile Crisis the United Nations afforded greater scope to the Secretary General to act as a third party.

It may be noted that in the Cuban crisis discretion seemed to have proved the better part of valour for the Soviet Union at least and the office of the Secretary General was used to restore the status quo ante and the balance of power between the two superpowers in the Caribbean. In Hungary the United Nations was not allowed to alleviate the situation without disturbing the over-all balance of power between the Soviet Union and the West that existed prior to October 1956. That scope for such a role existed can be seen from the statements of the Polish and the Yugoslav delegations to the Assembly.

It is remarkable that no proposals for using the services of the Secretary General were made in the early stages of the Hungarian conflict
when the matter was still before the Security Council. The Secretary General himself was hard pressed for time as he was caught between the Middle Eastern and the Hungarian crises. It would be difficult to blame the Secretary General if he devoted the greater share of his time and energies towards dealing with the Middle Eastern crisis which seemed more amenable to solution and where his role as a third party — formulating the consensus, providing a face saving device to the parties etc. — was exploited to the full.

Unlike the Cuban crisis, the Hungarian crises revealed little common ground in the bargaining positions of the parties. Hence the Secretary General could do little to formulate a consensus and act on it. In 1962 the objectives of the U.S., one of the parties to the conflict, were limited in nature being aimed at restoring the status quo and balance of power.

In 1962 apart from the formulation of the consensus, the role of the Secretary General was fruitful in i) averting an immediate showdown on the seas between the Great Powers and thus providing time for negotiations; ii) enabling one of the parties — the Soviet Union — to save its face by openly acceding to the Secretary General’s request; and more importantly iii) establishing contact between the two parties and facilitating negotiations under his auspices.

However, the role and influence of the Secretary General in such conflicts ought not to be exaggerated. The superpowers have allowed only a narrow scope for the intervention of the Secretary General where their vital interests were involved, and particularly, where such intervention was likely to disturb their spheres of influence. Even in averting a Great Power confrontation as in Cuba his role was limited. It is significant that the substance of U Thant’s proposals of October 24 were not accepted
by the U.S. and Soviet ships were diverted from their course to Cuba before U Thant's appeal of 25th October, which was accepted by both U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Though the Secretary General's office was used later by the Soviet Union as a face saving device and also for establishing a communication link with the U.S. the bargain was struck as a result of direct contacts between the two Governments.
NOTES AND REFERENCES: CHAPTER IV:

6. Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace* (New York: The Macmillan Co.1954) p.35. It is also interesting to note that F.D.Roosevelt had visualised such a role for the office when he suggested designating the office 'Moderator'. See Chapter one above.
7. The Iranian complaint was that the Soviet Union was not withdrawing its forces from Iran according to the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. Britain had withdrawn its forces from Iran.
8. The following account is based on Lie's autobiography op.cit., Chapter V.
9. Ibid., op.cit., p.75.
10. Ibid. p.78.
11. S/39
14. In 1948, consequent upon disagreement over the four power control on Soviet currency in Berlin, the Soviet Union cut off western access to the West Berlin by rail, road and river. This was met by a massive airlift of supplies from West Germany to the West Berlin.
15. Ibid. op.cit., p.201.
16. Ibid., p.213.
19. Ibid., p.318.
20. Ibid., p.318.
26. The Concept and its Implications are studied in the following chapter.
27. A detailed case study of the Hungarian crisis is made later in this chapter.
28. In 1954 the Communist Government of China had revealed that it had tried 11 American airmen (U.A. personnel in Korea) for espionage and had sentenced them for long terms of imprisonment - a violation of Korean Armistice Agreement.
35. The Cuban Crisis is discussed as a case study later in this chapter.
   For a good account of the crisis and its background, see Theodore Draper, "The Dominican Crisis - A Case Study in American policy." Commentary Vol.40 No.6 December 1965.
38. S/6375 May 1, 1965.
   In a press conference U Thant said that if bold steps had been taken in 1964 today's tragic developments could have been avoided.
   See Ibid., p.41.
   Also March 1965 p.33.
53. Note to Correspondents No.2951 in Secretary General Speaks (New York: U.N.office of Public Information nd).
   Also Introduction to the Annual Report 1964-65, op.cit., p.11.
59. Ibid. loc.cit.
61. U.N. Press Release S/6502 709 May 11, 1967. August Secretaries General have often sought to augment their influence by deriving additional support of nation or groups of nations.
   See Chapter III above.

63. Ibid., p.104.

64. See Chapter I above.


68. The Polish upheaval in 1956 and the proceedings of the 20th Congress of the Communist party in the Soviet Union encouraged a movement for democratization and national independence in Hungary. It reached a critical stage when the student demonstrators demanded withdrawal of Soviet troops, reconstitution of government under Imre Nagy, freedom of expression and improvement in the condition of workers. The demonstrations turned into mass uprising which led to intervention of Soviet troops on October 24. However the next day Erno Gefo, the party secretary was replaced by Janos Kader and Nagy became Premier.

The Nagy Government announced abolition of one party system, request/withdrawal of Soviet troops. They were withdrawn from Budapest on 27th. Nagy took over foreign ministry and declared Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Even while negotiations for withdrawal of troops were continuing, Soviet troops intervened for a second time on November 3. Janos Kader was announced to have formed a new government and to have requested the Soviet troops help to defeat 'fascism and reaction'. See for an impartial account of the Hungarian Revolution, Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary. UNOR/XI/Supp.1, No.18/A 3592.

72. A/3251 November 1, 1956.
73. SCOR/Lith year/S. V. 752 November 2, 1956 pp.24 and 26.
74. S/3726 November 2, 1956.
75. S/3730.
77. Ibid., p.20.
80. S/3733.
82. A/3311 November 4, 1956.
83. UNOR/ESII/S. V. 564 November 4, 1956 p.4.
84. A/3286. as amended by France. Originally the draft merely said 'existing situation'.
87. UNOR/ESII/569 November 8, 1956 p.44. Also A/3315 November 8, 1956.
89. A/3319; Res. 1006 (ESII) November 9, 1956.
94. A/3345 U.N. Year Book 1956, p.73.
99. UN/1/1th session/F.V. 582 Nov.13, 1956 P.103; denied by Hungary: ibid; 101.
100. A/3357/Rev.2
101. A/3358/Rev.3
103. UN/11th session/F.V. 587 November 21, 1956, p.186.
104. Res.1127 (XIII) and Res.1128 (XIII) both of November 21, 1956.
106. Ibid.
115. A/3436/Rev.2 December 12, 1956.
119. A/3435/Add.6.
120. A/3436 January 5, 1957.
123. Ibid. p.77: Faucher op. cit. p.177.
124. Summary of Kennedy’s interview with Khrushchev in Ibid. p.192.
126. Ibid. p.716.
127. Ibid. p.717.
128. Ibid. PP 716-7.
129. Ibid. p.718.
131. 5/518.
132. 2/518.
133. 5/518.
135. Ibid.
The appeal was prompted by ambassador Stevenson of the U.S. See Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (New York: J.B. Lippincott Co.) pp.157 and p.169.

144. The letter of October 26 remains unpublished but extracts are found in Robert Kennedy, 13 days - The Cuba Missile Crisis (London: Pen Books Ltd. 1969) pp.86-90.
146. Ibid., pp.743-4.
147. Robert Kennedy op.cit., p.106.
150. Ibid, loc.cit.
152. 9/5227 January 7, 1962.
154. See Chapter two above.
160. It is significant that Hammerskjold himself disapproved of such a 'moral' stance on the part of the U.N. and deprecated the tendency on the part of some nations to gain 'voting victories' in the Assembly at the expense of serious negotiations. See Wilder Foote (ed.) The Servant of Peace (London:The Bodley Head 1962) pp.265-66.
162. For example Krishna Menon of India said, "the office of the Secretary General is a Charter organ of the United Nations. He has rights; he has obligations; he has functions; he has a status of his own. Over and above any resolutions adopted by the Assembly, the Secretary General carries with him, wherever he goes, the responsibilities of fulfilling so far as it is assigned to him in the Charter, the implementation of its purposes." GAOR/14th year/r.V.586 November 21, 1956 p.167.