CHAPTER III

THE SECRETARY GENERAL: AN INTERMEDIARY IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

International conflict is defined as a "bargaining situation in which participants operate according to mixed motives in the range between full conflict and full collaboration." Defined in this fashion an international conflict has many points of similarity with industrial conflict. Mediation has a time honored place in bargaining in industrial conflicts. And though there have been mediators in international politics, their functions, bases and limits of influence, and conditions for their success or failure did not attract much attention till recent times.

In an industrial conflict collective bargaining negotiation is described as a social-control technique for "directing, controlling and exploiting power in the formulation of the web of rules governing the workplace. It is also a technique for containing conflict, for resolving it short of overt trials of industrial warfare if this be possible, or to handle such trials if necessary. (It is) a technique for the accommodation of labor and management organizations in pursuit of common organizational objectives." This could also apply to international conflict situations, though it must be admitted that unlike industrial conflicts there is no feeling of inevitability of ultimate solution in international conflicts, and perception of the common interest among nations is at best weak.

A distinction is made between simple bargaining and strategic bargaining. In the former the activities of the participants consist primarily of a straightforward assessment of bargaining positions and more or less direct procedures for exchanging information and efforts to strike a bargain on this basis. In strategic bargaining various bargaining tactics
like threats and bluffs are employed in order to alter the dimensions of the bargaining process or the perceptions of other parties concerning these matters. This is quite common in international bargaining. Strategic bargaining creates an atmosphere of great confusion with numerous impediments to successful bargaining. Three classes of such impediments are: i) problems arising from ignorance, lack of understanding or inability to characterise accurately the basic dimensions of a bargaining situation (for example relating to underlying issues at stake, or nature and distribution of gains); ii) emotional distortions and ideational divergences i.e. a gap between ‘realities’ and perception of them arising from a number of non rational sources; iii) problems arising from extended use of bargaining tactics, which rely upon distortion or dissimulation with regard to motives, expectations, physical capabilities, aimed at maximising one’s bargaining strength.

The role of a mediator lies in removing these impediments to a conflict resolution. His function is to guide the parties to an acceptable accommodation. He can contribute towards this goal by reducing irrationality, underscoring the objective issues of the dispute and drawing the attention of the parties to the cost and consequences of violence. He can help the parties in achieving full appreciation of reality by clarifying the intentions of the parties towards each other. The mediator also has an important role as a channel of communication between parties to the conflict. He can help the parties in dispassionately assessing the attitudes and proposals of the parties themselves and propose new solutions around which parts positions have not crystallised and generally, in finding solutions in which gains to one party are at a minimum cost to the other. The mediator may also help in providing a graceful retreat to the parties. This can be done
by the mediator's calling the parties together, or making offers, where such an initiative emanating from one side might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Further, such concessions offered through the mediator have the advantage of being revocable. Thus "the mediator makes it possible for the parties to yield without seeming to yield and thus to disclose their true positions to each other without being eternally committed to them." The mediator can help the parties save their face by and owning responsibility for the (unpalatable) solution. A more important aspect of his role is his ability to utilize the pressure of events, to influence the parties to make further concessions than those previously indicated.

Twentieth Century international organization has inherited a variety of methods for providing assistance to States, parties to a conflict, in composing their differences and settling their conflicts. Many of these involve interposing third parties—committees, commissions, rapporteurs, mediators—into the international conflict to induce the acceptance, by the States, of a peaceful termination or regulation of the conflict. It is accepted that "the basic fact from this (conflict resolution) point of view is the transition from the dyad of the conflicting parties to a triad, where an intermediary who stands outside the original conflict has been added to the dyad." Mediation, in this context is broadly understood as "any non-coercive third party intervention for the settlement of disputes." It may range from the mildest form of offer of 'good offices' to 'fact finding' and advocacy of a solution. In an international conflict situation, the exact role of the third party would, obviously, depend upon the degree of the intensity of the conflict, the imminence of violence and the kind of parties involved in the conflict.
Since the inception of the United Nations Mediation between nations was regarded as an important duty of the Secretary General of the United Nations. This is evident from the fact that President Roosevelt wanted the office designated as 'world's Moderator.' The Preparatory Commission to the United Nations also envisaged the mediatory functions of the Secretary General. A nation or a regional organization like the NATO or the OAU can also be the intervening third party. The non-aligned States are often regarded as natural parties in inter-bloc conflicts. A nation or a group of nations as a third party has certain advantages over the Secretary General. Such a party would be able, because of its strength and status, to induce the adoption of a desirable course or to dissuade the parties from adopting a wrong move or to add to the rewards or the punishments attendant upon either course. It is also likely to have instruments of mediation - peace forces, communications facilities, personnel and funds - more readily available than any other party. However, it may also suffer from some disadvantages such as the pressure of their own national interests to serve and the liability to influence at home and abroad. A Secretary General may be more acceptable than a nation as an intermediary by virtue of his independence and freedom from self-interest. He as an individual can be more flexible and agile in his moves. In the middle of the fifties and thereafter, this aspect of his functions assumed great importance.

In a conflict situation the relationship between the two sides is basically one of constant bargaining marked by mutual declarations of intentions and threats and of conflicting actions. To follow the 'static model' of Boulding each of the two parties has 'value ordered positons' i.e. in its image of the field it holds certain of its values and positions to be essentially inviolable and outside the field of compromise. While
it may attach greater value to certain position as compared to others. Further, the field can be divided into a 'conflict area' and a 'trading area'. The solution will have to be found within the area where there are positions which are high enough in the value ordering of one party and low in that of the other to facilitate the striking of a meeting ground or marginal area where the processes of compromise and conciliation could be initiated. A trading move is one which results in gains, as they perceive it, to both the sides over the status quo. However, the exchangeable positions have to be acceptable to both the parties. If the acceptable sets of the two parties do not coincide no bargain can be struck. The function of a mediator is to move the parties towards this trading area. The "essence of the procedure is the exertion or channeling of pressure on one or both of the two parties in dispute to obtain the necessary concessions for the settlement of their differences." He may skilfully manoeuvre pressures inherent in a conflict situation so as to bring about a solution or invite or generate new pressures for this purpose.

This naturally leads us to a consideration of 'influence' and particularly to the nature and sources of the political influence of the Secretary General of the United Nations. Influence is taken to mean the process of or capacity of 'affecting policies of others.' Influence base refers to the conditions for the exercise of influence. A fundamental basis for classification of influence base is the 'motivation of the influence base' that leads him to accept influence.' On this basis Lasswell and Kaplan define influence, power and authority. Influence is the value position and potential of a person or a group. Values are grouped under welfare (wealth, skill, enlightenment) and deference (respect, rectitude and affection). Motivation for acceptance arising from these values characterise influence.
Power is a special case in the exercise of influence: "It is the process of affecting policies of others with the help of severe deprivations for nonconformity with the policy intended." Therefore acceptance is motivated by sanctions. Authority is formal power. Here acceptance is motivated by the legitimacy of the exercise of power. Of course in practice it is difficult to maintain these distinctions. In every instance where these means achieve significant political results there is present an element of persuasion, an element of pressure bordering on coercion or an appeal to legitimacy. Sanfield describes five different means through which one could act on the motivations of the influence; i) authority or respect, ii) friendship or benevolence, iii) rational persuasion, iv) selling - by changing the influencee's perception of the behavior alternatives open to him and v) by positive or negative coercion. Looked from this point of view it is meaningless to describe a person as being influential unless the persons over whom he can exercise influence, the base values in respect of which he has influence and the conditions in which this influence is exercised are also indicated.

The formal sources of the influence of the Secretary General derive from the Charter of the United Nations. Articles 97 and 100 of the Charter establish the independence of the Secretary General. The unanimous support of the Great Powers and the support of the General Assembly ensure his independence in the inter-bloc conflict - and impart to his office the aloofness and impartiality similar to that of the non-aligned nations. The obligation 'not to seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization' on the one hand and the undertaking of the members to respect the 'exclusively international character of the responsibilities' of the Secretary General and 'not to seek to
influence him in the discharge of those responsibilities on the other, support his claim to be a truly international civil servant. It was this which led the Preparatory Commission to state that the "Secretary General more than any one else will stand for the United Nations as a whole. In the eyes of the world..... he must embody the principles and ideals of the Charter." This was to be repeated later by Dag Hammarskjold. The identification of the Secretary General with the United Nations automatically confers on him the deference values that form the basis of the moral influence which the Secretary General brings to bear upon nations through a recourse to Article 99. How far the nations would be influenced would, of course, depend upon how far they can identify these values in the Secretary General.

The affirmation of confidence in the Secretary General that followed his statement in the Security Council on October 31, 1955 is an example of such a recognition. But even this has its limits. Thus in 1950 (Korean crisis) and in November 1956 (the Hungarian crisis) the U.S.S.R. and the Communist States declined to attach any value to the opinion of the Secretary General. It was a matter which was too obviously connected with and vital to the interests of the Communist bloc to allow them to adopt a broader international outlook. However, it is likely that the voting of some of the uncommitted nations was influenced by the knowledge imparted by and the opinion of the Secretary General.

The conditions which enable the exercise of influence by the Secretary General actually enable an appeal to one of the influence bases that the Secretary General possesses and which become relevant in a particular condition. Knowledge, skill and the persuasive power have on occasions provided a source of influence to the Secretary General. Thus in the Congolaise case Dag Hammarskjold had first-hand information of the situation from his own
visit to that part of Africa and from Ralph Bunche, his personal representative in the Congo. His influence on the nations, members of the Security Council, was evident from the fact that the operative part of the Security Council resolution was almost taken verbatim from his statement made earlier in the Council. Again the vague blanket resolutions authorising him to take what action he thought best — the 'let Dag do it' attitude — is further evidence of the respect that he enjoyed among the members of the United Nations.

Of greater interest or importance is the source of influence of the Secretary General in inducing nations in conflict to terminate their disputes peacefully. In a conflict situation a third party, like the Secretary General can play a vital role as an intermediary. The object of the mediator is to induce the parties to a conflict to agree to settle it amicably. This may be achieved by bringing them to a realistic appraisal of the situation (bringing them to an unrealistic appraisal may also serve the end though it would involve deliberate deception). The "most important aspects of the mediation process is the mediator's control over the communications structure in the negotiations situation." It facilitates persuasion. The mediator may also supply a party with arguments which the party may in turn use to rationalise a position vis-à-vis his own constituents. The mediator may remove the elements of bluff or confirm the 'not bluff' in order to facilitate a settlement. Each of the parties to a conflict would place greater reliance on the helpful neutrality of a mediator than be taken in by the threats or menacing gestures of the other party. The Secretary General is in an ideal position to fulfil this role. As a neutral he is very often a confidence of both the parties and thus may be in a position to correct distorted images that one holds of the other. By virtue of his access to both the parties through his representatives, permanent missions etc. he would be able to
assess the position correctly and rectify the distorting versions of the parties involved in the conflict. Where the formal channels of communication between the parties have broken down the Secretary General may serve as a reliable link and intermediary. Thus in the Cuban crisis (1962) U Thant served as a valuable link of communication between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. Also between 1964-68 U Thant served as a go between for the U.S. and the Government of North Vietnam.

The intermediary can also serve as a face saving device where the parties who have committed themselves to certain positions want to wriggle out of them or to retreat to earlier positions. The mediator may assist the parties in retreating from their commitments without loss of dignity and coming to an agreement without any sense of humiliation or sacrifice of essential interest. He may share some of the responsibility of the parties for the final outcome. Or where a party has committed itself to a position by nailing a demand to a principle, the mediator could show that the demand is not a necessary part of the principles and demonstrate to the party that he need not insist on the satisfaction of the particular demand. Thus in 1956 the U.N.E.F. created by the Secretary General proved such a face saving device of which both Britain and France took advantage. In 1958 through the UNOIL the Secretary General demonstrated that the Eisenhower doctrine was not relevant in the context and no outside intervention was involved in Lebanon.

Even where the 'trading area' is manifest, the coordination of the expectations of each of the parties towards a single solution is not easy. In such a situation the procedure or solution suggested by the intermediary attains a 'saliency'. The future negotiations may focus around those proposals. This would all the more be so where the mediator is able to justify
his proposals on the basis of established criteria. In the Middle East crisis conflict (April 1956 to September 1956) the insistence of Dag Hammarskjöld that the Arabs and the Israelis unconditionally agree to respect ceasefire was one such example.

Another case may arise where there is already a covert 'agreement' in the sense that the acceptable positions of the parties coincide but either party may be deterred from openly stating it for fear that the other party might interpret it as a sign of weakness. The mediator may in such a situation author a proposal which might then be overtly accepted by both the parties. In the Cuban crisis for example the final proposal by U Thant was accepted by both the sides, thereby making public an 'agreement' which was already there.

However, since the Secretary General is not comparable to the heads of Governments in terms of power, his influence is based on his powers of persuasion and mediation and is specifically related to the situations which call for his intervention. As Stevens, in the context of industrial conflict, points out: "within some limits for variation, the basic determinants of the outcome of collective bargaining negotiation are the determinants of the basic power relationships which underlie the conflict in an industrial relation system. Negotiation is a social control technique for reflecting and transmuting these basic determinants, while at the same time containing the conflict short of overt trials of industrial warfare. The mediator's primary function is to abet the containment function of negotiation." This holds true of bargaining in an international crisis situation also. Therefore, a great deal would depend upon the actual as well as potential power situation of the adversaries and their perceptions of each other's situation. In such a situation the Secretary General can, by the appropriate
and timely use of skill, persuasiveness and an appeal to the basic values common to both parties, coordinate their expectations, correct their distorted images of each other and help them move towards the trading zone.

The problem is entirely different where such a trading zone does not exist. In such a situation in addition to using pressures which are intrinsic in the conflict the mediator may have to generate some, all of which can be used to change the value ordered position of the parties in such a way that a trading zone can emerge.

Thus in certain situations the Secretary General can cause deprivation or grant indulgence to a party. One such role is as an agent of legitimisation. In international relations nations have often sought approval and disapproval of their projects and policies by the United Nations. Its pronouncements are often invoked to prove the legitimacy of the action of a state. The value of acts of legitimisation is established by anxiety of States to invoke them on their behalf. "While States may act in violation of General Assembly resolutions, they evidently prefer not to do so, or to appear not to do so, on the ground that collective approbation is an important asset and collective disapproval a significant liability in international relations. A State may hesitate to pursue a policy that has engendered the formal disapproval of the Assembly not because it is prepared to give the will of that organ priority over its national interest but because it believes that the adverse judgment of the Assembly makes the pursuit of that policy disadvantageous to the national interest." To some extent, the Secretary General shares this function of the United Nations. In Congo Prime Minister Lumumba criticised Dag Hammarskjold's visit to Katanga and his negotiations with Tshombe fearing that it would invest Katanga Government with legitimacy. Again, the Secretariat's refusal to recognise and to deal
with the Mobutu Government did impede the recognition of that Government as legitimate. In a slightly different context, the pronouncements, advice and opinion of the Secretary General are welcomed or criticised by nations precisely because they affect the legitimacy of the actions concerned. Thus Trygve Lie's views on Korea, Dag Hammarskjold's approval of U.S. disarmament proposals, were resented by the Soviet Union because they afforded legitimacy to the Western position. The same could be said of Lie's legal advice regarding the Chinese representation in the United Nations or withdrawal of the Iranian dispute from the Council. Then, of course, there is the position of the Secretary General as an interpreter of the Charter and the Law of the United Nations. While the Charter itself is silent on the question of its interpretation, the San Francisco Conference accorded this right to the nations as members of the United Nations and its principal organs.

The Secretaries General have on numerous occasions interpreted the Charter, the resolutions of the political organs of the United Nations as well as international law in their application to particular situations. Thus in 1956-57 the Secretary General insisted on the evacuation of 'all territories' occupied by Israel rejecting Israel's plea that Gaza did not form Egyptian territory. In 1965 the Secretary General interpreted, notwithstanding the Indian protest, the Security Council's resolution as authorising him to create a new organization - the UNIFOM - to supervise the ceasefire line between India and Pakistan outside Kashmir. India was afraid that this action would imply legitimising Pakistan's contention that Kashmir did not form part of the Indian Union. While these interpretations may not be ultimate and, as the Secretary General conceded, may be rejected by the political organs of the United Nations, yet in the meanwhile they hold good and therefore legitimise the position of one party to the disadvantage of the
other. Another interesting instance of the legitimizing role of the Secretary General was in the Nigerian Civil War. Where his representative, is reported to have expressed his satisfaction with the way in which the Federal Government conducted its war against a secessionist Biafra and in effect exonerated it from charge the charge of genocide.

Another instrument through which the Secretary General could exercise his influence has been the United Nations peacekeeping forces. The Secretary General has been the chief agent through which the United Nations organs have controlled these forces. The history of the United Nations in the Congo is full of instances where the Secretary General exercised influence, some times decisive, on the Government of the Republic of Congo, the Government of Katanga, and other nations involved therein. This was made possible because of the availability and presence of a sizable military force under his control. The Secretary General's influence over the events in the Congo was the result of both acts of commission and omission on his part. Whatever might be the justification and excuse, in practice, the force was used till the Government of Katanga agreed to fall in line with the policy favoured by the Secretary General.

In the organisation and operation of the United Nations peacekeeping forces the Secretary General has a major role, though under the authority of the General Assembly and/or the Security Council. However, in practice, the Secretary General has had the last word in terminating the operations. By taking the decision to terminate or not to terminate the operation or by threatening to terminate a force the Secretary General can play an important role in the balance of forces in a conflict situation. Dag Hammarskjold at a critical moment in his negotiations with Nasser threatened to withdraw the UNF EMER drain unless his proposals were accepted.
Again, in 1967 it was under considerable pressure that U Thant decided to withdraw the UNEF from the Israeli-AUAR border. The use of discretion and the availability of power, though limited, in the form of the peacekeeping forces afford the Secretary General an important source of influence on the parties to a conflict, which can be used by the Secretary General to resolve or at least to contain a conflict. It certainly enables him to fix some of the parameters of the conflict.

While serving as an intermediary in a conflict situation, the Secretary General may augment his influence with the parties by associating himself with and thus 'borrowing' some of the influence and prestige of a great power or a group of powers. Such a backing to his diplomatic efforts may come either in the form of resolutions on the subject by the Security Council/General Assembly or outside the United Nations. Throughout Dag Hammarskjold's negotiations with the Arabs and Israeli Governments the Security Council and later the General Assembly maintained a constant pressure and gave backing to Hammarskjold's interpretation of the Armistice Agreements and the new state of affairs to be established in the area.

Again, in the initial stages of the Congolese conflict the Security Council supported the Secretary General in overcoming the Belgian and Katangese resistance to the entry of the United Nations force. Similarly, in the Kashmir conflict of 1965 the Security Council's support in the form of 'orders' under chapter VII of the Charter was sought by U Thant if the parties did not agree to his ceasefire proposals. In fact, according to certain writers failure of the Secretary General's mediation in certain cases could be attributed to the lack of such support from the United Nations organs.

A much more fruitful procedure from the point of view of resolving a conflict, has been a parallel and cooperative effort by a Great Power to use its
influence to support the Secretary General's mediation. Thus in the Congo the so-called Thant Plan became operative largely because of the backing that the U.S. lent him and influenced Belgium, France and U.K. to accept it. Another such instance was when U Thant appointed Elsworth Bunker to mediate between Indonesia and the Netherlands on the question of West Irian. U.S. pressure was largely responsible for making the Netherlands grant the necessary concessions. The Secretary General may seek to build up his influence by canvassing support for his proposals with certain groups of nations. It is noteworthy that in the Cuban crisis U Thant took care to mention that his proposals were supported by a large number of representative of nations. Again in 1967-68 U Thant undertook a tour of countries - most of them non-aligned - at the end of which he declared that all of them agreed with his views on the Vietnam conflict - an obvious attempt to influence U.S. position and public opinion.

In order to buttress a particular solution to a conflict proposed by him the Secretary General may also employ accepted norms in international relations like the United Nations Charter, international treaties, international law or legal principles. This reliance on legal principles in the conciliation efforts would facilitate acceptance because "it endowed the proposed standards with the authority of pre-existing obligations and the character of a universal rule that would be applied equally in other cases." Thus, the solution to be reached would not diverge too sharply from the expectations of the parties. Dag Hammarskjold, for example, in his mediation efforts often interpreted and applied the Charter and international law - and the commitment of the parties to them - in order to reach a solution. The Secretary General, as the servant of the United Nations Charter, with responsibilities which are exclusively international is particularly well
suited to his role.

A more simple case is where both the parties to a conflict, desire to end the crisis situation and seek the assistance of the Secretary General for purposes of factfinding or mediating. This was how the Philippines and Malaysia sought the services of the Secretary General for finding out certain facts about the wishes of the people of the areas to be included in the proposed federation of Malaysia. Similarly, again, was the case when on the request of the parties, U Thant agreed to observe 'disengagement' in Yemen in 1964.

A much more sophisticated device used by the Secretary General, either on his own or under the authority of the Security Council or the General Assembly, to 'contain' a conflict has been named by Dag Hammarskjold: 'preventive Diplomacy'. He defined it as 'efforts (aiming).... at keeping newly arising conflicts outside the sphere of bloc differences.... (and ) in the case of conflicts on the margin of, or inside, the sphere of bloc differences, ...(to) seek to bring such conflicts out of this sphere through solutions aiming, in the first instance, at their strict localization.... for the general purpose of avoiding an extension or achieving a reduction of the area into which the bloc conflicts penetrate.' This purpose is accomplished by establishing a 'United Nations Presence' in the area. The localization and insulation of the conflict, by itself may not resolve the conflict, but it certainly prevents the exacerbation of the conflict and the introduction of other points of friction. It could better be described 55. 'encapsulation' of conflicts. Examples of such cases are the Jordanian, (1956) Lebanese (1958), and the Congolese crises.

The role of the Secretary General as an intermediary and the conditions in which his influence can become functional have their limitations.
The most important limitation on the role of the Secretary General is the problem of acceptability. To serve a useful role the Secretary General must be acceptable to the parties. The one qualification which determines, at least in part, his acceptability is the perception that he is neutral in the conflict. Thus though in a situation of unstable equilibrium the support, or the legitimising influence of the Secretary General may be sought, the very approval of the action of one of the parties may cost him the confidence of the other. Thus, Lie's support to the American action in Korea cost him the confidence of the Soviet Union and though U.S. supported him in the United Nations, his very dependence on the U.S. decreased his influence with it. Thus the Secretary General is in a paradoxical position. His influence stems from his non-involvement in the Cold War. But the very act of exercising his influence gets him involved in it and costs him his influence. Even though Dag Hammarskjold tried to distinguish between objectivity and impartiality it must be noted that even if he is not really committed the mere suspicion by a Government that he is so committed is enough to weaken his influence with that State.

Secondly, it seems to be accepted that the work role of the Secretary General as an intermediary in a Cold war conflict is strictly limited. Thus Dag Hammarskjold confessed that in such cases it was "practically impossible for the Secretary General to operate effectively with the means put at his disposal short of risking seriously to impair the usefulness of his office for the organization in all the other cases for which the services of the United Nations Secretariat are needed." A similar admission was made by U Thant, the present Secretary General a few years later. "His only role in such conflicts seems to be as a channel of communication, and as a third party when both the parties feel it useful."
As a corollary to this it can be stated that some amount of consensus among the Great Powers in relation to the issue and the Secretary General's role in it is essential. The Great Power consensus may be positive or negative - positive in the sense that the both the bloc leaders may encourage and welcome Secretary General's initiative - as for example in the Suez crisis and the 1956 Arab-Israeli conflict; negative in the sense that one or both the Great Powers are either indifferent to the issue (where it is thought not likely to affect the global system or where even an unpalatable action of the Secretary General is tolerated in its larger interests). Thus in the Congo conflict after 1961 and the Laotian crisis (1959) the Soviet Union was not pleased with the actions of the Secretary General. However, it did not make an issue out of them at that time as these actions fell well within its limits of tolerance.

A more serious limitation on the Secretary General's role as an intermediary could be the lack of organization or instruments adequate for tackling the situation. Thus in spite of the initiatives of all the three Secretaries General, in different ways, the Secretariat could not have a ready, well equipped peace force, United Nations Guard or even a stand by force at its command. During the Cyprus mix crisis (1964) much good time was lost in assembling a respectable size of peacekeeping force. Similarly is the case with the availability of funds. Both Dag Hammarskjold and U Thant had to resort to odd means to pay for the peace forces and had at times to threaten their termination for want of funds.

The ability of the Secretary General to move the positions of the parties to the trading area would depend to a great extent on how far the party thinks its particular position as being vital its national interest. Thus where a nation gives highest importance to its position in a conflict
situation it would be difficult for the Secretary General to move it by mere persuasion, or even by sanctions, from that position. In fact, in such situations the parties have spurned the offer of intervention by the Secretary General. Thus in Hungarian crisis of 1956, Bizerte crisis 1960, and the Kashmir conflict (1964), Hungary supported by U.S.S.R., France and India respectively did not welcome Secretary General’s effort to intervene. In such a situation even small powers have displayed the same attitude. Mediation by the Secretary General may also be rejected because the parties may prefer intervention by some other power or powers, possibly with a view to gaining positive rewards from it. Thus in 1965–66 both India and Pakistan favoured mediation by Great Powers to that of the Secretary General.

Where a Secretary General is using resources 'lent' to him there is always the possibility of their being withdrawn by the lender, if the direction of the Secretary General's influence, or the pace he is adopting does not suit its tastes. For example in the Congo crisis the African States threatened to withdraw their contingents from the UNUC when the policy of Dag Hammarskjöld did not satisfy them. This may also happen where the lender wants to displace the Secretary General as an intermediary. At least such a position imposes a serious limitation in that it forces the Secretary General to be in constant consultations with the lender or even to adopt moves according to indications arising from that source. This may, however, cast a reflection on the independence and neutrality of the Secretary General, and may seriously impair his role as an intermediary.

In measuring the political influence of the Secretary General it cannot be ignore that he himself may be subjected to pressure when involved as an intermediary in a conflict situation. In the Congolese conflict Hammarskjöld was under intense pressure for removing ambassador Dayal from

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Leopoldville as his representative. On the other hand the Asian-African States mounted pressure to get him help the Lumumba faction. U Thant also has on certain occasions complained of such influence by nations. During the 1967 West Asian crisis he was under great pressure for/ as well as against withdrawing the UNEF from Sinai and Sharm-al-Sheikh.

In the resolution of conflicts, therefore the significance of the Secretary General varies. In an interbloc conflict, he may serve as a communication channel. He lacks any independent capability. According to Liska "the third party's influence must not derive only from the interplay of powers which the party seeks to moderate. To the extent that it does so derive, the effect of third party pressures is actually due to the greater powers' regard for the capabilities of each other." To the extent to which, therefore, such a recognition of each other's capabilities exists, and the need of an intermediary is felt, the Secretary General serves a useful purpose. However, as demonstrated by the Hungarian case of 1956 and the Dominican case of 1965, where the question falls within the sphere of one bloc and is thought vital to its interest, willingness to allow the Secretary General to intervene rarely exists.

The most fruitful area for the Secretary General's influence and mediation is the one where the Great Powers agree to keep out and where the United Nations is allowed to fill the vacuum. However, in it is necessary that a consensus among the Great Powers and the parties concerned must support the Secretary General's role. Success, in such cases, attends his efforts if the Great Powers lend their influence to the United Nations in moving the parties to an agreement.

In cases where the Great Powers are indifferent and the conflict is largely between small powers, the willingness of the parties to agree becomes
crucial. Paradoxical as it may seem, the very insulation of the conflict from the Cold War may reduce the anxiety of the nations to resolve the conflict. Internationalisation of a problem is often a step towards resolution of conflict.

Since the Congo crisis the trend towards increasing the executive capabilities of the United Nations has halted. The principles regarding the organisation, control and finances of these operations have been in dispute. This necessarily affects one of the bases of the Secretary General's influence. Yet, limited as it may be, the Secretary General's role as an intermediary forms an essential part of the international conflict resolution process.
REFERENCES AND NOTES: CHAPTER III:


2. Some of the studies which have contributed to an understanding of the dimensions of the international conflict and the place of mediator in it are:


5. Michael Barkun, Compares, in this sense, international community with a segmentary society as against a juridical community. See 'Conflict Resolution Through Implicit Mediation', Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.8 No.2 (1964).


16. Also see Oran H. Young, The Intermediaries, op.cit., pp.92-113.

17. Boulding, op.cit., Chapter I.


25. A similar incident took place when the representatives of the Great Powers in the Security Council affirmed their confidence in U Thant in order to persuade him to accept a second term.
SC/115th year/5-V.873 p.5 and Res. S/4387 of 13th July 1960
26. For example, S/5302 and S/4387, 28 December 1960. S/4387, July 14, 1960, and
27. Stevens, Strategy of Collective Bargaining ... op.cit., pp.133-34.
28. Walter Lippmann called this role as being 'father confessor to member governments' quoted in Mark K. Zacher: 'The Secretary General and United Nation's Function of Peaceful Settlement', International Organization, Vol.22 No.4 p.735.
32. Thomas Schelling op.cit., pp.54-56, 68.
33. S/3596, 9th May 1956, pp.56-60.
35. Ibid., p.132.
37. Ibid., p.375.
38. SC/13th year/5-V.815, 29 April 29 and May 4, 1956. pp.17-8; sovietreading
39. S/466. March 8, 1950
40. Trygve Lie, In the Cause of the Peace (New York: The Macmillan and Co. 1946)k pp.82-88. also S/466 March 8, 1950.
42. S/6735, October 1, 1965.
43. S/4417/Add.6 Letter of 10th August 1960, p.70
44. Times of India, October 31, 1965.
46. A private memorandum on Middle East Peace Force prepared by Dag Hammarskjold and given to Ernest Gross. It was published on the eve of the Six Days' War between Israel and the Arabs.

See International Legal Materials 1967 (Vol.6) PP 553-603.

47. 8/668  September 16, 1965.


49. See his letter to the U.S. President and Soviet Prime Minister.


In the Congo crisis Dag Hammarskjold also relied on a certain Asian-African nations to further his policies.


57. Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary General 1959-60


Also Press Release SG/691 May 12, 1966.
