CHAPTER VI:

THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND SMALL POWER - NON-COLD WAR CONFLICTS:

At the height of the Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjold said in the Assembly, "it is not the Soviet Union or indeed, any other big powers who need the United Nations for their protection; it is all the others. In this sense the Organization is first of all their Organization; and I deeply believe in the wisdom with which they will be able to use it and guide it." He believed that they would be interested in strengthening the Organization and in using it for resolving conflicts and maintaining peace and security. Hammarskjold was so confident of this that he offered to resign on February 15, 1961 if these small and uncommitted nations had lost faith in him. Conflicts between smaller powers, outside the power blocs, where the Great Powers have little competitive interest should offer logically, greater and more fruitful scope for the mediating efforts of the Secretary General, as an independent spokesman of the United Nations. However, this does not appear to be confirmed by the following account.

In such cases there are two levels at which the political activities of the Secretary General can be significant. The term "good offices" covers a large variety of tasks and constitutes a considerable part of the workload of the Secretary General. His help may be sought for discreet approaches to the other parties on delicate problems requiring urgent solution. Naturally, a great part of this activity lies in the field of quiet diplomacy and is not open to public knowledge. At another level, the office of the Secretary General is used for dealing with situations which are likely to threaten international peace and security. Some of these cases are studied here to bring out the scope and limits of the Secretary General's role in such situations.
THE ARAB–ISRAEL CONFLICT:

The simmering conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbours could be considered as one long case in which all the three Secretaries General have successively had a hand in pacification. Early in 1948 after the Arab attack on Israel, Trygve Lie, the first United Nations Secretary General sought to take a initiative in resolving tension and conflict between the two parties. He regarded the Arab attack as aggression on Israel and tried to goad the permanent members, particularly Britain and the U.S., to take action through the Security Council. He made representations to both the Governments at London and Washington in order to impress upon them the urgency of the matter and to explain to them his point of view. On Lie’s suggestions Count Bernadotte of Sweden was appointed Mediator in Palestine. Lie made available to him staff drawn from the Secretariat and arranged military personnel for Truce control functions. The Secretary General helped the Mediator in negotiating a more durable agreement and in fact Lie felt that the intervention from Lake Success "seemed to be decisive in preventing the parties from breaking off negotiations on the spot." After the assassination of Bernadotte he appointed Ralph Bunche to succeed him. The appointment was later ratified by the Security Council. Negotiations between the parties were held at Rhodes island under Bunche’s chairmanship which resulted in Armistice Agreements.

In 1956 the successor of Trygve Lie, Mr. Hammarskjold tried to avert a military conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbours and bring peace to the area. He initially acted under the authority of his office and was later supported by a mandate from the Security Council. The initiatives of the Secretary General were supplemented by U.S. efforts to persuade Egypt and Israel
to take steps towards a peace settlement. The influence of the Secretary General as well as of the U.S. was limited by circumstances and, therefore, the initiatives did not fully achieve their aims.

Under quite different circumstances, Hammarskjöld, with the backing of the General Assembly and strong U.S. pressure, was successful in containing the Egypt-Israel conflict in 1956 and was able to bring about Israeli evacuation of the Egyptian territory occupied during the war. His efforts, however, after the Suez crisis, the secure a free passage on a de facto basis for Israeli goods through the Suez Canal met with failure when the U.A.R. refused to move from its position.

Israel-Arab relations plummeted once again in May 1967. On the 16th General Fawzi of the U.A.R. demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Israel-U.A.R. borders. The Secretary General while rejecting any partial withdrawal of the force, accepted that U.A.R. was entitled to withdraw its consent and that if it did so he would order withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Gaza, simultaneously informing the Assembly and the Security Council. On May 17 U Thant met with the representatives of States contributing to the United Nations Emergency Force and on 18th consulted the Advisory committee on U.N.E.F. Conflicting opinions were voiced in the committee. Two of the contributing States made it known that they would withdraw their contingents the movement such a request was made by the U.A.R. No proposal to call the Assembly was made in the Committee. U Thant submitted to the a report to the Council and to the Assembly and ordered withdrawal of the Force when he received a formal request from the U.A.R. Governments to that effect. After consultations with permanent members of the Security Council, U Thant left for Cairo on May 22.

But even before he could reach Cairo, the U.A.R. declared the Straits of Tiran
closed to Israeli shipping. When Israel found that the Council would not take prompt action it resorted to a preventive war by attacking the U.A.R. and, therefore, the efforts of the Secretary General towards mediation and prevention of conflict resulted in failure.

THAILAND-CAMBODIA CONFLICT:

Another instance of the Secretary General's initiatives in such cases was his efforts to help solve differences between Thailand and Cambodia when relations between the two countries deteriorated in 1968. Both the parties complained to the Secretary General of military threats from each other. After consultations with the representatives of the two Governments Hammarsk- jold appointed Baron Beck-Friis of Sweden as his personal representative to assist the two countries "in efforts to find a solution." He informed the members of the Security Council of his action and no objections were raised. The Mission visited both the countries and helped to secure the release of Thai prisoners and restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The willingness of the two sides to take steps towards relaxation of tension was helped by the presence of a third party in the form of the Secretary General's representative. The indifference of the two Cold War contestants to the conflict was an added help in simplifying the bargain.

THE WEST IRIAN CONFLICT:

In 1962 Indonesia and Netherlands, on an appeal from the Secretary General, entered into negotiations on the question of West Irian which threatened to disturb international peace and security. The Secretary General requested Mr. Ellsworth Bunker of the U.S. to act favourably as a mediator. The U.S. Government which favoured a settlement of the problem brought pressure to bear upon the Dutch Government and an agreement between the two
parties was signed on August 15, 1962 at the U.N. Headquarters. The Agreement envisaged the establishment of a U.N. Temporary Executive Authority to be headed by a United Nations administrator acceptable to both the parties. The U.N.T.E.A. was to administer the territory after October 1, 1962 till the territory was transferred to Indonesia. A ceasefire between the two countries was to be implemented under U.N. observation. The cessation of hostilities was completed under a U.N. Observer Group headed by Inder Jit Rikhye. The Secretary General appointed José Rolz Bennett as his representative in West Irian to arrange for the transfer of the administration. A force of 1500 drawn from Pakistan served as a U.N. force. The Agreement contemplated the transfer of administration in two phases. The first phase constituting the sole control of the U.N.T.E.A. was to end on May 1, 1963. In the second phase the Administrator had the discretion to transfer all or part of administration at any time to Indonesia. The Secretary General, presumably under Indonesian pressure, so interpreted the Agreement as to transfer the authority on May 1, 1963 itself, shortening the second phase to only a few hours.

On 19.

SITUATION IN YEMEN:

On 29th April 1963 U Thant reported to the Security Council that since the fall of 1962 he was in consultation with the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the U.A.R. concerning "the situation in Yemen of external origin" and had offered his good offices to the parties. In late February he had sent Bunch to Yemen and the U.A.R. on a fact-finding mission primarily devoted to talking with the Presidents of Yemen and U.A.R. with the purpose of ascertaining their view on the situation and what steps might be taken to ease tension and restore conditions to normal. As a result of activities carried out by his representative Ralph Bunche and Ellsworth Bunker of the U.S. independently
the three Governments had accepted a disengagement agreement. This required Saudi Arabia to cease all aid to the Royalists of Yemen and the use of Saudi Arabian territory for the purpose of carrying on the struggle and simultaneously a withdrawal of the U.A.R. troops from Yemen. Creation of a demilitarized zone of 20 kilometers on the Yemen-Saudi border and stationing U.N. observers for supervising the disengagement. U Thant designated Carl Von Horn to consult the Governments regarding the terms relating to the nature and functioning of the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (U.N.Y.O.M).

On 27th May the Secretary General further informed the Council that a U.N. Observer Group was "vital and necessary and could well be a decisive factor in avoiding serious trouble in that area." It was to be stationed for four months, the expenses to be shared by the parties. He proposed to send an advanced party within a few days. On the insistence of the Soviet Union the question was considered by the Council which passed a resolution authorizing the Secretary General to station an observation Mission in Yemen to observe the terms of disengagement.

The Mission was established on 4th July, 1963. In September the Secretary General reported that "in some important respects the terms of the disengagement agreement have not been fulfilled by either of the parties". Not much progress was made towards a solution in the following months and the Secretary General himself felt that the "mandate...... is so limiting and restrictive as to make it virtually impossible for U.N.Y.O.M. to play a really helpful and constructive role in Yemen." U Thant appointed on November 4, 1964 Pier Spinelli as his special representative to conduct exploratory conversations with the parties to encourage the implementation of the agreement. The Mission was extended until May and then July 1964 in view of the prospective negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. It was further extended by two months
on July 2. The Mission had to be abandoned when the parties declined to 29. finance it any longer, though the disengagement was not completed.

QUESTION OF MALAYSIA:

Early in 1963 the projected formation of a federation of Singapore, Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak precipitated a crisis. Indonesia and the Philippines laid claims to Sarawak and North Borneo respectively. A Foreign Ministers meeting of the three States decided, on August 5, 1963 to request the Secretary General "to ascertain, prior to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, the wishes of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak within the context of General Assembly resolution 1541 (AV) principle 30. 11 of the Annex......" The Secretary General was to determine, by a 'fresh approach' which in"his opinion is necessary to ensure compliance with the principle of self determination." In particular he was to determine whether the recent elections held in the territory were free and whether Malaysia was a major issue in the elections. U Thant accepted the task on the understanding that his determination would not be subject to ratification or confirmation by 32. any of the Governments concerned.

The Mission was sent on 16th August and held hearings in the area. Even before the completion of the Mission 16th September was announced as the date for the establishment of the federation. On 16th September the Secretary General informed the three governments of his conclusions. He was of the opinion that complete compliance with the principle of self determination was ensured.

However, Indonesia and the Philippines were not satisfied with the findings of the Secretary General and stated that the Mission was unable to carry out fully their terms of ascertainment. Relations between Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia worsened and Indonesia soon launched its 'confrontation' with Malaysia.
KASHMIR CONFLICT - A CASE STUDY:

In Aug August 1965 the ceasefire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir suddenly became alive as a result of numerous violations of ceasefire. The military conflict soon spread beyond the State and what was merely a local military conflict turned into an almost undeclared Indo-Pakistan War. The U.N. Security Council intervened with unusual vigour supported by a rare unanimity of will among the Great Powers to contain the conflict. With the able assistance of the Secretary General it was successful in persuading the parties to cease hostilities and agree to withdraw their 'armed personnel' to their own side of the line. But neither the Secretary General nor the Security Council could go beyond this 'holding' or peacekeeping stage. With the use of U.N. observers they were able to "contain and isolate explosive situations without really affecting the basic causes of the conflict."

Background to the Conflict:

The Kashmir question or what later became the 'Indira-Pakistan Question' came before the Security Council in January 1948 on an Indian complaint that armed tribesmen with Pakistan's support had invaded Kashmir. It wanted the Council to prevent Pakistan from supporting them. Earlier, consequent upon the tribal attack the Maharaja of Kashmir had signed the Instrument of Accession and thus the State had acceded to the Indian Union. In accepting the accession, India, however, unilaterally declared its intention that "as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people." Despite various charges and counter charges there was an agreement of views between India and Pakistan on the principle of holding a plebiscite under the
authority of the United Nations. The Security Council, therefore, without fixing responsibility for the invasion of Kashmir addressed itself to the task of bringing about a ceasefire and laying down, with the agreement of the parties, the minimum conditions necessary for holding the plebiscite. It established a commission to investigate facts and to exercise a "mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties." The commission passed two resolutions on 13th August 1948 and 5th January 1949 both of which were accepted by India and Pakistan. In January 1949 a ceasefire was agreed upon and was put into force supervised by U.N. military observers. The commission's efforts were stalled on the question of creating conditions necessary for holding a plebiscite. After the failure of the U.N.C.I.P. numerous attempts at mediation were made by the Security Council through General McNaughton (Canada) March 1950, Sir Owen Dixon (Australia) May 1950, Frank Graham (U.S.) 1951-53, Gunnar Jarring (Sweden) 1957; but to no effect.

In 1954 Pakistan entered into Mutual Security Pact with the U.S. from whom she received large scale military aid, thus changing the military balance and, according to India, the whole political picture. Pakistan also became a member of the Bagdad Pact and the S.E.A.T.O. This, according to India, constituted a material change which rendered a reconsideration of the whole problem, in the new context, necessary. In addition to this, elections were held in the area under India's control and a Constituent Assembly formed. This body 'ratified' the accession to India.

The question of Kashmir was discussed in the Security Council several times after 1952 (in 1957, 1962 and 1964). Following the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India in 1955 U.S.S.R. openly endorsed India's position and recognized Kashmir as part of the Indian Union. It vetoed resolutions other than those providing for mediation efforts by Gunnar Jarring and Frank Graham
which were accepted by India. This reduced any possibility of the Security Council's bringing any political pressure on India to fulfil the earlier U.N. resolutions.

In spite of the fact that the Secretary General of the U.N. emerged as one of the important instruments of mediation and conciliation in the U.N., his role in the U.N. effort in the Kashmir question till the 1965 conflict seems to be insignificant. The Council's resolution of 20th January 1948 (which established the U.N.C.I.F.) provided that "the Secretary General of the United Nations shall furnish the Commission with such personnel and assistance as it may consider necessary." Mr. Lie appointed a personal representative to accompany the Commission and participated in the mediatery efforts of the Commission. On the basis of the U.N.C.I.F. reports Mr. Schwebel concludes that "the Secretary General's representative and the governmental representatives of the Commission itself worked closely together in a collaborative, non-hierarchical fashion, in which the Secretary General's influence, as exerted through the former, and the Commission's policies as presented by the latter had a coordinate effect." But on the whole there is little evidence of either Lie or Hammarskjöld having played any direct role in the matter.

India has discouraged the idea of intervention by the Secretary General in the conflict. In 1962 Ireland introduced a draft resolution in the Security Council which reminded the parties of the U.N.C.I.F. resolutions and requested the Acting Secretary General "to provide the Governments with such services as they may require for carrying out the terms of this resolution." The resolution was not accepted by India and was vetoed by the Soviet Union. On February 1, 1962 V.K.A. Menon, India's Defence Minister emphasized that India would "not submit to any kind of mediation or arbitration." The next day Pandit Nehru also expressed himself against a third party becoming arbitrator
or mediator in this issue because "a third party cannot come in where this
issue of sovereignty is involved." Again in 1964 when the question was
debated in the Council, the representative of the U.K. suggested that amid
India and Pakistan consider the possibility of engaging the assistance of
the Secretary General. The suggestion was supported by U.S. and Norway.
Morocco wanted the Council to call upon the parties to negotiate on mutually
agreed bases in the course of which the Secretary General could both lend
his advice and assistance to the parties and inform the Council of the pro-
gress achieved. The idea was supported by Ivory Coast, China, France and
Bolivia. Brazil wanted the Secretary General to visit India and Pakistan and
inform the Security Council about the situation and make suggestions about
ways and means of achieving a solution. The President of the Council summed
up saying "Several members of the Council expressed the view that the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations might possibly give useful assistance
to the parties in order to facilitate the resumption of negotiations on the
question of Jammu and Kashmir, or might help them to continue such negotia-
tions in the event of the latter encountering difficulties. Other members
of the Security Council, however, expressed the view that the negotiations
between India and Pakistan might be complicated by any outside intervention
and that even the principle of having recourse to the Secretary General
should be a matter for agreement between the parties."

Pakistan's Foreign Minister wanted a 'definite role' to be assigned to
the Secretary General to enable him to ensure a fruitful result of these
contacts. The Indian delegate, Mr. Chagla made it clear that the Secretary
General would have freedom to go anywhere "but I do not want him to come
in the context of the Kashmir debate unless we both agree that he should so
come. I am sure that the Secretary General himself will never put himself
in the embarrassing position of coming to India if he is not wanted on
this Kashmir question. But he will always be our friend and always wel-
come to come to our country, but as our guest and not in an official posi-
tion in this connection. I assure the Secretary General... that any
intervention on the part of the Secretary General which is uninvited and
without the consent of both parties will hinder and hamper the negotiations
which we propose to carry on in the near future."
The one important respect in which the Secretary General played a role
in the Kashmir question was when in 1949 on the request of the U.N.C.I.R.
he appointed Lt. Gen. Maurice Delvoi (Belgium) as Military Adviser to the
Commission to delimit the ceasefire line and to organize a team of U.N.
observers. A team of 35 observers was recruited and sent by the Secretary
General. After the termination of U.N.C.I.R. a "decision was made by the
Secretary General and the U.N. Representative, without any formal United
Nations authorization, that the military adviser and observers should report
directly to the Secretary General and not to the U.N. Representative." The
observers are placed on both the sides of the ceasefire line and report vio-
lations of the ceasefire. By their very presence they were successful till
1965 in preventing large scale violations of the ceasefire on either side.
The 1965 Crisis:

Phase I:— Relations between India and Pakistan, which were never
cordial, further deteriorated in May 1965 when there was a military conflict
between the two in the town of Kutch. The dispute was referred to arbitra-
tion on the mediation by the British Prime Minister. In the same month the
Indian army occupied Pakistan's military posts in Kargil commanding Indian
supply routes. They were evacuated only after the intervention by the
Secretary General and after a promise that U.N. observers would be stationed
there to make the supply routes secure. A military conflict in September
resulted from a "series of violations that began on August 5,... in the
form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the ceasefire line
from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side."
The number of infiltrators was estimated to be 5000 by the Indian Home Mini-
ster. The Indian army was not completely successful in apprehending them.
The infiltrators, however, did not receive the massive support from the
local population that they expected. In order to stop the infiltrators the
Government of India felt it necessary to control the mountain passes and to
strike at their bases in the Pakistan held area of Kashmir. On August 15
and after, the Indian army crossed the ceasefire line at several places.
On September 1, Pakistani army struck back across the international boundary
between Pakistan and Kashmir in order to cut off the only road connecting
India with Kashmir. This led to an Indian attack across its borders with
Pakistan near Lahore on September 5. An undeclared war began in which both
the sides used their armour, artillery, airforce and navy.

On 9th August the Secretary General was informed by the United Nations
commander, Gen. Nisso of the deteriorating situation. U Thant saw the Paki-
istani representative at the United Nations and expressed his "serious concern
about the situation.... involving the crossing of the ceasefire line from
Pakistan side by number of armed men and their attacks on Indian military
position." He appealed to India and Pakistan to observe the ceasefire line.
He also appealed to India for "restraint as regards any retaliatory action," and suggested withdrawal of "all personnel" of either party on the
wrong side. Pakistan did not reply but India assured restraint on its part
and agreed to respect the ceasefire line if Pakistan did likewise. U Thant
considered releasing a statement, but Pakistan's reaction was 'strongly
negative' as it did not present the political background of the issue and Pakistan felt that its emphasis on the ceasefire alone supported the status quo to India's benefit. He also thought of sending Bunche to the subcontinent. But the response of the Governments, though not negative, involved in each case conditions which would have rendered the mission ineffective. So he abandoned the idea. On September 1, he sent telegrams to the two Governments regarding the imminence of military confrontation and wrote "mutual observance of the ceasefire would result in a quiet most favourable to the resolution of political difference." He thought it essential that crossing the ceasefire line by armed personnel from both sides of the line should cease and armed personnel should be withdrawn from positions on the other party's side of the line. In a message of September 4, India's Prime Minister suggested as starting points: i) stopping of infiltration and withdrawal of infiltrators and armed forces by Pakistan from the Indian side; and ii) India will have to be satisfied that there would be no recurrence of such situation. Pakistan denied that the "freedom fighters" were raiders and insisted that they were the 'sons of the soil'. It thought that implementation of Thant's appeal meant only to return to the status quo ante without any assurance that the Security Council will strive to implement U.N. resolutions pertaining to the plebiscite. It argued that for a peaceful settlement United Nations must turn its attention to the issue of self determination and should not merely be concerned with the ceasefire line. "Insistence on a ceasefire can only be meaningful if there is a self implementing agreement to follow it." U Thant released his report on the incidents on the ceasefire violations on September 3. But by that time the war had started.
Phase II: A meeting of the Security Council was called by the U.S. on the 4th September. The report of U Thant of September 3 by implication put the blame for the current conflicts on Pakistan. He suggested the following conditions for restoring of the ceasefire and return to normalcy: i) willingness of both the parties to respect the Agreement they have entered into; ii) a readiness on the part of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent crossing of the ceasefire line from Pakistan side by armed men, whether or not in uniform; iii) evacuation by each party of positions of the other party now occupied and withdrawal of all armed personnel of each party to its own side of the line; iv) a halt by both the parties to the firing across the ceasefire line; v) allowing full freedom of movement and access to United Nations observers by both parties on both sides of the line.

In the debates India charged Pakistan with having sent 5000 armed Pak troops disguised as civilians in Kashmir and described its response as defensive measures. Pakistan denied any crossing by infiltrators and justified its action as a defensive one, forestalling 'Indian aggression.' The Council passed a resolution introduced by the non-permanent members. It 'called upon' the two Governments to take forthwith all steps for an immediate ceasefire; to respect the ceasefire line and have all "armed personnel" of each party withdrawn to its own side of the line; to cooperate with U.N.M.O.G.I.F. in the observance of the ceasefire, and requested the Secretary General to report on its compliance within three days.

India told the Council that the resolution should have been addressed to Pakistan alone. The Indian delegate said that implementation of para 2 could come about only when Pakistan stopped further crossing of the ceasefire line by armed or unarmed personnel, in or out of uniform; that Pakistan must withdraw all such personnel from the Indian side and vacate the Chamb
area; and further that India would have to be satisfied that such a situation would not recur.

On the 6th September U Thant reported indicating further 'broadening and intensifying' of the conflict. There was no response to the Council's resolution. The Council adopted another resolution on the 6th September calling upon the parties to cease hostilities in the entire area of the conflict immediately and promptly withdraw all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before August 5, 1965. It requested the Secretary General to "exert every possible effort" to give effect to the Council's resolutions of September 4 and 6, to take all measures possible to strengthen the U.N.M.O.R.I.F. and to keep the Council 'promptly and currently' informed on the implementation of the resolutions and the situation in the area. It also decided to keep this issue under urgent and constant review so that the Council may determine what further steps may be necessary to secure peace and security in the area.

U Thant visited India and Pakistan between 7-16 September. He called on the two Governments to order an unconditional ceasefire and said he was confident that after that "the Security Council would wish to provide the necessary assistance in ensuring the supervision of the ceasefire and withdrawal of all armed personnel on both sides to the positions they held before 5th August." He was also sure that the Security Council would wish to explain, as a matter of urgency, methods of achieving enduring peace between India and Pakistan.

The Indian Prime Minister replied on 14th September agreeing to order ceasefire but added that "consequent upon ceasefire when further details were considered India would not agree to any disposition which would leave the door open for further infiltration or prevent Indians from dealing with
infiltrations which have taken place." He also stated that no pressures or attacks would deflect it from maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India of which the State of Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part. Pakistan on the other hand insisted upon a "purposeful ceasefire which would provide for a self-executing arrangement for the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute" and wanted the induction of a force to maintain order in the State and holding a plebiscite within three months after the ceasefire. U Thant in reply to the two Governments noted that "they had added to their replies..... conditions and qualifications upon which I have no right under the Security Council's resolution to give undertakings." He once again appealed for a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. On the 15th September, the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Shastri wrote reaffirming the Indian Government's willingness to ceasefire on a reciprocal basis and pointed out that his letter of 14th August did not expect any undertakings from him but merely clarified India's stand on certain important matters. On the same day but before receiving Shastri's letter, U Thant again wrote to the two Governments saying that both had posed conditions which made acceptance of a ceasefire very difficult for the other side. He called for a new effort by them to reach a settlement and suggested was a meeting of the two Heads of the Governments with or without his presence, in the spirit of the Nehru-Ayub declaration of 29th November 1962. On the 16th President Ayub agreed to stop fighting in principle but said the ceasefire would be meaningful only if followed by an "effective machinery and procedure that would lead to a final settlement of the Kashmir" problem.

On the 17th U Thant stated in the Council that both the Governments found it difficult to make concessions under threat of force. He proposed
that the Council "order the two Governments concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further hostile military actions and to this end to issue ceasefire orders," and "declare that failure by the Governments concerned to comply with this resolution would demonstrate the existence of a breach of peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter." U Thant also suggested that the Council consider what assistance it might provide in ensuring the observance of the ceasefire and study means of assisting in carrying out of the withdrawal of the armed forces back to the positions of 30th August. He wanted the Council to request the Heads of the two Governments to meet together to discuss the current situation and problem underlying it and offered his assistance. He also suggested the appointment of a small committee to assist them if they thought it desirable.

The opinion in the Council was divided. Jordan endorsed Pakistan's stand rejecting a 'simple ceasefire' which sealed the fate of self-determination and wanted the Council to reaffirm its past pronouncements. U.K., U.S. and France supported a ceasefire to be followed by talks. U.S.S.R., (also Malaysia and Ivory coast) wanted the Council to concentrate on the task urgent task of ceasefire which would make possible talks between them and repeated its offer of good offices. Indira was ready for talks but not while the conflict continued. After two days of consultations Pakistan expressed its willingness, for bilateral talks provided the ground was adequately prepared and they were likely to be fruitful and said it was considering the Russian offer. The Council passed a resolution sponsored by the Netherlands which noted the 'differing' replies of the parties as to the appeal and considering that an early cessation of hostilities is essential as a first step towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences.
between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters; demanded a ceasefire by 0700 hours on September 22 and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5th August. It requested the Secretary General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of ceasefire and the withdrawal of armed personnel. The Council decided to consider after the implementation of the para 1 of resolution 210 what steps could be taken to facilitate a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict. It requested the Secretary General to exert every possible effort to implement the resolution and to seek a peaceful solution.

U Thant asked the two Governments to inform him about the positive steps taken or likely to be taken for ensuring ceasefire and transmit to him the plans of withdrawals. Mr. Shastri replied agreeing to order a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. At a specially summoned meeting of the Council Pakistan's Foreign Minister said that Pakistan considered the resolution unsatisfactory but said orders for the ceasefire had been issued. The Council again 'demanded' that the parties honour their commitments to the Security Council to observe ceasefire and withdraw all armed personnel in accordance with its resolution of 20th September.

Earlier, on September 21, U Thant interpreted the September 20 resolution to mean that "each party should instruct its forces to ceasefire at 0700 hours on September 22 without condition, although it would be understandable if in issuing these orders the troops were instructed to fire if fired upon." This was rejected by India. The Indian Prime Minister stated in the Parliament: "in a battle that is continuing, it is just not possible for one side to ask its soldiers to stop firing, leaving the other sides free to continue its operations."
Phase III: After the ceasefire two important issues arose: 1) withdrawal of the armed personnel. In reply to U Thant's letter Pakistan insisted on joint agreement on withdrawal. It interpreted the resolution to mean that "military disengagement should proceed concurrently with an honourable political settlement... it is imperative that we should evolve a self-executing arrangement and procedures that would ensure an honourable settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute... without such an arrangement it is hard to envisage an effective programme for the withdrawal of forces." It threatened to resume hostilities lacking such a settlement. India sought clarification of the word 'troops' and stressed that the resolution also covered withdrawal of infiltrators. It wanted withdrawal on both the sides to be coordinated and synchronized. India also reminded the Secretary General of the conditions laid down by it in its letter of September 14. U Thant explained that in his letters the words 'troops' and 'armed personnel' were used interchangeably with no difference in meaning and exclusively within the context and intent of the resolution. In giving guidance to military observers he had assured that 'positions' must connote identifiable military positions of some nature which prior to 5th August have presumably been occupied by some kind of armed personnel under government control and/or direction. U Thant suggested withdrawal of troops to their well known respective sides rather than try to define the precise positions from which they must withdraw.

U Thant appointed Brig. Gen. Maradiago of Chile as his representative to arrange a meeting of Indo-Pak representatives to seek an agreed plan of withdrawal. President Ayub wanted the Council to appoint a commission so that negotiations for settling the basic cause of the conflict would proceed at the same time as arrangements for withdrawal were being made. India on the other hand wanted a stabilization of the ceasefire before withdrawals were considered.
The Security Council met on October 25 and adopted a resolution calling upon the Governments to cease all military activity; it insisted on an end to violations of ceasefire and demanded prompt and unconditional execution of proposals already agreed upon in principle by the two Governments. It urged the formulation of an agreed plan for withdrawal in cooperation with the Secretary General's representative and to lay down a time limit. It asked the Secretary General to report within three weeks. The meetings took place in November and December but final agreement could be arrived at only after the Tashkent agreement where political decisions were made.

11) A second important point in connection with U Thant's role arose over the organization of the supervision of the ceasefire. As early as September 21 U Thant reported to the Security Council that he intended to deploy 100 military observers with the necessary staff and logistic support outside Kashmir. He was also strengthening, he said, the U.N.M.O.G.I.F. with additional observers and transport. In a telegram to the two Governments he explained that "because of the differences in origin of the two operations", he was separating the supervision of the ceasefire and withdrawal of troops in areas outside Kashmir from U.N.M.O.G.I.F. The team of observers operating outside Kashmir was to be known as U.N.I.R.O.U.M. He clarified to India that "it is not to be assumed that in this purely administrative action there is any suggestion of treating the conflict between India and Pakistan and the supervision and withdrawals otherwise than as a whole". The U.N.M.O.G.I.F. had its origin in U.N.C.I.P. resolution of 13th August 1948 (Part I-d) and the Karachi Agreement of July 27, 1949 and was limited in its terms of reference and function to the ceasefire line in Kashmir. He added, he "assumes no authority on his part to extend the scope
of U.N.M.O.C.I.R.'s functions beyond the ceasefire line." Since the Security Council did not extend the scope of U.N.M.O.C.I.R., he had to create a new organization to implement resolution 211 of September 20. He stressed that the separation of the two organizations was only for administrative reasons, and that the provisions of the resolution were being dealt with as a whole throughout the area.

India's objections were that the infiltrations started the conflict. "These operations and the ceasefire which brought an end to them can only be treated as one whole, and the supervision of the ceasefire line has, therefore, necessarily to be a single operation to be carried out by a single group of observers under one command." According to India the Security Council in requesting him to strengthen U.N.M.O.C.I.R. (September 6, resolution 100) contemplated one group to supervise the ceasefire. Para 2 of September 20 resolution should be viewed in the context of the council's earlier resolutions. It further objected to the creation of new organization without its consent and declared that India would continue to treat the operation 'as a whole.' U Thant agreed to Gen. Nisso's supervising the whole operations and commanding both the organizations - it was an 'informal' arrangement, he explained to Pakistan.

To India's objections U Thant replied that he could not be induced to take any action which he considered he had no authority to take. As for the interpretation of the resolution he said, only the Security Council could make an authoritative interpretation. He could not consult India about the extension of U.N.M.O.C.I.R.'s functions because "the two parties were locked in a battle and it is was not a propitious time to raise such a sensitive question." Incidentally, the Soviet Union also challenged the interpretation put by the Secretary General and questioned his authority in
creating a new organization without the express consent of the Council.

The final solution of the 1965 crisis came in a dramatic way at the Tashkent Conference where President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri met between 4th to 10th January 1966 and with Kosygin, the Soviet Premier acting as a third party arrived at an agreement. The agreement envisaged the two Governments' "firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their manaz countries" and "to exert all efforts to create good manzi neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They affirmed their obligations under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means." The two Governments agreed to withdraw "all armed personnel" of the two countries before February 25 to the positions they held before 5th August, 1965. The Agreement included acceptance of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other" and The parties agreed to meet both at the highest and at other levels 'on matters of direct concern to both the countries.'

The Agreement was implemented to the extent of withdrawal of armed troops of the two countries to their own sides and restoring of diplomatic relations. Meetings at Foreign Ministers' level took place but could make no progress. India continued to insist that Kashmir was an integral part of India while Pakistan held on to its demand for 'self determination'. The Security Council has not debated the question since then and the Secretary General has taken the stand that "the onus is back again with the Security Council. He remarked that the first two paras of resolution 211 were implemented but political discussions would be taken up by the Security Council at the appropriate time.
The Kashmir question in general and the 1965 crisis in particular raise some important points regarding the Secretary General's role as an intermediary in a small power conflict. In the pre-conflict stage i.e. from 5th to 30th August there were indications of a likely breach of peace and by urging Pakistan to observe the ceasefire line and India to observe restraint against any retaliatory action, the Secretary General, by implication, had held Pakistan culpable. It can be presumed in the light of the later postures of the two sides that his proposal to send Bunche was not feasible because Pakistan wanted him to discuss the substance of the political conflict while India wanted him to confine to the military situation. His second proposal— to issue a public statement on August 16— was shelved because of the 'strongly negative' attitude of Pakistan. By the time the statement was issued (as part of S/6651) and a second appeal for observation of ceasefire was made on September 1, matters had gone out of hand and hostilities had ensued. A statement of facts in the early phase could have helped mobilise diplomatic support, and public opinion to prevent the eruption of the conflict. Postponement of the statement helped Pakistan to gain time. Mrs. Indira Gandhi and the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Shastri 107, criticised U Thant for this delay. It is clear that if U Thant's primary aim was to put an end to the fighting and if he thought the initiative for it lay with Pakistan then there was no need to obtain the consent of the parties to issue such a statement. Such a statement could have become a basis for a Security Council meeting on the Lao-tian precedent of September 1959.

During the conflict stage, the Security Council used U Thant as its negotiating instrument. He was charged with the responsibility of implementing the Council's resolutions. U Thant tried personal diplomacy which, however, did not bear fruit. Pakistan demanded a 'self executing arrangement'
for plebiscite and its delegate criticised his proposals for a long term solution as being 'neither precise nor effective' and for not referring to the Kashmir dispute or to the implementation of the U.N.C.I.P. resolutions.

It is a little intriguing that in spite of India's acceptance of ceasefire he wanted the Council to order the two Governments under Article 40 to ceasefire with the threat of Article 39 hanging over the recalcitrant country. This attempt at equating the two countries might have been aimed at facilitating Pakistan's compliance with the demand. Ultimately it would have been held responsible for breach of peace since India had already agreed to ceasefire on a reciprocal basis. A second important point is that U Thant was not satisfied with an agreement to ceasefire on reciprocal basis but wanted India to unilaterally ceasefire. This was very much unlike the attitude of Hammarskjöld in 1956. He, in the Middle Eastern Crisis did not insist on a unilateral ceasefire but interpreted Egypt's offer of reciprocal ceasefire as compliance with the Assembly's resolution. It is also interesting to note that para 5 of the September 29 resolution gave a vague mandate to him to 'seek a peaceful solution' and though India and Pakistan welcomed his good offices he let go the opportunity and did not, even after the ceasefire, try to grapple with the underlying political differences.

A second fact that emerges from the case study is that the ceasefire did not result from the efforts of the Secretary General alone; though unlike many other situations the Security Council gave him unflinching support. In fact at the conclusion of his personal intervention he could achieve only conditional acceptance of ceasefire. As James Reston of New York Times pointed out the acceptance of the ceasefire was heavily influenced by the U.S. and partly by U.S.S.R. attitudes to the conflict. On 8th September U.S. suspended military aid and practically stopped new economic aid commitments
Food shipments to India, which was passing through drought conditions, were put on a month to month basis. The fear of losing economic aid from the U.S. and consortium countries and the crippling effect of suspensions of military aid/sale was an important factor in bringing about the ceasefire. Though invited by Pakistan, the U.S. declined to intervene directly by passing the United Nations and refused to take sides in spite of its military alliance with Pakistan.

Similarly, on the question of withdrawal of armed personnel both the sides challenged the authority of the Secretary General. While Pakistan resented the fact that he was giving precedence to withdrawal over political negotiations, India joined issue with him on the interpretation of the Council’s resolution. U Thant following the precedent of Hammarskjold in a similar case, refused to make withdrawal dependent on the solution of the basic question.

U Thant’s interpretations of the resolutions, disputed by India, present some difficulties: 1) India insisted that the term ‘armed personnel’ included infiltrators; U Thant meant by it only troops of either side. U Thant’s use of terms in his reports leaves much to be desired. In his telegram of September 1 three terms are used: ‘armed men’, ‘armed personnel’, and ‘regular army troops’. It is not clear whether ‘armed men’ and ‘armed personnel’ are identical and if they cover infiltrators. The report of September 3 also uses the term ‘armed men’ and in the conditions laid down by it for restoration of peace a distinction is made between ‘readiness on the part of the Government of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent crossing the ceasefire line from the Pakistan side by armed men, whether or not in uniform’ and ‘evacuation by each party of positions of the other party now occupied and withdrawal of all armed personnel of each party to its
own side.' This would indicate that 'armed personnel' do not include 'armed men' not in uniform.

In the Security Council debate on the resolutions of 4th and 5th September the term is not fully explained. Only at a late stage on 20th September, Malaysia, a coauthor of the resolution, argued that the date 5th August mentioned in the resolution was of 'vital significance.' It wanted the Council to deplore the infiltrations. On the other hand Jordon, also a coauthor, stated that the date was merely to give an indication of the lines for the withdrawals of the both the parties. It was not meant to pass judgment on the charges of infiltration or to establish facts in this regard. It is true that though the Council noted the Secretary General's report of September 3 which, in a qualified way, gave basis for accusations of infiltration, its resolutions neither deplored infiltrations nor prohibited the crossing of the ceasefire line by armed men whether or not in uniform as U Thant recommended. Therefore, by implication the Council's resolutions referred only to troops which held distinct positions before 5th August. If the Indian interpretation were to be true then India would have had to ceasefire even against the infiltrators, which she refused to do.

11) Separation of U.N.I.F.O.M. from U.N.M.O.U.I.F.: On this issue the Secretary General had to contend not only with India but also with the U.S.S.R. U Thant's argument that U.N.M.O.U.I.F. had its origin in the Karachi Agreement and the U.N.C.I.F. resolutions and, therefore, he had no authority to extend it beyond Kashmir seems valid. But India was justified in arguing that the creation of U.N.I.F.O.M. - a new organization to be stationed on its territory required its consent. India had not accepted the Council's September 20 resolution in its totality. It had merely agreed
to order a 'simple ceasefire'. However, India did not press its objections to their logical conclusions — refusing entry to the observers — but contented itself with recording its non-recognition and getting it supervised by Gen. Mimmo, Commander of U.N.M.O.I.F., and refusing to support financially the U.N.I.O.M.

The Soviet Union's objections were more fundamental. It stated that

steps are being taken not towards strengthening the group of military observers of the U.N. in India and Pakistan, but towards a substantial expansion of the group..... a new organ is being created altogether.... If the Security Council truly did have in mind the creation of this new group..... it is certain that a clear cut decision would have had to be adopted providing for it.' The Soviet Union had to be drawn to attention to its position immediately after the publication of his first report. It argued that only the Security Council was competent to adopt the relevant decisions on all concrete questions involving military observers of the United Nations. The Council must decide, in particular, such matters, as the functions, number, command, terms of reference of the observers. Two questions were involved: a) Secretary General's power to interpret the mandate and b) his taking initiatives to implement them. While the Secretary General took care to note that only the Council could give an authoritative interpretation, he based the implementation on his interpretation, making his actions stand still they were ruled out by the Council. Given the differences among the Great Powers his interpretation would stand almost as final. The Dutch delegate put the matter succinctly when he stated that the Security Council should always be entitled to interpret its resolutions. It would be helpful if the Council would, from time to time, whenever it deemed that desirable, give broad directives. "Secretary
General as the principal administrative officer of the Organization, should have sufficient freedom of movement to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council without having to ask the authorisation of the Council for every step in detail. If the Secretary General should have to ask such authorization for each separate step, once the task of implementation of a resolution had been entrusted to him, his work would become practically impossible and implementation of the Council's resolution would become fictitious." The Dutch delegate wanted the Secretary General to consult the Members informally about the steps taken.

In getting the withdrawal of armed personnel U Thant did not meet with success, though the Security Council passed a strong resolution on November 5, peremptorily demanding withdrawal of armed personnel. The agreement on withdrawal was reached not at the United Nations, and not essentially through the efforts of U Thant but at Tashkent with the mediation of the Soviet Premier. There India gave up its insistence on withdrawal of infiltrators and retention of some important posts captured in the war. On the other hand Pakistan gave up its demand for a 'self-executory arrangement.' The Declaration did not even mentioned negotiations as Kashmir in future but only promised talks on 'outstanding differences.'

Inx A number of factors were instrumental in reaching agreement on the withdrawals. i) The U.S. and the consortium countries had not yet lifted the informal embargo on the economic aid to India and Pakistan. India's foreign exchange reserves were depleted. It was made clear that resumption of aid was dependent on some amount of reconciliation between India and Pakistan. ii) Russo-Pak relations were improving over a year and the change in Russian attitude to Kashmir - from backing India to the assumption of a posture of neutrality - was seen as a welcome sign by Pakistan. Russian
involvement, it might have thought, would in future make negotiations on Kashmir easier. iii) A stalemate was not in the interests of Pakistan as a larger and strategically more important of its area was under the Indian occupation and Indian leaders were clamoring for its retention. Further, it badly needed military supplies to recuperate its strength.

The crisis pointedly brings out the limited role of the Secretary General in the resolution of the conflict between two small powers. Here backing by the Security Council was not enough. His efforts had to be coupled with intense pressure by at least one of the superpowers on which the two countries were economically and militarily dependent. They had greater things to gain from the mediation of a Great Power than from the Secretary General. His diplomatic efforts can be more successful in a situation where the parties dislike involvement of the two superpowers or where they fear intervention or pressure from one or the other. Pakistan openly sought U.S. intervention while India accepted Soviet Union's good offices. Moreover, the direction and objective of the Great Power pressure and the Secretary General's activities were one and the same and there was no question of saving face. What is more, the Secretary General was not the only impartial actor in the situation. Neither of the parties seriously accused U.S. and U.S.S.R. of partiality. But compared to the 1948-49 conflict it must be admitted that Secretary General's office as a negotiating instrument of the Council was more efficient and prompt than the U.N. which took six months to visit the subcontinent and another six months to negotiate a ceasefire. His office was also better suited to devising and organizing peacekeeping machinery.
THE UNITED NATIONS IN CYPRUS:

The Cyprus crisis which erupted in December 1963 offers another case for the evaluation of the role of the Secretary General and the peacekeeping machinery used by him as an instrument in resolution of the crisis. In this case again the conflict has, as in the Congo, two aspects: intra-national and international. In its intra-national aspect it is a conflict between two 'national communities' - the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot. In its international aspect it is a conflict between Greece and Turkey, both of which supported their respective communities in the island. Since Cyprus has been a non-aligned nation, and since both Greece and Turkey are members of N.A.T.O., cold war has only a peripheral relevance to the conflict. Neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. had a vital interest involved in the conflict as such. It is of interest then to study how far the Secretary General has and the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFUCY) has been useful in preventing the aggravation of the conflict and in promoting the long term solution of the conflict.

Background: A crown colony before 1960, the island was the scene of a strong movement for Enosis (union with Greece) led by Archbishop Makarios and of a guerilla war led by Col. Grivas. This produced a reaction among the Turkish Cypriots who demanded partition of the island. The formation of the Republic of Cyprus was made possible in 1960 as a result of prolonged negotiations between Greece, Turkey and the U.K. The compromise arrangement arrived at was embodied in the Constitution of Cyprus and the Treaty of Guarantee. The Constitution provided for complex institutional arrangements which gave a veto right to the representatives of the Turkish minority in the island on many Government decisions. The Treaty prohibited Enosis, guaranteed the 'state of affairs' established by the 'basic articles of the constitution'
and reserved the right to the three powers 'to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs' created by the Treaty in the event of its breach. A Treaty of Alliance allowed for stationing of contingents of the three powers on the island. Given the deep distrust between these two communities it is not surprising that the Constitution proved unworkable and in November 1963 President Makarios suggested certain constitutional changes which were rejected by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. Disturbances and communal fighting broke out on December 21. A joint truce force comprising Turkish, Greek and the British soldiers under British command kept peace temporarily.

On January 16, 1964 a conference of the U.K., Greece, Turkey and Cyprus opened in London. Cyprus requested the Secretary General to appoint a personal representative to look into the situation in Cyprus. Turkey and Greece agreed to the request and therefore on 17th January the Secretary General decided to send Gen. P.S. Kyani as his representative. His function was to observe the progress of the peacekeeping operation and report to the Secretary General. At the invitation of the participating states he sent Jose Rols Bennett to London to consult the parties outside the conference about their earlier request. Whereas Cyprus supported it at the conference the establishment of a unitary state, Turkey favoured the division of Cyprus on communal lines. A proposal to have a peace-keeping force recruited from the NATO countries was rejected by Makarios. He wanted the peacekeeping force to be under the United Nations control.

The Security Council met on 18th February to consider the situation on the request of the U.K. and Cyprus. In the debate the Cyprus delegate charged Turkey with fostering the idea of communal separation. He rejected the right of the Turkey to take unilateral action to restore the state of
affairs under the Treaty of Guarantee as being in contravention of the Charter. It requested the Council to send an international force under the control of the United Nations to provide assistance to the Government of Cyprus in restoration of law and order and for the protection of the integrity and independence of Cyprus.

Turkey insisted on its treaty rights and the safeguards to the Turkish Cypriots given by them. The Soviet delegate warned against a foreign intervention and said it could not remain indifferent to the situation in the area. He wanted the Council to protect Cyprus and stop foreign intervention. The U.S. delegate favoured a reestablishment of the 'state of affairs' created by the Treaty and wanted the Council to promote agreement on an international peacekeeping force and a long-term political solution through a United Nations mediator.

On February 25 the Secretary General made a statement in the Council. He informed the Council that he had held discussions with the parties to determine to what extent a common ground might be found. While there was progress on some issues, certain other basic differences persisted. He assured the Council that the discussions were held within the context of the Charter, bearing in mind the authority of the Security Council. The question of sending a peacekeeping force without the concurrence of the Security Council would not arise.

The Secretary General further explained, on March 4, 1964 that the creation of the peacekeeping force could come about only by the positive action of the Council and could be stationed in Cyprus only with its consent. From the preliminary soundings that he had taken, he informed the Council that although "the problem of composition (was) delicate and difficult because of the indicated limitations on the range of choice" he hoped that
the force envisaged could be created. He also made it clear that the ex-
tension of the force beyond three months could be brought to an about only by
fresh action of the Council. A resolution was adopted on 4th March as Res.
1964. The resolution recalled Article 2(4) of the Charter and called upon
all Member States to refrain from action likely to worsen the situation in
Cyprus or to endanger peace and recommended the creation of a peacekeeping
force. It asked the Secretary General to decide its size, and composition
in consultation with the four Governments (U.K., Cyprus, Greece, Turkey).
The Commander of the force was to be appointed by the Secretary General and
was to report to him. The Secretary General was to keep the Governments
providing the force informed about it and report periodically to the Council.
The force was to function 'in the interests of preserving international peace
and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting
and...... to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order
and a return to normal conditions.' The Secretary General also was to appoint
a mediator 'who use his best endeavours with the representatives of the
communities' and also promote a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement
of the problem. The force was initially stationed for a period of three
months and its finances were to be made up by Cyprus and the nations provi-
ding the force as well as voluntary contributions. On March 6, U Thant
designated Gen. Gyani Commander of the force. However, the Secretary General
found it difficult to assemble a force because of the reluctance of nations
to get involved in a Congo-like affair. In March fresh fighting broke out
and the Council meeting on 13th March renewed its earlier call urging restraint.

The Force became operational on March 27. Sakari Toumioja was
appointed United Nations mediator. On May 11 Calo Plaza was appointed Secre-
tary General's special representative to conclude negotiations on essentially
nonmilitary matters.
The Secretary General soon ran into differences of opinion regarding interpretations of the Council's resolution. Both Turkey and the Vice President (Turkish) of Cyprus held that the term 'Government of Cyprus' meant "a government which according to Cyprus Constitution acts and takes decisions with the concurrence of Turkish Vice President and its Turkish members." Therefore, they held that in implementing para 6 and 7 of the resolution both the President and the Vice-President must be consulted. The Turkish Government held that the Constitution of Cyprus was of a bi-communal character, which achieved a careful balance between the rights and duties of the two communities. "It would seem appropriate, therefore, that the United Nations Force in order to be able effectively to carry out the mission entrusted to it by the Security Council Resolution of March 4, 1964, should in the first instance endeavour to restore the machinery of constitutional government in Cyprus. It would indeed be difficult to see," it argued, how the Force could 'contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order' so long as the Constitution of the Republic, which is the source of all law and order, is in abeyance. This is what Turkey meant by 'return to normalcy'.

On the other hand the Greek Cypriot Government argued that 'the purpose of the United Nations Force is to eliminate the rebellion and restore law and order after which a peaceful solution would be possible.' It held that the Force ought not to protect the 'rebels' and their fortifications. The force must, according to it, "find a balance between these two objectives: to prevent a recurrence of fighting and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order." The Cyprus Government wanted the Force to render 'move active assistance' to reestablish the authority of the Government over the whole country.
U Thant tried to find a way out of this on the one hand, by instructing the Commander of the Force that he and members of the Force were free to have such contacts as they might deem desirable in order to ensure proper performance of functions of the Force as defined by the Security Council Resolution. He pointed out that the Force was exclusively under the United Nations command under the mandate given to it by the Council. "The Force is an impartial, objective body which has no responsibility for political solutions and indeed, which will not try to influence them one way or the other." On the other hand while clarifying the functions of the force, he recalled para 2 of the Council's March 4 Resolution which asked "the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus." Thus he refused to let the United Nations Force become an instrument in the hands of the Government (Greek Cypriot) but he also turned down the interpretation that the United Nations Force should restore the Constitution of 1960.

Such a policy, obviously, put the Turkish Cypriot minority to a disadvantage and both Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leadership bitterly complained against this. The Turkish delegate to the United Nations remarked that the United Nations Force could not carry out its mandate with impartiality if it recognised that the prerogatives of sovereign Government belonged to one side of the Civil War. He felt that "a strict and legalistic interpretation of (March 4) resolution tends to exert a direct influence on the political situation." As examples he pointed out that the Security General regarded arm build up by the Greek Cypriot leadership as natural for self-defence but called importation of arms by the Turkish Cypriots smuggling; or the United Nations Force's failure to put an end to the economic
blockade, imposed by the Greek Cypriot Government, in effect influenced the ultimate political situation. He felt that the Secretary General's in interpreting the resolution was obsessed with the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriot regime of Cyprus. The Vice-President of Cyprus protested against the Secretary General's interpretation and said "your action in recognizing the Makarios administration as the Government of Cyprus is so radically detrimental to Turkish political interests that it undermines and destroys the whole Turkish case which is that the Greeks have no right to act as the government of Cyprus in violation of the Turkish constitutional interests."

In the guidelines to the U.N.F.G.R., the Secretary General laid down conditions on the use of force. The troops were not to take initiative in the use of armed force. Use of force was permitted only in self-defence, which included i) defence of United Nations positions, premises and vehicles under armed attack, and ii) support of other United Nations personnel under armed attack. Minimum use of force was allowed only when attempts at persuasion had failed for e.g. where their safety was jeopardized by their positions being infiltrated or enveloped; or where attempts to disarm them or prevent them from performing their duties were made. Peace was to be maintained by deployment of the United Nations Force in disturbed areas, or by interposing itself between conflicting groups. The Force was to avoid conflicting with either communities except in self-defence or where specific arrangements agreed by both the communities have been or were about to be violated thus risking a recurrence of fighting.

However, the Secretary General found that in an atmosphere of suspicion and lack of confidence the role of the United Nations Force was exceedingly difficult and "both constructive initiatives and noninterference (work) inevitably and invariably misinterpreted by one side or the other."
In his first report the Secretary General stated that the Force had prevented a recurrence of fighting but the Cyprus Government had decided to organize an army while the Turkish Cypriots smuggled arms into the island. In Nicosia both sides raised fortifications and United Nations Force had to warn that any construction of further posts or fortifications would result in their removal by United Nations troops. But the United Nations Force was not successful every time in preventing a clash.

In August 1964 fighting between the two communities erupted when the Government of Cyprus took offensive action in the Kokkina-Mansonra area. The U.N.F.C.Y.R. was unable to act and Turkey was forced to take 'limited police action' i.e. air and naval bombardment in the North western Cyprus. The Council reaffirmed its President's appeal to Turkey to cease fire and to stop the use of military force against Cyprus.

The Government of Cyprus continued its arms build up on the pretext of defending the island from foreign threats. It refused entry of United Nations personnel to docks for checking on the import of arms by Government, in the interests of defence and security of the island. United Nations vehicles were searched. The Secretary General protested against the contravention of the freedom of movement of United Nations Force. He was forced to declare that the United Nations Force was given a heavy responsibility without a precise definition of its mandate, especially regarding use of force. "This inadequacy and lack of clarity in the mandate of the Force has been a handicap to its operation", he said. He tried to force the issue by stating that he proposed to proceed on certain assumptions pending clarification of the mandate: a) that in establishing the Force and defining its important functions the Council realized that the Force could not discharge that function unless it had complete freedom of movement in Cyprus,
which could only mean such unrestricted freedom of movement as may be considered essential by the Force Commander to the implementation of the mandate of the Force; b) that the Force in carrying out its mandate to prevent recurrence of fighting is reasonably entitled to remove positions and fortified installations where these endanger the peace and to take all necessary measures in self-defence if attacked in the performance of this duty; c) that in seeking to prevent a recurrence of fighting, it may be demanded by the Commander that the opposing armed forces be separated to reasonable distances in order to create buffer zones in which armed forces will be prohibited.

In the Council though his proposals were supported by many members, Soviet Union opposed any broadening of the functions of the United Nations Force. However, U Thant stated in the Council that in the discharge of its mandate it was his intention to continue to seek full respect for the freedom of movement for the Force which was not only indispensable but was provided for in the Status of Force Agreement. He further said, "It will also be my intention to continue to initiate any actions which would prove necessary for the implementation of the mandate to prevent a recurrence of fighting and contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and return to normal conditions." The Council merely reaffirmed its earlier resolutions.

Serious incidents took place in March 1965 and again in November 1965. On both the occasions the United Nations Force interceded and proposed steps like withdrawal of troops from fortified positions, free movement of civilians and arranging a ceasefire.

The March 4 Resolution indicated that the introduction of the U.N.F.T. C.I.F. in the island was a holding operation in order to give time and for creating an atmosphere conducive to an agreed political settlement. For this
purpose a mediator was to be appointed. However, in practice the weak Greek Cypriot Government and the Turkish leadership followed policies of hostile confrontation. The Government built an army - National Guard - for itself with Greek assistance. The Turkish Cypriots pursued a policy of 'self-isolation' (stopping access of all Greek Cypriots to areas under their control) and fortified their positions with arms smuggled from Turkey. In retaliation the Government, from time to time, imposed economic restrictions on them. These led the Secretary General to remark that the Government sought to enforce a potential solution by economic pressure as a substitute for military action. The representative of the Secretary General tried to mitigate these conditions by seeking compromise solutions. By 1966 these efforts had, with varying degrees of success, led to restoration of economic life and normal communications in the Government controlled areas of the island. For example, another such difficulty was regarding the rotation of Turkish troops stationed in Cyprus, which the Government of Cyprus did not allow. At the mediation of the Secretary General a compromise was reached by which the Turkish troops which had controlled the Kyrenia road were withdrawn, giving exclusive control of the road to the United Nations and the Government of Cyprus allowed the rotation of the Turkish contingent.

The Mediator (Gallo Plaza, who had succeeded Tsoumioja on his death) after prolonged efforts did not find the possibility of an agreed solution unless there was a radical change in the attitudes of the parties and the circumstances in which they were placed. He found the positions of the parties to be wide apart. Turkey wanted a reestablishment of the balance of power existing prior to 1963 before talks could take place. The Greek Cypriots insisted on an unfettered independence and right to self-determination - i.e. a choice between Enosis and continued independence. They were ready
to have talks on the minority rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Finding an agreed solution impossible, Mr. Plaza suggested "some directions along which (the parties) should reasonably be expected to meet and try to seek an agreement." He rejected Enosis, the idea of a federation, as well as re-establishment of the 1960 constitution as not feasible. He suggested meeting between leaders of the two Cypriot communities to find common ground. Mr. Plaza wanted a United Nations Commissioner to be stationed on the island to secure the guarantees given to the minorities. His suggestions also included a voluntary renunciation of Enosis, and a demilitarisation of the island. The United Nations itself could guarantee the arrangement. The terms of settlement were to be presented as a package plan to the Cypriot people for their approval.

Turkey rejected the report on the ground that the Mediator had exceeded his terms of reference and considered that his function had come to an end. The Secretary General, however, did not find anything in the report which went beyond a or was incompatible with para 7 of the March 4 resolution. Turkey agreed to the continuation of the mediation effort but did not feel Mr. Plaza suited for the purpose. The Government of Cyprus described the report as a constructive approach to the problem, though it did not agree with his recommendations regarding the right to self-determinations. The Secretary General himself felt that the report provided a reasonable basis for settlement. But Turkey stuck to its position. Finally, Plaza resigned his post in December 1965.

In May 1966, Thant through his representative in Cyprus U Thant proposed a provisional settlement for the consideration of Greece and Turkey. This involved a Great Power guarantee of Cypriot independence; suspension of Zurich and London treaties for 3-5 years after which negotiations on
permanent solution could begin; the Security Council to guarantee rights of
Turkish minority and receive reports on the situation from a United Nations
observer. However, the Greek Government rejected the plan.

Violence erupted in a more intense form in November 1967 when the
Cyprus Government police tried to resume patrolling in a mixed village.
It was opposed by the Turkish Cypriots. The United Nations Force could not
bring peace and was fired upon by Government troops. The Secretary General
intervened on November 15 requesting withdrawal of Greek Cypriot National
Guard from the positions they had occupied and restoration of peace. Figh-
ting broke out again on 16th and Turkish planes overflew Cyprus. On the
22nd U Thant appealed to Greece, Cyprus and Turkey to exercise restraint
and to avoid action that might precipitate a new outbreak. He sent his
Under Secretary Jose Rolz Bennett to assist the parties in reducing tension.
On 24th he again warned the nations concerned against the dangers of war.
He suggested substantial reduction of non-Cypriot armed forces other than
those of United Nations in order to facilitate positive demilitarisation
and progress towards peace. Turkey insisted on evacuation of the island by
Greek forces, dissolution of the National Guard and assurances regarding the
validity of Zurich and London Agreements. Greece and Cyprus accepted the
recall of Greek forces and made the dissolution of National Guard contingent
on agreed alternative arrangement for maintaining law and order. They re-
jected the validity of the Zurich and London Treaties. The U.S. President
sent Assistant Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance to help the parties compose
their differences. After long negotiations between the parties helped by
Bennett and Vance a compromise solution was reached based on Secretary Gene-
ral’s appeal of November 24. By this a) as a first step Greece and Turkey
were to recall their forces in the island over and above their specified
contingents within a forty-five days and Turkey to dismantle its war preparations; b) the United Nations Forces were to be given increased peacekeeping powers for maintaining peace and supervising disarmament in the island. The Secretary General made a further appeal on December 3 which embraced the substance of these agreements. Both Greece and Turkey welcomed the appeal and responded favourably to it. The Government of Cyprus welcomed the withdrawal of Greek and Turkish forces but thought that the question of enlargement of United Nations Forces power should require consideration by the Security Council, with due regard to the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. The Government said that it looked forward to United Nations Force's contribution to measures aimed at establishment of peace and security for all the people of Cyprus.

In the Security Council U.S.S.R. opposed any enlargement of the powers of the UNFCIP while the Government of Cyprus showed readiness to bring about disarmament if the Greek and Turkish contingents stationed in Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee also withdrew. The Resolution of the Security Council noted the appeals made by the Secretary General and the replies of the Governments to them. It invited the parties to avail themselves of the good offices proffered by the Secretary General and requested him to report to the Council as appropriate. Since then with the assistance of Secretary General's representative talks between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders have been initiated and have been continuing.

The Cyprus conflict offers a unique case for the study of the role of the Secretary General combining as it does divergent elements. On the one hand the main task of the United Nations is to prevent a recurrence of fighting on the island, to maintain law and order and to provide an atmosphere in which a negotiated solution may be feasible, on the other hand, in
the island the "United Nations is for the first time leading directly with
forces inside a State and with conflicts between sectors of the population
of that State." Two of the parties to the conflict - Greece and Turkey -
have been members of NATO. Both have favoured mediation by the U.S., from
which they get both economic and military aid. The Greek Cypriot Govern-
ment of Cyprus on the other hand has with skill, tried to involve the United
Nations, both the Secretary General and the non-aligned anti-colonialist
Afro-Asian nations in the General Assembly, in order to withstand Turkish
pressure and its threat to use direct action guaranteed to it under the Treaty.
At the same time it has relied on the Soviet objections in the Security Coun-
cil to resist all demands to widen the mandate of the UNFUCYF and the Secre-
tary General. At home President Makarios has used the legitimising influence
of the United Nations and the Secretary General to consolidate the position
of the Greeks Cypriot Governments of the island and to maintain law and order.

The U.S. is caught in an unenviable position. Its attempt late in
1963 to keep the conflict away from the Soviet influence, and keep it within
the NATO, failed because of the insistence on of President Makarios that
the United Nations should assume the sole peacekeeping functions. The U.S.,
while supporting the treaty rights of Turkey has sought to work out a
compromise acceptable to its two allies. It is of interest to note that
both in 1964 and in 1967 U.S. influence was functional to a compromise between
Greece and Turkey. However, on both the occasions its efforts had to be
supplemented by those of the Secretary General to satisfy Makarios Govern-
ment of Cyprus. The Soviet Union has been opposed to all foreign bases on
the island and though it has helped the Cyprus Government with arms and
warned against any interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus, it has
been careful not to take sides in the basic communal conflict with the
with the improvement of its relations with Turkey in 1965, the Soviet Union has talked of an amicable settlement between the two 'national communities' in the island. It has not shown any sympathies to the emotion-charged demand for Enosis. Thus, in the General Assembly debates on Cyprus in the fall of 1965 the U.S.S.R. delegate explained that a solution to the problem should be based on respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and upon respect for the lawful rights of both 'national communities' on the island. The question could be solved only on the basis of 'legitimate rights and the principles of justice.' Incidentally Greece has banned the Communist party and especially since the rightist coup in Greece, such a union would mean loss of the strong communist group in the island of Cyprus. In fact there are enough indications to believe that the Makarios administration itself is not overly enthusiastic about their slogan of union with Greece.

In such circumstances the role and influence of the Secretary General has operated under numerous restrictions. In the initial stages of the conflict a role for him was eagerly sought by Cyprus. When the discussions moved to the Security Council forum the Secretary General was instrumental in formulating a consensus between the opposite parties. The formula was spelt in the March 4, 1964 resolution. The resolution put heavy responsibilities on the Secretary General. As in the earlier peacekeeping operations he was given the leading role in organizing and controlling the Force. He was to lay down the guiding rules for it, and was to appoint a Mediator. Such a role was only grudgingly accepted by France and the Soviet Union. The former felt that "the Security Council is... divesting itself of responsibilities which belong to it but which would clearly be difficult to discharge... this is really going for in the direction of delegating powers to one man." The Soviet delegate thought that para 4 of
the resolution bypassed the Council and was not happy with the United Nations. Force Commander's reporting to the Secretary General alone.

Unlike the UNAF and ONUC, not many nations were eager to contribute to this new organ of the Council, fearing an involvement in the civil war and the financial difficulties which threatened to paralyse the United Nations itself. It took twenty-three days for U Thant to make the Force operative.

In the conduct of the operations, U Thant sought to avoid the mistakes of the ONUC. From the first he established working relationship with the effective Government on the island and recognised its right to maintain law and order without getting bogged down in the questions of its legality or constitutionality. The Force and the Secretary General, however, suffered from the same malaise as the earlier operations viz. an inadequate and vague mandate. As U Thant described it, "United Nations Force in Cyprus, is in the most delicate position that any United Nations mission has ever experienced, for it is not only in the midst of a bitter civil war but it is dangerously interposed between two sides of that war." His efforts to clarify and enlarge the mandate did not meet with success in the Council - thanks to the consistent opposition of the U.S.S.R. The Force had to operate under severe limitations physical and financial e.g. in bringing about defortification, checking smuggling of arms etc. It had to prevent violence only by its presence, by interposition and persuasion the parties to keep peace.

Nor was the Secretary General successful in the mediator's role. The Mediators' suggestions were rejected by Turkey, though supported by U Thant himself. He was partially successful in 1967, when joined by the U.S. His efforts were fruitful in framing a compromise to avoid the impending military conflict between Greece and Turkey. In fact, according to the
U.S. representative to the United Nations "Secretary General's appeal of December 3 represented a critical, element in the favourable turn of events."

But then that was the limit.

Conclusions:

In the cases of international conflicts discussed above Cold War was not a significant factor, and therefore, competitive interests of the Great Powers were absent or limited. However, it is evident that the absence of the Cold War element while it could simplify the situation is not in itself a sufficient condition for the resolution of the conflict or even for providing a meaningful role for the Secretary General of the United Nations. In fact, the absence of such a competitive interest removes the urgency for the resolution of the conflict. The introduction of a United Nations presence or a peacekeeping force merely freezes the situation, and favours the status quo. The urgency, then has to be supplied by other elements like military threats by one of the parties. In the Cyprus situation movements in the bargaining situations were possible only when Turkey threatened to take direct action in 1964 and then again in 1967. Thus, U Thant reported in December 1965:

"It remained to be demonstrated that there was a genuine will to peace among the leaders of the two communities.... It was not without significance that fruitful negotiations on agreements covering local situation.... had usually come on the heels of serious fighting."

A successful resolution of the conflict between the small powers, with the help of the Secretary General becomes possible only where there is a readiness among the parties to compromise and they require the assistance of the Secretary General to convert this readiness into an agreement and help implement it. Such were the conditions in the Thailand-Cambodia dispute. xxxxx
As U Thant put it "the primary responsibility for peaceful settlement of
crises must inevitably rest with the parties themselves and (that)
without their cooperation and effort no peace mission of the United Nations,
however skillfully conducted or strongly supported, can hope to succeed.
On the other hand given that cooperation, the United Nations can be of in-
estimable assistance." Thus in the case of Malaysia, Yemen or Arab-Israeli
conflicts the initiatives of the Secretary General were of only marginal help.

The role of the Secretary General in pacifying small power conflicts
is valuable in providing impartial peacekeeping machinery to implement an
agreement already arrived at (e.g. West Irian or Yemen) or to maintain
quiet pending solution of basic differences behind the conflict (e.g. Kashmir
or Cyprus). Though even here the capabilities of the Secretary General
are subject to severe constraints because of the recent stand of the Soviet
Union on the United Nations peacekeeping machinery. Thus in Yemen the Soviet
Union prevented the Secretary General from establishing a peacekeeping force
under his authority; in Kashmir it attacked U Thant's action in creating the
UNIFIL without explicit consent of the Security Council, while in Cyprus it
has put the UNFICYP under the strain of renewal every three months and has
opposed any extension of its mandate even with the consent of the parties
concerned. U Thant has on occasions protested against these attempts and
threatened not to accept renewal of the term unless the Great Powers accepted
his concept of the role of the office. Therefore, the Secretary General
has maintained his leadership in defining the situation, organizing and con-
trolling the Force, and interpreting the mandate and the law of peacekeeping
though not without protest from the members.

As indicated earlier it is in influencing the parties to move towards
a solution of the conflict, by making them modify their bargaining positions
that the Secretary General has faced the greatest difficulties. Obviously, the Secretary General is commanded neither sanctions nor rewards, in any great measure. He has been able to influence a situation occasionally by his power of interpreting a resolution of the United Nations organ or his control over the peacekeeping force. Thus his recognition of Makarios administration as the Government of Cyprus and refusing to help reestablish the 1960 Constitution there did legitimise the position of the Greek Cypriot Government. It is interesting to note that under somewhat similar circumstances in the Congo Hammarskjöld maintained that the United Nations Force must remain neutral between the two parties and did not recognise either the Mobutu faction or the Lumumba faction as the Government. Similarly his decision to withdraw the UN&F from the U.A.R. whatever the legal position of the matter did materially affect the circumstances. Similarly his interpretations of the Assembly resolutions in the 1956 Middle East Crisis or the Dutch-Indonesian agreement affected the position of the parties. Important though this power is, it can not go far in influencing the basic positions of the parties. Thus the Mediator's report on Cyprus or Malaysia mission's findings were rejected by Turkey and Indonesia/Philippines respectively in spite of the fact that the Secretary General backed them up.

In such cases while Hammarskjöld relied on his skill in negotiation, and deftness in defining a consensus, both Lied and U Thant have sought to lean on the influence of the Great Powers with the parties concerned. Lied as described above sought to persuade U.K. and the U.S. to take a strong position in imposing a ceasefire and partition of Palestine through Security Council action. U Thant also has used the U.S. influence to bring results in some of the cases. Thus he employed Ellsworth Bunker in bringing about a Dutch-Indonesian agreement. His representative and U.S. representative
complemented each other though acting independently and bringing about the disengagement agreements between the U.A.R., Saudi Arabia and Yemen. So also in the 1967 crisis in Cyprus Cyrus x Vance of the U.S. and the representative of the Secretary General acted as parallel lines though in the same direction to pacify the conflict. In fact, a small power may generally prefer intervention by a Great Power rather than by the Secretary General in the conflict by virtue of the sanction which the Great Power commands and which the Secretary General lacks. Thus in 1965 Kashmir war President Ayub Khan invited U.S. intervention, while India favoured such intervention by both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Ultimately it was the mediation of the U.S.S.R. that brought the crisis to an end.

This not to say that the Great Power can impose a solution. Its influence itself is limited by a number of factors. Thus where the cause of conflict involves the vital interest of the parties but does not affect the strategic or other interests of the Great Power materially, the Great Power would find it difficult to pressurise a small power into accept a solution favoured by it. Thus while U.S./U.S.S.R. have been successful in 'persuading' the parties to avoid violence neither has been able to force through a solution to the basic conflict. The same could be said of Cyprus.

The influence of a Great Power is bound to be limited where the state to be influenced has greater room for manoeuvre i.e. where it can appeal to the rival Great Power for aid, or can use the numerical majority of small and non-aligned powers in the United Nations to counter the influence of the Great Powers.
NOTES AND REFERENCES CHAPTER VI:

6. Ibid., p.189.
7. The account of Hammarskjold's efforts in this case is given in Chapter five above.
9. Ibid., p.132.
10. UAR (Egypt) considers itself at war with Israel and therefore feels justified under the 1967 Convention in stopping Israeli goods passing through the Canal.
12. Ibid., p.162 and pp. 140-41.
13. Ibid., p.162.
16. West Irian (West New Guinea) formed part of Dutch East Indies. When Indonesia achieved independence it claimed the area. The dispute was discussed fruitlessly in the General Assembly several times. In early 1962 naval clashes between Indonesia and the Dutch occurred and full scale military conflict seemed imminent.
21. The crisis was the consequence of a coup in 1962 by Abdullah Sallal overthrowing the Imam of Yemen. Yemen was declared a Republic. A civil war followed in which Saudi Arabia and U.A.R. extended military support to the Imam and the Republican Government respectively.
22. S/5528 April 29, 1963. The above account is based on this report.x
23. Ibid.,
25. For the Soviet letter see S/5326 June 8, 1963.
25. Ibid.
30. Annual Report of the Secretary General 1963-64 GAOR/XXI/SUPPL.1A/SR.27 p.27
   Both U.S. and the U.S.S.R. did not champion the cause of one as against
   the other so as to make it a part of the Cold War. For U.S. attitude
   see Usha Mahajan, 'The Malaysia Dispute: A study in Mediation and
   For Soviet attitude see Amia Derkach, 'The Soviet Policy Towards Indo-
   nesia in the West Irian and the Malaysian Disputes', Asian Survey
   Vol.5 No.11 November 1965 pp.569-571.
32. Ibid., p.27 Annual
33. The above account is based on the Secretary General's Report 1963-64
34. For a good discussion of the sixti s crisis see Lawrence Scheinman and
   David Wilkinson, International Law and Political Crisis (Boston: Little
35. Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary General 1964-65
   GAOR/XXI/SUPPL.1A/A(661/Add.1) p.7.
   p.83.
37. India has made it a grievance that the Council did not name Pakistan the
   aggressor. In fact the Council had no need to since India brought the
   matter to the Council under Article 35 of the Charter.
40. See V.K.Krishna Menon's speech in the Security Council on January 23, 1957,
   SCOR/12th year/K.V.763; Jan 24,1957 P.29
   Reproduced in Kashmir - V.K.Krishna Menon's Speeches in the Security Council
41. Korbel op.cit. p.246
   According to India this constituted the 'ascertainment of the wishes of the people'.
42. The Council's resolution of April 21, 1948 (S/726) empowered the Secretary
   General to nominate Plebiscite Administrator. The Naughton Plan of
   December 17, 1949 suggested appointing a U.N. representative by the Secretary
   General to supervise the execution of: reduction and redistribution of
   armed forces and to make recommendations for expeditions and enduring solution.
44. Stephen M. Schwebel, The Secretary General of the United Nations (Cambridge:
   Harvard University press 1952) p.118.
47. SCOR/19th year/K.V.1090 February 10, 1964, p.30
48. SCOR/19th year/K.V.1091 February 14, 1964 p. 4, 16.
49. SC/619th year/P.V.1115 May 12, 1964 p.15.
50. Ibid., p.25.
51. SC/619th year/P.V.1117 May 18, 1964 pp.2-3
52. Ibid., p.4.
53. Ibid., p.6.
57. Ibid., para 6.
According to the Prime Minister by 13 August only 126 infiltrators were killed and 83 arrested. See his speech of August 13, 1965.
70. S/6661, September 6, 1965.
73. Ibid. pp.6-7, S/6683 para 8.
75. 'Pakistan Frustrates..... op.cit. p.5, S/6683 para 10.
76. Ibid., p.9, S/6683 para 11.
77. Ibid., p.11, S/6683 para 13.
86. Resolution 214, September 27, 1965.
88. Lok Sabha Debates Series 3, Vol.46, Col. 7059.
98. Ibid.
100. S/6735, October 1, 1965.
103. Ibid.
111. That the pressure was felt is evident from Mr. Shastri’s resentment against Great Power pressure voiced in his speech to the Congress Parliamentary Party vide New York Times September 27, 1965.
112. Pakistan relied for its military supplies on the U.S. and the abrupt halt of military supplies and spare parts must have had a crippling effect on Pakistan’s war effort. Ayub Khan admitted as much to the National Assembly on November 15, 1965 when he said “In obtaining (military) assistance from other sources we have to guard against the danger of relying too heavily on any single source of supply. Already we have suffered on this account, we cannot afford to commit the same mistake.” Vide Asian Recorder 1965 p. 632. Also Economist September 11, 1965. p. 987.
114. The Hindu, September 17, 1965.
117. To be continued.
118. It is of interest to note that Gen. Mamo interpreted the Karachi Agreement so as to allow the crossing of the ceasefire line by armed civilians. When India wanted this practice to be banned he tried to get the representatives of the two governments to meet together to decide the issue but to no purpose. Under the Agreement, therefore, crossing the ceasefire line by armed civilians from either side did not constitute a violation of the ceasefire Agreement. See Indian delegate’s statement SCOR/20th year/p.V. 1237, September 4, 1965. p. 58-43.
119. On September 18 Shastri stated in the Lok Sabha that during discussions with the Secretary General he had raised no objection to ceasefire but had made clear that India will have to deal with raiders. See Lok Sabha Debates Series 3, Vol. 46 col. 1597.
120. On September 24, he further told the Parliament that his understanding of the resolutions was that they were applicable to both regular forces and
infiltrators but if Pakistan did not own responsibility for them India alone must deal with them. Ibid., col.7548.

118. Ibid. PP.57-58.
121. Between 1961-65 Pakistan received about three billion dollars (U.S.) in economic aid from the U.S. Though President Ayub visited Washington in December 1965 the joint communiqué was silent on Kashmir and future economic aid. See Pakistan Horizon Vol.19 No.1 (2 1966) PP.4-5. The British government imposed a ban on supplies of arms to India and Pakistan on September 8. In Washington Dean Rusk told the Congress that military aid to the two countries was stopped and no additional economic aid would be granted without consultation with Congressional Readers. Times (London) September 9, 1965. The Economist commenting on Rusk's statement that economic aid to the two countries will have to await discussions, wrote that it was plain arms twisting. It reported that the two hundred million dollars (U.S.) aid from the U.S. for 'maintenance' imports was half of the total aid coming from all the countries. As a result some industries were closing down. "Unless the situation changes after the December talks India is in for serious industrial dislocation, the more so because the U.S. example is catching on." (It was followed by Japan) Economist November 13, 1965 p.750.

122. Three agreements on trade, economic cooperation and cultural exchange were signed in April 1965. President Ayub visited Russia from April 3-11, 1965. The vague terms in the final communiqué issued were interpreted to mean a Russian support to Pakistan's stand on Kashmir. This view was strengthened by the fact that when Shastri visited the USSR the joint communiqué of May 19, 1965 did not mention Kashmir at all. See Pakistan Horizon, Vol.18 No.2 (1965) p.106.
123. Cyprus has attended the two non-aligned conferences held in 1960 and 1964.
124. Cyprus, Command 4093 (London 1960)
127. Ibid.
129. SCOR/19th year/V.1095 February 18, 1964 p.22.
130. Ibid., p.35.
131. SCOR/19th year/V.1096 February 19, 1964 pp.8-10.
133. SCOR/19th year/V.1097 pp.2-4.
136. For their reluctance see S/5593 March 12, 1964 and Add.1,2.
137. Also David Weinhouse op.cit.p.448.
140. S/5593/Annex IV.
144. S/5653/Add.3 March 18, 1964 and S/5653.
147. Ibid., p.29.
152. Ibid.
153. Resolution 193 (1964) August 9, 1964 and S/5662/19th year//v.1143
August 9, 1964.
For those supporting see S/1154 September 18, 1964. p.4.
159. Ibid., p.5.
165. Ibid.
166. S/5679.
172. Ibid. p.6.
p.8.
175. The account relating to the events in 1967 and after is based on United
Nations Year Book 1967, United Nations Monthly Chronicle, December 1967 and
January 1968 and the article by Nancy Crawshaw, 'Cyprus after Korphinou'
Speeches. (New York: U.N. office of Public Information nd.)
177. After the 1964 crisis the Turkish Cypriot leadership boycotted the Govern-
mental institution and started acting independently.
178. Linda B. Miller op.cit., pp.43-44 and p.52
Also Robert Stephens, Cyprus: A Place of Arms. (London: Pall Mall Press
179. Gromyko’s interview to Izvestia of January 20, 1965 in Kessing Archives
1966 p.20630.
For a description of Soviet and U.S. position on the issue see W.M. Dobell,
'Division of Over Cyprus' International Journal Vol.22 No.2 pp.286-87, 282-83.
181. Statement of the representative of Brazil SCOR/19th year/P.V.1100
182. SCOR/19th year/P.V.1102 March 4, 1964 p.6.
183. Ibid. p.2.