Agriculture is the mainstay of Indian economy. India is a land of villages, most of the people who live in villages, directly or indirectly depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Presently agriculture and allied sectors contribute nearly 22 per cent of Gross domestic product (GDP) of India.¹

In Bombay Presidency under the British rule over 80 per cent of village population lived by the tillage of the soil. In the words of G.V. Joshi 'it is painful, after a century of British rule and its new light and life and elevating influences, to have to recognize the fact that the mass of our population is at this hour as absolutely as ever at the mercy of soil and sun, and wind and rain, for its very daily bread.² It clearly shows the importance of agriculture, however, the colonial policies, by abolishing all other avenues forced our masses to be dependent more and more on agriculture.

In Bombay Karnataka too agriculture was the primary occupation of large number of people. The western part i.e., western portion of Belgaum, Dharwad and full of Kanara as already mentioned fall under western ghat, where much land is not available for cultivation, but variety of spice crops, rice, sugarcane etc., been grown. While eastern part of Bijapur district has less fertile land comparatively and the cultivation largely depends on irrigation. However, overall Bombay Karnataka had fertile land and agriculture was prosperous, villages were self sufficient before the advent of British. This fact is proved by the agriculture prosperity even under British rule. Variety of crops grown in Bombay Karnataka region such as Jowar, Bajra, Wheat, rice, cotton, tobacco, sugarcane, oil seeds, pulses etc.³
For instance the production of various crops up to 1939 was as follows, in the Bijapur district major portion of land was under the cultivation of jowar, while the Bombay Karnataka division stood second in the production of jowar in the Bombay Presidency. Dharwad stood second to Ahmedabad as the largest wheat producing district in the Bombay Presidency, while Bijapur stood third. Barley was grown extensively in Belgaum and Bijapur, and nowhere it was grown more in the Bombay Presidency than in Karnataka (8,062 acres, 46.73%). In pulse production Belgaum stood first, Dharwad second and Bijapur fifth in the Bombay Presidency.

Chillies, garlic, turmeric, coriander etc. are some of the condiments and spices grown here. The most important centre of chilli cultivation was Dharwad, which occupied 43.9 per cent of the total cultivable area in 1924-25, while Belgaum stood next. Coriander seeds (dhane), turmeric (halad) and garlic were largely grown in Belgaum. In fact Belgaum has the largest number of acres under garlic cultivation in Bombay Presidency. Betel leaf (pan) was produced largely in Bombay Karnataka. Karwar stood first where pan occupied 30% of garden lands in 1924-25. In fact, North Kanara is the real home of spice garden, which produces cardamoms, pepper, betel nut palm, coconut etc. The taluka of Siddapur grown black pepper on large scale in the western India. As a matter of fact, North Kanara is described as “Pepper Queen”, because it had monopoly of black pepper and cardamom in Bombay Presidency. Kanara also has the highest number of acres under betel nut in the Bombay Presidency. Its percentage in acres under betel nut cultivation was 79.4% in 1914-15.
Sugarcane was also grown largely in Bombay Karnataka, in fact, it stood second in the Bombay Presidency in the cultivation, while Belgaum was next only to Ahmedabad in Bombay Presidency.¹¹

The above mentioned figures undoubtedly prove that the Bombay Karnataka region was agriculturally one of the best potential area. The land of Bombay Karnataka receives good rainfall, except Bijapur district, the soil is deep, black and retentive on the whole except on the high lands and hills.¹² However, the Bombay Karnataka was the poorest region in Bombay Presidency under colonial rule. Mainly owing to the defective policies of British Government G.V. Joshi said ‘Nowhere perhaps in the civilized world is there such hopeless dependence on an industry (agriculture) – so uncertain in its returns and in its nature capable of only limited expansion. But what makes the situation grave, and give cause for anxiety, is the fact that this industry which constitutes the sole, surviving stand-by of the people, is in a most unsatisfactory condition.

The unsatisfactory condition of agriculture was the result of British rule. The early British rule was interested mainly in its trading activities. Their policies were deliberately designed to get more benefit. So to fulfill their desire they encouraged the cultivation of commercial crops like cotton, tobacco, sugarcane, oil seeds in Bombay Karnataka. From that point of view increased land revenue, by neglecting the critical situation of the cultivators. Once the colonial rule firmly established in Kanara (1799) and Dharwad, Belgaum and Bijapur (1818), they noticed the availability of huge economic resources such as spices, forest sources, and suitability of the land to grow cotton, sugarcane, tobacco etc., they began to exploit it for their benefit by neglecting the interests of common people.
On the part of Indian intellectuals, the consciousness about the exploitation mainly arose from economic factor. Almost all of the early nationalist leaders use to speak about the deteriorating condition of Indian peasantry. As far as Bombay Karnataka is concerned first the intellectuals of Bombay Presidency and later the Native Newspapers played very vital part in awakening the people of Bombay Karnataka. The nationalists of Bombay Presidency exposed the exploitative policies of colonial government and the deteriorating condition of the masses. Hence, among various factors the backwardness of agriculture was the fundamental base for the growth of nationalism.

G.V. Joshi in his essay 'Note on Agriculture in Bombay' reviews the agriculture condition of Bombay Presidency. He took 20 years of period from 1872-73 to 1892-93 in which he reveals that the position of agriculture industry was in a serious depression.

During this period (1872-73 to 1892-93) of 20 years, there was an

1. increase of population 13.4%
2. increase of revenue (general) 39%
3. increase of revenue (land) 22%
4. increase of foreign export (India) 84%
5. increase of general prices 12.8%
6. increase of cropped area 3.6%14

The first four increases represent a largely enhanced demand on the land, while 12.8 per cent rise in prices was partially balanced, and it is disheartening to find that their increased demand has not been in any adequate measure met either by extension of cultivation or improved husbandry.
He further writes the cultivated areas have an increase of only 5¼ lacs acres or 2.1 per cent, while over 18 lacs of acres awaiting the plough in the various districts of the presidency. If one follows the right policy along with the increase of revenue, the cultivated area also should have increased. Next, the double cropped areas have advanced from to a trifle over 3 lacs to 7¾ lacs, so there by increasing the total cropped area of the presidency by 1.5 per cent. Thus taking both kinds of cultivation a total increase in cropped area was about 3.6 per cent during those 20 years. Evidently a most inadequate advance to balance the pressure of increasing population, revenue and export. In other words, when the population is increasing, revenue collection has been increasing, the export of raw materials has been increasing, but the cultivated area has not increased at the same pace to maintain the balance. Here the fundamental question arises, How is it possible? Or from where it was compensated? The answer would be at the cost of the poor peasantry.

Evidently the general style of cultivation marked deterioration, ploughing and manuring, and the application of restorative methods, being all worse. Three-fourths of the cropped area only is harrowed each year, and ploughed – and that too very imperfectly – once in four or five years. Nearly 90 per cent is cropped year after year without manure, and 96 per cent was unirrigated. Under a deteriorating system of culture the exhaustion of the soil was proceeding a pace, and that the outturn per acre was gradually diminishing, it was mainly because of two things firstly, the peasant lost interest in agriculture due to the oppressive colonial policies and secondly, the Ryat realized that if he produces more, he cannot reap it, instead it would go to the government in the form of land tax. The Mahratta dated 28th August, 1901 writes “It is now a fact admitted even by the optimists that the once
world famous fertility of the Indian soil is diserting it gradually year after year. If we compare the yield of similar crops in other countries, we see how this country has fallen far behind even in the matter of rearing crops. In Bavaria and in Italy near Pidinour the rice produce was 25,000 lbs per acre, while with us it is not even 1/3 rd of it. In America an acre of good cotton yields 200 lbs, but in this country the average cotton produce per acre is about 70 lbs.

Again wheat produce in Great Britain was 28 bushels per acre, while in India the average was hardly 10 bushels. The chief cause of the increasing deterioration of the Indian agriculture was that every crop lessens the fertility of the land, while it is not replaced by the use of insufficient manure. If the land revenue assessment had been lighter than they are at present, peasants would have been better able to attend to land improvement. It is a fact that the Indian cultivator has much to learn from his more advanced brother in the west, but it is impossible for him to make any progress so long he continues to be a self as it were the sirkar and the sawkar. The sawkar thrives at the expense of the rayat, because the rayat is driven into his hands by the sirkar let the rayat have a light government tax to pay for some years and he will be able to free himself from the clutches of the sawakars and would make agricultural improvements on civilized models.17

One of the most important reason for the low outturn was famine, Karnataka vaibhav of 6th May, 1905 writes in the Indi and Sindgi talukas both the kharif and rabi crops have entirely failed in the Bijapur district, Badami and Navalagund talukas the state of crops was little better. The government themselves are of the opinion that in these five talukas the crop yield does not exceed four annas in the rupee. In the
remaining talukas the estimated outturn is twelve annas. But the average yield for the whole district is not more than four annas in the rupee because this year the whole of the Karnataka has been visited by famine people are almost dying of starvation, and fodder in scarce.  

It is very clear that the outturn of a crop was steadily diminishing particularly on dry crop lands, which consisted 96.5 per cent. Sir J. Caird observed in the report on the condition of India that average produce of Bombay Presidency was below 10 bushels per acre. Ironically if an increase in the outturn of even a couple of bushels to the acre would have provided food enough for 5 millions of increased population in the presidency. The inter provincial comparison also revels the fact that the Bombay Presidency in many points of agricultural importance, was worse off than most of the other provinces.

Causes for the depression of agriculture

1. Over-assessment of land revenue: The most important reason for the backwardness of agriculture was the over-assessment of land revenue [dealt separately in the next chapter]. The assessment were pitched too high and in some cases even heavier, against all the declared principles of the survey, than the true economic rents, sweeping away not only all the Ryot's "net assets" but also trenching on his narrowing margin of subsistence. Therefore, the government assessment does not leave enough food to the cultivator to support himself and his family through the year. This was the state of the peasantry not in times of famine, but in ordinary seasons.
2. **Agricultural stock:** In the agricultural economy of India cattle plays a very important part, more so in Bombay Karnataka. Hence their care and improvement was a matter of first-rate concern. Whether it be for tilling the fields, for thrashing the grain, for carrying the produce or for working the primitive oil mill, the cattle are the principal 'coadjutors' of the ryots.22

Under the colonial rule keeping the existing cattle alive was very difficult firstly because, during droughts and famine cattle population decreased, for want of fodder, either large number of plough cattle died, or peasant forced to sell at very low prices.23 Secondly, the provision of grazing facilities has become very difficult since the beraking up of the grazing areas and the reservation of forests under colonial rule. In case if the good season arrives next the ryot had no money to purchase cattle, thus, the ryot faced the problem of tillage, with no adequate Taqavi loan assistance from the government, the ryot was once again forced to fall into the clutches of sawakar, or neglected the proper tillage of soil. This was the reality of ryot in Bombay Karnataka, where famine was recurrent phenomena.

3. **Manure:** Insufficiency of manure was one of the causes of the backwardness of cultivation. Dr. Voelcker pointed out that it was not the ignorance of the ryots, which prevented them from utilizing natural farmyard manure to fertilize fields, but it was their poverty which compelled them to use it for other purposes.24 Cattle dropings were used as fuel because the Forest Department has implemented unnecessarily stringent rules in conserving the forest wealth, for exploitation for themselves. For instance, the cultivators of Kanara, who had the practice to collect dry leaves from forest to make manure, were prohibited to enter the forest, by the stringent forest laws.25

56
Similarly the everlasting money-famine compels the ryot to export his oil seeds, and thus a very valuable source of high-quality manures lost. 

4. According to G.V. Joshi following were the determining causes for depression of agriculture in the Bombay Presidency:

(a) The Ryot’s growing insecurity of position due (1) partly to the incidents of the survey tenure, and (2) partly to the consequences of the extended practice of sub-letting, and the oppressive burden of unrelieved indebtedness, an insecurity of position, which makes him feel less as a freeman working on his land for himself and more as an adscriptur gleba working for another, and almost puts him into the desperate and demoralizing condition of a cottier-tenant a condition in which he has little to gain by industry or thrift and little to lose by reckless indolence.

(b) Heavy load of debt: The increasing heavy load of debt, and the equally growing burden of public taxation, leaves him but little breathing-time to recover, and little or no means to make a sustained effort. This phenomena forces the ryot to the doorstep of a moneylender or sawakar, who used to squeeze out as much as he can from the ryot and never realize or took any interest in the improvement of agriculture and he was quite content to receive the interest. Hence his debts were growing and the money lender presses him harder than ever with his diminishing corn-heap, he can even in average years hardly pay his taxes and rents and live without borrowing.

As a matter of fact, the cultivator was not permitted to enjoy even his luxury of cheap salt. So, this double pressure increasing concurrently with his diminishing
yields from the soil makes his condition worse, thus the ryot under colonial rule
born in debt, lived in debt and died in debt.

(c) The over-crowding of the Ryot's fields of work: Due to increase of population,
and concurrently with it a progressive collapse of non-agricultural industries to
draw off the increase, which resulted in a most unhealthy over-competition for the
land, forcing up the rents against him, and bringing down the profits of his work,
and even compelling him under the increasing economic pressure to fall to the status
of a tenant at will.31 G.V. Joshi further shows that about 10,649,811 population of the
presidency lived on the 28.3 million acres of cropped area, which estimated less than
3 acres per capita. He assuming with Sir J. Caird that a square mile of cultivated land
could give employment only to 50 persons- men, women and children together (or
12.8 acres per head). He revels that the cropped area of the presidency was not
enough even for an agricultural population of 3 millions. So that, he assumed that
about 7-8 millions agricultural population of the presidency was without adequate
employment and were in a condition of demoralizing indolence.32 This clearly
indicates the deliberately designed free trade policy and destruction of indigenous
handicraft industries to give fillip to British industries, brought unnecessary
pressure on agriculture, which ultimately resulted in backwardness of agriculture.

(d) The Ryot's utter want of education: Which leaves him without the needful
light of knowledge to help and guide him to stimulate his efforts. As far as education
was concerned hardly 4 or 5 per cent of the ryots were educated. This was mainly
because of lack of education facilities. In the Bombay Presidency proper out of 22,968
villages only 5,140 villages had schools, while the remaining 17,828 villages with a
population of 10 millions were unprovided with any educational facilities. So the large number of cultivators were never very strong in their sense of proprietary security under the survey, always felt his position was insecure. As a matter of fact, when the position of primary education was like this, the agriculture education was far distant. Therefore the nationalists and the Native Newspapers urged the government to provide primary as well as agricultural education. G.V. Joshi urged the government to provide every village with a population of 600 or more with a school. More than 17,000 villages were at that moment had no schools.

Joshi further urged that an adequate scheme of agricultural education including the appointment of traveling lecturers to carry out to the very cottages of the poor Ryots. The government half heartedly tried to educate the ryot that too only in commercial crops and not in food grains. The Belgaum Samachar dated 14th November, 1904 asserted on the efforts of government to educate the cultivator to improve the existing methods of agriculture model farms are established in different places and the results of the experiments made there published for a general information through the press. But these efforts fails – It is no secret that the Indian agriculturists with a few exception here and there are illiterate, and it is, therefore, folly to except that, they will read the information published for their benefit in newspapers. If government have a sincere desire to ameliorate the miserable condition of the Indian peasant, let them adopt some other methods. In our opinion the best plan would be to appoint lecturers all over the presidency, who should, with the help of the village officials, gather together the agriculturists at selected places and give them demonstration in plain and simple language.
The Bombay Samachar dated 15th January, 1884 urged the government to make arrangements for sending a certain number of the University graduates to England to obtain instructions in scientific agriculture. It also said provision should be made for importing education to the children's of Indian farmers, and the instruction given to them should be such a nature as would enable them to improve the cultivation of their ancestral farms.36 Even the famine commission insisted on the necessity for making due provision for the training of the agriculturists, pointed out the supreme importance in the critical economic circumstances of India and called the government to aid the Ryot by providing resources of science and scientific skill.37 But the government seldom took these suggestions seriously, for instance, the Government of Bombay, for the first time opened the Department of Agriculture at Dharwad to work in this connection. However, instead of appointing the University Undergraduates for the subordinate posts, who certainly would have proved more intelligent and efficient,38 it appointed illiterate and corrupt karkuns, who knew nothing about these instructions. The Dharwad Vritt of 4th June, 1885 recommended the government to order a Kannada translation of the Marathi book on “the means of improving agriculture” by Mr. Prabhakar Ballal Limaye, (who was Asst. District Inspector, Kaladgi) and distribute the copies thereof in the southern divisions,39 but the government did not move, in fact, it was necessary in Bombay Karnataka to publish these materials in Kannada, because majority of people were speaking Kannada.

The government half-heartedly tried to some extent to spread awareness of western agricultural improvement by conducting exhibitions. But, as the Bombay Samachar of 3rd October, 1883 observes, the prices of several improvements and
machines were high and consequently poor agriculturist was not in a position to purchase them. The paper further argues the smallest of these machines cost one hundred rupees each, but as they perform less work than indigenous improvements of the same kind, the cultivator would not care to purchase them. The agriculturists ask for such improvements and machines as can be procured cheaply and which would do more work in less time and with less labour than can be executed by indigenous implements and machines. If European artisans are unable to meet this demand, native artisans should try and meet it themselves.

Thus the poverty striken peasant was not in a position to purchase and use these implements.

**Taqavi advances**: lack of banking facilities and lack of government efforts, could not provide the Taqavi loans to the suffering peasantry in time of need. The procedure to get the Taqavi loans were not simple. Most importantly the government did not take any rational method to improve the position of cultivator. In 1892-93 over 6 lacs of rupees were lent as Taqavi loans throughout the Bombay Presidency while in 1873-74 about Rs. 42,69,063 was collected as land revenue only from Bombay Karnataka. Ironically, here also government tried to get more income by imposing high interest rate on the taqavi loans. The Karnataka vaibhav of 4th July, 1896 wrote it is certainly a curious phenomena that our rulers cannot rise superior to their commercial interests even in the problems of beneficent administration. In the matter of the takavi advances similarly, we find its business propensities asserting themselves, because government, though it borrows its creditors at a trifle over 3 per cent cannot think of advancing the same money to the poor and needy rayats for agricultural purposes or improvement at less than 5% while, on the one hand, a regular tendency to gradually lessen the interest on people’s deposits in the postal savings banks is
visible, there are on the other hand, unmistakable signs of an intention to raise the interest on takavi loans higher than 5%. Why we ask should government think of tightening the screw, and seek to drive a hard bargain with the agriculturists, if its real object is to give him helping hand in his distress and to raise him out of the slough of dependency? Again, we cannot understand why interest should be made payable on the takavi loans from the very first year. Will it not be better to wait for at least two years so as to enable the rayat to reap some benefit from his borrowed investment. It seems like adding to the difficulties of the rayat, and not helping him in any way to demand interest from him on the completion of the very first year of the loan, when, in all probability, he has derived no benefit whatsoever from the same. It would therefore, be at once wiser and more generous on the part government to abstain from raising its rate of interest on the takavi advances and to postpone its demand of the first instalment of interests till after two years of the transaction as the writer of the paper knew the reality of the cultivator, it urged the government to act according to the situation. But the government as usual rarely opened its ear to listen the grave situation of the peasantry. Moreover the government had little interest to improve the condition of agriculturist therefore, the rayat could not get the takavi advances adequately and in time.

In fact the takavi loans were very essential to the rayat for the purpose of purchasing seeds, cattle, to acquire manure and for the improvement of land. Though, half heartedly the government tried to provide loans but the weakness of the plan seems to be that it placed too exclusive reliance on the agency of the state departments. For the more part it ignored the popular element, and never sought to enlist the cooperation of the people in the work which concerned them so vitally.
Irrigation

Lack of irrigation facilities was one of the most important reason for the backwardness of agriculture in Bombay Karnataka. Irrigation in Bombay Karnataka was both an absolute necessary as well as possible. It was necessary for the obvious reasons that rainfall in this tract is more or less invariable, and limited to but a few months of the year. Irrigation was also possible as the heavy rains on the Western Ghats yield a large quantity of water which can be stored in big reservoirs and supplied to different districts when required.\(^{46}\)

Though there were many rivers in the region such as Krishna, Malaprabha, Ghataprabha, Doni, Kali, Sharavati etc. there was scarcity of water because of the negligence on the part of the government. The most important irrigation work undertaken, half heartedly, by the British Government was construction of Gokak Canal at the expense of Imperial revenue on the Ghataprabha river above the Gokak falls. It was first brought to notice in 1852 by Sir G. Wingate. A preliminary survey was made by Walter Scott, he drew the attention of remarkable facilities for leading a canal from a point about two miles above the falls to water the tract lying between the Ghataprabha and Krishna river comprising portions of Gokak in Belgaum and Bagalkot in Bijapur and native states of Mudhol and Jamakhandi. From 1865 to 1867 the project was surveyed in detail by Major Smith, his plan comprised a total length of 162 miles of main canal at an estimated cost of Rs. 48,50,000.\(^{47}\) But the government did not take up the project because they though it would benefit the native states of Mudhol and Jamakhandi more than the area under British control. Therefore the larger project was placed in abeyance, and a fresh scheme was drawn up for a definite project for watering only the lands of Gokak in Belgaum.
In 1868 the project was submitted it comprised fifty miles of main canal commanding an area of 135 square miles. The cost estimated was Rs. 15,00,000 and the return on expenditure was fixed at six and three quarters per cent. Once again the government did not consider the scheme sufficiently satisfactory to admit its being sanctioned from loan funds and suggests further revision of the design and estimates.

The canal was designed to carry 430 cubic feet a second at the head and to command a total arable area of 77,319 acres at an estimated cost of Rs. 9,75,000.

During 1876-78, the Bombay Karnataka witnessed severe drought conditions in fact, it was the severest famine ever visited Bombay Karnataka region. Hence, the government decided to take up the works of Gokak Canal scheme as a relief measure. Between the end of 1876 and December 1877 the earthworks in a length of nine miles of canal, beyond the deep cutting in the first 3½ miles, were partially completed. The highest number of people employed was 11,946, the outlay was Rs. 1,77,880 on wages and charitable relief, and the value of the work done was only Rs. 76,460.48 In October, 1877 a gang of about 600 convicts was employed on the heavy cutting through the ridges in the first 3½ miles of the canal.49

In 1879 Sir Richard Temple, then governor of Bombay visited the Gokak canal site, after examining the prospect of the canal he wrote to the government of India on 30th August, 1879 that ‘the canal will afford complete protection from famine to the whole of the country i.e. Gokak taluka in Belgaum, Bagalkot taluka in Bijapur and the native states of Mudhol and Jamakhandi50 and urged the government of India to take step immediately. In fact it was the wisest advise made by Sir Richard
Temple, because if the work was completed, with a single intention to provide irrigation, the severe sufferings, droughts because of periodical failure of rainfall could have been averted. But the government of India did not move. The government of India thought it would benefit more to the native states rather than the British territories.

It was on the insistence of the native states of Mudhol and Jamakhandi and their assurance to pay the full cost of their respective benefit, the new survey and a revision of the project, section III and IV was prepared by Mr. Palliser, which was also sent to the government of India by Richard Temple.51

The sections of the canal in the several jurisdictions were as under:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gokak taluka</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagalkot taluka</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mudhol state</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamakhandi state</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The whole cost was estimated at 1,40,00,000 and divided between the different jurisdiction was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Rs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>87,50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mudhol state</td>
<td>40,80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamakhandi state</td>
<td>11,70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,40,00,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total cultivated area that will be commanded by the canal when completed was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mudhol state</td>
<td>92,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamakhandi state</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,62,00052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65
The results to the British Government were that 240,000 acres or 375 acres miles of cultivated land would be protected from the effects of drought and consequent famine, and that 60,000 acres would be irrigated each year, which could bring a net annual revenue in the shape of water rates of Rs. 4,00,000, which gives a return of 4½ per cent in the outlay of Rs. 87,50,000, that is, a direct return in the shape of canal revenue, exclusive of all indirect benefits, such as the savings of the land revenue and the like.53

3. The canal project was completed on 31st March, 1897. The total area that would thus be commanded was about 625 square miles of which about 375 square miles were in British territories and the reminder was in the native states.54

The above mentioned description on clearly indicates that the government of India was more concerned about the financial gain, and not public welfare. Therefore, it clearly appears that the Gokak canal work was taken up. Firstly, after the government signed an agreement with the M/s Ritchie Stewart and Co. popularly known as Gokak water power and manufacturing company. According to the agreement the government promised to secure the company a constant flow of 17 cubic feet water per second from the storage to be constructed by the government.55 Secondly, the severe famine on 1877, which kept the whole of Bombay Karnataka under its grip, forced the government to bargain the work as relief measure.56 Thirdly, at the close of the famine, the work was carried out by employing the convict labours, who forced to work without any monetary remuneration. Fourthly, later the work of extension was taken up only after the assurance of the native states of Mudhol and Jamakhandi.
Thus, the native newspapers of Bombay Karnataka exposed the reality of the government policy. The Belgaum Samachar of the 19th February, 1889, wrote, six lakhs of rupees have been sanctioned for the construction of a dam to the river near the railway station at Dhupdal in the Gokak taluka and the work has been commenced. It is said that the old dam being a small one the Gokak canal does not get sufficient supply of water. Thousands of acres of land along the river will have to be taken up for the purpose of the new dam, but the strange was the chief object in constructing the new dam is said to be not to increase the supply of water of the Gokak canal, but to supply water to the mill near the Gokak water fall. The government are said to have at once ordered this costly work on receiving a complaint from the shareholders of the mill. Another circumstance, according to the rumour which has led to this work was that many persons holding high positions in the government services have shares in the Gokak company, and hence this favourable but improper interpretation of a condition in the agreement. It was the reality of British rule, evidently the British Government stopped water to the perennial irrigation, neglecting the suffering of the cultivator, thereby the irrigation was seriously crippled, because the government required to supply the water to the Gokak Mill in hot-weather months. The Belgaum Samachar, therefore urged the government to publish the agreement between them and Gokak company.

Regarding the survey and plans, like the Gokak canal G.V. Joshi wrote we have had surveys and surveys over again of most of these rivers, and irrigational projects planned out thirty and twenty years ago shelves mostly on financial grounds. Among the projects so shelved may be mentioned the Godavari, Girnar, Aner and Don schemes. It was true, we have seen above how the Gokak canal
project was surveyed again and again. Another example was the Don project (on the river Doni in Bijapur) which examined in 1877-78 and the plan comprised a very large storage reservoir on the river with canal on the left bank commanding 193,881 acres in Bijapur, Sindgi, and Bagewadi sub-divisions. The work was estimated to be capable of watering 23,434 acres yearly and the net revenue estimated was Rs. 1,17,170. But the plan was completely left untouched because the government thought the estimates for land compensation were too large. The government did not show any sympathy towards the suffering people, by atleast taking the project under famine relief work, because the year 1877-78 the district was ruling under famine a district admittedly the most precarious in the arid upland – no more than some 15,000 acres, out of a total cropped area of 27,87,225 acres were protected by irrigation that too not by government facilities, but by private efforts only. There were just two small tanks Muchkhandi and Nilgund. The former one was undertaken in 1877-78, because it provided very large storage room at a comparatively small cost.

G.V. Joshi analyzed the irrigation of Bombay Presidency in comparison of other provinces, he said the Bombay irrigation department was organized in 1862 and ever since then this question of irrigational supply for agriculture purpose has been under the consideration of the Bombay authorities and yet, as will be seen from the table the progress in this matter was smallest in India.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Net cropped area in millions of acres in 1898-99</th>
<th>Irrigated area in millions of acres in 1898-99</th>
<th>Proportion of irrigated to cropped acres in 1898-99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>18.241</td>
<td>8.967</td>
<td>49 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W. provinces</td>
<td>25.010</td>
<td>7.270</td>
<td>29 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oudh</td>
<td>8.600</td>
<td>2.383</td>
<td>27.5 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>24.511</td>
<td>6.116</td>
<td>22 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mysore</td>
<td>5.902</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td>15 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>23.96</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>4 per cent yearly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, the figures clearly indicate that the total breadth of irrigated acreage in a fairly normal year like 1898-99, the Punjab has close on 50% of its cropped area under irrigation, the North-West province has 29 per cent, Oudh has 27.5 per cent, Madras 25% and even Mysore over 15%, the Bombay Presidency has but a bare 4 per cent of its total cropped acreage irrigated. That marks a serious position of things from the point of view of famine protection, one can imagine the naked situation of Bombay Karnataka under the colonial rule. Mysore was in no way a more favoured region, and yet even that native state was far ahead of Bombay Presidency in the matter of irrigation equipment, because the state allocated more fund for the development of irrigation.66

As far as the repair or maintenance of existing lakes and tanks were concerned, the government policy here also was disappointing the existing lakes in Dharwad such as Haveri lake in Karajgi, Nagnur lake in Bankapur, Dambal lake in Gadag, Madag lake which watered Kod67 and Gaddekeri lake at Magutkhan-Hubli in Belgaum district.68 were not repaired properly, even the government did not clear the silt deposit it felt it was very costly and unproductive mode of increasing storage.69 Therefore, the percentage of irrigation so supplied in Bombay Presidency was about 26 per cent as against 82 per cent in Mysore, and 43 per cent in Oudh.70 As regard the aid of government, the aggregate irrigated area in the presidency was a bare 4 percent of the cropped acreage, wells and private canals provided by for the largest percentage even of such irrigation full 61 per cent as against mere 7 per cent in Mysore and an average of 43% for other provinces.71 The wells here as elsewhere the private property of the individual ryots, regarded from this point of view, it is noticeable how largely the ryot in this presidency, as compared with other
provinces, was left to rely on his own individual resources, and how small was the
direct state assistance that was extended to him in this direction.

There is one more point in connection with these government works, which
deserves to be mentioned – the water rates in Bombay Presidency charged per acre
irrigated were heavier than in other provinces. The Bombay water-rate on the major
works was nearly twice the average for India. The rates in Bombay Presidency vary
from Rs. 10 and Rs. 40.73 The sums spent on the means of irrigation was very paltry
compared to the revenue realized. In the Dharwad Collectorate where for the 11
years ending 1851, the government had realized a revenue of 10½ lakhs, the
proportion spent in tanks and wells was about one-fifth per cent of the receipts from
land.74

As regards the capital outlay while Bengal has a total outlay on such
irrigation works up to end of 1899-1900 amounted to 226 per cent of its land revenue,
Bombay, so peculiarly liable to drought and famines has only 90 per cent of its year’s
land revenue demand so spent.75 Even to repair the small works the government
levied additional charges. The Dharwar vritt of the 12th July, 1883 wrote, it is
injustice of making people pay for the repair of irrigation works in addition to the
tax levied on them for the use of water.76

Looking at the disappointing aspects of irrigation in Bombay Presidency, G.V.
Joshi asserted surely, nothing can be more depressing and humiliating than the fact
that, after forty years and more of continuous preparatory efforts, the recent famines
particularly on the Bombay Presidency side of India should have been so destroying
and devastating in their efforts not to speak of the suffering and distress they
involved, the ryots losses in respect of crops and cattle amounted, as Lord George Hamilton pointed out in his Budget speech in parliament that, to no less than 50 million sterling, or 75 crores of rupees, in western India, and one cannot resist the reflection that one-tenth of the amount, if well and judiciously applied to the development of irrigation, would have assuredly been the means of not only averting half the wreckage, but also putting the presidency in a proper posture of defence against drought and its dreadful results. For, it has to be borne in mind that our extensive crop failures that occurred in the recent years of famine occurred not through blight, not through the ryot's lazy indifference, but solely through want of water for the fields. Significantly, as a matter of fact irrigation was important not only for giving direct protection from drought and famine, but also for promoting the efficiency of agriculture, the one surviving national industry under colonial rule, on which more than 80 per cent of the people depended for their daily bread. The holding of a rain water into reservoir even for a couple of weeks could have turned a bad season into a good season. In a country like ours, therefore, it is indispensable that the agriculturist should have at his command an artificial irrigation supply both to supplement the deficiencies of the seasonal rainfall, and also as a means of increasing production by the method of double-cropping. But under the colonial rule the irrigation supply in Bombay Presidency was most inadequate. G.V. Joshi wrote "it was barely enough for 1/10th of the cropped acreage, and the fact was that full 90 per cent of lands under crop were exposed from year to year to all the capricious fluctuations of the seasons". He further analyzed that the total irrigated area was about in Bombay Presidency was 8 lakhs of acres or 3.2 per cent of the cropped area, and the remaining 96 per cent was dependent on the variable rainfall of the
seasons. These figures clearly indicate that the government wanted maximum revenue from the peasantry, but it was not ready to spend on irrigation or for the development of agriculture. In the Annual Report of the Director of Agriculture for 1891-92 it is stated that during the 5 years 1886-87—1891-92. The increase in the number of irrigational wells was 10,196 but the real fact was that 7,576 new wells were constructed, and 2,620 old wells repaired by the Ryots, during the period.

Undoubtedly the ryot hoped for some returns, but the ruthless government always tried to extract as much as it can. As many as 29,405 old works (26,293 wells; 1929 tanks, 1183 bandharas and other works) were in despair, and evidently 3,320 tanks remain in disrepair and disuse in the single district of Dharwar, but the government could not turn its face towards these problems.

Therefore, the cultivator suffered to a great extent during famines, for want of food and fodder to animals. Thus the nationalist leaders of Bombay Presidency raised the issue of irrigation facility and showed that, lack of irrigation facilities hindering the agriculture, which ultimately resulted in the backwardness of agriculture and poverty of the peasantry. So the nationalist leaders, nationalist newspapers and even famine commissions urgent for the development irrigation rather than railway. They suggested to start irrigation work as a famine relief measure, instead of railway construction, but the government continue to give preference to railways over irrigation. The Kesari dated 5th November, 1901 wrote “whatever may be the advantages derived from railways one thing is certain that they cannot increase the produce of the soil”. The government, however, does not seem to recognize this, and one has, therefore, reason to suspect that irrigation works have been hitherto neglected because they do not afford to British capitals as
profitable an investment as railways. Out of 200 millions of acres under cultivation in British territories only 20 million are watered by irrigation. In the Mysore state one half of the total expenditure on public works is set apart for the construction of irrigation works, whereas in the British territories the proportion is only ten per cent. Such is the contrast between native states and the British territories. The native states knew that if they develop irrigation and then agriculture, the state may prosper and it can get more revenue thereby it can further develop it. Whereas the colonial government wanted more and more taxes without giving anything back, everything was taken out of the country.

Hence, irrigation is one of the vital importance from the point of view not only of famine prevention, but also of the efficiency and prosperity of Indian agriculture. Irrigation is not only one of the first condition of a prosperous agriculture, but is, one of the most effective measure of protecting the country from droughts and famines. It was indeed disappointing that the colonial government did so little in Bombay Karnataka.

Commercialization of Agriculture

The commercialization of agriculture was one of the worst consequences of the British economic policy in India. Commercialization of agriculture means production of crops for market to be sold for cash rather than for family use. The commercialization of Indian agriculture began in the 19th century and after the opening up of the country by roads and introduction of railways, the process gained momentum. In the Bombay Karnataka soon after its acquisition from the Peshwa Baji Rao II in 1818, the commercial resident in the ceded distract recommended the
cultivation of Brazilian cotton in Dharwad. As a result the transition of agriculture from production of food or family self sufficiency to commercial gain took place.

Primarily the need for some cash earnings had arisen in the villages owing to the introduction of the system of payment of land revenue in cash by the British.

The middlemen, who made huge profits by collecting the produce from villages and selling them, advanced some money to the farmers and induced them to grow the commercial crops.

The process of commercialization of agriculture received great fillip on account of the development of roads and railways. For instance, the road from Dharwad to Karwar fort and railway link with Bombay was mainly developed to carry cotton produced in Bombay Karnataka. In fact, it was colonial party, which encouraged it to meet the raw material requirements of British industry rather than to meet any domestic ends. The East India company realized the export potential of some Indian agricultural products like, indigo, cotton, jute and oil seeds when industrial growth of England fiscal restrictions on manufactured goods from India was imposed in England. This resulted in millions of artisans being thrown out of their jobs and they were forced to fell back upon agriculture and mostly these artisans were encouraged to take to commercial crops.

After 1833, the East India company had ceased to be a trading concern and private enterprise (mostly British) in foreign trade and begun to show a new vigour. The American civil war (1861-64) carried the process of "commercialization" of agriculture one step farther. British manufacturers of cotton goods who had so long
derived the back of their raw material supplies from the U.S.A., were forced to increase their dependence on Indian cotton. Imports of Indian cotton into the England increased 2½ fold between 1860 and 1864. The price of cotton in India rose from 3.7 annas per lb in 1860 to 11.5 annas in 1864.\textsuperscript{88} But it is perhaps true that the farmers derived very little benefit from this trade because huge profits were reaped by the English merchants and Indian middlemen. Soon after the great famine in Bengal and Orissa in 1866 a commission was set up which recommended the setting up of a separate Agricultural Department. Nothing came out of this proposal because the early British rulers though that, famine, starvation death, suffering of Indians was not concerned to them, rather they were more concerned about the profit only. It is proved that, in 1869, the cotton manufacturers of England put pressure on the government to establish agriculture department and the government readily agreed in principle to establish Agriculture Departments in each province with the special objective of bringing about much needed improvement in the quality of raw cotton.\textsuperscript{89}

Let us see briefly how the British Government introduced new varieties and encouraged cotton cultivation in Bombay Karnataka to feed the industries of England. IN 1819, a year after Dharwad passed to the British, the commercial resident in the ceded districts, recommended that 50,000 to 1,00,000 pounds of Brazilian cotton seed and some quantity of new Orleans and sea Islands cotton seeds should be procured and distributed in Dharwad. To tempt the husbandmen to try these foreign cotton it was proposed to offer a reward of £ 1710 s (50 pagodas) in cash or in the shape of a gold medal and chain on the first delivery of five hundred
ponds of clean white cotton free from seed dirt and leaf, that is at the rate of about 17s bd (2½ pagods) for each man of twenty-five pounds.90

In 1829 under the orders from the court of Directors, to improve local cotton and introduce five foreign varieties, experiment were begun in Dharwar under Dr. Lush, who chose land for a small cotton arm at Sigihalli in the Khanapur subdivision of Belgaum.91 Initially the experiment failed. About 1830 a small trade in Dharwar cotton sprang up with China, and the canton merchants highly approved of the consignments that were sent to them. In 1831, pernambuco seed, in 1832 some Egyptian varieties were tried at the Sigihalli.92 As Indian peasant gave first preference to grow food grains, he did not get attracted either by these offers or the farm experiments, so in 1836 the collector Mr. Baber wrote though the experiments had gone on for five years, not a single landholder close to the farm had in the slightest degree changed his mode of cotton tillage, of gathering the crop, or of preparing it for market.93 However the government did not stop here, because they knew, it was a utmost important for them to feed the industries in England.

By 1838 the court of Directors determined to try, how far Indian cotton could be improved by employing American planters in India. Captain Bayles was sent to America. At least 12 planters accepted his terms and agreed to come to India. In 1841, Mr. Mercer one of the American planters, with two assistants Mr. Hawley and Mr. Channing was sent to Dharwar, they began experiments at Kushgal near Hubli, and operations prove successful.94 Mr. A.N. Shaw, the collector of Dharwar believed that of all western Indian estimates the Dharwad estimate was most like the climate of the United States cotton growing districts.95
The initial debacles did not prevent the government from carrying out the experiments because the court of Directors and the merchant community put constant pressure on British authorities in India. Because, England with the help of her power looms and her protective tariffs, suppressed the cotton manufacturing industries of India, and England hoped that India would continue to grow the raw material required for the factories of Lancashire. Therefore, endeavours were made to extend and improve the growth of cotton in India, with the idea that Great Britain would thereby have both the raw material and the manufacture in her own hands.

It was obvious that without considering the sufferings of the cultivators in Bombay Karnataka the government went ahead with the experiments. The Maharatta dated 1st April, 1883 wrote, In the Dharwar district for the last five or six years American cotton seed has been imported by government in considerable quantities and given away the rayat to sow in their best fields, the only condition being that they should take the greatest possible care of the crop and give a return twice the quantity of the seed from the crop raised. Unfortunately, however, it has been found by experience, that whether owing to defects in the seed itself, which must greatly suffer during the sea voyage, or to the unsuitability of the soil and climate, the exotic cotton plant does not thrive well in total district, so that instead of any beneficial results arising from the attempt of government to improve the cotton, complaints are heard on the part of the ryots concerned that not only have they not a single instance realized the large profits which the officers of government promised to them when giving them, against their will, the exotic seed, but that the crop having entirely or almost entirely failed, they have been obliged to bear a dead loss, having had to make up the assessment on the fields by some other means. If they had not been forced to sow
exotic cotton seed, they urge that they would have sown the indigenous variety, which thrives well in spite of unfavourable seasons, and which would have at least yielded a return sufficient to cover the assessment. It further urged that the exotic cotton was very precarious crop and less able than the indigenous variety to withstand the effects of an inclement season. Therefore, whenever the yield of the exotic cotton is insufficient to cover the assessment of the land sown with it, government should forego the revenue, or in other words, grant remissions to requisite extent.98

It shows that how the government pressurized the peasants to grow the American cotton. The officials claimed that between 1840-50 the Dharwad district was enriched by about Rs. 8,15,00,000 and between 1862-1865, no less than Rs. 4,70,00,000 or a yearly average of Rs. 1,17,50,000 were amassed by the growers and dealers in Dharwar American cotton.99 God knows whether these figures were true? If at all true the maximum benefit could have been reaped by the dealers or middleman and Mahrotta wrote, the maximum amount was paid by the ryot to the Sawakar and the government in the form of land revenue.

The influence of British manufacturers led to abolition of all duties on cotton export into England from Bengal in 1836, those on Bombay cotton in 1838.100 They did it because in India there was an immense extent of territory, and the population of it would consume British manufacturer to a most enormous extent.101 Therefore the select committee on cotton was appointed with a task to inquire into the growth of cotton in India.102 The select committee recommended the construction of railways
roads and other communication facilities from the centres of export and import to the interior of India.\textsuperscript{103}

It is, perhaps appears that the British Government encouraged cotton cultivation, opened several experimenting research stations and spent huge amount on the experiments, only to feed the growing industries of England. It is noteworthy that when these commercial crops more and more encouraged, that led to the shortage of food grains and whenever the famine or drought occurred the cultivators suffered to a great extent. Evidently, we do not find any research stations to experiment how to grow more food grains in Bombay Karnataka, because it was not necessary for them. Hence, the Indian manufacturing industries were ruined and transformed it to mere exporter of raw materials and importer of British manufactured goods. In the long run, when the Indian mills began to grow, particularly in Bombay, the government with several measures tried to suppress them. Therefore the nationalist leaders raised the question. The Tariff Act of 1894-96 convinced the Indian leadership that the objective of these Acts was to injure the rising textile industry of India. The Indian National Congress at its session of 1894 put “on record its firm conviction that in proposing this excise the interest of India has been sacrificed to those of Lancashire” and it shortly deprecated any such surrender of the Indian interest.\textsuperscript{104} Gokhale repeatedly voiced the resentment felt by the Indian Nationalists against the excise duty. In his budget speech in 1903 asserted that excise duties were levied not for the revenue purpose but as a concession to the selfish agitation of Manchester. He lamented that India was compelled to impose an excise duty on her own cotton manufacturers for the benefit of Lancashire. He said “In no other country would such a phenomena of the government taxing an internal
industry even when it was bordering on a state of collapse – for the benefit of a foreign competitor be possible." R.C. Dutt believed that India’s comparative advantage lay in the production of cotton textiles and not in agricultural raw materials. In fact, it was unwanted because the Indian government acted under the guidance of British mercantile class. The House of Commons pressed at the instance of Lancashire manufacturers, a resolution in 1877 to the effect “that, in the opinion of this House, the duties now levied upon cotton manufacturers imported into India, begin protective in their nature, are contrary to sound commercial policy, and ought to be repealed without delay, as soon as the financial condition of India will permit.” Lord Salisbury, then Secretary of State pressed upon the Indian government to repeal import duties on cotton goods. Although they were strongly opposed by Indian public, in 1878 and 1879 certain duties on cotton imports, which were supposed to have an unfavourable effect upon the Lancashire industry, were removed. Gokhale criticized it in the following words “the duty was actually repealed when Bombay Presidency and south India had not yet recovered from the Madras famine of 1878, when new cesses on land had recently been added to the land revenue, when the Famine Insurance Fund created by special taxes had disappeared, when the estimated budget showed a deficit, and when troubles and a vast expenditure in Afghanistan, brought about in quest of a scientific frontier, were impending.” It was not wise to have sacrificed a large source of revenue, especially at a time of falling exchange, recurring famines and growing military expenditure, this drastic step of cotton yarns and fabrics were exempted to satisfy the free trade conscience and Lancashire interests while the duty on British manufacture entering India were exempted. The Tariff Amendment Bill and the
Cotton Duties Bill subjected all cotton goods produced in Indian mills to a 3½ per cent duty assuming it would compete unfairly with those of Lancashire. The measure met with strong opposition from all sides and severely condemned by Intellectuals of India.

It is true that the cultivators derived very little benefit from the commercialization of agriculture. As agriculture became the handmaiden of trade, the commercial interests began to appropriate the larger share of whatever gains accrued from the country’s agricultural exports. The ryot in fact, was made to bear all the unfavourable consequences of the instability to which the world trading system in agricultural products was usually subjected. In a period of falling prices, the farm door prices would be cut down promptly. But the benefits of rising prices would be slow to reach the farmer.

The colonial government by the artificially restricting the inflow of cotton textile into England, was forcing Indian trade into channels which were not justified by India’s natural advantages. The ryot was forced to sell more of his crops owing to the pressure exercised by the land revenue demand. For instance, when the American civil war (1861-64) broke out, the import of American cotton into Lancashire received set back, which stimulated cotton cultivation in Bombay, resulting in rise of prices. The sign of temporary prosperity resulted in increase of land revenue. But once the American civil war ended, the American cotton import began into Lancashire, the cotton cultivation and prices in Bombay drastically fallen. However, the colonial government did not reduce the land revenue therefore, it resulted in the outbreak of Deccan riots in 1875.
In conclusion we can say that, when the nationalist leaders, native nationalist papers identified the real causes for the backwardness of agriculture and depression of ryot. The British authorities in India denied the fact that the colonial policies were responsible for that, instead the British authorities in India gave different set of reasons. Firstly, they said that the agriculture in the Bombay Presidency was backward because of precarious climate i.e. the fluctuations of the seasons, below average rainfall etc. superficially one can agree to this argument, but, once we go back and see, how does the agriculture was prosperous before the advent of British in the presidency? The answer could be found in the words of G.V. Joshi, who said, 'we must remember that if Bombay does not possess a more equable climate and a more certain rainfall, so is neither Switzerland, nor Belgium better gifted by the bounty of nature. And if the Swiss peasant is able to content with snow and storm, and clothe and rocks with verdure, and the Flemish farmer turns the sandy wastes of his inhospitable native land into fine, blooming gardens, what is there to prevent the Bombay Ryot from protecting himself against the uncertainty of the seasons?\textsuperscript{112} Obviously if the government derived to develop agriculture and condition of ryot, they should have drained less, by imposing lesser taxes. Secondly, they said that the Ryot himself was accountable for all his woes, because the ryot marries early, and multiplies and lives beyond his means, he is lazy, spends heavily on marriages, festivals and so on. G.V. Joshi said, but this theory which seeks to explain his difficulties by referring them all to the inherent failings of his nature, appears to us to betray a strange mis-conception of the fundamental principles of human nature, because human nature always tries for freeman in the full enjoyment of the privileges of a free status, and living under free conditions – and never as a slave. So,
Joshi further asserted the magic of liberty and property which has transformed the serf farmers of the Rhine and the Danube into the world the most prosperous peasantry in the world .......... (may also be) why can't be trusted to work of similar change in the valley of Krishna and the Tapti, if the ryot allowed to reap his hard work. Evidently we can say what has made him what he was, it was colonial policies and not otherwise.

Thirdly, the marwadi was responsible for the ryot's difficulties, it may be accepted to certain extent, but, again if the government had system of providing taqavi loans in time and the revenue demand was moderate it could not have happened.

Fourthly, the over-assessment theory, which was negated by the British authorities was the most important reason for the backwardness of agriculture.

Thus, we may sum up by saying the colonial policy was the main factor for the backwardness of agriculture and poverty of agriculturist in Bombay Presidency in general and Bombay Karnataka in particular. Lack of interest on the part of government to improve the agriculture, complete negligence in providing irrigation facilities and the over-assessment draw out larger and larger portions to pay his growing taxes to the State and his growing interest charges to the Sawakar, so that, he has now hardly enough left with him to live upon and save. So he was placed in a situation little better than that of a serf. He has no inducements to self-help and improvements, working for others he shows no good work – and why should he?
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