The Partition of Bengal gave a new impetus to the Muslim politics who regarded the newly created province with a majority of Muslim population as a strong centre of their political activities. As a result, a political consciousness prevailed among the Muslims throughout India. Before this, the common Muslim masses were never actively conscious on political phenomenon. It was due to late Syed Ahmed who directed the Muslims to be aloof from the politics. After the death of Syed Ahmed Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, the other leader, also followed the principle of Syed Ahmed and opposed the Muslims even to form a Muslim organization at Aligarh. But now the Muslims had got an impression by the Partition of Bengal that the British Government had become sympathetic towards the Muslims and according to them the partition was a vital precedence.

The new political consciousness of the Muslims soon found a favourable opportunity for active political work. In 1906, Morley announced in the House of Commons that the Viceroy, Lord Minto, was about to appoint a small committee to consider the question of extending the representative element in the Legislative Council. This opened before the Muslims the possibility of negotiating, in advance, with the Government insider to safeguard their rights and interests in the new Legislation. Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk made arrangements to wait upon the Viceroy in a deputation at Simla. It has also been pointed out how the deputation was really engineered by the
British as a deliberate step to drive in a wedge between the Hindus and Muslims, and Minto regarded this move as a "possible counterpoise" to the Congress which he regarded as disloyal and dangerous. It is also notable in that context that the then Principal of the Aligarh College guided Muslim politics in a channel which was also injurious to the interests of the Hindus. Due to his favour the old conception of the Muslim leaders-like Syed Ahmed and his European friends that the Muslims should not participate into politics, changed. The Aligarh politics was also affected accordingly. Thus the old conception was fading out and new conception was taking place. First, by the Partition of Bengal, second by the announcement of the Governor-General of the constitutional reforms and third by the so-called Bengali leaders' activities in the Indian National Congress, the communal sensation arose among the Muslims. The anti-Partition agitation among the Hindus was riding high and the Congress was taking favour. It brought an idea to the Muslims that in order to counteract the political organisations, mainly the Indian National Congress; they must have a central organisation of their own. In 1906 on the occasion of a Muslim educational conference held at Dacca, Nawab Salimullah got opportunity to express his idea among the rarely gathered eminent leaders and proposed for the foundation of Muslim League. Accordingly, the scheme was accepted and in the same year on December 30, 1906, the All India Muslim League took birth. In brief, the aims and objects of the League were laid down as follows:

a) To promote, amongst the Muslims of India, feelings of loyalty to the British Government and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intentions of government with regard to Indian measures.
b) To protect and advance the political rights of the Muslims of India and respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the government.

c) To prevent the rise among the Muslims of India of any feeling of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the other aforesaid objects of the League.4

The Secretary of the League further declared:

"We are not opposed to the social unity of the Hindus and the Mussalmans. . .But the other type of unity (political) involves the working out of common political purposes. This sort of our unity with the Congress cannot be possible because we and the Congressmen do not have common political objectives. They indulge in acts calculated to weaken the British Government. They want representative Government which means death for Musalmans. They desire competitive examinations for employment in Government services and this would mean the deprivation of Musalmans of Government jobs. Therefore, we need not to go near political unity (with the Hindus). It is the aim of the League to present Muslim demands through respectful request, before the Government. They should not, like-Congressmen, cry for boycott, deliver exciting speeches and write impertinent articles in newspapers and hold meetings to turn public feeling and attitude against their benign Government.5

Further, the political principles of the Muslim League were explained in a speech delivered by Nawab Waqar-ul-Mulk. He proclaimed:

God forbid, if the British rule disappears from India, Hindus-will lord over it; and we will be in constant danger of our life, property and honour. The
only way for the Muslims to escape this danger is to help, in the continuance of the British rule. If the Muslims are heartily with the British, then, that rule is bound to endure. Let the Muslims consider themselves as a British army ready to shed their blood and sacrifice their lives for the British Crown.\textsuperscript{6}

Referring to the Congress, he said:

We are not to emulate the agitational politics of the Congress. If we have any demands to make, they must be submitted to Government with due respect. But remember that it is national duty to be loyal to the British rule. Wherever you are, whether in football field or in the tennis lawn, you have to consider yourselves as soldiers of a British regiment. You have to defend the British Empire, and to give the enemy a fight in doing so. If you bear it in mind and act accordingly, you will have done that and your name will be written in letters of gold in the British Indian History. The future generations will be grateful to you.\textsuperscript{7}

Thus the very birth of the Muslim League shows that the Muslim League started with the utter loyalty to the British Government and hostility towards the Congress. Moreover, the clear difference between the Hindus and Muslims also comes to the light from this very time. Even Muhammad Ali, who was later on regarded as the greatest nationalist leader among the Muslims, admitted in a public speech in 1908 that the interests of the Muslims differed from those of the Hindus and would suffer if they joined the Hindus in their political agitation. He asserted that the Muslims could not be expected to become martyrs to the unity of India and it would be a retrograde step in the political evolution of the Muslims to leave them "at a mercy of an angelic majority".\textsuperscript{8}
The agitation over the Partition of Bengal demonstrated the wide cleavage between the Hindus and the Muslims. In the meantime the questions of weightage and separate electorate were also raised by the Muslims. The Muslim leaders tried to convince Lord Minto stressing on the essential differences between Hindus and Muslims. They distinguished the Muslims in social customs, religion, historical tradition from those of the Hindus. Besides, they expressed their fear that no Hindu will vote for a Muslim candidate. The Muslim deputation to Minto stressed on the part which was played by the Muslims in defending the country with their military service.

Consequently, the Act of 1909 gave the rights of separate electorates and other rights which were virtually promised by Lord Minto. Henceforth since that period the sense of two nation theory became clearer and Muslims after a long time returned back to the active politics, not as Indian nationalists but as communalist. M. Earnest Pirion, a French scholar, comments:

"Who had foreseen that Indian nationalism would give birth to Mussalman nationalism, first sulky, then hostile and aggressive? ...At any rate the most dangerous enemies of Indian politics are the Mussalmans"...9

Again he says: "The Indians when they became very troublesome are shown the sword of the Musalman hanging over their heads. The menace even is not necessary. When the Indians, strong in the opinion of the nation, demand simultaneous examinations in London and in India, it is so easy to tell them with lips: 'First begin by coming to an understanding amongst yourselves and by converting the Musalman."10

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It has clearly been explained in the first chapter that as situation took a turn, after 1910 one group of Muslims felt a need to come nearer to the Congress. The Balkan crisis and Khilafat Movement forced the Muslims to lose faith in the British and to unite with Congress. The Lucknow Pact of 1916 was the fruitful consequence of it. Gandhi, who was already eager to befriend the Muslims, raised his voice for the cause of Muslims and Khilafat. But ultimately when the Khilafat Movement failed and Gandhi was accused of "the Khilafat wrong", soon the Muslim leaders withdrew from the alliance with Congress. Thus as soon the Hindu-Muslim fraternity finished as it was started. 

In 1920 the Non-cooperation Movement was suspended by Gandhi and in the same year a number of communal riots occurred. Muhammad Ali, who was the Principal Lieutenant of Gandhi in his Satyagraha campaign, refused to join him in the second campaign in 1930. In the meeting of the All India Muslim Conference in the year 1930, he stated:

"We refuse to join Mr. (no longer Mahatma) Gandhi, because-his movement is not a movement for the complete independence of India but for making the seventy millions of Indian Mussalmans dependants of the Hindu Mahasabha."\textsuperscript{11}

He further told in the Round Table Conference: "Islam was not confined to India. I belong to two circles of equal size but which are not concentric. One is India and the other is the Muslim world...We are not nationalists but supernationalists."\textsuperscript{12}

By that time the leadership of Ali brothers was superceded by Muhammad Ali Jinnah who all of a sudden stood as the engine of the Muslim
leadership. The Nehru Report in 1928 was regarded by the Muslims as harmful for the community; Jinnah got only a way to win over the confidence of Muslims, to pass resolution again the report in the meeting of the All India Muslim League. Here it should be noted that even before the declaration of the Nehru Report the All India Muslim League in its nineteenth session at Calcutta in December, 1927 passed a resolution stating the separate entity of the Muslim community. It, the All India Muslim League authorises the Council of the League to appoint a Sub-committee to confer with the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress, and such other organizations as the Council may think proper, for the purpose of drafting a Constitution for India, in which the interests of the Muslim community will be safeguarded, having regard to the following proposals, which the League approves of and adopts, and subsequently to take part in the National Convention which is going to take place in Delhi in March next, as suggested by the Indian National Congress:

1. That Sindh should be separated from the Bombay Presidency and constituted into a separate autonomous province;

2. That reforms should be introduced in the North West Frontier Province and in Baluchistan, placing them on the same footing as the other provinces;

3. That in the present circumstances the representation of Musalmans in the different legislatures of the country through separate electorates is inevitable, and that the Muslims will not accept any scheme involving a surrender of this valuable right, unless and until Sindh is actually
constituted a separate autonomous province and reforms, as aforesaid, are actually introduced in the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan Provinces. When these requirements are fully satisfied, the Muslims will be prepared to abandon separate electorates in favour of joint electorates with reservation of seats, fixed on the basis of the population of different communities, subject to what is stated hereinafter:

i) In Sindh, the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, the Muslim majority shall make the same concessions with regard to the proportion of seats reserved to the Hindu minority that Hindu majority in other provinces would Muslim minorities over and above the proportion of the provinces, which shall be the minimum basis.

ii) In the Central Legislature, Muslim representation shall not be less than one-third.

The League further resolves (a) that in the future constitution of India liberty of conscience shall be guaranteed and no Legislature, Central or Provincial shall have power to make any laws interfering with the liberty of conscience; (b) that no Bill, resolution, motion or amendment regarding intercommunal matters shall be moved, discussed or passed in any Legislature, Central or Provincial, if a three-fourths majority of the members of the community affected thereby in that legislature oppose the introduction, discussion or passing of such Bill, resolution, motion or amendment (intercommunal matters mean matters agreed upon as such by the joint standing
committee of both communities of the Hindu and Muslim members of the Legislatures concerned, appointed at the commencement of every session of that Legislature).\textsuperscript{13}

It is clear that the Muslims were conscious of their separate electorate from the very beginning of the formation of the Muslim League. Jinnah then organised an All-parties Muslim Conference to give a reply to the Nehru Report. In the conference the Nehru Constitution was repudiated and Jinnah laid down the famous "Fourteen Points" which are explained in the Second Chapter. In brief, the "Fourteen Points" raised Jinnah to the height of a leader. Also the lapse of Nehru Report caused a great triumph and opportunity for Jinnah.

From now the Muslim League began rising. The nationalist Muslim Party which was formed by Ansari in 1928 weakened. Though at the time Muslims were divided into several parties, the Muslim leaders seemed to be equally conscious for their communal rights. The Simon Commission offered the following criticism to Jinnah's Fourteen Points:

This claim goes to the length of seeking to preserve full security for representation now provided for Moslems in these six provinces and to enlarge in Bengal and Punjab-the present proportion of seats secured to the community by separate electorates to figure proportionate to their ratio of population. This would give Mohammedans a fixed and unalterable majority of the general constituency seats in both the provinces. We cannot go so far...It would be unfair that Mohammedans should retain the very considerable weightage they enjoy in six provinces and that there should at
the same time be imposed, in the face of Hindu and Sikh opposition a definite Moslem majority in Punjab and Bengal unalterable by any appeal to the electorate.\textsuperscript{14}

The First Round Table Conference was attended by all other prominent Muslim leaders, and they declared in clear and unambiguous language, that no constitution, by whosoever devised, would be accepted by the Muslims unless their interests were adequately safeguarded in the Constitution. Of course, the Muslim leaders alone would decide whether the proposed safeguards were adequate or not. This position was tacitly accepted by the Conference, by passing a resolution which admitted the Muslim claims of "adequate safeguards" to be incorporated in a future Constitution of India.\textsuperscript{15}

Iqbal's Presidential address in the Allahabad Session of the Muslim League in December, 1930, reflects the then Muslims' attitude towards the communal problem. It also can be regarded as one of the foundations of the background of Pakistan. Defining the term nationality, Iqbal observed: "Experience, however, shows that the various caste-units and religious units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective individualities in a larger whole. Each group is intensely jealous of its collective existence...."\textsuperscript{16}

Moreover, Iqbal justified the "Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India". He told: "I would like to see Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state."\textsuperscript{17}

The resolutions which were passed at the Delhi Session of the All India Muslim League in 1933 are more relevant to the topic. The twenty-third Session in its second meeting resolved\textsuperscript{18} that;
i. Whereas owing to the failure of the two majority communities inhabiting India, viz. the Hindus and the Muslims to come to an agreement, His Majesty's Government was forced to give a decision relating to some matters between the parties and though the decision falls far short of the Muslim demands, the Muslims have accepted it in the best interests of the country, reserving to themselves the right to press for the acceptance of all their demands, this meeting of the All India Muslim League condemns the activities of those rights which have already been conceded to them....

ii. This meeting of the All India Muslim League advises the Musalmans of India not to be in any way affected by the militant resolutions of the Hindu Mahasabha or the utterances of the communalist Hindu leaders.

iii. It is essential that the Muslim demands which yet remain to be met in respect of the following matters be provided for in the new constitution:

1. Allotment of the Muslim seats, as one third of either of the two houses in the Central Legislature.

2. Provision for adequate representation of the Muslims from special constituencies.

3. Election to the Federal Upper Houses by the direct method and separate electorates.

4. Declaration of fundamental rights relating to Muslim Personal laws; establishment of Qazi's courts in matters involving Muslim rights and usages.¹⁹

Moreover, the resolution of Muslim League on Communal Award declared
the acceptance of it as follows:

The League should accept the Communal Award so far as it went until a substitute was agreed upon by the various communities, and on that basis, express its readiness for cooperation with other communities and parties to secure such a future constitution for India as would be acceptable to the country.20

R.C. Majumdar opines that "the foundation of Pakistan was thus well and truly laid long before the leaders, either Muslim or Hindu, ever dreamt of it."21 To prove his version authentic, he cites, for an example, the statement of Lala Lajpat Rai made in as early as 1925 where in he suggested "the creation of Muslim provinces in the north-east and north-west of India...to set at rest the ceaseless Hindu-Muslim bickering and jealousies in some provinces"22

Moreover, Muslims had made it clear more than once that, besides the questions of religion, culture, language and personal laws, there was another question of life and death for them and that their future destiny and fate were dependent upon their securing definitely their political rights, their due share in the national life, the Government and the administration of the country.23

From the above points of view, the Muslim leaders became conscious during the forties of the twentieth century. This communal feeling found its full voice in Muslim League which was taking a new shape under the leadership of M.A. Jinnah. Jinnah was very much dissatisfied with the Muslim League organisation which consisted mostly of big landlords, title-holders and rich selfish people who looked more interested, in saving their personal interests than the communal or national interests.24 Therefore, he declared:
"I would like to see the Muslim League Organisation purified and revived, and with that end in view I am going to hold a Muslim League session on 10 May 1936 at Bombay where I would ask the Muslim League to give me a mandate to form a Parliamentary Board for the forthcoming election purposes. And I promise to you that in that Board I shall give people of your party a majority. If we have to fight elections on the Muslim ticket, it would not be in the interests of either of us to split our votes. Let us therefore fight from the common platform of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board."86

Khaliquzzaman, the prominent Muslim leader, describes the condition of Muslim League during 1936 that Muslims outside, were hopelessly divided between themselves and there appeared to be no chance of a joint effort to present a united front, in the Central or the Provincial legislatures through a well-knit party.28 Khaliquzzaman writes:

I believe it was this great drawback which induced Mr. Jinnah to start negotiations with Maulana Ahmad Said, who was Secretary to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind and had great-influence on his colleagues in the Unity Board to consider the advisability of fighting the 1937 elections from a common Muslim platform. But it could only be done if the Muslim Unity Board could be brought round to compromise with the Muslim League, because for the first time the Board had fought and won one-third of the Muslim seats in the Central Assembly in the 1934 elections.29

Of the Unity Board representatives who negotiated the settlement with Jinnah, four of them, Maulana Shaukai Ali, Mufti Kifayatullah, Mauiana Hussain Ahmad and also Maulana Ahmad Said died.28 Khaliquzzaman writes:
"I happen to be the only person alive to narrate to our progeny both in India and Pakistan the story of how through unity we put life into our old organisation, the Muslim League."

Thus prior to the elections of 1937, Muslim politics was chaotic, in a state of desperate disorganisation, with interests in conflict at all levels, provincial, local and personal. No Muslim organisation appeared capable of overcoming the differences that decided the Muslim body politic.

In May 1936, Jinnah announced the personnel of the Central Parliamentary Board consisting of fifty-six members—Bengal 8, Punjab 11, Sind 4, North West Frontier Province 4, Madras 4, United Provinces 9, Bihar 5, Central Provinces 2, Delhi 1, Assam 2 and Bombay 6. It is notable that by the time the other Muslim leaders had already formulated their programmes on provincial basis, Jinnah had to depend only on those leaders who were still unattached to any provincial parties or on those whom he could persuade to merge their organisations with the Muslim League. Although leaders like Fazl-ul-Haq (Krishak Praja Samiti, Bengal), Syed Abdul Aziz (United Party, Bihar), Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi (Azad Party, Sindh), Syed Rauf Shah (Muslim Parliamentary Party, Central Provinces), Maulana Zafar Ali Khan (Majlis-i-Ittehad-i-Millat, Punjab), Nawab of Chattari, Muhammad Yusuf, and Liaqat Ali Khan (National Agriculturist Party, United Provinces) had already organised their respective parties to fight the elections under the auspices of their own organisations, yet they were originally nominated to Jinnah's board.

Jinnah, viewing the entire situation, tried to lift Muslim politics from the provincial and local levels to an all India level. He believed that as long as the
Muslims were divided and disorganized and as long as they continued to follow disparate paths having provincial groups without a sense of national unity and cohesion, there could be no chance of a settlement with the Congress. If "the entire Muslims of India were politically organized and if they remain united", he said to the press, "then they will be forging sanctions behind them in order to play their part in the decisions of all India questions." He further estimated in his Presidential address of the All India Muslim League:

...Since the elections, I find that hundreds of District Leagues have been established in almost every province. Since April last, the Mussalmans of India have rallied round the League more and more; and I feel confident that once they understand and realize the policy and programme of the Muslim League, the entire Musalman population of India will rally round its platform and under its flag. The Muslim League stands for full national democratic self-government for India.

Moreover, he prevented the Muslims from merging with the Congress:

I want the Mussalmans to ponder over the situation and decide their own fate by having one single, definite, uniform policy which should be loyally followed throughout India. The Congressite Mussalmans are making a great mistake when they preach unconditional surrender...The League is not going to allow the Mussalmans to be exploited either by the British Government or any other Party or group inside the Legislature or outside...The Congress' attempt, under the guise of establishing mass contact with the Mussalmans, is an effort to detach them from their accredited leaders.
However, Zaidi in his article on Muslim League maintains that Jinnah throughout 1936 and in the beginning of 1937 continued to speak for Hindu-Muslim co-operation. He realized that there had been differences in the past but he believed that those differences were not incapable of solution for he was still looking at the Indian political scene as an idealist while his statements in his Presidential speech of All India Muslim League give a different idea; the Hindu-Muslim unity was, according to him, barely impossible. He said: "No settlement with the majority is possible, as no Hindu leader speaking with any authority shows any concern or genuine desire for it."

The year 1937 was very important from this point of view also that Jinnah's ideals were confused. On the one hand he could not totally forget the memories of 'nationalist Jinnah' in him, and on the other, he could not totally rely upon his 'Communalist Jinnah'. Consequently during the time he delivered quite confusing statements. At one place he spoke in favour of Hindu-Muslim unity, and just thereafter at the other place, he declared the communal unity as impossible.

But most of all, Jinnah wanted to make the Muslim League a popular organization built not on the support of a few but one organisation which could have a wider platform to appeal for the Muslim masses. Henceforth, the main feature of the Muslim League programme was to maintain the solidarity of the Muslims as an all-India community and to save them from breaking up into provincial parties and groups.
The coming election was important according to Jinnah not essentially between the Congress and the Muslim League (as some of the members of the Muslim League continued to be the members of the Congress) but between the Muslim League and the local Muslim parties.\textsuperscript{37}

The election manifesto asked for the replacement of the present Provincial Constitution and the proposed Central Constitution by democratic full self-government.\textsuperscript{38}

Moreover, apart from other programmes, the manifesto stressed upon the need for a new social order with a view of uplifting the social and economic conditions of the poor and backward Muslims. Therefore, the League adopted the following programmes:

1. To protect the religious rights of the Mussalmans. All matters of purely religious character, due weight shall be given to the opinion of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Hind and the Mujahids.

2. To make every effort to secure the repeal of all repressive laws.

3. To resist all measures which are detrimental to the interest of India, which encroach upon the fundamental liberties of the people and lead to economic exploitation of the country.

4. To reduce heavy cost of administrative machinery, central and provincial, and allocate substantial funds for nation-building departments.

5. To nationalize the Indian army and reduce the military expenditure.

6. To encourage development of industries, including cottage industries.
7. To regulate currency, exchange and prices in the interest of economic development of the country.

8. To stand for the social, educational and economic uplift of the rural population.

9. To sponsor measures for the relief of agricultural indebtedness.

10. To make elementary education free and compulsory.

11. To protect and promote Urdu language and script.

12. To devise measures for the amelioration of the general conditions of Muslims.

13. To take steps to reduce the heavy burden of taxation.

14. To create a healthy public opinion and general political consciousness throughout the country.\textsuperscript{39}

The election results of 1937 showed that while the Congress had a great hold on the non-Muslim electorate, its hold on Muslims was negligible. The newspapers also expressed their view that the Congress' hold on Muslim voters was very poor.\textsuperscript{40} On the other hand, the League jumped on its strength. Jinnah's efforts of organizing the Muslim masses showed a hopeful result and the Muslim League session held at Lucknow in October, 1937 was itself a striking proof of its rapidly growing strength. Provincial leaders who had fought elections on the tickets of their organizations and had shown reluctance to merge their parties with the Muslim League joined the League. Fazl-ul-Haq's Praja Party came within the fold of the League. Many Muslim leaders from Sindh, Frontier, Madras, Assam, and Central Provinces merged
their parties with the Muslim League. The Unionist group in Punjab led by Sikandar Hayat Khan joined the League. He wrote to Jinnah:

"You will be glad to learn that enrolment of the League members is going apace and we hope to be able to set up district Leagues throughout the province in a short space of time...On the whole, the developmental Lucknow which brought about the solidarity of the Muslims throughout India has been welcome by the Muslim masses."41

Pioneer opined that the Lucknow session gave fresh strength to the League and the unity which Jinnah aspired to have was partly achieved within about a year of his launching the programme.42

An economic, social and educational programme was also evolved to bring the organization into touch with the masses. The Working Committee of the All India Muslim League included certain points into its programme as:

1. to fix working hours for factory workers and other labourers;
2. to fix minimum wages;
3. to improve the housing and hygienic condition of the labourers and make provision for slum clearance; to reduce rural and urban debts and abolish usury; to abolish forced labour; to undertake rural uplift work;
4. to encourage cottage industries and small indigenous industries both in rural and urban areas; to encourage the use of Swadeshi articles, specially hand-woven cloth;
5. to establish an industrial board for the development of industries and the prevention of exploitation by middlemen; to devise means for the
relief of unemployment; to advance compulsory primary education; to
reorganize secondary and university education, specially scientific and
technical; to establish rifle clubs and a military college; to enforce
prohibition;
6. to abolish and remove un-Islamic customs and usages from Muslim
society:
7. to organize a volunteer corps for social service; and devise measures
for the attainment of full independence and invite the co-operation of
all political bodies working to that end (proposed by Raja Amir Ahmad
Khan of Mahmudabad and seconded by Ali Bahadur Habibullah).43

Then, steps were taken to strengthen the League. The working
Committee of the League very shrewdly tackled almost all the socio­
economic programmes which the Congress had been dealing with.

However, to popularize the League, the membership fee was reduced
to two annas. Jinnah went on with his call for unity among Muslims. The other
Muslim leaders also had by the time come to a decision to preach the Muslim
masses and warned them to beware of the so-called "Congress tricks". One
speech of Fazl-ul-Haq is remarkable where he said:

Gentlemen, we are passing through times which are extremely critical
for the Muslims of India. On one side, we find the Congress with all its might,
organization and resources, determined to crush and subdue the Muslims,
and on the other side, we find the Hindu Mahasabha, with all its communal
bigotry, characteristic intolerance, narrow political outlook, and unholy
intentions, devoting its energies to the frustration of Muslim hopes and the
suppression of the legitimate rights and liberties of the Muslim community.\textsuperscript{44}

He further discloses: "The time has come for us to review what steps the Muslims have taken so far to counteract these sinister forces which aim at the complete enslavement of the Muslim people of India."\textsuperscript{45}

Jinnah also claimed to be equal with the Congress:

The Muslim League claims the status of complete equality with the Congress, or any other organisation, and we have our problems to solve. We have under the present conditions, to organise our people, to build up the Muslim masses for a better world and for their immediate uplift, social and economic, and we have-to formulate plans of a constructive and ameliorative character, which would give them immediate relief from the poverty and wretchedness from which they are suffering more than any other section of the people in India.\textsuperscript{46}

Jinnah and other Muslim leaders strongly reacted against the Congress' plan of contact with Muslim masses. Moreover, they not only criticized the Congress' Ministry but also declared it as 'dictatorship' and made number of charges against the Congress' Ministry.\textsuperscript{47}

Though there were certain efforts for the reconciliation and mutual understanding between the Congress leaders and the Muslim leaders, no good result came out.

Consequently, the Muslim leaders turned towards their direct demand for a 'separate land'. The Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference held at Karachi in October, 1938 foreshadowed the trend of Muslim thinking and it was resolved that: "The Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference
considers it absolutely essential in the interests of an abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two Nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, that India may be divided into two Federations, viz., the Federation of Muslim States and the Federation of non-Muslim States.48

Again it resolved:

"This Conference therefore recommends to the All India Muslim League to devise a scheme of constitution under which Muslim majority provinces, Muslim native states and areas inhabited by a majority of Muslims may attain full independence in the form of a federation of their own with admission to any other Muslim state beyond the Indian Frontiers to join the Federation and with such safeguards for non-Muslim minorities in the non-Muslim Federation of India."49

Thus, by 1918 the shape of Muslim politics seemed to have undergone a change. The Muslim League gained enough confidence to define the Hindus and Muslims as two nations and to claim for a separate Muslim nation.

While the Congress insisted that a constituent assembly would be the answer to the communal problem, the Muslim League having rejected the federal scheme, resolved that partition was the only practical solution of the problem.50

This idea of division spread so fast from the very beginning of 1939 that in March, 1939, Muslim League's Working Committee considered it seriously and appointed a small committee to look into the various constitutional schemes. The committee consisted of;
Thus the Muslim politics gradually turned to the path of Pakistan and succeeded. All these events prepared a foundation for the famous Lahore resolution of 1940 which is also called as "Pakistan resolution".

The question that arises now as to who was the driving force behind the Muslim organisation? If it was Jinnah, then why could the Muslim League not gain full strength prior to the thirties when Jinnah was already a leading figure in the League? Did the Muslim League receive new impetus first as a result of the short-sightedness of the Congress in excluding Muslim League's representatives from the Provincial Congress cabinets in 1937 and later owing to the alleged persecutions that the Muslims suffered during the Congress regimes of 1937-39? Though some thinkers like Khaliquzzaman seem to think that the former was the main factor which helped the League to rally the Muslims under its banner. At the same time it is also true that the Muslim
leaders were enough conscious to avail every opportunity to raise their voice against the Congress and to demand their own claims. Khalid B. Sayeed seems to be more just in his opinion that "those who think that Pakistan was entirely a product of Hindu hostility to Muslims not only exaggerate Hindu responsibility for it, but also forget that Muslims were just as hostile."52
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3. Ibid.

4. Ibid, p. 150.

5. *Aligarh Institute Gazette*, Aligarh, 14 August 1907.


7. Ibid.


10. Ibid.


12. Ibid.


17. Majumdar, n. 2, p. 536.


19. Ibid.


27. *Ibid*.


29. *Ibid*.


34. Zaidi, n. 30, p. 250.

35. *Ibid*.

36. Pirzada. n. 13, p. 269.


43. Pirzada, n. 13, p. 280. (The twenty-fifth session of the League held at Lucknow in October 1937 resolved that).

45. Ibid, p. 283.
46. Ibid, p. 283.
47. Ibid, p. 284.
50. Ibid,
52. Ibid,