CHAP. VI

Figures based on Vākya-nyāya:

Ruyyaka treats the figures based on vākya-nyāya or syntactical rules in the following sequence.

Yathāsāṃkhya, Paryāya, Parivṛtti, Purisaṃkhya, Artha-patti, Viṁalpa, Samuccaya, Samabhā.

Jagannātha treats these figures in the same order. He, however, does not give any indication, either in the beginning or at the end of the treatment of these figures, about vākya-nyāya, which forms the basis of these figures. A careful examination of all these figures shows that the figures Paryāya, Parivṛtti and Samabhā cannot be said to be based on syntactical rules.

Similarity, contrast and inter-connection are directly connected with the emotions of the poet. Figures based on similarity, contrast, and inter-connection, can therefore be appṛthayānaṁnirvartya. Figures based on tarka may also be appṛthayānaṁnirvartya. The figures based on vākya-nyāya cover forceful, systematized, and clear expressions. They come in the second stage, when the emotions of the poet subside, and when the poet tries to express his emotions in a beautiful form. They cannot be said to be appṛthayānaṁnirvartya.
The compound yathāsamythun is dissolved as saktiṣyep antikrasya
(in such a manner that the order of things mentioned is not violated).
The non-violation of order takes place only when the first object (of one
group) is connected only with the first object (of the other group),
the second object with the second and so on. Thus the objects
mentioned in a certain order are referred to in the same order in
this figure. The name 'yathāsamythun' therefore is significant.
The order is śāstra when only uncompounded words are connected.
The order is ārtha when one compound is connected with another compound
and when consequently the members of the first compound are connected
with the corresponding members of the second compound.

What is the factor that restricts the connection of objects
to a particular order? Some say that the knowledge of compatibility
restricts the connection to a particular order. Thus in
'vraiśpitvagalanakura .....', Hari cannot be connected with wandering
in cemetery and Īśva cannot be connected with wandering in Yrādvāna.
Hari therefore has to be connected with wandering in Yrādvāna and
and hence has to be connected with wandering in the sky, because of compatibility. This leads to a connection in an order.

Others do not agree with this view. They say that if the knowledge of compatibility can restrict the connection, then objects, not mentioned in a particular order, when referred to other objects, will also be apprehended as connected in order, because of compatibility. Kramasūdra, then, cannot be a defect. Kramasūdra, however, gives rise to incompatibility. The knowledge of connection in a particular object, should be considered to be the effect and it has, its cause, the knowledge of objects which are connected with other objects and which possess mutually the same number.

Jagannātha discusses another question. Does Yathāsāṃkhyā deserve to be an alāṃkāra? It does not contain the alarm which results from the exercise of poetic genius. It is only the absence of a defect called Apskrāma. The later rhetoricians therefore hold that the view of the followers of Uḍāḍa, who admit Yathāsāṃkhyā as an alāṃkāra, or of Vāmana who calls it Krama, is not proper.

Yathāsāṃkhyā is defined by Bhāmaṇa as follows:

\[ \text{Yathāsāṃkhyā is defined by Bhāmaṇa as follows:} \]

\[ \text{ującāya devacatanīrak'rātāya sākṣāya bhavantah kramaḥ} \]

Some others also have the view of the followers of Uḍāḍa, who admit Yathāsāṃkhyā as an alāṃkāra, or of Vāmana who calls it Krama, is not proper.
The word 'asadhfXE/ansm shows that bhainaha does not consider similarity to be essential in this figure. Bhainaha says that Rudrata called it Saikhya. Rudrata remarks that the figure is called Saikhya or Krama. Udbhata follows Bhainaha. Vijnana calls this figure Krama and defines it as 'upamanyopasikam kamasambandhah Kramah'. He holds that the various objects connected should be similar in this figure. Rudrata remarks that when two or three objects are connected twice or thrice in a particular order or when two objects are connected many times in order, the figure becomes more charming. Hayyaka says that Yathasamkhya is Sābda when the words are not compounded. The connection in a particular order is apprehended clearly when words are not compounded. The figure is Artha when the objects are represented in compounds and when one compound is connected with another compound. This connection of compounds is Sābda. When, however, the meaning is taken into consideration, the members of the first compound are connected with the corresponding members of the second compound. S'obhākara gives a figure named Krama which does not in any way resemble the figure Yathasamkhya of other rhetoricians. S'obhākara does not admit the figure Yathasamkhya. He holds that it is only the absence of a poetic defect called Apakrama. He further says that Yathasamkhya cannot be a figure of sense as order is not necessary in the apprehension of sense. It cannot be a figure of words, as the
strikingness does not arise from words. It thus, does not deserve to be an alamkūra. Jayaratha does not admit Yathāśaṃkhya as an alamkūra. He says that Jayasva has admitted it only according to Udbhata.

Jagnātthā also seems to agree with Jayaratha in holding that Yathāśaṃkhya does not deserve to be an alamkūra. He has however, given this figure. This shows that Jagnātthā does not like to deviate from the ancient rhetoricians. He does not like to differ from the traditions established by the ancient rhetoricians and therefore follows it inspite of himself.

(2) Paryāya:

Kramaṇānekādhiṣṭhikaraṇayamānakāmādeśeyamakaḥ Paryāyath.
Kramaṇānekādhiṣṭhikaraṇayamādeśeyakamekamadhyamaparāh.

There are two varieties of the figure Paryāya. When one thing successively resides in many abodes the first variety takes place. In the second variety, one abode is occupied by many objects successively. The word Paryāya, etymologically, gives the sense-order or succession. Paryāya, meaning order, however, cannot be the general definition of this figure because such a definition will cover everything where
order is present, the word krama in the definition of the first variety excludes the second variety of Viṣeṣa, because, one object simultaneously occupies many abodes in the second variety of Viṣeṣa. The same word in the second variety excludes the figure Samuccaya, where many qualities or actions simultaneously take place in one object.

In the first illustration of the first variety of Paryāya given by Jagannātha, an object is described as occupying lower places successively. In the second illustration, the object is described as occupying higher places successively.

Appayya has cited the following as an example of Viśeṣaparyāya.

Bimbosthā eva rāgaste tanvi prāmadrṣyata
Adhunā mṛgāvākṣi hṛdayaprṣyate.

Jagannātha believes that this is not a proper illustration. In Paryāya when an object is connected with another abode, its connection with the first abode must come to an end. This is shown by the illustrations given by Kammata and Ruyyaka also. In this verse, when rāga is connected with the heart, its connection with lips does not come to an end. The figure in 'bimbostha......' therefore, is that variety of Śāra where one object successively rises in excellence. Appayya should have accepted the figure Vardhamānaka given by S'obhakara.
Nāgēśa defends Appayya. Sāra as suggested by Jagannātha, is not accepted by the ancients. The ancients have admitted Sāra in connection with many different objects. In 'bimbostha.....', redness and love are identified and consequently the two are considered as one. Sāra therefore cannot be the figure here. Instead of accepting a new figure like Vardhamānaka, the scope of the figure Parvāya should be widened, so that it may cover such cases. Māmata also has cited 'bimbostha.....' as an instance of Parvāya.

It must be said that 'bimbostha.....' is not a proper illustration of Parvāya, as it does not fulfil the conditions of Parvāya. Jagannātha, therefore, is justified in criticizing Appayya. Even Nāgēśa has nothing to say against this. Nāgēśa only suggests that the scope of Parvāya should be widened and that Sāra cannot be the figure here.

Jagannātha then discusses another question. What is the figure in the following instance?

Pūrvam nayansyorlagā tato magnā mansyabhūt
Atha saiva priyasyātsarvavedangacarē.

The figure cannot be Parvāya, because the connection with the preceding objects (eyes and mind) has not come to an end when the presence of the beloved is experienced everywhere by the lover. The figure cannot be Sāra, as there is no successive rise of excellence. It is said that the figure in such cases is Krama.
In Paryāya, the object and its abodes, their relation, and the succession should be imagined by the poet. When one thing occupies many objects; naturally, the figure Paryāya cannot arise. Hammata illustrates Paryāya in sroṇibandhastya jatitajātanāṁ svatā mādyābhāge, padambān muktāstaralagatayaṁ sansāritā locanābhāyaṁ. Here tanuṣa belonging to the hips is different from that belonging to the waist but the two are identified by the poet. Similar is the case with taralatva. Similarly the description in āuyakā's illustration also is the result of poetic imagination. Jagannātha says that the description of succession is also imagined by him in his illustration of Paryāya. Appayya has illustrated Paryāya in 'ādhunā pulinā tatra yatra srotah purāhavat'. This is only the description of feet and does not deserve to be an example of the figure Paryāya. Nāgasa defends Appayya. Srotah signifies deep water. But the place where formerly there was deep water, can now be easily passed over, as the water is scanty. Thus there is a superimposition of pulinatva on scanty water; due to poetic imagination. Appayya's illustration thus, is proper as the description is a result of poetic imagination.

It must be noted that 'sroṇibandhah......' quoted by Jagannātha as an illustration cited by Hammata is not found in the text of Kavyaprabhāsa.
Bhāmaḥa, Dāṇḍin, Udabhaṭa and Vāmana have not defined this figure. Eudrata is the first to define it. He treats it as a figure based on vastava and divides it into two varieties. The first variety (A) is akin to the figure Paryayokta of other rhetoricians. The second variety (B) is defined as:

\[ वस्तू संक्षेपिते श्रियते वाणयाः स परयायाः. \]

Manmade follows Eudrata. He thus divides the first variety into two subvarieties: (a) when one thing successively occupies many abodes and (b) when one thing is made to occupy successively many abodes. Similarly the second variety also is subdivided into two: (a) when many things successively occupy one abode and (b) when many things are made to occupy successively one abode. Paryyaka follows Eudrata. The two main varieties of Paryāya are subdivided by him in a different way. He says that the adhāya may be either (1) a collection (looked upon as one), (2) or, it may not be a collection (there may be several distinct places). Similarly the kāhyaka may be (3) a collection (4) or it may not be a collection. S'oldākara says that in the first variety of Paryāya, (1) the different abodes may be similar or (2) may not be similar. In the second variety, the different kāhyakas may be similar or may not be similar. Paryāya is thus divided into four...
varieties. S'obhākara gives a figure Krama, which is defined as 'ārohāavaroḥah'. Thus when the object reaches a successively higher place, there is āroha. The reverse is āvaraha. If the object leaves the former place and resorts to another higher or lower place, the figure, Krama is mixed with Paryāya. If an object reaches successively higher places, without leaving the former places, the figure is pure Krama. Jayaratha severely criticizes this figure. He says that āroha and āvaraha may be treated as varieties of Paryāya. The general definition of Paryāya is applicable to āroha and āvaraha. Again, the charm remains the same when the object connected with another abode leaves or does not leave the preceding abode. Krama, therefore, should be included in Paryāya. Vidyānātha gives only two varieties of Paryāya. Visvanātha admits the four varieties given by Mammata. Like Ruyyaka, he says that the ādhara or ādhaya may consist of a collection of several distinct objects. Appayya divides the first variety of Paryāya into Samkocaparyāya and Viṅgasaparyāya.

Jagannātha does not give the varieties given by Mammata or Ruyyaka. The divisions suggested by Ruyyaka are not accepted by any of the succeeding rhetoricians except Visvanātha. Jagannātha is inclined towards S'obhākara's view in his treatment of Paryāya. He does not clearly admit āroha or āvaraha in Paryāya. But, he, as suggested by Jayaratha, gives two illustrations of the first variety of Paryāya,
His logic says that Krama should be admitted as an independent figure. However, he does not like to add new alamkāras and therefore cannot agree with Bhāskara who shows a tendency to increase the number of figures. He therefore, only gives Krama 'according to some' and does not give his own opinion.

(3) Parivṛtti:

Parakīyayatātītābhimanditavādānaisampannaṃ parasmāvivaśaṃ vinayanatītābhimanditavādānaisampannaṃ Parivṛttih.

Parivṛttī consists in exchange. In Parivṛttī, a person gives up an object belonging to him to some one and receives another from that some one. Exchange is twofold: (a) a thing may be exchanged for its equal, (b) a thing may be exchanged for its unequal. Exchange of equals is twofold: (a) a superior thing may be exchanged for superior (b) an inferior thing may be exchanged for inferior. The exchange of unequals is also twofold: (a) an inferior thing is given up and a superior one is received (b) a superior thing is given
up and an inferior one is received.

The exchange in this figure must be poetically imagined. A real exchange cannot give rise to this figure.

The object given up in Parivṛtti should be received by some other person. Here abandonment of an object cannot give rise to the figure Parivṛtti. This excludes cases like 'kiśorabhāvam pariḥṣaya rāma babhara kāmanugunām pranālim.' Here a previous condition is given up but it is not received by some other person. Again, the girl does not receive the succeeding condition from the other person. Again, this is only a fact and therefore, cannot be an alāṃkāra. 'Uyyaka's definition 'vinīmayotrā kimeityakyātva kasyacidādānam' is not proper, as it does not require that the thing given up should be the thing received, and that the person abandoning should also be receiving.

Bhāmaḥa defines Parivṛtti as follows:

Visistasya yadādānananyāpohena vastu
Arthāntaranyāsāvati Parivṛtti rasau yathā.

The giving up of something and acceptance of another thing constitutes Parivṛtti according to Bhāmaḥa. Parivṛtti should be accompanied by Arthāntaranyāsa according to him. Dandin's illustration shows that the thing given up
by one should be received by another and the thing received by first
person should be given up by this another person. Udbhata follows
Bhamaha. He gives three varieties of Parivrtti, according as the
object exchanged is similar, inferior or superior. Vamana follows
Bhamaha. He divides the exchange in Parivrtti into: (A) equal and (3)
unequal. Rudrata and Mammata also follow Dandia. Rudrata treats
Parivrtti as a figure based on vastava. Mammata gives three varieties
of Parivrtti: When the thing parted with is equal, inferior or
superior to the object received. Vuyyaka's concept of Parivrtti is
the same as that of Bhamaha and Udbhata. He treats Parivrtti as
a figure based on vakyanyaya. S'obhakara's concept of Parivrtti is
wider. He, however, holds that the thing given up must be the thing
received. Like Mammata, he divides the exchange into three varieties.
Parivrtti also arises according to him when an act is returned. This
variety of Parivrtti is divided into two: (a) when a bad turn is
returned for a bad one and (b) when a good turn is returned for a good
one. The division into equal, inferior, and superior is possible in
both these varieties. A bad turn returned for a bad one may result
into retaliation. It may also result into the removal of the bad
turn received by the first. Vidyanatha treats Parivrtti as a figure based
on loka-nyaya. Vidyanatha follows Mammata in the divisions of
this figure. Visvanatha allows Parivrtti when a thing is only
given up. Appayya follows Vuyyaka.
It can be seen that the scope of this figure is wider according to Bhāṣāha, Udbhata, Vāmana, Ruṣyaka and Visvanātha as they hold that Parivṛtti arises when something is given up and some other thing is received. Dāṇḍin, Rudrāṇa, Mammatā, Sobhākara and Jagannātha have restricted the scope of this figure as they hold that the thing given up by a person must be received by some person, and this person should also give up a thing which should be received by the former person.

(4) Parisamkhyā:

Sāmānyataḥ prāptasyārtmasya kasmāccidvisēśādvyāvṛttih Parisamkhyā.

When an object, generally known, is excluded by some speciality, the figure is Parisamkhyā. Though niyama works on two alternatives that are mutually exclusive and Parisamkhyā works on alternatives that are simultaneously possible, this distinction is not intended in this figure. The figure Parisamkhyā thus covers cases which are classed under niyama also.
The figure Parissrēchya is divided into two varieties:

(A) Suddhā, where the exclusion is not preceded by a question
and (B) Praśappurvikā, where the exclusion is preceded by a question. In both these varieties, Parissrēchya becomes सति when the object excluded is expressed. It becomes अर्थ when the object excluded is known from the force of sense.

In 'sevāyām yadi sābhiśamasi re laksāmipatiḥ sevyatāṁ' the word 「sevā」shows that anybody can be worshipped. Though the worship of Viṣṇu is implied in the worship, it is clearly mentioned that Viṣṇu should be worshipped. What is the aim of the poet in mentioning the worship of Viṣṇu when it is so known? In order that the words 'laksāmipatiḥ sevyatāṁ' may not be futile, it should be understood that these words exclude all else that can be worshipped.

The four varieties of Parissrēchya are given according to the ancients. Others say that the figure Parissrēchya arises only when the things excluded are known by the force of sense. When the things excluded are mentioned in words, there is only Parissrēchya and not the figure Parissrēchya. They thus admit
only two varieties of this figure: (A) सुध्धा and (B) प्रश्नपुर्विका.

Still others say that in the figure परिसमक्ष्या, the thing excluded should not only be known from the force of sense but should also be a result of poetic imagination. 'सेव्यायुयती......' quoted above will be an instance of परिसमक्ष्या but not of the figure परिसमक्ष्या according to them, as the exclusion is not a result of poetic imagination. The following will be an instance of the figure परिसमक्ष्या according to them:

याम्मिति सति वसुमतिपाकसासमेः महामासेः संतापः सरधिक्षर्दयेः स गैलयता।

The word 'संतापः' here gives two meanings: heat and mental afflictions. These two senses are identified by the poet by his imagination. The word 'संतापः' therefore excludes mental affliction. This exclusion is understood only by the force of sense. Such cases only can form the figure परिसमक्ष्या according to them.

भामाहा, दार्शिन, उब्बहा and युमामा do not mention परिसमक्ष्या. रुद्रता is the first to define it. He defines it as follows:
Prastama-prastam va sadgunadhi yatkathya ke vacittulyam

Anyatra tu tadabhava pratiyate seti Parisanamkhyā.

Rudrata thus gives two varieties of Parisanamkhyā: (A) Praśnapūrvika, (B) Apraśnapūrvika. Mammata follows Rudrata. He, however, gives four varieties of Parisanamkhyā. He holds that in both the varieties given by Rudrata, the object excluded may be suggested or expressed.

Ruyyaka follows Mammata. He adds that a special charm arises when Parisanamkhyā is based on Śīleṣa. Śobhākara defines Parisanamkhyā as 'Prāptasya (vidhiḥ) Parisanamkhyā.' He does not classify Parisanamkhyā into Praśnapūrvika and Apraśnapūrvika. He holds that the object which is mentioned in Parisanamkhyā is well known; a question therefore becomes highly incompatible. Hence Śobhākara gives only two varieties of Parisanamkhyā: (A) Śabdī (B) Ārthī. Śobhākara mentions a figure Niyama which is defined as 'anyānishedhārthāpi vidhirniyamāḥ.'

Niyama is divided into Praśnapūrvaka and Apraśnapūrvaka. These two varieties are again divided according as the thing denied is mentioned in words or is known by the force of sense. The rhetoricians do not distinguish Niyama from Parisanamkhyā. Śobhākara, however, distinguishes between the two and gives Niyama as a separate figure.

The well known instance of Parisanamkhyā like 'kim bhūṣaṇam....' or
are instances of Niyama according to Sobhākara. Sobhākara does not admit the figure Uttara and includes it into Niyama. Vidyānātha and Visvanātha follow Mammata. Appayya does not give the divisions of this figure.

Jagannātha follows Mammata in his treatment of Parisamkhyā. After giving the illustrations of the four varieties of Parisamkhyā, he says, "iti Pṛcāmmatam!" He then quotes two views about the figure Parisamkhyā. Jagannātha does not clearly mention which view he prefers.

(5) Arthāpatti:

Kenacidarthena tulyanyāyatvādārthāntaraśyāpattirarthāpattih.

When an object is known from another object through the applicability of similar reasons the figure Arthāpatti arises.

Arthāpatti is divided into twenty four varieties: (A) when a prakṛta object is known from a prakṛta object (B) when an aprakṛta object is known from an aprakṛta object (C) when an aprakṛta object is known from a prakṛta object (D) when a prakṛta object is known from an aprakṛta object. In all these varieties the object known may be similar or inferior or superior to the object from which it is known.
This gives us twelve varieties of Arthāpatti. In these varieties, either the presence or absence of an object may be known. Arthāpatti is thus divided into twenty-four varieties.

The figure Arthāpatti is different from the Arthāpatti of the Mīmāṃsakas. In Arthāpatti, the object which brings about the knowledge of the other object, becomes incompatible in the absence of that object. In 'Pīmo Devadatto divē na bhūkte,' pīmatva cannot be explained in the absence of rātribhōjana.

This is not the case with the figure Arthāpatti. The sense which brings about another sense, is compatible by itself. The figure Arthāpatti is different from Anumāna because the two objects in Arthāpatti do not reside in the same place. In Anumāna, smoke and fire reside in the same place. In Anumāna, the cognition is definite, and takes the form 'this is so.' In Arthāpatti, the cognition takes the form 'this should be so.' Arthāpatti is also different from Yadyarthā Atīśayokti. In Yadyarthā Atīśayokti, the ultimate sense is the reverse of the expressed sense. In Arthāpatti, the object which brings about another object is already established; the object which is known is only probable; the expressed sense, therefore, is the ultimate sense in Arthāpatti. The figure Arthāpatti is given according to the ancients. The object which is known in Arthāpatti, should be a result of poetic imagination.

If it is not a result of poetic imagination,
it gives mere kaimutikanyaya. The illustrations of Arthapatti given by Ruyyaka, are not proper, as they are based on kaimutikanyaya and not on poetic imagination.

Appayya has defined Arthapatti as 'kaimutyenarthasamsiddhi kavyarthapattirigirat'. This definition is not accepted by Jagannatha, Kaimutikanyaya, is applicable only to an inferior object. In cannot cover cases where the object known is superior. Nagesa defends Appayya. Jagannatha should include cases where a superior object is known into Yadyarthi Atisayokti. The difference between Atisayokti and Arthapatti shown by Jagannatha should not be admitted.

The distinction of the object known, into equal, inferior or superior are imagined by Jagannatha. He can therefore imagine these distinctions into Yadyarthi Atisayokti. Appayya has followed the ancients in admitting kaimutikanyaya as the basis of Arthapatti. It has its own charm and must be admitted as a figure.

Bhāmaka, Daṇḍin, Ucchaha, Vāmana, Rudrata and Mamma do not define the figure Arthapatti. Ruyyaka defines it as 'dandapupikayarthamatarapatanamarthapatti'. Ruyyaka gives two varieties of Arthapatti: (A) when the aprakṛta is known from the prakṛta, (B) when the prakṛta is known from the aprakṛta. He says that sometimes Ślesa may also give rise to the figure Arthapatti. Sōbhakara divides Arthapatti into twenty four varieties:
(A) when a prakṛta is known from prakṛta (B) when an aprakṛta is known from an aprakṛta (C) when a prakṛta is known from an aprakṛta. (D) when an aprakṛta is known from aprakṛta. In all the four varieties, the object known may be similar, inferior or superior to the object from which it is known. This gives twelve varieties. In all these varieties, the object bringing about may be possible and the object brought out may also be possible. The object bringing about may be impossible and the object brought about may also be impossible. This gives twenty-four varieties. Divisions of Arthāpatti into śabdī and Ārthī are also possible. It can be seen that Jagannātha has admitted all these varieties. Instead of the words 'saṁbhava' and 'asaṁbhava' of Saṁbhakara, Jagannātha uses the words 'bhava' and 'abhava'. Jayaratha says that so many varieties should not be admitted. He says that the object known may be mentioned or may not be mentioned. Vidyānātha and Appayya do not give the divisions of this figure. Appayya treats Arthāpatti among figures based on pramāṇas. Viṣvanātha follows Ruyyaka in the divisions of this figure.

Jagannātha is highly influenced by Saṁbhakara in his treatment of the figure Arthāpatti. Saṁbhakara and Jagannātha are the only two rhetoricians who have given so many varieties of Arthāpatti.
When two opposite objects are obtained as alternatives, the figure Vikalpa arises. When two opposite objects, each arising from its own pramāṇa, and consequently equally powerful, are obtained in connection with one dharma, their simultaneity is not possible. Thus one object can come only to the exclusion of the other. The figure Vikalpa is the opposite of the figure Samuccaya. It is based on the similarity of the two alternatives. "Jivam maranam vāstus naiva dharmam tyajāmyaham", therefore is not an instance of the figure Vikalpa, because no similarity is apprehended between life and death. The poet here only intends to say that death is preferable to the abandonment of dharma. He does not intend to bring out the similarity between life and death.

In Vikalpa, the similarity between two alternatives is suggested sometimes. "Hato va ārpaṇa śvargaḥ jītvā vā bhokṣyaḥ mahīṃ", the enjoyment of earth and attainment of heaven are intended to be described as similar because both are good. Here kartṛtvā or karmatva is not enough to give rise to a charming similarity.
Ruuyaka has cited 'bhaktiprahvavilokana.....' as an instance of Vikalpa where the two alternatives, eyes and body of Lord Viṣṇu, are apprehended as similar. Jagannātha holds that this illustration is not proper because both the body and the pair of eyes can simultaneous put an end to the afflictions of worldly existence. The figure Vikalpa therefore cannot arise. It may be argued that when the word 'netre' is separately mentioned, the poet's intention to represent the eyes and body as contradictory is apprehended. But this argument is not correct because Vikalpa is based on real virodha. The figure here is Upamā based on Ślesa.

The figure Vikalpa is not defined by Bhāmaha, Dandia, Udbhata, Vāmana, Rudrata and Nammata. Ruuyaka claims that he is the first to define the figure Vikalpa. (..... Vikalpākhyālamkāraḥ pūrvairakrt.-vivekhotra darsita ityavagantavyam). He defines Vikalpa as tulyabalavirodhaḥ. He says that the two alternatives in Vikalpa must be similar. The similarity between the two alternatives may also be based on Ślesa. Sobhākara, Vidyāmātha, Visvanātha, Appayya and Jagannātha follow Ruuyaka. Jagannātha criticizes Ruuyaka's illustration where the similarity is based on Ślesa. Jayaratha adds that the common property in Vikalpa may be anugāmi or vastuprativastubh-avāpana.
The figure Samuccaya consists in a simultaneous connection of things. The word 'yugapat' in the definition excludes succession. It is not necessary that the connection should take place in one and the same moment. Samuccaya may arise even when the connection takes place after a short interval of time. Samuccaya is divided into two varieties: (A) when there are different dharmīs and (B) when there is only one dharmī. The second variety is further divided into two subvarieties: (a) when the connection with one dharmī consists of any relation, other than the relation of cause and effect, (b) when the connection with one dharmī consists of the relation of cause and effect. In the first two varieties (i) many qualities may be connected (ii) many actions may be connected (iii) qualities and actions may be connected. In the third variety the things connected may be (1) all good (2) all bad and (3) good in the beginning and bad due to the viśeṣaṇās. Samuccaya is thus classified into nine varieties: (A) when many gunas are connected with different dharmīs, (B) when many actions are connected with different dharmīs, (C) when gunas and actions are connected with different dharmīs, (D) when many gunas are connected with one dharmī, (E) when many actions are connected with
one dharmi (F) when guṇas and actions are connected with one dharmi
and (G) when the cause connected with one dharmi are all good (G/2)
when causes connected with one dharmi are all bad (G/3) when cause
connected with one dharmi are good intrinsically but are bad due to
vīṣeṣaṇas. Samuccaya is to be distinguished from Samādhi. In
Samādhi, when one cause is already working, another cause accidentally
comes in so that some speciality is added to the effect. In Samuccaya,
many causes are working simultaneously for producing the effect; however,
there is no speciality in the effect.

Śobhākara does not admit the divisions of the third variety
into sadyoga, asadyoga and sadasadyoga. Sadyoga and asadyoga in
Samuccaya are not different from the figure Sama and the connection of
objects good in the beginning but bad due to some vīṣeṣaṇas is nothing
but a mixture of Sama and Viṣama. Hence Śobhākara holds that these
varieties of Samuccaya should not be admitted.

Jagannātha refutes the view of Śobhākara. When the poet
intends to convey that the connection of things is appropriate, the
figure is Sama. When the poet intends to show that objects, all good
or all bad, work together and produce a certain effect, the figure is
Samuccaya. In Samuccaya the poet intends to show that the causes, either
all good or all bad are working for producing the effect. In Sadasadyoga also the poet does not intend to convey that the connection of a good object with a bad quality is incompatible. He only intends to convey that good things cannot exist for a long time. They turn out to be unfavourable and then produce the effect. All these three kinds therefore, deserve to be the varieties of the figure Samuccaya.

Bhamaha, Dandia, Udbhata and Vamana do not mention the figure Samuccaya. Rudraṭa gives Samuccaya as a figure based on vastava. He treats it as a figure based on similarity also. Samuccaya based on vastava is defined as follows:

Yatraikatramekam vastu param ayutsukkavahadyeva
Jaeyah Samuccayosau tredhanyah sadasatoryogah.

His illustrations of these varieties show that Samuccaya arises when (1) all the objects bring happiness, (2) when many gunas are connected with one dharma, (3) when many actions are connected with one dharma (4) when there is a connection of good objects, (5) when there is a connection of bad objects, and (6) when there is a connection of things, of which some are good and some are bad. He gives another variety of Samuccaya when many gunas and many actions are connected in different abodes. Samuccaya based on similarity is defined as follows:
It can be seen that Rudrata is not very clear in the treatment of Samuccaya. Mammata tries to systematize the treatment of Samuccaya. He defines the first variety of Samuccaya as follows: "Utsiddhiheśevakasmiṣyatrāṇyat tatkram bhavet Samuccayasaṃ." He is not inclined to accept the divisions into Sadyoga, Asadyoga and Sadasadyoga though he gives the illustrations of these varieties. The second variety of Samuccaya is defined as 'yugapadya guṇakriyāḥ'. Mammata remarks that vyadhikaraṇa or ekādēṣa should not be laid down as the condition for this variety. Mammata does not say definitely which view he holds about Sadasadyoga in Samuccaya. Ruyyaka mentions the second variety of Samuccaya as first. It is defined as 'guṇakriyāyaugapadyāṃ Samuccayāḥ'. Ruyyaka admits this variety when the qualities and actions reside in the same abode and when they reside in different abodes. Both these varieties are subdivided into three varieties: (a) when two qualities are represented simultaneous, (b) when two actions are represented as simultaneous and (c) when qualities and actions are represented as simultaneous. Ruyyaka follows Mammata in his second variety of Samuccaya, which is the first variety of Kammata. The compound Sadasadyoga involves Karmadhāraya according to him. Thus, things, good
by themselves, but bad due to circumstances, are represented as combined in this variety. Śobhākara follows Ruyyaka. He divides Samuccaya when there is vyadhikarana and when there is ekadesa. He favours the interpretation santasca te asantah in Sadasadyoga. He, however, does not divide the variety based on cause and effect into Sadyoga, Asadyoga and Sadasadyoga, as he holds that they may be included into Sama or Viṣama. Vidyānātha divides gunakriyāaugapadya into vyadhikarana and ekadesa. He does not divide the variety based on cause and effect into Sadyoga, Asadyoga or Sadasadyoga. Viśvanātha follows Ruyyaka. Sadasadyoga involves a Karmadhārya according to him. He not only favours this interpretation, but he refutes the view according to which, it involves a Dvandva compound. Appayya does not divide gunakriyāaugapadya into vyadhikarana or ekadesa; the variety based on cause and effect also is not divided by Appayya into Sadyoga, Asadyoga or Sadasadyoga. All these rhetoricians have mentioned the two varieties of Samuccaya separately. They have not given a general definition which can cover all these varieties.

Jagannātha is the only rhetorician who gives a general definition which can cover all the varieties of Samuccaya. After giving the definition, he proceeds to give the divisions of the figure scientifically. Samuccaya is thus divided when there are many dharmas and when there is only one dharmā.
He accepts Samuccaya in vyadhikarana as well as in ekadesa. The variety based on the relation of cause and effect is treated as a division of Samuccaya where there is only one dharmī. The compound ramanīyaramanīya is karmadhāraya according to Jagannātha. His refutation of the view of S'obhākara shows his depth of thinking. Jagannātha holds that the intention of the poet is the criterion for deciding the figure. Though Jagannātha's approach towards the different elements of poetry is objective like his predecessors, he also takes the intention of the poet into consideration.

The treatment of the figure Samuccaya shows Jagannātha's scientific, systematic and analytical approach towards the subject.

(8) Samādhi:

Ekārāṇajanyasya kārasyākasmikārāṇāntarasamavadhānāhitasaukaryam
Samādhiḥ.

When an effect produced by a certain cause becomes easy of accomplishment due to the accidental presence of another cause, the figure Samādhi takes place. The effect becomes easy of accomplishment
in two ways:— (1) the effect becomes accomplished without any efforts and (2) the effect is accomplished in all its parts. The figure Samādhi occurs only when the other cause is accidental, and comes afterwards.

Bhāmaha mentions a figure called Samāhita but does not define it. Dandin defines Samāhita as follows:

Kiṃcidārabhamāṇesya kāryaṃ daivavasāt punah.
Tatsādhanasamāpattiyā tadāhuh Samāhitam.

Udbhata also gives a figure called Samāhita, which however, is connected with the prasāma of rasa, bhāva etc. Vāmana also defines a figure, which however, is not the same as that of the later rhetoricians. Rudrata does not mention the figure Samāhita. Mammata defines the figure Samādhi and he follows Dandin in the treatment of this figure. Ruṣyāka also follows Dandin. Sobhākara defines Samādhi as 'upodbalanam Samādhiḥ'. He holds that the figure Samādhi takes place when the effect is confirmed by the adventitious cause when the permanent cause is already operating or by the permanent cause when the adventitious cause is already at work. Samādhi therefore, does not consist in the mere saukarya of the effect, according to Sobhākara. Jayaratha says
that kāryasaukarya here stands for heightening the effect. The effect in Samādhi therefore has two varieties: (A) when the effect is accomplished with ease and (B) when the effect is heightened or intensified. Vidyārātha, Visvanātha and Appayya follow Ruyyaka.

Jagannātha modifies Jayaratha's view and gives two varieties of the effect in the figure Samādhi.