Paradoxical statements have their own charm. Some strikingness is experienced when objects totally opposite are described together. Contradiction, therefore, is another basis of classification. The contradiction in all the figures based on Virodha is only apparent, and never real.

Virodha, Vibhavanã, Viségokti, Asamgati, Visêsa, Sama, Vicitra, Adhika, Anyonya, Visêsa and Vyâghata are the figures based on contradiction.

The contradiction may be intrinsic; it may also arise from the violation of the law of cause and effect. Vibhavanã, Viségokti, Asamgati, Visêma (based on the incompatibility of bhopatti) and Sama (based on bhopatti) are the figures where the contradiction arises from the violation of the law of cause and effect. Jagannâtha starts the treatment of the figures based on Virodha with the remark - 'atha virodhamúlañgkârâh.'

(1) Virodha:

Ekádhikaraññasañbaddhatvena prtidadityorarthayorbhêsa -
mansikádhikaraññasañbaddhatvam, ekádhikaraññasañbaddhatvabhânam vâ
Virodahâ.
Ekādhikaraṇāsaṃbaddhatvena prasiddhayorekādhikaraṇasāṃbaddhatvena pratipādanām saḥ.

In Virodha two objects are represented as connected with one abode; apparently this connection with one abode seems to be impossible. In other words, two objects wellknown as not having one and the same abode are represented as connected with one and the same abode, in Virodha. The contradiction is only apparent and therefore it is removed in the end. The figure is called Virodhābhāsa for the same reason.

The contradiction in Virodha should not be based on cause and effect relation. Virodha is divided into ten varieties; jāti may be opposed to jāti, quality, action and substance (i.e. varieties); quality may be opposed to quality, action and substance (i.e. three varieties); action may be opposed to action and substance (i.e. two varieties) and substance may be opposed to substance (i.e. one variety). Thus there are ten varieties of Virodha. Jāti, guṇa etc. stand for any property and abhāva. The divisions based on jāti etc. do not give raise to strikingness. Jagannātha, therefore holds that Virodha should be divided into two varieties: (A) Pure Virodha and (B) Virodha based on s'lesa.
According to the ancients, Virodha is sabda or expressed when words like api are used, and it is ārtha when such words are absent. Jagannātha believes that Virodha can never be apprehended from words, because Virodha is not included into the different relations existing between the visēṣa and the visēṣya. Virodha does not consist in pratiyogikatva also, because it cannot then cover cases like 'suptōpi prabuddhah.'

In 'suptōpi prabuddhah,' the two words convey the senses 'sleeping' and 'awakening' respectively. The knowledge that the two are opposite in nature, aided by the word 'api,' gives rise to the apprehension of Virodha. As this knowledge is stronger, a cognition of the Virodha between the two properties arises. This cognition may be mental or suggested. The senses of the words 'suptah' and 'prabuddah' cannot be identified because of the cognition of Virodha. The two words are therefore connected when the second sense of the word 'prabuddah' is taken into account. Though the cognition of Virodha is now removed, it gives rise to strikingness, because of the intention of the poet. This is the explanation of the strikingness in Virodha, given by the ancients.
Strikingness cannot arise if the cognition of Virodha is lost; an alamkāra must give rise to strikingness. The later rhetoricians, therefore offer another interpretation. Virodhābhāsa arises only when both the senses are conveyed. Of the two senses, one gives rise to contradiction, the other sense is connected with the other words and is compatible. When this other sense is connected with the other words, the sense giving rise to contradiction becomes identical with the other sense which is compatible. Though the two senses are different, the identity proceeds from the fact that both are conveyed by one and the same word. Though a connected sense is obtained because of the second sense, the sense giving rise to contradiction is not absolutely removed. The Virodha is conveyed to our mind after the apprehension of the connected sense. The strikingness arises because of this Virodha.

The word 'api conveys Virodha by nirūdhā vyañjana which is just like abhidhā. 'Api therefore is not suggestive of Virodha.

An important question is discussed by Jagannātha. The Virodha between two jātis and two dravyas, when expressed, gives rise to Rūpaka. Thus 'kusumāni sārāḥ' which is a well-known instance of Virodha contains superimposition and therefore, gives rise to Rūpaka. It may
be said that Virodha is present in all the cases of Rūpaka. Rūpaka therefore will not have any scope. Virodha has scope in the other divisions: (where guṇas etc., oppose guṇa, kriyā etc.). Rūpaka therefore is an apaśāda and is therefore stronger. But then cases like, 'kusumāni sarāḥ' will all be cases of Rūpaka and not Virodha.

This difficulty is solved by Jagannātha. An alamkāra arises from charm which is experienced by the sāhyāyas. Thus though Virodha is present in 'mukham candraḥ,' it is not intended by the poet. The poet only intends as identity of the moon and the face so that all the qualities of the moon are apprehended in the face. The abheda is the chief source of strikingness here, and gives rise to Rūpaka. The presence of Virodha is not favourable to the intention of the poet, and therefore Virodha cannot be the figure in 'mukham candraḥ.' In 'kusumāni sarāḥ' the condition of a beloved separated from her husband is to be depicted as extra ordinary; the implied Virodha therefore is favourable to the poet's intention, and the figure is Virodha. Though abheda is present here and gives rise to Virodha, it is not the chief source of strikingness. The figure in 'kusumāni sarāḥ' cannot therefore be Rūpaka.
Another question is then discussed by Jagannātha. In 'suptopī prabuddah' one sense gives rise to the contradiction which is removed by the other sense. 'Gāṅgāyām ghosah' also can be an instance of Virodhaḥbhaṣa because the expressed sense gives rise to contradiction and the indicated sense removes it. The definition of Virodhaḥbhaṣa thus covers cases of laksanā also. Jagannātha answers this question. He says that though the Virodha is apprehended here, these instances are not poetic and therefore not charming. Hence they cannot be instances of the figure Virodha.

Appayya has given an illustration where the contradiction is removed by Utpreksā. Jagannātha says that the Utpreksā removes the contradiction and leaves no scope for Virdha in that illustration. Nāgāra contends that the Utpreksā is based on Virodha in the illustration given by Appayya.

Bhāmaha defines Virodha as follows:

Gunasya vā kriyāyā vā viruddhānyakriyābhidha
Yā viśeṣābhidhānāya Virodham tam vidurbudhāḥ.
Thus Virodha takes place, when a quality or an action is opposed to another action, according to Bhamaha. His opposition must convey some special meaning. Dandin's definition is wider, as according to this definition, Virodha takes place when opposite objects are connected in order to convey some speciality. Nābhata follows Bhamaha. Vāmana defines Virodha as viruddhabhasatvam.

Vāmana is the first to state that the Virodha should be only apparent. Vāmana's illustration of this figure contains the figure Asamgati of the later rhetoricians. Rudrata defines Virodha as the simultaneous existence of dravya etc., which are opposed to each other in one and the same place. He is the first to introduce the divisions of Virodha. He, however, gives nine varieties of Virodha, unlike the ten of his successors, as Virodha between jāti and dravya is not possible according to him. Over and above these nine varieties he gives four more varieties where there is an abhāva or absence of two opposite jātis, two opposite qualities, two opposite actions and two opposite dravyas in one and the same place. Virodha is thus divided into thirteen varieties by Rudrata. It is very significant that Rudraṭa has treated Virodha as a figure based on Atisayokti.

Mammata follows Rudrata in giving the division of Virodha. Mammata allows Virodha between jāti and dravya. Virodha is therefore, divided into ten varieties by Mammata. Mammata does not admit the division
based on abhāva. Ruyyaka follows kammata and gives ten varieties of Virodha. Ruyyaka mentions two views about the relation of Sūleśa and Virodha when they enter into combination. The first view is held by the followers of Udbhata, who believe that Virodha has its own field. Whenever Virodha enters into combination with Sūleśa, prevents the cognition of Virodha. Sūleśa and Virodha are mixed and form saṃkara according to others; Jayaratha remarks that the second view is held by Ruyyaka himself. (Darsanāntare iti granthaḥ kṛddhānātāṃ). Jayaratha believes that Sūleśa gives rise to Virodha and saṃkara is not possible between the cause of a figure and a figure itself. Jayaratha, following Rudrata, says that Virodha is developed when two opposite objects are simultaneously (1) present and (2) absent in one place. He also gives an additional third variety where, of the two opposities, one is present and the other absent in one place. Sobhākara gives twenty-one varieties of Virodha: jāti may be opposed jāti, guṇa, kriyā, dharma, dravya and abhāva giving rise to six varieties. Guṇa may be opposed to guṇa, kriyā, dravya and abhāva (i.e. five varieties). Kriyā may be opposed to kriyā, dharma, dravya and abhāva (i.e. four varieties), dharma may be opposed to dharma, dravya, and abhāva (i.e. three varieties), dravya may be opposed to dravya and abhāva (i.e. two varieties), abhāva may be opposed to abhāva (i.e. one variety).

Sobhākara explains the removal of contradiction in Virodha in the
following words: ' kintu partitiravabhāte virodhāpi avirodbhāparvāsat
na tu vākyaśyavasthādvayam. Vāstavārthasya vāstavenābhēdenādhyavavaitat
ātvādārthabhedābhāvāt'. He believes that the word expressive of
Virodha is not to be given up when words are to be connected because
charm arises only when the expression implies Virodha. Vičyānātha
divides Virodha into two: (A) Virodha based on Śīlesa and (B)
Virodha not based on Śīlesa. He gives the traditional ten varieties.
Vīśvanātha follows Kammata. Both the elements in Virodha are bādhya
according to him. Āppayya illustrates Virodha based on Śīlesa only.

Jagannātha's treatment of Virodha shows that he approves
only two varieties of Virodha: (A) Pure and (B) Śliṣṭa.

Jagannātha mentions the views of the ancient and later
rhetoricians about the apprehension of Virodha. He does not
explicitly state which view he prefers. Jagannātha does not
admit the division of Virodha into Sābda and Artha.

Virodha is a very beautiful figure. It can be spontaneous
aprthagystanānīrvarṣṭa - and striking at the same time. It is a
figure not only in Sanskrit literature, but in any literature, as
paradoxical statements are very powerful expressions for conveying
effectively the thought of the poet. Figures like Virodha, Rūpaka, or Atisayokti form a part and parcel of poetic expression and they ably convey the intention of the poet, when plain words fail to do so.

Virodha, however, is treated very mechanically by our ancient ācāryas. Even Bhaṣmaka has based the divisions of Virodha on grammar when he says that one quality or one action opposes another action in Virodha. Rudrāta, Nammata, Ruyyaka, and Sōbhākara have enthusiastically elaborated the division of Virodha. These ācāryas have never kept the poet before their eyes when they have discussed these divisions. Can a poet be conscious of jāti, guṇa or kriya when a beautiful Virodha like 'ma yāyau ma tāsthau or kusumāni sarāḥ' comes out of his pen? The ācāryas have taken only an objective approach towards poetry. They have never tried to understand the poet's mind. They have only taken a logical approach towards the different elements of poetry. The divisions of Upama into Ekalupta, Dvīlupta or Trīlupta or the divisions of Virodha may be logically perfect, but are unnecessary. We hope a new approach towards these figures, from Jaganaṭha, who with all his depth and originality has overshadowed most of his predecessors. Though he is inclined towards reducing the number of figures or towards eliminating the unnecessary divisions, he also fails to examine these figures from the poet's viewpoint.
In Vibhāvanā, the effect is represented as taking place in the absence of cause. Though an apparent contradiction is apprehended when the effect is represented as taking place in the absence of cause, this contradiction is removed when some other cause, not so well known, is understood as giving rise to the effect. Vibhāvanā is illustrated in the following:

Vinaīva śatram hrdayāni yūnām vivekabhājīkapi āranyantyaḥ
Anantamāyamayavāyukaita jayanti nīlābjadalāyātakṣyaḥ.

Here 'tearing off' is the effect. Its cause is a weapon, but as 'tearing off' is represented as taking place in the absence of a weapon, Vibhāvanā takes place. An objection may be raised here. By 'āranyantyaḥ' the poet here intends love torments. A weapon is not the cause of the torments of love. It is only the cause of cutting or tearing. Thus that cause, which gives rise to the effect in the form of love torments, is not apprehended as absent.
This objection is answered by Jagannātha. Tormenting and tearing are identified. 'Tearing' is the principal sense conveyed by the word 'dārayantyah.' 'Tormenting' is the secondary sense. When these two senses are identified, the weapon can become the cause of tormenting. As the tormenting is represented as taking place in the absence of weapon, Vibhāvanā is developed. This illustration shows that in Vibhāvanā, Atisāyokti is essential in understanding the effect.

The cause of the principal sense is absent here while the effect forms the secondary sense. The principal and the secondary senses are identified so that the cause of the principal sense may be the cause of the secondary sense.

The absence of cause and the manifestation of effect, are the two elements giving rise to contradiction in Vibhāvanā. Of the two, the absence of cause is more powerful as it suppresses the other element. The absence of cause is natural, and therefore stronger here. The effect is imagined by the poet and therefore is weaker. This characteristic distinguishes Vibhāvanā from Virodha because in Virodha, both the elements are equal while in Vibhāvanā one element is stronger and the other weaker.
Ruyyaka holds that Atisayokti forms the essence of Vibhāvanā. Jagannātha criticizes this view and holds that the apprehension of volitional identity is essential in Vibhāvanā. Sometimes Atisayokti gives rise to the apprehension of volitional identity and sometimes Rūpaka. In the following instance, Vibhāvanā is not based on Atisayokti:

Nirupādānasambhāramabhittāvemā tanvā
ejagaccitraṇaṃ namastasmāi kalaśāgāyūya sūline.

The causes of picture (brush, ink etc.) and the support—wall—are represented as absent though the effect—picture—arises. The contradiction is removed when the universe in the form of picture is understood, and when it is understood that the Lord created the world though the materials etc. were absent. Jayaratha believes that there is no Vibhāvanā as only a fact is described here. His view, however, is not correct.

Appayya has given six varieties of Vibhāvanā: (A) the effect arises without the cause, (B) the cause is not complete, (C) the effect arises though the obstructions are, (D) the effect arises from that which is not the cause, (E) the effect arises from that which is opposed to it and (E) the effect gives rise to the cause.
Jagannātha severely criticizes these varieties. The effect arising in the absence of cause is regarded as the first variety by Appayya. What is the general definition of Vibhāva when this is regarded as a variety? Again, the second variety cannot be distinguished from the first variety. By the absence of cause, the absence of all that is characterized by kāraṇatva, is intended. Thus as the absence of completion of cause is not different from the absence of cause, it is not necessary to treat this as a separate variety. Similarly obstruction is not different from the absence of cause. Absence of cause is implied in the fourth variety also. 'Sānkhādvīnānimādo'ya' is cited by Appayya as an illustration of the fourth variety, but this line conveys that the note proceeds without the cause-lute. The first variety thus covers all the other varieties.

These varieties, therefore, should not be admitted. If somehow these in varieties are to be supported, then they should be represented in the following way:

The general definition of Vibhāva is 'Effect arising in the absence of cause'. Vibhāva is (A) Sābdī and (B) Ārthī. Sābdī is divided into three kinds: (a) when there is a statement of the absence of cause, without mentioning obstruction, (b) though the cause may be present, the properties which are responsible for bringing
the effect into existence are not mentioned and (c) the property characterized by kāraṇatā is represented as obstructed. Ārthī may also be divided into three kinds: (a) the effect is stated as proceeding from a cause, which gives rise to an effect similar to the prakṛta effect, (b) the effect is stated as proceeding from a cause, which gives rise to the effect opposite to the prakṛta effect and (c) the prakṛta effect is stated as proceeding from the effect of the cause.

Vibhāvānā is divided into two varieties. (A) the cause responsible for the manifestation of the effect may be mentioned or (B) may not be mentioned.

Ruyyaka has cited the following as an instance of Uktanimitta Vibhāvānā:

\[
\text{Asambhṛtam maṇḍanamāngayastena māsavākhyam karaṇam madasya Kāmasya puspavyatiriktam bālyātparanā sātha vayāh prapede.}
\]

Ruyyaka holds that the Vibhāvānā is developed only in the second pāda, because intoxication is represented as taking place, without wine. The first and the third pādas do not contain Vibhāvānā as sambharaṇa, madasya and flowers are not the causes of ornaments and missiles respectively.
Ruyyaka's view is not accepted by Jagannātha. The figure in the second pāda is suggested Utprekṣā and not Vibhāvanā. Virodha forming the basis of Vibhāvanā gives rise to strikingness. As seen above, this Virodha should only be apparent. Here youth is described as the cause of intoxication. Youth is mentioned in words, and youth and wine are apprehended as causes of intoxication. These two are not connected with one another. The contradiction is not apprehended. Vibhāvanā, therefore cannot develop. Vibhāvanā would have developed if the poet had not mentioned youth as the cause of intoxication. Youth is mentioned in words; it is understood as another cause giving rise to intoxication like wine. As the cause is mentioned here, the figure cannot be Vibhāvanā. The figure is suggested Utprekṣā as youth is imagined to be the cause of intoxication. In the first and the third pādas, the figure is Rūpaka, where the upameya possesses a property less than the upamāna.

It must be said that Jagannātha's view is better. This once again shows Jagannātha's bold and original thinking. "Kamalamāṇabhāsi..." the well-known illustration of Atisāyokti also contains Vibhāvanā, as the effect—lotus—takes place without water which is the cause. The Vibhāvanā is Śābdā in 'kamalamāṇabhāsi' and Ārthī in the other parts of the verse.
Bhadama defines Vibhavana as:

Kriyāyāh pratiṣedhe yā tatphalasya Vibhavanā

Jñeyā Vibhavanāvāsau samādhausulabhast.

In Vibhavanā, the effect takes place without the cause, if the contradiction can be removed i.e. if some cause, other than the well-known cause produces the effect. According to Dāṇḍin, Vibhavanā takes place when another cause, - natural or attributed - is stated (as producing the effect) by denying the well-known cause. Udbhata follows Bhāmaha, Vāmana does not differ from Bhāmaha. Rudrata gives three varieties of Vibhavanā. Rudrata does not differ from his predecessors in the first variety. In the second variety, a change is described as taking place in the absence of that cause which is generally responsible for the change. In the third variety, an object is described as possessing the qualities when a particular object possesses the same qualities. Rudrata treats Vibhavanā among figures based on Atiśyokti. Narmata and Ruyyaka follow their predecessors. Ruyyaka holds that in Vibhavanā the absence of cause is stronger and suppresses the manifestation of effect which is śādyya. Atiśyokti is essential in Vibhavanā. Vibhavanā, therefore, is not possible without Atiśyokti according to Ruyyaka. Ruyyaka divides Vibhavanā into Uktanimitā and Anuktanimitā.
In Uktanimitā the cause other than the wellknown cause is mentioned.
In Anuktanimitā such a cause is not mentioned. Sobhākara holds that
the manifestation of effect is stronger than the absence of cause.
Sobhākara divides Anuktanimitā into Cintyanimitā and Acintynimitā.
According to Sobhākara Vibhāvanā is possible without Atisayokti also.
He therefore criticizes Ruyyaka when he says that Atisayokti is
essential in Vibhāvanā. Sobhākara has cited 'nirupādāna......' as an
illustration where Vibhāvanā is not based on Atisayokti. Jagannātha
accepts this view of Sobhākara. Jayaratha defends Ruyyaka and holds
that Vibhāvanā is always based on Atisayokti. He says that the
creation of world without any materials is a fact, hence there is
no Vibhāvanā in 'nirupādāna......'. Vidyānātha and Visvanātha follow
their predecessors. Visvanātha divides Vibhāvanā into Uktanimitā
and Anuktanimitā. Appayya gives six kinds of Vibhāvanā which are
already given above.

It can be seen that there is a controversy between Ruyyaka and
Sobhākara. Sobhākara, though following Ruyyaka very often criticizes
his views. Jayaratha, however, defends Ruyyaka. It is seen that
while Ruyyaka does not admit Vibhāvanā without Atisayokti, Sobhākara
admits it. Jagannātha carefully examines the views of both the
parties, with a highly balanced mind and accepts the view of him,
whose view he thinks proper. Thus he divides Vibhāvenā into Uktanimitā and Amuktanimitā. He, however, follows Sobhākara and holds that Vibhāvenā may be possible without Atisayokti. He does not follow Sobhākara blindly as he does not admit Acintyanimitā Vibhāvenā which is admitted by Sobhākara.

(3) Visesokti:

Prasiddhakaranaka śapesāmanādhikaranayena varṇyanānā
dhāhyānena pāpyāt

Kāryāṃutpattirvisesoktih,

In Visesokti, the effect is not produced, though all the well known causes are present. The contradiction is removed when the absence of a cause other than the well known cause is understood to be responsible for the absence of effect.

Visesokti is divided into two varieties: (A) Uktanimitā and (B) Amuktanimitā. In Uktanimitā, the cause which prevents the effect is mentioned. In Amuktanimitā, it is not mentioned. Others admit a third variety and call it Acintyanimitā, where the cause is incomprehensible. In Amuktanimitā, the cause is known but it is not mentioned. In Acintyanimitā, the cause cannot be known. Some rhetoricians do not distinguish Acintyanimitā from Amuktanimitā.
They divide Amuktanimitta into two varieties; where (a) the cause is
comprehensible but is not mentioned (b) the cause is incomprehensible
and hence not mentioned.

Most of the rhetoricians hold that the absence of effect is
stronger in Viśeṣokti, as it prevents the cognition of causes.
Jagamātha holds that the non-rising of effect is prevented in Viśeṣokti
and the presence of cause is stronger. In 'karyāra iva.....' the cause
— destruction of the body of Cupid — is a fact established by other
means of knowledge. Its cognition, therefore, cannot be prevented.
People cannot explain the existence of strength in Cupid. The non-
rising of effect, therefore is prevented in Viśeṣokti.

Vibhāvanā and Viśeṣokti are called sabdi, when the absence of
cause and the absence of effect are mentioned as characterized by the
determining attribute of pratiyogita i.e. when they are negatively
stated. When the absence of cause and the absence of effect are
represented by mentioning the presence of opposite, Vibhāvanā and
Viśeṣokti are called ārtha. In 'yāḥ kaumāraharaḥ.....' the absence
of cause or effect is not stated negatively. Hence, Kammata says
that the figure in this verse is not distinct (asphuto).
Most of the later rhetoricians have followed Udbhata. Udbhata divides Visesokti into two varieties: (1) when the nimitta is pointed out and (2) when the nimitta is not pointed out.

Vāmana's concept of Visesokti is quite different. His definition is already given above. Vāmana himself remarks 'Rûpakam cedam prayena'.

Rudrata does not treat the figure Visesokti. He gives a figure Abetu, which resembles Visesokti. Kammata divides Visesokti into Anuktanimitta, Uktanimitta, and Acintyanimita. Ruyyaka follows Kammata. He, however, divides Anuktanimitta into Cintyanimita and Acintyanimita. Ruyyaka holds that the absence of effect is stronger in Visesokti, and the cognition of the presence of causes is prevented. Jayaratha remarks that Ruyyaka should be held to believe that the absence of effect is bâdhyya, because, Ruyyaka generally follows Tiloka and Tiloka holds that the absence of effect is bâdhyya, and the presence of cause is badhaka in Visesokti.

Ruyyaka remarks that sometimes the absence of effect in Visesokti is represented by describing the presence of that which is opposite to the effect. Similarly in Vibhavāna the absence of cause may be represented by describing the presence of that which is opposed
to kārana. This makes the figure indistinct (asphuta). It can be
seen that what Ruyyaka explains in simple words, is stated by Jagannātha
in nāyāyika terminology. S'obhākara holds that in Viśeṣokti the
absence of effect is stronger than the presence of cause. S'obhākara
divides Viśeṣokti into Jktanimitā and Anukātanimitā. The latter
is divided into Cintyanimitā and Acintyanimitā. S'obhākara
remarks that the nimitta in Viṣbhāvanā and Viśeṣokti may be cintya
for an intelligent person while it may be acintya for an ordinary
person. S'obhākara therefore, says that Acintyanimitā should not
be accepted. Sobhākara says that the concomitance between the
cause and the effect in Viśeṣokti may be mentioned or may not be
mentioned. Vidyaṇātha and Appayya do not give the divisions Viśeṣokti.
Virvāṇātha considers Acintyanimitā as a variety of Anukātanimitā.

Jagannātha follows Jayaratha and holds that the presence of
cause is stronger than the absence of effect in Viśeṣokti. Jagannātha
only mentions two views about Acintyanimitā Viśeṣokti; but does not
give his own opinion. It seems that he does not accept Acintyanimitā
because he does not give the illustration of this variety. Following
Kammata and Ruyyaka, Jagannātha recognizes the distinction between
asphutatva and asphutatva of the figures Viṣbhāvanā and Viśeṣokti.
Jagannātha calls the figures (Viṣbhāvanā and Viśeṣokti) asphuta when
they are asphuta, and acintya when they are asphuta.
When the cause and its effect are represented as existing in different places, the figure Asamgati takes place. Such a representation should give rise to apparent contradiction. The words 'viruddhatvam' etc. show that when the cause and effect have necessarily to be in two different places, Asamgati cannot take place. The word 'hetu' stands for prayojaka. Asamgati is illustrated in the following verse:

Angaih sukumārātaraiśa kusumānām ēriyām karati Praharati hi kusumabānā jagatitālavartino yūnāk.

Here the cause—offence consisting in stealing the beauty of flowers—exists in the lady, and the effect—striking—is experienced by the youths. The word 'Praharati' here conveys the sense 'love torments'. This sense is the viṣaya. Maṃ viṣayā is the principal sense—'beating or striking because of fault'. The two senses are identified. The well-known cause of beating is the fault consisting in stealing (the beauty of flowers). An apparent contradiction arises when the
cause—fault— is represented as existing in the lady and the effect—striking or beating—is represented as experienced by the youths.

The contradiction is removed when the viṣaya (torments), is taken into account and when it is understood that the youths undergo torments of love due to the beauty of the lady which is described as stealing the beauty of the flowers. Abhedādhyaśasāna, therefore, is essential in Asāṃgati. Asāṃgati may also be based on S'lesa.

Ruyyaka holds that Atisāyokti is essential in the representation of effect in Asāṃgati; the apparent contradiction can be removed only if Atisāyokti is taken into consideration. Jagannātha says that Ruyyaka's view is not correct; only the ascertainment of identity is essential in representing the effect. This identity may also be ascertained by S'lesa.

Sometimes the identity may be ascertained by Slesa in the representation of the cause also. But identity is not essential in the representation of the cause.

Jayaratha distinguishes between Virodha and Asāṃgati on the ground that in Virodha the contradiction is apprehended because
two objects are connected with one place while in Asamgati the contradiction is apprehended because two objects are connected with two different places. This is not true according to Jagannatha. In Asamgati also the determining attribute of the kārya and the difference in place are connected with the same abode — i.e. the kārya. Virodha and Asamgati are distinct because the contradiction in Virodha is apprehended without any reference to the effect, while in Asamgati the contradiction is apprehended when the effect is taken into consideration. In Virodha, two objects, known to be existing in different places are represented as existing in one and the same place. In Asamgati two objects, well-known as existing in one place are represented as existing in different places. The cause and effect in the definition stand for any two objects which are co-existent. Thus 'netram nirañjanaṁ tasyāḥ sūnyāstu vayamadbhutan' is an instance of Asamgati though absence of collyrium and sūryatva (absent-mindedness) are not connected by the relation of cause and effect.

Appayya gives two varieties of Asamgati. When a thing which is to be accomplished in one place, is accomplished at a different place, the first variety takes place. This variety is illustrated in 'apārijtām vasudhāṁ ekārṣan dyāṁ tothikā thāh'. The second variety takes place when a person engaged in achieving one
thing achieves an opposite thing. It is illustrated in 'gotroddhā-rapraṇa-topi gotrodbhedaḥ purāṇāḥ'.

These two varieties are not accepted by Jagannātha. In the illustration of the first variety 'pārijātārāhitya-cakrīra' is the cause. Its object or support is the earth. The effect, 'pārijātārāhitya' takes place in the heaven. It is well known that the desire to achieve is the cause and the achievement is the effect. Both should refer to the same object i.e. they should reside in the same object. In 'pārijātām....' the two reside in different places. This instance is covered by the definition of Acāṅgati. The first variety therefore should not be admitted.

Nāgēśa defends Appayya and refutes Jagannātha's arguments. An object may be desired to be achieved at a particular place and the effect may take place at another place. The fact that the desire to achieve 'pārijātārāhitya' and the effect are connected with different places, does not at all give rise to Virodha. The charm here arises because an object, to be achieved at a particular place, is achieved at a different place. Thus the charm does not arise due to the presence
of cause and the effect at different places. The variety given by Appayya, therefore, should be admitted.

Jagannatha refutes the second variety given by Appayya. This variety is not different from the fifth variety of Vibhavanā given by Appayya. The Lord tried to achieve gotroddhāra—uplifting of the earth but he achieved just the opposite. The definition of the fifth variety of Vibhavanā (viruddhātkāryasampattih) is applicable here. The illustration contains a sampuruṇa of Vibhavanā and Viśesokti.

Both the varieties given by Appayya, therefore, should not be admitted.

Nāgōśa tries to defend Appayya by saying that in 'gotroddhāra....' etc. The charm arises due to the apprehension of an opposite achievement. In the fifth variety of Vibhavanā the charm arises due to removal of the contradiction. It can be said that Nāgōśa's argument is not convincing. In all the figures based on Virodha, the contradiction is removed at the end. The charm arises everywhere due to apparent Virodha. How can then the fifth variety of Vibhavanā be striking due to the removal of Virodha? Nāgōśa's arguments, though clear and ingenious, are not acceptable. Jagannatha therefore, seems to be right when he considers the first of the two varieties given by Appayya, as covered by the general definition of Asamgati. In
Asamgati a difference in place is essential. The second variety given by Appayya, has nothing to do with place. Jagannatha is therefore justified when he treats this variety as a sankara of Vibhavanā and Visesokti.

Rudrata is the first to define it. He defines it as:

Vispaṭe samakālaṃ. Kāraṇamanyatra kāraṇamanyatra Yasyāmpalabhyate vijñeyāsamgatiḥ seyam.

Asamgati is treated by Rudrata as a figure based on atiśaya. Kamata, Rayyaka and Vidyānātha follow Rudrata. Rayyaka defines and treats the figure Atisayokti (based on cause and effect) after Vibhavanā; Asamgati is treated after Atisayokti. Sbhākara defines Asamgati as 'tayordeshākāmyatvarasamgatiḥ'. Asamgati takes place when the cause and the effect are represented as taking place in different times and in different places. It is divided into eight varieties by Sbhākara. (A) When of the cause and the effect wellknown as existing in one place, the effect is represented as existing in different place. (B) When the cause and the effect existing in different places are represented as existing in the same place. (C) When the effect
coming into existence after the cause is represented as preceding or (D) coming into existence simultaneously with the cause. (E) when the effect succeeding the cause is represented as taking place after a very long time (?) or when the effect is represented as taking place immediately. (G) when the effect taking place in this world is represented as taking place in the other world or (H) when the effect taking place in the other world is represented as taking place in this world. S'obhākara holds that as in all these varieties the coexistence (samgati) of the cause and effect is absent, Asamgati is present in all these varieties. Appayya gives two additional varieties of Asamgati which are already given above.

It is surprising that Jagannātha does not criticize S'obhākara for the varieties given by him. Jagannātha generally follows the order adopted by Ruyyaka in treating the figures. He here differs from Ruyyaka and treats Asamgati after Vibhāvanā. Following the ancients, Jagannātha has given Atisayokti based on cause and effect in his treatment of Atisayokti. He therefore, does not repeat these varieties. Ruyyaka has also given these varieties in his treatment of Atisayokti. But he again treats these varieties among figures based on Virodha.
Ananurūpasamsargor Vīṣama.
The figure Vīṣama consists in an inappropriate association.
Association may be of the form of (A) causation or (B) conjunction.

The causation becomes inappropriate in two ways: (A) when
the cause gives rise to an effect which possesses properties which
are different from those of the cause. (b) when a cause known to
produce a desired effect produces an effect which is not desired.
The conjunction becomes inappropriate when of the two objects which
are associated, the properties or nature of one contradicts the
properties or nature of the other. Vīṣama is thus divided into
three varieties.

Atiśayokti is essential in Vīṣama. Strikingness in this
figure arises from apparent contradiction. In the first variety,
the invariable cause and the instrumental cause are identified. The
contradiction arises because the effect, which is the result of the
invariable cause is represented as arising from the instrumental
cause. When the invariable cause is taken into account, the Virodha
is removed. In Vīṣama an identification may also be established
between the effects of the instrumental cause and the invariable
cause.
In the second variety of Viṣama, a cause known to produce desired effect produces an effect which is anīṣṭa. Anīṣṭakāryotpatti may be interpreted as iṣṭa-ryāmutpattiḥ and anīṣṭa-kāryotpattiḥ; Anīṣṭakāryotpatti may thus take place in three ways: (1) when the desired effect is not achieved and a calamity arises, (2) when the desired effect is not achieved and (3) when an undesired effect (calamity) is achieved. Now iṣṭa or desired may be four fold: (1) when one obtains an object which brings happiness, (2) when one desists from an object that brings unhappiness, (3) when somebody else obtains an object that brings unhappiness and (4) when somebody else desists from an object that brings happiness. These four divisions are possible in both the varieties connected with the failure in achieving the desired effect (iṣṭānavāpti) i.e. in (1) and (2). Anīṣṭa is three fold: (1) when one obtains an object that brings unhappiness, (2) when somebody else obtains an object that brings happiness and (3) when an object bringing unhappiness to somebody else is destroyed. Thus both the varieties connected with anīṣṭāprāpti i.e. (1) and (3) may be subdivided into three varieties. The four sub-varieties of iṣṭāprāpti may co-exist with the three varieties of anīṣṭāvāpti, and give rise to saṃśāti. Thus twelve varieties are possible in the variety where, from a cause which is
known to produce a desired effect, anistakāryotpatti takes place. Other combinations are also possible in this variety. These varieties form a samkara with the figure Viśādana.

Appayya has defined the second variety of Viṣama as "anistasyāpyavāptisa tadistarthasamudyamat." Appayya then remarks that īstānavāpti is also covered due to the presence of the word 'api', and each variety is connected with the word Viṣama. Jagannātha criticizes this. In the definition given by Appayya, the word 'aniśta' is connected with the word 'avāpti'. Īstānavāpti is to be connected with Viṣama which is denoted by the word 'ta' according to Appayya. This is not correct. The word 'api' conveys īstāvāpti. It is possible to cover all these three varieties by the word 'ca'. The word 'api', however, cannot cover these varieties as the sense implied by 'api' is connected with that when the word succeeding 'api' is connected. The word 'iśta' implied by 'api' is to be connected with 'avāpti'. This however, will have to be connected with Viṣama. Thus, according to Appayya, anistāvāpti and īstāvāpti will constitute Viṣama which is absurd. Appayya's illustration of īstānavāpti is also not correct.

The sāmyoga or conjunction becomes inappropriate when a union of two dissimilar objects is described. The description of
such union should be a result of poetic imagination. If such a union is natural, it does not give rise to the figure Visama.

The ancient rhetoricians Bhāmaha, Dāntin, Udbhata and Vāmana do not define Visama. Rudrata is the first to define it. He treats in under two heads: (A) among figures based on vāstava and (B) among figures based on aupamya. Rudrata gives four varieties of Visama based on vāstava. Visama is defined by Rudrata as follows:

Visama iti prathitosau vaktā vighatayati kamapi sambandham
Yatṛarthayor asantam paramatamāśahkyā tatrātva.

The second variety of Visama takes place when the connection of two objects is described as improper or when an impossible thing is described as possible. The third variety of Visama is four fold: when due to some reason (a) a person does not perform even an insignificant work, (b) a person performs some difficult task, (c) a person achieves some object even though he is unable to do so and (d) a person does not achieve anything even when he is able to do so. The fourth variety takes place when not only the object
is not achieved by a person undertaking some task, but a calamity is experienced due to the destruction of cause. Viṣāma based on atiśaya takes place when the qualities and actions of the effect are opposed to those of the cause. Kammata and Ruyyaka do not give a general definition of Viṣama. They give three varieties of Viṣama: (a) when there is an incongruous union of two objects, (b) when a person commencing something, not only does not obtain the fruit but attains a calamity and (c) when the qualities and actions of effect are opposed to those of the cause. Though not giving a general definition, Ruyyaka remarks 'anamurūpasāṃsargo Viṣama'.

Jayaratha says that the description of dissimilar cause and effect should be a result of poetic imagination. Śobhākara's concept of Viṣama is different. He admits the three varieties given by Kammata and Ruyyaka; he gives an additional variety where the causes are not complete. He gives two more varieties: when a calamity is described as turning into good and when the good is described as turning into calamity. Vidyārātha, Viśvanātha and Appayya follow Kammata. They do not give a general definition of Viṣama. Appayya however, gives some sub-varieties of the second variety on the basis of the various interpretations of anistāvāpti. Thus in the second variety of Viṣama (a) the desired object may not be obtained and a calamity may be experienced, (b) the calamity is experienced and (c) the desired object is not obtained. The ista may consist in avoiding the calamity
or in causing calamity to others. Īstānavāpti takes place also where some body else achieves his own object. Sometimes the īstānavāpti may be preceded by the attainment of the desired.

Jagannātha is the first to give a general definition of Viṣama. Though Ruyyaka has explained Viṣama as 'ananurūpasamsarga' he has not given a general definition. Jagannatha divides samsarga into utpatti and samyoga. Jagannātha has dissolved the compound anistakāryotpatti in three ways. Hence the different varieties of anistavāpti. Jagannātha, again, shows four ways which are logically possible for giving rise to ista. Similarly in dividing the anista also, he has taken into consideration all the logical possibilities. Thus, all these varieties are based on logic.

Appayya has given some of the varieties and Jagannatha draws upon these varieties in the divisions given by him. The definition, divisions and treatment of this figure together with the criticism of Appayya's interpretation show how Nyāya has possessed Jagannatha's mind.

(6) Sama: Anurūpasamsargah Samam.

Association is divided into two varieties: (A) causation and (B) connection.
Causation becomes appropriate when, (a) a cause gives rise to an effect which possesses qualities similar to those of the cause, (b) an object is described as possessing the qualities similar to those of an object with which it is associated and (c) from a cause employed to give rise to a desired result, a desired result is obtained.

Conjunction becomes appropriate when the union of two objects becomes appropriate, due to one object helping the other by qualities and nature. The ascertainment of identity by Sīlaṃ or atisaya is essential here. Āśa can accordingly divided into four varieties.

Appayya has cited the following as an instance of the third variety of Āśa:-

Vedāṅga geśairāsanaścaryavṛtha eva
Abhājatayannika cārūnāsītāsam āṭjaṇa
Vedāṅgacch vamapi labhajyase tadava
Āśayogama naiva viphalā mahātaṃ hi sovā.

Appayya holds that in this Vṛṣastuti, when the apparent praise suggests censure, the figure is Viśaṃ. When however, the expressed sense consisting in the praise of the king is apprehended, the figure is Āśa.
This view is criticized by Jagannātha on the ground that the incongruity gives rise to censure. The strikingness here arises due to Vyājastuti; Viṣṇa, therefore, is subordinate to Vyājastuti here.

The figure therefore, is Vyājastuti as it is an apavāda and prevents the cognition of Viṣṇa. Nagesa defends Appayya. The expressed sense—services rendered to great people never turn out to be futile constitute praise. When the other sense—wandering caused by the king—is conveyed, the figure Viṣṇa takes place; the censure is apprehended only afterwards.

The conjunction becomes appropriate in two ways: The description of appropriateness may result into praise or censure.

Ruyyaka defines Śama as 'tadvipaṃpyayāḥ Śama'. The definition of Śama follows the definition of Viṣṇa in which the three varieties of Viṣṇa are mentioned. Ruyyaka then remarks that the word 'tadvipaṃpyayāḥ' in the definition of Śama refers only to the last variety of Viṣṇa which consists in an inappropriate union; the first two varieties are not referred here as their converse is not striking. There is no charm in describing that the effect similar to the cause, or that the desired object is obtained, as these are only facts. Commenting on this, Jayaratna also says
that it is wellknown that the effect is similar to the cause. The
description of such an effect is not charming. Jagannātha does not
agree with this view and says that when the dissimilar cause and effect
are represented as similar by Ś'leṣa etc. or when, the attainment of
an undesired object is represented as desired, by Ś'leṣa etc., strikingness
does arises.

Bhamaha, Dandia, Udbhaṭa, Yāmana and Rudraṭa do not treat
this figure. Rudraṭa defines a figure Sāmya which, however, is
different from Sama. Māmata is the first to define Sama. He
defines it as 'Samam yogyatayā yogo yadi saṃbhāvitaḥ kvacīt'.

Sama is divided into two varieties by Māmata: (A) when there is
a union of good things (sadyoga) and (B) when there is a union of bad
things (asadyoga). Ruyyaka follows Māmata. Sama is a converse of Viṣama.
The converse of the first two varieties of Viṣama is not considered to
be striking and therefore, not admitted by Ruyyaka in Sama. According
to Śobhākara, Sama is the converse of all the varieties of Viṣama. Thus
Sama takes place (1) when the cause and the effect are described as
similar, (2) when there is the description of an appropriate association
and (3) when the causes or other objects are represented as complete.
Śobhākara holds that all these varieties possess, strikingness and
therefore, deserve to be alamkāras. The second variety is divided
by him into two: (1) when there is a union of two good objects and (2) when there is a union of two bad objects. Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha follow Homaṇa, but they do not admit asadyoga. Thus Sama consists in the praise of a worthy object which is united with another worthy object according to Viśvanātha. Appayya gives three varieties of Sama, which are the converse of the three varieties of Viṣarna. He says that the appropriate union may result into (1) praise or (2) censure. These two subvarieties are not different from the Sadyoga and Asadyoga respectively, given by Homaṇa.

Jagannātha follows Sōbhākara and Appayya in his treatment of Sama. Thus the varieties of Sama given by him represent the converse of all the varieties of Viṣarna. The general definition of Sama, given by him is applicable to all the varieties. How is it that Sama is treated among figures based on virodha? Ruyyaka remarks 'Viṣarna-vaidharmyādhi prastāvah.' This explanation is not satisfactory. An answer to this question may be obtained from Jagannātha's criticism of the views of Ruyyaka and Jayaratha. There is an apparent contradiction when the cause and the effect, dissimilar by nature, are represented as similar or when the attainment of an object, aniba by nature, is represented as iṣṭa. Jagannātha is the only rhetorician who shows apparent contradiction in all the varieties of Sama.
Jagannātha prefers to follow Appayya in dividing the last variety. Thus he uses the terms 'stutiparyavasāyinī' and 'hindāparyavasāyinī' instead of 'sadyoga' and 'asadyoga' or 'abhirūpavisayatva' and 'anabhirūpavisayatva.'

Mammata treats Viṣama, after Sama; Huṛyaka treats Sama after Viṣama. The idea that a converse of all the three varieties of Viṣama is possible in Sama occurs first to Huṛyaka, but he gives up two of the varieties as they do not possess any charm. Sobhākara picks up the idea of Huṛyaka. Sobhākara has divided Viṣama into five varieties. He holds that the converse of three varieties of Viṣama is striking and constitutes Sama. Appayya follows Sobhākara. His concept of Sama is more perfect, as all the three varieties of Viṣama are converted into Sama by him. Viṣama is based on Virodha. Sama is treated after Viṣama by these rhetoricians simply because it is a converse of Viṣama.

Jagannātha's concept of Sama is the most perfect because, (1) he logically converts all the varieties of Viṣama into varieties of Sama (2) he shows that all these varieties are charming, (3) he shows that the charm arises in Sama, because of apparent contradiction, (4) he shows that like other figures based on Virodha, Sama also possesses abhedābhuvasaena as its essence. Jagannātha is indebted to Sobhākara for his treatment of Sama. The treatment of Sama thus reflects Jagannātha's depth of thinking and logical outlook.
Iṣṭasiddhyarthaniṣṭaisina kriyāniṣṭaṁviparīturccaraṇāṁ Vicitraṁ.

When someone wishing to obtain a desired object, behaves in a way which is contrary to the desired, in order to accomplish the desired object, the figure Vicitra takes place. The definition may be slightly altered. Thus, Vicitra may also take place when the person wishing to obtain an object, engages himself in an effort which is (only) apparently favourable to the desired object. In both the cases the desired object is already accomplished by itself. The behaviour, therefore, suggests the illusion of the person who is desirous.

Vicitra is to be distinguished from the first variety of Viṣama, where the effect is dissimilar to the cause. The cause and effect relation in Viṣama is natural. It is not a result of human efforts. In Vicitra the cause and effect relation is brought about by human efforts. Again, the subject of Viṣama is the dissimilarity of cause and effect; the subject of Vicitra is an unfavourable effort for obtaining the desired object.

Bhūmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhata, Viśamana, Hudraṭa and Kṣemāṭa do not define Vicitra. Ruyyaka is the first to define it. Jayaratha remarks "etadāhi granthakṛtaṁvipūkhinavatvenoktaḥ". Sobhākara holds that Vicitra
takes place when any fruitless effort is described. The effort may be physical, vocal or mental; it may be of the form of activity or cessation of activity. Vicitra is divided into three varieties by him; (A) when the effort yields a fruit which is opposed to its well known fruit, (B) when there is some incongruity in the result i.e. a great effort may give an insignificant fruit or little effort may yield a great fruit and (C) when the fruit is unattainable, impossible or useless. Vidyānātha, Visvanātha, Appayya and Jagannātha follow Ruyyaka.

(8) Adhika:

Archādheyyoranyatargyatistptatsiddhiphalakamitarasyātīny
unatvkalpanamadhikam.

In Adhika, either the support, or the supported is imagined as smaller than the supported or the support. This proves that the supported or the support is very spacious. The word kalpana in the definition shows that when the support or the supported is naturally smaller or greater than the supported or the support, the figure Adhika does not arise. Ruyyaka's illustration of Adhika is not proper as the description is not a result of poetic imagination.
Bhamaha, Dundin, Udbhata and Vasmema do not treat this figure.

Rudrata gives two varieties of Adhika. In the first variety, one cause is described as giving rise to two contradictory objects. In the second variety, there is a description of a small supported which cannot be contained in a vast support due to some reason. Lamata gives two varieties of Adhika: (1) when the support is described as greater than the supported, (2) when the supported is described as greater than the support. Suyyaka defines Adhika as ‘āśrayāśrayagata(ānā) murūpyam’. He does not differ from Lamata. Sobhākara holds that Adhika should be included into Vīśama. The description of the support or the supported which is smaller than the supported or the support, implies an incongruity between the two. Adhika, therefore, is not different from vināpasanghatā which is a variety of Vīśama. Jayaratha defends Ayuyyaka. He distinguishes between Adhika and Vīśama. In Adhika, the incongruity is apprehended when the relation of support and supported is taken into account.

In Vīśama, there is a union of two objects and each of the two objects is incongruous by itself, irrespective of the other. Jayaratha criticizes Suyyaka’s illustration (dusumatri) as the vastness of the sky is natural. Vidyānītha, Visvenātha and Appayya do not differ from Lamata.

(9) Anyohā:

Dvayoranyonyenānyonyasya vīśeṣāṇāmānānyonyam.
When two objects mutually add speciality to each other, the figure Anyonya takes place. The speciality consists either of a quality or of an action etc.

Appayya quotes the following as an example of Anyonya:

Iathordhvāksah pibatyambu pathiko viralāhugulih

Tathā prapāpālikāpi dhāram vitanute tanum.

Appayya then comments, 'the girl in charge of the watering place who was desiring to look at svamukha for a long time under the pretext of giving water out of attachment (Svasaktya) was obliged by the traveller by securing a repetition of drinking water, by keeping his fingers apart. Similarly the girl also obliged the traveller who was desirous of looking (at svamukha) by securing a repetition of giving water, by pouring the water slowly.

These comments are severely criticized by Jagannātha. The word 'sva' in 'svamukhāvalokanamabhilaśantyāḥ' is connected with the adjective of the girl. It, therefore, refers to the girl's face and not to the traveller's face. Similarly 'sva' in 'svamukhavalokanamabhilaśtaḥ' refers to the face of the traveller and not to the face of the girl. The sense then becomes highly inconsistent and ridiculous. Again, in
Anyonya, the charm arises only when the act of one obliges the other. There is no charm when one oblige's one's own self by one's own act. Here the girl pours the water slowly in order that she may look at the traveller for a longer time. Similarly, the traveller keeps the fingers apart in order that he may look at the girl's face for a longer time. Thus Anyonya cannot take place here.

Shāṅkara, Dāṇḍin, Udbhata and Tūmara do not define Anyonya. Rudraṭa treats it among figures based on vāstava. He defines it as follows:

Yatra parasparanamkāḥ kārakabhāvobhiṣayayो kriyayā
eraṃṣayaste sāyitattvaviveśaṃṣadaṇanyonyaṃ.

According to Jermaṭa, Anyonya takes place, when two objects mutually become the cause of each other through one action. Auyyaka treats Anyonya as a figure based on Virodha, because there is an apparent contradiction when two objects are described as mutually causing each other. Auyyaka defines Anyonya as 'parasparakārakābhāvanananyonyem'. Jayaretha remarks that the word 'kriyā' stands for property. Anyonya takes place when nature or properties of two objects give rise to each other according to Śobhakura. Vidyānātha follows Auyyaka. Viśvarūpa defines it as 'Anyonyamahayorakārakābhāvanananyonyem kāraṇam nātha'. Appayya's concept of Anyonya is rather different. Anyonya, according to Appayya arises when two objects mutually oblige each other.
Prasiddhamādheyaṁ vinā ādheyaṁ varṇyamānaneko Viśeṣaprakāraḥ.

Vaccākamādheyaṁ parimitayatkiścidādhiśaratamapi yugopanekādhiśaratasyā
dhīṣyate sāparo Viśeṣaprakāraḥ. Yacca kiścitkāryāmāraḥvāmanasyāsamābhāv-
tāsakyavastvantaranirvartanam sa triṇyā Viśeṣaprakāraḥ. Evam
caitadanyatamtvam Viśeṣālaṁkārasāmāṇyaśalasam.

The first variety of Viśeṣa takes place when the supported is
described as without the well-known support. This variety is divided
into two varieties: (a) when the supported is described as residing
in another support and (b) when the support is described as having no
support.

In the second variety, a supported, though residing in a
particular support, is described as residing in many supports
simultaneously. The word 'yugapat' excludes the figure Paryāya.

In the third variety, someone, beginning some work, accomplishes
another impossible thing. Abhedādhayasāna is essential in the third
variety of Viśeṣa. The work which is started by the person must be
identified with the other impossible thing. This variety is different from a sanākara of Praharṣaṇa and Viṣama, because such an identification is not necessary in these figures. This variety is distinct from Atisāyokti as nigaṇaṇa does not take place in this variety. It is distinct from Kūpaka, because the viṣaya (the work started) and the viṣayi (the other impossible thing) do not have the same case. This, says Jagannātha, is the view of the ancients.

Jagannātha, however, holds that the third variety of Viṣesa should be treated as a separate figure. How can it be said that the accomplishment of an impossible thing is a variety of Viṣesa? There is no general definition of Viṣesa, which can be applied to this variety. The statement of the ancient rhetoricians cannot be authoritative here as they fail to give a common definition applicable to all the varieties. Again, 'yena dṛṣṭosi deva tvam tena dṛṣṭah hutāsanah' is an instance of Nidarsana; when we read 'suresvaraḥ' instead of 'hutāsanah', the charm does not differ. 'Yena dṛṣṭosi deva tvam tena dṛṣṭah suresvaraḥ', however, is an instance of the third variety of Viṣesa according to the ancients as the sight of the Lord of gods is considered to be an impossible thing. Such cases in this variety may therefore be included into the second variety of Nidarsana.
Though proposing this, Jagannātha, at the end of his treatment of Viśeṣa, says that the example of the third variety should contain a description of a thing which is really impossible, and which is not based on similarity. Abhedādhyavasāna, then will not be an essential condition for this variety.

This discussion once again shows that Jagannātha, with all his original thinking, does not like to differ from the ancients and prefers to follow the concepts of the ancients. Though Jagannātha personally holds that the third variety should be treated as a separate figure or should be included intośīrṣaśāna, he reconciles himself to the ancients' view by proposing that the illustrations of this variety should describe a really impossible thing and should be based on cause and effect relation.

Phāmaha, Dandān, Udbhata and Vāmana do not define this figure. Rudrats is the first to define it. He treats it as a figure based on atīśaya. Rudrata gives three varieties of Viśeṣa: (1) when a supported is described as existing without support, (2) when one object is represented as existing simultaneously in many supports and (3) when someone, doing a work, simultaneously accomplishes another
impossible thing. Kannata, Ruyyaka and S'obhākara follow Rudrāta. Sobhākara divides the third variety into two: (a) when a person doing one thing accomplishes something more than expected and (b) when a person accomplishes something which is contrary to his expectation. Though contrary, the object is not of the form of calamity. This variety, therefore, is different from Vīṣṇeśa. Jayarātha remarks that the three varieties of Vīṣeṣa are quite distinct and do not have any common definition which can cover them all. "Vīṣeṣaścātra trayo na punarāstrividhah. Laksanasya bhinnatvāt". Vidyānātha, Vīśvanātha and Appayya follow Rudrāta.

Jagannātha holds that the third variety should be treated as a separate figure.

(11) Vyāghāta:

Yatra hyekena kartrā yena kāraṇena kāryam kiṅcinniśpāditam nispipādayaśītāṃ vā tadanyena kartrā tenaiva kāraṇena tadviroddhakār, yasya nispāśānena nispipādayāyā vā vyāhanyate sa Vyāghātāh.
In Vyāghāta, a person accomplishes or wishes to accomplish a certain effect with a certain means. Another person undoes that effect with the same means, by accomplishing or by wishing to accomplish an effect which is contrary to the effect achieved by the first. In Vyāghāta, when someone undoes with some means what another has accomplished with the same means, it follows that someone is superior to that another person. Vyāghāta thus leads to Vyatireka. The activities of the agent of the work should be directed for the achievement of the effect. Thus the following cannot be an instance of Vyāghāta:

Pāṇḍityena pracaṃdena yena mādyanti durjanāḥ
denaiva sajjanā rūdhā yānti sāntimanuttamām.

Though the wicked persons and the good persons are the agents of the actions - getting intoxicated and getting pacified, intoxication and pacification are not the objects of their activities. Thus, though intoxication and pacification result from the same cause (learning), Vyāghāta cannot be the figure in this verse. Intoxication and pacification form the very nature of the wicked and the good persons respectively; there is no strikingness in the description of natural facts. One and the same cause can give rise to two opposite results due to the different natures of objects resorted by the cause. This is very natural and therefore cannot give rise to an alaṃkāra.
Tyaghita is divided into two varieties. In the first variety of Tyaghata an effect, which has already come into existence is undone by the same means. In the second variety, an effect which is desired to be accomplished by a certain means is undone by another effect which is desired to be accomplished by the same means and is contrary to the first effect. In this variety there is an apparent contradiction when the same cause is represented as giving rise to two opposite results. In the first variety, apparent Virekha arises when the effect is undone with the very means that gave rise to it. It is removed because two different causes are identified and represented as one. In both the varieties the desire of the first person is undone (vyahanyate).

Drśā dagdhān manasijam jīvayanti drśāiva yāh

Virūpakaśasya jyayistāḥ stuve vāmaścānāh.

The ancient rhetoricians have quoted the above as an illustration of Vyaghata. The figure however is Vyatireka as women with beautiful eyes are described as superior to Lord Śiva. Vyaghata is subordinate to Vyatireka in this instance. Vyaghata is invariably accompanied by Vyatireka; it cannot arise in the absence of Vyatireka. This seems to be Jagannātha's view. He, however, obeys the ancient tradition and accepts Vyaghata as a separate figure. He accepts the argument put forward by
the ancients who say that many alamkāras, though invariably connected
with other alamkāras, are treated as separate figures, due to a special
charm owned by them. Similarly Vyāghata has a charm of its own and
becomes a separate figure. Jagannātha does not accept Appayya's
illustration of Vyāghata. Nāgasa défends it by arguing that the
definition of Vyāghata is applicable to it and the illustration
therefore, is proper.

Vyāghata is not defined by Bāmaha, Dandina, Udbhata and Vāmana.

Rudrata defines it as follows:

Anyairapratihata api karāṇamuptādanam na kāraṇaya
Yasminabhidhīyeta Vyāghatah sa iti vijñeyah.

Rudrata's concept. Vyāghata is different from that of his successive.

Mamata defines Vyāghata as follows:

Yad yatha sādhitam kāryaparāna tadanyatha
Tathaiva yad vidhīyeta sa Vyāghata iti smṛtah.

Ruyyaka follows Mamata. He, gives another variety which takes place when
a cause easily gives rise to an effect which is opposite to the effect
which the cause is expected to bring about. S'ebhākara defines
Vyāghāta as 'utpattivināṣyorekṣapāyate Vṛgyāghaṁ'. S'ebhākara does
not admit the second variety defined by Ruyyaka and says that this
variety is covered by his definition. Jayaratha remarks that Vyatireka
is invariably present in Vyāghāta. He criticizes S'ebhākara's definition
and illustrations. Vidyanātha follows Mamitā and gives only one variety
of Vyāghāta. Viśvanātha, Appayya and Jagannātha follow Ruyyaka and
give two varieties of Vyāghāta. Jagannātha agrees with Jayaratha and
holds that Vyatireka is always present in Vyāghāta.

Vyāghāta is the last figure based on Virodha. The apparent
contradiction apprehended in all the figures based on Virodha, arises
due to abhedādhyāvāsāna, which is brought about by Śīlaśa or Atisayokti.
Strikingness arises from this apparent Virodha which exists for a moment
like a flash of lightning and vanishes afterwards. Some hold that all
the figures based on Virodha are only different varieties of Virodhābhāsa.
These figures represent only different forms of one strikingness just as
bracelets, earings etc. are only different forms of gold. Other hold
that if synthetic attitude is adopted, then figures like Rūpaka and Dīpaka
will have to be treated as varieties of Upamā. This will give rise to a
chaos. So all the figures based on Virodha have their own charm and they
should be treated as separate figures. Who held these views is not known.
Jagannātha does not give his own opinion.