Sanskrit poetics emphasizes that the readers should be sympathetic, imaginative, and should have the capacity to be lost in the world described by the poet. The mind of an appreciative reader should be clear like the surface of a mirror, so that the emotions, and sentiments depicted by the poet are at once reflected in it. Though the Sanskrit poetics thus demands a particular imagination and sensitiveness from the readers, it by no means lessens the importance of poetic expression. The poetic expression should suggest the emotion in a charming way. Striking turns of expression, - alamkāras - spontaneously occur to a poet, when simple words and ordinary expressions cannot freely convey his overflowing emotions. That alamkāra, which is spontaneous, which is a part and parcel of the poetic expression, when the poet has concentrated his efforts on depiction of emotion, is not only not external and detachable but is a most powerful and effective vehicle for the poet to convey his idea to the readers. Ānandavardhana gives an unquestionable criterion for an alamkāra as follows:

Rasāksiptataya yasya bandhah śākyakriyo bhavet
Aprthagyatnanirvartyah sālamkāro dhvanau mataḥ.

And which alamkāras can be more aprthagyatnanirvartya than the alamkāras based on similarity? Upama, for example, is an omnipresent alamkāra. Poets of all ages, all places, and all languages have freely employed Upama for presenting clearly their objects of
The ancient mind, with all its originality, and intelligence, had developed a peculiar tendency of carrying things to their logical extremes, and this tendency is the cause of a curious love for classification. This tendency is seen in Alamkārasāstra also.

Similarity presupposes two things: (i) an object of comparison and (ii) a standard of comparison. These two have some common properties and similarity is based on these properties. Though the object of comparison and the standard of comparison, which are called upameya and upamāna respectively, have some common properties, they are quite distinct as they have their own special properties. Similarity can be established only between two different things. Similarity thus presupposes difference. The degrees of similarity and difference, may, however, vary and the figures based on similarity are accordingly classified into three groups:

(i) Figures where difference and non-difference are equally prominent
(ii) Figures where non-difference predominates
(iii) Figures where difference predominates.

(i) Figures where difference and non-difference are equally prominent:

The degree of difference and non-difference is equal in the figures forming this group. The upamāna and the upameya are apprehended here as similar. They are non-different so far as their common properties
are concerned. But they are distinct so far as their special properties are concerned. This group comprises the figures Upamā, Upameyopama, Ananvaya, Asama, Udāharana and Smarana. Though difference and non-difference are present in all these figures, there are different modes of expressing them. Hence the different alamkāras.

(1) Upamā:

Sādṛṣyaṃ sundaram vākyārthopaskārakam upamālamkṛtih. The word 'sundaram' is significant here, as it excludes the figures Ananvaya and Vyatireka. Sādṛṣya is present in Ananvaya and Vyatireka; it is also present in the figures - Rūpaka, Apahnuti etc., where abheda or non-difference predominates and in figures - Drṣṭānta, Prativastūpama etc. where difference predominates but it does not give rise to camatkrśti - strikingness-in these figures. In Upama the sādṛṣya itself gives rise to strikingness; in Ananvaya, not the sādṛṣya, but dvitiyasadrśavyavaccheda gives rise to strikingness. In Vyatireka, the denial gives rise to strikingness. In figures based on non-difference or difference, the sādṛṣya lies at the root but it is not the chief source of strikingness. Pratīpa and Upameyopama are two alamkāras where sādṛṣya gives rise to strikingness, but these two are only varieties of Upama. Some hold that Kalpitopama, where the upamana is invented by the poet, should be treated as a separate figure, but Kalpitopama is only a variety of Upamā, because the definition of Upamā does not mention that
the upamāṇa and the upameya should be real. Besides, in Kalpitopama also the sādrśya is the chief source of strikingness. Kalpitopama gives rise to the apprehension of the absence of any other upamāṇa but Kalpitopama cannot be treated as a separate figure on the ground of this characteristic. This characteristic makes Kalpitopama only a variety of Upamā. Besides, Upamā may also be based on bimbapratibimbabhāva. Kalpitopama, therefore, is only a variety of Upamā.

Appayya has defined Upamā as ' upamitikriyānispattimatatsādṛ-śyavarananamayānāgamupamanālankāraḥ.' He has also defined it as "svanisedhāparyavasāyī sādṛśyavarananam vā tathābhūtam tathā." Jagannātha criticizes these two definitions.

Varnana consists either of particular words or of particular cognition. In both these cases it cannot be expressed by words. Upamā is a figure of sense, and sense is always expressed by words. 'Upamitikriyānispattimatatsādṛśyavarananam' therefore, cannot be the definition of a figure of sense. Such a description can never be suggested, since the word 'avyāṅgym' in the definition is superfluous.

Appayya cannot escape from this criticism by arguing that Upamā is that sādṛśya which is the object of description, because then any ordinary description will be Upamā. As a matter of fact the description in Upamā should be striking, but Appayya's definition fails to mention this important characteristic. If this is introduced in the definition,
the adjective upamitikriyanispatimad will be superfluous, because that sadṛṣya which is superfluous cannot give rise to strikingness. The word niṣedhāparyāvasāyī in the second definition will also be redundant if the word varṇana in Appayya's definition is taken to imply the characteristic of giving rise to strikingness because sadṛṣyanisṛṣedha is striking only in Vyatireka and Ananvaya. Again, the definition will be overlapping and will be applicable to that comparison, which is the principal sense of the sentence (mukhyavākyārtha). The words Vyāpāro upamāṇākhyo bhavedyadi vivakṣā itah Kriyānispatipyantamupamālaṅkṛtistu sā clearly show that Appayya intends to define only the figure Upamā. The definition therefore, should exclude Upamā which is mukhyavākyārtha. The word sadṛṣya in the definition is also redundant because the words upamitikriyanispatimadvarṇanam can give the intended sense.

Vidyānātha has defined Upamā as follows:

Svataḥsiddhena bhinnena sammatena ca dharmataḥ
Sāmyamanyena varṇyasya vācyam cedekadopama.

This definition can be applicable to Vyatireka also.

Some ancient rhetorician has defined Upamā as follows:

Upamanopameyatvayo gyayorarthayordvayoḥ
Hṛdyam sādharmyamupametyucyate kāvyavedibhiḥ.

The words hṛdyam sādharmyamupama, however, are enough and the other words are redundant.
Mammata has defined Upama as "sadharmyamupama bhede" but this definition is applicable to Vyatireka also. Sadharmya may be qualified by some such word as 'paryavasita' by the objector. But then, the word 'bhede' which is intended to exclude Ananvaya, will be redundant, as sadrsya is not the ultimate idea in Ananvaya. Jagannatha criticizes *Ruyyaka's definition of Upama for this very reason.

* Jagannatha then criticizes Sobhakara, who defines Upama as "prasiddhagunenopamanenaprasiddhagunasyopameyasya sadrsyamupama." This definition is faulty as it cannot be applicable to Upama based on slesa, where the common property consists of particular words only, and where, therefore, the upamana is not wellknown.

Following Mammata, Jagannatha classifies Upama into twenty five varieties. The following table shows the classification of Upama:

* Ruyyaka, the author of Alamkārasarvasva, is referred to as Alamkārasarvasvaśākhṛt. Jayaratha, the author of Vimarśinī (Commentary on Alamkārasarvasva) is referred to as Vimarśinīkāra. Sobhākara, the author of Alamkāraratnakara is referred to as Ratnakara by Jagannatha in the Rasagaṇgādhara.
Over and above these twenty-five varieties, Jagannath gives seven more varieties, which some of his predecessors have admitted. They are:

1) Niniga vacakalupta
2) Kangā vacakalupta
3) Kvibgā vacakalupta
4) Chhapratyayaga upamanapupta
5) Vācakopamāṇalupta
6) Taddhitagā dharmopamāṇalupta
7) KangāVācakadharmalupta.

Karmakyajga, Adhārakajga and Kyānggā are treated by the ancients as instances of Vācakalupta, but Jagannath believes that these are instances of Dharmavācakalupta. The acara denoted by kyac and kyang is not enough to constitute the common property in Upama. If mere acar is enough for Upama, then how is it that triviṣṭapam tatkhalu bhāratayate is not an instance of the figure Upama? When the words 'suparvabhih sōhitamantarāsthithaih' are added, triviṣṭapam...... becomes an instance of Upama. This shows that the sadhāraṇadharmā in Upama should be capable of giving rise to Upama. Such a sadhāraṇadharmā being absent in Karmakyajga, Adhārakajga and Kyānggā, these should be considered as instances of Dharmaloopa also over and above Vācakalopa.

Appayya has shown Citramiṣasā that Dharmalupta is possible in dvīrbhāva also; thus, in Paṭupuṭurdevadattāh the reduplication conveys similarity. Paṭupuṭurdevadattāh is an instance of Vācakadharmalupta according to Jagannatha because the upamāpratipūḍaṇa
word is not mentioned. The dvirbhāva cannot be expressive or vacaka of sadṛṣya as it is suggestive and not expressive. Nāgese here defends Appayya. He argues that dvirbhāva here conveys the idea of sadṛṣya and the word expressive of sadṛṣya therefore is present here. In 'candra iva mukham also iva' cannot be the vacaka of sadṛṣya according to those who think that 'iva etc. are suggestive, and still 'iva is admitted as vacaka. Similarly dvirbhāva conveys the idea of sadṛṣya; the vacaka being present, instances of dvirbhāva will contain dharmalopa only and not vacakadharmalopa. Appayya, again, says that in 'tam jagat-yabhaṃmartyaścānca chandrakalādharam', there is Kangā Vācakadharmaluptā, but he is wrong according to Jagannātha. 'Not worshipping Lord Śiva' is the common property and it is mentioned here. Kangā will thus be only Vācakaluptā. The word 'purato' used by Appayya in 'purato harināksīnāmesa puṣpāyudhiyati', is not grammatically correct according to Jagannātha. Here also Appayya is defended by Nāgese who proves that the word is used correctly by Appayya.

The figure Upamā may beautify (a) suggested vastu, (b) suggested alāṃkāra (c) suggested rasa (d) vācyā vastu and (e) vācyā alāṃkāra. The twentyfive varieties, when multiplied by these five, will give rise to one hundred and twentyfive kinds of Upamā. According to those who accept thirty two varieties, Upamā will have one hundred and sixty varieties.

Another classification of Upamā is based on the nature of the common property. The sadharaṇadharma may be (1) anugamī, (2) bimbapratibimbabhāvāpanna, (3) of the form of a combination of bimbapratibimbabhāvāva
and anugāmitā, (4) of the form of a mixture of bimbapratibimba, and vastuprativastubhava, (5) upacarita, (6) purely sākātātmaka. A combination of these kinds is also possible. The relation of cause and effect is also possible among the common properties when there are more than one Upamās in one place. The common property may be (1) vācyya (2) vaṅgya and (3) lakṣya. All instances of dharmaluptā are instances where the common property is suggested.

Upamā, again, may beautify the principal sense either directly or through a medium. Words like pratibhata, pratimalla etc. give the idea of sāḍṛṣya by lakṣana and the Upamā, indicated in this manner, will adorn the principal sense. Upamā can be an alamkāra, even when it is vaṅgya. That even a suggested Upamā can be an Alamkāra shows that there is no contradiction between vyāṅgatva and alamkārtva; Appayya is therefore wrong in introducing the word 'avyaṅgya' in his definition of Upamā. The contradiction lies not between vyāṅgatva and alamkārtva, but between pradhānata and alamkāratva because the pradhāna is always the object to be beautified, the alamkāra is factor that beautifies, and that which beautifies can never be identical with that which is beautified.

Appayya has divided Upamā into three types: (1) that which finally rests in its own beauty (2) that which brings about the sense which is already expressed (Uktārthopapādanaparā), (3) that in which the suggested sense in principal. This division, says Jagannātha, is not proper as it
cannot be extended to the instances of Upāma where the vastu is principal. How can the first kind—that which ultimately rests in itself,—be the figure Upāma ? And if Upāma can ultimately rest in itself, why has he introduced the word 'āvysmya' in the definition of Upāma ? Appayya has allowed that which should not be allowed and does not allow that which should be allowed! Appayya cannot defend himself by saying that the first kind beautifies the prabandha because then this variety cannot be called 'svavicitryātravidhāntā', as it ultimately rests, not within itself, but in the prabandha. The illustration of the second variety "sanantaratna...." is not correct because it contains the figure Udākaraṇa and not Upāma.

Nāgasa defenses Appayya by saying that Appayya has defined here, only Upāma in general and not the figure Upāma. He again, interprets ‘uktēthropāpādaśasvatā’ as ‘uktēthropāpādastam’. Again, the figure in "sanantaratna...." can be Upāma, as both the general and the particular statements are represented by different and then the Upāma is developed. The figure therefore, is Upāma and not Udākaraṇa. Nāgasa’s defense, however, is not convincing. The definitions and divisions of an alamkāra ought to be logically perfect. Appayya’s definitions and divisions are not so; and Jaganātaka is justified in criticizing Appayya. Appayya, again, says that in Lupotpāma the common property is always vasyam and therefore the divisions (based on the varieties of common properties) are not possible in Lupotpāma. Jaganātaka says that in Lupotpāma also the
divisions based on the common property are possible. Thus the common property may be bimbapratibimbabhāvāpanna; such a property may be mentioned or implied.

Jagannātha further divides Upamā like Rūpaka. The division may be shown as follows:

There are three types of Ras'ānopamā: (1) when the common property in the Upamā constituting Ras'ānopamā is the same, (2) when there are different common properties and (3) when the common property is not mentioned.
These varieties, when connected with the varieties shown by the ancient rhetoricians, give rise to innumerable varieties of Upama.

When Upama is suggested by the whole sentence and is principal, it ceases to be a figure, and becomes (Alamkāra) dhvani. Though not an alamkāra at that time, it is called Upama only because it possesses the characteristics of an alamkāra. The ornaments, kept in a box, are called ornaments, though they are not adorning the human body, because they possess the qualities of ornaments; similar is the case here. Upamādhvani may be sābdasaktimulaka (based on the power of a word) or arthasatimulaka (based on the power of sense).

The various divisions of Upama, which are based on grammar, are to be distinguished from each other and Jagannātha does so by showing the sābdabodha of these different expressions. This discussion of sābdabodha is unique in Alamkāraśāstra because no other rhetorician has discussed it. The expressions arvindasundaram mukham or arvindamiva mukham sundaram, may apparently bring out sādṛṣya in the same manner, but there is some subtle difference underlying all these expressions which can be shown by the sābdabodha. Jagannātha, gives the sābdabodha according to the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas. The Mīmāṃsakas believe that sādṛṣya is something different from the common property. The Naiyāyikas however, believe that sādṛṣya is identical with the common property.
Jagannātha first gives the sabdabodha according to the Kimamsakas. In aravindasundaram, for example, the word aravinda will indicate by laksanā, 'aravindanirūpitasādṛṣya.' The expressed sense of aravinda - lotus - is not compatible with sundara. So, by laksanā, aravinda will indicate the sense shown above. The sādṛṣya is always nirūpita by the upamāna. So aravinda will indicate aravindanirūpitasādṛṣya. This is to be connected with 'saundaryayukta' which is the sense of sundara. Sādṛṣya is not related to saundaryayukta. So it will have to be connected with a part of the sense - saundaryya. As the Kimamsakas believe sādṛṣya to be different from saundarya, the relation between sādṛṣya and saundarya will be prayojakata, because saundarya brings about sādṛṣya. The sabdabodha is arvindanirūpitasādṛṣya prayojakāhaṃ. In order to connect it with saundarya, the relation of identity is to be established. So aravindasundara, now, will give the sabdabodha aravindanirūpitasādṛṣya prayojakabhinnasaundaryayuktā, and in order to connect this with mukha, the relation of identity will have to be established once again. So the sabdabodha ultimately takes the form arvindanirūpitasādṛṣya prayojakabhinnasaundaryayuktā bhinnam. The relation of abheda is established between the senses of arvinda and sundara by a rule of grammar according to which the senses of two names, other than the nipatas, are connected by abheda. The laksyartha of arvinda is connected only with saundarya and not with saundaryayukta; this should be taken as an exception to the rule padarthah padarthenēnveti na tu padarthaikadesāna.
The Grammarians believe that the whole sense 'aravindaνirupitaṣ-
ādṛṣṭyaprajñaksauṇḍaryayuktā is conveyed by the power of the compound.
The Naiyāyikas believe that the sense arvindarupitasaḍāyaprayojaka-
sauṇḍaryayuktā is indicated by the word 'aravinda' by laksanā, and the
word 'sundara' gives the purport.

In 'gaja iva gacchati,' the word 'gaja' will indicate by laksanā,
gajagamana and the śabdabodha will be 'gajagamanasaḍāygamana
nukulakṛtimān.'
A point is raised by the objector here. 'Iva' cannot be connected with
the sense of 'gacchati,' which is a verb, because sādṛṣṭya, the sense of
'iva,' cannot qualify the sense of the root. The sense of the root
should be qualified by the sense of a case termination and not by a
pratipadika. The sādṛṣṭya in 'gaja iva gacchati' should be connected with
the agent of action, and not with the action itself, and the common
property should be 'gajagamanasaḍāygamana kartṛtva.' In this way the śabdabodha
should show that gamanakartra resembles the elephant. The śabdabodha
should take the form 'gajakartṛkagamanasaḍāygamana kartṛta.'

Jagannātha rejects this śabdabodha because the sādṛṣṭya is not
vidheya in this śabdabodha. The two sentences - 'gaja iva yah
puruṣoḥ sa gachchati' and 'puruṣo yah sa gaja iva gachchati'
definitely give rise to two different senses. In the first sentence
the sādṛṣṭya is uddēṣṭya while in the second it is vidheya and the
śabdabodha suggested by the objector resembles the śabdabodha of
the first sentence. Another objection to this šabdabodha is that the karmakārakas and other kārakas connected by bimbapratibimbabhāva, cannot be connected in the s'abdabodha suggested by the objector. In 'vanam gaja iva grham Devadatto gacchati,' only the sādṛṣya between Devadatta and gaja is understood; what will be the position of vanā and grha? So the šabdabodha here should be 'gajanirūpitasaādṛṣyaprayojakagamanāśrayaḥ.' In the case of the other kārakas, the words expressive of upāmana will convey the action connected with them by laksana.

This refutation is very sound. But NāgESA's view on this point is very ingenious and intelligent. He supports the view of the objector. He says that in 'vanam gaja iva ranabhūmiṃ sūro gacchati,' the šabdabodha will be 'vanakarmakagamananukālakṛtivadgajasadṛṣaḥ samarabhūmikarmakagamananukālakṛtimsurah.' The word 'iva' here will convey that act of going which is qualified by vanā and ranabhūmi.

In this šabdabodha the absence of connection pointed out by Jagannātha, will not arise. As for the two sentences 'gaja iva yah purushah sa gacchati,' and 'yah purushah saḥ gaja iva gacchati,' NāgESA says that in the first sentence 'iva' conveys the common property—bravery; in the second sentence it shows the common property—gamanakriyā. Thus, the two different senses arise because of two different common properties and not because of the vidheyatva or otherwise of the sādṛṣya. Again, according to NāgESA, the sādṛṣya becomes vidheya, when upamāpratipādakas
like 'iva,' convey the predicate of the sentence as the common property. In 'gaja iva gacchati' or 'vanam gaja iva graham,' Devadatto gacchati, the word 'iva' conveys the predicate gamana as the common property.

Jagannātha's view might have been stronger if he had given the sabdabodha according to the Grammarians.

Another instance, where Nāgāsa criticizes Jagannātha, is 'arvindavatsundaram.' Vat, according to Jagannātha is suffixed to the word 'aravinda' according to the sutra "tena tujyam......"; it gives the sense sādṛśyavat, but by laksanā it indicates sādṛśya and then it is connected with a part of the sense of 'sundara' through prayojakatva. So the sabdabodha will be 'aravindanirūpitasādṛśyaprayojaka-saundryavadabhinnam.' This is the same as the sabdabodha of 'arvindamiva sundaram.' But in the former, the sabdabodha is conveyed by laksanā, in the latter by abhidhā.

Nāgāsa says that vat is suffixed according to 'tena tujyam..." only when the common property is an action. In 'arvindavatsundaram,' the common property bhavati is understood. The word 'aravinda' indicates by laksanā, sundarāravindabhavana and the sabdabodha is 'sundarāravindabhavanasadṛśam sundaramukhabhavanam' and after this sabdabodha, the similarity between arvinda and mukha based on beauty, is known by vyanjana. Similarly, in 'aravindavamukham' the sabdabodha will be 'aravindabhavanasadṛśamukhabhavanam.'
In aravindavatsaundaryamasya, the word 'aravinda' indicates, by laksanā, arvindasaundarya. Vat here expresses sādṛṣya, according to the sutra "tatra tasyeva" and arvinda saundarya is related to sādṛṣya by nirūpitaya. This sādṛṣya is again related to saundarya by śārayatā. The sābdabodha here takes the form: "aravindasaundaryanirū- pitaśādṛṣyādhikaranametatsaundaryam." When a similarity between the two saundaryas is established, an identity based on similarity between these two beauties will be superimposed and these beauties when identified, will lead to the knowledge of similarity between the face and the lotus.

Nāgēsa believes that vat in aravindavatsaundaryamasya is suffixed according to the sutra "tatra tasyeva" and it has conveyed by a abheda the sādṛṣya. By laksanā, it will indicate sādṛṣya prayojaka. The sābdabodha here will be 'arvindasādṛṣyaprayojakametatsambandhisaundaryam.' He says that Jagannātha is wrong when he says that 'aravinda' indicates 'arvindasaundarya,' by laksanā.

After giving the sābdabodha of fourteen different expressions of Upama, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, Jagannātha briefly discusses the sābdabodha of some of the expressions according to the Naiyāyikas who consider sādṛṣya to be identical with the common property. The word 'aravinda,' in aravindasundaram mukham, indicates by laksanā, 'aravinda-vṛttisamānadharmā.' It is connected with sundaratva which is a part of the sense of the word 'sundara,' by abhedā. The sābdabodha, therefore,
takens the form: - aravindavṛtti samānadharmabhinnasundaratvasārayam vadanam.

The Grammarians believe that iva etc. are suggestive of sadṛṣya, as they are nipātas. The Naiyāyikas believe that they are vācaka.

Anything that mars the beauty of upama is a doṣa. The following are upamādosas: (1) not following the poetic convention (2) incongruity between the upamāna and the upameya in points of (a) class (b) gender (c) proportion and (d) number (3) deficiency or redundancy of the properties belonging to the upamāna or upameya if the properties are bimbapratibimbabāvāpanna (4) difference of (a) tense (b) person (c) mood and the like if the common property is anugāmi. The doṣas cease to be doṣas if they do not mar the strikingness of upama or if they are sanctioned by poetic convention. Upama is defined by Bharata as follows:-

Yatkimcit kavyabandhesu sadṛṣ'yenopāyate
Upama nāma vijñeyā guṇakṛtisamāraya.

Bhāmaha defines Upama as follows:-

Viruddhenopamānena des'akālakriyādibhiḥ
Upameyasya yatsāmyam guṇales'ena sopama.

Bhāmaha's definition shows that the similarity in Upama exists between two objects which are distinct. The definitions given by Daṇḍin and
Vāmana also bring out the same point. Bharata, Dandin, Sobbākara, Appayya and Jagannātha use the word 'Sādṛṣya' in their treatment of Upamā. Udbhāta, Mammata and Ruyyaka, have used the word 'sadharmya'. Bhāmaha, Vāmana and Vidyānātha have used the word 'Sāmyam'. Sādharmya is the cause of sādṛṣya but the ancient writers do not seem to draw any line of demarcation between the two. Mammata uses the words 'sadharmya', 'sāmya' and 'sādṛṣya' as synonyms. Mammata has introduced the word 'bhed' in his definition of Upamā, in order to exclude the figure Ananvaya.

Ruyyaka defines Upamā as 'Upamānopaśeyoḥ sādharmye bhedābheda-tulyatve Upamā'. Ruyyaka has introduced the word 'bhedābhedatulyatve', in order to exclude figures like Ananvaya and Vyatireka. Jagannātha has not introduced any such word in his definition of Upamā, because the word 'Sundara' in his definition serves this purpose. The words 'sundaram', 'vākyarthopaskāraṇam' and 'alamkārtih' in the definition meant to emphasize the alamkāratva of Upamā are, however, applicable to all the alamkāras. Jagannātha seems to have influenced by Udbhāta, who defines Upamā as follows:

Yacetoḥāri sādharmyamupamānopaśeyoḥ
Mithovibhinnakālādāi s'abdayorupamā tu tat.

Jagannātha uses the word 'sādṛṣya' in his definition of Upamā. Sādharmya does not presuppose difference. It only shows a connection based on common property. Sādṛṣya implies similarity and distinctness.

Bharata gives five varieties of Upamā: (A) Praśamsopamā (B) Nindopamā (C) Kalpitopamā (D) Sadṛṣi Upamā (E) Kiṃcit sadṛṣi Upamā.
The divisions based on grammar were known to Bhamaha but Bhamaha does not attach any importance to these divisions. Dandin follows a different principle and divides Upama into Viparyasopama, Mohopama, Samsayopama etc. Vāmana divides Upama into Kalpita and Laukiki and into Padavṛtti and Vakya-vṛtti. He also divides Upama into Pūrṇa and Lupta. Udbhata has based his divisions on grammar and he is followed by Mammatā, Vidyādharā and Vidyānātha. Ruuyaka says 'asyaśca purṇaluptatvaḥ thedā sa cirantanaṁtaḥ uvidhatvamuktaṁ'

Commenting on this, Jayaratha says 'evam ca teṣāṁ gaṇane tathā na vaicitryam kinciditi sūcitam.' Ruuyaka has based his divisions of Upama on the nature of the common property. Sōbhākaramisra divides the common property into bhāvarūpa and abhāvarūpa. The bhāvarūpa is divided into jāti, kriya, viṣeṣa and samavāya, in accordance with the Vaiśeṣika belief. Of these, jāti cannot be a common property as it does not allow any gradations. Samavāya and viṣeṣa are not pratyakṣa and therefore cannot be the subject of poetic descriptions. The bhāvarūpa common property may be either of the form of guṇa or kriya; to this, Sōbhākara adds dharma. These varities of bhāvarūpa common property, together with abhāvarūpa, give rise to four types of common property, which may again be anugāmi, bimba-pratibimbabhāvāpanna etc. The upamāna and the upameya, according to Sōbhākara may be prakṛta, aprakṛta or one prakṛta and the other aprakṛta. Visvaṁātha follows Mammatā, but he says that Upamānalupta may be sravatī also. He thus gives twentyone varieties of Lupta. Following Ruuyaka, he also gives the divisions of Upama, based on the nature of common property. Visvaṁātha also defines Ekadesavivartini, Māla and Rasānā Upama.
Upameyopama:

Trṭiyasadṛśāvyavacchedabuddhiphalakarpananaviṣayībhūtam parasparamupamānopameyabhāvamāpunnayoarthoḥ sādṛṣyam sundaram—upameyopamā. In Parasparopamā, the mutual comparison is based on different common properties; but the ultimate intention is not Trṭiyasadṛśāvyavaccheda. Trṭiyasadṛśāvyavaccheda however, is an important condition in Upameyopamā. Another important condition for Upameyopamā is mutual comparison. The upameya in one sentence should become the upamaṇa in the other sentence. The word 'sundara' excludes poetic defects like līṅgabheda etc.

The common property in Upameyopamā may be expressed or suggested. In Uktadharmā Upameyopamā, the common property may be anugāmi, bimbapratibimbabhāvāpanna, upacarita etc. The vākyabheda in Upameyopamā may also be ārtha.

Appayya has defined Upameyopamā as follows:

Anyonyenopamā bodhā vyākyā vṛttyantareṇa vā
Ekadharmās'rayā yā syātsopameyopamā mata.

This definition is criticized by Jagannātha on the ground that it fails to mention Trṭiyasadṛśāvyavaccheda; secondly, according to this definition, the Upamā characterized by anyonyapratiyogikatva should be conveyed either by vyaṅjana only or by abhidhā only. Such an Upamā, according to Jagannātha, should not necessarily be conveyed by one process only.
Pratiyogitva is a relation. Upamā is vṛttivedya; the relation however, cannot be conveyed by any vṛtti.

Ruyyaka has defined Upameyopamā as 'dvayōḥ paryāyena tasmin Upameyopamā.' He remarks that the word 'paryāya' implies vākyabheda. The word 'dvayōḥ' is redundant according to Jagannātha, as the word 'paryāya' implies vākyabheda, even if the word 'dvayōḥ' is justified on the ground that it wards off defects like Lingabheda etc., the definition as it stands is too broad as it covers cases of Upamā like 'aham latāyāḥ: ......'; and at the same time, it is too narrow as it does not cover cases of Upamaṇḍopamā like 'tadvalgūṇā......'; It also covers cases of Parasparopamā. In fact, the definition can be perfect only if it mentions trtiyasadṛśavyavaccheda. The illustrations of Upameyopamā given by Jayaratha and Sobhākara are also criticized by Jagannātha.

Upameyopamā may also be suggested.

All the Upamādosas are possible in Upameyopamā also. Over and above these defects there is one defect special to Upameyopamā. The upamāpratipādaka words and the words expressive of upamāna and upameya in both the upamās constituting Upameyopamā should be of the same form. A difference in these is a defect if it pains the sahrdaya.

Upameyopamā is defined from the times of Bhāmaha. Dapājin has treated it as a division of Upamā and he calls it Anyonyopamā. Rudrāṇa
calls it Ubhayopama. Udbhata, Rudrata and Jagannatha have mentioned tritiyasadvayavaccheda in their definition of Upameyopama. Ruyyaka is the first to give the division of Upameyopama. He has based his divisions on the nature of the common property. These divisions are elaborated by Jayaratha and Jagannatha. Jagannatha considers Upameyopama as a variety of Upama. S'obhakara divides Upameyopama into Sabdi and Arthi. Appayya says that the upamana and the upameya may both be either prakrti or apakrti and he divides Upameyopama on this ground. Ruyyaka treats Upameyopama after Ananvaya. Vidyadhara treats Upameyopama after Upama.

(3) Ananvaya:

Dvitiyasadvayavacchedaphalakavaranavishayibhatan
yadekopamanoopameyakam sadrsyam tadananvayah. The sadrsnya of one and the same upamana and upameya should aim at the exclusion of a second similar entity. If one and the same object is described as upamana and upameya, but the exclusion of a second similar thing is not apprehended, the figure Ananvaya does not take place. The word 'ekopamanoopameyakam' excludes Kalpitopama. In Kalpitopama, the upamana is an imaginary object, not existing on the earth; the upameya is an object on the earth. The comparison of the upameya with a non-existing object shows that no second similar object exists on the earth; 'dvitiyasadvayavaccheda' is thus present in Kalpitopama also but the upamana and the upameya are two different things in Kalpitopama. In
Ananvaya the upamāṇa and the upameya must be one and the same. The word 'ekopamānopamayakam' thus excludes Kalpitopamā.

The common property in Ananvaya may be vācyā or vyaṅgya. In Ananvaya, the common property can not be bimbapratibimbabhāvāpanna, because bimbapratibimbabhāva has difference at its root. Ananvaya means absence of connection (similarity). If the common property in Ananvaya is bimbapratibimbabhāvāpanna, the object, characterized by one property will be connected with itself characterized by a different property. The idea of absence of connection in point of a particular property, which is the essence of Ananvaya, will be lost if the common property is bimbapratibimbabhāvāpanna.

Ananvaya may be Pūrṇa and Lupta. All the six divisions of Pūrṇopamā are possible in Pūrṇa Ananvaya. In Ekalupta Ananvaya, the following varieties are possible in Dharmalupta: (A) Srauto Vākyagah, (B) Ārtha Vākyagah, (C) Srautah Samāsagah, (D) Ārthaḥ Samāsagah, and (E) Ārthaḥ Tatāhitagah. In Vācakalupta the following varieties are possible: (A) Kyāṅgagah, (B) Samāsagatah, (C) Karmanamulagatah and (D) Karṇamulagatah. In Dvīlupta Ananvaya, the common property and the word expressive of Ananvaya may be lupta. In Trilupta Ananvaya, the vācaka, common property and upamāṇa may be lupta. Varieties like Upamāṇalupta are practically impossible, and even when possible, they are not charming and therefore not illustrated.
S'ebhākara has defined Ananvaya as 'tenaiva tadekadesenāvasītabhedena-vepamānataya kalpitena sadṛṣyamananvayah'. He gives three varieties of Ananvaya: (A) when an apparent similarity of the Upameya is brought out by making it the upamāna, (B) when a part of the upameya is imagined to be the upamāna, and (C) when the upameya, different by its reflections etc., is presented as the upamāna. S'ebhākara says that in all the three varieties, the absence of any other upamāna is understood.

Jagannātha refutes this on the ground that mere absence of upamāna is not enough for Ananvaya; absence of upamāna is apprehended in Kalpitopamā and in the third variety of Atisayekti also. Ananvaya is based on that sadṛṣya in which the upamāna and the upameya are one and the same, and which aims at dvitiyāsadṛṣyavyavaccheda. How can the second variety in which one part of the upameya is imagined as the upameya, and is compared to another part which is imagined as upamāna, be Ananvaya? It cannot be argued that in Ananvaya, the sadṛṣya may be characterized by the pratiyegitva of (A) the upameya, (B) a part of the upameya or (C) the reflection of the upameya, for this argument will go against the very etymological sense of the word Ananvaya. When Ananvaya means absence of connection, how can the connection i.e. sadṛṣya between the upameya and its part be called Ananvaya? Again, in Ananvaya, the upameya itself is established as upamāna and thereby the absence of any other upamāna is brought out. Here, when one part is compared to the other part, how can it be said to be incomparable? Such a comparison does show the matchlessness of the thing but that does not come under the province of Ananvaya as the thing is not upameya he
The upameya here is only a part of one thing. Jayaratha has criticized S'obhākara for his division of Ananvaya, and Jagannātha's refutation is based on Jayaratha's criticism. Alamkārasarvasvakāra also is wrong when he says that Ananvaya is suggested in 'anuharati tasyāh vamārdhan daksi-

nārdhasya'. It is already said that the sādṛśya in Ananvaya (A) should aim at the exclusion of another upamāna, (B) and should have one and the same upamāna and upameya. It is true that the absence of upamāna of the beloved is suggested in the above instance but this is not brought about by presenting the identity of the upamāna and the upameya. Absence of another upamāna is not always preceded by the apprehension of sādṛśya in which the upamāna and the upameya are identical. As already seen, matchlessness of upameya is brought out in Atisayokti and Kalpitopamā also, but it is not described by presenting the identity of the upamāna and the upameya in these two figures. So there is neither Ananvaya nor Ananvayadhvāni when the left half of the body is compared to the right half. It is interesting to note that the sentences quoted by Jagannatha from Alamkarasarvasva are found, not in Alamkarasarvasva, but in Vimarsini.

Appayya's illustration of vyāgā Ananvaya (where the pleasure felt by Vidura on Kṛṣṇa's arrival at a particular time is compared to the pleasure which will be felt when Kṛṣṇa will come again) is criticized by Jagannātha on the same grounds. This illustration can-not be defended by arguing that the types given by Sōbhākara are suggested in it. The types given by Sōbhākara are open to faults and again, Appayya has not given the varieties given by Sōbhākara in his treatment of Ananvaya.
Ananvaya is accepted as an alamkāra by Bhāma. Dandin does not treat it as a separate figure, but his Asādhāraṇopaṃa is equivalent to Ananvaya. Rudrā also treats it as a variety of Upamā and calls it Ananvajāyopaṃa. Bhāma, Udbhata, Rudra and Jagannātha have mentioned asādrśya-vivākṣa in their definitions.

(4) Asama:

Sarvathaiv-opamāniṣedhosamākhy-ilamkārah. Asama is suggested in Ananvaya, but it has its own independent charm when it is expressed. While Asama is very near to Ananvaya on one hand, it is very near to Luptopamā on the other hand. Jagannātha, therefore, distinguishes Asama from Luptopamā. In Asama, the upamāna is absolutely non-existent, while in Luptopamā the upamāna exists somewhere but its existence is not realized by the person speaking.

Mammata has cited 'dhundhulanto... as an illustration of Luptopamā. According to Sobhākara, the figure in his verse is Asama. Jagannātha believes that the non-existence of upamāna is not absolute here; the bee may not have come across anything resembling the Malati flower, but such a thing does exist somewhere. The upamānaniṣedha is not absolute here and the figure therefore is Luptopamā.
If strikingness arises from the suggestion of Asama in Ananvaya, should Ananvaya be treated as a separate figure? Jagannātha answers this question by showing a parallel instance. Upamā is suggested in figures like Dipaka and still Dipaka etc. are treated as separate alamkāras. Similar is the case here. It is true that Asama is principal when it is suggested in Ananvaya, but Ananvaya continues to be a figure even then. In figures like Paryāyokta, Dipaka, Samāsokti, Aprastutaprasāmsā (based on similarity) etc., dhvani is present as a subordinate element and still Dipaka etc. do not cease to be alamkāras. In Ananvaya, Asama is suggested principally and still Ananvaya does not cease from being an alamkāra. Again, in Ananvaya, similarity of an object with itself is expressed and its alamkāratva is based on this expression. Ananvaya therefore, deserves to be treated as a separate figure.

The ancient rhetoricians do not admit Asama as a separate figure. The illustration 'mayi tvadupamāvidhau' shows that the suggested Asama embellishes the praise of the king; it is thus an alamkāra even when it is suggested.

Asama may be suggested principally in two ways:
(A) by denying the upamāna, (B) by denying the upamā itself.

Sobhākara is the first rhetorician to define and illustrate the figure Asama. Among the later rhetoricians, only Jagannātha admits it as a figure. Jayaratha, Vidyānātha, Vis'vanātha and Appayya do not
admit this figure. As already seen, Asama expresses that which is implied in Anuvaya. It is on this ground that even the later rhetoricians do not accept it as a separate figure.

(5) Udāharaṇa:

Samānyena nirūpitaśyārthasya sukhapratipattaye tadekadesām
nirūpya tayoravavāvavāvibhāva ucyamānāḥ udāharaṇām.

The relation of avayava and avayavin between the particular statement and the general statement is expressed in Udāharaṇa by words like iva, yathā, nidarsana etc. In Arthāntaranyāsa such words are absent. The word 'ucyamānā' in the definition therefore excludes Arthāntaranyāsa. Words like iva or yathā can, by laksanā indicate the relation of avayava and avayavin.

Between the general statement and particular statement in Udāharaṇa, there is no upāma. The general statement is the sāmānya, of which the particular statement is a part. A visēsa can-not be different from the sāmānya of which it is a part; sādṛśya, which implies bheda, is not therefore possible between the general statement and the particular statement in Udāharaṇa.

When words like iva are used in this figure, the sāmānya holds a principal position and there is only one sentence. When words like
nidarsana are used, the particular statement holds a principal position
and there are two sentences. This is made clear by giving the
śabdabodha of the illustrations, according to the Grammarians and the
Naiyāyikas.

The ancients do not admit Udāharaṇa as a separate figure,
as they include it into Upamā. They say that any particular object
forming a part of the sāmānyā will bear resemblance with another particular
belonging to that sāmānyā. Thus though iva etc. may apparently convey
sāmānyaviseṣabhāva, ultimately sādṛṣṭya is conveyed in this figure. It
is thus not different from Upamā. As shown by Jagannātha, Udāharaṇa
is not admitted by the ancient rhetoricians. Sobhākara has defined
this figure and he carefully distinguishes it from Upamā. Jagannātha
follows S'obhākara in the treatment of this figure.

Jayadeva, and following him, Appayya have given Vikasvara-
a new alamkāra, which consists in the corroboration of a višeṣa by a
sāmānyā, which again is corroborated by a višeṣa. Though Jagannātha
does not write anything against this figure, the illustration of
Vikasvara, given by Appayya is criticized by him. He says that in
'ānantarānaprabhava! the figure Udāharana beautifies Arthāntaranyāsa.
This implies that Vikasvara need not be considered as a separate figure
as it represents, only a saṃkara of Arthāntaranyāsa and Udāharana.
Sādṛṣyajñānodbuddhasamskaraprāyojyam smaranam Smaranālaṃkārah.

The recollection in the figure Smarana should proceed from the impressions which are awakened by sādṛṣyajñāna. Jñāna includes anubhava and smṛti. The recollection in Smarana may arise not only from sādṛṣaṃubhava but also from sādṛṣasmṛti. The word 'sādṛṣyajñānodbuddhasamskaraprāyojyam' in this definition has widened the field of this figure. In 'ekibhavat....', the recollection of bed and sleep does not arise directly from sādṛṣya, from a sight of the army, the impressions are stirred up, and the recollection of the ocean took place. As the bed consisting of the body of the serpent and the sleep are connected with the ocean, their recollection also can be said to be based on sādṛṣyadarsana. In order to cover such cases, the word 'prāyojya' is used in the definition instead of 'janya'.

Some rhetoricians, however, restrict the field of this figure. The thing recollected should bear comparison with the object perceived according to them. Thus according to them, the figure Smarana occurs only when the ocean is recollected at the sight of the army. They hold that the recollection of the bed and sleep will be out of the province of the figure Smarana as they do not bear resemblance to the army which is perceived.
What is the difference between the figure Smarana and Smarana, which is also a bhāva? In the figure Smarana, the recollection results from the perception of a similar object. If the recollection is a result of any other cause, and if it is suggested, it is a bhāva. If the recollection is not based on śādṛṣya, and is not suggested, it is neither a figure nor a bhāva but a vastu.

Appayya has defined Smarana as follows:

\[
\text{Smr.} \text{tih śādṛṣyamūlā yā vastvantarasamāśrayā} \\
\text{Smaranālāṃkṛtih sā syādavyāṅgyatvaviseṣitā.}
\]

He says that the word "vastvantarasamāśrayā" is significant, for it covers not only the recollection of objects bearing śādṛṣya but also the recollection of objects not bearing similarity with the object perceived. The word "avyāṅgyatvaviseṣitā" excludes samītī when it is suggested and when it is alamkārya.

Jagannātha criticizes this definition. The word "vastvantarasamāśrayā" in the definition serves no purpose as the word "śādṛṣyamūlā" is enough to bring out the sense intended by Appayya. It will cover all cases of recollection of objects, similar or dissimilar to the object perceived. It is not a rule that a figure should always be avyāṅgya. Alamkāratva bears contradiction with vyāṅgyatva only when the suggested sense is principal; if Appayya wants to keep away pradhānavyāṅgyatva from his definition, he should have introduced
upakārakatvā. In 'saumitre amu....' the smṛti is not alaṃkārya as supposed by Appayya; it is an alaṃkāra as it embellishes viṃpralambhaḥāragāra which is alaṃkārya. Nāgasa défends Appayya and says that smṛti is principal and alaṃkārya here.

According to Ruyyaka and Sobhākara, smṛti in Smarana is based on sadrāṃubhava, but this is not correct, as it will not cover recollections based on sadrāṃsmṛti.

After giving illustrations of Smraṇadhāvani, Jagannātha turns to the doṣas. Almost all the doṣas in Upanā are doṇas in Smarana. Sadṛṣṭya is suggested in Smarana. An expression of sadṛṣṭya will give rise to a defect in this figure.

Smarana is a figure based on Upanā. Like Upanā, the common property in Smarana also may be (A) mentionable, (B) unmentionable (if it is too well known), and (C) both mentionable and unmentionable. If the common property is not well-known, it must be mentioned. Common properties consisting of śīṣṭa words, if not mentioned, will not be easily comprehended. The common property in Smarana may be anugāmi, bimbapratibimbabhāvāpanas, upacārita or śīṣṭa.
The figure Smarana is not defined by Bhāmaha, Dandin, Udbhata and Vāmana. Rudrata defines it for the first time. His definition and illustration show that the recollection of a similar object arises only when an object is seen. Though Mammata also uses the word 'drste' in his definition, his illustrations show that the recollection is caused by the perception of similar object. Ruyyaka, Sobhakara, Vidyanātha and Visvanātha have widened the field of this figure as according to them the recollection may be based on sādarsanubhava. Jagannātha's definition makes the field of this figure still wider, as according to him, the recollection may be based on sādarsajnāna, which comprises anubhava and smṛti and again any object connected with the object which is bearing similarity to the object perceived may also be recollected.

Visvanātha mentions the view of Rāghavānanda according to whom, the recollection in this figure may arise from visadrśanubhava. Ruuyaka distinguishes the figure Smarana from the figures Anumāna, Preyas and Viṣesa. He remarks that Smarana is identical with Kavyaliṅga according to one view and Jayaratha says that this view is held by Udbhata. This shows that the ancient rhetoricians did not distinguish Smarana from other alamkāras. Like Anumāna, one object becomes the cause of knowing
another object in this figure. Like Preyas, recollection is described in this figure. Like Vīseṣa, the person perceiving one object, experiences something else in Smarāṇa and still, when some fine specialities are added, an independent charm arises, which makes Smarāṇa different from all the figures shown above. Smarāṇa thus finds a place among the figures defined by rhetoricians like Rudrāṇa and Mammata, and then it is unanimously accepted by Ruuyaka, Sobhākara and all the other rhetoricians succeeding them.

(ii) Figures where non-difference predominates:

Jagannātha does not give the principles underlying the classification of figures systematically. His treatment of Rūpaka, however, is preceded by the remark 'athābhedapradhānesu Rūpakāṃ tāvannirūpyate'. Similarity between the upamāna and the upameya is more intense and consequently non-difference predominates in the figures of this group. Rūpaka, Pariṇāma, Sasamdeha, Bhṛantimān, Ullekha, Apahnuti, Utpreksā and Atisāyokti are the figures constituting this group. This non-difference is conveyed by āropa or superimposition in the figures: Rūpaka, Pariṇāma, Sasamdeha, Bhṛantimān, Ullekha and Apahnuti. The similarity and the consequent non-difference are still more intense in the figure Utpreksā which is based on sambhāvanā or probability. The similarity and the consequent non-difference reach climax in Atisāyokti, which is based on nigarāna or introspection.
(1) Rupaka:

Upameyatāvacchedakapuraskārenopameye s'abdān̄iścīyamānamupama-
netādātmyaṁ Rupakam, Tadavopaskārakatvavisistamalamkāraḥ. The word 'upameyatāvacchedakapuraskāreṇa' is very important. In Rūpaka, the upameya (mukha) is characterized by its determining attribute (mukhatva) and the identity of the upamāna with the upameya is ascertained by words. The upameya does not lose its determining attribute here. The figures Apahnuti, Bhrantimān, Atis'ayokti and Nidarsanā are excluded by the word 'upameyatāvacchedakapuraskāreṇa.' In Apahnuti, the determining attribute of the upameya is denied; in Bhrantimān, it is obstructed; Atis'ayokti and Nidarsanā are based on sadhyavasana laksanā. In all these figures, the upameya is not characterized by its determining attribute. The word 's'abdāt' in the definition excludes volitional abheda which is the object of direct perception; the abheda should be ascertained in words. The word 'niścīyamānam' excludes the figure Utprekṣā which is based on probability. The words 'upamāna' and 'upameya' show that the āropa should be based on similarity alone and not on any other relation like the relation of cause and effect.

Śobhākara does not restrict the field of Rūpaka to the abheda based on sādṛṣya only, but extends it to abheda based on other relations also. Rūpaka according to him, is the sāmānādhikaranya of two different objects, and this sāmānādhikaranya may be based on sādṛṣya.
or on any other relation. This definition is not accepted by Jagannātha on the ground that it is applicable to Apahnuti also. Again, Sobhākara has restricted the figure Smarāṇa to recollections based on similarity alone. If the field of Rūpaka is allowed to be so wide, Sobhākara should also widen the scope of Smarāṇa and allow recollection based on any relation.

Appaya has defined Rūpaka as follows:

Bimbāviṣīṣte nirdiṣte viṣaye yadyañihunte
Uparāṇjakatāmeti viṣayī Rūpakāṃ tadā.

The viṣaya in Rūpaka should not be characterized by bimbatva according to Appaya. He says that the word 'bimbāviṣīṣte' in the definition excludes the figure Mīdarsāna which is based on bimbapratībimbabhāva. The word 'nirdiṣte' exclude Atisāyokti where the upameya is not mentioned and the word 'añihunte' excludes Apahnuti where the upameya is concealed. The word 'uparaṇjakatāmeti' shows that in Rūpaka, there is a volitional cognition identity. The word, therefore, excludes the figures Sandeha, Utpreksa, Samāsokti, Pariṇāma and Bhrāntimān because a volitional niscaya of identity is not apprehended in these figures.

This definition is not perfect according to Jagannātha. Bimbapratībimbabhāva is possible in Rūpaka, and an illustration of Rūpaka where bimbapratībimbabhāva is present, is also cited by
Jayatath in Vimarsini. If ‘nirdiṣṭe’ means that the viṣayya should be somehow expressed in words, then the definition will extend to cases like ‘sundaraṁ kamalaṁ bhāti latāyāmānadbhūtam’ where the figure is Rūpākatisayokti. If ‘nirdiṣṭe’ means that the viṣayya is presented as characterized by its determining attribute, then the word ‘anihmute’ will be useless, for, in Apahnuti, the viṣayya is denied and therefore, not characterized by its determining attribute. The word ‘uparanjakatāmeti’ is useless; it may be explained that this word signifies that the viṣayya becomes the object of tādṛṣṭyaniṣcaya and this nisīcaya is volitional, but if the viṣayya is presented as characterized by its determining attribute, then there is no possibility of Bhārāntimā, for the upameya is not presented as characterized by its determining attribute in Bhārantimā. Bhārantimā therefore, will be excluded by the word ‘nirdiṣṭe’ alone. The definition, again is applicable to Apahnuti defined in Kuvalayāṇanda. In Citramānasā, Appayya has remarked that if the word ‘avyāṅgya’ is added in the definition, the definition will apply to the figure Rūpaka. But, as already seen, the contradiction lies, not between vyaṅgyatva and alamkāratva, but between pradhānavyaṅgyatva and alamkāratva. The word ‘upaskāraka’ should be mentioned in the definition in order to exclude Pradhāna Rūpaka – vyaṅgya as well as vācyas.

Mammata has defined Rūpaka as ‘tadrūpakamabheda yaḥ upamānopameyatayoh’. But this definition is applicable to Apahnuti also. The words ‘upamāna’ and ‘upameya’, even if understood to imply
upameyatāvacchedaka and upamānatāvacchedaka, will not save the definition for even then the definition can be applied to Utprekṣā. The word 'abheda' in the definition therefore should be qualified by the word 'niscīyamāna'.

Rūpaka is divided into (A) Savayava, (B) Niravayava and (C) Paramparita. Savayava Rūpaka consists of a group of Rūpakas which are inter-related among themselves. Though the Rūpakas here are inter-related, the poet intends to present one Rūpaka as principal and therefore samarthya. There are one or two subordinate Rūpakas. The relation between these and the principal Rūpaka is aṅgāṅgibhāva.

Savayava Rūpaka is divided into (a) Samastavastuvisaya and (b) Ekadesāvivarti. In Samastavastuvisaya, all the Rūpakas are mentioned in words. In Ekadesāvivarti, the visayī is mentioned in some parts, in the avayavarūpaka; in other parts, it is implied by the force of sense. Ekadesāvivarti is so called because it exists in a different manner, i.e. by concealing its form, in the Avayavarūpaka, where the visayī is not mentioned; or it is so called because it exists specifically in one part - i.e. in that part where the visayī is mentioned in words. If the samarthya Rūpaka is vidheya, the whole Savayava Rūpaka is vidheya and if the Samarthya Rūpaka is anuvādyā the whole Savayava Rūpaka is anuvādyā.

In Ekadesāvivarti Rūpaka, either the Samarthya Rūpaka or the Samarthaka Rūpaka may be implied.
Though a group of Rūpakas is common to Savayava Rūpaka and Mālarūpaka, the two are to be distinguished. In Mālarūpaka, though there are many viśayīs, the viśaya is only one. Again the different Rūpakas in Mālarūpaka are independent of each other. In Savayava Rūpaka, there are many viśayās, and the different Rūpakas are inter-connected.

Niravayava Rūpaka does not consist of a mixture of inter-related Rūpakas. It is divided into (a) Kevala and (b) Mālarūpa. In Kevala, there is only one Rūpaka; in Mālā, many objects are superimposed on one viśaya.

In Paramparita Rūpaka one superimposition is the cause of another superimposition. When the Rūpaka which is the cause, is based on śleṣa, the Rūpaka is called Śliṣṭa Paramparita; when it is not based on śleṣa, the Rūpaka is known as Sūḍha Paramparita. Both these varieties are again subdivided into Kevala and Mālarūpā. The following table shows the classification of Rūpaka:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rūpaka</th>
<th>Savayava</th>
<th>Niravayava</th>
<th>Paramparita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samastavastu-viśaya</td>
<td>Ekadesavarti</td>
<td>Kevala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kevala</td>
<td>Mālar</td>
<td>Kevala</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sāvayava Rūpaka is similar to Paramparita Rūpaka, because one Rūpaka gives rise to another in both these varieties. The two are however, different as in Sāvayava Rūpaka, the Avayavirūpaka is complete even without the Avayavārūpaka as the sādṛṣya here proceeds from poetic convention. In Paramparita, the superimposition in the Kāryarūpaka is not possible without the Kāraṇarūpaka, as the sādṛṣya between the visaya and visayi (in the Kāryarūpaka) is not wellknown. Some rhetorician has said that the Sāvayava Rūpaka consists of many Rūpakas while the Paramparita consists of only two Rūpakas.

How does one superimposition in Śliṣṭa Paramparita Rūpaka become the cause of another superimposition? By Ślesa we can establish only the abheda of two objects but not āropa, as āropa requires that the visaya and the visayi should be mentioned separately. Abheda and āropa are not identical. In the first variety of Atisāyokyti abheda is present though the āropa is not present. By yatstambhandhini yatstambhyabhedastasminstabdabhedaḥ, the abheda in the Kāraṇarūpaka may cause the abheda in Kāryarūpaka, but not the āropa. Ślesa can establish only the abheda in the Kāraṇarūpaka. This difficulty is solved by Jagannātha. He says that when by the force of Ślesa, abheda is established, we should mentally imagine the superimposition of the visayi on the visaya.

In Śaṃśagata(Suddha) Paramparita Rūpaka, we may feel some inconsistency. In 'saujanyaṣandrikācandro rājā', for instance, the
word saujanya is a višeṣaṇa, qualifying the word candrika, which is višeṣya. The relation between the two words is abheda. So we understand the abheda of saujanya in candrika. By 'yatsam-bandhini.....' we understand the abheda of rājā in candra. The poet, however intends the superimposition of candra on rājā, which can be brought about only by establishing the abheda of candrika in saujanya. How will the Kāraṇarūpaka bring about the superimposition in the Kāryarūpaka in Samāsagatā? Sūddha Paramparita Rūpaka? Jagannātha solves this difficulty. He says that the višeṣaṇa is always related to the višeṣya by abheda. Sometimes, in the abheda, the pratiyogī (candrika) may be presented as višeṣaṇa, and sometimes the anuyogī (saujanaya) may be presented as višeṣaṇa. In both these cases, the abheda of the pratiyogī in the anuyogī is to be understood. It is not a rule that the pratiyogī should always be presented first. Even when saujanya becomes the višeṣaṇa of candrika, the abheda of 'candrika' in 'saujanya is to be understood. This will bring about the abheda of candra in rājā. If the anuyogī is presented first, the Rūpaka is vidheya; if the pratiyogī is presented first, the Rūpaka is anuvādyā.

In Paramparita Rūpakās the viśayás in the constituent Rūpakās may be favourable or unfavourable to each other; similarly the two viśayás may also be favourable or unfavourable to each other. This however, does not have any effect on the anugrahy-anugraha-kabāva of the constituent Rūpakās.
All these are the divisions of Padārtharūpaka. Jagannātha admits Vākyartharūpaka also. In Vākyartharūpaka, Rūpaka between the padārthas forming the vākyartha is implied. This shows that bimbapratibimbabhāva in Rūpaka is possible and Appayya is wrong when he does not admit it.

In discussing the sādabdabodha, Jagannātha first mentions the sādabdabodha according to the ancients. The Sādabdabodha according to the ancients in mukham candrāḥ is candravṛttigunavādabhinnammukham. The word candrā indicates by saropa laksanā candravṛttigunavat. This is a visesana to the visaya - mukham and is connected with it by abheda. This sādabdabodha is identical with the sādabdabodha in Upamā in the expression candrasadṛśam mukham. Though this bodha is conveyed by abhidhā in Upamā and by laksanā in Rūpaka, it may be argued that as the sādabdabodhas do not differ, the two expressions do not give rise to different charms and Rūpaka therefore, is not different from Upamā. But this argument is not correct. The abheda in Rūpaka is experienced after the operation of laksanā - it comes as a prayojana of this laksanā. In Rūpaka the abheda is thus conveyed by vyanjana, and in Upamā by abhidhā. This cognition abheda is not sublated as the knowledge conveyed by vyanjana cannot be sublated by any contradictory cognition.

The later rhetoricians believe that abheda is the relation between mukha and candra and when we can establish abheda in this manner,
It is not necessary to resort to lakṣaṇā. Following are the reasons given by Jagannātha for rejecting lakṣaṇā. (1) If lakṣaṇā is accepted in Rūpaka, then the uttarapada in the compound mukhacandra will indicate, by lakṣaṇā, the sense 'candrasadṛśa'. Mukhacandra is a visesānamasāsa in Rūpaka. When mukhacandra is an instance of upamitasamāsa (i.e. in Upanā) the word 'candra' indicates 'candrasadṛśa'. How can the two compounds and consequently Rūpakā and Upanā be distinguished if lakṣaṇā is common in both the compounds? (2) In expressions like 'mukham na candrasadṛśam api tu candra', the word 'candra' indicates 'candrasadṛśa'. The s'abdabodha in such expressions will be absurd. (3) In Devadattamukham candra eva, Yajñadattamukham tu na tatha api tu candrasadṛśam also the same absurdity will arise as the s'abdabodha takes the form 'Yajñadattamukham na candrasadṛśam, api tu candrasadṛśam.' (4) Lakṣaṇā gives the abheda characterized by the common property only. It yields the sense that mukha and candra are identical so far as their common properties are concerned. The knowledge of this abheda can-not give rise to the knowledge of abheda characterized by special properties. Mukha and candra may be related by abheda in point of common properties but they are distinct in points of properties which are special to them. These absurdities can be removed if the view of the later rhetoricians is accepted. When the abheda of mukha and candra is accepted, the abheda of special properties is to be accepted as a consequence. From the refutation of the ancient view, it is clear that Jagannātha accepts the view of the later rhetoricians.
In 'gambhiryena samudrohayam saundaryena ca manmathah' the instrumental case in gambhiryena is related to sadrdya, which is a part of the indicated (laksya) sense of the word 'samudra' by prayojyata or abheda. The s'abdabodha, therefore, takes the form 'gambhiryaprayojyasamudrasadrdyahabhinna'. The s'abdabodha, according to the later rhetoricians, has the form 'gambhiryadiprayojyasamudraahabhinna'.

The abheda is only a relation and not the sense conveyed by lakṣaṇā. The common property is prayojaka here, because the poet has mentally identified the king with the ocean on the basis of the common property.

Or the instrumental sense may be taken to convey the sense 'jñānajanyajñānapraṇātā, by lakṣaṇa, and the s'abdabodha then takes the form, 'gambhiryajñānajanyajñānapraṇātasamudrabhinnah (ayam)'.

When the visaya and the visayi are expressed by words in the same case, the abheda does not form the sense of any word; it is only a relation. When however, the visaya and the visayi are expressed by words in different cases, abheda forms the sense of a word. It may come as vīsesaṇa or vīsesya.

The common property in Rūpaka may be amuğāmi, bimbapratibimbabhāvapanna, upacarita, or Kevala'sabdātmaka. It may be mentioned or suggested. Sometimes two visayīs may be superimposed on one visaya by one word; the cause of such superimposition is always some sliṣṭā word.

Rūpaka may be suggested by S'abdāsakti or arthasakti.
Anandavardhana has cited 'praptasrīh' as an illustration of Rūpakadhvani. The abhedaniscaya here is not volitional according to Jagannātha because the ocean experiences kampa. Again, the bheda is known only to the poet and not to the ocean; the strikingness, therefore, arises out of delusion experienced by the ocean. The verse therefore contains Bhrāntimaddhvani according to Jagannātha.

Anything that mars the beauty of Rūpaka by violating poetic convention is a defect. If in spite of doṣas like lingabheda, the strikingness of Rūpaka is not marred and if the poetic convention is not violated, the doṣas cease to be doṣas.

Rūpaka is one of the four slāmkāras treated by Bharata who defines it as follows:

Nāṇādravyānuṣaṅgādyairyaśaupamyāṃ guṇās'rayam
Rūpanirvarṇanāyuktam tadrūpakaniti sārtam
Svavikalpairviracitaṃ tulyāvyayavalakṣānam
Kīṃcitsādṛśyasampannam yadrūpam Rūpakam tu tat.

Bhāmaha gives only two varieties of Rūpaka: (A) Samastavastuvīṣaya and (B) Ekaḍesāvivartī. Daṇḍin gives many varieties of Rūpaka like Samastarūpaka, Vyastarūpaka etc. Udbhāta defines Rūpaka as

Srutya sambandhavirahādyatpadena padāntaram
Gunāvṛtti pradhānena yuṣyate Rūpakam tu tat.
The words 'gunavṛtti' and 'pradhanena' are important here because the later rhetoricians have fully brought out the implications of these words in their treatment of Rūpaka. Udbhāta gives four varieties of this figure; (A) Samastavastuviṣaya, (B) Ekadesāvivarti, (C) Samastavastuviṣaya Mālā Rūpaka and (D) Ekadesāvṛtti. Vāmana does not give the divisions of Rūpaka. Rudrata divides Rūpaka into Vākyagata and Samāsagata. Both these varieties are subdivided into Sāvayava, Niravayava and Samākīrṇa, and into Samastavisaya and Ekadesi. Sāvayava is divided into Sahaja, Āhārya and Udbhaya and Niravayava is divided into Suddha, Āhāra, Raśanā and Paramparita. Rudrata is followed to a certain extent by the rhetoricians succeeding him. Jagannātha follows Māmata in his treatment and divisions of Rūpaka. Ruyyaka, Vidyānātha, Visvanātha and Appayya also follow Māmata. Ruyyaka, and following him, Jayaratha say that the divisions of Rūpaka are not exclusive. Thus the two varieties of Sāvayava Rūpaka may also be Śiṃśa; and Paramparita may also be Ekadesāvivarti. Aropa, based on any relation, gives rise to the figure Rūpaka according to Śobhākara. His view however, is not accepted by Jagannātha (yochrūkhā punarāropamātram Rūpakam vadantaḥ .....). Visvanātha agrees with Jayaratha. Ruyyaka and most of the later rhetoricians accept Vākyārtharūpaka and Rūpaka based on vaidharmya. Visvanātha gives Adhikārūḍhavaisiṣṭya Rūpaka, where the excellence of the upameya is carried to the highest pitch. Appayya divides Rūpaka into (A) Abhedarūpaka and (B) Tādṛūpyarūpaka (in Kuvalayānanda.) Both these varieties are further divided when (a) an additional quality of the viśayi is mentioned, (b) when the quality in which the viśayi is deficient is mentioned and (c) when neither is mentioned.
In Parinama, the visayi serves the purposes in hand, when it is identified with the visaya. Two conditions are essential for the figure Parinama: (1) the visayi should be identified with the visaya and (2) when this is identified, the vasayi should serve the matter in hand. Parinama is two-fold: (1) when the visaya and visayi are expressed by words in the same case and (2) when they are expressed by words in different cases; the first variety may be (a) Vakyaga and (b) Samasaga. Avayavavyavibhava is also possible in the figure Parinama.

Appayya has cited 'taranayakas ekharaya...,' and 'dvirbhavah puspaketaoh...,' as illustrations of Parinama. These can't be the illustrations of Parinama according to Jagannatha because the visayi serves the purpose by itself, and not when it is identical with the visaya. Lord Siva is described as a lover; the visayi—s'ekhara—brings out the gallantry of Siva by itself and not when it is identified with the river. Similar is the case with 'drst' tilakine.' The figure therefore, in this instance, is Rupaka. Though the first condition, identification of the visayi with the visaya is fulfilled, the second condition is not fulfilled here as s'ekhara, tilaka do not serve the matter in hand when they are identified with the visyaas—river and eyes—respectively.
Commenting on this criticism, Nagesa says that 'tārānāyaka' was illustrated in Parināma but it was cited as an instance of Rūpaka. It was preceded by the remark 'idam vaiyadhikaraṇṇam Rūpakēpi dṛṣṭaṁ.' In 'nādyā sekhariṇe' the figure is not Rūpaka as the viṣayī is not the pratiyogī. The words 'Nārāyaṇenāsriṇe' show that the description of Lord Siva as a lover is not the matter in hand. The matter in hand is a salutation to Lord Siva. All the viśeṣaṇas in the verse bring out the excellence of the Lord. The Sēkhara, when identified with the river brings out the excellence of the Lord and serves the matter in hand. The figure therefore, is Parināma.

Ruyyaka has defined Parināma as 'aropyamāṇasya prakṛtopayogitve Parināmāh'. By Prakṛtopayoga he cannot mean that the viṣayī should serve the purpose of the viṣaya because Ruyyaka's illustration does not bring out this characteristic. If by prakṛtopayoga he means that the viṣayī serves the purpose in hand when identified with the viṣaya, then the illustration 'atha paktrimatāmpetyadbhih' is not consistent, for the viṣayī - gift - serves the matter in hand by itself and not when it is identical with the viṣaya - words. On the contrary the viṣaya, words, serve the purpose in hand when identified with the viṣayī - gift. 'Atha paktrimatā' therefore, is an illustration of Vyadhikaraṇa Rūpaka. Nāgeda defends Ruyyaka. He says that the meeting with the king is the matter in hand. The gift for a king must have some speciality and the speciality lies in the fact that the gift consisted of speech. The gift (viṣaya) thus serves the purpose when it is identified with the speech (viṣaya).
Ruyyaka therefore is justified according to Nāgasa in citing this verse as an illustration of Pariṇāma.

It must be said that Ruyyaka is not very clear when he explains the figure Pariṇāma. The words 'Parināme tu prakṣātmatayāropamāṇasyopayogah' show that the viṣayī should be identified with the viṣaya, while the words 'Prakṣātmaropyamāṇataya pariṇamatati' show that the viṣaya should be identified with the viṣayī. Thus there is some inconsistency in Ruyyaka's treatment. Jagannātha is very clear about the figure and is therefore, justified when he criticizes Ruyyaka.

Some rhetoricians deny Pariṇāma as an independent figure. They believe that abheda has two facets: (1) sometimes the viṣaya is identified with the viṣayī and serves the matter in hand. (2) Sometimes the viṣayī is identified with the viṣaya and serves the matter in hand, when thus identified. But these are only two different forms of abheda; Pariṇāma, therefore, should not be treated as distinct from Rūpaka, as it consists only of a different form of expression. Though Ruyyaka admitted Pariṇāma as a separate figure, he did not distinguish between these two forms and hence some inconsistency can be noticed in his vṛtti. The later rhetoricians, however, have emphasized the form - the abheda of viṣayī in viṣaya - and hence their treatment is more clear.

In 'Harinavatamālas' the sābdabodha shows that tamāla is identical with Hari; i.e. Hari is the pratiyogī of abheda and tamāla is
anuyogī. In 'ahinacandrā lasatananena' (Vyadhikaraṇa Parināma), abheda is the sense conveyed by the instrumental case; so the sādābodha takes the form 'lasadanānabhinnahīnetaacandravyuktā'.

Appayya has criticized Vidyādhara for his illustration of Parināmadvani. Jagannātha defends Vidyādhara and shows that Appayya is wrong in criticizing Vidyādhara. Nāgēśa, however, justifies Appayya's criticism.

According to Jagannātha, both the identification of the viṣayī with the viṣaya and the prakṛto-paryoga of the viṣayī should be suggested when the figure Parināma is vyānāya. Jagannātha rejects Appayya's illustration of vyānāya Parināma, as only prakṛto-paryoga is suggested there, while the identification of the viṣayī with the viṣaya is vacya. Parināmadhvani should not be confused with Atisayokti. In Atisayokti the viṣaya is identical with the viṣayī, while in Parināma, the viṣayī is identified with the viṣaya. Parināma may be suggested by arthasākti and sabdāsakti.

Līṅgabheda etc. are doṣas in Parināma.

The ancient rhetoricians have not defined Parināma. Ruyyaka is the first to define Parināma and all the succeeding rhetoricians have admitted it. All these rhetoricians agree about prakṛto-paryoga in Parināma.
but difference of views is seen on the other conditions of Parināma. Some inconsistency has crept in Ruyyaka's treatment of Parināma because of his failure in distinguishing the two forms of abheda. S'obhākara, Jayaratha and Vidyādhara believe that the prakṛta is identified with the aprakṛta in Parināma. Vidyānātha, Visvanātha, Appayya and Jagannātha believe that the visayi is identified with the viṣaya in Parināma. Jagannātha is very clear in the treatment of this figure and the sābdabodha given by him very clearly shows that the pratiyogitva of abheda here belongs to the viṣaya.

(3) Sasamdeha:

Sādṛṣyamūla bhasamanavirodhaka samabala nānakoṭyavagāhini dhīramaniya sasamdehālāṃkritih.

The figure Sasamdeha is based on similarity; the knowledge of similarity is a fault here as it gives rise to the doubt. The word 'bhasamanavirodhaka' excludes Mālārūpaka. If this word is removed, the definition is applicable to Mālārūpaka. In Mālārūpaka all the viṣayīs are equal. In Sasamdeha, however, there is some incompatibility in all the attributes. The word 'samabala' excludes Utprekṣā. The alternative which is predicated is more powerful in Utprekṣā. In Sasamdeha, however, all the alternatives are equally powerful. Though the adjectives 'bhasamanavirodhaka' and Samabala imply that the alternatives should be many, the word 'nānā' makes this point more clear. The word 'ramaniya' excludes ordinary doubts.
Sasamdeha is divided into (A) Suddha, (B) Niscayagarbha and (C) Niscayanta. In Suddha, the doubt continues to the end. In Niscayagarbha, characteristics belonging to the upamanas are mentioned. In Niscayanta, a characteristic belonging to the upameya is mentioned. Sasamdeha is based on āropā. Jayaratha admits Sasamdeha based on adhyavasāna. Jagannātha, however, does not admit Sasamdeha based on adhyavasāna. Cases suitable for āropā are required when the āropā is expressed in words. Suggested āropā does not require cases. The instance cited by Jayaratha as based on adhyavasāna, is based on suggested āropā according to Jagannātha.

'Asyāḥ sargavidhau.....' cannot be illustration of Sasamdeha according to Appayya, since the attribute is only one — the creatorship of the nymph. In Sasamdeha, many attributes are doubted, so the definition of Sasamdeha can not be applied in this instance. Jagannātha says that the dharmī here is only one — (Prajāpati); candratva, Madantva etc., are the attributes doubted about the dharmī. The verse therefore, can be cited as an illustration of Sasamdeha. Appayya's illustration of Sasamdehadhvani is also criticized by Jagannātha.

Sasamdeha may be vācya, lakṣya or vyāhyga. The different alternatives may have only one common property or different common properties. The common property may be anugāmi or bimbapratibimbabhāvāpanna. It may be mentioned or may not be mentioned.
The doubt in Sasamdeha is mostly real when the poet describes it to be felt by some character depicted by him. This may also be volitional in some cases. When the doubt is described by the poet himself, it is volitional. It must be said that Jagannātha unnecessarily divides the sāṃśaya into real and volitional. The doubt is described by the poet in both the cases and therefore should be considered to be volitional in the whole field of Sasamdeha.

Sasamdeha may also be Paramparita.

Sasamdeha is admitted by all the rhetoricians. Bhāmaṇa defines Sasamdeha as follows:

\[
\text{Upamānena tattvam ca bhedaḥ ca vedataḥ punaḥ}
\]
\[
\text{Sasamdeham vacaḥ stutyai Sasamdeham viduryathā.}
\]

He does not classify it, but his illustration contains Suddha Sasamdeha. Dāndin does not mention Sasamdeha as a separate figure, but treats it as a variety of Upamā and calls it Sāṃśayopamā. Udbhāta mentions two varieties of Sasamdeha which correspond to the Niscayagarbha and Suddha of the later rhetoricians. Vāmana does not give the divisions. His illustration also contains Suddha Sasamdeha. Rudraṭa gives the three varieties of Sasamdeha which are given by the writers succeeding him. Kammata gives two divisions of Sasamdeha: (A) when the difference is mentioned and (B) when the difference is not mentioned. The first kind is divided into Niscayagarbha and Niscayānta. Ruuyaka gives three
varieties of this figure. He says that the viṣayīs in Saṃdeha may be 

bhinnaśrya. He says that some admit Saṃdeha based on adhyavasāna in

this type but he does not seem to approve it. Sobhākara admits Saṃdeha 
based on adhyavasāna. He holds that any doubt, arising from similarity or 
causes other than similarity, constitutes the figure Saṃdeha if it is a 
result of poetic imagination. Jayaratha believes that Ruyyaka accepts 
Saṃdeha based on adhyavasāna. He approves Saṃdeha based adhyavasāna 
and divides it into three varieties: when the (1) svarūpa, (2) hetu and 
(3) phala are doubted.

Ruyyaka, Sobhākara, Visvanātha and Appayya call the figure 

Saṃdeha. Vidyānātha, Visvanātha, Appayya and Jagannātha admit the 
three varieties given by Kammata.

(4) Bhrāntimān:

Sadṛṣe dharmiṇi tādātyena dharmyantarā-prakārakonāharyo 
niscayāh sadṛṣa-prayojyascamatāri prakṛte Bhrāntik, Sa ca paśupakaśadigati 
yasminvāksandarbhe anūdyate ca Bhrāntimān. In Bhrāntimān, there is a 
definite comprehension of the identity of (an aprakṛta) dharma in the 
prakṛta dharma. This comprehension should be based on similarity. It 
should be honest or real and striking. The bhrānti itself constitutes 
the figure; it is only upacāra that the figure is called Bhrāntimān. The 
bhrānti should be described as felt by beasts, birds etc.
The word dharmi is used twice in the definition. It excludes the figures Mūlita, Sāmānya and Tadgūna, as one dharma is apprehended in another dharma in these figures. The word anāhāryaḥ excludes Rūpaka as the comprehension in Rūpaka is volitional. Again, in Bhrāntimāṇ, the identity is comprehended by anybody other than the poet, while in Rūpaka, it is comprehended by the poet himself. The word pasupaksyādīgataḥ also excludes the figure Rūpaka. The word niscayaḥ excludes the figure Sasamdeha, as the figure Sasamdeha is based on doubt. The word camatkārī shows that the bhrānti here should be a result of poetic imagination. Cases of mistaken identity based on similarity in daily life cannot give rise to this figure as they are lacking in charm. The word sādṛṣyaprayojyaḥ is significant, as it excludes errors arising from causes other than sādṛṣya. The singular number (sā) in the definition is significant, as it excludes the figure Ullekha, where different perceivers perceive an object to be possessed of different characters and where there is a series of perceptions.

Appayya has defined Bhrāntimāṇ as follows:

Kavisammataḥ sādṛṣyaḥ visaye pihatātmani
Āropyamānubhavo yatra sa bhrāntimāṇaḥ.

Appayya has used the word pihatātmani in order to exclude Rūpaka. Jagannātha holds that this word is not necessary as Rūpaka, is excluded even in the absence of this word. In Rūpaka, the experience of the identity of the visañja is not described; the experience arises from the
description of the visayi. Bhranti however, is an experience. The word aropyaamananubhava excludes Rupaka. It can not be argued that bhranti is defined in the verse upto the word aropyaamananubhavah, and in order to exclude Rupaka from the definition of Bhranti, the word pihatatmani is used. Bhranti is an established experience while the experience of identity is in process in Rupaka. Thus the word pihatatmani is not at all necessary. If somehow the word Rupaka is understood in the sense of the cognition of abheda and the word pihatatmani justified, then also, the definition is applicable to Sasamdeha and Ullekha, where the upameya with its determining attribute is not referred to. The illustration cited by Appayya for delusion experienced by different persons, is severely criticized by Jagannatha, as it contains expressions which are not allowed by poetic conventions and grammar.

Ruyyaka has defined Bhrantiman as 'sadrsyadvastvantarapratiti'. This definition is criticized by Jagannatha, as it is applicable to the figures Samsaya and Utpreksa. If the word pratiti means niscaya, the definition is applicable to Rupaka also. If niscaya is qualified as not presenting the determining attribute of the upameya then also the definition is applicable to Atissayokti. The 'niscaya' should be qualified by the word real (anahirya).
The common property in this figure may be (1) anugāmi (2) bimbapratibimbabhāvepanne and (3) sūdha sāmānyarūpa. The ancient rhetoricians Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhata and Vamana do not define this figure. Daṇḍin's Mohopama however, corresponds to the figure Bhrāntimān. Rudraṭa is the first to define the figure Bhrāntimān. He defines it as follows:

Arthavis'ēsaṃ pasyannavacchedanyameva taṭsadṛṣam
Nisamdeham yaśminpratipattā Bhrāntimān sa iti.

Mammata, Ruyyaka and all the other rhetoricians have admitted this figure. S'obhākara has widened the scope of this figure as he allows bhrānti based on similarity together with bhrānti based on causes other than similarity. He believes that the bhrānti in this figure is based on adhyāvasāna. Jayarātha does not admit bhrānti based on causes other than similarity; he, however, agrees with S'obhākara and says that the bhrāma is based on adhyāvasāna. Appayya and Viśvanātha do not allow error not arising from similarity, in this figure.

(5) Ullekhā:

Ekasya vastuno nimittavas'ādyadaneśapprahitābhiranekāpapramānaṃ
grahanāṃ tadullekhaḥ.
In Ullekha, an object is perceived as having different characteristics by many perceivers due to some reason. The words 'ekasya vastunah' exclude Bhrañti. The words 'anekañh grahitṛbhīh' exclude Nālārupaka, where the objects are not perceived by many perceivers. The plural number in 'anekañh grahitṛbhīh' is not significant. Thus the figure Ullekha takes place even when there are only two perceivers. The word grahanām represents the class. Thus there should be two or more perceptions. Ullekha may be Suddha and Samkīrṇa (mixed with other figures). Ullekha has three varieties (A) Svarupollekha where the svarūpa is represented to be different (B) Hēulllekha where the cause is represented to be different and (C) Phalollekha where the fruit is represented to be different.

Jagannātha gives another variety of Ullekha, in which a thing is described as having different characteristics on account of the difference of objects, āśraya co-existents etc. This variety may also be Suddha and Samkīrṇa.

The two varieties of Ullekha are distinct. In the first variety, strikingness arises from the different cognitions of different perceivers. In the second variety, although the different apprehensions are present, they do not give rise to strikingness. The strikingness arises from the characteristics which differ owing to the difference of objects, āśraya etc.
When these varieties of Ullekha are suggested, they give rise to Ullekhadhvani.

Ullekha is not defined by the ancient rhetoricians. Ruyyaka is the first to define it. He defines it as 'ekasyāpi nimittava-śādanakadhā grahaṇam' and gives two varieties of Ullekha. Jagannātha follows him in the treatment of Ullekha. The divisions of the first variety into Svarūpa, Phala and Hetu are not given by Ruyyaka. They are given by Jayaratha and accepted by Jagannātha. Ruyyaka carefully distinguishes Ullekha from other alamkāras and established its independent existence. Ullekha is accepted as an independent figure by all the rhetoricians succeeding Ruyyaka.

(6) Apahnuti:

Upameyatavacchedakaniṣedhasāmānādhi karanyenaropyamānapamāma-tādatmyamapahnutiḥ.

In Apahnuti, the denial of the determining attribute of
and this characteristic makes Apahnuti distinct from Rūpaka.

Apahnuti is divided into Savayāvā and Niravayāvā. In Savayāvā the subordinate Apahnuti and the principal Aphnuti are inter-related, adding beauty mutually. In Niravayāvā there is only one Apahnuti.

The denial of the upameya is direct when it is expressed by some negative particle. It is indirect when it is conveyed by putting forward the views of others, which implies that others believe the upameya to be the upameya, but I do not believe so. In these two cases, Apahnuti is expressed by vākyabhedā, i.e. in two different sentences. The denial may also be conveyed by words like misa, chhala, kapata etc; Apahnuti in such instances is expressed in one and the same sentence.

Apahnuti may be expressed in many ways. The denial of the determining attribute of the upameya may precede the establishment of the Upamāna; the establishment may precede the denial; either of the denial and the establishment may be expressed in words and the other may be implied; both these may be expressed in words or both may be implied by the force of sense; both these may be predicated (vidheya) or known – anuvādyā. These varieties are not striking and therefore do not deserve any importance.
The word "āropyamāṇa" here signifies that the comprehension of the identity of the upamāṇa is volitional here. Apahnuti can-not take place if the denial and the establishment are genuine. This distinguishes Apahnuti from the figures Bhrāntimāṇ and Sasamdeha. In Apahnuti the denial of the upameya and the establishment of the identity of upamāṇa should always go together.

Appayya defines Paryastāpahnuti (a variety of Apahnuti) in Kuvalayānanda as 'anyatra tasyāropārthāḥ Paryastāpahnutistu sā'.

Jagannātha does not admit Paryastāpahnuti, as the definitions of Apahnuti, given by Mammata, Ruyyaka and by Appayya himself (in Citramāṁsā) are not applicable to it. 'Nayam sudhāmsuh kim tarhi sudhāmsuh preyāśimukham', which is cited by Appayya as an illustration of Paryastāpahnuti is an illustration of Drdharopa Rūpaka according to Jagannātha, as the upameya and the upamāṇa are mentioned together. Similar cases are considered to be instances of Drdharopa Rūpaka, by Jayaratha also. If it is argued that Paryastāpahnuti is treated as a variety of Apahnuti according to the definition given by S'obhākara then Apahnuti should be treated as a variety of Rūpaka because a volitional, definite comprehension of the identity of upamāṇa is common to both. Again, the definition of Rūpaka, given in Citramāṁsā is applicable to 'nayam sudhāmsuh...'. 
Nages'a defends Appayya here. He says that 'nedam mukhaṃ candraḥ' which is a well-known illustration of Apahnuti, can be said to be an instance where the denial of the face strengthens the superimposition of the moon; it can thus be treated as an instance of Drḍhāropa Rūpaka. If Apahnuti is treated as an independent figure on the ground that the superimposition of the upamāṇa gives rise to a special strikingness when it is preceded by the denial of upameya, then Paryastāpahnuti should be treated as a variety of Apahnuti as the superimposition (of the upameya) is preceded by a denial of the upamāṇa and it gives Paryastāpahnuti a special charm.

In Apahnuti, the āropas may be connected by avayavāyayavibhāva. Apahnuti can be Paramparitā when one āropa causes another āropa.

Both the denial of the upameya and the superimposition of the upamāṇa should be suggested in Apahnutidhvani.

The verse 'tvadālekhya' is cited by Appayya as an illustration of Apahnutidhvani. Jagannātha does not accept this illustration because only superimposition of the upamāṇa is suggested here; by the painting of disc and suparṣa, the denial of the upameya is not suggested in the second line. In the third line, though both the denial of Lord Viṣṇu and the superimposition of 6upid are suggested, Viṣṇu is not prakṛta here, as the prakṛta is always
the upameya according to Appayya's own definition and the definition given by Mammaṭa. The prakṛta in the present verse is the king and not Lord Viṣṇu.

Nāgeseṇa once again defends Appayya. He says that Appayya has quoted Dandin's definition (Apahnuti ṛapahnutiya kiṃcidanyārthasūcanam) and then cited 'tvadālekhyē' as an illustration of Apahnutidhvani, in the light of this definition. According to this definition, something is denied and another thing is established in Apahnuti; thus this definition does not require the denial of the upameya. Kāvyaprakāśa also is not contradicted in this definition.

It must be said that Nāgeseṇa's arguments here are not convincing. The illustration 'tvadālekhyē' is cited after quoting Dandin. Dandin's view, therefore, has nothing to do with the illustration of Apahnutidhvani cited by Appayya. Appayya's illustration, therefore, should not be understood in the light of Dandin's definition. Mammaṭa also paraphrases the word prakṛta in his definition by upameya and anyat by upamāṇa which shows that he admits Apahnuti based on similarity. 'Tvadālekhyē' can-not be an instance of Apahnutidhvani according to Mammaṭa also.

Bhāmaha, Udbhata, Vāmana and Rudrata hold that Apahnuti must be based on similarity. Dandin does not restrict the field
If the view of the ancient rhetoricians is followed, then Hetupreksā and Phalotpreksā will not be distinct from Svarūpotpreksā because the kārya and the kārana will respectively be imagined to be identical with the visāya which is not mentioned. The Hetu and Phala cannot be the visayis if the ancient view is accepted and there will be no grounds for the divisions. It may be argued the three can be distinguished as in Hetūpreksā and Phālotpreksā the hetu and the phala qualify the thing fancied while in Svarūpotpreksā the thing fancied is not so qualified; but this argument is not correct, because in "tanayaināka" also the fruit-"minākagaveṣa"-qualifies the thing fancied (bhūja) though "tanayaināka" is an instance of Svarūpotpreksā. Though gavedana does not qualify the visayi directly, this fact is not sufficient for distinguishing Svarūpotpreksā from the other two Utpreksās.

When there are different visayīs, that Visayi which is predicated, becomes principal and the Utpreksā generally receives its name after this visayī. Thus, in 'bagā, Sthāti!' there is an Utpreksā of pain as existing in the anklet but it is subordinate. The principal Utpreksā consists in the fancy of the cause 'viślesaduhkha' which is predicated.
There are two kinds of common property in *Utpreksā*; (1) The common property is common by itself (2) It is not common but is made to be common by some means. These means consist of *Rūpaka, Śleṣa, Apahnuti, Bimbapratibimbabhāva, upacāra* and *abheda-dhyavasāya*. Sometimes the property which is mentioned may not be common to the viṣaya and viṣayi may not be striking, or capable of giving rise to *Utpreksā* but it may give rise to a dharma which is capable of giving rise to *Utpreksā*.

Bhāmaha defines *Utpreksā* as follows:

\[ \text{Avivakṣitasamanya' kīciccopamāyā saha} \]
\[ \text{Atadgūnakriyāyogadutpreksātis'ayānvitā.} \]

Dandin's concept of *Utpreksā* is different. He defines *Utpreksā* as follows:

\[ \text{Anyathaiva sthitā vṛttiścetanasyetarasya va} \]
\[ \text{Anyathotpreksyate yatra tāmupreksām viduryatha.} \]

*Utpreksā* should be based on similarity according to Bhāmaha, Udbhata and Vāmana. Udbhata divides *Utpreksā* into two kinds: (1) when the viṣayi is of the form of bhāva (2) when the viṣayi is of the form of abhāva. *Utpreksā* is discussed twice by Rudrata. He discusses *Utpreksā* as a figure based on *aupamya*, and gives three varieties (1) when identity is established between a well-known *upamāna* and *upameya*, and gunas etc.
belonging to the upamāṇa are superimposed on the upamēya. (2) when an object connected with upamēya is represented as identical with object connected with the upamāṇa. (3) when a non-existent similar object is superimposed on the upamēya which is qualified by certain properties, so that the fancy becomes compatible by property. Rudrata again discusses Utpreksā as a figure based on atisāya, and gives three varieties: (1) when somebody is represented as performing an impossible act because of some excellence, (2) when some one not performing a particular act is represented as performing that act and (3) when an object, assuming a particular form due to some cause is represented as having that form due to some other cause. Kammata holds that the viṣayā and viṣayī in Utpreksā are always connected by abheda. Ruyyaka treats Utpreksā in great detail and gives its divisions and subdivisions systematically. He defines Utpreksā as 'adhyavasāne vyāpāraprādhiṁye Utpreksā', and divides it into Vācyā and Pratīyamanā. In Vācyotpereksā the viṣayī may be jāti, guṇa, kriyā and dravya and each of these may be positive (bhāvarūpa) or negative (abhāvarūpa). In all these eight varieties a guṇa or a kriyā may be the source (nimitta) of Utpreksā and the nimitta may be mentioned or may not be mentioned. This gives thirtytwo varieties. In all these varieties a cause (hetu), nature of an object (svarūpa) or fruit (Phala) may be fancied. Ruyyaka remarks that Hetutpreksā and Phalotpereksā are not possible in Dravyotpereksā; Jayartha, the commentator
maintains that they are possible. Vācyotpreksā will have eighty divisions because sixteen varieties of Dravyotpreksā will be deducted from ninety six divisions of Vācyotpreksā. Almost all these varieties are possible in Pratiyamānotpreksā but in Pratiyamānotpreksā, the nimitta must be mentioned. The varieties where the nimitta is not mentioned are not possible in Pratiyamānotpreksā. Svarūpotpreksā is not possible in Pratiyamānotpreksā. Thus Pratiyamānotpreksā has forty-eight varieties. Over and above these varieties, Ruyyaka admits Utpreksā when the dharma in Utpreksā is śliṣṭa. He also admits Upamopakramotpreksā and Apahnavotpreksā. Jayaratha elaborates these divisions. He admits Svarūpotpreksā in Pratiyamānotpreksā. He also admits Utpreksā mixed with Atisāyokti and shows that all the divisions of Atisāyokti, can be mixed with Utpreksā and give rise to some more varieties of Utpreksā. Ruyyaka is the first to give the divisions and subdivisions of Utpreksā in detail and he is followed by most of the rhetoricians succeeding him. Another important contribution of Ruyyaka is his analysis of Utpreksā. He shows that the nimitta in Utpreksā is based on adhyavasāya even when the viśaya and the viśayi are connected by relations other than abheda. Utpreksā is based on (sādhya) adhyavasāya according to Ruyyaka.

Sobhākara criticizes Ruyyaka's definition of Utpreksā. In adhyavasāya the viśaya is swallowed up and therefore not mentioned and
the viśayi is definitely comprehended. In Utpreksā the viśaya is mentioned and the viśayi is not definitely comprehended. Utpreksa, therefore, is not based on adhyavasāya. S'obhākara, therefore contends that Utpreksa is based on sambhāvanā; this sambhāvanā is based on sandeha. He first divides Utpreksa into Dharmyutpreksa and Dharmotpreksa and then subdivides these two varieties. Sobbhakara holds that in 'limpativa.....' there is Svarūpotpreksa as vyāpana is fancied to be identical with lepana. Ruyyaka is criticized for holding that in 'limapativa .....' the darkness is fancied to be the agent of smearing.

Jayaratha defends Ruyyaka. He distinguishes sandeha from sambhāvanā. In sandeha, all the alternatives are equally prominent. In Utpreksa one of the alternatives is more prominent. Sambhāvanā comes in between sandeha and adhyavasāya and Utpreksa is based on sambhāvanā. As Utpreksa is based on sambhāvanā, the viśaya may or may not be mentioned.

However. important Ruyyaka's contribution may be in the development of the figure Utpreksa, there is some inconsistency in his treatment. He says that Utpreksa is based on (sādhyā) adhyavasāya and adhyavasāya is the comprehension of the identity (abheda) of viśayi. The general definition thus shows that abheda is essential in Utpreksa i.e. the viśaya and viśayi must be connected by abheda in Utpreksa. In the illustrations given by him, the viśaya and the viśayi
are connected by relations other than abheda also. If abheda and consequently adhyavasāya are essential in Utpreksā, how can the instances where the viṣaya and visayī are connected by relations other than abheda, be covered by Utpreksā? This inconsistency can be avoided by removing the word adhyavasāya from the definition of Utpreksā. S'obhākara examines adhyavasāya comes to the conclusion that adhyavasāya may be present in nimitta but it does not form the basis of Utpreksā.

Jagannātha accepts this conclusion. He follows S'obhākara and holds that Utpreksā is based on Sambhavā and not on adhyavasāya. Following S'obhākara, he divides Utpreksā into Dharmyutpreksā and Dharmotpreksā. He, however, follows Ruyyaka in other points. He accepts the divisions of Utpreksā given by Ruyyaka and agrees with Ruyyaka in holding that in limpatīva..... a dharma, lepanakartātva is fancied in the dharma-tamah. Jagannātha's scholarship and depth of thinking are reflected in his discussions about the relation between the visṣaya and the visayī in Utpreksā. He very clearly refutes the view of the ancient rhetoricians on this point and establishes the view of the later rhetoricians. Jagannātha's view on the different questions connected with Utpreksā can be considered perfect; he draws the essence from the controversy of Ruyyaka and S'obhākara with an unbiased mind and presents it clearly and in full details.
Appayya gives only six varieties of Utpreksā. He divides Utpreksā into (A) Vastūpupreksa (śvarūpupreksa), (B) Hetūpukṣa and
(C) Phalotpreksa. śvarūpupreksa is divided into (a) Ukātavīṣaya and
(b) Anuktaśīṣayā. Hetūpukṣa and Phalotpreksa are divided into
(a) Siddhavīṣaya and (b) Asiddhavīṣaya. Viśvanātha and Vidyānātha
follow Ruyyaka. They give fifty-six varieties of Vācyotpreksa.
Viśvanātha gives thirty-two, and Vidyānātha, forty-eight varieties of
Pratīyamānotopeksa. Like Kammata, Viśvanātha holds that the relation in Utpreksa is always abheda. According to Appayya and Viśvanātha,
'Impatiya' is an instance of śvarūpupreksa where the viṣaya - vyāpana
is not mentioned. Appayya and Viśvanātha follow Kammata and S'obhākara
on this point.

It is interesting to note that all the rhetoricians
succeeding S'obhākara have carefully omitted the word 'adhyaśāya'
from their definition of Utpreksa.

(g) Atisāyokti;

Viṣayina viṣayasya nigaraṇamatisāyā. Tasyoktiḥ.

Nigaraṇa is the knowledge of the indicated sense characterized
by the determining attribute of the expressed sense. The word expressive of the viṣayī indicated the viṣaya by laksana. In this laksana the viṣaya is the indicated sense, characterized by the determining attribute of the expressed sense. In "Tamalāḥ mama śramān haratū" the word 'tamāla' indicates the viṣaya-Lord Kṛṣṇa, characterized by tamālatva so that tamālatva is apprehended and Kṛṣṇatva is not apprehended. Others believe that Kṛṣṇatva, the determining attribute of the indicated sense is also apprehended here. Laksana indicates Kṛṣṇa characterized by Kṛṣṇatva according to a third view. By vyanjana it suggests the sense Kṛṣṇa characterized by tamālatva. The uddesyavidheyabhāva is not present here as Atisayokti is expressed in one word only. Atisayokti may be Sāvayava and Niravayava.

The viṣaya and the viṣayī are connected by abheda. the visesya visesanaabhāva is established between them only when the viṣaya and viṣayī are apprehended as distinct. In Atisayokti, the viṣaya is characterized by the determining attribute of the viṣayī and as the two are not apprehended as distinct, the relation of abheda does not take place here. It is however, said that abheda predominates in Atisayokti. This should be explained to mean that the determining attribute of the viṣayī conveys absence of difference. In Atisayokti
the properties concomitant with the determining attribute of the visayi should not be special either to the visaya only or to the visayi only i.e. these properties should be common. Sometimes the determining attribute of the visayi may not be wellknown and may be imagined by the poet.

Appayya has defined Rupakātisāyokti as Rupakātisāyoktiḥ svānnigiryaḥhyavasānath. He remarks that Atisāyokti is qualified by the word 'Rūpaka' in order to show that the varieties of Rūpaka are possible in Atisāyokti also. Thus Atisāyokti has two varieties:

(A) Abhedaṭisāyokti and (B) Tādrūpyātisāyokti. This is criticized by Jagannātha. The designation Abhedaṭisāyokti has no scope according to the later rhetoricians as the identity of the visayi is not apprehended in Atisāyokti. According to them, the visaya is characterized by the determining attribute of the visayi, and as the visaya and visayi are not mentioned separately they can-not be connected by abheda. Nāgēśa here retorts that Jagannātha also has accepted the view of the ancient rhetoricians (when they state that abheda predominates in Atisāyokti) by explaining that the apprehension of the determining attribute of the visayi is bheda. The name Abhedaṭisāyokti can be explained in the same way. Appayya has only followed Kāvyaprakāsa.
The ancient rhetoricians distinguish Atisayokti from Rupaka on the grounds that in Atisayokti the visaya is swallowed up and therefore not mentioned, while in Rupaka, it is mentioned. Atisayokti is also distinguished from Utpreksa by them, because in Atisayokti the adhyavasaya is complete; prominence therefore belongs to the visayi and not to the process of adhyavasaya. The comprehension of the visayi is also definite here. In Utpreksa the process of adhyavasaya is incomplete and the process therefore is prominent. In 'kamalamidamanambujatam ja±atitamam kanakalatikayam' if the word 'idam' is predicated of the word 'kamalam' and if it qualifies 'kamalam' then the figure is Atisayokti; if, however it qualifies the subject i.e. 'mukha' then the figure is Rupaka. Thus the nigarana - swallowing - is to be predicated in Atisayokti.

Atisayokti is divided into five varieties: (A) two objects are represented as identical though they are distinct; (B) One and the same object is represented as different. This representation gives rise to the apprehension of the excellence of the object described. (C) Objects not connected with each other are represented as connected. This brings out the excellence of the object described. (D) Objects connected with each other are represented as not connected and (E) There is an inversion of the sequence of cause and effect.
This variety is subdivided into two varieties: (a) The cause and the effect may take place simultaneously. (b) The effect comes into existence before the cause. Both these varieties imply that the cause is very quick in bringing the effect into existence. Some hold that the varieties where objects, though connected with each other are represented as distinct and where objects not connected are represented as connected, should not be considered as varieties of Atisayokti. This type of exaggeration is present in figures like Rūpaka, Dīpaka, Aparahutī etc. Almost in all the figures except the figures based on vāstava. There is no strikingness in presenting things as they are. Some sort of exaggeration is always present in poetic expression. The last variety can also be included in either of these two varieties mentioned above. Thus Atisayokti consists in any of the following: (1) when the visaya is swallowed up and identified with the visayī. (2) when the same object is represented as distinct (3) when some impossible thing is imagined and (4) when there is an inversion of the order of cause and effect.

The later rhetoricians believe that Atisayokti takes place only when the upamāna swallows the upamayā with the result that it is comprehended as identical with the visayī. The other varieties of Atisayokti should be treated as separate figures as the general definition
of Atis'ayokti cannot be applied to them. S'obhākara and Jayaratha have stated that sīkara is the common factor underlying all these varieties. Thus in the second variety, difference swallows non-difference, in the third variety, connection swallows absence of connection, in the fourth variety, absence of connection swallows connection, and in the last variety, the inversion of cause and effect swallows up their natural sequence. But it is a matter of experience that strikingness arises only when matters are presented in a different way. Each of these varieties has a charm of its own. These four varieties therefore should be treated as separate figures.

Appayya admits Atisayokti based on Paryastapakniti, but this is admitted by Jagannātha, as Paryastapakniti is not accepted as a figure.

"Saudāgrāni purasyāsya sprāsati vidhammaṇḍalam" is cited by Appayya as an instance of āsambhdhe sambhādhe variety of Atisayokti. Jagannātha does not accept Appayya's illustration. If, instead of the last two words, "sprāsati vidhammaṇḍalam" is read, then the figure is Uprekal. It is a rule that when words like iva are present, Vyācyotprekal takes place and in the absence of such words the Uprekal is implied.

"Saudāgrāni......" therefore is an instance of Gasyotprekal. Nāgeśa
defends Appayya. If Jagannātha's arguments are accepted, 'mukham chandraḥ' will be an instance of Gamyotprekṣā. 'Nūnam mukham candrah' is an instance of Vācyopreksā and if the word 'nūnam' is removed the Utpreksā will be implied. Conditions of Utpreksā are not present in 'saundhāgrāṇī....'. It is clear that Jagannātha unnecessarily criticizes Appayya.

Instances of Atisayokti are found in Vedas and Śaṅkīṣ also. 'Deva tvaddāraḥ anādeva....' is an instance of Atisayoktidhvani.

Atisayokti consists of an extraordinary, hyperbolic statement according to Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. Udbhata mentions four varieties of Atisayokti: (A) Non-difference is represented when there is difference, (3) Difference is stated when there is non-difference, (C) Representation of an impossible thing and (4) Inversion of the order of cause and effect. Vāmana does not give the divisions of this figure but his illustrations correspond to the third and the first varieties given by Udbhata. Rudraṇa defines atisāya which is the basic principle underlying different figures. He does not define the figure Atisayokti. He defines a figure Pūrva, which corresponds to the last variety of Atisayokti given by Udbhata. Mammata does not give any general definition of Atisayokti. He defines the four varieties where he follows Udbhata. Ruśyaka is the first to give a scientific
definition of Atisayokti so that it is applicable to all the varieties of Atisayokti. He defines Atisayokti as 'Adhyavasita- prādhānye tyatisayoktiḥ.' Ruyyaka accepts all the varieties given by Udbhata. But he divides the third variety given by Udbhata into two:

(a) Sambandhe asambandhā, (b) Asambandhe sambandhā. The last variety given by Udbhata is again divided by Ruyyaka into two varieties: (a) Inversion of the sequence of cause and effect (b) cause and effect represented as coming into existence simultaneously.

Jayaratha, however, divides the last variety into five varieties. He interprets the words 'Karyakaranapaurvaparyavidhvaṃsaḥ' as the inversion of cause and effect and the inversion of the well-known sequence (of cause occurs and effect). Inversion of cause and effect in two ways: (1) when the well-known cause is represented as effect and (2) when the well-known effect is represented as cause. Inversion of the sequence of cause and effect takes place when (1) the order is not existing, (2) when the sequence of cause and effect is represented as inverted and (3) when the effect arises simultaneously with the cause. Ruyyaka says that adhyavasāya underlies all the varieties of Atisayokti because in all these varieties, the natural beauty of an object is identified with the beauty imagined by the poet. Ruyyaka seems to
believe that in all these varieties one property is identified with the other property, one dharma is not identified with the other dharma (nā tu vedaṇādīnāṃ kamalādhīrābhedādhyāvasāyo yojaniyāḥ). Jayaratha remarks that the adhyāvasāna may be of two dharmas or of two dhammas, or of one dharma and dharma. S'obhākara defines Atisayokti as ‘adhyāvasānam.’ He gives four varieties of Atisayokti and does not admit the fifth variety. He believes that in the fifth variety, the effect, though not connected with the simultaneity of cause etc., is represented to be so. The fifth variety therefore should be included in the fourth variety (Asambandhe sambandhah). S'obhākara says that if the fifth variety is maintained, then a sixth variety also may be admitted, where incongruity of the cause and the effect in point of place is represented. This will, however, leave no scope for the figure Asāṃgati. Thus, the varieties based on cause and effect (in points of time and place) should not be admitted. S'obhākara remarks that all the varieties of Atisayokti may be included in the fourth variety (Asambandhe sambandhā) but he has given the varieties separately because others have given them and have treated Sambandhe-Asambandhah as a separate variety. Jayaratha criticizes S'obhākara, for his views about the fifth variety. If S'obhākara admits the other varieties because others have given them and because the fourth variety is treated as a distinct variety, why does he not admit the fifth
variety for the same reasons? Aṣaṅgatī will have a scope because the fifth variety is based on atisaya and adhayaavanāya. When the cause and the effect are represented as residing in different places, the strikingness arises, not because of atisaya but because of virodha. Thus the variety suggested by S'obhākara (where the cause and effect reside in different places) cannot be included in Atisayokti. As time and place go together, varieties based on time and place should also be treated as varieties of the same figure. They are, however, treated distinctly, because the charm in the variety based on time arises because of atisaya while the charm in the variety based on place arises because of virodha.

Again, there is no incompatibility in the variety based on time.

There is an apparent incompatibility in the variety based on place.

The fifth variety, therefore, should not be included in the fourth variety.

S'obhākara does not agree with Ruyyāka on the point that in Atisayokti, the natural property of an object is identified with the property imagined by the poet. He says that this type of adhyavasāya is present in figure like Upamā also. In the first variety of Atisayokti, difference is identified with the non-difference; in the second variety, non-difference is identified with difference; in the third variety, absence of connection is identified
of Apahnuti. He holds that anything may be denied and anything may be established in Apahnuti. Mammata defines Apahnuti as 'prakṛtam yannisidhyānyatsāchyate sātvapahnutih.' He paraphrases the word 'prakṛta' by 'upameya' and 'anyat' by 'upanāna.' Thus Mammata also holds that Apahnuti should be based on similarity. Ruyyaka agrees with Mammata. S'obhākara has defined Apahnuti as 'viśayasya mukhyasya vāpahnave anyavidhih Apahnutih.' Thus nāyam sudānsuh...is an instance of Apahnuti according to S'obhākara. S'obhākara allows Apahnuti based on relations other than similarity also. He divides apahnava into Ābda and Ārtha in accordance with the words used to convey apahnava. He is followed by Jagannātha in the divisions of Apahnuti. S'obhākara allows Apahnuti in places where the word used in primary sense is denied and the same word its secondary sense is established. Following S'obhākara Jayaratha says that Apahnuti may be based on similarity and relations other than similarity also. He says that when Apahnuti is based on similarity the common property may be anugāmi, s'uddhāsāmānyarūpa and bimbapratibimbabhāvapanna. Apahnuti may also be based on adhyavasāya according to him. Viśvanātha gives two varieties of Apahnuti. The first variety is based on similarity. In the second variety, something which is somehow divulged is represented differently by s'leşa or otherwise. This variety is not based on similarity, and resembles the Chākāpahnuti of Appayya. The definition and divisions of Apahnuti given by Appayya in Gitramāṁṣā do not differ from those given by Jagannātha. In Kuvalayāhanda, Appayya allows Apahnuti
based on relations other than similarity also, and divides Apahnuti into Suddhapahnuti, Hetvapahnuti, Paryastapahnuti, Bhmantsapahnuti, Chhekapahnuti and Kaitevapahnuti.

(7) Utpreksa:

Tadbhinnatvena, tadabhavavattvena va pramitasya padarthasya ramaniyatadvrtti, tatsamunadhikarananyatarataddharmasambandhanimittakam tattvena tadvattvena va sambhavanamutpreksa. This definition covers Dharmyutpreksa and Dharmotpreksa.

In Dharmyutpreksa, thing is represented as probably identical with that which is different from itself. This identification is based on a charming property belonging to that thing and the probable identification arises because of the similarity between the subject of fancy and the object fancied. In Dharmotpreksa, an object known as not possessing a particular quality is represented as probably possessing it because of a charming property which is coexistent with that quality.

The Sambhavana in Utpreksa should be volitional. This is shown by the words' tadbhinnatvena pranitasya'. Genuine sambhavana and illusion are excluded by these words. The sambhavana in Utpreksa should be based on a property common to the upamana and upameya; the
word taddharmanimitakam thus excludes that sambhavana which is not based on similarity. The common property which gives rise to Utpreksa should be charming. The word ramanîya qualifying the dharma, excludes ordinary sambhavana based on similarity. The word sambhavana excludes the figure Rûpaka as Rûpaka is based on definite comprehension.

In Dharmyutpreksa, the two dharmas are connected by the relation of abheda. In Dharmotpreksa the viṣayī (dharma) and visaya are connected by other relations.

Utpreksa is divided into two varieties: (A) Vācyotpreksa where the conditions of Utpreksa are accompanied by words expressive of sambhavana like iva, mūnam, manye etc. (B) Pratīyamānotpreksa where the conditions of Utpreksa are not accompanied by such words and where the Utpreksa is suggested. These two varieties are subdivided into (a) Svarupotpreksa (b) Hetūtpreksa (c) Phalotpreksa. When the dharmas like jāti, guṇa, kriyā and dravya, together or separately give rise to the fancy of jāti, guṇa, kriyā and dravya and the negation of all these four, into the viṣayas which may be jāti, guṇa, kriyā and dravya according to possibility, the Utpreksa is known as Svarupotpreksa. The dharmas giving rise to sambhavana may be mentioned or may not be mentioned; again, they may be completely established or they may be in process. In Dharmyutpreksa the relation is abheda; in Dharmotpreksa the relation is other than
the 'limbs' of Damayanti is the property on which the Utpreka is based. In 'limpativa tamonga, the viśaya is the act of pervasion which has darkness as its agent. The viśayīs are the act of anointing which has darkness for its agent and the act of showering which has sky for its agent. The relation is abheda; the viśaya is not mentioned; rendering everything dark' is the dharma giving rise to the Utpreka, and it is not mentioned. In ummaṇa yo! which is an instance of Hetūtpreka, possession of natural redness by the feet is the viśaya and the viśayī is "the act of falling at the feet, caused by joy". These two are identified. Similarly in Phalotpreka also the relation between the viśaya and the viśayī is abheda.

The later rhetoricians allow relations other than abheda also in Utpreka. In 'asyaṃ muninam! the Utpreka is based on bheda. In 'limpativa tamoga, the viśayī is lepanakartrtva which is a dharma imagined in the viśaya, tamah, which is a dharma. The suffix 'ti' is connected by the relation of bheda (i.e. āśrayata) with the viśaya tamah, if process or action is understood to be the sense of that suffix. If, however, the suffix is understood as giving the sense āśraya, then it will be connected with the viśaya, tamah, by the relation of abheda. In any case, the viśaya here is not vyāpana. Jagannātha gives three reasons for this; (1) The sense of īva (sambhāvanā) will not be vidheya āf vyāpana is understood to be the viśaya. Both the uddēsa and vidheya - subject and the predicate - should be expressed by different words.
How will the subject (uddes'ya) be expressed if vyāpana is swallowed up?

(2) The expression 'tamahkartrkam lepanam iva, which does not contain uddes'ya vidheyahāva, will also give rise to the apprehension of Utprēksa, as adhyāvasāya will be present in that expression also. (3) If the identification of 'lepana' with vyāpana which is the source of Utprēksa, is believed to be Utprēksa based on adhyāvasāya, then Rūpaka also can be said to be based adhyāvasāya. In 'lokāṅhanti khalo viṣam' the pain caused by the wicked person is swallowed up by death caused by poison. So 'khalo viṣam', which is Rūpaka and is accepted to be based on āropa, will have to be accepted as having adhyāvasāya at its root if the view of the ancient rhetoricians is accepted.

Thus there is Atisāyokti in the source of Utprēksa in 'limpatiṣyat and lepanakartrtva is related with tamah (the viṣaya) by bheda (āśrayatā). Similarly, in Hetutprēksa and Phalotprēksa also the relation between the viṣaya and viṣayī is bheda.

Ruṣyaka has treated Utprēksa in the following way. Adhyāvasāya is the comprehension of the identity of the viṣayī when the viṣaya is swallowed up. It may be siddha or sādhyā. Utprēksa takes place when sādhyatva is comprehended, and when the process predominates. In siddha adhyāvasāya, the viṣayī predominates. Figures like Atisāyokti are based on siddha adhyāvasāya. Figures like Utprēksa are based on sādhyā adhyāvasāya, where the process predominates. In 'saisā sthalī
a guna - pain - is fancied to be the cause of the silence of the anklet. The source - nimitta - is supplied by silence which is comprehended to be identical with the absence of tinkling in the anklet. Again in 'limpatīva tamo,' which is cited as an example of Dharmotprekṣā, the nimitta is supplied by 'pervading' which gives rise to the Utprekaṣa of lepanakartrtvā (dharma) in tamah, which is the visaya and which is dharmi.

Jagannātha feels some inconsistency in the definition and the explanation given by Ruyyaka. In 'saisā sthali,' the Utprekaṣa of pain in the anklet is not based on abheda, as the visaya and visayi are connected by the relation of āśrayata and not of abheda. Adhyavasāya is present when silence is identified with the absence of tinkling, but here it is siddha and therefore gives rise to ātisāyokti and not to Utprekaṣa; again it is a nimitta and therefore it is not the object of Utprekaṣa. In 'limpatīva' also, the visaya and visayi are not connected by the relation of abheda when lepanakartrtvā is fancied in tamah; and the part where abheda is present (when lepana is identified with vyāpana) is not the province of Utprekaṣa. Ruyyaka himself has said that vyāpana is not utprekaṣāvisaya. Adhyavasāna in the nimitta can-not give rise to Utprekaṣa as such adhyavasāya is present in Upama also. Again adhyavasāya is not possible in 'nūnām mukham caṇḍrah' as the visaya is mentioned. Siddha adhyavasāya can-not be distinguished from sādhya on the grounds that the visaya is swallowed up and therefore
it is not mentioned in siddha adhyavasāya, while in sadhya adhyavasāya the process of swallowing is not complete and the visaya is therefore, mentioned separately. There are no standards to prove that the process is over and that the adhyavasāna is complete. If adhyavasāya is allowed in places where the visaya is mentioned then ūpaka can also be said to be based on adhyavasāya. Adhyavasāna is a variety of laksanē. And the predicate in a sentence should not be based on laksanē according to the grammarians. The bodha based on relations like abheda here is volitional.

Thus the views of the ancient and the later rhetoricians are not correct. Jagannātha gives his own views about the different types of Utpreksā. In Dharmayutprekṣa, the Utpreksā is based on abheda. In Hetūtpreksā, the ablative case gives the sense hetu and its relation with the sense of the stem is abheda. The word vislesaduhkhā thus denotes 'viślesaduhkkhābhinnahetuh'. This is connected with the word 'iva' by the relation of prayojyatā. Thus viślesaduhkhā adiva baddhamaunām mūpurān gives the bodha, viślesaduhkkhābhinnahetuprayojya-maunasaṁbhāvanāvisayah mūpurānā. According to another view, prayojyatva is the sense conveyed by the ablative case; the senses of the stem and the suffix are connected by the relation of nirūpitaṁva and the suffix is connected with the Utpreksā by the relation of āśrayaṁ. In both these views the sense denoted by the ablative case is the thing fancied, as it
is connected with the sense of the word 'iva', 'absence of tinkling', identified with silence by Atisayokti and coexistent with the thing fancied i.e. the pain of separation is the nimitta of this Utpreksa.

The anklet here is the subject of fancy. The Utpreksa is connected with the anklet through silence. The pain of separation first gives rise to the Utpreksa of silence and this silence leads us to the anklet; thus the sense of ablative is always connected with the dharma which is to be connected with a dharma by Utpreksa, through a dharma. When a dharma itself, identified with some other dharmas, is the subject of Utpreksa the determining attribute of the subject becomes the nimitta. Thus if instead of 'baddhamaunam' we read 'maunam asya' then maunatva which is the determining attribute of the visaya (mauna) becomes the nimitta as mauna which is the subject of Utpreksa is a dharma.

In Phalotpreksa the sense of the infinitive is the fruit. The senses of the stem and the suffix are connected by abheda. This sense is connected with the subject of Utpreksa by the relation of sadhanatā. The nimitta here is that dharma which is the viśeṣana of the part where the fancy takes place. Thus in the instance 'Calasya yad......' vāpātayan is a dharma qualifying the borders of the forests in that part where the fruit is imagined. Thus the bodha here takes the form 'aṃśaradārśanābhinnasphalasādhanatāprayojakalatātātavāgvyipātana-

In Phalotpreksa if the visaya is a dharma, then the nimitta is a dharma (belonging to the visaya) identified with a
dharma (belonging to the visayi). Thus in 'Colasya yad.....' the fruit, seeing the letters in the forehead, is imagined as belonging to the borders of the forests. The borders of the forests tear off the skin of the forehead; thus the 'natural tearing' is a dharma belonging to the visaya (borders of the forests). The visayi is a desire to see the letters. 'Tearing the skin of the forehead in order to see the letters' is a dharma belonging to the visayi. When these dharmas belonging to the visaya and visayi are identified, they give rise to the Utpreka of the fruit aksaradarśana (visayi) in the borders of the forests (visaya). If the visaya is a dharma, then some other dharma which is a viśeśaṇa of that dharma becomes the nimitta.

If the visaya is subordinate to a compound or suffix, the cause or the fruit cannot be connected directly with the subject; the cause and the fruit in these cases should be connected with the principal visaya, by the relations of prayojya and prayojakatā, through the viśeśaṇa which deserves to be the visaya. Though somehow, the cause and the fruit may be connected with the viśeśaṇa, and the viśeśaṇa can also be the visaya, still the visayi is always apprehended as vidheya, the visaya is apprehended as a subject; this method is based on the ground of these apprehensions.
with connection and in the fourth variety connection is identified with non-connection. Jagannātha has criticized this view.

Ruyyaka is followed by Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Visvanātha and Appayya in the treatment of Atisāyokti. Vidyānātha does not divide the last variety. Appayya gives the name Rūpakātīsāyokti to the first variety and divides it into Abhedātīsāyokti and Tūdrūpyātīsāyokti for which he is criticized by Jagannātha. He gives the name Bhedātīsāyokti to the second variety. He divides the last variety into three kinds: (a) Akramātīsāyokti where the cause and the effect take place simultaneously, (b) Capalātīsāyokti where the effect is produced as soon as the cause is known and (c) Atyantātīsāyokti where the order of cause and effect is inverted.

Atisāyokti consisted in an exaggerated, hyperbolic statement according to the ancient rhetoricians. As most of the alāṃkāras are based on exaggeration, alāṃkārikas like Bhūmaha and Anandavardhana believe that Atisāyokti underlies most of the figures.
Ruyyaka, S'obhakara and other later rhetoricians held that the adhyavasāya is complete in Atisayekti. Jagannātha says that nigaratā is atisaya. Nigaratā and atisaya are synonyms according to Jagannātha. It is very significant that Jagannātha does not mention the term 'adhyavasāya' in his definition of Atisayekti. He uses the word 'nigaratā' in explaining the illustrations of Atisayekti also. Thus the statement of nigaratā constitutes the figure Atisayekti according to Jagannātha. Ruyyaka, however, says that atisaya is the fruit in Atisayekti i.e. the process of adhyavasāya, when complete, finally conveys the atisaya of the object under description. Though Jagannātha follows Ruyyaka in the general treatment and divisions of Atisayekti, he differs from Ruyyaka and all the other predecessors on this point.

In nigaratā the visaya is characterized by the determining attribute of the visayi. The word expressing the visaya is not mentioned. The word expressing the visayi is mentioned and it conveys its indicated sense (visaya) characterized by the expressed sense. Thus, the expression 'candrā udoti' conveys the face, characterized by candratva. Nigaratā is to be distinguished from adhyavasāya. Jagannātha did not accept (sadhya) adhyavasāya as forming the essence of Utpreksā. By defining atisaya as nigaratā, he once again rejects
siddha adhyātmasāna as the basis of Atisayokti also. Thus the
expression 'candrah udeīti' conveys complete identity of candra in mukka,
according to Ruyyaka. It conveys the face characterized by candratva
according to Jagannātha. It must be said that Jagannātha's
definition is more subtle and analytical. When 'candrah udeīti' is
said about the face, definitely the face is referred to, but the
properties of moon are attributed to it.

Jagannātha's treatment of Atisayokti is perfect. Ruyyaka
had tried to bring all the varieties given by Udbhata under a general
definition and very ingeniously he has shown that in all these varieties
the natural property of an object was identified with the property
imagined by the poet. Śobhākara attempts to show that adhyātmasāya
underlies all the varieties of Atisayokti. This view is already
discussed above. Jagannātha under the name of 'nāvyāṅ' gives his opinion
that these varieties do not possess any common factor and therefore,
they should be treated as separate figures. At the end of his treatment
of the figure Atisayokti, Jagannātha illustrates Atisayoktīdhvani,
He gives only one illustration ('deva tvaddarsanādeva ....') where
the first variety is suggested. The illustrations of the dhvani of
the other four varieties are not given. This implies that he treated
these varieties as separate figures and not as divisions of Atisayokti.
If, however, he believes so, why does he give all the varieties under Astisayokti like his predecessors? Jagannatha can-not be free from "prācāṁ anurodhaḥ", and therefore does not like to differ from his predecessors in the main outlines of the figure.

(iii) Figures where difference predominates:

Jagannatha treats the figure Ṭulyayogitā after Astisayokti. The treatment of Ṭulyayogitā is not preceded by any remark showing that the figures beginning with Ṭulyayogitā are bhedapradhāna. In his treatment of Upamā, Jagannatha remarks:... "... bhedapradhāneṣu Drṣṭantaprativastūpamādiṣaṁ Ṭulyayogitadisu.....". This remark shows that figures like Ṭulyayogitā, Dīpaka, Prativastūpamā, Drṣṭanta are bhedapradhāna according to Jagannatha.

Ṭulyayogitā, Dīpaka, Prativastūpamā, Drṣṭanta, Nidarsana, Vyatiraka, Sahokti, Vinokti, Samasokti, Parikara, Śileśa, Aprastutapras'amsa, Paryayokta, Vyājastuti and Āksepa are figures where difference predominates.
Ruyyaka has attempted to explain the sequence assigned by him to the figures. Jagannātha follows Ruyyaka in assigning the sequence to the figures. He, however, does not always give explanation for the sequence given by him, but it can be said that Ruyyaka's explanation of sequence is accepted by him.

Ruyyogita and Dīpaka are called by Ruyyaka, 'Padārthagatam alaṃkāradvayam'. Again, the similarity in these figures is suggested according to Ruyyaka. Jagannātha also remarks, 'aupamyam cātra gāmyam tatprayejakasya samānadharmasyopādānāt vācakābhamācca'. Though Jagannātha does not state very clearly, it can be said that he also holds that similarity between two padārthas is suggested in these two figures. Prativastupamā and Drstānta are treated after Dīpaka by Ruyyaka, because similarity is suggested between two vākyārthas in these two figures. Jagannātha's definitions of these two figures also show that similarity is developed between two vākyārthas in these figures. The similarity in these figures, is ārtha according to Jagannātha. Nidarsanā is treated after Drstānta because it is based on bimbapratibimbabhāva.

Vinokti is treated after Sahokti because it is the opposite of Sahokti. Ruyyaka remarks 'Sahoktipratibhatabhotam Vinoktim laksayati'. Samāsokti is followed by Parikara, because
in both these strikingness arises from the adjectives (adhuna viśeṣanavicchityāśrayenālāmāṅkaradvayamāṇya). S'leṣa is treated after Parikara, because, in it, the substantives also give rise to strikingness. Aprastutaprasaṃśa is treated after S'leṣa because it is the opposite of S'leṣa. Ruṣyaka treats Arthāntaranyāsa after Aprastutaprasaṃśa, Jagannātha, differs here from Ruṣyaka. He treats Arthāntaranyāsa as a figure based on tarka-nyāya and therefore does not treat it as a figure based on similarity. Paryāyokta is treated after Aprastutaprasaṃśa, because like Aprastutaprasaṃśa, the expressed sense suggests some sense init. The figures Vyājastuti and Akaepa are treated after Paryāyokta because the suggested sense is striking in these two figures.

The group of figures having bheda as predominant element can be subdivided into smaller groups. The principles underlying the subdivisions are not mutually exclusive. Thus, figure having abheda as a predominant factor, and the figure Smarana, which is bhedabheda-pradhāna can also be said to have similarity suggested in it.

(1) Tulyasrigitā:

Prakṛtiṇānāmeva prakṛtiṇāneva Vā gunaṁ kriyādirūpaikadharmāv-
yastulyasrigitā.
In Tulyayogita, either all prakṛta objects or all aprakṛta objects are connected with one property consisting of a quality, or an action etc. The similarity is suggested here, as the common property which is the cause of similarity is mentioned here and the word expressive of similarity is not mentioned. The ālāmkārikas hold that sādṛṣya is different from the common property. They, therefore, say that sādṛṣya is suggested in Tulyayogita. Only the common property is expressed in words. Others believe that sādṛṣya consists of the common properties, but the determining attribute of sādṛṣya, which is the expressed sense of words like, iva, is different from the common property. As words like iva which are expressive of the determining attribute of sādṛṣya are absent, sādṛṣya is suggested in figures like Tulyayogita by words expressive of common property. The word 'kecit' shows that this view is not preferred by Jagannātha.

The word ādi' in the definition suggests that over and above quality and action, a word, a sense ascertained to be identical with another sense by ślesa, or an act qualified by a guṇa may also give rise to Tulyayogita.
Ruyyaka has explained Tulyayogita as 'gunakriyābhīś samaddhatve gunakriyārupaikadharmanvayah'. Appayya has followed him. They have restricted Tulyayogita to cases where the objects are connected with quality only or action only. In Tulyayogita, objects may be connected with words, abhāva, visēsanās and actions qualified by guṇas. The definition should cover all such cases, because the strikingness in Tulyayogita arises from the connection of one property with many objects. The property may consist not only of quality or action but of abhāva, words etc. also. Appayya has defined a variety of Tulyayogita which consists in a similarity of attitude towards friends and enemies. Jagannātha holds that this need not be considered as a separate variety because it is already covered by the definition of Tulyayogita given by Appayya.

Nāgaisā defends Appayya and says that the charm in this variety arises from the fact that the instance 'priyate parābhūti-ṛmitras ataravayoh samā' the king behaves in a similar way towards the friends and enemies. He however, leaves the judgment to the Sahrdayas. He again says that Appayya here only quotes Bhoja. It must be said that Jagannātha's criticism is not improper. The definition of Tulyayogita given by Appayya covers the second variety given by him, which therefore, does not deserve to be a separate variety.
What is the difference between Tulyayogita and Upama? In 'candra iva mukham Sundaram', candra and mukha are also connected with one property, conveyed by the word Sundaram. Like Tulyayogita, all the dharmas may be prakrta only or aprakrta only in Upama also. Like Tulyayogita, sadrīya may be implied in Gamyopama also. Then again what is the difference between Rūpaka and Tulyayogita?

Jagannātha says that in Tulyayogita and Dīpaka the connection of the common property with the dharmas gives rise to strikingness. In Upama the sadrīya resulting from the connection with a common property gives rise to strikingness. In Rūpaka, the abheda apprehended from the connection with a common property gives rise to strikingness.

Like Upama, Tulyayogita may also be Raksārūpā. When two actions—either both prakṛta or both aprakṛta—are connected with one karaka, Karakatulyayogita takes place. Tulyayogita may also be mixed with figures like Arthāntaranyasa.

Tulyayogita is suggested in 'aye līlābhagna......'.

According to Bhūmaha, Tulyayogita takes place when an inferior object is intended to be represented as similar to the superior, on account of the connection with similar action. Daṇḍin believes that this connection conveys either praise or censure. Udbhāta defines Tulyayogita as:
Later rhetoricians have based their definitions of Tulyayogita on Udbhata's definition. Vāmana follows Bhāmaha in defining this figure. Rudraṭa does not define Tulyayogita. Mammata and Ruyyaka follow Udbhata and say that in Tulyayogita either all the objects should be prakṛta or all aprakṛta. Mammata says that the property should be mentioned only once. Ruyyaka adds that the similarity is suggested and that the connection of one property is with two padārthas. The property may be a quality or an action. Tulyayogita is thus divided into four varieties by Ruyyaka: (A) when all prakṛta objects are connected with one quality, (B) when all prakṛta objects are connected with an action, (C) when all aprakṛta objects are connected with a quality and (D) when all aprakṛta objects are connected with an action. Jayaratha says that bimbapratibimbabhāva is also possible in Tulyayogita. The common property may be Śuddhasāṁyārūpa. Śebhākara says that if the qualities of the objects are wellknown they should be treated as upamānas, and therefore, aprastuta. If the qualities are not wellknown, the objects will be upamaya and therefore, prastuta. He thus gives the criterion for knowing the prakṛtatva and aprakṛtatva of the objects. If all the objects in Tulyayogitā are not definitely
known as upamānas or upameṣ, upamānopameyatā is implied. Appayya follows Ruyyaka. Following Ḡhoja, Appayya gives another variety of Tulyayogīta where there is a similarity of attitudes towards the friends and foes. Appayya says that this variety may convey either the praise or censure of the object described. Jagannātha criticizes Appayya for admitting this variety. Appayya also gives a third variety where an inferior is equalled with a superior.

Vidyanātha and Visvanātha follow Ruyyaka. Though Visvanātha admits that Tulyayogīta is developed between padārthas, he does not mention anywhere that upamya is suggested in this figure.

Jagannātha follows Ruyyaka in his treatment of Tulyayogīta, but he says that the common property in Tulyayogīta may consist, not only of quality or action, but of abhāva, words (based on s'lesa) etc. also. He gives two varieties of Tulyayogīta: (A) when only prakṛta objects are connected with one property and (B) when only aprakṛta objects are connected with one property. Tulyayogīta may have more than four varieties according to Jagannātha. Another point, where Jagannātha differs from his predecessors is that he admits Karakatulyayogīta. Two varieties of Karakatulyayogīta are possible: (a) when all the actions are prakṛta and when (... (b) all the actions are aprakṛta. Thus Jagannātha gives four broad divisions of Tulyayogīta.
He illustrates the second variety of Dipaka in 'svidyati kṣatī.....'. Mammata's definition is criticized by Jagaññāthā. The first line gives a general definition of Dipaka. This definition is applicable to both the varieties of Dipaka. A quality consisting of a kāraka mentioned once may also be connected with many actions one of which is prakṛta and others aprakṛta. It cannot be argued that the second definition shows that in Kārakadipaka the actions may be either all prakṛta or all aprakṛta, because this will not leave scope for Kārakatulyayogitā. All the Śrāvakārikas are unanimous on the point that in Tulyayogitā either all the objects may be prakṛta or all aprakṛta and in Dipaka, one is prakṛta and the other aprakṛta. This convention is violated if this argument is accepted. Again, if this argument is accepted, then none of the definitions of Dipaka given by Mammata, is applicable here. A third variety suggested by the argument will disturb the whole order of figures. In ' Svidyati kṣatī.....', all the actions are prakṛta; Dipaka therefore is not possible in that instance. Again, suggested similarity is the essence of Tulyayogitā and Dipaka. No similarity, however, is apprehended in the actions mentioned in 'svidyati kṣatī.....'. The figures in 'svidyati kṣatī.....', therefore, is Samuccaya. If, somehow it is argued that the various actions in the verse are similar, then also, the figure is Tulyayogitā and not Dipaka. It is clear that Mammata is rightly criticized by Jagaññāthā.
Jaysratha has cited 'ālingitum stairukhān... ' as an illustration of Kṛkādīpaka. He remarks that in this verse only one person is represented as an agent of many actions viz., embracing, drinking, obtaining etc. This is criticized by Jagannātha. It is not necessary to think that all the actions described in the verse should have one agent. The verse can well be understood even if each action is understood to have its own agent. The charm in the present verse arises out of the bimbapratibimbabhāva of stairukhā, Sudā etc. Again, the statement that all the different agents of these actions are beasts is more charming than the statement that one person who has failed to do all these actions is a beast. Jayaratha's interpretation therefore, is not very happy. Jagannātha therefore suggests a better interpretation. In the verse 'ālingitum... ' though the different actions are not connected with one agent, they are connected with one determining attribute which is common to all the different agents of the actions—viz., mandardarātva. Kṛkādīpaka is developed in the present verse, because all the actions are connected with mandardarātva. Jagannātha's interpretation is definitely better than that of Jayaratha; it can be said that Jagannātha is fully justified in criticizing Jayaratha.

Under the name of navyā, Jagannātha says that Dīpaka should not be regarded as distinct from Juleyogita, because both these figures possess a common charm consisting in the fact that the common
property is mentioned once. The ground - प्रक्रतप्रक्रतत्वा - on which the two are treated as distinct figures, does not possess sufficient charm for treating both these as separate alamkāras. If such an insignificant charm is taken into account, then the two varieties of Tulyayogitā will have to be treated as separate alamkāras. All the different varieties of the alamkāras, then will have to be treated as separate alamkāras. There are no definite standards to show that the prakṛta is the upameya and that the aprakṛta is the upamāna. It can not therefore, be said that one object is prakṛta (upameya) and the other aprakṛta (upamāna) in Dipaka, and that Dipaka is based on real similarity while the similarity in Tulyayogitā depends on the intention of the speaker. Instead of treating the two as distinct alamkāras, Tulyayogitā should be divided into three varieties: When (a) all prakṛta objects, (b) all aprakṛta objects and (c) one prakṛta object and another aprakṛta object, are connected with one common property.

The ancient rhetoricians have divided Dipaka into three varieties according as the common property occurs in the beginning, middle or end. Jagannātha remarks that endless divisions like these are possible, but they do not give rise to any distinct charm.
Bimbapratibimbabhāva is also possible in Dīpaka but the bimbapratibimbabhāva should always be accompanied by an anugāmi common property. The very nature of Dīpaka requires that the common property should be mentioned once only. This requirement can be fulfilled only by an anugāmi dharma. In bimbapratibimbabhāva the property is mentioned twice and in different forms. So the common property in Dīpaka must be anugāmi; the other objects connected with the property may be bimbapratibimbabhāvāpanna.

The figure Mālādīpaka arises when each preceding object adds excellence to each succeeding object. Jagannātha defines Mālādīpaka in connection with Dīpaka, only out of respect for the ancient writers. He believes that Mālādīpaka is not based on similarity. It should, therefore, be treated not as a variety of Dīpaka, but of Bkavali.

When the common property is not connected with the different dharmās in one and the same form, a dosa arises. When the prakṛta and the aprakṛta differ in gender or in number and consequently when it becomes necessary to change the word expressive of the common property so as to make it go with either the prakṛta or the aprakṛta then the deśas-Lingabheda and Vacanabheda arise. When however, the word expressive of the common property does not require
to be changed when construed with both the prakṛta and the aprakṛta, in spite of the fact that the prakṛta and aprakṛta differ in gender and number the dosas, Lingabheda and Vacanabheda do not arise.

Similarly difference in points of tense and person - Kālabheda and Pṛruṣabheda - are also dosas, if the verb has to be changed in order to make it suitable for going with the prakṛta or the aprakṛta which differ in points of tense and person.

The verse ' saṅgramāṅgamanāgatena.....' illustrated by Mammata is not a good illustration of Dipaka according to Jagannātha, as it contains the dosas Lingabheda and Vacanabheda.

Dipaka is one of the four alamkaras defined by Bharata, who defines it as follows:

Nāṃdhikaraṇarthanāṃ sabdānaṃ samprakṛīrtitam
Ekavākyena samyogāttaddāpakamihocye.

Dipaka

Bhamaka, Dandin, Udbhaṭa, Vāmana and Rudrāṭa divide into Ādidipaka, Madhya Dipaka and Antyadipaka. Dandin says that the common property may consist of words indicating jati, guṇa, kriya and draṇya. Vāmana and Rudrāṭa believe that the common property should consist of action only. Rudrāṭa gives another variety of Dipaka - Kārakadipaka.
Udbhata had hinted that in Dipaka, the property should be connected with
two objects one of which is pradhana and the other apradhihana. Mammata
and Ruyyaka take up this hint and say that in Dipaka one object
should be prakṛta and the other aprakṛta. Following Rūdraṭa, they
divide Dipaka into Kriyādīpaka and Kārakadīpaka. But Mammata does
not divide Dipaka into Adidīpaka, Madhyadīpaka and Antyadīpaka.
Ruyyaka distinguishes Dipaka from Tulyayogita on the ground that in
Dipaka, the similarity is real while in Tulyayogita it depends on the
intention of the speaker. He follows the ancient writers and divides
the variety into Adidīpaka, Madhyadīpaka and Antyadīpaka. S'obhākara
follows Ruyyaka but he does not give the three divisions given by the
ancients. The common property may consist of guṇa or bhāva according
to him. Jayaratha is the first to say that Dipaka and Tulyayogita should
not be treated as separate figures. He rejects the distinction drawn
by Ruyyaka and says that upamānatva and upameyatva cannot be
ascertained by the criterion of prasiddhi. He is followed by
Jagannātha. Following S'obhākara, Jayaratha says that the common
property in Dipaka may consist of a quality also. Mammata's
illustration of Kārakadīpaka is criticized by Jayaratha; Jagannātha
follows Jayaratha in criticizing Mammata. Jayaratha says that the common
property in Dipaka may be bimhapratibimbabhāvāpanna or s'uddhasāmānāyāraṇa.
Jayaratha is followed by Jagannātha on this point also.
Vidyanātha, Visvanātha and Appayya follow Mammata.

Following Ruyyaka, Vidyanātha and Appayya distinguish Dīpaka from Tulyayogita. Jagannātha is the only rhetorician, who follows Jayaratha in maintaining that the two figures should not be regarded as distinct.

(3) Prativastūpamā:

Vastu prativastubhāvāpamasaḥñāramdharmakāvyaḥprathāyārthamau-pamyam Prativastūpamā.

Prativastūpamā is a figure developed in two sentence-senses. The similarity is suggested in this figure. The common property is vastuprativastubhāvāpamasaḥ, i.e., one and the same common property is mentioned in two different words, when it is connected with two different objects. This characteristic distinguishes Prativastūpamā from Aprastutaprasaṃsaḥ, because in Aprastutaprasaṃsaḥ the prakṛta is suggested and therefore not mentioned; the common property as connected with the prakṛta is also not mentioned. Again, though the common property is one and the same it is not expressed in two different words. It is mentioned only once— as connected with the aprakṛta.

Prativastūpamā, though expressed in two sentences, is different from
Vākyārthopāna, because the similarity in Prativastūpamā is suggested. Prativastūpamā is different from the figure Smarāṇa, because Smarāṇa is developed in padārthas while Partivastūpamā is developed in sentence-senses.

Prativastūpamā may also arise due to dissimilarity. The example mentioned in words is negative in this variety. It implies the negative concomitance in general. The negative concomitance gives us the positive concomitance in general. The concomitance in the particular instance which is mentioned, is proved by this general positive concomitance. In Prativastūpamā arising from similarity also the particular instance in the prakṛta sentence is established when the positive concomitance in general is established by the positive illustration in the aprakṛta sentence. Some rhetoricians think that not the concomitance, but only the sense in prakṛta. Only the similarity with the sense of the aprakṛta sentence is implied according to them.

Similarity is suggested in all the instance of Prativastūpamā. Thus when Prativastūpamā springs from dissimilarity, the aprakṛta sentence implies its opposite and this bears resemblance with the prakṛta sentence. Though the prakṛta sentence bears resemblance
with the sense implied by the aprakṛta sentence, the similarity is not affected as the implied sense is connected with the sentence.

As similarity is suggested in Prativastūpama, the two sentences are not related by sāmānyavidesabhāva because similarity is not apprehended between sāmānya and its visesa.

Appayya has cited 'yadi santi.....' as an instance of Prativastūpama arising from dissimilarity. This is criticized by Jagannātha. When Prativastūpama arises from dissimilarity, the dissimilar illustration should consist of a statement which is connected with a dharmi, which is similar to the negation implied by the dharmi in the prakṛta statement. Only such an illustration can support and affirm the prakṛta statement. In 'yadi santi.....' the illustration is not negative and therefore it can-not be dissimilar. Appayya has cited it as an illustration of Prativastūpama based on dissimilarity only because of the presence of the word 'na'. As a matter of fact, the illustration is similar and the Prativastūpama springs from similarity.

In Prativastūpama, the bimbapratibimbabhāva between the different words in the prakṛta and aprakṛta statements should be brought out very clearly. Any lack of proportion or inconsistency
in the construction of sentences constituting Prativastūpamā deprive the figure of its charm. Poets should have a highly cultivated mind, and they should be skilful in the construction of various subjects. In figures like Prativastūpamā, the aprakṛta statement must have names, words, cases etc. exactly corresponding to the names, words and cases etc. of the prakṛta statement.

Like Upamā, Prativastūpamā may also be hālārupa. Bhūṣamaṇḍin and Vāmana have treated Prativastūpamā as a variety of Upamā. They do not treat it as a separate alamkāra. Udbhata treats Prativastūpamā as a separate figure. Rudrata calls it Udbhāṇyūṣa. Nammattī follows Udbhata. Ruyyaka is the first to say that Prativastūpamā may spring from dissimilarity also. Saṃśākara says that both the sentences in Prativastūpamā may be prakṛta or both aprakṛta or one prakṛta and the other aprakṛta. He accepts Prativastūpamā based on dissimilarity. He is the first to analyse this variety of Prativastūpamā. He says that the dissimilar statement implies a similar statement; the mere presence of a negative word like 'ṇa' is not enough to give rise to dissimilarity. The dissimilar statement should consist of a sense which is contradictory to the sense expressed in the prakṛta sentence. Jagannātha is influenced by his views. This is seen in his discussion on dissimilar illustration.
Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha and Appayya follow Ruyyaka in the treatment of Prativastūpañā. Nāmaṣṭya, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha have illustrated Kālāprativastūpañā.

(4) Drṣţānta:

Prakṛtvākyārthaghatākanāmpamānanādīni śāchantadārmaśya ca timbapratibimbabhāve Drṣţāntaḥ.

In Drṣţānta all the objects like the upamāna etc. forming prakṛta sentence - sense and the common property are connected by bimbapratibimbabhāva i.e. reflective correspondence with those forming the aprakṛta sentence - sense. In bimba pratibimbabhāva, two distinct properties are mentioned in two sentences separately by two different words. These properties are mutually similar. Bimbapratibimbabhāva exists not between the properties, but also between the other objects mentioned in the two sentences. Drṣţānta is to be distinguished from Prativastūpañā on the ground that the common property in Drṣţānta is bimbapratibimbabhāvapanna, while it is suddha sāmānyarūpa in Prativastūpañā.
Jayaratha distinguishes the figure Drṣṭānta from Prativastūpama in a different way. He says that the aprakṛta is mentioned in Prativastūpama, in order that it may be apprehended as similar to the prakṛta. In Drṣṭānta, the aprakṛta is mentioned in order to make the prakṛta clearer. It shows that an object resembling the prakṛta object is present elsewhere also. The aprakṛta here is not meant for showing its similarity with the prakṛta.

This way of distinguishing these two figures is not accepted by Jagannātha. The prakṛta and the aprakṛta, when stated together, will give rise to the same effect i.e. the comprehension of similarity in both the places. The clarification of the prakṛta by showing that an object resembling it is present elsewhere also, is nothing but similarity. When the other factors are the same, a converse of Jayaratha’s view is also possible. Thus it can be said that similarity is apprehended in Drṣṭānta and the prakṛta is clarified in Prativastūpama. Jayaratha, in explaining 'abdhirlaṅghita!', has remarked that the poet intends to convey the similarity of 'crossing the ocean' with worshipping the Divine speech. This remark contradicts his own statement that similarity is not apprehended in Drṣṭānta. Thus the line of demarcation drawn by the ancients is correct.

Drṣṭānta also arises from dissimilarity.
Dṛṣṭānta is defined by Udbhata. It is not defined by Bhāmasa, Daṇḍin and Vāmana. Udbhata has given term pratibimba. He gives only one variety of Dṛṣṭānta and does not distinguish between the varieties based on similarity and dissimilarity. Rudrata says that in Dṛṣṭānta based on dissimilarity, either the prakṛta may be mentioned first and a similar aprakṛta be stated in the following line or the aprakṛta may be mentioned first and a similar prakṛta be stated in the following line. Mamata says that the bimbapratibimbabhāva exists, not only between the two properties, but also between the objects mentioned in the two sentences. Dṛṣṭānta may spring from similarity or dissimilarity according to Mamata. Ruyyaka, Sōbhakara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha, Appayya and Jagannātha follow Mamata.

(5) Nidarsana:

Upāttayorarthayorārthābheda aupasyaparyavasāyī Nidarsanā.

There is an implied abheda of the objects mentioned in words, in Nidarsanā. This abheda ultimately brings out the similarity of the objects. The word 'Upāttayoh' in the definition excludes Atisāyokti and suggests Rūpaka where the abheda is implied. The word 'ārthah' excludes Vācyā Rūpaka. Nidarsana is different from
Visistopama where not only the visesanas but the visesyas are also bimbapratibimbabhavapanna. In Nidarsanā the visesyas are not bimbapratibimbabhavapanna. The visesanas must be bimbapratibimbabhavapanna. This is the definition of S'rauti Nidarsanā.

Nidarsanā is divided into (A) Padarthanidarsanā and (B) Vākyārthanidarsanā. The latter is divided into (a) Ekavākyagā and (b) Anekavākyagā. In Padarthanidarsanā, the properties of the upamāna and the upameya are comprehended as identical. This identity is implied. As this type of identification is apprehended between padarthas, this variety of Nidarsanā is known as Padarthanidarsanā. Bimbapratibimbabhava takes place in Nidarsanā only if there are visesanas. In Vākyārthanidarsanā, definite objects belonging to the prakṛta dharmā, are identified. The different objects belonging to the upamāna and the upameya are bimbapratibimbabhavapanna, and the identification is implied.

In Vākyārthanidarsanā the visesanas are mentioned. The implied identification of these visesanas can be clearly understood. In Padarthanidarsanā, the word 'sobha' or 'līlā', though mentioned once, should be understood to belong to the upamāna, and the upameya, and the implied abheda of these two 'sobha's results into the apprehension
of similarity, giving rise to the figure Nidarsanā.

Jagannātha suggests a change in the definition of Padārthanidarsanā. Padārthanidarsanā may be defined as the superimposition of the properties of the upamāna on the properties of upameya or vice versa. The definition of Vākyārthanidarsanā is not too broad; it is not applicable to Rūpakadhvani, because Rūpaka (abheda) is subordinate in Vākyārthanidarsanā, while it is principal in Rūpakadhvani. In Padārthanidarsanā either there is the abheda of the properties of the upamāna in those of the upameya or there is the abheda of the properties of the upameya in those of the upamāna. In Rūpaka and Atisayokti there is the abheda of the upameya in the upamāna. In Atisayokti, the upameya is swallowed, while in Nidarsanā, the upameya is not swallowed. Again, the subject and the predicate are definite and therefore, cannot be changed in Rūpaka. In Nidarsanā they may be changed - the subject can be the predicate and the predicate can be the subject.

The figure in the verse 'tvatpadanakha.....', is Vākyārthanidarsanā according to Rūyaka. Rūyaka remarks that when a sentence - sense is superimposed on another sentence - sense by samānādhikaranya, the figure is Nidarsanā, which is based on impossible connection. This is not accepted by Jagannātha because the figure in
"tvatpādamsakha....." is Vākyārtharūpaka based on bimba-pratibimbabhāva, as there is the superimposition of one sentence - sense on another. If "tvatpādamsakha....." is treated as an instance of Vākyārthānīdārṣāna, Vākyārtharūpaka will have no scope. It cannot be argued that this verse cannot be an instance of Rūpaka as it contains bimbapratibimbabhāva. Bimbapratibimbabhāva is possible in Rūpaka also. Superimposition, having abheda at its root is the essence of Padārtharūpaka, while it is not the essence of Padārthānīdārṣāna. Vākyārtharūpaka cannot be dismissed. Both Nidārṣāna and Rūpaka are distinct figures, and therefore should be treated as separate figures.

Ruyyaka has defined Nidārṣāna as 'saṃbhavata asaṃbhavata va vastusāmbandhena gamyamanam upamam Nidārṣāna'. Following him Appayya has defined Nidārṣāna as 'vākyārthayoh sādṛṣayorikyāropo Nidārṣāna'. These definitions are too wide, because they are applicable to Rūpaka and Aṭisayekti. It cannot be argued that these are the definitions of Vācyā Nidārṣāna, because then it may also be argued that Upanā is expressed in 'mukham candra iva', it is suggested in 'mukham candra', and therefore it is not necessary to accept Rūpaka as a separate figure. Implied abheda is the essence of Nidārṣāna. The abheda of the agents is expressed in words and it implies the abheda of their actions Vākyārthānīdārṣāna.
Nāgāda says that the instance of Nidarsanā, cited by Jagannātha, may also be treated as an instance of suggested Rūpaka. This also will not leave any scope for Nidarsanā. If Nidarsanā is accepted, suggested Vākyārtharūpaka will have no scope. Again, the abheda of agents in Jagannātha's illustration gives rise to Rūpaka but the abheda of their actions does not give rise to any figure. Thus mere suggestion cannot give rise to a new figure. If Jagannātha regards Vākyārtharūpaka as a figure because of his regard for the ancients and states that Vākyārtharūpaka arises when the abheda is suggested and Rūpaka arises when the abheda is expressed, then he should not disturb the concepts formed by the ancients and should accept Nidarsanā as an alāṃkāra.

It must be said that Jagannātha's criticism is unnecessary and Nāgāda is justified in his criticism of Jagannātha's view.

'Tvat pādanakha' is an illustration of Drstānta according to some. This view is rejected by Jagannātha. The two sentences constituting Drstānta are independent of each other, though they are bimbapratibimbabhavapanna. The two sentences in 'tvatpāda......' are interrelated. The figure in that verse, therefore is Vākyārtharūpaka.
Nidarsana may also be based on possible connection.

It is illustrated in the instance 'cudāmanipade dhatta...'. Here the abheda of the agents of the actions, (instructing and bearing) is expressed in words and implies the abheda of the actions. It is possible for the mountain to instruct others in hospitality by bearing the sun on the head. The Nidarsana therefore is based on possible connection. It cannot be said that the figure here is implied Utpreksa. Utpreksa is not based on natural possibility, while this variety is based on a possible connection, which is real.

' Cudāmanipade....' is an instance of Nidarsana based on possible connection if the view of the grammarians is followed. They believe that the agent is the ʻasraya of the action mentioned by words, and the 'nic' here conveys favourableness. Thus the mountain can be the agent of the action of instruction and bearing. This implies the abheda of the actions— instructing and bearing—and ultimately results in similarity. The Naiyāyikas believe that bodhana here conveys that the mountain is the ʻasraya of bodhanānukulaśatna. The mountain is not sentient and therefore cannot be the agent of instructing, according to this view. Thus as a thing, not possible by itself, is imagined here, the figure is Pratīyamanā Utpreksa according to the Naiyāyikas.
In verses like 'hālāhalaṃ khalu.....' the abheda of the agents is expressed in words and it implies the abheda of actions. The figure therefore is Nidars'ana according to the Naiyāyikas because they believe that the viśeṣya is a word in the nominative case. The figure, however, is Rūpaka according to the grammarians, because they consider action as the principal viśeṣya in a sentence. The abheda of two actions is vācyā and the figure therefore is Rūpaka according to them.

Asambhavadvastumūla Nidars'ana is possible only if the Naiyāyikas are followed because the expressed abheda of the agents will lead to the abheda of actions. Instances of Asambhavadvastumūla Nidars'ana are instances of Rūpaka according to the grammarians because they believe that the abheda of actions is expressed. Sambhavadvastumūla Nidarsāna is possible only if the grammarians are followed. Instances of Sambhavadvastumūla Nidarsāna are instances of Partīyamanā Utpreksā according to the Naiyāyikas.

Bhāmaha defines Nidarsanā as

Kriyayaiva viśiṣṭasya tadarthasyopadarsanāḥ

Jñeyā Nidarsanā nāma yaḥ eva vavamābhirvinā.

Dandin calls it Nidars'anam. Nidars'anam takes place when a similar good or bad consequence is exhibited by connecting a thing with another object.
S'obhākara defines Nidarsanā as 'asati sambandhe Nidarsanā'. He does not admit Nidarsanā based on possible connection. He also believes that in Nidarsanā the properties of the upamāna may be apprehended in the upameya or the properties of the upameya are apprehended in Upamāna. The figure in 'Tvpatādankha....' is Vākyārtharūpaka according to S'obhākara and he criticizes Ruyyaka for citing it as an illustration of Nidarsanā. S'obhākara distinguishes between Kūpaka and Nidarsanā. He says that Kūpaka is based on abheda. This abheda may be expressed or implied. In Nidarsanā there is an additional characteristic – absence of connection – over and above abheda. Nidarsanā is also different from Sambandhe asambandha Atisayokti because there is implied abheda in Nidarsanā, while in Sambandhe asambandha Atisayokti the abheda is not implied. Jagannātha follows S'obhākara to a certain extent and says that in 'Tvpatādankha....' the figure is Vākyārtharūpakā. Jagannātha believes that implied abheda, which is distinct from āropa and adhyavasāna, is the essence of Nidarsanā. S'obhākara admits a figure Pratimā and defines it as 'anyādārma-yogādārthamaupamyam Pratimā'; this figure resembles Nidarsanā to a certain
Vidyānātha follows Ruyyaka. He, however, does not admit Nidarsanā based on possible connection. He does not divide Nidarsanā into Padārthavṛtti or Vākyārthavṛtti. Visvanātha and Appayya follow Ruyyaka. Appayya follows Dāṇḍin to a certain extent in his second variety of Nidarsanā where an action exhibits good or bad things.

It is interesting to note that though Bhamaha, Dāṇḍin, and Vāmana define Nidarsanā differently, their illustrations are the instances of sambhavadvastusaṃbandhā Nidarsanā of the later writers. Vāmana's definition shows that Nidarsanā is not based on similarity according to him. Thus while Bhamaha, Dāṇḍin and Vāmana accept only sambhavadvastusaṃbandhā Nidarsanā, Śobhakara and Vidyānātha accept only asambhavadvastusaṃbandhamuḷā Nidarsanā.

A systematic treatment is given to Nidarsanā by Ruyyaka who gives a scientific definition of Nidarsanā and gives all the divisions and subdivisions in details. Ruyyaka is followed by most of the later rhetoricians, including Jagannātha.

Jagannātha has not given the two main varieties in the beginning. He gives a general definition of Nidarsanā, illustrates Ekavākyagatā, Bhinnavākyagatā and Padārthagatā, and then remarks - 'evam saṃbhavadvastuṇibandhamuḷā Padārtha - vākyārthanida Ṛnu daśita'.
So only at the end of the discussion of these varieties, it is known that these are the varieties of Nidarsana based on impossible connection. Jahannatha then proceeds to discuss Nidarsana based on possible connection.

It is seen that the first variety can be a variety of Nidarsana only if the Naiyayikas are followed, and the second variety can be so only if the Grammarians are followed. This is rather inconsistent, and it is surprising that Jagannatha, consciously allows this inconsistency to creep in his treatment. Jagannatha only mentioned the views of Naiyayikas and Grammarians but does not clearly follow any one of the two exclusively. It seems that the regard for the ancients once again compels him to follow the ancient writers - especially Udbhata and Jadran. Because they have admitted both these varieties, he admits them. It is for this reason that he gives both the varieties and does not consistently follow either the Naiyayikas alone or the Grammarians alone. Nagesa is justified when he remarks - 'Pracinasatuvighatanam vyarthameva' - about Jagannatha.

(6) Vyatireka:

Upamanadupameyasya gunavisesavattvenotkarso Vyatirekah.
The upameya is superior to the upamāna in Vyatireka as it possesses some special qualities. The word gunavattvena excludes the figure Pratīpa. In Pratīpa the superiority of the upameya consists in its being the upamāna. The superiority is not due to dissimilarity in Pratīpa as finally the similarity of the two is apprehended. Vyatireka does not consist merely in the inferiority of the upamāna, or in conveying that the upameya possesses some additional qualities. These two must imply the superiority of the upameya. Vyatireka does not aim at the absence of connection. Absence of connection may be brought out even when the upameya is represented as inferior to the upamāna. This is, however, a fact and there is nothing striking in it. The absence of connection in Vyatireka, therefore, must be brought out by representing the upameya as superior to the upamāna.

The dissimilarity can be shown by representing the superiority of the upameya or by the inferiority of the upamāna. Vyatireka is divided into four varieties: (A) when both the superiority of the upameya and the inferiority of the upamāna are expressed, (B) when both these are not mentioned (C) when only the superiority of the upameya is mentioned and (D) when only the inferiority of the upamāna is mentioned. The Upamā in all these four varieties may be (a) S'rauti (b) Arthī or (v) implied. Vyatireka is thus divided into twelve varieties. All these twelve varieties are possible in S'leṣa also.
Vyatireka has thus, twenty four varieties. These are the divisions
given by the ancient rhetoricians. When only one cause of Vyatireka
is mentioned (i.e. either only superiority of the upameya or only the
inferiority of the upamāna,) the other is implied. When neither of
these two is mentioned, both are implied.

When Vyatireka is based on Ślesa, three varieties, in which
the Upanā may be Śrautī, Ārthī or implied are not very common when
both the causes are not mentioned. In these varieties the sliṣṭa words
themselves bring out another sense, which is dissimilar. When the
causes of dissimilarity are not mentioned, Vyatireka will have no scope.
It is true that words like dvija, surālaya etc. are sliṣṭa and Vyatireka
will arise, when they are present as upamāna and upameya, but then the
dissimilarity also will be expressed by these words, and they will not
be instances where the causes are not mentioned.

Though dissimilarity is the essence of Vyatireka, Vyatireka
is based on Upanā. Though the upamāna and upameya are represented
as dissimilar in a particular property which gives superiority to the
upameya, they are similar in other respects. This resemblance in
general is always intended by the poet, and the superiority of the
upameya is always based on this general resemblance. When A is said to be superior to B in point of wealth, it is implied that A and B are similar in points of learning, beauty, high birth etc. Thus Vyatireka is based on similarity. The similarity however, is not striking as the charm arises out of the superiority of the upameya. This is the view of the ancient writers.

The denial of similarity is expressed sometimes in words and the superiority of the upameya and the inferiority of the upamāna are implied by this expressed denial. The superiority of the upameya is sometimes expressed and it implies the inferiority of the upamāna and the denial of similarity. Sometimes the inferiority of the upamāna is expressed and it implies the superiority of the upameya and the denial of similarity. All the three may also be implied sometimes. Implied Vyatireka is different from suggested Vyatireka. Some incompatibility is present in implied Vyatireka and the expressed sense becomes compatible only when the implications are taken into account. In suggested Vyatireka the upamāna or its adjectives are not mentioned. The adjectives of the upameya are complete by themselves in giving the relevant sense. These adjectives, however, are significant, and suggest the superiority of the upameya to some other dharmā. Thus, there is no incompatibility
in the expressed sense in suggested Vyāsaṭa.

Rāyaka considers dissimilarity to be the essence of Vyāsaṭa. He therefore, admits Vyāsaṭa in cases where the upānyaya is represented as inferior to the upānyuṣa also and cites the verse ‘Keśūnā Keśūnā.....’ as an illustration. Jayaratha first mentions the pūrvapakṣa. According to the Pūrvapakṣa there is no strikingness in representing the upānyaya as inferior to the upānyuṣa. Again the unsteadiness of youth is to be brought out. This can be brought out only when it is represented as superior to the moon in point of unsteadiness. The moon may return but the youth does not.

Jayaratha contends that youth is inferior to the moon, because it cannot return. The matter in hand is the pacification of anger. From the viewpoint of the matter in hand also the inferiority of the upānyaya should be established. The lady will give up her anger only if she is explained that the youth cannot return like the moon. This inferiority of the youth thus suits the rasa also. The variety in which the inferiority of the upānyaya is established should also be admitted.
Jagannatha criticizes Jayaratha's view. The upamaya (youth) is represented as superior to the upama (moon) in the above instance. Moon comes again and again and therefore does not deserve much importance. Youth cannot return and is therefore more valuable. It is not fit for the lady to waste youth. The matter in hand is thus nourished only if the superiority of the upamaya (youth) over the upama (moon) is understood. The superiority of youth in point of other properties like giving happiness, which are not mentioned, also nourish the matter in hand. The inferiority of the upamaya, ultimately brings out its superiority.

Appayya follows Ruyyaka and cites 'raktastvam....' as an illustration where the inferiority of the upamaya over the upama (asoka tree) is established. The figure in this verse is not Vyatireka according to Jagannatha. Jagannatha believes that the figure in the first three lines is Upam and it is given up in the last line, as giving up of Upam suits the rasa. Dhanikara has also cited the verse as an illustration where the asokabahana is given up for the sake of rasa. Harinatha also accepts Vyatireka only when the superiority of the upamaya is established.

Thus, the inferiority of the upamaya can not give rise to Vyatireka according to Jagannatha. If somehow, the variety where the inferiority
of upameya is established, is to be accepted, then it should have some special strikingness.

Nāgās'e defends Appayya. He says that Vyatireka consists in showing that the upameya is different from the upamāna. Vyatireka may sometimes lead to the superiority of the upameya or to the inferiority of the upameya or to neither of these two. In 'raktastvam.....' the Vyatireka results into the inferiority of the upameya. Though the upameya is superior to the upamāna in being sentient and sensitive the insensibility of the Aśoka tree is presented as a good point. Sorrow is not a very good feeling, and the speaker is a person who is separated from his beloved. The speaker experiences sorrow while the tree does not. Thus the inferiority of the upameya is brought out. Jagannātha is thus wrong when he interprets ' raktastvam.....' as an illustration where the figure Upamā is given up.

It can be said that both Jagannātha and Nāgās'e are right in their own way. If the context is taken into consideration, Nāgās'e's interpretation seems to be better.

Appayya has cited 'dṛḍhatara.....' as an illustration of Anubhayaparyavasāyivyatireka. The figure in this verse is suggested
Upama according to Jagannatha, Vyatireka cannot be the figure here as neither the superiority nor the inferiority of the upameya is apprehended here. No property which can establish the superiority of the upameya is mentioned here. The long letter -ā' (in the word Kṛpāṇa) cannot bring out the superiority of the upameya. The two senses (form, and the long letter -ā' conveyed by the word ākārte) are identified. This word, therefore, cannot establish the superiority of the upameya. Slesa here gives the common property. The slesa in the word ākārte does not make the Upamā ineffective. If the poet had intended Vyatireka he would have said that the difference between kṛpāṇa and kṛpāna is only based on the long letter -ā. Slesa therefore, is not meant for the development of Vyatireka. It identifies the long letter -ā' (which was the only point of dissimilarity) with 'form' and thereby gives rise to the similarity between the sword and the miser and avoids dissimilarity. The inferiority of the upameya also is not brought out. Thus the figure is suggested Upamā.

Nagesa says that the Slesa here does not establish the abheda of the upameya and the upamāna. The word 'bheda' in the verse shows that identification is not intended here. Amubhayaparyavasāna means that the Vyatireka results neither into the superiority nor into the inferiority of the upameya. Under these circumstances, Vyatireka cannot be an alamkāra, giving rise to strikingness. Nagesa, however,
agrees with Jagannātha and says that the figure is not Vyatireka, but suggests Upāśa. Though the miser and the sword are distinct in points of the long letter \( \text{ā} \) and 'form' they are similar in other respects. This is how Nāgasa explains suggested Upāśa here. Jagannātha says that the miser and the sword are similar, because of the properties mentioned in the first line. The difference in point of long letter \( \text{ā} \) does not matter, as the long letter \( \text{ā} \) is identical with 'form'.

Vyatireka can spring from other figures also.

The common property in Vyatireka may be anugāmi, bimbapatibimbabhūvāpanna and sūdā sānāñyarūpa. Vyatireka may also be connected with abheda. Bhāmaka and Vāmana hold that the superiority of the upameya is established over the upamāna in Vyatireka. Dandīn and Udbhata hold that in Vyatireka, the upamāna and the upameya are distinguished. Udbhaṭa says that the sources of difference may be mentioned or may not be mentioned. Vyatireka may also arise from dissimilarity and slesa. The definitions given by Dandīn and Udbhata are not very clear; only the upameya is established to be superior to the upamāna in all the illustrations given by Dandīn. Rudrāta clearly states that the superiority of the upameya and the upamāna give rise to
Vyatireka and that the sources may be mentioned separately or together. Marmata follows Vaman and holds that only the superiority of the upamāna gives rise to Vyatireka. He gives twenty four divisions of Vyatireka. The causes in Vyatireka are mentioned in the first variety. Three more varieties arise when either of the causes is not mentioned and when both are not mentioned. The similarity in all these varieties may be mentioned, implied or suggested. Thus there are twelve varieties. All these twelve varieties are also possible when Vyatireka arises from Slesa. Marmata thus gives twenty four varieties of Vyatireka. Ruyyaka follows Audrata and holds that the superiority of the upāmāna, as well as the superiority of the upamāna, can give rise to Vyatireka. He does not accept the divisions given by Marmata. Jayaratha adds that the common property in Vyatireka may be anugami, vastuprativastubhavapana and sūdha sāmānyarūpa.

Sobhākara criticizes Ruyyaka for admitting Vyatireka when the upamāna is established to be superior to the upamāna. He says that there is no charm in presenting the upamāna as superior to the upamāna as this is too wellknown. Sobhākara therefore holds that Vyatireka arises only when the upamāna is represented to be superior to the upamāna. Sobhākara holds that Vyatireka arises also when the upamāna is represented as unfavourable to the upamāna. He gives another variety
of Vyatireka where also a member is represented as not possessing the quality which is possessed by the class to which it belongs. This may be shown in two ways: (1) either the quality possessed by the class may be represented as not possessed by the member or (2) the member may be represented as possessing altogether different properties. It must be said that all these are merely different ways of establishing the superiority of the upameya over the upamāna and should not therefore be treated as separate varieties of Vyatireka. Vidyānātha, Visvanātha and Appayya follow Ruyyaka in holding that Vyatireka may also take place when the upamāna is established as superior to the upameya, Vidyānātha does not give the divisions of Vyatireka, Visvanātha, following Mammata, gives twenty four varieties of Vyatireka, when the upameya is established as superior to the upamāna. He adds that all these divisions are also possible when the upamāna is represented as superior to the upameya. Vyatireka is thus divided into forty eight varieties by Visvanātha. Appayya does not give the divisions of Vyatireka, but he gives a third variety of Vyatireka and calls it Anubhayaparyavasyayī for which he is criticized by Jagannātha.

Jagannātha follows Mammata and admits Vyatireka only when the superiority of the upameya is established over the upamāna. Following Mammata, he gives twenty four divisions of Vyatireka but the aptly remarks that the three varieties where both the superiority of the upameya
and the inferiority of upamāna are omitted in Ślesa, should not be accepted.

Like 'limpativa.... kṣīnaḥ kṣīnopi.....' is another piece which has become the centre of controversy. Rudrata has cited it as an illustration showing that the, upamāna—moon—is superior to the upameya—youth—as the moon can come again while youth cannot. Buyyaka, Jayamatha and Viśvanātha have followed Rudrata. Maumata, Sebhākara and Jagannātha on the other hand hold that the unsteadiness of the youth is the upameya here and as the youth is more unsteady than the moon the superiority of the upameya over the upamāna is established here.

(7) Sahokti

Gunapradhānabhāvavacchinasadārthasambandhah Sahoktih.

In Sahokti the connection with the sense of 'saha' is characterized by the relation of principal and subordinate. This connection should be charming. The ancient writers say that Sahokti has for its essence Atisāyokti. This Atisāyokti may be of the form of (1) the inversion of the order of cause and effect, (2) the
ascertainment of identification based on slesa or (3) pure ascertainment of identification. Sahokti cannot take place in the absence of gunapradhānabhāva. If all the objects are principally connected with the action, the figure is Dīpaka or Hulyayogita. Sahokti is suggested when words like Saha are absent. The apradhānabhāva (absence of being principal), however, is expressed. The instrumental case denotes apradhānatva. The apradhānabhāva therefore, is always expressed in Sahokti, even when words like 'saha' or 'saka' are absent. The principal object is prakṛta here and the subordinate object is aprakṛta. The strikingness in Sahokti arises from Atisayokti. 'Putraṇa sahāgataḥ pita' therefore cannot be an instance of Sahokti, because there is no Atisayokti in it.

After discussing Sahokti according to the ancient writers, Jagannātha gives his own views. In 'tavakoporināśena jāyate yugapannṛpa' the figure is Atisayokti because the cause and the effect are represented as arising simultaneously. In 'tava kopor ināśena sahaiva nṛpa jāyate, ' arināsā is subordinated but the strikingness arises because the cause and the effect arise simultaneously. Thus, though the latter is an instance of Sahokti, the strikingness arises because of Atisayokti and not because of gunapradhānabhāva. As the two give rise to the same strikingness, they should not be supposed to be instances of two different alāṅkāras,
for the divisions of alamkāras are based on strikingness. Thus when Sahokti is based on the last variety of Atiśayokti, the charm arises because of the last variety of Atiśayokti. Sahokti should not be treated as a separate figure in these instances. Though figures like Rupaka have similarity as their essence they have some special charm, and the similarity is subordinate to this charm. In Sahokti, which has got the last variety of Atiśayokti as its essence, Sahokti has no charm of its own and the charm arising out of Atiśayokti is principal. Thus Sahokti, when based on the last variety of Atiśayokti, should not be treated as a separate figure.

When Sahokti is based on the first variety of Atiśayokti (ascertainment of identity) the ascertainment of identity embellishes Sahokti and is therefore subordinate to Sahokti; here is principal. It has its own charm and therefore deserves to be a separate figure. The second reason of treating Sahokti as a separate figure when it is based on abhedādhyavasāna is that the ascertainment of identity is only atiśaya and not the figure Atiśayokti. Such an identity is apprehended in Ślesa also. Atiśayokti consists in nigaraṇa i.e. when the upameya is swallowed by the upamāna. When Sahokti is based on abhedādhyavasāna the upameya is not swallowed up, but is mentioned separately. Sahokti therefore is based on atiśaya and not on Atiśayokti. Atiśaya is present in the common property and thus gives
rise to many figures. Ruyyaka, therefore, is not correct when he says that one of the varieties of Sahokti is based on the inversion of the sequence of cause and effect.

The opponent may argue that Sahokti may be included into Dīpaka or Tulyayogī ṭā because Sahokti does not possess charm enough to be ranked as a separate figure. In Dīpaka and Tulyayogī ṭā the upamāna and the upameya are principal when they are connected with the property like action or quality. In Sahokti one object is principal and the other is subordinate. This is the only point of distinction and if such insignificant distinctions are taken into account there will be endless Alākāras.

Jagannātha's answer to the opponent is that such an argument only shows a lack of understanding on the part of the opponent. The guṇapradhānabhāva in the connection has a charm of its own. The ancient writers have treated Sahokti as a separate figure as they have apprehended a special charm in it. Sahokti based on abhedādhyāvasāna should be accepted as a separate figure on the authority of the ancient writers.
Hagesa remarks that in Sahokti based on the inversion of the order of cause and effect also, a special charm is experienced in gunapradhānābhāva. It must be said that though logically Hagesa's criticism is correct, Jagannath's view should be accepted, as the charm in Sahokti arises from the inversion of the sequence of cause and effect, when Sahokti is based on the last variety of Atiśayokti. Jagannath's judgment is based on experience, and experience may contradict logic.

Like action, quality may also be the common property in distinct Sahokti. Malasahokti takes place when many Sahokti are connected with only one upameya. Each Sahokti here should be distinct in points of property and upamāna. A difference in property alone, or upamāna alone, will not do. Each Sahokti should be distinct both in points of properties and upamānas.

Sahokti is defined by Bhamaha as follows:

Alyakāle kriye yatra vastudvayasadāraye
Padenaikena kathyete Sahoktih aā matā yathā.

Dandin defines it as a conjunctive statement of qualities and actions. Udāhaṇa and Vāmana follow Bhāmaha. Rudrata treats Sahokti twice.
Once with figures based on vāstava and then with figures based on similarity. He subdivides Sahokti in both the places; Rudrata does not realise that Atisayokti underlies Sahokti. He has therefore, to define it differently at both the places so that the different definitions may cover all the instances of Sahokti. Hammata follows Bhāmaha.

Huyyaka gives a scientific definition of Sahokti. He shows that Sahokti is based on similarity and that there is gunapradhānabhāva, among the different objects in Sahokti. There is another contribution of Huyyaka in the development of Sahokti. He says that Sahokti is always based on Atisayokti. Either the inversion of the order of cause and effect or ascertenement of identity, based on Slesa etc. are always found at the root of Sahokti. The sahitya in Sahokti may be between agents or objects etc. Sahokti may also be based on Ṣalyayogita and Sambandhe asambandha variety of Atisayokti according to Sobhākara. Sobhākara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha and Appayya follow Huyyaka. Viśvanātha illustrates Mālāsahokti.

Jayaratha adds that the common property in Sahokti may be suddhasāmānyarūpa or bimpapratinbhāvāpanna.
Jagannātha differs from Ruyyaka on certain points. He believes that Sahokti, when based on the inversion of the order of cause and effect does not deserve to be a separate figure.

Another important point in the treatment of Sahokti is the distinction between, atisāya and Atisāyokti, pointed out by Jagannātha. Jagannātha holds that atisāya consists in the ascertaining of identification. Atisayokti is nigaraṇa. Sahokti is based on atisāya and not on Atisayokti. Sahokti based on atisāya has its own independent charm. While Sahokti is based on Atisayokti according to Ruyyaka, it is based on atisāya according to Jagannātha.

Though criticizing Ruyyaka, Jagannātha is much indebted to Ruyyaka for the deep insight shown by him in the treatment of Sahokti, for, Jagannātha only advances a step further in the background prepared by Ruyyaka.

Like Visvanātha, Jagannātha also gives ṇālīsahokti.

(8) Vinokti:

Vinārthasambandha eva Vinoktih.

Vinokti arises when there is a connection with the sense of the word 'vinā'. The thing with which it is connected may be beautiful or not beautiful. Thus in Vinokti an object may be beautiful
without another or it may not be beautiful without another. Vimokti may be mixed with other figures also. Vimokti takes place, not only when the word 'vinā' is mentioned, but also when the sense of 'vinā' is conveyed by nayi and by words like rte, rahita or vikala.

Alamkārabhāṣyakāra defines Vimokti differently. Vimokti according to him arises when objects invariably connected, are stated as not connected. The view of Alamkārabhāṣyakāra is mentioned by Jayaratha also, but his work and name are not available.

It is said that this figure is charming only when it is connected with other figures. Vimokti may also be suggested.

Vimokti is not defined by the ancient rhetoricians Bhamaka, Udbhata, Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Rudrata. It is defined by Kammata. Ruyyaka follows Kammata and adds that Vimokti is possible even in the absence of the word 'vinā'. Sobhākara says that Vimokti is based on the figure Vināma when one object is represented as good without another, because two incompatible objects are presented together. The other variety of Vimokti, which takes place when one thing is represented as bad without another, is based on the figure Sama according to Sobhākara. Sobhākara also admits Vimokti, even in the absence of the word 'vinā'. Vidyāmātha, Viśvanātha and Appayya follow Ruyyaka.
Ruyyaka also gives a variety of Vinokti where two objects are mutually good or bad without one another.

Jagannātha quotes the definition given by Ālāmakārabhāṣyakāra, whose concept of Vinokti is quite different from that of the later rhetoricians.

Some scholars do not admit Vinokti as a figure based on similarity. However, the illustrations given by Māmāta, Ruyyaka and most of the rhetoricians following Ruyyaka show that there are many statements containing Vinokti and it may be said that these sentences are connected by similarity, as in all these sentences, something is represented as good or bad without the other.

(9) **Samāsokti**

Yatra prastutadharmiko vyavahārah sādhūrānavis esanamā.

In Samāsokti the behaviour of the prakṛta dharmi is apprehended as identical with the behaviour of the aprakṛta dharmi, which arises because of common adjectives. The word 'mātra' in the definition excludes Śābdasāktimiladhvani, in which, both the adjectives and the
substantives are paronomastic. The paronomastic substantive thus gives rise to the apprehension of the aprakṛta dharmi and thereby behaviour. The word 'dharmi' used twice in the definition is very significant. In Saṃsokti, the prakṛta dharmi is connected with two behaviours—the behaviour of the prakṛta and the behaviour of the aprakṛta. In S'lesa the substantive may be connected with two behaviours and both the behaviours may belong only to the prakṛta dharmi. The word 'dharmi', therefore, excludes S'lesa from the definition. In Aprastutaprasamsa, the behaviour of the aprakṛta is expressed in words while in Saṃsokti the behaviour of the aprakṛta is not expressed in words. The definition therefore does not cover Aprastutaprasamsa.

How does the apprehension of the aprakṛta arise? The ancient and the later rhetoricians explain this apprehension in different ways.

The ancients believe that the aprakṛta is apprehended by abhidha and implication. They cite the following illustration to explain this.
Vibodhayant karaspardain padminim mudritananam
Paripurnamuragaena pratarjat y bhaskarav.

The behaviour of the sun is apprehended by abhidhā. The aprakrta - awakening by touching with hand - is apprehended by abhidhā or vyānjanā. These two senses must be connected, because we apprehend the sun as a lover and the lotus-plant as a beloved. If these two senses are not connected, then the sentence will convey two principal senses, which, however, is faulty. If the two behaviours are superimposed on the sun, then also some incompatibility will arise as the two behaviours are not connected in any way. Somehow the apprehension of a beloved in the lotus-plant may be explained to be the result of Ślesa. But then the word bhāskara is not parenemastic and therefore the apprehension of a lover in the sun cannot be explained. The ancient writers, therefore say that the aprakrta is apprehended because of common adjectives. It implies a suitable sense, (a lover, a beloved etc.) becomes complete by itself, and then becomes identified with the prakṛta, so that the different parts of the aprakṛta are identical with the corresponding parts of prakṛta. Like Parinama, the aprakṛta serves the matter in hand only when it is identified with the prakṛta. By itself it gives rise to the apprehension of rasa. This is the view of the ancient writers.
This view is open to two objections. How can the aprakṛta be apprehended when the adjectives are not paronomastic? In 'nīsamukham cumbati candra eṣa', there is no Ślesa, and still the apprehension of the behaviour of a lover and his beloved does arise. How does this apprehension arise? Again, even if it be taken for granted that the lover is implied, how can it be said that the lover is identical with the sun? Another explanation, therefore, is suggested. The feminine gender in the word 'nīṣā', suggests the beloved. The masculine gender and the nominative case suggest the lover. This is proved by the fact that the apprehension of the lover and the beloved does not arise in 'nīsamukham cumbati candrikaisa', where there is only feminine gender, or, 'aharmukham cumbati candabhānuh' where there is only masculine gender. The behaviour of a lover and his beloved cannot be expressed by abhidhā, as abhidhā is restricted by context. The aprakṛta sense is suggested, and then identified with the prakṛta sense. As the suggested sense is subordinate to the expressed sense, instances of Samāsokti will be instances of guṇibhūtavyāṅga.

Ruyyaka suggests another explanation. He says that the aprakṛta is apprehended because of common adjectives. The behaviour of the aprakṛta is, however, apprehended as a determining attribute of the prakṛta. Thus there is a superimposition of
the behaviour of the *aprakṛta* on the *prakṛta*. Jagannātha puts this view on the horns of a dilemma. When the behaviour of the *aprakṛta* is superimposed on the *prakṛta* agent, is the *prakṛta* agent characterized by the agent of the *aprakṛta* behaviour or not? It cannot be characterized by the agent of the *aprakṛta* behaviour, because it means that the moon (in 'niśāmukhaṃ cumbati candrikaisā') is resorted by the *aprakṛta* behaviour i.e. the moon is resorted to by the behaviour which is similar to that of the lover i.e. the moon is similar to the lover. The poet, however, does not intend similarity here. He wants to show the identity of the two behaviours. Again, only the behaviour of the lover is superimposed on the moon. There is no charm in a superimposition of behaviour which does not refer to the *nāyikā* and which cannot therefore be the determining attribute of the *nāyaka*. The first horn of the dilemma, therefore, cannot be broken. The second horn also remains unbroken, because mere kissing, not connected with the lover, has no charm. Both the horns remain unbroken. Ruyyaka's view, therefore, is not correct logically.

Appayya follows Ruyyaka and says that the *aprakṛta* behaviour, apprehended because of common or similar adjectives, is superimposed on the *prakṛta* substantive. *Samāsokti* is to be distinguished from *Rūpaka*. In *Samāsokti*, there is no word expressive of the *aprakṛta*;
again there is no factor suggestive of the aprakṛta. In Rūpaka, the word expressive of the aprakṛta is present and consequently, Candratva is superimposed on mukha in 'mukham candrah'. The charm in Samāsokti lies in the superimposition of the behaviour of aprakṛta which is conveyed by adjectives. Both the prakṛta and the aprakṛta are equally prominent here, and either the superimposition of the aprakṛta on the prakṛta, or the superimposition of the prakṛta on aprakṛta is necessary. It is, however, proper to understand that in Samāsokti, there is a superimposition of the behaviour of the aprakṛta on the prakṛta substantive because the prakṛta substantive is expressed. There is no charm in the prakṛta as it is known to us. It gives rise to rasa only when it is connected with the behaviour of the aprastuta. The lover, though not expressed is suggested.

Jagannātha refutes this view. In Rūpaka, sbheda is the connection between two nouns. Hence the face and the moon are identified in Rūpaka. Again, the superimposition required a word expressive of the aprakṛta only when it is expressed. Such a word however, is not necessary in a suggested superimposition. In Samāsokti also the apprehension of the behaviour of aprakṛta, arising from Ślesa or vyahjanā does suggest the aprakṛta substantive. There are two kinds of suggestive elements: (1) implication and (2) suggestion. Of these, the first requires some incompatibility.
the second does not need any incompatibility. The aprakṛta may be suggested even when there is no incompatibility in the expressed sense. Again, Appayya also has to admit the apprehension of the aprakṛta substantive. This substantive should be identified with the prakṛta substantive by the relation of abheda. This interpretation is better than that of Appayya because Appayya has to accept the aprakṛta substantive as qualifying the aprakṛta behaviour. This implies the difference of moon and lover and there is no charm in attributing the mere aprakṛta behaviour to the prakṛta substantive.

Thus it is clear that the feminine and the masculine genders, aided by the adjectives suggest the beloved and the lover. If this is not accepted, Appayya will contradict Ruyyaka, whom he follows, and Jayaratha, the commentator on Ruyyaka's work. Both Ruyyaka and Jayaratha admit that the aprakṛta substantives characterize the prakṛta substantive. Appayya has said that the lover, suggested by the behaviour (kissing) characterizes only the behaviour. The lover cannot be a vīsesa of moon and cannot be connected with the moon by abheda, because there is no word expressive of the sense - 'lover'. Jagannatha contends that it can also be said that there is no word expressive of the sense - 'beloved'. The beloved
only characterizes the behaviour. This however, is not compatible. Kissing unconnected with the beloved, cannot be connected with the lover. The face may also be connected with the night only when the beloved is identified with the night. If Appayya accepts that the beloved is apprehended from the word 'nisā' because of the feminine gender, then he must admit that the lover is understood from the word 'candra' because of the masculine gender. Appayya's view also is put on the horns of a dilemma by Jagannatha. When the aprakṛta behaviour is superimposed on the prakṛta substantive, does the aprakṛta behaviour remain unconnected with the prakṛta behaviour or does it get identified with the prakṛta behaviour? If the two behaviours remain unconnected mutually, but are connected with the prakṛta substantive, then it will give rise to a fault. If the aprakṛta behaviour is identified with the prakṛta behaviour, then it will be connected with the prakṛta substantive by bheda. In this case, Appayya will have to admit that the superimposition takes place twice—once, when the two behaviours are identified and then, when the aprakṛta behaviour characterizes the prakṛta vīṣṇya. It is therefore, better to superimpose the aprakṛta behaviour on the prakṛta behaviour by abheda, because here the superimposition takes place only once. The prakṛta behaviour identified with the aprakṛta behaviour, is related to the aprakṛta substantive which is apprehended as identical with the aprakṛta substantive. The aprakṛta sense is
After refuting all the views, Jagannatha clearly shows how the two senses are connected in Samasokti. The parts of the prakṛta sentence, which are mentioned in words, get identified with the parts of the aprakṛta sentence. Then there arises an apprehension where the padarthas belonging to the prakṛta are related mutually with the padarthas belonging to the aprakṛta. On the basis of this apprehension, a mahāvākyārtha arises, which gives the identity of the prakṛta and aprakṛta senses.

Samasokti is divided into two varieties: (A) when the similarity of adjectives arises from ślesa and (B) when the adjectives are purely common. Each variety is divided into two when (a) the property (common to the aprakṛta) is mentioned or (b) an action (common to the aprakṛta) is mentioned. Samasokti has thus four varieties. The properties and the action may also be mentioned together.

Huyyaka has cited the following verse:
Tanvī manoramā bālā puspākṣā ī puspahāsinī
Vikāsameti subhaga bhavaddarsānamātrataḥ.
Ruyyaka then remarks that the behaviour of the creeper is understood here due to the similarity of adjectives. The reason for this is blooming which belongs entirely to the creeper. Blooming belongs to the girl only metaphorically. The behaviour of the creeper cannot be understood only from similar adjectives.

These remarks are criticized by Jagannatha. Ruyyaka himself says that the apprehension of creeper arises here due to blooming, which is connect with the creeper only. The definition of Samāsokti is not applicable here, because, in Samāsokti the apprehension of aprakṛta arises only because of similarity of adjectives. If it is argued that over and above the similar, adjectives, blooming also gives rise to the apprehension of the aprakṛta creeper, then the definition will extend to Ślesa also. The figure in the verse, is not Samāsokti, but suggested Rūpaka because the apprehension of the aprakṛta arises due to the special characteristics of the aprakṛta in suggested Rūpaka. In the present instance also, blooming, which belongs entirely to the creeper, gives rise to the apprehension of the aprakṛta in spite of the presence of the common adjectives. Jagannatha suggests another illustration to show that the aprakṛta may be apprehended by common adjectives only. Jayaratha, therefore, is wrong when he says that the aprakṛta is apprehended only when the property or action of the aprakṛta is mentioned when Samāsokti is based on common adjectives.
Similarity of visēsāras can also be brought about by adjectives containing implied similarity, according to Ruṣyaka. He cites the following illustration:

Dantaprāphūscitā pāṇipallavasābhinī
Kesāpāsalivindena suvesā harinekṣanā.

The compounds here may be dissolved in two ways. It may be dissolved as dantaprabhāsādṛśāṇī puspāṇī. The word 'suvesā', however goes only with the word 'harinekṣanā'. The compound 'dantaprabhāpupspacitā' is therefore dissolved as dantaprabhāhpuspāṇī iva so that the things connected with the lady are prominent and all the compounds in the verse are dissolved accordingly. The figure then is Upāṇā. Afterwards the compound may be dissolved in another way so that the creeper is apprehended (dantaprabhāsādṛśāṇipuspāṇī). The words 'pupspā', 'pallava' etc. imply the creeper. But the behaviour of the creeper cannot be superimposed on the lady as Samāsokti requires that the aprakṛtā should be apprehended from the similarity of adjectives. Here however, the creeper is implied by things connected with it. Thus the figure here cannot be Samāsokti. If we read the word 'prītā' instead of 'suvesā', then there is no factor which may be favourable or unfavourable for Upāma or Rūpaka and there will be therefore Sāṃsāyasāṅkara of the two. The figure now can be Samāsokti as the
apprehension of the creeper may arise if the compound is dissolved as dantaprabhāḥ puspāṇi iva. The similarity of adjectives arises from the sameness of words (dantaprabhāpuspacita etc.) though the compounds may be dissolved differently and give rise to different senses. If in this sandehasamkara, the compound is dissolved as dantaprabhāḥ eva puspāṇi, the figure is Rūpaka, and the identity of the creeper with the lady (haripekṣanā) will be implied, giving rise to Ekadesāvivartīrūpaka. Samāsokti, then, will have no scope.

Jagannātha severely criticizes this view. The apprehension of the creeper as an upamaṇa arises by Ekadesāvivartini Upamā, when in the Samsāyasamkara, dantaprabhāpuspacita is dissolved as dantaprabhāḥ puspāṇi iva. Samāsokti will have no scope here. It may be argued that Samāsokti is established here because Udbhata does not admit Ekadesāvivartini Upamā or Ekadesāvivarti Samkara. But Rūyaka himself admits Ekadesāvivartini Upamā; so this variety of Samāsokti based on aupamyagarbha adjectives should not be admitted. Aupamyagarbha adjectives may be present when Samāsokti arises owing to śīṣṭā adjectives or purely common adjectives. But they cannot give rise to Samāsokti independently. Thus there is Ekadesāvivartī Samkara, for those who accept Samsāyasamkara in such cases. For those who do not admit Samsāyasamkara, the figure is Ekadesāvivartini
Upama if the compound is dissolved as upamitasamāsa and Ekadesāvivartī
Rupaka if the compound is dissolved as vīseṣaṇasamāsa. The aprakṛta
is apprehended by any of these two; hence it is not necessary to
explain the apprehension of the aprakṛta in such cases, by
Aupamya-garbhā Samāsokti.

Jagannātha's views on the apprehension of aprakṛta in
Samāsokti and refutation of Ruyyakṣa's view show his profound
scholarship combined with a sensitive imagination, which are
necessary for any good critic.

Appayya admits Samāsokti based on similarity and cites
the well known verse, 'purā yatra,.....' as its illustration. He
remarks that the prakṛta here is the description of the forest.
The aprakṛta cities etc. resorted by the families which have
experienced ups and downs - is understood due to similarity.
Jagannātha criticizes him on the ground that the essence of Samāsokti
(similarity of adjectives) being absent here, Samāsokti cannot be
the figure. The prakṛta behaviour should be identified with the
aprakṛta behaviour in Samāsokti. Here the changes in the trees etc.
are not apprehended as identical with changes in financial conditions
etc. in the families. The figure therefore cannot be Samāsokti.
Samāsokti may be divided into four kinds: (1) The behaviour of an object in ordinary life may be superimposed on the behaviour of an object in ordinary life, (2) Scientific processes may be superimposed on scientific processes, (3) The behaviour of any object in ordinary life may be superimposed on an object described in science and (4) The behaviour of an object described in science may be superimposed on objects described in ordinary life.

It must be said that this division is absolutely unnecessary as it has no strikingness.

Samāsokti may be mixed with many figures. In Utpreśa, Samāsokti lies at the root when the behaviour of insentients is attributed to the sentents vice versa.

Samāsokti is treated by all the ancient rhetoricians. Samāsokti arises from similar adjectives according to Bhāmaha and Udbhata. Dandin slightly differs from Bhāmaha as Samāsokti according to him, takes place, when the poet intends to describe some object from the statement of another object. He admits a variety based on similar adjectives which is the same as the one defined by Bhāmaha and Udbhata. Vāmana and Audrata differ from their predecessors.
as they believe that the upamāṇa is understood from the statement
of upamāṇa here. This however will be the definition of Aprastutap-
rasaṇgsā of others. Kammata believes that in Samāsokti the aprakṛta
is conveyed by the prakṛta from paronomastic adjectives. He thus
restricts the scope of Samāsokti. Ruyyaka is the first to treat
Samāsokti in detail. He tries to explain the apprehension of the
aprakṛta in Samāsokti and discusses fully the divisions of Samāsokti.
In Samāsokti the aprakṛta behaviour is apprehended as a determining
attribute of the prakṛta according to Ruyyaka. This view is
criticized by Jagannatha, who believes that the aprakṛta (substantive)
is identical with the prakṛta (substantive) in Samāsokti. Ruyyaka
divided Samāsokti into three varieties when the aprakṛta is
apprehended from (A) action (B) similar adjectives and (C) action
and adjectives. The second variety is divided into three subvarieties
as the adjectives may be (a) paronomastic, (b) common and (c) aupamya-
garbhā. The second subvariety is again divided into two: (a1) a
property may give rise to the superimposition (b1) an action may
give rise to the superimposition. The third subvariety is
further divided into two: it may be based on (a1) upamitasamāsa or
(b2) samkarasamāsa. Ruyyaka's divisions may be shown as follows:
of the behaviour of laukika objects on sāstrīya etc.) given by Ruyyaka without proposing any change. Jagannātha follows Sobhākara to a certain extent, as he accepts Samāsokti based on adjectives only. He differs from Ruyyaka and Sobhākara as he does not admit the variety based on aupamyagarbha adjectives. Samāsokti thus may be based on paronomastic adjectives, or common adjectives according to Jagannātha. Jagannātha follows Ruyyaka in dividing Samāsokti based on common adjectives when it is based on (1) properties and (2) actions. These varieties are possible when Samāsokti is based on paronomastic adjectives also according to Jagannātha. Ruyyaka however, does not admit these sub divisions when Samāsokti is based on paronomastic adjectives.

Jagannātha's division may be shown as follows:

Samāsokti

\[ \text{S'listavisesanamula} \quad \text{Suddhasadharaṇavisanamulā} \]

\[ \text{Dhrmapuraskāraṇa} \quad \text{Kāryapuraskāraṇa} \quad \text{Dhrmapuraskāraṇa} \quad \text{Kāryapuraskāraṇa} \]

A mixture of dharma and kārya may also give rise to Samāsokti according to Jagannātha. Jagannātha illustrates this variety only in connection
with Samāsokti based on Sadāreṇavisesaṇas. Jagannātha differs from Ruyyaka and Sobhākara in one point. He does not admit vyāvahāra-samāropā in Samāsokti. To a certain extent he is influenced by Jayaratha. Jayaratha says that the aprakṛta behaviour implies a dharmī and the prakṛta dharmī is distinguished by the aprakṛta dharmī. Jayaratha thus brings in the aprakṛta dharmī. Jagannātha also admits the aprakṛta dharmī, which according to him is suggested by adjectives and genders. He differs from Jayaratha and says that the aprakṛta dharmī is identified with the prastutādharmī. In short, Jagannātha admits rūpasemārope in Samāsokti. Jagannātha follows Jayaratha when Jayaratha says that aupamyagarbha adjectives cannot give rise to Samāsokti independently. Aupamyagarbha compounds may lead to Ekadesāvivartinī Upāna in conveying the aprakṛta according to Jayaratha. Jayaratha, however, defends Ruyyaka on the ground that Ruyyaka has admitted this variety out of respect for ancients.

Visvanātha follows Ruyyaka in the divisions of Samāsokti. He, however says that Samāsokti may arise from similarity of action, gender, and adjectives. He follows Jayaratha and arrives at the conclusion that aupamyagarbha adjectives cannot give rise to Samāsokti, though following Ruyyaka he discusses and illustrates Samāsokti based on aupamyagarbha adjectives. Jagannātha accepts Visvanātha’s view when he says that the genders suggest the aprakṛta dharmī in Samāsokti.
Vidyānātha and Appayya admit Samāsokti based on adjectives only. Vidyanātha accepts Samāsokti based on aupamyagarbha adjectives; Appayya does not admit this variety. The adjectives may be paronomastic, common or similar - according to Appayya. Jagannātha criticizes Appayya for the last variety. Nāgesa defends Appayya and say that Samāsokti may arise from similarity which is suggested from similar adjectives.

(10) Parikara:

Viṣeṣanāṇāṁ sabhiprāyatvam Parikaraḥ.

The strikingness in Parikara arises due to significant adjectives. Sabhiprāyatva consists in suggesting a striking sense which can either embellish or bring out the matter in hand. The suggested sense is subordinate to the expressed sense in Parikara.

A point is raised in connection with this figure. It is stated that a defect named Apuṣṭartha doesa arises when the adjectives do not nourish the matter in hand. The use of significant adjectives is only an absence of the above mentioned defect. Parikara, therefore should not be treated as an alamkāra.
Jayaratha and others believe that there should be many significant adjectives in Parikara. The strikingness arises because many adjectives are used significantly. A single significant adjective cannot give rise to this figure because it represents merely the absence of the defect Apuṣṭatā.

Jagannātha admits that many significant adjectives give rise to a special charm; he, however, does not admit that many significant adjectives form the essence of Parikara. A single significant adjective may give rise to strikingness in Parikara.

Appayya has remarked that in figures like Ślesa or Yamaka a single significant adjective may give rise to the figure Parikara as a single adjective gives rise to special strikingness; this implies an absence of fault named Apuṣṭārthatā. A single significant adjective may therefore, give rise to the figure Parikara. Jagannātha criticizes this remark. He asks a question: do significant adjectives give rise to special strikingness when Yamaka or any other figure of word is absent? If the answer is 'yes', then Parikara must be admitted as a figure, as special strikingness arises only out of a figure. If the answer is 'no', then Parikara should be discarded as a figure, irrespective of the presence or absence of Yamaka or other figure of word. The presence or absence of Yamaka has nothing to do with Parikara.
Jagannatha says that there are two characteristics of an alamkāra: (1) an alamkāra is charming and (2) it embellishes the principal sense. Absence of doṣa means absence of hindrances to strikingness. The characteristics of alamkāra and doṣabhāva are found together in this figure. Even though Parikara represents absence of defect, it is an alamkāra all the same. It is treated as an alamkāra in order to show that it is something more than absence of defect. Parallel instances can be shown, Samāsokti is an alamkāra, but it is also a variety of guṇībhūtavyāhgya.

Parikara is divided into two varieties: (1) it may contain a suggested sense which is subordinate in order that the expressed sense may be comprehended completely and (2) it may contain a suggested sense which embellishes the expressed sense. In both these varieties the suggested sense may be clearly apprehended like the expressed sense or may not be clearly apprehended. Parikara is thus divided into four varieties.

Parikara is not defined by the ancient writers Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhata and Vāmana. It is defined for the first time by Rudrata. Rudrata divides Parikara into four varieties: the significant adjectives may qualify the substantive which may consist of jāti, guṇa, kriya or dravya. Kannata believes that
many significant adjectives constitute Parikara. Ruyyaka, Sobhākara, Jayaratha, Vidyānātha, and Viśvanātha also believe that many significant adjectives are necessary in Parikara. Appayya and Jagannātha believe that one significant adjective may also give rise to the necessary strikingness, and Parikara therefore may develop even when there is a single significant adjective.

(11) Śḷēṣa:

Śṛutyaikāyamārthapratipādānāṃ Śḷēṣah.

Śleṣa is developed when many senses are expressed by one word or sound, which remains unchanged when heard. Śleṣa is divided into two varieties: (A) when many properties are presented and (B) when only one property is presented. The second variety is known as Āuddhasleṣa. The first variety is divided into two: (a) when there is an apprehension of many words and (b) when there is an apprehension of only one word. These two subvarieties are known as Sabhaṅgasleṣa and Abhaṅgasleṣa respectively. In all these three varieties: (1) both the senses may be prakṛta (2) both the senses may be aprakṛta (3) one of the senses may be prakṛta and the other may be aprakṛta. The substantive may or may not be paronomastic in (1) and (2). In (3) the word expressive of substantive should not be paronomastic.
Thus only the adjectives are paronomastic here. In this variety both
the prakṛta and the aprakṛta substantives should be mentioned in
words. This characteristic excludes Samāsokti. Thus there are
nine varieties of S'lesa.

S'lesa mostly enters into combination with other figures.

A question arises here. When S'lesa enters into combination with
other figures is it stronger than the other figures, mixed with other
figures or less powerful and therefore overshadowed by other figures ?

S'lesa is more powerful when it enters into combination with
other figures according to Udbhata. It has no inde pendent province of
its own. When two objects, either both prakṛta or both aprakṛta are
connected, the figure is Tulyayogita. When one of the objects is
prakṛta and the other aprakṛta, the figure is Dipaka. S'lesa,
thus, has no province of its own. When S'lesa is mixed with figures
like Upamā or रुपाकस an apparent apprehension of Upamā arises, but as
a matter of fact, the figure is S'lesa. S'lesa is thus more powerful
than other figures as it prevents the coagulation of figures like Upamā.

Others do not agree with this view. A badhaka has no province
of its own; S'lesa has a province of its own, in instances like
The figure here cannot be Tulyayogita, as there is no similarity between the two senses (Visnu and Siva) here. The figure here is only S'lesa, because the strikingness arises from the apprehension of two senses from one word. S'lesa, therefore has its province and therefore cannot be bādhaka. The other figures also have their own province. The apprehension of S'lesa is only apparent, while the apprehension of other figures is real. Had S'lesa been bādhaka, then the apprehension of all the other figures would have been obstructed. As S'lesa and other figures have their independent spheres, a co-existence of S'lesa and other figures should be admitted. A samkara of S'lesa with other figures may however, take place as is obvious from the designations Slistaparamparita or Slistasamāsokti. S'lesa thus cannot be without province, and thus it can never be a bādhaka. It is therefore mixed with other figures.

According to a third view, S'lesa is obstructed by other figures. A figure receives an independent existence and designation when it gives rise to a principal strikingness. When it becomes subordinate to some other figure, it looses its independent existence. S'lesa beautifies other figures. It is always subordinate to other figures and therefore cannot be an independent figure. S'lesa, thus
S'lesa is to be distinguished from Sabdasaktimūlaḍhvani.

The prakṛta and the aprakṛta substantives are also mentioned by paronomastic words in Sabdasaktimūlaḍhvani. Appayya says that only the Upama is suggested in Sabdasaktimūlaḍhvani. The aprakṛta is expressed by abhidhā. Though the prakṛta is apprehended first due to the context and the aprakṛta is apprehended due to paronomastic words, the apprehension of aprakṛta is not the result of vyanjana. In Samasokti also the aprakṛta is apprehended by S'lesa and not by vyanjana. This view is criticized by Jagannatha. Harrauta has said that vyanjana gives rise to the apprehension of a sense other than the expressed when the abhidhā of a word possessing more than one senses, is restricted. Appayya differs from Harrauta. The suggestion of Upama does not depend upon the restriction of abhidhā, as Upama is not obstructed even when the abhidhā is not restricted. Again the aprakṛta is never conveyed by abhidhā. Appayya himself has said that abhidhā is restricted. The context also restricts the abhidhā to the vācyartha. Vyanjana, therefore, must be accepted. Abhidhā cannot convey the sense, when there is any incompatibility while vyanjana can. The expressed sense does not
become compatible or incompatible in accordance with the speciality of speaker. The speciality of the speaker etc. is taken into account only in vyanjana. The aprakṛta sense therefore is not expressed by abhidhā. In Samāsokti also the aprakṛta is apprehended by vyanjana.

For this very reason, Samāsokti is treated as a variety of janabhataVyāṣṭigya poetry. Abhidhā has no scope when the aprakṛta is apprehended from etymology or tradition. The aprakṛta in such cases is always understood by vyanjana.

Another important point is then discussed. In rāgāyāto velgukarābhinirṣṭaḥ śyāmāsukheḥ cumbati cāru candraḥ the figure is Samāsokti. If the word candraḥ is replaced by the word rājā S'ābhasēktibhādāvani takes place. In both these instances the apprehension of the aprakṛta behaviour arises only due to the paronomastic adjectives. In the first case however, the suggested sense is regarded as subordinate, while in the second case, it is regarded as principal. As the prakṛta is principal here and as the aprakṛta embellishes the prakṛta in both the cases, the suggested sense should be regarded as subordinate in both the cases. The only difference between the two is that in the first case the substantive is not paronomastic while in the second case, it is paronomastic. This is not sufficient for regarding the suggested sense as principal in the second
case. Appayya and others may say that in Samāsokti there is only the superimposition of the behaviour of the aprakṛta while in dhvani there is the superimposition of the aprakṛta itself. Even if their view is accepted the aprakṛta should be regarded as subordinate in both the places as it embellishes the prakṛta. Samāsokti therefore, should be divided into two varieties: (A) when the substantives also are paronomastic and (3) when they are not paronomastic. It can also be said that S'abāsaktinūladvani should be treated as a variety of gunibhūtavyāngya.

Is Ślesa a figure of word or a figure of sense? Udbhata treats it as a figure of sense and divides it into Sabhanga and Abhanga. Kṣaṇata holds that the first two varieties are figures of words, as the figure is lost when the words are changed. The third variety (Śuddhaslesa) is a figure of sense as it depends on sense. Ruyyaka believes that Sabhangaślesa resides in two words; the two words though look like one as the lacquered wood appears to be single thing however, look like one as the lacquered wood appears to be single thing... Abhanga resides in two senses, i.e. two meanings are connected with one expression just as two fruits are connected with a single stem. Abhangaslesa therefore is a figure of sense according to Ruyyaka.
Though an independent figure, S\'lesa is helpful to other figures and thus brings in fresh charm in poetry.

Śrīmadha defines S\'lesa as follows:

Upanāvena yat-tatwa-punyasya sādhyate
Guna-kriyā-bhīyānāna ca śliṣṭam tadabhādhyate.

He calls it Śliṣṭa and adds that S\'lesa may be mixed with Sahokti. Bhāmāḷha's definition shows that S\'lesa is a figure of sense according to him. Dandin divides S\'lesa into Abhinnapada and Bhinnapada, which are Abhaṅgaślesa and Subhaṅgaślesa of the later rhetoricians. Udbhata treats it as a figure of sense. He divides it into two varieties which correspond to the Abhaṅga and Subhaṅga Śleṣa of the later rhetoricians. S\'lesa is more powerful according to Udbhata as it gives rise to beauty in figures like Upamā or Rūpaka. Rudrāṇa treats S\'lesa as a figure of word and also as a figure of sense. Sabdaśleṣa is divided into eight varieties by him. S\'lesa may be present in (1) letter (2) word (3) gender (4) language (5) base (6) termination (7) case and (8) number. Arthaśleṣa is divided into ten varieties: (1) Aviśeṣa (2) Vārodha (3) Adhika (4) Vakra (5) Vyāja (6) Ukti (7) Asambhava (8) Avayava (9) Tattva and (10) Virodhābhāsa.
Eudrata says that Sileśa may enter into combination with Upama and Samuccaya. Though Upama and Samuccayya are figures of sense, they may be developed on the basis of verbal similarity. Following Rudrata, Mammata also treats Sileśa as a figure of word as well as a figure of sense. Following Rudrata, Mammata divides Sabdasileśa into eight varieties. This Sabdasileśa is the Sahāngasileśa of others. Mammata gives a ninth variety of Sabdasileśa, where the words remain unchanged though the base etc. may differ and convey two senses. This ninth variety of Sabdasileśa is the Abhangasileśa of later rhetoricians. Mammata also treats Sileśa as a figure of sense, and says that two meanings are apprehended here even if the words are changed. This kind of Sileśa is Suddha by Jagannātha. Mammata has adopted the principle of anvaya and vyatireka in the divisions of figures into figures of words and figures of sense. Mammata believes that Sileśa has its own sphere like other figures. It may therefore be mixed with other figures. He does not agree with Udbhata who regards Sileśa as bādhaka and therefore stronger than other figures. Sādhyabādhhakabhāva is possible only when one of the alamkāras has no sphere of its own. As both Sileśa and other figures have their own spheres, Sileśa does not prevent the cognition of other figures. It only mixes with the other figures. Ruyyaka divides Sileśa into three varieties: (A) when both the senses conveyed by Sileśa are prakṛta, (B) both are aprakṛta and (C) one is prakṛta and the other aprakṛta.
Ruyyaka divides S'leṣa into Sabdarṣaṇa, Arthasṛṣaṇa and Ubhayasṛṣaṇa on the basis of asrayaśrayābhāva. Following Udbhata, Ruyyaka believes that S'leṣa is more powerful and prevents the cognition of other figures, when it enters into combination with other figures. It seems that Ruyyaka is inclined to accept Hammata's view and holds personally that S'leṣa has an independent sphere of its own. It can therefore co-exist with other figures and be mixed with it. Jayaratha remarks:

Itadevaṁ svamatābhiḥ prāyenāśayaṃkārāntaravādanyāśaṃkaraḥ saḥ
badhyatiḥ vikaraḥ saṃkīrṇatvam ca prakāśya .......'. Ruyyaka, however, regards S'leṣa as more powerful than other figures only out of regard for the ancient writers. Jayaratha remarks 'atra ca granthakṛtā S'leṣaḥ
sarvāśaṃkāraṃpavadaka iti na kevalaṃ prācyānusāramuktam yāvadapahavava-
paryavaspāyāśadṛśyarūpapahnutibhedāpitaṃmatānusāram evoktaḥ'. Obhākara
follows Ruyyaka and treats S'leṣa as a figure of sense. He divides S'leṣa into S'abdarṣaṇa and Arthasṛṣaṇa; he does not accept Ubhayasṛṣaṇa.

He gives twelve varieties of S'leṣa. The first four varieties take place when the similarity of the substantives is conveyed (1) by one and the same word, (2) by different words, (3) by one of the words expressive of the substantives and (4) by the adjectives. These four varieties are possible when both the senses are (1) prakṛta and (2) aprakṛta (i.e., eight varieties). When one of senses is prakṛta and the other aprakṛta, the similarity may be conveyed (1) by the word expressive of
the prakṛta substantive, (2) by the word expressive of aprakṛta substantive, (3) by different words and (4) by similar adjectives (i.e., twelve varieties). Śobhākara holds that S'lesa has its own sphere. He criticizes Udbhata's view and holds that when S'lesa enters into combination with other figures sometimes it prevents the cognition of other figures, sometimes it is subordinate to other figures, sometimes its cognition is prevented by other figures, and sometimes it forms the essence of other figures. Viśvanātha combines views of Mammata and Ruyyaka. Thus following Mammata, he treats S'lesa twice— as a figure of words and as a figure of sense. Following Rudrata and Mammata, Sabdaślesa is divided by him into eight varieties. Sabdaslesa is divided into Sabhaṅga, Abhaṅga and Udbhaya; S'lesa is again treated by him as a figure of sense, where the figure remains even when the words are changed. Vidyānātha defines S'leṣa as similarity consisting of words. He is silent about the divisions into Sabhaṅga and Abhaṅga. It can be said that S'leṣa is a figure of sense according to Vidyānātha as he treats it among figures of sense. He gives three varieties of S'leṣa; when both the senses are (A) prakṛta, (B) aprakṛta and (C) one is prakṛta and the other aprakṛta. Appayya treats S'leṣa as a figure of sense and divides it into Sabhaṅga and Abhaṅga. He also gives the three varieties of S'leṣa where both the senses are (A) prakṛta, (3) aprakṛta and (C) one prakṛta and the other aprakṛta.
Jagannatha's treatment of S'leśa shows that he combines the views of Mammata and Ruyyaka. He does not accept the eight varieties of Sabdaśeśa given by Mammata but accepts Sabhaṅgaśeśa and Abhaṅgaśeśa, which are treated by Mammata as varieties of Sab TXTaśeśa. His Suddhaśeśa is the Arthaśeśa of Mammata. He follows Ruyyaka in treating S'leśa as a figure of sense and in dividing S'leśa into Sabhaṅga and Abhaṅga which are designated as Sabhaṅgaśeśa and Arthaśeśa respectively by Ruyyaka. Jagannatha does not accept Udbhayaśeśa, given by Ruyyaka. He also follows Ruyyaka in dividing S'leśa into three varieties where both the senses are prakṛta, both are aprakṛta, and one prakṛta and the other aprakṛta. Jagannatha, though admitting Suddhaśeśa, gives the illustrations of Arthaśeśa or Suddhaśeśa only when both the senses are prakṛta. He has not illustrated Suddhaśeśa when both the senses are aprakṛta and when one is prakṛta and the other aprakṛta. In fact, the divisions of S'leśa into prakṛta, aprakṛta and prakṛtaaprakṛta, started by Ruyyaka have complicated the figures. If not impossible, it is very difficult to illustrate all these varieties. Mammata's division of S'leśa seems to be most reasonable as it covers all the different types of expressions having double meaning. Mammata's Arthaśeśa has no place Ruyyaka's classification and Ruyyaka's classification was imperfect to that extent. This defect is removed by Jagannatha by giving place to Arthaśeśa, which is designated Suddhaśeśa by him.
hands of Jagannātha, who eliminates all that is inaccurate in the
treatment given to S'lesa by his predecessors.

(12) Aprastutaprasāmsā:

Aprastutena vyavahāreṇa sādṛṣṭyādīvakṣyāmāṇapraṅkarānyatamapraṅkāreṇa
prasūta-vyavahāro yatra prasāyate aprastutapraṃsā.

The word prasamsā is used here in the sense of description.

The prastuta behaviour is conveyed in this figure by the aprastuta
behaviour. Aprastutaprasamsa is divided into five varieties:
(A) when the aprastuta conveys a prastuta which is similar to it, (B)
when the aprastuta effect conveys the prastuta cause, (C) when the
aprastuta cause conveys the prastuta effect, (D) when the aprastuta
general conveys the prastuta particular and (E) when the aprastuta
particular conveys the prastuta general. In the first variety, the
aprastuta may convey a similar prastuta by paranomastic adjectives
also. Kammata gives a subvariety of this variety where Samāsokti
conveys the suggested similar. Jagannātha criticizes Kammata. In
Samāsokti the aprakṛta is suggested and is subordinated to the
prastuta which is principal. In Aprastutaprasamsa, the prastuta is suggested and is principal according to Nammata. Thus the definitions of Aprastutaprasamsa and Samasokti given by Nammata show that the two are contradictory. Samasokti, therefore cannot be subordinate to Aprastutaprasamsa. In this variety the expressed sense is sometimes indifferent to the suggested sense; sometimes it has to be identified with the suggested sense in order that the adjectives may be understood. This identification may be complete in some cases and only partial in other cases. Sometimes the suggested sense also has to be identified with the expressed sense in parts and the expressed sense has to be identified with the suggested sense in order that the expressed sense may be fully comprehended.

After discussing Aprastutaprasamsa, Jagannath remarks that he has treated it according to the ancient. Jagannath then proceeds to give his own views. He says that when Aprastutaprasamsa is based on similarity, both the expressed and the suggested senses may be prakrta in special circumstances. The word aprastuta should be understood as conveying a sense which is different from the sense which is intended to be principal by the poet. Such a sense may sometimes be totally irrelevant; sometimes it may be relevant. This should not mean that
devani is included into Aprastutaprasamsa, because in dhvani the expressed sense is connected with the suggested sense by any relation other than the five mentioned in the definition of Aprastutaprasamsa.

The figure Prastutankura defined by Apparya as 'dvayoh prastutatve Prastutankuransenyasamkara,' can now be included into Aprastutaprasamsa and should not be treated as a separate figure. If such insignificant differences are allowed giving rise to new figures, there will be innumerable figures.

Nagesa criticizes Jagannatha. If the change proposed by Jagannatha is accepted, the word aprastuta used by the ancients in naming this figure will have no meaning. If Prastutankura is not accepted as a separate figure, then it will be impossible to distinguish between Samasokti and suggested mupaka, between Dipaka and Rulyayogita and between Dratsnta and Prativastupana.

When the expressed sense is completely irrelevant in first variety abhidha expects the suggested sense in order to be complete. Dhvani has no scope here as the suggested sense is subordinate to the expressed sense. Devani has scope when both the senses are prastute, because abhidha is complete by itself and vyakjana comes afterwards.
These two are the varieties of Śādravyāmula Aprastutaprasamsā. The other four varieties are instances of gunībhūtvānyāngya. Nagesa argues that this can be possible only when Prastutānkura is admitted as a separate figure. The variety proposed by Jagannātha will be gunībhūtvānyāngya because the expressed sense requires the superimposition of the suggested sense in order to be complete.

Jagannātha then proposes another change. In the first variety the expressed or suggested aprākṛta may describe the expressed or suggested prakṛta. The figure in such instances cannot be Samāsokti because Samāsokti is developed only when the adjectives are similar. This change may be introduced in the other four varieties also.

Aprastutaprasamsā thus may be explained as aprastutena prasamsā and the aprastuta, expressed or suggested, may be described by the aprastuta which may be either expressed or suggested. Thus it is not necessary to hold that the aprastuta must be expressed and the prastuta must be suggested in Aprastutaprasamsā. It may be argued that here one sentence-sense swallows up another sentence-sense which is finally ascertained as identical. Thus Aprastutaprasama based on similarity will have no scope as Atisāyokti will give rise to the apprehension of the other sense. But this argument is not correct. In Atisāyokti the
indicated sense is characterized by the determining attribute of the expressed sense, while in Aprastutaprasamsa the expressed and the suggested senses are disconnected. Abheda has a place in the variety of Aprastutaprasamsa when the suggested sense is conveyed by paronomastic adjectives or when the expressed sense of the object addressed and its adjectives require abheda of the suggested sense. But except in such instances, the expressed sense in Aprastutaprasamsa is disconnected with the suggested sense. Again, the prastuta is indicated in Atisayokti while it is suggested in Aprastutaprasamsa. Thus 'purā yatra.....' will be an instance of Aprastutaprasamsa. Some hold that this variety comes under the province of dhvani and dhvani being alamkāra cannot be an alamkāra; this variety therefore may be eliminated and only the other four varieties may be accepted in Aprastutaprasamsa. The way in which this view is mentioned shows that Jagannatha does not agree with this view.

Nāgasa rejects Jagannatha's interpretation. Praśamsa may mean utkarsādhāna or pratītimātra. Both these meanings are not satisfactory. There are many instances of Aprastutaprasamsa where the aprastuta does not beautify the prastuta. Praśamsa, therefore, cannot mean utkarsādhāna. It also cannot mean pratīti, because in 'purā yatra', the aprastuta does not lead to the knowledge of the prastuta.
Bhāmaha defines Aprastutaprasāmsa as:

Adhikārādapiṣatyā vastunāṇyasyā yā stutih
Aprastutaprasāmṣeti sā caivaṃkathayeṣthā.

Bhāmaha admits only one variety of this figure. His Aprastutaprasāmsa is based only on similarity. Dandin defines it as praise of an irrelevant object. Dandin also gives only one variety of this figure. Dandin employs the word 'stuti' in the sense of praise and not of description. Bhāmaha is not very clear as he does not explain his illustration. Bhāmaha's illustration, however, shows that he might also have meant praise by 'stuti'. The illustrations given by Bhāmaha and Dandin can also be interpreted as conveying the censure of the prastuta. Udbhata adopts Bhāmaha's definition but adds the words 'prastutarthanibandhini', which shows that Aprastutaprasāmsa is developed according to Udbhata only when the subject of description is conveyed from the description of that which is not the matter in hand. Udbhata uses the word 'stuti' only in the sense of description and differs here from his predecessors.

According to Vāmana, Aprastutaprasāmsa consists in a slight mention of the upameya, when the upamāna is fully described. Vāmana understands the word 'prāmsa' in the sense of description. Rudrata gives only one variety of Aprastutapraśamsa, which is called Anyokti by him.
Rudraṭa believes that common behaviour is enough to give rise to this figure. Rudraṭa’s Anyokti is the fifth variety of Aprastutapraśāmsā of the later rhetoricians.

Anandavardhana mentions three varieties of Aprastutapraśāmsā based on sāmānyavisēśabhaeva, nimittanimittibhāva, and sarūpya. He is the first to give these varieties, as his predecessors have given the variety based on similarity only. Abhinavagupta discusses Aprastutapraśāmsā with its five varieties. Kammata follows Abhinavagupta in his treatment of this figure. He divides Aprastutapraśāmsā into five varieties: (A) when the statement of cause suggests the effect, (B) when the statement of the effect suggests the cause, (C) when the statement of a particular illustration suggests a general proposition, (D) when the statement of a general proposition suggests a particular proposition and (E) when the statement of a similar subject suggests another similar. The last variety is subdivided into three when the cause of the suggestion of a similar consists of, (a) paronomastic adjectives and substantives (b) paronomastic adjectives only and (c) mere resemblance. The last variety is subdivided on the basis of the principles of superimposition also. Thus the expressed sense in this variety, (1) may be understandable without the superimposition of the suggested sense, (2) may not be understandable without the superimposition
of the suggested sense and (3) may be understandable without the
superimposition of the suggested sense in some parts and may not
be so in other parts. The two divisions of the last variety are
not mutually exclusive. Ruyyaka follows Mammata in his treatment
of Aprastutapradamsa. He gives all the divisions given by Mammata,
but adds that the last variety is also possible in vaidharmya. This
division is Ruyyaka's original contribution. Ruyyaka regards sambhava
or asambhava of the expressed as the basis of the division of the fifth
variety. Ruyyaka also accepts the division of sarupyasatya on the
basis of Slesa. S'obhakara follows Ruyyaka in the divisions of
Aprastutapradamsa. Vidyanatha follows Mammata. He divides the
Sarupyasatya variety on the basis of superimposition. Visvanatha also
follows Mammata. He holds that the Sarupyasatya variety is based on Slesa
or paronomastic adjectives only or mere resemblance. Though following
Mammata; Visvanatha improves upon the terminology used by Mammata; he
also admits the variety based on vaidharmya, like Ruyyaka. Appayya
follows Mammata. He gives three subvarieties of the Sarupyasatya
variety, where there is, (a) praise, (b) censure or (c) simple statement
of the prastuta, leading to the praise, censure or simple statement
of similar aprastuta. Appayya says that relations other than these
given by the ancients are also possible between the expressed and the
suggested sense in this figure. Thus the aprastuta expressed sense
may convey a prastuta object which has simultaneously come into existence
Jagannātha has followed the ancient ṛhetoricians in his treatment of this figure. He enumerates the Sarūpyamūlā variety first. This variety is treated as the fifth variety by Jagannātha's predecessors. Jagannātha admits the Sarūpyamūlā variety based on Śleṣa; he does not accept the variety based on Samāsokti given by Mammata. Jagannātha's broad outlook is reflected when he says that both the expressed and the suggested senses may be relevant here and when he says that the suggested prastuta may also describe the expressed aprastuta. Allegory has its own charm in any literature and Aprastutaprasyamsa or Anyokti therefore can be said to be a universal figure. The poet aims at the suggestion of human nature by addressing a bird, a bee etc. It is useless to restrict the relation between the expressed and the suggested, to Sāmānyavisēṣabhāva or kāryakāranabhāva or sarūpya as the ancients have done. Later rhetoricians like Appayya and Jagannātha have realized that any expressed description, leading to any suggested description has its own charm. The ancients have attempted to analyse this figure and in doing so they have restricted this figure unnecessarily. Jagannātha and Appayya try to widen the sphere of this figure, so that almost all allegorical descriptions may be covered by this figure. Jagannātha bases the divisions of Sarūpyamūlā variety on the tādātmya of the suggested sense.
Bhangyantara is a mode which is different from the form which is intended by the poet. The intended sense is conveyed in a different form or it is conveyed by implication in this figure.

Mamata says that the suggested sense is expressed in Paryayokta, but the forms of the two senses differ. Thus there is no contradiction when it is said that the suggested sense is expressed in Paryayokta.

Ruyyaka has defined Paryayokta as 'gamyasya pari bhangyantaraḥ bhādham Paryayokta'. The suggested sense can never be expressed. So the suggested sense is expressed by the effect or some other property which is concomitant with the intended sense. This is made clear by the following illustration:

Yam preksya cirirudhapi nivāsaritirujjhita
Madenairāvanamukhānena kṛṣyate Hareḥ.

Here it is suggested that Airāvata was deprived of intoxication and Śakra was deprived of pride. The dharmas—Airāvata and Hari are not
suggested, but expressed. Only the absence of intoxication and pride is suggested. The suggested sense is not expressed in a different mode, but is expressed by effect etc. i.e. it is implied by the effect.

Abhinavagupta explains 'Paryayekta' etymologically. He explains 'Paryāya' as a mode which is different from the expressed sense — the suggested sense. Uktam means expressed. Paryāyena Uktam means paryāyena upalakṣitam uktam. Thus the expressed sense is characterized by the suggested sense. If Abhinava's interpretation is accepted, then 'niḥsasacyuta' which is a wellknown illustration of dhvani will be an instance of Paryayekta as the expressed sense of the word 'dhvama' is characterized by the enjoyment with the female messenger. This difficulty arises also if the interpretation suggested by the ancients is accepted.

In 'namastasmai kṛtaṁ yena mudhā Rāhuvedhūstamau' Lord Kṛṣṇa with his special characteristic, vāsudevatva — is suggested and is expressed in another way as rendering useless the breasts of the wife of Rāhu. This is the view of Appayya. Jagannātha criticizes this view. The cutting of the head of Rāhu is suggested here; the Lord characterized by vāsudevatva is conveyed by the adjectives and does not
deserve to be the suggested sense which is essential in poetry.

Slight suggestion may be present when an attribute is understood from the adjectives, but being very insignificant, it does not receive any consideration in poetry as such a suggestion is lacking in strikingness. The presence or absence of vasudevatva (apprehended from the adjectives of Lord Krishna) does not have any effect on the figure as the figure arises because the slaughter of Rahu is conveyed in a different mode.

Nagesa remarks that in 'yam prekṣya...' also the suggested sense is similar to the suggested sense apprehended from adjectives. That the suggested sense apprehended from adjectives should not be considered as giving rise to the figure, is Jagannatha’s unauthentic, prejudiced opinion.

Appayya says that in 'cakrabhīṣṭa...' the figure is Prastutāṅkura as cutting the head of Rahu which is the cause is understood, from the effect which is expressed and as both the cause which is suggested and the effect which is expressed are prastuta. When from the expressed statement of the effect, Lord Krishna is known, the figure Paryāyokta takes place. This view is criticized by Jagannatha. Paryāyokta has no scope when the cutting of the head of Rahu is understood by Prastutāṅkura.
If it is said that Paryāyokta is developed when adjectives give rise to the apprehension of Lord Kṛṣṇa - then the answer is that such a suggestive element cannot give rise to a figure. Prastutāṅkura again is not accepted by the ancients as a figure. Even if it is to be accepted, it should be based on similarity and not on cause and effect relation. Nāyyaka has distinguished between Aprastutaprasāṃsā and Paryāyokta, on the ground that in the former the irrelevant effect conveys the relevant cause, while in the latter the relevant effect conveys the relevant cause. This distinction will have no scope if Prastutāṅkura based on cause and effect relation is accepted. So the figure here is Paryāyokta and it is developed when the Lord is apprehended as cutting the head of Rāhu.

Nāgadeśa severely criticizes Jagannātha. It is true that the apprehension of the Lord arising from adjectives is lacking in charm but this is an īṣṭāpatti because in Paryāyokta the suggested sense must be less charming than the expressed sense. The figure in 'cakrābhīghāta....' should be Aprastutaprasāṃsā according to Jagannātha's revised concept of Aprastutaprasāṃsā where the expressed or suggested sense may describe the expressed or suggested prastūta. Why should
Jagannatha say that the figure is Paryayokta? It cannot be argued that the suggested sense is subordinate to the expressed sense in Paryayokta while in Aprastutaprasamsa the expressed sense is subordinate to the suggested sense because in instances of Aprastutaprasamsa like 'kastvang bho', the suggested sense can also be subordinate to the expressed sense. Again it cannot be argued that the figure here is not Aprastutaprasamsa because both the suggested and the expressed senses are principally intended by the poet. Jagannatha then shall have to invent another figure. The figure Prastutankura must therefore be admitted.

It must be said that Nagesa's criticism is fully justified. Jagannatha is very unjust in criticizing Appayya in both the places. The figure in 'cakrabhigata...' should be Aprastutaprasamsa according to Jagannatha's revised concept of this figure. It seems that Jagannatha, though proposing original interpretations and changes in the concepts of figures, follows the tradition when he says that the figure in 'cakrabhigata...' is Paryayokta.

The suggested sense is subordinate to the expressed sense in Paryayokta. Paryayokta therefore becomes a variety of guṇibhūtavyanīgīṇa dhvani where the suggested sense is subordinate to the expressed sense in order that it may be complete.
Jayaratha says that Paryayokta and Aprastutaprasamsa are distinct, because Paryayokta is based on upadanalaksana, while Aprastutaprasamsa is based on lakshanalaksana. Jagannatha criticizes this view. Lakshanā is based on the incompatibility of the expressed sense. In these two figures there is no incompatibility in the expressed sense. It is generally believed that the expressed sense is principal in Paryayokta while in Aprastutaprasamsa the suggested sense is principal. This shows that vyamjana functions there. If the process were laksanā, it would have been principal as the expressed sense cannot be principal in laksanā. The prominence enjoyed by the expressed sense in Paryayokta shows that laksanā has no scope here. Jayaratha also contradicts Nyaya's statements in Alankarasarvasva if he admits laksanā in these two figures.

The predecessors of Dhwanikara have not used the words dhvani, gunabhutavyaṅga etc. in their works. It is, however, wrong to infer that they did not accept dhvani. In the treatment of figures like Samasokti, Vyajastuti etc. they have admitted gunabhutavyaṅga; all the other varieties of suggestion are included into Paryayokta by them. Dhvani is experienced in poetry and cannot therefore be concealed. Paryayokta may be divided into three varieties: (A) when the expressed
cause, which is relevant suggests an effect which is relevant,

(3) when an expressed effect is relevant suggests the cause which is relevant and (c) when any relevant object suggests any other relevant object, which is connected with it. These three are only broad divisions. Endless varieties of Paryayokta are possible, as only one idea may be expressed in innumerable ways.

Ruyyska has distinguished between Paryayokta and Aprastuteprasamsa as Aprastuteprasamsa (where the effect is expressed) is likely to cover the instances of Paryayokta. This shows that the sphere of Aprastuteprasamsa is wider than that of Paryayokta according to Ruyyska. As a matter of fact the sphere of Paryayokta is wider than that of the Karyarupa variety of Aprastuteprasamsa.

Paryayokta consists in a different way of expressing the intended sense, according to Bhusaha and Dandin. Udbhata's definition is more clear. He adopts Bhusaha's definition, but adds that the intended sense should be conveyed by the force of sense and not by abhikshata. He defines Paryayokta as follows:

Paryayokta yodavyadesa prakritvabhikshayate
Vocaykakavritibhyam sanyavagamatman.
Udbhata emphasizes that the intended sense should not be conveyed by abhidhā. Rudrata calls it Paryāya and defines it as:

Vastu vivaksitavastupratipādanasāktamasadṛśam tavya
Yadajansakajanyam vatakathanaḥ sa Paryāyak.

The thing expressed should convey the intended sense, which is not related as cause or effect to it. Rudrata gives another variety of Paryāya which is the figure Paryāya of later rhetoricians. According to Mammata, Paryāyokta consists in a different mode adopted to convey the intended sense. Mammata thus does not differ from the ancient rhetoricians. He especially follows Udbhata in defining and explaining this figure. Ruyyaka's concept of Paryāyokta is different. Paryāyokta is developed when the prastuta cause is suggested from the prastuta effect according to Ruyyaka. Paryāyokta consisted in any roundabout way adopted to convey the intended sense, according to Mammata and other ancient rhetoricians. Ruyyaka restricts the scope of Paryāyokta to only one mode of roundabout manner. Ruyyaka discusses the figure Arthantaranyāsa, before Paryāyokta. Sobhākara lays down that Paryāyokta and Aprastataprasāmsā are based on lakṣaṇā. Paryāyokta arises when the expressed sense requires some other sense in order to be complete. In this type of Paryāyokta both the expressed and the indicated senses may be (1) prastuta or (2) aprastuta. Sobhākara gives another variety of Paryāyokta where
the expressed sense is conveyed in a different mode. The different mode may also be based on upacāra. Following Śabdhakara, Jayaratha also admits lakaśanā as the basis of Paryāyokta and Aprastutaprasāmsā for which he is criticized by Jagannātha. Vidyanātha and Visvanātha follow Ruyyaka. Appayya follows Mammata. He criticizes Ruyyaka and Abhinavagupta for twisting the definition given by the ancients and interpreting their illustration in a different manner. He is criticized for this by Jagannātha and defended by Nāgasa. Appayya gives a second variety of Paryāyokta which consists in accomplishing a desired object through pretext. The illustration given by Appayya is similar to that given by Daṇḍin.

Jagannātha follows Mammata in his treatment of Paryāyokta. He does not restrict the scope of this figure like Ruyyaka, Vidyanātha and Visvanātha. Jagannātha treats Paryāyokta immediately after Aprastutaprasāmsā; and therefore differs here from Ruyyaka in the sequence.
Vyājastuti:

Amukhapratītabhyāṃ mīndāstutibhyāṃ stutinindayoh kramena paryavāsānaṃ vyājastutih.

In Vyājastuti the apparent censure results into praise, and the apparent praise results into censure. The word 'āmukha' in the definition shows that the censure or the praise is only apparent and not real. Thus the expressed censure or praise is not compatible in this figure. Vyājastuti cannot be a variety of dhvani, because the expressed sense is not incompatible in dhvani, when it suggests the other sense. In Vyājastuti, only the incompatible part of the expressed sense yields another sense. The other part remains as it is. Vyājastuti is also mixed with other figures.

The following is cited as an illustration of Vyājastuti in Dhvanyāloka:

Kim vṛttaṁ parāphagataṁ kiṃtu nāham saṁarthāḥ
Tūṣṇīṁ sthātum prakṛtiṁ jhāro daksīṇātyasvabhāvaḥ
Gehe gehe vipeeśu tathā cātvarā pānagoṣṭhyām
Umsatteva bhramati bhavato vallabhā hanta kīrtih.

This is not a proper illustration of Vyājastuti according to Ruyyaka and his commentator Jayaratha, because though the poet has started with
The apparent censure or praise and the resulting praise or censure should belong to the same object. Thus Vyājastuti cannot take place when the apparent praise or censure, and the resulting censure or praise, belong to different objects. This can be possible only when the apparent praise or censure is incompatible.

Appayya gives four more varieties of Vyājastuti; (A) the apparent praise of one object leads to the censure of another object, (B) the apparent censure of one object leads to the praise of another object, (C) the apparent praise of one object leads to the praise of another object, and (D) the apparent censure of one object leads to the censure of another object. These four varieties are not accepted.
by Jagannātha as they are not based on incompatibility and as they are not accepted by the ancients. If Appayya does not want to follow the ancients and wants to establish his own innovations, then he should include all the varieties of dhvani or guṇībhūtavyaṅgya into alamkāras. Then Vyājastuti also will have to be included into Aprastutaprasāmsā. The expressed is only a pretext and conveys some other sense in Vyājastuti as in Aprastutaprasāmsā. The four varieties given by Appayya should be included into varieties of dhvani.

NāgESA refutes Jagannātha's arguments. Paryāyokta, Aprastutapraśamsā, and Samāsokti are accepted as alamkāras though they are varieties of dhvani. Similarly, Vyājastuti with its four varieties given by Appayya, may be an alamkāra in spite of its being a variety of dhvani. Vyājastuti defined by Appayya is guṇībhūtavyaṅgya and not dhvani. It is not a rule that Vyājastuti should never be based on vyaṅjanī. Disagreement with the ancients does not matter. It must be said that NāgESA's arguments are correct. Jagannātha himself has proposed changes in the traditional concepts of figures. Appayya may also do so. Jagannātha's criticism is biased and prejudiced.
'Ardham dānavairinā.....' is cited by Appayya as an instance where the apparent praise of the king results in his censure as he does not protect the speaker though he knows the speaker's poverty. This is not accepted by Jagannatha, because Vyājastuti here is not based on incompatibility. The king is described as omniscient. His ignorance therefore cannot be intended. The only intended sense here is that the king should protect the speaker who is very poor. Vyājastuti is not developed here. Even if Vyājastuti is somehow understood to be present, the omniscience and supremacy of the king do not leave our cognition. The censure therefore cannot arise. Appayya's illustration therefore is not correct.

Nāgasa says that the speaker is a person who has served the king for a long time, but who has not received money and wealth from the king. If this speciality of speaker is taken into consideration the suggested censure may be apprehended from the apparent praise. Appayya's illustration therefore is correct. Here also, Nāgasa's interpretation seems to be better.

According to Bhāmaha, Vyājastuti occurs, when under the pretext of praising some highly meritorious person, the prastuta is censured. This censure, however, ultimately leads to the praise of
the prastuta. Bhāmaha gives only one variety of Vyājastuti, where the prastuta is praised. Dandin also gives only one variety where the apparent censure leads to praise. He says that Vyājastuti may also be based on Ślesa. Udbhata's definition resembles that of Dandin. He also mentions only one variety like his predecessors. Vāmana follows Bhāmaha. Ādṛata treats this figure as a variety of Arthaślesa and calls it Vyājaslesa. In Vyājaslesa the apparent praise conveys censure and the apparent censure conveys praise. Ādṛata is therefore, the first to give the second variety of Vyājastuti, where the apparent praise conveys censure. Mammata mentions both the varieties of Vyājastuti. Āuyyaka gives both the varieties of Vyājastuti. He says that the expressed sense is incompatible in Vyājastuti; Vyājastuti is thus based on viparītalaksana. In Vyājastuti, the strikingness arises from gamya element. Sōbhākara admits both the varieties of Vyājastuti and believes that Vyājastuti is based on laksana. Sōbhākara says that Vyājastuti arises only when the apparent praise or censure and the censure or praise apprehended from it, belong to the same object. If they belong to different objects then the figure will not be Vyājastuti but Atiśayokti because the censure of one object conveys the excessive praise of the other object. If this atiśaya also is not intended by the poet the figure will be Aprastutaprasāmsa. In Vyājastuti the intention of the poet is to
convey an atisāya of praise or censure: the apparent censure or praise is ascertained to be identical with the praise or censure, conveyed at the end.Vyājastuti is based on viparītalaksanā and viparītalaksanā has adhyāvsaṇa for its essence. Thus Vyājastuti has to be distinguished from Atisāyokti. If the strikingness arising from censure or praise conveyed at the end is not prominent and mere exaggeration is intended, the figure will be Atisāyokti and if the atisāya is not intended the figure is Aprastutapraśamsā. Jayaratha distinguishes between Vyājastuti and dhvani. In Vyājastuti the sentence — sense is incompatible due to context etc. and therefore results into censure or praise. In dhvani, the expressed sense is complete and the praise or censure is understood when the propriety of the speaker, subject etc., is taken into consideration. Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha follow Māmata. Besides the well-known two varieties, Appayya admits Vyājastuti when the apparent praise or censure of one object leads to the censure or praise of another. He also admits one more variety when the praise of one object leads to the praise of another. Appayya gives a new figure—Vyājanindā, where the censure of one object leads to the censure of another object. Appayya is criticized for holding these four varieties by Jagannātha. It must be said that Vyājastuti as defined by Dandin and others does not contain similarity, as its essence. Only the Vajastuti defined by Bhāma and Vāmana is based
on similarity. Though the rhetoricians, succeeding Bhamaha have eliminated the element of similarity, they have followed Bhamaha in treating Vyājastuti as a figure based on similarity.

(15) Āksépa:

Jagannātha does not define the figure Āksépa. He only mentions the views of other rhetoricians about Āksépa.

First view:

As the upamāna is capable of performing all the works of the upamāna, the uselessness of the upamāna, represented by condemning the upamāna, gives rise to Āksépa.

Second view:

The denial of an object already mentioned before, arising from taking up another alternative, gives rise to Āksépa.

Third view:

The denial of the object which is desired to be described with a view to convey some speciality gives rise to Āksépa. Āksépa is divided into two varieties: when the denial is connected with the object which is already described and when it is connected with the
object which is yet to be described. The prakṛta is denied because the poet intends to convey some speciality (which is suggested). The denial is not real but is apparent.

Ruvvaka's view:

When the matter in hand is denied, the denial cannot be real. It is only apparent and suggests some special sense. This is the first variety of Ākṣepa. In the second variety, permission of irrelevant object results into the denial of the irrelevant object. The first variety is divided into two: (a) when the denial refers to the object already described (uktaviṣaya) (b) when it refers to the object which is yet to be described (vakṣyamāṇaviṣaya). Uktaviṣaya Ākṣepa is divided into two: (1) only an object is denied (2) the description of the object is denied. Vakṣyamāṇaviṣaya is also divided into two: (1) when only a part of the vakṣyamāṇa is mentioned. (2) when the whole of the vakṣyamāṇa is mentioned. In all the four varieties, there is an intended sense; it is denied; the denial is not real; and it conveys some special sense. Thus as the apparent denial implies the statement (of the prakṛta) the figure is called Ākṣepa. Ākṣepa is derived from आ + (to imply).
In second variety of Ākṣepa being false, the permission implies the denial. Here an object is not desired; it is permitted; the permission is not real; it conveys a special sense.

Of the four definitions mentioned above, the first defines a variety of Pratīpa. The second only defines that which is already stated.

Some say that Ākṣepa consists in any denial. Being an alamkāra, the denial should be striking. Strikingness arises only when the denial suggests something. This definition of Ākṣepa covers all the definitions mentioned above. Thus, the uselessness of the upamāna, the uselessness of the previous view by adopting another alternative, the uselessness of the statements already mentioned or of the statements which are to be mentioned in order to convey some speciality, and the apparent denial or permission — all these are covered by this definition.

Jagannātha then proceeds to give illustrations of Ākṣepadhvani, according to this definition. Ruyyaka has rejected the illustration of Ākṣepadhvani given by the Dhanānikāra, as Ākṣepa, defined by him (Ruyyaka), is not suggested there. Jagannātha criticizes Ruyyaka. It is not inevitable that Ākṣepa should consist in apparent denial only.
Such a rule is not laid down by the ancient ācāryas. It is better to follow the Dhvanikāra, as Dhvanikāra has established the tradition for the rhetoricians. The ancient writers like the Dhvanikāra are the only authorities to fix the concept of figures like Ākṣepa. This criticism shows Jagannātha's respect towards the Dhvanikāra.

The following is cited by Appayya as an example of Ākṣepa according to Ruyyaka:

Narendramaule na vayam rāgasandesahārinah
Jagatjutumbinastedyā na satruḥ kas'cidikṣyate.

These words are uttered by the messenger. The denial therefore is not compatible. It results into the assurance of telling the truth given by the messenger and into the suggestion of the vīṣeṣa that the king should not consider anybody as his enemy, but should protect all the other kings as his slaves.

Jagannātha says that the vīṣeṣa mentioned by Appayya is not suggested by the denial. The vīṣeṣa is not understood when the speaker says that he is not a messenger; the apprehension of vīṣeṣa arises from the second line. It cannot, therefore be said that the
denial suggests the viśeṣa here. The word rājaśandesahāriṇāḥ is incompatible here, as shown above. It indicates the use of false statements made by the messenger. The denial of the indicated sense suggests that the speaker, or his words are true. It may be argued that the word rāja indicates an enemy. The expression na vayam rājasandesahāriṇāḥ, therefore, indicates that we have not brought any message from the enemies and suggests the viśeṣa. Our king is not an enemy; he should be looked upon as a servant.

Ākṣepsa here is developed in the denial of enmity. Appayya, on the contrary says that the denial suggests the viśeṣa. Somehow the viśeṣa may be understood as suggested by connecting it indirectly with the denial but Appayya is still inconsistent, when he says that the denial results into the assurance of telling truth.

' The assurance of telling truth' cannot suggest the viśeṣa pointed out by Appayya. This višeṣa is apprehended from the second line. The assurance of telling truth only nourishes it. The denial can only suggest the višeṣa in the form of assurance of telling truth.

Nāgesa tries to defend Appayya. He says that the denial in Ākṣepsa is incompatible; it conveys another sense and becomes helpful in the suggestion of višeṣa when some factor suggestive of the višeṣa is present. It must be said that Nāgessa's interpretation is far-fetched.
Appajya's explanation of 'narendramaule....' is not a very happy one. Jagenath's criticism and interpretation, therefore are justified.

Bhamaha defines Aksapa as follows:

Pratidesha ivesatasya yo visagabhidhitisaya
Aksapa iti tan santah saumsanti dvividhan yathah.

He divides Aksapa into (A) Vaksyamvisaya and (B) Uktavisaya. Aksapa consists in the statement of denial and it may refer to past, present or future according to Dandin. Thus any denial is Aksapa, according to Dandin. Dandin's Aksapa covers cases of Aksapa as well as Pratipa. Vamana defines Aksapa as 'UpamanaAksapa'. He explains Aksapa as pratidesha. He holds that Aksapa arises when the upamana is denied, i.e., it is deemed useless. Vamana gives another variety of Aksapa and defines it as 'upamanaAksapatah pratipatti\text{\textbf{\textit{h}}} Aksapah'. Aksapa here means implication. This variety will be Samasokti according to the other rhetoricians. Vamana's first variety is the figure Pratipa of the later rhetoricians. Vamana's view is cited first by Jagenath. Aksapa is developed according to Rudrata when some well-known object is represented as contradictory and in order to prove it, another object is mentioned. Lammat and
Vuyyaka follows Bhamaha. Vuyyaka, however, divides both Uktavishaya and Vaksyamavishaaya into two varieties which are already discussed. Vuyyaka gives another variety of Aksepa which is defined as 'anisatavidyabhása'. In this variety there is an apparent permission or assertion of an object which is not desired. Sobhakara follows Kammata. Uktavishaya is divided into three varieties by Sobhakara: (a) the object described may be denied, (b) the object may be described as denied and (c) the statement of an object may be denied. Sobhakara follows Vuyyaka in dividing Vaksyamavishaaya. Sobhakara gives Vidyabhása as a separate figure; he does not treat it as a variety of Aksepa because he holds that vidyabhása is not denoted by the word Aksepa. Vidyanatha and Visvanatha follow Vuyyaka. Appayya defines Aksepa as 'svayamuktasya pratishadho vicaranat'. He gives two other varieties of Aksepa - 'nisedhabhása' and 'vidhyabhása'. Appayya, however, does not give the divisions of nisedabhása.

It can be said that the first view mentioned by Jagannatha is held by Vamanan, the second by Jayadeva and Appayya and the third by Bhamaha, Udbhata, Mamatta and others succeeding him. Then again, Jagannatha seems to refer to Dandin's definition when he mentions that any denial is Aksepa according to some. Jagannatha does not
definitely say which view he prefers. It can however be said, from his criticism of Ruyyaka's view that he holds that Ākṣepa does not consist in apparent denial only.

Ākṣepa also cannot be said to be based on similarity. It is, however, treated as a figure based on similarity by Ruyyaka and others. Only Ākṣepa, defined by Vāmana, is based on similarity.