Caste, the rural community, and the joint family have contributed to social and cultural solidarity in India, where differences of race and culture were likely to provoke perpetual conflict. Although they make up an interwoven compact and solid structure they are plastic, bending to economic forces. Through the caste system, the aboriginal tribes have been gradually absorbed into Hindu social organization. As peasants, artisans, and traders rise in the economic scale, they also rise in caste, not as individuals but as groups. Almost unceasing are the processes of differentiation and fusion of castes and sub-castes, especially on the lower rungs of the Hindu social ladder. With the growth of cities and industrial development, caste has abandoned many of its restrictions and has demonstrated its adaptability to become the guild or trade union in the new system of industry.¹

Marginalisation is an experience affecting millions of people throughout the world. This problem is considered to some extent in most of the following chapters. Being poor, unemployed, discriminated against, or being disabled by a society that won't work around the problems of impairment; they all bring with them the risk of exclusion. Being excluded from economic, social and political means of promoting one's self-determination can have adverse effects on individuals and communities alike. This is focused on social marginalization to see how community psychologists can understand it and challenge it at the same time. Marginalization is a slippery and multi-layered concept. Whole societies can be marginalized at the global level while classes and communities can be marginalized from the dominant social order. Similarly, ethnic groups, families or individuals can be marginalized within localities.
To a certain extent, marginalization is a shifting phenomenon, linked to social status. So, for example, individuals or groups might enjoy high social status at one point in time, but as social change takes place, so they lose this status and become marginalized. Similarly, as life cycle stages change, so might people's marginalized position.\textsuperscript{2} Caste systems are any ranked, hereditary, endogamous occupational groups that constitute traditional societies in certain regions of the world, particularly among Hindus in India. There, caste is rooted in antiquity and specifies the rules and restrictions governing social intercourse and activity for each group based on their occupation and social status. The different castes practiced mutual exclusion in many social activities, including eating, as well as marriage. In addition to the major castes, there also existed another group, the "outcastes," who were relegated to the worst occupations if any employment at all. Ranked below the castes, they were treated as sub-human "unseeable" and "untouchable."

While the Indian caste system is the most well-known, other cultures have had similar structures. While most are no longer in force, one common attribute, and one that persists despite official rulings against it, is the existence of an "outcaste" group. Those classified in this way, whether they are Dalit in India, Burakumin in Japan or Baekjeong in Korea, have suffered discrimination throughout their history. While the caste system in general is no longer considered acceptable as it denies people many opportunities now considered human rights based on their lineage, it is those that suffer the greatest loss of rights and opportunity, the outcastes, for whom the caste system remains most strongly a reality.

Caste is defined by the American Heritage Dictionary as "an endogamous and hereditary social group limited to persons of the same rank, occupation, and economic position." The word caste is derived from
the Romance word casta (seen in Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian), which (in addition to representing the same concept as English caste) can mean "lineage" or "race." It comes from Romance casto, which can mean "pure" or "chaste." Casto in Latin means "chaste," which is derived from castus, meaning "pure, cut off, separated."³

Many of these cultures show only the remnants of a caste system that divided the population into what might today be regarded as different social classes, based on lineage and on the role they performed in society. What remains, however, and is common to many cultures is the "outcaste," the people considered below the level of common humanity of all the others, "untouchable." They and their descendants, the Dalit in India, the Burakumin in Japan, and the Baek Jeong in Korea, all have faced discrimination, and some continue to do so today.

The traditional hereditary system of social stratification in India, in which all social classes exist in thousands of endogamous groups, is termed as Jati. The jāti system, usually with politically and economically derived hierarchies, has been followed across the Indian subcontinent with regional variations across India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. Different religious denominations have traditionally followed different kinds of jāti stratification. While the prevalence of the jāti system has reduced significantly over the course of the twentieth century, remote and rural areas of the subcontinent continue to adhere to the system of jāti segregation.

"Caste," on the other hand is a theoretical construct of the Brahmin scholars to describe and categorize (Varna) the complex social arrangement of which they were themselves apart. In the absence of any other better word, Varna was translated as "Caste" by the Europeans, with its connotations of racial purity. Contrary to popular belief, historically
there was a great deal of mobility and intermingling within Indian castes, other than Brahmins, largely based on the economic or political status of the concerned group.

The Brahmins were enjoined by their scriptures and texts (including the Manusmriti) to live in poverty and to shun possessions and temporal power, and instead devote themselves to study the teachings of scriptures, pure conduct and spiritual growth. They subsisted mainly on alms from the rest society.

Caste became an important element of Indian politics after the British used the entirely theoretical construct of Varna (literally meaning "colour") as the basis for classifying the Indian population, especially the Hindus, in the Population Censuses of late nineteenth century. This became more specific in the 1901 Census because the Indian population did not understand what was meant by "Caste" and gave their occupation, religion and education as their "Caste." In the 1901 Census, the people were asked to classify themselves or were classified by enumerators, as members of the specific castes of Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, or Shudra. This was ostensibly done to simplify an otherwise difficult to categorize society, with subtle hierarchies, for the purposes of better statistical manipulation.

Outside the caste system is the fifth and lowest class called the Dalit or "Untouchables," seen as untouchable because of the job functions they performed. Some of the untouchables were so polluted that they were called "unseeable" and, therefore, were supposed to keep out of sight, being able to do their jobs only at night.\textsuperscript{4}

Thus, a purely theoretical construct of "Varna" or "Caste" now became a living entity and became embedded in the minds of intellectuals and common people alike as an "ancient" system of social segregation.
Caste and Class:

The relationship of caste to class is one of the oldest questions in Indian social science, and the defining question of Nehruvian India in particular. It is no coincidence, therefore, that all the senior Indian scholars are featured in the previous section Karve, Srinivas, Biteille, Kothari, and especially the professed Marxist Kosambi are concerned with this question. However, it’s very pre-eminence, and the manner in which it was usually posed, have made it an oddly disabling question. It is hardly surprising that in the era of colonisation, enormous hope was invested in economic development as the solution to all manner of social and historical problems. Despite their formidable challenges, poverty and underdevelopment seemed explainable and, therefore, transformable in ways that caste or religious divisions were not. That is why class came to be considered the legitimate axis of stratification in the social sciences and questions about the economic dimensions of caste were reduced to the teleological expectation that it would be transformed into class. But like all transition narratives, this framework tended to narrow the focus of attention to only those features of caste that were considered relevant to it, thus crowding our alternative descriptions of what was happening in the present. The most debilitating aspect of this mode of posing the question has been the implicit expectation that caste would somehow become inert or lose its affectivity when alloyed with class. The possibilities of a synergistic union by which each might enhance the force of the other without dissolving its distinctive character could not be adequately explored.\textsuperscript{5}

The relationship between the ideas of caste and class has been a matter of lively controversy. Some say that caste is analogous to mss and that there is no difference between the two. Others hold that the idea of castes is fundamentally opposed to that of class. This is an aspect of the
subject of caste about which more will be sodded hereafter. For the present, it is necessary to emphasize one feature of the caste system that has not been referred to hereinbefore. It is this. Although caste is different from and opposed to the notion of class yet the caste-systems distinguished from caste recognizes a class system that is somewhat different from the graded status referred to above. Just as the Hindus are divided into so many castes, castes are divided into different classes of castes. The Hindu is caste conscious. He is also class conscious. Whether he is caste conscious or class conscious depends upon the caste with which he comes in conflict. If the caste with which he comes in conflict is a caste within the class to which he belongs he is caste conscious. If the caste is outside the class to which he belongs, he is class conscious. Anyone who needs any evidence this point may study the Non-Brahmin Movement in the Madras and the Bombay Presidency. Such a study will leave no doubt that to a Hindu caste periphery is as real as class periphery and caste consciousness is as real as class consciousness.

Caste, it is said, is an evolution of the Varna system. I will show later on that this is nonsense. Caste is a perversion of Varna. At any rate, it is an evolution in the opposite direction. But while caste has completely perverted the Varna system it has borrowed the class system from the Varna system. Indeed, the class-caste system follows closely the class cleavages of the Varna system.

Looking at the caste system from this point of view one comes across several lines of class cleavage that run through this pyramid of castes dividing the pyramid into blocks of castes. The first line of cleavage follows the line of division noticeable in the ancient Chaturvarna system. The old system of Chaturvarna made a distinction between the first three Varnas, the Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and the fourth Varna, namely,
the Shudra. The three former were classed as the regenerate classes. The Shudra was held as the unregenerate class. This distinction was based on the fact that the former were entitled to wear the sacred thread and study the Vedas. The Shudra was entitled to neither, and that is why he was regarded as the unregenerate class. The line of cleavage is still in existence and forms the basis of the present-day class division separating the castes that have grown out of the vast class of Shudras from those which have grown out of the three classes of Brahmins, the Kshatriyas and Vaishyas. This line of class cleavage is the one that is expressed by the terms High Castes and Low Castes and which are short forms for the High-Class Castes and Low-Class Castes.⁶

Secularisation of Middle Caste and Class:

On the whole, the discourse on caste in post-independent India remained bogged down in the dichotomous debate on 'tradition versus 'modernity' and 'caste versus 'class'. The dichotomous view of change has prevented scholars, policy-makers and political activists alike, from taking a view of the process by which caste has changed, and a new type of stratification system has emerged. This process, which can broadly be characterised as secularisation of caste, has detached caste from the ritual status hierarchy, on the one hand, and has imparted to it a character of the power-group functioning in the competitive Democratic politics on the other. Changes in caste could thus be observed along these two dimensions of secularisation: de-ritualisation and politicisation. These changes have: (a) pushed caste out of the traditional stratification system, (b) linked it to the new structure of representational power, and (c) in their cumulative impact they have made it possible for individual members of different castes to acquire new economic interests and social-political identification and own class-like as well as ethnic-type identities. Thus, the secularisation
of caste, brought about through its de-ritualisation and politicisation, has opened up a third course of change. For lack of a more appropriate term call it classification. In the following sections, it describes these three processes of change in caste and their implications for the emergence of a new type of stratification system in India.  

**Politicisation of Castes:**

It is evident that competitive politics after Independence required that a political party seeking wider electoral bases view castes neither as a pure category of 'interest' nor of 'identity'. The involvement of castes in politics fused 'interest' and 'identity' in such a manner that some castes could share common interests and identity in the form of larger social, political conglomerates. The process was of politicisation of castes, which by incorporating castes in competitive politics re-organised and recast the elements of both hierarchy and separation among castes in larger social collectivities. These new collectivities did not resemble the Varna categories or anything like a polarised class-structure in politics. The singular impact of competitive democratic politics on the caste system thus was that it de-legitimised the old hierarchical relations among castes, facilitating new, horizontal power relations among them.

The process of politicisation of castes acquired a great deal of sophistication in the politics of the Congress Party. By relying on the caste calculus for its electoral politics and, at the same time, articulating political issues in terms of economic development and national integration, the Congress was able to evolve durable electoral bases across castes and to maintain its image as the only truly national party. This winning combination of 'caste politics' and 'nationalist ideology' secured for the Congress Party a dominant position in Indian politics for nearly three decades after Independence.
The Congress Party projected its politics at the national level as representing 'national aspirations of the Indian people. At the regional levels, the party consolidated its social base by endorsing the power of the numerically strong and upwardly mobile dominant, but traditionally of lower status, castes of landowning peasants, e.g. Marathas, Reddys, Patidars, Jars and so on. In the process, it created the patron-client type of relationships in electoral politics, relationships of unequal but reliable exchanges between political patrons the upper and dominant (intermediate) castes and the numerous 'client' castes at the bottom of the pile, popularly known as the Congress 'vote-banks'. This ensured for the Congress a political consensus across castes, despite the fact that it was presided over by a small upper-caste, English-educated elite in collaboration with the regional social elites belonging by and large to the upwardly mobile castes of landed peasants. The 'national elite', with the self-image of modernisers, often viewed the latter as parochial traditionalists. Still the alliance held.  

This collaboration between the two types of elites created a new structure of representational power in the society, around which grew a small middle class. This class constituted of the upper-caste national elite living in urban areas and the rural social elite belonging to the dominant peasant castes as well as those upper-caste members living in rural areas. The ruling national elites, although they belonged to the upper dwija castes, had become detached from their traditional ritual status and functions. They had acquired new interests in the changed economy, and lifestyles that came through modern education, non-traditional occupations, and a degree of westernisation that accompanied this process. The dominant castes of the regional elites still depended more on Sanskritisation than on 'westernisation in their pursuit of upward social mobility. But they encouraged their new generations to take to modern,
English-medium education and new professions. In the process, despite their Shudra origins, but thanks to their acquisition of new power in the changed rural economy and politics, several peasant communities succeeded in claiming social status equivalent to the middle class dwijas.\textsuperscript{12}

Consequently, such communities as Patidars, Marathas, Reddys, Kammas, and their analogues in different regions were identified with 'upper castes', and not with 'backward castes'. Acquisition of modern education and interest in the new (planned) economy enabled them, like the dwija upper castes, to claim for themselves a new social status and identity, i.e. that of the middle class.

At the same time, the caste identities of both these sections of the 'middle class' were far from dissolved. They could comfortably own both the upper-caste status and the middle-class identity as both categories had become concomitant with each other. While the alliance between the upper-caste national elite and the dominant caste regional elites remained tenuous in politics, they together continued to function as a new power-group in the larger society. In the formation and functioning of this middle class as a power group of elite, caste had indeed fused with class and status dimension had acquired a pronounced power dimension. But insofar as this process of converting traditional status into new power was restricted only to the upper, rungs in the ritual hierarchy, they sought to use that power in establishing their caste-like hegemony over the rest of the society. It is this nexus between the traditional upper status and new power that inhibited the transformative potentials of both modernisation and democracy in India.\textsuperscript{13}

This conflation of the traditional status system with the new power system, however, worked quite differently for the numerous non-dwija lower castes. In negotiating their way into the new power-system, their traditional low status; contrary to what it did for the upper and the
intermediate castes, worked as a liability. The functions attached to their very low traditional statuses had lost relevance or were de-valued in the modern occupational system. Moreover, since formal education was not mandated for them in the traditional status system, they were slow to take to modern education when compared with the tipper castes. Nor did they have the advantage of inherited wealth as their traditional status had tied them to subsistence livelihood patterns of the Jajmani system.

In brief, for the lower castes of small and marginal peasants, artisans, the ex-untouchables and the numerous tribal communities, their low status in the traditional hierarchy worked negatively for their entry in the modern sector. Whatever social capital and economic security they had in the traditional status system was wiped out by the modernisation process; they no longer enjoyed the protection that they had in the traditional status system against the arbitrary use of hierarchical power by the upper castes. On top of that they had no means or resources to enter the modern, nor in any significant way, except becoming its underclass. They remained at the bottom rung of the hierarchies, the sacred and the secular, caste and class.

This did objectively create an elite-mass kind of division in politics, but it still did not produce any awareness of polarisation of socio-economic classes in the society. In any event, it did not create any space for class-based politics. In fact, all attempts of the left parties at political mobilisation of the numerous lower castes as a class of proletarians did not achieve any significant results either for their electoral or revolutionary politics. Neither did their politics, focused as it was on class ideology, make much of a dent on Congress dominated politics marked by the rhetoric of national integration and social harmony. In effect, the Congress could establish the political hegemony of the upper caste oriented-middle class with the electoral consent of the lower castes! A very peculiar caste-
class linkage was thus forged in which the upper castes functioned in politics with the self-identity of a class (ruling or 'middle') and the lower castes, despite their class-like political aspirations, with the consciousness of their separate caste identities. The latter were linked to the former in a vertical system of political exchange through the Congress Party, rather than horizontally with one another.  

**Classisation of Caste:**

Classisation' is a problematic and admittedly an inelegant,' concept used for describing certain types of changes in caste. As a category derived from conventional class analysis, it articulates the issue of change in linear and dichotomous terms, i.e. how is caste transforming itself into a polarised structure of economic classes?

Classisation neither follows a linear, teleological course of change nor does it represent the caste-system's reproductive process. Therefore, view classisation as a two-fold process: (a) releasing of individual members of all castes (which may vary in extent across castes) from the religiously sanctioned techno-economic and social organisation (i.e. occupational and status hierarchy) of the village system; (b) and linking of their interests and identities to organisations and categories relevant to urban-industrial system and modern politics. This process operates not only in urban areas but also increasingly in the rural areas. The two aspects of the process are not temporally sequential, nor spatially separated. They crisscross, and the changes become visible in the form of elements of the newly emergent, macro-system of social stratification. Thus viewed, classisation is a process by which castes, but more frequently their individual members, relate to categories of social stratification of a one type different from that of caste. The quest today is not for registering higher ritual status; it is universally for wealth, political power and modern
lifestyles. In short, caste has ceased to ‘reproduce’ itself, as it did in the past.

**Emergence of a new Middle Class:**

All these changes have imparted a structural substantiality to the macro-stratificatory system of a kind it did not have in the past. In the absence of a centralised polity, the secularisation of Canto and the Making of Mu Now Middle Class the system functioned super-structurally as an ideology of Varna hierarchy. Lacking structural substance, it served as a 'common social language' and supplied normative categories of legitimation of statuses to various local, substantive hierarchies of jatis. But after India became a pan-Indian political entity governed by a liberal democratic state, as we saw earlier, new social formations each comprising some jatis, often across ritual hierarchies and religious communities emerged at the regional and all-India levels. Deriving its nomenclature from the official classification devised by the state in the course of implementing its policy of affirmative action (reservations), the new formations began to be identified as: the forward or the 'upper castes', the backward castes, the Dalits or Scheduled Castes (SCs) and the Tribals or the Scheduled Tribes (STs).  

Unlike status groups of the caste system, the new social formations function as relatively loose and open-ended entities, competing with each other for political power. In this competition, members of the upper-caste formation have available to them the resources of their erstwhile traditional higher status and those of lower-caste formations have the advantages accruing to them from the state's policy of affirmative action. Thus, the emergent stratificatory system represents a kind of opinion between the old status system and the new power system. Put differently, the ritual
hierarchy of closed status groups has transformed into a fairly open and fluid system of social stratification.\textsuperscript{17}

This system is in the making; it cannot be described either in caste terms or pure class terms. However, the salience of one category in this newly emergent stratificatory system has become visible in recent years. It can be characterised as the 'new middle class: 'New because its emergence is directly traceable to the disintegration of the caste system, this has made it socially much more diversified compared to the old, upper caste-oriented middle class that existed at the time of Independence. Moreover, high status in the traditional hierarchy worked implicitly as a criterion for entry into the old middle-class, and Isansl criticised' l lifestyles constituted its cultural syndrome. Both rituality and Sanskritisation have virtually lost their relevance in the formation of the 'new middle class. Membership of today's middle class is associated with new lifestyles (modem consumption patterns), ownership of certain economic assets and the self-consciousness of belonging to the middle class. As such, it is open to members of different castes that have acquired modern education, taken to non-traditional occupations and command the higher incomes and the political power to enter this middle class.

And yet, the new middle class cannot be seen as constituting a pure class category a construct which, in fact, is a theoretical fiction. It carries some elements of caste within it, insofar as an entry of an individual in the middle class is facilitated by the collective political and economic resources of his/her caste. For example, upper-caste individuals entering the middle class have at their disposal the resources that were attached to the status of their caste in the traditional hierarchy. Similarly, for lower caste members, lacking in traditional status resources, their entry into the middle class is facilitated by the modern-legal provisions like affirmative
action to which they are entitled by virtue of their traditional low status. It seems the Indian middle class will continue to carry caste elements within it, to the extent that modern status aspirations are pursued, and the possibility of their realisation is seen by individuals in terms of the castes to which they belong.

Crucial to the formation of the new middle class is the Fact that while using collective resources of their castes, individuals from all castes entering it undergo the process of classisation; (a) they become distant from ritual roles and functions, attached to their caste; (b) acquire another, but new, identity of belonging to middle class; (c) their economic interest and lifestyle converge more with other members of the middle class than with their non-middle-class caste compatriots.  

Secularisation of caste, occurring along the dimensions of de-ritualisation. Politicisation and classisation has reduced caste to a kinship-based micro-community, with its members acquiring new structural iden- tities derived from categories of stratification premised on the set of principles than those of the ritual hierarchy. By forming themselves into larger horizontal social groups, members of different castes now increasingly compete for entry into the middle class. The result is, and members of the lower castes have entered the middle class in sizeable numbers. This has begun to change the character and composition of the old, pre-Independence, middle class that was constituted almost entirely by the small English-educated upper-caste elite. The new and vastly enlarged middle class constituting about one-fifth of the Indian population is becoming, even if slowly, politically and culturally more unified but highly diversified in terms of social origins of its members.
Caste and Religion:

With regard caste and community, 88 percent of respondents in our survey were “found to be Hindus while only 5 per cent were Christians and 2 percent Muslims. Brahmins constituted 48 percent of our sample. The pre-dominance of Brahmins is not surprising, given their historical monopoly over higher education and formal sector employment, especially in South India. If we include others belonging to 'twice-born castes, the figure for all upper castes comes to 71 per cent. Employees from dominant agricultural castes that are classified as other backward classes (OBCs) constituted 15 per cent, is bringing the proportion of respondents who come from upper or dominant caste groups to 86 per cent. If we further include some of the Christian respondents, such as Syrian Christians, the proportion is even greater. Only one respondent said that he belonged to a scheduled community. Other studies have thrown up the same pattern: in the survey by Oommen and MCenalcshi Sundararajan (2005). Three-fourths of the respondents were from forwarding castes, and the rest were Other Backward Classes while none were from the Scheduled Caste (SC)/Scheduled Tribe (ST) category.

Caste Labour and Stigma:

Discussions on exclusion and discrimination based on caste speak of the operation of stigma, where caste stigma works through institutional structures to exclude people belonging to lower castes from entitlements and status, as well as within educational institutions. The stigma of untouchability thus reduces opportunities for advancement and continues the alienation of self, despite legal guarantees and mechanisms for equity. It is the experience of relations of labour as evidenced both by caste-based labours and the location of Dalit people in other situations that bring to light the continued structural operation of the stigma of untouchability.
In the case of the women labourers, we see a further complication of the stigma where the stigma of caste works alongside the stigma of sexuality. Feminists confronted such a moment when Maharashtra promulgated a ban on women dancing in dance bars in Mumbai, and after that in the entire state. While a section of feminists, largely from the autonomous women's groups, opposed the ban, saying it deprived women of the right to livelihood, the fact that a majority of women were from castes and communities where dancing was a traditional caste practice led, another section of Dalit-Bahujan feminists to oppose the former's position, stating that in supporting the uncritical right to livelihood of the bar dancers, they were reinforcing the existence of the women within caste-based occupations and the stigmas related to it. That troubling moment further brought to light the fact that the autonomous feminist articulations, while responding to issues of communalism and sexual politics, had not addressed the experience of caste hierarchies and exclusion. However, the moment offered an opportunity to initiate some dialogue, which is still seeking momentum.

**Caste-Based Social Background:**

As rightly quoted by Dr. Ambedkar, in a caste-based society, the choice of occupation was not based on individual preference or capabilities, but on the social hierarchy for Brahmanism. While some occupations are valued by society, others are devalued and are considered polluting, impure, and therefore socially degrading. The social stigma of impurity and pollution attached to occupations such as scavenging and leather-making reduces the social status of the persons engaged in them. The workers those who are forced into these occupations on account of their caste origin do not derive job satisfaction and are constantly prone to aversion, ill will and the desire to insinuate. There are many degraded by
Hindus, provoke those who are engaged in there is a constant desire to evade and escape from such occupations which arises solely because of the blighting effect which they produce upon those who fellow them owing to the slight and stigma of caste on them by Hindu religion what efficiency can there be in a system under which neither men’s hearts, not their minds are in there work, public life in India is controlled by cast identities.\textsuperscript{19}

Caste is a term used to identify the different social segments within the caste based Brahmnical societal system in India. Each caste has its customs, rituals, family deities and food habits. According to Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, it is mainly the custom of endogamy that has preserved the castes and prevented one caste from fusing into another. He again says ‘by the Hindu social system the communities are placed in an ascending scale of reverence and a descending scale of contempt.

\textbf{Scheduled Castes}: The Simon Commission in 1935 first coined the term ‘Scheduled Castes’. All the untouchable castes, which were listed in 1931-Census of India came to be known as the ‘Scheduled Castes’ (SCs) through the Government of India Act of 1935. In the meantime, the Government published a list of Scheduled Castes under the Government of India (Scheduled Caste) Order 1936. The Government of India in post-independence period carried the same idea. Scheduled Castes is the marginalized social group in India. In caste-based society, they are boycotted & exploited and so it is nothing but socially excluded strata of the society in the Indian context.

The relevant Articles dealing with the Scheduled Castes (SCs) in the Constitution of India provide for as under: “341. (1) The President may with respect to any State or Union territory, and where it is a state, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification, specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes
which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the case may be. (2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification issued under clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification”.

**Social Exclusion:** Social exclusion has been defined as a ‘process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society within which they live in this sense social exclusion is opposite to social integration’.

**Entrepreneurship Development:** Entrepreneurship development may be defined as, “It is a process through which entrepreneurial qualities are injected with necessary motivational drives of achievements to transform business ideas or opportunities into the enterprise and to manage uncertain and risky situations of business undertakings.”

**Occupational Mobility:** Occupational mobility may be defined as the mobility or movement of factors of production from one type of productive activity to another type of productive activity. In particular, it is the ease with which resources can change occupations. For example, a worker leaves a job as an accountant to takes a job of a computer programmer. Some factors are highly mobile and thus can easily move jobs. Other factors are highly immobile and not easily able to switch production activities.

**Marginalized Groups:** Marginalization is the social process of becoming or being made marginal or relegated to the fringe of society e.g. “the marginalization of the underclass”, “marginalisation of intellect”, etc. Many communities experience marginalization with particular focus in this
section on Aboriginal communities and women. Marginalization of Aboriginal communities is a product of caste system in the Indian context, as a result of castiesm. Aboriginal communities lost their land, were forced into destitute areas, lost their sources of income, and were excluded from the labour market.\textsuperscript{21}

**Structure of Class and Caste Hierarchy:**

Since in a class society status attributes are achieved competitively, the shape of its hierarchy must of necessity is pyramidal. In other words, the greater the desirability of the status, the greater the difficulty of achieving it. The higher one rises, the keener is the rivalry and the fewer the rivals. Thus, the size of the class tends to vary inversely with the superiority of status. The shape of the caste hierarchy, however, is unpredictable, for caste membership is principally a birth rate of caste populations. Although we have no data on caste membership by "natural districts" India, figures for the country as a whole show that some of the higher castes such as Brahmans and Shaikhs have the largest membership. Indeed, the Brahmans have a larger membership than any other. We may venture the speculation that since the lowest castes are usually recruited from those primitive tribes on the periphery of the caste system, it is probable that the shape of the caste hierarchy may appear like an inverted truncated pyramid.\textsuperscript{22}

The class hierarchy is a status continuum, we think of it as including discrete strata only for purposes of comprehension and analysis. Castes, however, are distinct segregable social groupings. While class strata, if they are to be meaningful, must be few, the number of castes may be practically unlimited. Castes may be classified, but classes are already social classifications, as we have indicated elsewhere, there may be social classes within castes a rather tautologous conception when applied to the
class system. A crucial difference between a class and a caste is that regarding the social order, the caste is a status bearing entity; while the social class is a conceptual strain of status bearing entities. Therefore, the class is not a form of social organization.²³

To illustrate, we may think of segregating all the castes in Brahmanic India according to some scheme of classification, and pigeonhole all the castes under the following headings: high, low-high, middle, low, and lowest. Here, there, will be a hierarchy of classes of castes. We may be able to describe these classes and even show that a vague sense of their approximate status tends to determine to differ-entail behavior' attitudes of persons within them. But what finally is the nature of these two structures: our classes, and the castes? Clearly the classes are not forms of social organization and, as such, we should expect them to have little if anything in common with the castes constituting them. Moreover, it would seem obvious that other taxonomists, according to their criteria of classification, may arrive at quite different distributions of castes.

In a class system it is the family or person who is the bearer of status; in the caste system it is the caste. The caste system emphasizes group status and morality; the individual without a caste is a meaningless social entity. He is an object naturally ignored by the rest of society. Thus, a man's class does not determine his rank in society, for the class is rank; a man's caste, how-ever, does tend to decide his rank. In other words, his class is his rank, while his caste has to be determined. We define an individual's status, not by first determining his class position, but rather we determine his class position by ascertaining his status.

If we were thinking of status hierarchies only, it is not class and caste that we should compare, but rather individuals and families in the class system, and sub-castes or castes (endogamous units) in the caste
system. In both cases, the number of statuses would be large beyond comprehensible limits. To make the hierarchy wieldy, then, some scheme of classification regarding the purpose in hand is consciously or unconsciously devised. We may illustrate the position of the person in the class system and the caste system.

India’s Problem is not Poverty having cleared the preliminary doubts that are haunting our minds; we will now deal with the practical aspects of ‘caste consolidation’. How can castes be strengthened? This is another question that is bothering our brainwashed 'educated' Ingalls. However, the uneducated, village-dwelling Bahujans know the answer. They are free from all such confusions. When we say that every 'caste has to be strengthened', it presupposes that currently our castes are weak. Why did they become weak? What is the sociological meaning of such 'weakness'?

To understand this question and to find an answer, we must first identify India’s most serious problem and who its victims are. Hundreds of books and 'research works' have been published on this subject and most of them have invariably identified 'poverty' as the single most serious problem of India. Hunger, illiteracy, unemployment, under-employment, impoverishment, disease, corruption, prostitution, child labour, bonded labour, etc., are all considered to be the by-products of 'poverty'. Fine, but who are the victims of this 'poverty'? Who are the 'poor', the illiterate, the unemployed, the impoverished and the marginalised?

Here lies the genius of our upper caste 'scholars'. Their genius lies in not identifying the victims of 'poverty'. Their only identification mark is that all those victims suffering from the above diseases are the 'poor'. Poverty is the cause of all their ailments. But in Dalit Voice we have discussed this mischievous 'poverty yardstick' and emphatically declared that India's problem is not poverty. Nay, there are no 'poor' people at all in
India. We recognise no 'poor' people. The word 'poor' is not found in the dictionary of an Ambedkarite. Who, then, are these victims?

It is none other than the Bahujans, viz., Scheduled Castes (20 per cent), Scheduled Tribes (10 per cent), Backward Castes (35 percent), Muslims (15 percent) and Christians (2.5 percent). Our upper caste social scientists, scholars, researchers and the rulers do not want to disclose this supreme truth because they do not belong to any of the above suffering castes of Bahujans. They all belong to the ruling Hindu castes.

If 'poverty' is such a widespread problem in India, all the Indians, irrespective of caste and community should have been affected by poverty. How is it that only the Bahujans are 'poor', illiterate and unemployed, etc.? How is it that the Hindus have escaped the curse of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and prostitution, etc.? How did the Hindu rulers manage to save their 15 per cent people from 'poverty', and how did the Bahujans fail to escape from the noose of 'poverty'?

**Sense of belonging:**

There can be only one answer to this question. The Brahminical rulers have 'consciously' identified their people and offered them all the avenues of development and progress. This 'consciousness' is the 'sense of belongingness' or the 'awareness of kind'. In other words, this 'consciousness' is nothing but 'caste consciousness' because in India it is one's own caste that brings an 'awareness of kind' and a 'sense of belonging'.

It is this vibrant 'caste consciousness' among the Hindus that has helped them identify their people. It is 'caste consciousness' among the Hindus that has forced them to uplift their kith. It is again this 'caste consciousness' that has empowered the Hindus to become the ruling class of India.
The reverse is true with the Bahujans. If it is 'caste consciousness' that enabled the Hindus to rule India, it is the loss of such 'caste consciousness' among the Bahujans that has pushed them to be slaves. Despite being a majority in number, they are lost under the minority Hindu rule because of their loss of 'caste consciousness', which they once possessed, and thereby have allowed their castes to disintegrate and degenerate into slavery. The Aryan rulers have managed, through psychological warfare, to erase and eradicate the caste consciousness so effectively and painlessly that the slaves themselves did not know that they had become slaves. Consequently, how can they understand that there is a slave master riding on their neck? That is how this 'most populous' Indian sub-continent has become the biggest beggar country on earth. Since the majority of Indians are suffering from poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and disease, the entire country naturally turns out to be poor, illiterate, sick and lazy.

Hence, 'poverty' is not the greatest problem of the Indian subcontinent. It is the 'loss of caste consciousness' or the 'loss of self-consciousness' among the majority of Indians that is the single biggest problem in India today. The loss of 'caste consciousness' among the Bahujans has led to the 'loss of identity' that in turn has led to the loss of political power. When a community is deprived of political power, it is said to have lost the key to its community's progress. Since all the Bahujans are politically insignificant, they cannot unlock the door of progress closed to them. That is how all these communities have become weak and 'poor' in every aspect.

Therefore, Bahujan development, which means the development of India, is possible only when the Bahujans capture political power. It is possible to capture political power only by strengthening 'caste identity'.
There is no other way. The way shown by the Hindus that is the 'poverty eradication way' has proved to be a futile one.

One can strengthen caste only when he/she is conscious of his/her caste. In other words, in India it is 'caste consciousness' that enables a caste to capture political power. All those castes which are politically powerful today are essentially those with strong 'caste consciousness' and those that have lost their 'caste consciousness' are politically weak. Powerful communities are those which possess strong 'caste consciousness' and weak communities are those which have lost their 'caste consciousness'. It is the degree of 'caste consciousness' that determines the strength or the weakness of a particular caste.

That is why there is an all-round conspiracy of silence on the Anthropological Survey of India's verdict on the durability of caste. It is this very reason why the ruling castes have created all sons of confusion on the question of caste. They do not want to even have a discussion on the miracle of caste or the caste system.

Because they feel that if the masses are emancipated from the yoke of caste they would be a menace to the power and prestige of the Brahmins as a class.' If it is the loss of 'caste consciousness' that has made a community weak, then by infusing 'caste consciousness' we can make that very community strong and thereby enable it to capture political power.

How to infuse Caste Consciousness low can a caste retain or develop its 'caste consciousness' unless it loves its own caste and feels proud of it? All these years, particularly after 1947, the Brahminical media has been brainwashing the Bahujan castes into hating their own castes. So intense is the self-hatred, that the 'low caste' people, particularly, the Untouchables, do not even disclose their castes. In Gujarat, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, etc, the Untouchables have taken upper caste jati surnames.
Today, if you ask any city-born, 'educated' Bahujan, particularly a Dalit, of his caste, he is sure to say that either he does not believe in caste or he does not know his caste. If one is so ignorant about his own caste roots, how can he feel one with his suffering caste? On the other side of this self-hatred is the blind imitation of the Brahminical culture. Almost all the 'elites' or the 'creamy layer' among the Bahujans have become neo-Brahmins and are detached from their own communities. As they get educated, they gradually move away from their jati and start despising their own kith. How can such a self-hating lot take the responsibility of liberating the masses from slavery? This is the worst tragedy that could befall a jati.

A Brahmin, on the other hand, is so proud of his jati that he arrogantly flaunts his 'sacred thread'. He keeps his shirt buttons open deliberately even in his workplace to frighten his colleagues and non-Brahmin superiors. A mere 10 paise thread has the miraculous effect of elevating him in the eyes of the beholder, conferring upon him a superman status and the licence to loot. If some South Indian Brahmins, particularly those from Tamil Nadu, have dropped their surnames, it is because of Periyar E V Ramaswamy's virulent anti-Brahmin movement which physically threatened every 'cross-thread'.

But Brahmins and other upper castes in North and Eastern India are better known by their caste surnames than by their first name. We get proof of the power of caste if we go through the telephone directories of Delhi, Calcutta and Mumbai and other bigger cities. For want of space, the telephone directory always abbreviates the name, but publishes only the caste name in full. A newborn child is given a name. All over the world a person is known by his name. But this is not so in India. Here, a person is
known by his caste name and his real name is pushed into the background or is entirely forgotten as he grows up.

We have the famous example of late EMS Namboodiripad, India's most senior Marxist leader. Nobody knows his real name Shankaran. Namboodiripad is not his name. It is the name of his jati in Kerala. If one were to refer to him as 'Shankaran', nobody would know that the reference was to EMS Namboodiripad. Ironically, this person is considered the country's greatest crusader against caste. The other famous name is Gandhi, which is the surname of the Gujarati Bania, M K Gandhi. His name is Mohandas, but he is not known by his name but by his caste name, Gandhi. Vajpayee, the top Hindu Nazi leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party, is the jati surname of Mal Behari. But if you call him by his first name, nobody will recognise him. Upper caste people prefer to be known by their caste names: Patnaik, Bhattacharya, Mishra, Sharma, Patel, Tripathi, Dwivedi, Haksar, Kaul and Goel, etc. Imitating the ruling class is natural. When upper caste surnames have acquired such miraculous powers, the deprived Bahujans too have started imitating the upper castes and borrowing their surnames.

Sixty eight years of ruling class mis-education and false propaganda have converted the 'creamy layer' among the SC/ST/BCs into idiots. At every stage they get culturally and psychologically corrupted. They have given up their original tribal names, which are peculiar to their own communities, and have taken on Brahminical names. In some places, they have even taken to Brahminical symbols like wearing the 'sacred thread' and putting the 'tilak' on their forehead, etc. Formerly marriages among the Bahujans used to be conducted according to their own tribal customs under the guidance of their own jail elders and community leaders. It continues even to this day in rural areas. But the urban-born elite Bahujans
have started inviting Brahmin priests to conduct their marriages under the false belief that inviting a Brahmin and serving vegetarian food will make them more civilised compared to their rural blood relatives. A Brahmin sociologist named such a phenomenon as 'sanskritisation' which is his academic field made famous and described as a great contribution to social theory. Sanskritisation is nothing but imitation of Brahmins who are nothing but the rulers of the land. Imitating the rulers is not new to India. On the other hand, there was a system whereby the bridegroom's family offered 'bride money' to the bride's parents. Now, dowry has made serious inroads into the families of Bahujans and has become the chief instrument of enslaving women. Dowry exists only in societies where women have lost their predominant position in society.

Ours is a matriarchal society where women are the head of the family and are even priests. Bahujans claim their lineage from female deities and worship them. But those Bahujans who have migrated to cities have totally discarded their female deities and replaced them with aggressive Brahminical male chauvinistic gods. Brahmins are experts in manufacturing such gods to suit the times and popularising them to loot the innocent Bahujans. So much so, the position of women has gradually fallen among the Bahujans. This is described as sanskritisation or Hinduisation, another word for enslavement.

**The Problem of Classification:**

Because class is collective rank, each class must inevitably have a hierarchical position. Quite obviously, then, there can never be a dispute concerning the place of a class. A caste, on the other hand, may have no determined place in the caste hierarchy; it will thus be able to claim distinction only. In other words, castes sometimes find themselves in the position of the individual whose precise class rank is either in or
indeterminable, yet the individual lives, and so does the caste. Hierarchical organization is essential to the caste system, but not to the individual caste. It is this latter fact which is responsible for considerable inter-caste conflict. Each caste is supposed to have an immemorial right to a definite niche in the caste hierarchy, but the integrity of this sanctum rests finally upon public opinion. And it is in this latter capricious area that impregnable caste position must be maintained.

The social class has objective reference to social position; it implies two coordinates: one the composite of status criteria, and the other the number of persons capable of meriting the judgment. It is a more or less arbitrary ordinal segment of society with incomprehensible margins. Indeed, from the point of the individual, the class system may be thought of as a hierarchy of conceptual social status frontiers. Social classes, then, may be thought of as somewhat nebulous social strata varying in meaning and position with the status of the person seeking to estimate them. This, of course, is not intended to detract from the social significance of classes. Reciprocal classification of persons in society is an intuitive procedure necessary in organizing attitudes for consistent behavior. Even within the caste system, ends to follow some generally accepted system of classification. The concept of "the four castes" is one of these generally accepted ideal types of classification.

At this point we shall make a rather plain statement: There is no such thing as an objective social class amenable to physical circumscription; neither is there in fact a recognizable social class hierarchy in class systems of advanced societies. In other words, the class system is not stratified; stratification is an idea only. A social class is a heuristic concept significant to the person conceiving of it. As A. C. Mace well says: "Awareness of one's class as a whole must be purely conceptual. The inter-
familial links of any member of a class supply connections with only an insignificant portion of the class.\(^{25}\)

The researcher who goes into the field looking for a social class is hunting for something that is not there; he will find it only in his own mind. Of course, if he insists, he is likely to think that he has indeed isolated social classes in the homogeneous web of social interaction. His Procrustean arrays may even seem natural to him. Social classes are "held apart," not by "institutional arrangements" but by the segregating criteria which the researcher has devised. Strictly speaking, a class does not have members because it is not an organization. When we speak of "the middle class," for example, it must be understood that persons in the middle of the middle class are no more in class than are persons on the conceptual borders of that class. A still more serious limitation is the problem of determining how much of the middle the middle class is. In other words, a qualitative continuum can be divided only arbitrarily. We could hardly imagine a status hiatus between our selections of classes.\(^{26}\)

Persons behave toward other persons and not toward social classes; for a class is merely a segregating concept; it cannot have a status as persons may. A social class is, in fact, what people think it is; and the criteria of status may vary from society to society, or from community to community—indeed, from status circle to status-circle. Wealth, education, health, family record, talent, and so on may be status values; but since these may vary by infinitesimally small increments; since they are generally interdependent variables so that, for example, wealth without education may not mean the same thing as wealth with education; and since they may not always be precisely known,\(^{27}\) margin for discretion is always great. The following analogy may be helpful: We all know the difference between daylight and darkness. But could we speak of a
hierarchy of light or of definitely distinguishable classes of light between noon and midnight? There are some valleys and hills, and even spots in shadow and in reflected light, all affecting the imperceptible gradations of light; and, although this illustration is much simpler than the problem in hand, we may expect real differences of opinion as to minute degrees of light. However, persons will readily understand what illumination is meant by noon, twilight, and nightfall. So, too, in our own society, we have a general idea of what is meant by. The upper-middle and lower-class.28

Class vs Caste Controversy:

The methodology adopted by the Mandal Commission and various other backward classed commissions appointed by the state governments has been contested by scholars and intellectuals on the ground that the Commissions have identified backwardness with reference to caste while the Constitution speaks of the class of a citizen only.29 It is interesting to observe that those critics who put forward this argument have not clearly specified what they mean by class. As we have pointed out earlier there are different theories of class and we do not know to which theory of class these researchers are referring to Marxian, Weberian or some other, and their relationship with the Indian caste categories. Further, the critics of the caste criterion have brought out arguments of both the economic factors and occupation of people as important factors in determining the backwardness of a group of people. In this case, Andre Beteille (1969) has argued that ‘in reality, the backward classes are not classes at all, but aggregates of closed status groups. One’s economic position is not a determining factor in one’s membership of the backward classes; rather membership is determined generally by birth’. This observation has been supported by field surveys conducted by the backward classes commissions which show that, ‘even today the
agricultural, service and low castes have high concentration in the unskilled occupations. The high-status castes are to be found in professional and managerial occupations in greater number’.

Similar conclusion can be arrived at by looking into the caste-wise employment of people in the Central Government sector presented in the Appendix Tables of the Commission. Further, the concept of ‘a class of citizens’ in the Indian context refers to a distinct genus which comprises more than one species (that is castes, tribes and communities). Even the Supreme Court, in one of its decisions, mentioned that ‘caste has always been recognized as a class’ (1968). The Havanur Commission in Karnataka devoted three chapters in its report to point out that this concept refers to groups of people who are associated with their race, caste and religion. The Commission has also examined how the concept has been loosely referred to groups of people as backward classes from the time of Dadabhai Naoraji in his Congress addresses down to Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly. The Commission has pointed out that the first constitutional amendment took place to include Clause 4 to Article 15, specifically with reference to caste, race and religion and, therefore, it does not restrict any one to a particular caste. Furthermore, in most cases, state governments have grouped a number of identical castes into one group and a certain percentage of reservation is provided to them so that the individual identity of the caste is removed and groups of people are really considered as classes of people and not castes of people. This was done in the case of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Bihar and other states where castes are grouped into different categories. Thus, arguments against the use of caste as a unit of identification of backwardness have a number of strong points of arguments in their favour. However, the most important aspect that is generally neglected in the analysis of Caste reservation is the concept of
social and educational backwardness. It is not clear to us as to why the problem of economic backwardness is brought in as a dominant issue or discussion while the Constitution speaks only about social and educational backwardness. It appears that most of the counter arguments against backward classes reservation did not examine the relationships between education and social backwardness on the one hand and economic backwardness on the other.

Further the issue of economic strength of the backward classes does not arise when places are provided to than in an educational institution. However, it can be used as an important factor in distinguishing the economically strong backward and the poor backward class of persons at the time of economic benefits. At this stage, ‘there should definitely be an income ceiling in the case or OBC’s above which OBC people should not be given the facility of reservation because, unlike in the case of SCs and SU, a stream of affluent bourgeoisie has developed among the OBCs both in the towns and countryside’. However, it is to be assessed now to see how many of than are really forming into an affluent bourgeoisie and what is their percentage in the total population.

**Caste and the Concept of Inequality:**

The concept of inequality has been analysed and understood in two different ways by two schools of thought. The functional explanations of stratification of society by Davis and Moore, and others have reasoned that the phenomenon of inequality is universal. It is said that in every society there are certain positions which are fundamental to its survival. Society in turn ensures that the most able persons fill those positions. This entails the Inequality of access to income, status and prestige of those who functionally hold superior positions than the rest. On the other hand, the conflict theory or the Mandan analysis of inequality is based on the
question of power and decision making. The small minority of those who have possessed wealth and property also possess decision making power against the majority of the dispossessed. In the Indian context, the noted sociologist Andre Beteille, says, 'inequality can be studied not only as a mode of existence but also as a mode of consciousness. Societies are different not only in their division into groups and categories and their arrangement in a hierarchical system, they differ also in the extent to which these divisions are regarded as right, proper and desirable'. He further explains this inequality in the Indian rural context by saying that, 'it cannot be denied that in the traditional system these inequalities were closely related to the inequalities of caste. The caste system contributes to the persistence of these inequalities by providing the values and norms which were appropriate to the agrarian hierarchy'. Thus, inequality in India is manifested in the form of caste. The problem here is how to understand the relationship between caste-based inequalities with that of the educational Inequalities. This is to examine the concept of inequality in the context of creation of equality of opportunity; it is necessary to analyse it in the light of the theory of human capital which is directly concerned with education.

There are many studies in the area of education and inequality. The conclusions of Jencks (1972) in explaining the inequality of income with the help of human capital theory have been widely reported in some of the Indian studies on education and inequality. Jencks has argued that neither family background, cognitive skills, educational attainment nor occupational status explains much of the variation in men's incomes. Indeed when we compare men who are identical in all these respects, we find only 12 to 15 per cent inequality than among random individuals. He attributes the difference in incomes then to sheer luck. However, Atkinson (1976) has objected to Jencks' conclusions on the ground that he (Jencks)
did not relate the differences to just earnings but to total money income and he had also understated the contribution of education, ability and family background. Further, the studies of Bowles and Nelson (1974) and Bowles and Gintis (1976) demonstrated that the genetic inheritance of Intelligence Quotient is a relatively minor mechanism for the inter-generational transmission of economic and social status compared to the educational system which is a major vehicle for transmission of economic status from one generation to the next in a class-based society like the US. These arguments are further supported by James P. Smith (1984) in a different context while examining the human capital theory with reference to African-Americans. Smith concluded that with gradual improvement in the quantity and quality of skills of the African-Americans, there is relative increase in their earnings. This suggests the need for continuation of preferential treatment for the disadvantaged to reduce the inequalities in society. In Soviet Russia, allotment of quotas to certain ethnic communities are followed in educational institutions. Thus, the theory and empirical investigations that have been carried out by experts in advanced societies India, that education can be used as an important vehicle to bring down socio-economic inequalities. It can also be used in India to reduce socio-economic inequalities which are related to the alienation of the weaker sections from mainstream literate learning ages. Caste being an important category for identification of backwardness, protective discrimination in the field of education has been in vogue for the last few decades. It is now it can be seen how it has fared in that task.

**Caste System in Modern India:**

The leaders of independent India decided that India will be democratic, socialist and secular country. According to this policy there is a separation between religion and state. Practicing untouchability or
discriminating a person based on his caste is legally forbidden. Along with this law the government allows positive discrimination of the depressed classes of India.

The Indians have also become more flexible in their caste system customs. In general the urban people in India are less strict about the caste system than the rural. In cities one can see different caste people mingling with each other, while in some rural areas there is still discrimination based on castes and sometimes also on untouchability. Sometimes in villages or in the cities there are violent clashes which, are connected to caste tensions. Sometimes the high castes strike the lower castes who dare to uplift their status. Sometimes the lower castes get back on the higher castes.

In modern India the term caste is used for Jat and also for Varna. The term, caste was used by the British who ruled India until 1947. The British who wanted to rule India efficiently made lists of Indian communities. They used two terms to describe Indian communities, Castes and Tribes. The term caste was used for Jats and also for Varnas. Tribes were those communities who lived deep in jungles, forests and mountains far away from the main population and also communities who were hard to be defined as castes for example communities who made a living from stealing or robbery. These lists, which the British made, were used later on by the Indian governments to create lists of communities who were entitled for positive discrimination.

The castes, which were the elite of the Indian society, were classified as high castes. The other communities were classified as lower castes or lower classes. The lower classes were listed in three categories. The first category is called Scheduled Castes. This category includes in it communities who were untouchables. In modern India, untouchability exists at a very low extent. The untouchables call themselves Dalit,
meaning depressed. Until the late 1980s they were called Harijan, meaning children of God. This title was given to them by Mahatma Gandhi who wanted the society to accept untouchables within them.

The second category is Scheduled Tribes. This category includes in it those communities who did not accept the caste system and preferred to reside deep in the jungles, forests and mountains of India, away from the main population. The Scheduled Tribes are also called Adivasi, meaning aboriginals.

The third category is called sometimes Other Backward Classes or Backward Classes. This category includes in it castes who belong to Sudra Varna and also former untouchables who converted from Hinduism to other religions. This category also includes in it nomads and tribes who made a living from criminal acts.

According to the central government policy these three categories are entitled for positive discrimination. Sometimes these three categories are defined together as Backward Classes. 15% of India's population are Scheduled Castes. According to central government policy 15% of the government jobs and 15% of the students admitted to universities must be from Scheduled Castes. For the Scheduled Tribes about 7.5% places are reserved which is their proportion in Indian population. The Other Backwards Classes are about 50% of India's population, but only 27% of government jobs are reserved for them.

Along with the central government, the state governments of India also follow a positive discrimination policy. Different states have different figures of communities entitled for positive discrimination based on the population of each state. Different state governments have different lists of communities entitled for positive discrimination. Sometimes a specific
In modern India new tensions were created because of these positive discrimination policies. The high caste communities feel discriminated by the government policy to reserve positions for the Backward Classes. In many cases a large number of high caste members compete for a few places reserved for them. While the Backward Classes members do not have to compete at all because of the large number of reserved places for them compared to the candidates. Sometimes in order to fill the quota, candidates from the lower classes are accepted even though they are not suitable. Sometimes some reserved positions remain unmanned because there were few candidates from the lower classes causing more tension between the castes. Between the lower castes there are also tensions over reservation.

In the order of priority for a reserved place of the Backward Classes, candidate from the Scheduled castes is preferred over a candidate from the Scheduled Tribes who is preferred over a candidate from the other Backward Classes. As stated earlier Other Backward Classes are about 50% of India’s population but only 27% of the Other Backward Classes are entitled for positive discrimination according to central government policy. Some Other Backward Classes communities are organizing politically to be recognized as Backward Classes entitled for positive discrimination.

The Scheduled Tribes who are seen as the aborigins of India got ownership and certain rights over Indian land. Many communities in India claim also to be aborigins of India and they are claiming the same rights as the Scheduled Tribes.

The caste identity has become a subject of political, social and legal interpretation. Communities who get listed as entitled for positive
discrimination do not get out of this list even if their social and political conditions get better. In many cases the legal system is involved to decide if a certain person is entitled for positive discrimination.

But with all this positive discrimination policy, most of the communities who were low in the caste hierarchy remain low in the social order even today. And communities who were high in the social hierarchy remain even today high in the social hierarchy. Most of the degrading jobs are even today done by the Dalits, while the Brahmans remain at the top of the hierarchy by being the doctors, engineers and lawyers of India.

**Modern Developments:**

With rapid urbanization and education of India's largely rural, agrarian population, the significance of caste has diminished, except in government mediated interventions in the form of quotas and reservations in education, jobs, and promotions for the socially "lower," but numerous and thus politically important, castes.

The caste system and its attendant practices have been outlawed and declared punishable offenses, but these laws are difficult to implement. There are occasional violations of human rights of Dalits by the higher castes, including forcing Dalits into their traditional professions. Dalits in rural areas have often been victimized by other castes. The government of India provides free ships, scholarships, reservations for government jobs and of university seats in programs of higher education for people hailing from Scheduled castes, Scheduled tribes, and Other Backward Castes. Upper caste Hindus and several secular elements counter-argue that unmeritorious Dalits are exploiting this constitutionally obligatory discrimination to their unfair advantage and meritorious candidates are being sidelined.
Hindu Caste System:

The Indian caste system, prevalent also among local Muslims and Christians, exhibits some differences from those of other countries. Elsewhere, the separation between one group and the other is usually along racial lines. Within India, that is not so. Nor is there any discernable dichotomy because the caste system forms a continuum that defies such ready definition. Lower-caste people live in conditions of great poverty and social disadvantage, though efforts by the Indian government to emancipate the lower castes with affirmative action have achieved some success in recent years.

The concept of 'upper' and 'lower' caste is simply a matter of social standing and assimilation. Some castes do not allow other caste members to touch them, and in such case would wash themselves or their possessions. In some parts of India, there was the practice of defining the physical distance one should keep from persons of another caste. As a result of this, children who attended a school where children of lower castes were present had to bathe before returning home. In some parts of the world, as well as in India, such discrimination still exists, though it is punishable by law and unconstitutional in India. The Indian constitution was drafted by Ambedkar, himself of low-caste origins, who is regarded as an emancipator of the Dalits.

Caste System among Indian Muslims:

There are several caste systems among some Muslims in India also. They are broadly divided into two castes, Ashraf and Ajlaf, or oonchi zaat (high caste) and niichi zaat (low caste). The Muslim Caste system in India was analyzed by Ambedkar, who had a very dim view of the rampant discrimination against the Ajlaf castes by the Ashraf caste, who base their superiority on lineage. In addition to the Ashraf and Ajlaf castes exists
the *Arzal* (under-caste) or the *Dalit*. They are Muslims who are regarded by the Ashraf and the Ajlaf as ritually impure and are relegated to professions regarded as "menial" such as scavenging and the carrying of night soil. They are not allowed to enter the Mosque, and their dead are buried apart from the public Muslim cemetery.

In addition, Muslims in Bengal organize their society according to social strata called "Quoms," where division of labor is granted by birth, rather than by economic status. Professions perceived as "lowly" are provided to people of certain ostracized *Quoms*; higher *Quoms* get professions perceived as superior. The *Quoms* are rigidly segregated with little or no intermarriage or cohabitation.

**Caste system among Indian Christians:**

Converts to Christianity have retained the old caste practices. In particular, Dalit Christians are regarded as an under caste by upper caste Christian clergy and nuns and are discriminated against in society.

Recently, writers on aspects of social stratification have been thinking of social status in terms of a continuum of societies. At one end are societies in which the status of the individual tends to remain fixed for life; at the other are societies in which the opportunity for advancement of status of the individual is recognized and even encouraged. In other words, at the one end are caste systems, at the other open class systems.

In 1498 the Portuguese adventurers who landed at Calicut with Vasco de Gama observed that in India society was organized in a number of endogamous groups with inferior and superior social positions held in perpetuity. They compared this with the social mobility familiar to them in the West, and called it caste. Since then, almost numberless writers have made the same observations, recognition of relative rigidity of social status
among different status systems, then, is no contribution of modern sociologists.

"Castes are a special form of social classes which in tendency at least are present in even society. Castes differ from social classes, however, in that they have emerged into social consciousness to the point that custom and law attempt their rigid and permanent separation from one another. 32

If we examine these situations more closely, we should recognize that the structure of a class is categorically different from that of the caste. If we think of a social class as a status stratum consisting of individuals with heterogeneous economic, political, and religious interests, their historically we have no instance in which a class became increasingly stable until at length it crystallized into a caste. Evidently the factor which is supposed to produce the rigidity or inertia in the transformation of a class to a caste is endogamy. But, historically speaking, endogamy has had the function of securing the segregation of class membership rather than that of solidifying classes. At this point we should mention that a class, one conceptual segment of a classification, does not move; only status-bearing entities may have social mobility.

The belief that the caste system consists of four castes constituting a status gradient has led to very much confusion. As a matter of fact, there has never been any support for this belief indeed, so far as the caste system is concerned, an endogamous social class is anomalous. The social class may include castes, while the caste includes the person. The social class may be thought of as a form of social stratification and differentiation; the caste may be a form of social differentiation only. Castes may have collateral social status; classes must of necessity be hierarchically superposed. Thus two different castes may be socially equal—that is, they
may be of the same social stratum—just as, say, stationary engineers and electricians may be of the same social class. Frequently in class systems, lateral status extends beyond the immediate society, so that an American, a Greek, an Englishman, and an Italian, for instance, of the upper social class in their respective countries, will tend to recognize each other in free association on common ground. In other words, an Englishman may go to France and marry within his class with impunity. The caste, however, is socially bounded on very side. Social classes are not founded upon occupational limitations in the sense that castes are. One of the principal features of castes is that they identify themselves functionally. Thus, if it were possible to conceive of the "middle class" in the United States as becoming endogamous, the resulting social entity would be very much different from any group that we have ever known as a caste in India. It would contain priests, racketeers, dancers, nurses, tanners, doctors, butchers, teachers, sewerage workers, undertakers, farmers, mechanics, Protestants, Mohammedans, Catholics, Jews, white, black, and red men, and so on. Clearly, no one could fit this social agglomeration into the concept of caste—a "Class and caste stand to each other in relation, not of parent and child, but of family and species. The general classification is by classes, the detailed one by castes. The former represent the external, the latter the internal view of social organization."

**Social Stratification:**

Social stratification is regarded here as the differential ranking of the human individuals who compose a given social system and their treatment as superior and inferior relative to one another in certain socially important respects. Our first task is to discuss why such differential ranking is considered a really fundamental phenomenon of social systems and what are the respects in which such ranking is important. Ranking is one of
many possible bases on which individuals may be differentiated.' It is only in so far as differences are treated as involving or related to particular kinds of social superiority and inferiority that they are relevant to the theory of stratification.\textsuperscript{33}

The theoretical possibility exists that not only any two individuals but all those in the system should be ranked as exact equals. This possibility, however, has never been very closely approached in any known large-scale social system. And, even if it were, that would not disprove the fundamental character of stratification, since it would not be a case of "lack" of stratification but of a particular limiting type. Stratification, as here treated, is an aspect of the concept of the structure of a generalized social system.\textsuperscript{34}

There is, in any given social system, an actual system of ranking in terms of moral evaluation. But this implies in some sense an integrated set of standards according to which the evaluations are, or are supposed to be, made. Since a set of standards constitutes a normative pattern, the actual system will not correspond exactly to the pattern. The actual system of effective superiority and inferiority relationships, as far as moral sanction is claimed for it, will hence be called the system of social stratification. The normative pattern, on the other hand, will be called the scale of stratification. Since the scale of stratification is a pattern characterized by moral authority which is integrated in terms of common moral sentiments, it is normally part of the institutional pattern of the social system. Its general status and analysis falls into the theory of social institutions, and it is in these terms that it will be analyzed here.\textsuperscript{35}

In one sense, perhaps, the selection of moral evaluation as the central criterion of the ranking involved in stratification might be considered arbitrary. It is, however, no more and no less arbitrary than, for instance,
the selection of distance as a basic category for describing the relations of bodies in a mechanical system. Its selection is determined by the place which moral evaluation holds in a generalized conceptual scheme, the "theory of action." The only necessary justification of such a selection at the outset is to show that the categories are applicable. In our ordinary treatment of social rank moral evaluations are in fact prominently involved. The normal reaction to a conspicuous error in ranking is at least in part one of moral indignation, either that a person thinks he is "unjustly" disparaged by being put on a level with those who are really his inferiors or that his real superiors feel "insulted" by having him, in the relevant respects, treated as their equal.\textsuperscript{36}

Consideration of certain aspects of social systems described in terms of the theory of action shows readily why stratification is a fundamental phenomenon. In the first place, moral evaluation is a crucial aspect of action in social systems. It is a main aspect of the broader phenomenon of "normative orientation," since not all normative patterns which are relevant to action are the object of moral sentiments. The second crucial fact is the importance of the human individual as a unit of concrete social systems. If both human individuals as units and moral evaluation are essential to social systems, it follows that these individuals will be evaluated as units and not merely with respect to their particular qualities, acts, etc.\textsuperscript{37}

Stratification is a hierarchy of positions with regard to economic production which influences the social rewards to those in the positions. According Raymond W. Murray; “Social Stratification is horizontal division of society into ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ social units.” According to Gilbert; “Social Stratification is the division of society into permanent groups or categories linked with each other by the relationship of superiority and subordination.” According to Kurt B. Mayer; “Social
Stratification is a system of differentiation which includes social positions whose occupants are treated as superior, equal or inferior relative to one another in socially important respect.” Every society is divided into more or less distinct groups. Even the most primitive societies had some form of social stratification.  

The main features of social stratification are;
1. It is a social and economic categorization of individuals within a societal frame work.
2. It is based on Caste, Class, and Status and Power of a Community or Section of People within the framework of a society.
3. Social Stratification exists because of natural differences in peoples abilities.
4. Due to Social Stratification societies tend to be stable and are held together through consensus.
5. It lessens conflicts and provides structure.
6. Social Stratification is a natural and voluntary separation according to race, social and economic status.

A system of social stratification such as the caste rests upon the unequal distribution of power between status groups having definite position in the prestige hierarchy. Social inequality is a product of Hindu caste ridden society. Nearly one third of India’s populations are socially, economically and educationally backward. The social hierarchy of Indian society operating through several centuries imposed a number of burdens on the so called lower classes including the untouchables.

Societies are divided into hierarchical groups in a way that though various groups are considered in equal in relation to each other but within one group, members are viewed as equals. Two main criteria of social stratification are caste and class, but some other recognised units of
stratification are age, gender and race/ethnicity too. Social stratification is different from social differentiation. The term 'differentiation' has broader application as it makes individuals and groups separate and distinct from each other for purposes of comparison. For example, within class strata, income, occupation, and education provide basis for differentiation and comparison. Stratification occurs where differences are ranked hierarchically. As a result some classes advanced socially and economically at the cost of lower classes. The backward classes suffer from disadvantages and disabilities which are age-old and which derive their sanction mainly from the caste system. The backward classes in India are socially, economically and educationally most backward section of Indian society.

The term ‘class’ signifies a form of social stratification. It is defined as a stratum of people who share similar socio-economic status or position. It is relatively open as compared to other forms of stratification like caste. A class is considered to be backward if its members are economically and educationally less privileged compared to other classes in that society.

The backward class in India can be understood only when we understand the basic character of Indian society which consists of a number of closed status groups. The ‘backward class’ does not constitute one single whole but a multitude of social groups with varying positions and socio-economic standing in the social hierarchy of Indian society.

The backward classes suffer from disadvantages and disabilities which are age-old. Low status, poverty and illiteracy are social problems which they have inherited due to their ascribed status of being born in a low caste or tribe. The Indian Constitution is silent on the definition of the backward classes.
What we find, however, is the characteristics of backwardness described and spread over the different articles of the Constitution. Article 15 (4) speaks of social and educational backwardness. In article 16 (4), mention is made of backward classes and their inadequate representation in services. Article 46 refers to weaker section of the people in which the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are included.

Along with such references of backwardness, the Constitution also makes a special provision for their upliftment. To overcome the problems of social disabilities the Constitution has laid down certain provisions under Article 46. It states that the state shall promote with special care the educational and economic advancement of the weaker section of the people, in particular the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Finally, there is the Article 340 which makes provision for the State Government to investigate the condition of the backward classes. Keeping these points in view, we will examine each category of backward classes like the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Classes’ composition.

**Composition:**

The backward classes constitute a large and mixed category of persons. They comprise roughly one-third of the total population of the country. They are made up of (i) the Scheduled Tribes, (ii) The Scheduled Castes and (iii) the Other Backward Classes. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes are well defined categories in the Indian Constitution. The other backward classes are not listed and defined.

**Poverty and Economic Marginalisation:**

People who are experiencing marginalization are likely to have tenuous involvement in the economy. The sources of their income will vary. Some will be waged and some will depend on state benefits, marginal
economic activity such as casual work, or charity. It is not unusual for people to combine, or move between, these various ways of getting money in their struggle for survival. Poverty, dependency, and feelings of shame are everyday aspects of economic dislocation and social marginalization.\textsuperscript{41}

The various indicators of attainments, deprivations, inequality and different composite indices attempt to capture the process of human development, human poverty and gender inequality from the perspectives of ‘development’, ‘derivation’ and ‘inequality’. The ‘development perspective’ captures the advances made by the society as a whole and the ‘deprivation perspective’ assesses the level of deprivation among social groups in a given society. The ‘inequality perspective’, similarly, measures the extent of inequality between two equal shareholders. All these perspectives are required to adequately understand the way in which the process of development in any society is achieved.\textsuperscript{42}

It is widely acknowledged that education has an important role to achieve a greater degree of social justice. The educational institutions are expected to equip children to the best of their ability for securing a meaningful place in society and thus fostering a process of developing an egalitarian society. However, a large number of children are still excluded from the educational system and hence cannot participate meaningfully in the economic, social, political and cultural life of their communities.

**Social Democracy of Marginalized Dalits:**

On the contrary, the principle of social democracy calls upon state to play a positive role for the protection as well as promotion of the interests of the downtrodden. It expects that state need not be confined solely to law and order system; it is expected to function as a harbinger of social and economic justice as well. It is in this context that the extended contractarian tradition of the welfare state comes into head on-collision
with the forces of neo-liberal market-economy in the contemporary domain of globalisation, thus, poses a serious challenge to the formation of social democracy in India.

It is often paraded as a custodian of enormous ‘opportunities’. But such ‘opportunities’ are and whom they benefit is a question that directly concerns the Dalits. In an existential asymmetrical world, where we actually live, such opportunities open many doors to the haves. But the interests of the have-nots, a large majority of whom happen to be low castes, socially excluded, tribal, women, and other vulnerable sections of the society, are often neglected. The socially excluded sections of the society are the worst victims of much-hyped Special Economic Zones and the resultant consequent process of forced displacement. This has led to further perpetuation and deepening of the social and economic inequities, which in turn seriously diminish the values and principle of social justice in the society. In other words, it deepens the perennial evil of social exclusion through its much advertised project of new economic reforms, which in effect is less about ‘reforms, and more about ‘exclusion’. It has led to the closure of various industrial units in the public sector that “played havoc with the employment scenario of the populace as a whole and of the Dalits in particular”. This, in turn, has increased unemployment and poverty on the one hand, and widened the hiatus between the rich/upper castes and the poor/lower castes on the other. In the first decade of the new economic reforms in India, the ratio of both unemployment and poverty increased from 28 per cent in 1989 to 48 per cent in 1992.

**Sharpening the Contradictions:**

Dalits constitute a significant proportion of the total population of India. How can India surge upward if it fails to care for the interest of the total 16.23 percent Scheduled Castes population, which can promptly swell
further if clubbed with the population of different categories of Backward and Other Backward Classes and Scheduled Tribes? No doubt the Indian constitution contains many provisions, thanks to Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, but how much the Indian state has actually done for the uplift of those on the socio-political margins is open to debate. To quote Dr Ambedkar that political power in this country has too long been the monopoly of a few and the many are not only beasts of burden, but also beasts of prey. This monopoly has not merely deprived them of their chance of betterment; it has sapped them of what may be called the significance of life. These down-trodden classes are tired of being governed; they are impatient to govern themselves. This urge for self-realization in the down-trodden classes must not be allowed to develop into a class of struggle or class war. It would lead to a division of the house. That would indeed be a day of disaster.

Even after 68 years when Dr Ambedkar echoed these words, majority of the Scheduled Castes are still landless. No systematic efforts have been made for the implementation of land reforms. A large majority of Dalit population remains landless. Even the provisions of minimum wages were never adhered to.

The benefits of globalisation are yet to reach these ‘patient and long suffering people’ who never shirk from hard work and toiling labour. But the free market economy driven forces advocate the concerns of the rich and resourceful only. This widens the gap between the rich and the poor. The widening gap coupled with the rolling back of the state lead to further resentment and alienation among the downtrodden that in turn put pressure on the practice of democracy in the country. Baba Sahib Dr. B.R. Ambedkar was very well aware, much in advance, about the serious implications of the lopsided development for the growth of social
democracy in a caste ridden country like India. He therefore underlined the inclusion of the downtrodden into the governmental set-up of the country. For that he emphasised that the safe route goes via total annihilation of caste and in that the role of the state is of utmost importance. If globalisation implies pushing the state out, then the future of the project of social democracy seems to be very bleak. It is in this context that the responsibility and the task of safeguarding the developmental character of the Indian state becomes very crucial more so for the empowerment of Dalits in particular and strengthening the forces of social democracy in India in general. In other words, a balance needs to be created between the forces of market and the principles of social justice.

It is in this context that Baba Sahib Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s warning, as referred to in the beginning of the paper, assumed critical importance. The globalisation process has been compelling India to bind up as early as possible its most sought after projects of social and economic justice aiming at empowering the Dalits. In other words, before social democracy could take firm roots in India, the state started rolling back from its commitment to facilitate the process of emancipation and empowerment of the downtrodden classes. Dalits are now no longer confined within the rural settings and patron-client relationship. Some of them have been able to move into mainstream sectors of non-polluting professions and a few of them ventured abroad. Now the relatively better off Dalits come forward to articulate the interests of their brethren and to some extent they have been successful in providing them with an alternative leadership. Dalits who have once tasted the fruit of political equality can no longer be denied further any more their long overdue social and economic rights. Nothing short of structural transformation including the free market based system of economic domination on the one hand and the traditional Varna system of
four-fold occupational division based on graded social hierarchy on the other could provide them their long denied basic human rights. In fact, in India the problem of Dalits is not just linked to the economic forces emanating from the spheres of the free market economy. It has equally been made complex by the all-pervasive caste ridden social order. It seems that market and caste have joined hands to pose a most serious challenge to the nascent institution of social democracy in India.

There is a general impression that some of the Dalits have been able to strengthen their economic position through sheer hard work and enterprise. Although the constitutional affirmative action played an important role in the uplift of the Dalits in general, their individual efforts to wriggle out of the abyss of social exclusion through the mechanism of localised social struggles armed with Dalit-Bahujan ideology, along with their ventures abroad, has turned out to be of crucial importance. Some of them have established their own small-scale servicing units such as carpentry, barber and blacksmith shops etc thus saying good bye to their low rank hereditary occupations. In addition, they have also been politicized to a large extent by the socio-political activities of the various regional Dalit movements and the consequent emergence of distinct ‘Dalit counter-public’ in the form of an alternative religious sphere, popularly known as Dalit deras. Their improved economic status has not only liberated them from the subordination of the upper castes but also encourage them to aspire for a commensurate social status. The upsurge of a consciousness among Dalits to aspire for dignity and social justice seem to bring them in direct confrontation with the new forces unleashed by the free market-economy. Since free market-economy is premised on the withdrawal of state from the economic-welfare domain, it leads,
consequently, to the demise of the institution of social democracy based as it was on the social welfare pillars of the state.

Economic liberalisation regimes in India can no longer ignore the stark realities of unequal and discriminatory patterns of its social life and chronic poverty. Any attempt to work out the economy in isolation of the hard-core social realities would have serious and far-reaching implication not only for Indian polity and society but also for its economy in the long run. It is in this context that the project of economic liberalisation needs to be understood, in consonance with the complex ‘social’ and ‘political’ of the Indian economy. To get rid of centuries-old caste-based social discriminations, exclusion and chronic poverty of millions of downtrodden in India, the ambitious project of economic liberalisation, perhaps, needs to be clubbed together with another equally ambitious project aiming at total transformation of the entire gamut of Hindu social order; thoroughly cleaning its long accumulated muck of hereditary occupation and repulsion. Can economic liberalisation alone help generate new avenues for rapid economic growth and equal opportunities (‘growth with redistribution’ or ‘capitalism with a human face’) for all in a society like India marked by rampant social hierarchies and inequalities? This is an urgent and critical issue that needs serious attention. That is what Dr. Ambedkar strongly pleaded for in his capacity as a Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution for Independent India and also as an organic leader of millions of downtrodden. Can economic liberalisation alone help generate new avenues for rapid economic growth and equal opportunities for all in a society like India dotted with rampant social hierarchies and inequalities? This is an urgent and uphill task that needs serious attention. And it is in this context that social democratic vision of Dr Ambedkar assumes critical importance. Failure to engage with this
vision is likely to result in further perpetuation of chronic poverty and
ingequalities leading to social unrest and political violence, with the
downtrodden and the marginalized becoming the worst victims.

Profile of Backward Classes in Andhra Pradesh:

From the definitions of the backward castes in the introduction chapter it is clear that they are given low position in the hierarchically divided social system, and they are producing class either of commodities or services, which are for the general use in the society. In this process they are denied basic rights, which are essential for the development of the community or individual and the Constitution of India is also not clear on these aspects.

Traditionally, in a caste-ridden society, they are the occupational groups who have been producing the goods and services for the general use of the society. Some of the caste-based occupations may be described as follows.

Viswabrahmins: Among the backward castes they claim superior status. Vadrangi (carpenter), Kamsali (goldsmith), and Kammari (blacksmith), are also important to mention. They pursue their hereditary occupations. Though their importance is still felt in the village, they cannot survive fully on their traditional occupations in the face of industrial competition.

Goud: Main occupation is toddy tapping. Though they are spread in the entire state, they are predominant in the Telangana region.

Yadavas: Their hereditary occupation is cattle rearing. They rear animals, sell milk and milk products.

Padmasalee: They are weavers by profession and claim superior status among the backward castes. They wear sacred thread. In pre-colonial period they were the main cloth producers in the village, they still practice
their hereditary occupation. It is hard for them to compete with the mills producing synthetic cloth with the help of modern technology.

**Chakali:** Their traditional occupation is washing clothes of all the other castes. They still follow the same occupation. At the time of rituals they have an important role to play, they served the dominant castes under the *Jajmani* system.

**Kummari:** Kummaris make and supply earthenware required by the villagers. Since all kinds of metal wear made inroads even into the villages, their importance is being reduced. They still practice their hereditary occupation.

**Mangali:** They are professional barbers. They acquire hereditary rights to work in some families in the village and continue to serve the same families. Their presence is necessary in social ceremonies. They also play music at the time of marriages and other festivals.

**Uppara:** Their traditional occupation is construction material and work relating to earth digging, carrying on construction and canal works.

**Vaddera:** Their main occupation has been cutting stones for construction purpose. Even today they practice their occupation.

**Mutharasa:** M.A.Stuart says that Mutharasas were employed as watchman to guard the frontiers under Vijayanagar kings. Others usually consider the caste low; he further says that most of the community members are poor and subsequently they have taken to agriculture. At present mostly they are agricultural labours and a few of them hold small patches of land.

**Medari or Mahendra:** Their occupation is making articles with the bamboos, now a day it is having a big threat from the modern machine based industries.
Jalari, Gangaputra, and Pallikarlu etc: Traditional occupation of these people has been fishing. The mechanized boats are destroying their livelihoods.

The above description of the caste based occupations reveals that there are two types of backward castes, one is commodity producers and second is service providers. The nature of production activities and services led to the cultural differentiation among them and stratified in the social hierarchy. In the past there was no freedom for an individual to choose his occupation for livelihood according to his talent, choice or interest. Inevitably one had to follow one's own caste occupation irrespective of its economic and social disadvantages. Each caste had certain functions and duties in the village as a whole in relation to the other castes. Consequently, the caste occupations continued without break and determine the status, role and power of an individual by birth and not by merit, nor talent and interest. M.N.Srinivas (1980) puts it as follows.

The hereditary association of caste with an occupation has been so striking that it has occasionally been argued that caste is nothing more than systematization of occupational differentiation'. The stratified backward castes of producers as well as the service providers were exploited by the caste-feudal society on the name of *jajmani* throughout the pre-colonial period.

During the colonial period destruction of the traditional occupations took place for the expansion of market to their goods produced in the modern industries. The strategy of the colonial rulers was to export the entire local raw material to England and import the machine-based commodities, which posed stiff competition to the local products. The local products were unable to compete with the machine based products in the market. Therefore, gradually over the years, the caste based traditional
occupations declined during the colonial period. Subsequently, the traditional handicraftsmen and artisans were forced to enter into the agriculture sector as labour.

In spite of colonial destruction of the traditional occupations, still they are playing a significant role next to agriculture in the rural economy even in the post-independent period. According to a study, which has collected the data to find out how many people in two villages such as Cheppial (non-irrigated) and Chelgal (irrigated) follow or retain their caste or hereditary occupations. Among the 452 respondents of the non-irrigated village, 271 (i.e., 64.4%) are following their caste or hereditary occupations whereas in the irrigated Village caste or hereditary occupations are followed by 220 (i.e., 42.1% per cent) out of 523 respondents.

According to this study there is no change in the occupational affiliation of Kummaris (potters) probably because of the fact that it is one of the very backward castes socially, economically and politically and very rigid in rituals and other customs. But, on other hand, a substantial occupational mobility in the Golla/Kurma (shepherd) caste was seen. More than half of the families of this caste have changed their occupation from sheep rearing to various other occupations. It may be stated here that those who own land tend to have agriculture as the main occupation and the five respondents in the category of agriculture have not deviated.

Tenuge is one of the backward castes, which is relatively more advanced in the Telangana area. They have no exclusive caste occupation and follow occupations such as agriculture, fruit selling, and fishing and also agricultural labour. Interestingly, there is no occupational deviance among the Gouds. Of the 19, 18 are following the toddy tapping. The reason for the occupational continuity may be the very nature of the
occupation. A person who follows this occupation gets daily cash more than what an ordinary laborer gets in season and can also attend to his subsistence agricultural work as well.

The caste occupation of Padmasali is weaving. This is one of the more mobile castes. The members of this caste follow different non-agricultural occupations. Most of them go to Bombay, Ahmedabad and Bheevandi for work in cloth mills. Observation shows that people who stay in the village either follow weaving or some other non-agricultural occupation, such as business.

The artisans include five sub-castes, namely, Goldsmith, Blacksmith, Kanchari, Carpenter and Silpi, but there are only four castes in this village. Some of these castes declined in their importance as their caste occupations are affected. For example, the goldsmiths are almost without work because of the high cost of gold and consequent decline in the demand for their services. Blacksmiths of ironwork, carpenter does wood work, Kanchars do vessel making and Silpis make idols and statues. Presently, all these sub-castes have their occupational demand in urban areas.

The young are going to cities and improving their skills and are earning a lot. The old stay at the village. The educated people among them are seeking government employment. Regarding barbers and dhobis, two-third of the respondents are following their caste occupations of hair cutting and clothes washing, and one-third shifted from their caste occupations.

As in Cheppial, the non-irrigated village, the caste and occupational deviance in Chelgal, the author, also examined the irrigated village. There is considerable occupational deviance among the Brahmins in this village as out of the five Brahmin respondents, only one respondent is following his caste occupation. On the contrary, three, out of four respondents of
Vaisya caste, are following their caste occupation, which shows that there is less occupational shift among the Vaisyas in this village.

Similar to the Vaisyas, among the Reddy/Kapu and Velama respondents also, there is very little occupational deviance, as most of them, (i.e., 89.4% and 77% respectively) are following their caste occupation, namely agriculture. The data show that the Kummaris, who are among the backward castes, shifted their occupation to various other occupations. Half of the Golla/Kurma caste respondents have also changed to different occupations. As in Cheppial, among Tenugu caste, a greater occupational mobility was seen in Chelgal also. Tenugus of this village are following fishing as their main occupation. There are also fruit sellers and agricultural labourers in this caste. In contrast to the Gouda caste, having minimal occupational deviance, the Padamasalis, whose caste occupation is weaving, have shown a lot of occupational diversity. On the other hand, about two-third of the artisans which include Blacksmiths, Goldsmiths, Carpenters and Kanchari, are still following their own caste occupations. Similarly, 88 percent of the barbers and dhobis are engaged in their respective caste occupations, showing that there is minimal occupational mobility in these castes.

Despite the fact that the freedom to choose any occupation, occupational mobility and diversity in the economy, the above analysis reveals that still traditional occupations are playing significant role in the rural economy. While recognizing the importance of traditional occupations in the economy, in the post-independent period, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, in response to the demands of the occupational castes introduced the cooperatives for those who are practicing the traditional occupations. The basic purpose behind the introduction of the occupational cooperative societies was to reduce the
occupational castes over dependence on the agriculture, stop them from
migration and to consolidate economically. Since the occupational
cooperatives are introduced under the Cooperative Societies Act-1964
created a lot of problems like bureaucrats over control, corruption,
inefficient management, bogus members, lack of financial support etc. Due
to lack of Government interest in encouraging the traditional occupations
and interest in promoting the major and modern machine based industries
under the ownership of upper castes and introduction of the new economic
policies led to the complete deterioration of the traditional occupations.
The occupations are drastically affected by the macroeconomic policies
followed since 1990s as they encouraged the entry of foreign goods and the
machine based products as well. The traditional local caste based
occupations are unable to compete with modern machine based industrial
products. Therefore, these communities are losing their livelihoods. The
decreasing position of the traditional occupations can be explained with the
help of following case studies.

The field based study of the five occupational co-operatives, such as
fishermen, bamboo workers, weavers, toddy tappers and washer men
reveals that they are rapidly marginalizing and thrown into the poverty due
to state policies, which are introduced since 1990s. As a result of the
globalization and privatization, the subsidies are stopped, cooperatives are
being abolished, occupational finance corporations are defunct, and
modern machines and machine-based products threaten the traditional
occupations and livelihoods of dependents.

The fishermen association has been in existence on the coast of the
sea since long, while fishing. There is hardly any development since
independence in this fishermen street, except the cyclone shelter, which is
about to collapse at any time. Ill health, social risk, lack of housing,
education, marketing facility etc, are the perpetual problems. Prevalence of the child labour is a common phenomenon. Their inns and huts are built with the palmer leaf. All the fisher folk belong to the Jalari community. Their source of livelihood is fishing in the sea with traditional means of fishing like catamaran, wooden boat and fiber boat. But there are two categories of fishermen within the Jalari community, one is the owner of the fishing boats and another is the labour class within the fishing community or dependents on the first one. There are few traditional boat owners and more fishing labour in Boyaveedhi. Both owners of the boats and labour category fishermen venture into sea to net the fish. The netted fish are distributed equally among themselves after setting aside the boat share.

The traditional local boat costs from Rs 10,000 to Rs 50,000/-. Since the local banks are not giving loans for the purchase of nets, and boats, they are forced to depend upon the private financiers, who charge high rate of interest. For spending thousands of rupees to purchase the fishing material, while taking loans from the private moneylenders, they are getting uncertain income of Rs 10 to Rs 100 per day. The derivation of the income depends on the quantity of fish they net in a day. With this low income, they have to feed their entire family of 10-14 members, payment to the moneylenders, day-to-day expenses, unforeseen expenses etc these are all to be met from paltry income. When they get the huge quantity of fish, their women go to market for selling. Now the quantity of the fish has been drastically reduced due to the mechanized boats. The fisher women are forced to work in the houses as sweepers and washerwomen just for left over rice.

In 1970s the fishermen of Boyaveedhi formed the fishermen cooperative society. However, due to the malpractices in the fisheries and
cooperative apartments, financial miss-management, government disinterest in organizing the fishermen, extending the financial support, involvement of the vested interests, encouragement to the private investors resulted in the failure of the fishermen cooperative society in the Boyaveedhi. Another important reason for the failure of the fishermen cooperative society is that the president of the society is an outsider, who borrowed about one lakh rupees from the local bank and he neither distributed the money among fishermen nor repaid. Therefore, the bank seized the society.

Today there is a threat to the livelihoods of the fishermen not only from the lack of government support and mechanized boats but also due to the government plan to make Boyaveedhi as a tourist spot. This may result in the fishermen being vacated from here, because land in the surrounding area of Boyaveedhi is being occupied by the prominent film personalities. Now there is an attempt to hike up the demand for their land, this will be materialized only through making Boyaveedhi a tourist spot. Generally the fishermen keep their fishing material on the coast of the sea, and the upcoming fishermen practice fishing. Now there is the pressure from the government of Andhra Pradesh, department of tourism, to get the area vacated. Forcing the fishermen to vacate Boyaveedhi is nothing short of destroying the occupation of a community, which has been living on the sea for centuries.

Similar thing is happening in the case of bamboo workers as well in Kurnool city itself. There are 2000 bamboo workers in the city itself, while depending on their traditional occupation of making goods and articles with the bamboos since long time. Prior to the invasion of the bricks, granite and cement, the bamboo articles used to build the thatched houses and there was a market for the bamboo articles during the marriages,
festivals and other occasions. When the bamboo workers society existed, the government used to supply the bamboos from the Nallamala forest at the subsidized rates of Rs 1000/- per quintal. The society also used to extend the financial support to the bamboo workers. Therefore, they had opportunity to create their own livelihood. The real problem started with the abolition of the bamboo workers cooperative society in 1994 in response to the privatization of the economy in the country. For the supply of subsidized bamboos, financial support was stopped. Now the private people are selling the bamboos at the rate of Rs 3000/- per quintal. To purchase the Bamboos, the workers are approaching the private moneylenders for the money at the high rate of interest. At present the products of the bamboos are unable to compete with the machine based products. That is why the bamboo workers of the Kurnool City are facing serious financial crunch. They are forced to borrow from the moneylenders due to lack of government support, they have to purchase the bamboos from the private individuals at the high rate due to lack of cooperative society, and there is no market for their products due to lack of demand.

Since the bamboo workers of Kurnool are living in city, their children have got education in the social welfare hostels and completed tenth or intermediate and their parents are not able to finance further studies. They have neither employment nor traditional skills for the eking their livelihood. Therefore, the educated children of the bamboo workers are thrown out of gear. When there is a market for the bamboo articles, women used to go for the market to sell them. Now there is no demand for the articles. Hence these women are becoming either household servants or remaining unemployed.

Another occupational cooperative society, which is in deep crisis, is the Yemmiganur Weavers Co-operative Society. The YWCS was
established in 1938, when there was severe drought during the colonial period. In order to stop the kurni (weavers) community from the migration to Bombay, Bangalore and other places, the prominent Gandhian Machani Somappa (by caste a weaver) was the brain behind in establishing YWCS. Soon the YWCS products got market and reputation at the national and international level due to effective management and hard work of the weavers. Until recent times, the YWCS provided employment for more than ten thousand weavers in Yemminaganur itself with two thousand and five hundred active members in the society. YWCS encouraged the weavers in the surrounding villages such as Gudikal, Gonegandla, Gudur, Nandavaram, Nagaladinne and Kosigi. In all these villages now the weaving industry is disappearing.

The YWCS succeeded in stopping the migration for decades; it has been able to consolidate the weaver community in terms of economic, social and political spheres. Gradually over the years, entry of the power looms, lack of supply of raw material from the Government, hike in the dyeing rates, rise of elite class within the weavers, entry of faction politics, mis-management of the society, corruption and bureaucratic control created a lot of crisis in the YWCS. Due to the heavy competition from the modern machine based products, entry of the foreign products, new economic policies non-cooperation of the government in supplying raw material and financial support the YWCS got into debt crisis in 1990s. With the gradual decline of the YWCS, in line with the overall destruction of the weaving and handloom industry in the country, the local traditional weavers started migrating to other places for survival. In fact the YWCS was started to stop the weavers from migration during the colonial period, the process of migration of the weavers is occurring in the post-globalization period.
The toddy tappers cooperative society is another one to be seriously studied. There are hundred toddy tapping or Goud families in Ibrahimpatnam; about fifty families are directly depending on toddy tapping. Though the society is located in urban area, still majority of the toddy tappers are illiterates, that is why they hardly know other than toddy tapping skills. Therefore, they are depending on the traditional occupation, though it is yielding less income that is not sufficient to meet their bare family needs.

One among the many reasons for the low income from the toddy tapping occupation is that there are three types of taxes levied on this occupation. These are tax on drawing the toddy from the tree, tax to the landowner for locating the tree in his/her land, and tax on selling of the toddy. The first and third are to be paid to the excise department and second one is to be paid to the landlord. The toddy tappers are also supposed to pay the bribe to the excise department and to the local lumpen gangs while meeting the day today expenses in the preparation of the toddy.

The second reason is that though there is toddy tappers cooperative society, it is full of bogus members. These bogus members are either from the non-toddy tapping communities or educated and employed and those people who are having nexus with politicians and excise department. The real toiling tapper is not having the membership in the society. Once the tapper is having the membership in the society, he is eligible to take loans from the Toddy Tappers Industrial Finance Corporation, claim ex-gratia and group insurance.

Third reason is that very often the government imposes the ban on the selling of the toddy, therefore, whenever government changes in the state the tappers has to gather in lakhs and demand the rulers not to impose
the ban on the livelihood source of lakhs of people. Fourth reason is that
the government is openly giving the licenses for the selling of the foreign
liquor and wine shops. Therefore, it has become very difficult to face the
competition in the market from the modern liquor.

Even though there is the Andhra Pradesh Toddy Tappers Industrial
Finance Corporation to extend the financial support to them, a lot of
corruption is taking place in it. The applications are supposed to be routed
through the excise department. In order to move the application the excise
department staff need to be bribed. It seems that the tappers are spending
10-15 percent of their loan on the excise department and Finance
Corporation staff to sanction the loan amount. The loan is also scarce; it
would be from Rs 10,000 to Rs 50,000/- only. The principal amount
should be paid regularly with interest, if there is any delay in the payment
of the instalments, the excise department will cancel the license of the
tapper. Every year government is getting about Rs 100/- crores from the
toddy, but hardly 5% is spent on the welfare of the toddy tappers. The
excise department is very much interested in collecting the taxes and their
monthly *mamuls* (bribe) but not in the protection of the date and palmer
trees, which are being rapidly destroyed, instead adulterated and foreign
liquor is encouraged.

Still there are many occupations, which are being destroyed, such as
washer men, pottery makers etc. Though the patron-client relations are
weakened, the new problems are emerging for these communities. One can
find the existence of the washer men in each and every village. They are
paid annually in kind for washing the clothes in the traditional society. In
the changing situation the washer men are facing dreadful economic
problems due to the modern equipments to wash the clothes. These
equipments are not available to the poor washer men, because of their low
economic position to purchase them. Even though there is the washer men co-operative finance corporation, its budget is hardly crossing 4-5 crores in a year for the 4.2 percent of the washer men population in the state. Since their occupation is not protected by distribution of the modern equipment or the state finance support, they are becoming simply the agricultural labour in the rural areas and unemployed in the urban areas.

Another traditional occupation, which has almost totally destroyed is the pottery with the entry of steel and plastic material for the daily use. The potters has neither alternative source of livelihood, except agriculture labour nor any supporting mechanism from the Government side, therefore, they are rapidly marginalizing might be due to lack of mobility and resistance among them.

This analysis indicates that at least some of the occupations and societies provided the source of livelihood for decades together for those people who used to depend on them in terms of income generation and socio-economic consolidation and prevented them from becoming either agriculture or migrant labour. When these societies were strong enough, government extended financial support to strengthen them. Once the privatization process started, all the subsidies and concessions that are extended to these societies are stopped. With the withdrawal of the financial support by the state to these societies, their existence has become doubtful. That is why the occupational co-operatives are either disappearing or becoming defunct. As a consequence of disappearance of the co-operatives, all those people who depended upon the traditional occupations have to find out an alternative path of survival strategy. They are joining the labour force. Therefore, in the post 1990s the percentage of labour has been increasing. One study revealed that the increase in the labour population is more than the population growth due to overwhelming
dependence of those communities who lost their traditional occupation on the agriculture sector.\textsuperscript{45}

P.S. Krishnan portrays vulnerable position of the occupational communities as "the Backward Classes, self-employed laborers in traditional home workshops, in oceanic and inland water-bodies and in various other areas of labour like stone-cutting, earth work, are increasingly immiserated their traditional occupations being snatched away by those with access to superior technology and finance the moment scope for more intensive exploitation and profit-making emerges. The extent to which they have entered modern fields is not measurable yet because it is only recently that recognition of their identity and provision of Reservation could be snatched for them four decades after India's Constitution. The visibility of some members of the relatively less backward castes of the backward classes should not misguide us and obscure the fact that the bulk of the backward classes in Rayalaseema region continue to remain as laborers of castes-castes in different fields. They include the stone-cutter caste of Vaddars, the earth-worker caste of uppari, the blacksmith caste of Kammari, the wood working caste of Vadrangi, caste of Kuruba and many other laboring castes of producers and of service providers like Mangali/Nayi-Brahman.\textsuperscript{46}

Above illustrations reveals that the disappearing cooperatives, when they are strong, helped in emergence of a clear-cut class division within the backward castes. Those sections and castes that have benefited from the occupational cooperative societies are economically consolidated and started purchasing the land from the dominant castes from 1970s. Therefore, the roots for the rise of some of the backward castes as small and marginal farmers lie in the occupational cooperative societies rather than the distribution of the land by the Government.
A majority of the population from the backward castes cannot survive fully on their traditional occupations and most of them do not have stake in the occupational cooperative societies. That is why they have shifted themselves to agricultural and non-agricultural works. This process is intensified by the introduction of the new economic policies. The class character within the backward castes is reflected in the changing agrarian relations also.

As important as civil and political rights in the Indian context are the rights of the marginalised women, Tribals, Dalits or lower-castes, and the poor whose survival depends on access to natural resources. It is the rights of the marginalised and of the minorities in the country today that are in peril. The challenge is to empower the poor and marginalised to demand their rights and participate in the public sphere.47

The Constitution of India is one of the most rights-based constitutions in the world. Drafted around the same time as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Indian Constitution captures the essence of human rights in its Preamble, and the sections on Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy.

The Constitution of India is based on the principles that guided India's struggle against a colonial regime that consistently violated the civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights of the people of India. The freedom struggle itself was informed by the many movements for social reform, against oppressive social practices like sati, child marriage, untouchability etc. Thus by the mid-1920s, the Indian National Congress had already adopted most of the civil and political rights in its agenda. The movement led by Dr B R Ambedkar against discrimination against the Dalits also had an impact on the Indian Constitution.
In spite of the fact that most of the human rights found clear expression in the Constitution of India, the independent Indian State carried forward many colonial tendencies and power structures, including those embedded in the elite Indian Civil Service. Though the Indian State under Jawaharlal Nehru took many proactive steps and followed a welfare state model, the police and bureaucracy remained largely colonial in their approach and sought to exert control and power over citizens. The casteist, feudal and communal characteristics of the Indian polity, coupled with a colonial bureaucracy, weighed against and dampened the spirit of freedom, rights and affirmative action enshrined in the Constitution.

In the first 15 years of the Indian republic, such inherent contradictions within the Indian polity were glossed over by the euphoria of 'nation-building', an agenda generally endorsed by political parties, the middle class and elite civil society. However, when the contradictions within the Indian polity and State came into the open in the late '60s, the oppressive character of the State began to be challenged by student movements and ultra-left formations like the Naxalite movement. When the Indian State began to suppress such expressions of political dissent and mini-rebellions, the violation of human rights by the State began to command attention.

Over a period of 30 years, the articulation and assertion of human rights within civil society has grown into a much richer, more diverse and relatively more powerful discourse at multiple levels. A brief historical sketch of the different trajectories of human rights discourse will help us locate human rights in the historical context.

There are four specific trajectories of human rights discourse in the Indian context -Civil and Political Rights, Rights of the Marginalised, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Right to Transparent and
Accountable Governance. Though each of these trajectories is interconnected, they were promoted by different sets of actors at different points in time. There has always been tension and lack of mutual appreciation between those who promoted civil liberties and the left-oriented groups who worked towards the structural transformation of socio-economic conditions and consequently of the State. As the concept of human rights was perceived as a western idea to gloss over inequalities and as a means of legitimising the capitalist and imperialist projects of the west the left-oriented groups were clearly sceptical about human rights, particularly as expressed by the civil liberties groups. Though in some quarters such scepticism still exits, there has been a greater recognition of the need to promote and protect human rights, in spite of the misuse of the human rights discourse by the new imperialist forces.

**Impaired Support Networks and Social Marginalization:**

A further problem is the relative or complete exclusion of marginalized people from social networks. People born into marginality will be, at best, able to access resources through strong social networks. Others will be able to access weaker networks, such as neighbourhood, or church based organisations. But often these sources of support will be weak or overburdened. For example, in some poor communities where unemployment is the norm and social problems are rife, tenants association have retreated to a minimal role of working just in the interests of those on the committee. Isolated from the world of work, strong associations like trades unions are not available to economically marginalized people.

People who have become disabled, and those with a severely disabled child, often report rejection and isolation from their former friends and allies. Marginalisation then means reduced opportunity to link with
others in common action to solve problems. The result can be described as
disempowerment.

What typically seems to happen is that the situation of the
marginalised persons is portrayed as a result of their own characteristics.
What is essentially a social and historical phenomenon is presented as a
biological or an intrapsychic phenomenon.$^{48}$

Lastly, there are no guarantees that any real change will occur: there
are many obstacles, counter forces, distractions, and setbacks. But
nurturing and supporting community activists, who speak and act on their
behalf and behalf of others is one way in which barriers may be overcome.
It is important that this social action at the local level does not end up as
isolated community activism. One of the great challenges is to make such
projects connect up to contribute to broader social change in the interests of
marginalized people everywhere.

One of the challenges to community psychology is, to use a well-
known proverb, to 'think global and act local'. Our analyzes of
marginalization must take account of the wider global picture, and the onus
is on us to share links, internationally, not in the grandiose ways of much
academic and professional activity. As community psychologists, we can
work together to help evaluate what works best, what are the barriers to
change, and what change projects are all about. We would argue that to
work at the margins of psychology, with one foot in and one foot out of the
discipline, with those who are marginalized, demands particular ways of
being. This work requires us to make personal commitments to social
justice, not just in our work, but in our lives as well.
References:
6. Ibid.
10.Ibid.
11.Ibid.
17. Ibid.
19. This chapter has been extracted from a longer paper published by the authors in the Economic and Political Weekly 45 (38), 27 November 2010.
26. A fairly misleading definition of class is the following: Classes are inclusive, loosely organized groupings; house members behave toward each other as social equals and onwards outsiders as social superiors or inferiors, and how as individuals either stay in the group to which they are born, or rise or fall to different levels depending upon the way their social attributes correspond to the values around which the particular class system is organized." Robert L. Sutherland and Julian L. Woodward, Introduction Sociology, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1940, pp. 363-64. And an ideally meaningless definition is the following: "social class . . . is the largest group of people whose members have intimate access to one another!' Davis, Gardner, and Gardner, Deep South, Chicago, 1941, p. 59. One might as well set himself the task of determining where the sky begins, as to go out with such a definition, say in Chicago, to locate social classes.
28. Observe, for instance, with what leisurely assurance Davis, Gardner, and Gardner speak of themselves: "The researchers concluded that the three main class divisions recognized by the society could be objectively described.
29. La Note, for instance, with what are individuals guard the facts concerning their financial orth. To ask a man what is his salary, or how much money he has in the bank is to enter into his most private
affairs. Furthermore, it will evidently do the researcher no good to try to discover such social facts as are not known in the community, for then he is likely to become the arbiter of social status. He should rather allow himself to be guided by the beliefs that people hold about one another's status. Social status is the product of the interplay of personal estimates of status bearing objects in the community, and a man may so live as to keep the community fooled or guessing about him.

30. In this study, we have used the terms "class hierarchy" and "class stratum" conceptually.

31. It is held by backward-class activists that there is unanimity among the anti-reservationists, forward-caste intellectuals and, in most cases, in the pronouncement of court decisions that caste should not be used as a criterion of determining backwardness. This, it is alleged, is because of politically-motivated arguments against the entry of the backward classes to positions of power, prestige, and status. Therefore, the anti-caste arguments need to be answered only on sociological or economic arguments because the so-called forward castes have fought with the domination of the Brahmins through reformist movements, and political mobilization to capture power and the same process has been denied to the backward classes in their fighting against the same forces. Of course, the backward classes seek the protection of the legal system because of their low socio-economic status, which the forward castes did not lack in their initial fight with the Brahmins.

32. Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, "Caste." Dr. Shridhar V. Ketkar concludes that "Classes are convicted into castes by becoming endogamous." The History of Caste in India, Vol. I. p. 28.
According to Ogburn and Nimkoff, "Class societies may be represented as extending all the way from those like the above (castes), which are relatively rigid or closed, to those who are flexible and open." Sociology, p. 317. And Davis and Dollard say that: "Caste in the (American) South is nothing more nor less than a system of limiting social participation between colour groups, and thus differentiating between these groups concerning the most fundamental opportunities in human society. In this latter respect, it is quite like our system of social classes. It differs from the class system in its arbitrary and final definition of the individual's status. “Children of Bondage, pp. 19-20.


34. E. A. Ross is explicit: "Class hardens into caste when the jealous upper-class resists or retards the admissions of commoners, however great their merit or wealth." Principles of Sociology, New York, 1930, p. 341.

35. P. A. Sorokin, Social Mobility, New York, 1927.

36. A generalized social system is a conceptual scheme, not an empirical phenomenon. It is a logically integrated system of generalized concepts of empirical reference in terms of which an indefinite number of concretely differing empirical systems can be described and analyzed (see L. J. Henderson, Pareto's General Sociology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), chap. iv and n. 3.

38. An excellent recent example of this is found in the results, reported by F. J. Roethlisberger and W. A. Dickson, Management and the Worker (Cambridge, Mass., 1939) Part 111, chap. xv.

39. The concept "integration" is a fundamental one in the theory of action. It is a mode of relation of the units of a system by virtue of which, on the one hand, they act so as collectively to avoid disrupting the system and making it impossible to maintain its stability, and, on the other hand, to "co-operate" to promote its functioning as a unity. (cf. Parsons, op. cit.)


44. Sukhadeo Thorat and Motilal Mahamallik, Development of Marginalised Social Groups Focus on Scheduled Castes and Tribes.

45. Prof. Ronki Ram, 2012: globalization, Dalits and social democracy.
