CHAPTER - V

FOREIGN POLICY - REGIONAL FRAME WORK
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With the founding of the New order government a new course in Indonesian foreign policy began as mentioned earlier. The new order government gave up the confrontation policy with Malaysia on 1st June 1966 and recognised Malaysia and Singapore on 31 August 1967 and 7 September 1967 respectively.

From the start the new order government gave priority to the promotion of close and harmonious relations with her immediate neighbours, the area where Indonesia's vital interests lie.

Indonesia was aware that any development, positive or negative, in Southeast Asia will have a direct bearing on its own national development. It correctly realised that political stability and economic progress within each individual country cannot be separated from the prospects of peace and stability in the surrounding region.

Indonesia, therefore, aspired to see Southeast Asia develop as rapidly as possible into an area of indigenous stability and Security, capable of withstanding any negative influences from outside. Indonesia realised this was possible only when the countries of Southeast Asia, jointly
and separately developed their ideological, socio-economic, political and military strengths, that is Ketahanan national or national resilience of the country as termed by President Suharto. Hence Indonesia in an effort to create a peaceful atmosphere in the region sought to form a new regional organisation.¹ This idea was openly put forth by President Suharto during his address before the House of representatives on 16 August 1966² (at that time Suharto was the acting President). This concept was crucial for Indonesia and other countries of the Southeast Asian region especially in an attempt to create regional order, so as to help them in establishing co-operation in the economic and cultural fields.

This idea of Indonesia to form a regional organisation was positively responded by neighbours. Hence a new regional organisation, called ASEAN, was formed on 8 August 1967. On 8 August 1967 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was established comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. ASEAN constituted at that time an unparalleled exercise in regional

2. Peter Polomka, "Indonesia’s Future and Southeast Asia", Adelphi Papers, No.104, Spring 1974, p.3.
reconciliation given the critical situation at that time in Southeast Asia. The main goal of ASEAN then was the development of economic, social and cultural cooperation. The second aim of ASEAN was the development of Regional peace and stability. In the preamble to the ASEAN declaration the five governments committed themselves to the Indonesian inspired opinion that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples. They also affirmed that:

All foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of states in the area or prejudice the orderly procedures of their national development. 3

This terminology is in essence the same as that employed in documents of the (Maphilindo) Manila agreements

on 1963 which reflected the foreign policy values of Indonesia during the old order. The incorporation of this terminology again into the ASEAN declaration of views required a lot of Indonesian initiative. The Indonesian effort and initiative for the formation of ASEAN was made explicit by President Suharto in his report to the People's consultative Assembly in March 1968.4

**Indonesia-Malaysia relations (post-confrontation)**

Within ASEAN Indonesia's initial relationship were mixed, with Malaysia the idiom of Malay brotherhood was carried over from the end of confrontation into practical bilateral cooperation.5 Thus Indonesia concluded a security arrangement with Malaysia in 1967 called the Joint Border Committee (JBC) to deal with the communist insurgents operating along its common border with Malaysia in Northern Borneo. Following this in March 1970 Indonesia and Malaysia delimited their common sea boundary in Malacca Strait.

On 27 November 1971 at the Kuala Lumpur meeting of the foreign ministers of the ASEAN countries in Malaysia,

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Malaysia proposed the Southeast Asia Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Though Indonesia had different view on the ZOPFAN proposal, for the sake of ASEAN Unity Indonesia accepted the Malaysian proposal and was one of the signatories of ZOPFAN. Indonesia felt the peace proposal as unrealistic and impractical because with the Soviet Union increasing its Naval presence in Southeast Asia and with the withdrawal of British from the east of Suez; she felt that it was in the interest of Southeast Asian nations that there should be a balance of power in the region. Indonesia felt that as the Soviets had already established a Naval presence in the area which was earlier an exclusive Western preserve; US would be welcome to do the same. Indonesia perceives that the ZOPFAN idea should be implemented through the creation of a national and regional resilience so that the formal support of the great powers was not needed in order to make ZOPFAN effective. Indonesia felt that the fulfillment of ZOPFAN idea could be achieved through ASEAN’s resilience.

On 16 November 1971 Indonesia and Malaysia converged their maritime interests and gave a joint challenge to the


customary legal status of the Malacca and Singapore strait. In a public statement, the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia expressed that the safety of navigation in the straits of Malacca and Singapore was the responsibility of the costal states concerned and they also added that the strait of Malacca and Singapore are not international straits, but they duly recognised their usage for international shipping in accordance with the principle of innocent passage. This joint statement by Indonesia and Malaysia reflected the degree of reconciliation between the two states since the end of confrontation.\(^8\) In February 1977 Indonesia and Malaysia, with Singapore, reached an initial agreement on traffic separation and safety of navigation in the Straits, which was endorsed by the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO) in London.\(^9\)

When the Prime Minister of Malaysia Tun Abdul Razak had a Summit meeting with President Suharto of Indonesia during his three day visit from May 5 to 7, 1973, Indonesia agreed on the recognition of PRC but differed only on the timing, where as Malaysia was for recognition of PRC as soon


as possible, Indonesia was not for the restoration of relations with PRC very soon but both the leaders reiterated that it was for each member of the ASEAN to decide the timing of establishing formal relations with PRC. Razak also exchanged views with President Suharto on a number of issues affecting the region and internal peace. The two leaders also discussed the situation arising out of the Muslim Rebellion in Southern Philippines and the Filipino claim on the East Malaysian state of Sabah.10

Earlier in April 1977, President Suharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn met at Penang for three hours and discussed the importance of Joint Security arrangements against the threat of certain "imported ideologies". In addition to their existing joint air and naval exercises, they considered further cooperation in their Land forces. President Suharto of Indonesia and Premier Datuk Hussein Onn of Malaysia issued a Joint communiqué on May 17, 1977 after the conclusion of their two-day annual talks in Laboun in Eastern Malaysia. They said that relations between the two countries were at an excellent level. The leaders had a wide ranging discussions on the Security of the region, their joint operations

against the communist guerilla bands mainly consisting of ethnic Chinese operating along the Sarawak-Indonesia border, joint Thai - Malaysian operations against the Malaysian Communist Party (MCP) guerrillas operating along the Thai-Malaysian border, Cambodia-Vietnam border clashes and clashes between Moro Muslim rebels of Philippines and the governments forces in Southern Philippines. They also said that it was the determination of Malaysia and Indonesia to assist the Muslims in Southern Philippines and the Philippine government to resolve their differences and to determine the possible ways of bringing the two parties to the conference table in the interest of peace and stability in the region.\(^{11}\)

Under the New order in Indonesia the bilateral cooperation with Malaysia was encouraged by personal contacts. Annual meeting between the Indonesian and Malaysian leaders were routinely held.\(^{12}\) Thus on 27 March 1980 President Suharto of Indonesia met the Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn in Kuantuan in Malaysia. Here the leaders agreed on a principle to solve the Kampuchean conflict latter known as the Kuantuan principle.


The essence of the principle is that Vietnam should not continue to be under Soviet influence and PRC should give up her hawkishness towards Vietnam and the Kampuchean conflict, so that the ASEAN nations could solve the Kampuchean problem with Vietnam without the influence of Soviet Union and hawkishness of PRC respectively. The two leaders were meeting each other for the fourth time and during this meeting they also discussed the issue of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Philippines and the ways in which they could bring the Philippine government and the leaders of MNLF to the negotiating table to solve the problem. In February 1982, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Musa Hitam visited Indonesia. He signed a treaty in Indonesia recognising the Indonesian Archipelagic concept which took two years of negotiation. Though Malaysia recognised Archipelagic concept of Indonesia it acquired rights to use air space and sea passage in certain areas of Indonesia territory between East and West Malaysia according to the treaty signed by it.


On December 1983 President Suharto visited Malaysia and had two rounds of discussion with the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahatir Mohammed. The two leaders spent a lot of time discussing on the Kampuchea crisis and the role of ASEAN. The two leaders affirmed their earlier commitment made in Kuantuan on seeking a political solution to the Kampuchea problem with Vietnam. President Suharto also reviewed with Mr. Mahatir Mohamad the performance of their 1973 trade agreement. The review of the 1973 trade agreement between the two countries was aimed for widening and increasing the volume of trade between the two countries and steps to reduce the unnecessary competition in Marketing their products, as the major export items of the two countries are similar like oil, rubber, tin and timber.

In 1984 the Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahatir Mohamad made a two day return visit to Indonesia. Dr. Mahatir Mohamad and President Suharto discussed on ways to increase the volume of trade between the two countries and the possibility of cooperation between the two countries in the field of defence industry. The two leaders felt that

15. Ibid.

stronger trade and economic co-operation between the two countries could become the benchmark of economic cooperation among ASEAN countries.\textsuperscript{17}

Thus the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Malaysia continued in its positive way because of the similar viewpoints of the two nations on the Indonesia issue, Vietnam and perception of PRC.

Indonesia – Singapore relations (breaking the Psychological barrier)

Indonesia’s early post-confrontation relationship with Singapore was not as good as post confrontation Indonesia – Malaysia relations. One reason for the strained relationship of Indonesia – with Singapore, was the acute sense of vulnerability exhibited by the Island Government faced by the Malay blood – brotherhood relationship restored between Indonesia and Malaysia by the end of confrontation.\textsuperscript{18} Singapore in an attempt to ensure respect for its recently acquired sovereign status injected an abrasive element into close regional relationship.

In October 1968 the Singapore Government ordered the execution of two Indonesian marines found guilty of acts of

\textsuperscript{17} Asian Recorder, June 4-10, 1984, p.18352.

murder and Sabotage during confrontation, in spite of the personal plea made by the President Suharto of Indonesia for the commutation of the sentence.\textsuperscript{19} This caused an uproar in Indonesia with the sacking of the Singapore's embassy in Jakarta in reaction to the execution of the marines. But the Indonesian government responded to the People's uproar pragmatically and it did not do anything rash as demanded by the public emotion against Singapore.\textsuperscript{20}

The New order knew there was more at stake than just relations with Singapore, the Indonesian government made some superficial undertakings to satisfy the people's emotion and then allowed the issue to die down. President Suharto did not however forget the issue of marines and retained a sense of personal insult. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore however made an act of personal contrition or regret during his first visit to Indonesia from 25 to 28 May 1973 - when he scattered flower petals over the graves of the two executed marines in the Kalibatua cemetery in Jakarta. On 25 May 1973 the Foreign Ministers of the two nations signed an agreement delimiting their territorial seas, this agreement was welcomed by President Suharto and

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\textsuperscript{20} Peter Polomka, Loc. Cit., p.10.
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Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew as an important step in the enhancement of the good neighbourly relationship between the two countries as well as in the building of more harmonious relationship in the Southeast Asia region.  

The two leaders also discussed the problem of safety of navigation in the straits of Malacca and Singapore. They also reiterated their conviction that these problems would be solved by the three coastal states. The two leaders also further agreed to strengthen their trade and economic relations. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew expressed Singapore's readiness to continue its participation in the development of Indonesian economy. The two leaders also discussed the concept of national resilience and regional resilience. The leaders also shared their worries of the rise of communism and agreed on the need to stop the expansion of Chinese political influence.  

The Indonesian President Suharto made a return visit to Singapore on August 29, 1974. He was accompanied by his wife and Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik. He was given a warm welcome by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and


his entire Cabinet. The two nations foreign ministers signed an Economic agreement for the strengthening of cooperation in the fields of trade, capital investments, transport and communications.

In a joint Communiqué on August 30, 1974 the leaders of the two nations expressed that the normalisation of relations with PRC by ASEAN countries would lead to greater peace and stability in the region. The communiqué also said that the two leaders discussed issues related to regions peace and security and the question of relations with PRC. 23

This visit of Suharto broke the psychological barrier which had long hampered the development of relations between the two states. Thus in late 1974 the Singapore Foreign Minister stated that Singapore would recognise the archipelagic sea concept if Indonesia allows Singapore fishermen to fish in the seas under an agreement. He also said that Singapore would agree to an extension of territorial waters from five to nineteen kilometers or more thereby indicating that the Straits of Malacca would no longer remain an international sea lane but would become the

territorial waters of Malaysia and Indonesia.\textsuperscript{24}

In 1975 however there was a little fall in Indonesia - Singapore relations because of the East Timor crisis, when Timor was brought before the UN general assembly in 1976. While Singapore abstained in the voting on the resolution, the other ASEAN countries, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia voted in favour of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{25} Again in 1976 much to the annoyance of Indonesia, Singapore abstained during the voting on the Timor resolution in UN general assembly, while all other ASEAN countries supported Indonesia.\textsuperscript{26}

In 1977 Indonesia's relations with Singapore moved a step closer, in November 1977 Singapore voted in favour of Indonesia in the UN general assembly resolution on Timor along with other ASEAN states. Indonesia's relations with Singapore in the economic sphere also moved closer, due to a six hour informal visit made by Indonesian President Suharto in early 1977 to Singapore. It was reported that an agreement was reached between President Suharto and the Singapore Premier Lee Kuan Yew on measures to expand intra-

\textsuperscript{24} Eileen Tang and Yong Mun Cheong, "Indonesia in Focus", \textit{Southeast Asian Affairs}, 1975, p.52.

\textsuperscript{25} Raja Segaran Arumugam, "Indonesia - Internal Developments and External Outlook", \textit{Southeast Asian Affairs}, 1976, p.191.

ASEAN trade. Discussions were also held on the development of Bataam Island of Indonesia twenty kilometers off Singapore for a huge industrial complex with the help of Singaporean investments.27

In June 1978 Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited Indonesia and had discussions with the Indonesian President Suharto in Bali. The two leaders discussed bilateral matters, and it was reported that the Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew reconfirmed that Singapore would not normalise its relations with PRC before Indonesia. This show of sensibility by Singapore to Indonesian sensitivity improved the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Singapore.28 Thus in 1979 Indonesia sided with Singapore in its dispute with Australia over low Australian air fares to Europe. This low air fare of Australian airline only affected Singapore (Singapore Airlines) more than other ASEAN countries, but Indonesia and other ASEAN states went along with Singapore in demanding that Australia review its policy and Indonesian Foreign Minister stated that it was the ASEAN common stand on this issue.


This Indonesian attitude favouring Singapore over the air fare issue, indicated its friendly relations with the island state of Singapore. The international civil aviation policy conference was also held in Jakarta, where Indonesia along with other ASEAN countries supported Singapore in its trade dispute with Australia.

In March 1979 the Singapore premier Lee Kuan Yew visited the Bataam island on the invitation of the Indonesian Minister of Research and Chairman of Bataam Island development authority, Dr.B.J. Habibie. In Bataam Mr. Lee Kuan Yew stated that the more developed Bataam is the better for Singapore and promised Singapore’s cooperation to Indonesia in developing the Bataam island.29

In July 1980 before his visit to Indonesia, the Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in an interview to Strait Times, (4 July 1980) said that while Singapore has improved its economic relations with PRC, it would not establish diplomatic ties with PRC before Indonesia does. In explaining this stand he said that there is always a lurking doubt in the minds of ASEAN countries that Singapore's population being made up of 75% ethnic Chinese could be easily manipulated by PRC and Side with PRC against

ASEAN countries interest. Thus by taking this stand Singapore demonstrates to ASEAN countries its independent nature.

Later in July 1980 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited Indonesia and held talks with President Suharto in Yogyakarta on various bilateral issues and on the development of Bataam island. Prime Minister Lee promised that Singapore government would provide facilities to aid the development of Bataam and would encourage investors to invest in Bataam island.30

In September 1982 Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew once more paid a visit to Indonesia, and held discussions with President Suharto on a number of issues. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew said that Singapore was interested in buying natural and petroleum gas from Indonesia. The sources of the gases could be the Natuna islands or the Conoco gas fields, both located in the South China Sea. President Suharto and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew also discussed the possibility of joint promotion of tourism and opening up of direct air services between Singapore and popular tourist destinations

in Indonesia such as Yogyakarta and Bali.\textsuperscript{31}

On December 27, 1983 President Suharto of Indonesia made a two-hour return visit to Singapore to meet the Singapore Premier Lee Kuan Yew, after inaugurating six infrastructure projects in Bataam island, 20 km of Singapore. Suharto, during his 80 minutes discussion with Lee Kuan Yew, reviewed bilateral, regional and international issues and the development of Bataam island.

President Suharto also briefed the Singapore Prime Minister on his discussions with the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in Kuala Lumpur recently. Suharto also briefed the Singapore Prime Minister on the recent developments in Indonesia, since Mr. Lee Kuan Yew's last visit to Indonesia in September 1982.

The Singapore Prime Minister after seeing off President Suharto at the airport, stated that there are no bilateral problems between Indonesia and Singapore and Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia share a large common ground in their perception of the region and the basic stand points of the respective countries were similar.\textsuperscript{32} In 1986 Indonesia


\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Asian Recorder}, January 29 - February 4, 1984, pp.17587 - 17588.
stepped up its efforts in trying to build up a greater understanding in her relations towards Singapore. Thus in 1986 the Indonesian Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, in co-ordination with Singapore's Institute of International Affairs organised a two-day closed-door conference in Bali-Indonesia. The conference was addressed by the Indonesian Minister for Youth and Sports, Mr. Abdul Gafur and Singapore's Minister of State for Health and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yeo Cheow Tong.

The conference discussed co-operation with ASEAN, the role of Great powers in the region, the Kampuchean problem and the situation in the Philippines. Though there were differences in perception on certain issues, both Mr. Gafur and Mr. Yeo Cheow Tong said that the ability of Indonesia and Singapore to thrash out differing views in a calm, rational and frank manner was a significant point in their bilateral relations.

Following the visit of Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to Indonesia in 1985 and the recent visit of the first Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore Mr. Goh Chok Tong in 1986, there has been increasing contacts between Indonesia and Singapore and both sides were positive about
their bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{33} This positive attitude of both sides was reflected in the speech given by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew to the Australian press unit on 16 April 1986. Mr. Lee stated that the character and outlook of President Suharto of Indonesia had a profound influence on the development of ASEAN, its progress and solidarity.\textsuperscript{34}

Indonesia and ASEAN

As stated earlier, Indonesia in her search for national as well as regional security has been emphasising the need for strengthening regional cooperation. ASEAN which was set up with the active initiative and participation of the New order government of Indonesia was conceived as an organisation to build up regional resilience. The role envisaged for ASEAN by Indonesia was clearly dictated by the statement expressed by Adam Malik, the then Foreign Minister of Indonesia; he stated that ASEAN expressed the growing determination of the nations of this region to take charge of their own future, to work out problems of their development, stability and security together. It signifies the rejection by those countries of the assumption that the

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Asian Recorder}, August 27 - September 2, 1986, pp.19053 - 19054.

\textsuperscript{34} For the exact text of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s speech see \textit{Indonesia Quarterly}, Vol.XV, No.1, January 1987, p.32.
fate of Southeast Asia is going to be determined by outside powers.35

Thus Indonesia accepted the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971 in which Malaysia proposed a plan for neutralisation of Southeast Asia and to turn the entire region of Southeast Asia into a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality," Free from any form of interference by outside powers.36 To further strengthen regional resilience, Indonesia initiated and inaugurated a conference on Regionalism in Southeast Asia which was held in October 1974 in Jakarta.

In this conference President Suharto of Indonesia in his Presidential address gave a precise meaning to the term "national resilience". According to him national resilience means, internally, the ability to ensure the necessary social changes while keeping one's own identity, with all its vulnerability and externally, it is the ability to face all external threats; regardless of their form and manifestation. The national resilience covers the strengthening of all the component elements in the development of a nation in its entirety, thus consisting of


resilience in the ideological, political, economic, social, cultural, and military fields. Thus according to Suharto, the national resilience was to be attained through politico-economic and military build-up, and through individual national resilience of each country the collective regional resilience of ASEAN was to be achieved.\textsuperscript{37}

In 1975 with the rise of united communist Vietnam, the growing Hanoi-Moscow rapprochement and the intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry, the main keynote of Indonesia’s foreign policy was regionalism or the achievement of regional resilience. Indonesia and all the ASEAN states felt the need for a collective response to the emerging situation. Indonesia and the Philippines had initiated the Summit proposal immediately after the collapse of Indo-China in 1975, with the problem of regional security uppermost in their minds. Thus all the leaders of the ASEAN states met in Bali in Indonesia on 23 and 24 February 1976.

The ASEAN Summit meeting in Bali produced two documents of great importance namely the ASEAN Concord and the ASEAN

Treaty of Amity, Friendship and Co-operation. President Suharto of Indonesia who presided over the Summit Session summed up the theme of conference of the ASEAN leaders in the following words: "we ought to promote constantly our respective national resilience which in turn, will create regional resilience".

Thus Suharto declared that while ASEAN should not be a military pact, it would be unrealistic to talk about its future if the question of regional and national security was overlooked. Thus so far as Indonesia perceived any threat from united communist Vietnam her foreign policy strategy was to meet it from a strong base of national and regional resilience of ASEAN states. Hence Indonesia tried to establish closer ties with other ASEAN states to counter any possibility of domestic insurgency through Hanoi.

Indonesia also tried to maintain a balanced regional foreign policy frame work. On June 21, 1975 President


Suharto stated that world peace is the ultimate goal of Indonesia's foreign policy and Indonesia is willing to establish friendly relations and co-operation with all countries particularly "her neighbouring countries". The President added that the end of the wars in Indo-China should be welcomed and used by all nations in this part of the world for entering a new era of mutual understanding, co-operation and trust.41

So Indonesia in order to maintain a friendly attitude towards Indo-Chinese countries recognised the new government of unified Vietnam and planned to develop peaceful cooperation with the Indo-Chinese states; thus a good will gesture was made towards the communist states of Indo-China consisting of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by the ASEAN countries led by Indonesia at the Kuala Lumpur Summit of August 1977. The ASEAN states declared their desire to develop peaceful and beneficial relations with all the countries in the Southeast Asia region, that is with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.42

The Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong visited

41. Refer News from Indonesia, Friday, 27, June 1975, New Delhi, No.22/430/75, p.1, Emphasis added.

Jakarta on 1978. The then Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja made a return visit to Hanoi where he signed a trade agreement with Vietnam. Jakarta believed that Vietnam was trying hard to maintain its independence from both PRC and Soviet Union, and Vietnam would not have joined the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON) in June 1978 but for the hostility of PRC. Indonesia believed that Vietnam would serve as a buffer if PRC wanted to expand Southwards. Nevertheless, signing of the friendship and co-operation treaty (which involved defence) between the Soviet Union and Vietnam on November 3, 1978 and the invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnam on 25 December 1978 changed the image of Vietnam in the eyes of Southeast Asian countries (Vietnamese forces entered Phnom Penh the capital of Kampuchea on 7 January 1979 and installed a new government in Kampuchea with which Vietnam concluded a Treaty of Peace and friendship on February 18, 1979). This not only destroyed the Independent and non-expansionist image of Vietnam but also changed the attitude of ASEAN countries towards Vietnam. Indonesia had no other way but to condemn occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnam. Along with


other ASEAN countries Indonesia condemned the invasion of Kampuchea and the setting up of new government in Kampuchea by Vietnam.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Indonesia-China relations, the slow thaw}

It is well known that Indonesia under the old order of Sukarno was on good terms with the PRC, especially during the guided democracy period when the two nations attempted to set up the Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) an alternative to the UN for poor nations, since the PRC had not yet been admitted to the UN and Indonesia had just left the organisation. But all the forces in Indonesia did not support the close Jakarta-Beijing relationship.\textsuperscript{46}

The army was very worried about this close relationship, but was not yet able to move Indonesia away from the PRC - anti-colonialist coalition. The abortive communist coup on 30 September 1965 and the emergence of

\textsuperscript{45.} Government of the Republic of Indonesia, Department of information, Government statement on the Draft State Budget for 1982-83 to the House of the People's Representatives, delivered by the President of the Republic of Indonesia on 5 January 1982 (Jakarta, 1982); also see Michael Leifer, Conflict and Regional Order in South East Asia, \textit{Adelphi Papers}, No.162 Winter 1980, pp.30-31.

\textsuperscript{46.} Leo Suryadinata, "Indonesia-China Relations: A Recent Breakthrough", \textit{Asian Survey}, Vol.XXX, No.7, July 1990, p.682.
New order under Suharto changed the policy of coalition with PRC.

The New order believed that PRC was behind the coup, and they were not only suspicious but hostile towards the PRC, which was equally hostile towards the New order. PRC called the Indonesian army reactionary and fascist and defended the PKI and gave political asylum to PKI leaders. The relationships started deteriorating and finally Indonesia froze its diplomatic ties with PRC in October 1967.47 The bitterness of Sino-Indonesian relations was revealed at the time of voting in UN General Assembly on PRC issue, in November 1967 Indonesia voted in favour of a defeated US resolution describing PRC’s entry into the UN as an important question. In 1968 and 1969 Indonesia abstained at the time of voting on the PRC issue. In 1970 when the question of PRC’s admission to UN came up for voting in the UN General Assembly Indonesia was present but did not participate in the voting.48

In 1971, PRC became member of the UN, Chinese government representatives at UN headquarters in New York

47. Ibid.

48. Kalyani Bandyopadhyaya, "Burma and Indonesia, Comparative Political Economy and Foreign Policy", South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, pp.203 and 204.
began to get in touch with their Indonesian counter parts at U.N. headquarters, expressing their desire to be friendly with Indonesia. The New order was still suspicious about PRC and was not responsive. In 1973 President Suharto stated that Indonesia would normalise relations with the PRC provided that PRC was truly friendly with Indonesia and ceases to render assistance and facilities to the former PKI leaders, making it clear that Jakarta was not yet ready to restore relations.49

In 1974 and 1975 PRC succeeded in establishing diplomatic ties with three ASEAN States-Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. To avoid Indonesian suspicion, ethnic Chinese-dominated Singapore decided not to normalise relations with PRC before Indonesia did.

The rise of Deng Xiaoping in 1977 signified a moderation of PRC's foreign policy. The PRC initiated the Four Modernisation programmes, which required foreign investment, high technology, and a stable political situation. Friendly relations with non communist countries were actively promoted, Beijing wanted the Friendship of

Indonesia, but Indonesia remained adamant.\textsuperscript{50}

In fact the, New order Indonesian leaders were divided on the issue of normalisation of Sino-Indonesian relations. The pro-normalisation group included businessmen and officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially Foreign Minister Adam Malik and Mochtar Kusumaatmadja \textsuperscript{51} (on 24 March 1978 Adam Malik became Vice President of Indonesia and Mochtar Kusumaatmadja became the Minister for Foreign Affairs). Businessmen felt normalisation would encourage more exports to the PRC, which would stimulate business in Indonesia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that normalisation would project Indonesia’s image overseas as a nonaligned nation, at the same time making it easier to talk directly with the Chinese on a number international issues. However, the pro-normalisation group could not succeed.\textsuperscript{52}

The anti-normalisation group was much larger and stronger, consisting of President Suharto himself, the Armed


\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
forces, the Islamic group and others. The military, concerned with internal security, regarded the PRC as a major security risk and was afraid that it would assist the banned PKI in subverting the New order once the PRC established an Embassy in Indonesia. It is also feared that PRC would make use of the approximately one million overseas Chinese in Indonesia to promote its interests. 53

The Islamic group, which was basically anti-communist, was also worried that the PRC would again support the left-wing movement in Indonesia once it had normal ties with Indonesia, the Islamic group was also concerned about the overseas Chinese in Indonesia, whom the PRC could use for its interests.

Yet some progress was made in the process towards normalisation, when in November 1977, a five member official delegation of the Indonesian National Chamber of Commerce and Industry visited PRC for the first time since the suspension of diplomatic ties. The purpose of the mission was to attend the trade fair in Canton. In May 1978 another Indonesian trade delegation led by Air Chief Marshal Suwoto Sukender visited PRC, Suwoto during his discussion with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Trade Mr. Li Chiang discussed

53. Ibid.
the possibility of establishing direct trade relation, but this possibility did not fructified because the Indonesian government for fear of domestic repercussions refused to proceed further on the issue.\(^{54}\)

Earlier President Suharto even openly stated on the eve of the Presidential election in 1978 that he was prepared to resume diplomatic ties soon. However not much headway was made towards having direct trade link with PRC and also towards normalising diplomatic ties. The Indonesian government's plan towards normalisation of relations with PRC received a set back as a result of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict over the "Overseas Chinese", beginning in May 1978. The Sino-Vietnamese conflict over the "Overseas Chinese" attracted great attention in Indonesia.\(^{55}\) President Suharto while receiving the new Hanoi Ambassador to Indonesia expressed his wish that PRC, Kampuchea and Vietnam should settle their differences peacefully. In August 1978 Indonesia restored full diplomatic relations with the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea, a rival of Vietnam and a friend of PRC.\(^{56}\) Thus Indonesia tried to maintain a


\(^{55}\) Richard Butwell, Loc. Cit., p.216.

\(^{56}\) Leo Suryadinata, Loc Cit., pp.115-116.
balance in her regional foreign policy without giving an image of being too friendly to Vietnam, a rival of PRC.

In October 1978 a ten man Chinese delegation led by Mr. Wang Pin visiting Jakarta for attending the eighth world forestry congress was warmly received by President Suharto.

Following the invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnam and the Vietnamese troops incursions into Thailand chasing the Khmer guerrillas created a tense atmosphere in the region. Thailand perceived that it could be the next target of Vietnamese expansion. In February 1979 Chinese troops invaded the border areas of Vietnam to put pressure on Vietnam, so that Vietnam would stop its operations along the Thai-border against Khmer guerrillas. PRC stated that it wanted to teach Vietnam a lesson for its invasion of Kampuchea. This border violation of PRC created some more hurdles in the process of normalisation of Indonesia's ties with PRC. Thus, there was a lull in the normalisation process.

The turning point came in July 1985 when Indonesia decided to restore direct trade relations with PRC, before this Indonesia had indirect trade relations through Singapore and Hong Kong with PRC. On July 5, 1985 a three man Chinese delegation lead by Wang Yao Ting the Chairman of
the Chinese Council for international trade, and a nine man Indonesian delegation headed by Sukamdhi Gitosardjono, met in Singapore, and had discussions. Here the two delegations signed an agreement on direct trade. 57

Earlier in April 1985 the Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xue Quian who visited Indonesia on the 30th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, during his discussions with Indonesian Foreign Minister Mr. Wu Xue Quian agreed on the need to formalise the direct Indonesian-Chinese trade which had been cut off since 1967. Thus with the establishment of direct trade links with PRC, Indonesia broke the ice in its relationship with PRC.

In April 1988 in a speech given to the MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly) President Suharto stated that Indonesia had no worries about the influence of communism in ASEAN countries. This statement by Suharto indicates that the New order had now realised that there was no real threat for its internal security and stability from communist movements and that PRC could be now believed and that it would not pose any threat to its security.

Again in his Independence day speech on 16 August 1988 Suharto stated that Indonesia would re-establish full diplomatic relations with PRC, subject to a formal assurance that it would not interfere in Indonesia's internal affairs.\(^{58}\)

Indonesia and the Kampuchea issue

In the first 12 to 15 months after Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea and after the initial condemnation by Indonesian Foreign Minister and Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee on January 9, 1979, \(^{59}\) Indonesia reacted cautiously to avoid the complete diplomatic isolation of Hanoi within the region.\(^{60}\) The foreign policy position of Jakarta became clearer in March 1979 with respect to Vietnam - Kampuchea imbroglio when President Suharto had bilateral talks with Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn. The two leaders meet in Kuantuan Malaysia, after two days of discussion the two statesman agreed on what was officially described as Kuantuan principle to clear up the Indo-China


59. For the full text of statement made by the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee refer, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, FE/16014/A3/12, 12th January 1979.

conflict. The basic idea was that Vietnam should not continue to be under Soviet influence and nor should it fall into PRC's strangle hold. President Suharto and Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onh also announced that Indonesia and Malaysia would seek, independently, to make contact with the conflicting parties in Indo-China with a view to resolving the issues between them.61 In June 1979 President Suharto had discussions with the Thai Leader Kriangsak Chomanon, during these discussions Indonesian President Suharto had stated his concern at the possibility of Vietnam becoming completely isolated and subject to prolonged pressure. President Suharto felt that if the Chinese push too hard in Vietnam, then Vietnam will have no other option but to rely more heavily on the Soviet Union - and this will only lead to greater big power involvement in the region.62

However this sympathetic attitude of Indonesia towards Vietnam was severely strained due to the mounting flood of unwanted refugees arriving in Indonesia and other ASEAN countries from Vietnam.63 In May 1979 Indonesia organised an international conference on the problems of the Indo-


Chinese refugees in Jakarta and, in late June 1979, it sponsored the enlarged Foreign Ministers Conference of ASEAN.\textsuperscript{64} Despite its apparent sympathy for Vietnam, Indonesia nevertheless went along with the consensus achieved within ASEAN on the Kampuchean issue, for the larger interest of unity of ASEAN at stake, ASEAN which is the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy for the maintenance of Regional order and Regional resilience.\textsuperscript{65} In September 1979 Indonesia along with other ASEAN countries successfully sponsored two resolutions in the United Nations, one holding Kampuchea’s seat in the General Assembly for Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea and the other calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops, the holding of U.N. Supervised elections, and the convening of an international conference to consider the whole Kampuchean situation.\textsuperscript{66}

These two resolutions came to form the foundation of the official Indonesian and ASEAN stance on the Kampuchean


crisis, though the Suharto regime had no sympathy for the ousted murderous communist regime led by Pol Pot. The twin objectives of this diplomatic effort were, on the one hand, to make it clear that Indonesia and ASEAN did not accept as legitimate the setting up of a government by means of foreign intervention and on the other, to induce Hanoi, by means of mobilising international diplomatic pressures to agree to a negotiated political settlement in the Kampuchean issue. 67

Though the UN resolutions projected outward ASEAN unity on the Kampuchean crisis, there was significant internal disagreement. The root cause of the discord was the well known divergence of opinion over the main threat to regional security. Indonesia and Malaysia perceived PRC as the fundamental and long-term threat to Southeast Asian Security. Perceiving Vietnam's ambitions to be limited to Indo-China, Indonesia and Malaysia were of the opinion that some mutually acceptable compromise would be reached between ASEAN and Vietnam, which would enable Vietnam to retain at least de facto domination of Kampuchea. But Singapore and particularly Thailand were convinced that it was the Vietnamese hegemonic ambitions which constituted the paramount danger to the region.

The primary difference in ASEAN security view is between Thailand and Indonesia, with Singapore aligning more with Bangkok, Malaysia learning toward Indonesia and the Philippines located more or less in the middle. In December 1979 these differences came particularly close to the surface when the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja aired his concern upon returning from an ASEAN Foreign Minister's meeting saying that there have been attempts of drawing ASEAN into one certain side (of the conflict) and bringing about a confrontation between ASEAN and Vietnam.

In March 1980, following the stemming of the refugee tide from Indo-China that had swept into Southeast Asia the previous year. Indonesia mounted her first diplomatic effort aimed at reasoning Hanoi to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Kampuchean issue. The effort began with the so-called Kuantuan principle, following meeting between Suharto and Datuk Hussein Onh. They called for a speedy resolution to the Kampuchean issue in order to forestall the possibility of serious regional de-stabilisation and great power intervention. The Kuantuan principle in view of President Suharto's personal involvement in its articulation, and indicative of the preponderant belief in

68. Refer Sheldon W. Simon, Loc. Cit., p.79.
Indonesia that if reconciliation was not affected, Vietnam would be so weakened by protracted conflict and confrontation that it would fall into increasing dependence on the Soviet Union. They also believed that if Vietnam did not assert a dominating influence in Indo-China, then PRC would certainly fill that vacuum or void. Hence Suharto and Datuk Hussein Onh proposed that a political resolution should be sought to the conflict that would take into account Vietnam’s security interests in Kampuchea. Additionally they proposed in the first instance only a partial withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea rather than a full withdrawal. The purpose seems to have been to suggest a willingness to move towards acceptance of the Heng Samrin regime as a *quid pro quo* for easing Vietnamese pressure on Thailand. In spite of the fact that the Kuantuan stand of Malaysia and Indonesia caused considerable anxiety in Thailand and Singapore, Indonesia continued her diplomatic effort to achieve some form of reconciliation with Hanoi. Senior officials from the Foreign Ministry (DEPLU) and the Defence Ministry (HANKAM)


apart from the President were involved in the diplomatic effort to bring out a negotiated settlement with Vietnam on the Kampuchean issue.\textsuperscript{72} Lt. General Benny Murdani the deputy head of BAKIN, the State intelligence went as a special emissary in an unpublicised visit to Hanoi in May 1980 to have discussion with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach on the Kampuchean issue. In spite of Thach’s earlier rejection of the Kuantuan principle during a trip to Malaysia, Murdani went to Hanoi to encourage Thach to give positive concessions during his impending visit to Indonesia so that Jakarta might have a concrete proposal to present to the forthcoming ASEAN Foreign Minister’s meeting. Concessions from Vietnam was a necessity for Indonesia’s attempt to persuade ASEAN to adopt a more conciliatory approach on the Kampuchean issue towards Vietnam.\textsuperscript{73}

The results of Benny Murdani’s trip to Hanoi were not successful and also Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach failed to give any positive concessions during his subsequent visit to Jakarta. Thus Indonesian hopes of bringing about a substantial diplomatic effort were stifled. On June 23 1980

\textsuperscript{72} Leo Suryadinata, "Indonesia in 1980: Continuity rather than Change", \textit{Southeast Asian Affairs 1981}, pp.142-143.

almost on the eve of the ASEAN Foreign Minister's meeting, Vietnam mounted major military attack on the Thai border areas against the Kampuchean resistance guerillas. This action of Vietnam completely deflated the Indonesia's attempt to bring about a negotiated settlement of Kampuchean issue. Indonesia became unhappy about the Vietnamese action. Indonesia was compelled along with other ASEAN states to close ranks behind Thailand and accepted the US and Chinese supported view that Thailand should be regarded as a frontline state against Vietnamese aggression, but Indonesia at the same time rejected the idea that ASEAN should join the US, PRC and Japan in a sort of de facto alliance to contain the influence of the Soviet Union and Vietnam. 74 Indonesia also disagreed with the view that the ASEAN countries should provide military support to the non-communist Kampuchean forces fighting against the Vietnamese. 75 In his address of state on 16 August 1980, President Suharto clearly expressed Indonesia's official position on the Vietnamese attack along the Thai border in June, he stated that conditions have been worsened by


blatant violation to the territorial integrity of Thailand and as a fellow member of ASEAN we give our fullest support to Thailand's right to defend the territorial integrity and the security of its state.\footnote{Address of State by President Suharto on the 35th Independence day. Department of Information, Jakarta, August 16, 1980, p.92; also see Michael Leifer, "Conflict and Regional Order in Southeast Asia", Adelphi Papers, No.162, Winter 1980, pp.27 and 32.} He also stated that Indonesia's stand over the Kampuchean issue is clear, namely all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Kampuchea. Thus Indonesia maintained a Seesaw balance in her foreign policy towards the region; on one hand she did not want to completely isolate Vietnam and lead ASEAN's confrontation attitude against it and on the other she did not want to disturb the unity of ASEAN.\footnote{Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia 1982 Year Book, p.164.} Many senior officers within Defence Ministry (HANKAM) Benny Murdani maintained their active enthusiasm for a reconciliation with Hanoi but the Foreign Ministry (DEPLU) officials were not willing to Jeopardise ASEAN unity.\footnote{D. Jenkins, "The Dangers of Dialogue", Far Eastern Economic Review, August 29,1980, p.10; also see Jusuf Wanadi, Loc.Cit., p.509-512.} But no matter Indonesia engaged in little diplomatic activity in connection with Kampuchea for many months following the failure of its major diplomatic effort.
In the middle of 1981, Jakarta regained her enthusiasm to embark on a second major diplomatic effort to achieve some solution to the Indo-China imbroglio. This second effort was less direct and less abrasive to the sensitivities of Thailand and Singapore. In June 1981 the ASEAN Foreign Ministers met in Manila to prepare for the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) scheduled to be held in New York in July. A draft proposal, prepared for submission to ICK was notable for the significant concessions it made to Vietnam, in apparently recognising that Vietnam might have real security interests in Kampuchea.79

Indonesia's purpose was to use the ICK as a major forum from which to send conciliatory signals to Vietnam and in so doing perhaps lay the groundwork for the resumption of dialogue. Once again however like the Kuantuan based initiative, the second diplomatic effort of Indonesia was also frustrated. The encouraging signals the ASEAN proposals were intended to convey at the New York conference encountered heavy opposition from Beijing and indirectly from Washington, together with an apparent wavering of

Thailand's position. Despite the failure of the ICK to adopt the distinctly moderate ASEAN draft resolution, Indonesia continued its renewed effort to convey conciliatory signs to Vietnam apparently in the hope of making diplomatic headway, and at this stage the divergence in approach which was seen the previous year between DEPLU and HANKAM had narrowed down. Jakarta was frustrated with the ASEAN’s approach to the situation in Kampuchea and particularly with Thailand’s for its non cooperative attitude but yet it persisted with its attempt for reconciliation with Vietnam.

Hence Suharto on his August 16th Speech in 1981, delivered within a few weeks of the ICK in New York was moderate in his reference to Kampuchea and Vietnam than what he said in 1980. Following this Benny Murdani made a second unpublicised visit to Hanoi, where he encountered little success in his attempt to reason Vietnam for a political solution to Kampuchean crisis. Immediately after Benny Murdani’s trip Fuad Hassan a Senior DEPLU official made a visit to Hanoi, even this trip was not successful.

After this unsuccessful diplomatic efforts Indonesia

80. Address of State by President Suharto on the 36th Independence day, Department of Information, Jakarta, August 16, 1981, p.31.
for the remainder of 1981 made no attempts to bring about a solution to the Kampuchean crisis. Indonesia in essence, acquiesced the ASEAN endeavour to bring together a tripartite coalition of resistance forces in Kampuchea. In December 1981 Jakarta publicly aired its concern, when Singapore indicated her willingness to supply arms and material support to the two non-communist resistance factions of Son Sann’s Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and Sihanouk’s National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCIPEC). Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar stated that ASEAN was a regional organisation aimed for promoting social, cultural and economic relations among its members with no military dimension. Mochtar stated Indonesia did not want ASEAN to get into a confrontation with Vietnam which could happen if ASEAN member countries became a military backer of anti-Vietnamese resistance in Kampuchea.  

For the most part of 1982 with respect to the Kampuchean issue Indonesia worked within ASEAN framework. Jakarta steered clear of anything that might hint its sympathy towards Vietnam. Indonesia joined in the

initiative of Singapore and Thailand in moulding the resistance forces in Kampuchea into a coalition Government-in-exile called the coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk in June 1982. In October 1982, the ASEAN backed CGDK successfully retained its seat in the U.N. as the legitimate Government of Cambodia against the challenge of the Vietnamese installed regime of Heng Samrin.\textsuperscript{82} Thus Indonesia once more maintained its foreign policy posture with respect to Kampuchea issue between its two imperatives maintaining ASEAN unity without endangering her sympathetic stand towards Vietnam. The only opportunity for Indonesia to engage in diplomatic activity came in November 1982 when Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach visited Jakarta. Though the amity between the two ministers was obvious, the talks between Thach and Mochtar yielded little results.\textsuperscript{83}

In late September 1983 with the issuance of the so called "ASEAN appeal" a new surge of diplomatic initiative came from Jakarta aimed at bringing reconciliation in Indo-China. The significant element of the ASEAN package was the proposal for the phased withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from

\textsuperscript{82} Ahmad D. Habir, Loc. Cit., p.129.

Kampuchea on a scheduled and territorial basis.\textsuperscript{84}

The proposal was launched in the United Nations in October, it was followed by a series of special Foreign Minister's meeting in Jakarta in November, in Kuala Lumpur in December, and again in Jakarta in January 1984. In spite of the lack of positive response to the ASEAN proposal in the communique from the Indo-Chinese Foreign Minister's meeting at the end of January, Indonesia's enthusiasm was reinforced.

In the weeks that followed, a flurry of activity in Jakarta made it clear that a third major diplomatic initiative was underway. Benny Murdani who had become by now the head of armed forces, paid an official three day visit to Vietnam in February 1984, becoming the first ASEAN military leader to do so. The military leadership felt that Indonesian national interests should be placed before that of ASEAN perception.\textsuperscript{85} During his trip in Vietnam Murdani made a statement which clearly reflected Indonesia's perception and also its difference of perception with other ASEAN states. Murdani stated that Vietnam did not present a

\textsuperscript{84} Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, "Southeast Asia in 1983, Approaching a turning point?", Southeast Asian Affairs, 1984, ISEAS, Singapore, p.5.

\textsuperscript{85} Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia 1985 Year Book, p.163.
security threat to the region. This remark of Murdani caused considerable consternation in Thailand. 86

After Murdani's trip, a two-day joint seminar on Kampuchea was conducted in Hanoi between the CSIS and its Vietnamese counterpart, the Institute for International Relations. These developments were taking place in the context of visits to Jakarta by both Thach and Son Sann of the CGDK, as well as a planned visit by Mochtar to Moscow in April. Thus Indonesia made another major effort to solve the Kampuchean tangle. 87

The Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach visited Jakarta on March 12-13, 1984 and held discussions with his Indonesian counterpart and President Suharto. But the discussions did not bear any fruit, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister rejected the September 1983 appeal of ASEAN. 88 Jakarta felt let down by Thach and any hopes of an early diplomatic reconciliation were quickly stifled by major Vietnamese military incursions into Thai territory within eleven days after Thach's departure. The ASEAN states issued a strong joint communiqué condemning Vietnamese

86. Asian Recorder, April 8-14, 1984, p.17691.
action, but the ASEAN states especially Thailand were uncertain of the Indonesian position on Vietnam. To dispel this concern of ASEAN states the Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar called an extra ordinary meeting of ASEAN Foreign Minister's in Jakarta.\textsuperscript{89} The Indonesian President Suharto had a personal meeting with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers and assured them of the Indonesian fundamental commitment to ASEAN. During their meeting in Jakarta the ASEAN Foreign Ministers made a collective decision to designate Mochtar Kusumaatmadja as ASEAN's official interlocutor and authorised him to pursue negotiations on behalf of ASEAN as he saw fit.\textsuperscript{90} Thus in the months that followed Indonesia was once again forced to balance her enthusiasm for negotiating the Kampuchean issue in the interest of ASEAN's concern and Vietnam's intransigence. The ASEAN states including Indonesia in their joint communique after their annual Foreign Minister's meeting on July 9, 1984 strongly criticised Vietnam,\textsuperscript{91} after this no diplomatic initiative was made on this subject by Indonesia.

This relative diplomatic abstinence continued till the


\textsuperscript{90.} \textit{Asian Recorder}, August 26 - September 1, 1984, p.17911.

\textsuperscript{91.} \textit{Asia Research Bulletin}, 31st July 1984, pp.1185-1186.
end of the year. In January 1985 Vietnam mounted its largest dry season offensive against the coalition resistance forces of Kampuchea. This resulted in a climate which was not conducive to make visibly accommodatory moves towards Hanoi. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in early February 1985 issued a joint call for the international supply of arms and material support to the coalition resistance forces, CGDK. Earlier Indonesia had opposed such moves for the supply of arms to the CGDK but this time Indonesia went along with the ASEAN consensus and this generated some surprise. A week later the CSIS in Jakarta hosted a bilateral conference on Kampuchea with a visiting Vietnamese delegation. The credit for arranging the conference belonged to Murdani who was repeatedly thanked at the outset by the head of Vietnamese delegation. Thus Indonesia had not burnt completely her bridge with Vietnam and it still had the idea of negotiating the Kampuchean issue.


In late February 1985 the Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar appearing before the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the Indonesian Parliament announced that he would soon be going to Hanoi for talks, he also called upon the United States to normalise relations with Vietnam. Thus Indonesia started the fourth round of diplomatic initiative to seek a movement towards the satisfactory resolution to the impasse in Kampuchea when the US Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz arrived in Indonesia for talks, Mochtar pursued his proposal of normalisation of US relations with Vietnam. Indonesian view was that the normalisation of US-Vietnam relations would force PRC to negotiate with Vietnam and bring an end to the long standing Sino-Vietnamese bitterness which would lead to the Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea, since the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict was inherently connected with the sino-Vietnamese bitterness.

On March 14, 1985 Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar went for Hanoi where he stated the Indonesian concern over the violation of Thai territory by Vietnamese troops during their recent military action in Kampuchea and demanded that Vietnam immediately stop its military activities in order to

create a favourable atmosphere for finding a peaceful political solution to the Kampuchean crisis. Though Mochtar could make little progress in his talks with Vietnamese officials on Kampuchea issue, he significantly introduced his suggestion of normalisation of US - Vietnamese relations. After his return from Hanoi Mochtar discussed this proposal with his ASEAN counter parts in order to obtain their support and consensus. Mochtar also elicited the approval of the Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xue Qian for his proposal during the Bandung conference in April, following this in mid May after several round of talks with U.S. officials Mochtar succeeded in eliciting a measure of cautious American approval.

Concurrent with Mochtar's diplomatic effort, Benny Murdani was engaged in his own diplomatic activity. In mid April preceding the Bandung conference, he received the Vietnamese Defence Minister, General Van Tien Dung who was


paying his return visit to Jakarta.\textsuperscript{99} This visit received little press coverage in Indonesia, apparently because Mochtar had directly requested Murdani not to provide Dung with a forum from which to make pronouncements on Kampuchea that might embarrass Jakarta and irritate Bangkok. Yet the remarks of Murdani about possible military cooperation between Indonesia and Vietnam to the media caused considerable consternation and were met with an outright denial by Mochtar upon his return to the country. Murdani had announced that agreement had been reached for Hanoi to despatch a military attache to Jakarta, but Mochtar responded that this did not represent, a new level of military cooperation as Jakarta had for many years maintained a military attache at its embassy in Hanoi. This development highlighted the uneasy working relationship between the two principal architects of Indonesian foreign policy. Aside from being an instance of personal competitiveness between Mochtar and Murdani, the incident further illustrates Mochtar’s greater concern for ASEAN sensitivities in relation to Indonesian enterprise on the Kampuchean issue.

At the Annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in July 1985, Mochtar eagerly pursued his proposal of normalisation of Vietnam - U.S. relations, but this initiative of Mochtar brought him into conflict with Malaysian Foreign Minister Tunku Ahmad Rithaudden, who made his own proposal for 'proximity talks' between Vietnam (instead of the Heng Sarmin regime as originally envisaged) and the CGDK via a third party.  

Indonesian diplomatic initiative directed at Kampuchea continued into August 1985 with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach's visit to Jakarta. He held a series of talks with Mochtar which yielded little fruit. Murdani made an unpublicised trip to Bali and held discussions with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister. Additionally, Thach had a brief meeting with Suharto. Thus Indonesian government as a whole was acting towards achieving a solution to the impasse in Kampuchea but with little progress.

Mochtar undeterred by the lack of progress persisted in

100. Statement by H.E. Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, At the 40th session of the U.N. General Assembly, September 26, 1985, Directorate of Foreign Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, p.13.

his effort to form a formula that could provide a framework for regional negotiations to the Kampuchean issue. Thus the role of Indonesia in trying to bring about a solution to the Kampuchean issue clearly signifies the importance of Regional framework in Indonesian foreign policy. In December 1985, Mochtar visited Bangkok to discuss what became known as the 'Cocktail Party' proposal with his Thai counterpart, Siddhi Savetsila. Mochtar's proposal was to provide a forum, hosted by Indonesia, in which the CGDK members and representatives of the Heng Samrin and Hanoi government could discuss the Kampuchean issue. Despite an uncompromising communiqué from the Indo-Chinese Foreign Minister's meeting in late January 1986, Mochtar flew to Washington on February 10 to discuss his plans further. But as the year progressed little success was achieved in solving the impasse in Kampuchea.

In 1987, Mochtar tried his best for bringing all the interested parties together for informal talks within the so-called Cocktail party. In July 1987 he visited Ho Chi Minh city (formerly Saigon) where he had talks with Vietnamese officials which resulted in Vietnamese acceptance of Indonesia's "cocktail party" concept. This proposal of Indonesia was subsequently supported by the Khmer factions and other ASEAN countries as well as the international
community.102

As a follow up to the agreement achieved in Ho Chi Minh city Indonesia and Vietnam formed a high level conference group known as the Indonesia-Vietnam working group. The working group met twice to discuss the modality of the "cocktail party" proposal on November 23-24 and December 21-23. Meanwhile a hopeful process of establishing peace began on 2 December 1987, when Norodom Sihanouk, President of the CGDK and Hun Sen, the Prime Minister of the PRK met in a tiny village in Northern France.103 From July 25-28, 1988 Indonesia hosted in Bogor a meeting between the representatives of the CGDK, PRK, Vietnam, Laos and the ASEAN countries, for the first time in Jakarta called The Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) to discuss the resolution of the Kampuchean Conflict.104 In October, a follow-up meeting of the JIM working group continued the process, and at the


103. Press Statement by H.E. Prof. Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, December 31, 1987, Directorate of Foreign Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, p.5.

end of 1988 final preparations were made for the holding of JIM-2 in February 1989. This initiative of Indonesia is in line with its essentially regional approach for Regional problems, this approach signifies the right and responsibility of the countries of Southeast Asia to work together in limiting the role of external powers and promoting a sense of indigenous regional unity and cooperation.