CHAPTER - IV
SECURITY ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
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Threat Perception

How a nation uses her foreign policy in the pursuit of her security first depends on her threat perception. This is also the case with Indonesia, thus Indonesia's foreign policy priorities rests in considerable measure on its threat perception and this threat perception in turn tunes Indonesia's foreign policy. Indonesia basically perceives an internal source of threat like subversion and insurgency. This kind of threat perception by Indonesia is based on historical experience. Since the proclamation of its national independence on 17 August 1945, Indonesia had experienced repeated attempts of subversions and rebellions. The communist revolt of 1948 at Madiun in Eastern Java, the Moslem rebellion of 1953 and the Regional revolt of 1958 all during the old order of Sukarno and 1965 coup attempt by the communist which brought to power the new order of Suharto. All these events have all taught Indonesia an important lesson namely, the main source of threat to stability and security which is primarily internal in character.¹

internal threat. Indonesia does not perceive an external threat in the form of an open attack or invasion on it by any country.  

Indonesia believes that just as the prevention and containment of internal conflicts would ensure internal stability and security from external powers' interference, The prevention, containment, and peaceful resolutions of the intra-regional conflicts would ensure regional stability and security from external influences. If national resilience ensures internal stability, regional resilience would ensure security from outside interference.  

Foreign policy tuned to face threat  

Thus, the New order after it came to power in 1965, ceased the confrontation with Malaysia in 1966, and in order to build regional resilience which would ensure the security of Southeast Asia took the initiative for the establishment


of ASEAN 6. This can be inferred from the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 as stated by the member states that they "are determined to ensure their stability from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideas and aspirations of their people".7

Security from external interference has been a major pre-occupation of the New order. Indonesia believes that only if a nation is able to prevent, contain, and overcome internal conflicts, it can ensure its security and stability. Thus the maintenance of a nation's stability and security primarily depends on its capability to put its own house in order. The Indonesian government perceives that while the threat of subversion and insurgency may remain dormant, its possible manifestation or expression could be curtailed by preventing the emergence of social unrest and economic discontent among the population which could be


manipulated and exploited by subversive and insurgent elements. Indonesia knows that this will be determined to a large extent by the government's responsiveness to people's aspirations, demands and expectations for progress, prosperity and social justice, so as to prevent the seed and causes of internal conflicts. In this race against poverty and the revival of communism, the Indonesian government decided to speed up economic development. This forms the basis of Ketahanan national or national resilience of a country as termed by Suharto.

National resilience in essence means a nation's capability in all the aspects of its national life, particularly in the ideological, political, socio-cultural, economic and military fields, to safeguard its own internal stability and thus security from external interference. When South Vietnam fell to the Communist Regime of North Vietnam in 1975, Indonesia was alarmed but it felt that the United Communist Vietnam will not be an


expansionist state and Indonesia did not apprehend any direct attack from Vietnam.\textsuperscript{11} Nevertheless Indonesia was worried about the possible infiltration of the large quantity of arms left behind by the Americans in South Vietnam to the Indonesian subversive and insurgents.\textsuperscript{12}

The apprehensions and fears of Indonesia with regard to the communist victory in Indo-China were expressed by President Suharto in an interview with the editor of the magazine German International in July 1975. In the interview President Suharto noted that even if the Indo-Chinese countries decided to limit their application of communism to national development and reconstruction, it did not mean that such development would have no effect or influence on communists in the neighbouring countries. This influence, according to President Suharto, would take the form of communist solidarity among communist elements in other Southeast Asian countries and encourage them to broaden and expand their influence and even attempt armed revolt against legal governments. President Suharto has also added that communism could not be defeated by mere physical force


\textsuperscript{12} Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia 1977 Year Book, p.190.
alone, communism could only be countered by a still more powerful national ideological fanaticism, a national ideology which would strengthen national resilience.\textsuperscript{13}

While the New order continued to stress the importance of economic development and panca sila ideology as means of improving national resilience, it nevertheless took steps to improve the capabilities of its armed forces. Hence in July 1975, President Suharto visited US and sought military assistance from it, the then president of US Gerald Ford made a return visit to Jakarta in December 1975.\textsuperscript{14} Following this visit Adam Malik the then Indonesian Foreign Minister visited US in June 1976 and held talks with US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. This visit by Adam Malik helped Indonesia in buying a number of items of military equipment from the US.\textsuperscript{15} Indonesia negotiated the purchase of various items of military equipment from the US. In particular, it wanted to augment its surveillance and patrolling capability, coupled with speedier communications and greater troop mobility instead of only acquiring

\textsuperscript{13} Raja Segaran Arumugam, "Indonesia : Internal Developments and External Outlook", \textit{South East Asian Affairs}, 1976, pp.187 and 188.


of infiltration of arms from Vietnam facilitating the subversion by the remaining underground PKI activists. Lester Wolff, Chairman of the US house sub committee on International Assistance in response to the concerns of President Suharto of Indonesia and the Defence Minister General Panggabean on Vietnam, assured Indonesian leaders that America would give military assistance to Indonesia in the context of Vietnamese armed strength.¹⁹

When the Vietnamese troops invaded and installed the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea in late 1978, Jakarta was again alarmed.²⁰ The security perception of Indonesia was rendered acute by (i) the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, (ii) by the Soviet support to Vietnam, (iii) the Sino-US rapprochement and (iv) the growing Sino-USSR rivalry in the region and the increasing militarisation of the Indian Ocean in the context of the USSR gaining access to Vietnamese ports. The ever increasing US naval presence in the Indian Ocean increased the Indonesian perception of an external threat to its security more.


²⁰. But Indonesia entertained an understanding view that only Strategic reason compelled Vietnam to march into Kampuchea and not any expansionist motive; for details of Indonesian view see, Sabam Siagian, "Towards a Shared View on the Future of Southeast Asia", Indonesia Quarterly, Vol.XV, No.1, January 1987, pp.92-93.
sophisticated weapons. The US was also ready to assist Indonesia because of its strategic location and also because of the ideological compatibility of the new order regime of Suharto. Actually from 1972 there had been a steady increase in the number of US military advisers and technicians in Indonesia. The US military personnel had set up communications network linking the headquarters at Java with the outlaying regions and they taught the Indonesians how to maintain the new aircraft bought by Indonesia as well as the fleet of 130 military transport aircrafts Indonesia had then.

The US attitude towards Indonesia can be clearly perceived from the statement made by the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Arthur W. Hummer. He said that Indonesia, with its resources and its friendly government, was of political, strategic, and economic importance to the US. When Lester Wolff, Chairman of the US house sub committee in International Assistance, paid a visit to Indonesia In April 1977, president Suharto and the then Indonesian Defence Minister General Maraden Panggabean, expressed their deep concern at the possibility

16. Ibid., p.38.


18. Ibid.
of infiltration of arms from Vietnam facilitating the subversion by the remaining underground PKI activists. Lester Wolff, Chairman of the US house sub committee on International Assistance in response to the concerns of President Suharto of Indonesia and the Defence Minister General Panggabean on Vietnam, assured Indonesian leaders that America would give military assistance to Indonesia in the context of Vietnamese armed strength.  

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Indonesia thus perceiving an external threat to its security more and more, started increasing its military expenditure. Indonesia’s military expenditure increased steadily, though at a mild rate, from $1,338 million in 1974 to $1,726 million in 1981, but the value of Indonesian arms imports rose from US $30 million in 1973 to US $450 million in 1981.21

**Indonesian Military expenditure, 1975-1984 (US $ Million)**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMOUNT</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>1419</td>
<td>1404</td>
<td>1784</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>2690</td>
<td>2926</td>
<td>2527</td>
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Source: Pacific Affairs, LX, No.1, spring 1987, p.86.

Security perceptions impelled Indonesia to improve its special relationship with US. US also responded to the requirements of Indonesia and between 1967 and 1975, US military assistance to Indonesia totalled nearly $150 million and on 22 October 1975, news papers in Jakarta reported the U.S. State Department’s decision to double the military aid for Indonesia for the Year 1975-76 to a total of US $42.5 million. In fact US is the country which gives the highest military assistance to Indonesia which can be inferred from the following statistics.

Source of Military Assistance to Indonesia, 1965-74
(Total $ 170 million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount in Million US $</th>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL OTHERS</td>
<td>45</td>
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Thus in the late 70s the US-Indonesian relations became more closer in the context of the circumstance arising from the Soviet supported Vietnamese attack on Kampuchea. Henceforth the US assistance to Indonesia was mainly determined by the need to contain the suspected Soviet designs in Southeast Asia. The US has not only been the largest source of military aid to Indonesia but also the major supplier of conventional weapons. During 1976-80 Indonesia imported about 24 percent its major conventional weapons from the US and during 1981-85 Indonesia increased its imports further to 36 percent. Thus, with the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea international power politics in Southeast Asia became sharply bipolar with China, Japan and the US on one side and on the other side stood the Soviet Union and its allies. Indonesia felt it
should build up its national resilience, including its politico-economy and security aspects. Pragmatic considerations of Security made her pursue a pro-Western foreign policy and it formed a sort of de facto alliance with US and its allies.

Japan and Australia, US Allies being located in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean basin respectively, perceived the Soviet Union as a potential enemy and recognised Indonesia as a strategic friend. As far as anti-communism was concerned the interest of US, Japan and Australia converged with Indonesia. Indonesia with her 160 million population and a strong military regime with her known aversion for communism was perceived by these countries as the main bull work against the growth of Soviet influence in the region through Vietnam. Hence Australia was mainly interested in strengthening military co-operation with Indonesia, whereas Japan's main interest in Indonesia was in Indonesian oil and other natural resources.


As Indonesia feels that security and stability of the nation can be achieved only by economic development which will defeat the communist ideology. Japan as a major economic partner of the New order offered its services to improve the standard of living of the peoples of the Southeast Asia in general and Indonesia in particular. On 18 August 1977, the Japanese Prime Minister, Takeo Fukuda while delivering a Summarizing speech in Manila at the end of his visit to the Summit meeting of the ASEAN nations and his subsequent visit to each member of ASEAN Nations including Indonesia offered Japanese help for the economic development of Southeast Asia. This speech of Takeo Fukuda was later called the Fukuda doctrine. Japan increased its ODA (Official Development Assistance) to Indonesia and also offered a loan of US $ 1 billion for the five major industrial projects, one each in ASEAN member nation for Indonesia, Japan offered the loan for the setting up of a Urea plant.25

Earlier in 1972 a three year Jakarta-Canberra defence co-operation programme costing about $ 20 million was announced. It consisted a number of projects under which Indonesia received sixteen Sabre Jets, Several boats, a

number of electronic target ranges and field radio transceivers and the provision for training in Australia. 26

The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Whitlam visited Indonesia in February 20 to 24, 1973. During his visit Whitlam called on the President Suharto and held talks with other Indonesian leaders, including Foreign Minister, Mr. Adam Malik. Mr. Whitlam described Indonesia as one of Australia’s closest friend and offered aid to Indonesia to develop its self-reliance and capability to resist external threats. Whitlam further declared that Australia was willing to provide Indonesia if it so desires, assistance in the training of armed forces and technical facilities. 27

External threat perception

Of the two major communist countries, Indonesia was more concerned with China than the Soviet Union. In the course of trial proceedings of Dr. Subandrio, former Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs it was revealed that the People’s Republic of China offered 1,00,000 guns to Subandrio during his visit to Peking in early 1965 for arming a fifth force. Thus the experience of 30 September 1965 coup attempt by the PKI with the help of China has made


Indonesia more apprehensive of China. Relations between Indonesia and China were broken of on 9 October 1967. The bitterness of the Sino-Indonesian relations was particularly revealed at the time of UN voting on the China Issue. Indonesia voted twice in favour of a defeated US resolution describing China's entry into the UN as an important question once in November 1966 and second time in November 1967. In 1969 Indonesia was listed as 'absent' in the UN General Assembly at the time of voting on the China issue. In 1970, however, when the question of China's admission to UN came up for voting in the UN General Assembly, Indonesia was listed as present, but not participating in vote.

In the wake of the growing Sino-US rapprochement there was a significant change in Indonesia's foreign policy attitude towards China. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Adam Malik declared that Indonesia was pursuing a one China policy thereby indicating Indonesia's support for the PRC's


30. Ibid., p.517.

entry into the UN. Adam Malik also expressed Indonesia's willingness to consider a resumption of full diplomatic relations with China provided the initiative came from Peking, and the anti-Indonesian propaganda was stopped. In spite of Adam Malik's declared willingness to resume diplomatic relations with China, Sino-Indonesian relations remained frozen mainly due to the suspected loyalty of the four million Chinese minority in Indonesia, and the Chinese propaganda support for the Sarawak guerrilla insurgents who, the Chinese alleged were, being suppressed by reactionary Malaysian and Indonesian troops, and the repeated Chinese radio broadcast attacking the Suharto government.

Hence inspite of the Sino-US rapprochement Indonesia still perceived China as a source of threat which this can be understood from the way Adam Malik the Indonesian foreign minister reacted to the Nixion-Chou-En-lai Shanghai communique of 27 February 1972. Adam Malik remarked that if people's Republic of China ceased to launch subversion in Indonesia, then Indonesia would consider the Nixon visit to China as beneficial to her. Indonesia perceives Vietnam

as another communist country with a source of threat but comparatively speaking she feels the main threat to Southeast Asia and Indonesia is only from China. Thus Indonesia was more alarmed by the Chinese punitive action against Vietnam following the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978.

This trend continued in 80's also and the Indonesian Foreign Minister Mr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja who replaced Adam Malik told a Parliamentary commission on 22 December 1982 that the

"Indonesian government was still waiting for a proper time to normalise relations with China. He also added that the US policy of helping China in modernization worried Indonesia and other ASEAN countries".35

He said that China has still not changed its stand regarding communist movements in the region. That is the Chinese policy of having separate party to party relations and government to government relations.36

Hence Indonesia considered China as a more potential threat to the stability, peace and security of Southeast Asia than Vietnam. President Suharto on March 1, 1983 in


36. Ibid.
his address to the General Session of the People's Deliberative Assembly stated:

"The freezing of our diplomatic relations with the people's Republic of China since the outbreak of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) revolt 17 years ago cannot yet be liquidated upto the present because we place our safety and national interests above other interests, then ,so long as the PRC has not yet convinced us that it will not assist the remnants of the communist parties in South East-Asia. I consider it not yet time to normalise diplomatic relations with the PRC at present."37

Difference in threat perception; Indonesia-ASEAN

Threat perception of Indonesia was not in tune with that of other ASEAN countries mainly Thailand and Singapore who felt Vietnam more as threat than China.38 However, after the invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnam, Indonesia was obliged to place its commitment to Thailand, its ASEAN partner, before the cultivation of a special political

37. Address by the President/Mandatory of the People's Deliberative Assembly, Republic of Indonesia, Delivered at the General Session of the People's Deliberative Assembly on March 1,1983, Department of Information, Jakarta, p.27.

relationship with Vietnam. But in fact Indonesia believes Vietnam is a barrier which stops Chinese expansionism down Southwards towards Southeast Asia. Thus General Benny Murdani, head of the Indonesian armed forces, during his first official visit to Vietnam in February 1984 stated that it was his firm belief that there will never be a conflict between our two countries; he also stated that some countries think that Vietnam is a danger to Southeast Asia, but the Indonesian army and the people do not believe so. The Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea greatly affected the threat perception of Thailand and to some extent Singapore, Philippines being an island nation was not unduly worried about Vietnam and as far as Malaysia was concerned it felt like Indonesia, that is it felt that Vietnam did not pose any threat to ASEAN and only China was the long term threat to ASEAN nations. Thus there was a dichotomy in ASEAN threat perception.

Policy of Military cooperation

In 1984 Singapore and Thailand wanted the ASEAN members to set up a military alliance in order to meet possible threats to ASEAN nations. The Indonesian Foreign Minister


40. Ibid.

Mochtar Kusumaatmadja in reaction to this call said that Indonesia was opposed to any military alliance, but affirmed increased bilateral military co-operation among ASEAN nations. Thus the Indonesian foreign policy in the realm of security was more of bilateral and Independent nature than in the form of any power bloc or multilateral set up.

Indonesia as signed joint security arrangement with Malaysia in 1967. Also Indonesian security officials have regular meeting with their counter parts in Malaysia under the auspices of the Joint Border Committee (JBC) agreement signed in 1972. The JBC was originally meant to deal with the communist insurgents operating along the Sabah/Sarawak-Kalimantan border. Later this agreement was revised to include joint Naval and Air patrols along the common borders of the two countries and in the straits of Malacca by the revised security agreement signed in Yogyakarta in 1984. In 1986 during their 14th JBC meeting in Sarawak Indonesia And Malaysia agreed to upgrade their co operation in security matters. The two countries were concerned about the Indo China issue, the conflicting claims of sovereignty over certain parts of the Sea near the Natuna Islands between Vietnam and Indonesia, and also over the Spratly and Paracel islands dispute in the South China Sea.

The discussions at the meeting were co-chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Musa of Malaysia and Indonesian armed forces Chief General Benny Murdani. Indonesia and Malaysia also reached an agreement over the use of military facilities on the Indonesian island of Natuna by Malaysia when needed.

Indonesia also has joint co-operation agreements with Philippines on joint Naval patrols and exercise for self defense and enhancement of national defence capability of the nations, agreed by the President of Indonesia and Philippines President Marcos in Manila in February 1972.

Indonesian navy also conducts joint Naval exercise with Thailand regularly in the Java Sea. On 11 December 1975 three Thai Naval frigates and six Indonesian warships held joint Naval manoeuvres in the Java Sea. This was the second Thai-Indonesian joint Naval exercise, the first one took place at the close of 1974. On 24 August 1977 Indonesia held another joint Naval exercise with Thai warships, this time the exercise also involved five Australian naval vessels, as well as one US warship. Earlier in September 1975


44. Ibid., p.151.

Indonesia held joint Naval exercises along with Malaysia and Singapore. Though Indonesia conducts military exercises along with Malaysia and Singapore. Though Indonesia conducts military exercises with ASEAN Nations, it does not favour any ASEAN multilateral military exercise as it feels this kind of action would only invite suspicion and criticism from other nations like Vietnam and China, and would be like starting a new military block like SEATO.\textsuperscript{46}

**Timor Crisis**

Indonesia believes internal sources threatening Indonesian Security as more serious than external ones. Although the outlawed PKI has been under Kopkamtib’s (operation command for the Restoration of Security and order) close watch, Indonesia still suffers from the excessive communist phobia, from the very beginning of the New order with unflunging persistence Indonesian officials, from the President onwards, called attention to the communist danger to their nation.\textsuperscript{47} After the raise of united communist Vietnam in 1975 Indonesian Attorney


General. Ali urged the Indonesians to be vigilant since the underground PKI activists would have gained some inspiration from the Indo-China case.

This communist phobia of the New order regime in Indonesia also shaped the attitude of Indonesia towards the Portuguese plan to decolonise East Timor. Thus in late 1974 when the Portuguese colonial administration in East Timor. The New order regime in Indonesia did not welcome the prospect of an independent East Timor led by the Marxist oriented "Revolutionary Front" (FRETI LIN) which was the strong party at that time in comparison to the Democratic Union of Timor (UDT).48

Indonesia perceived that an Independent state of East Timor would pose a threat to Indonesia's Security - to its soft underbelly, it believed that East Timor could turn out to be a base for communist insurrection and subversion throughout Indonesia.49

In August 1975 a civil war erupted in East Timor when the commandos of the Democratic Union of Timor - a moderate anti-communist group demanding gradual self-determination

for East Timor raided the Police Station in Dili on August 10, 1975 and seized weapons and moved on to strategic outposts. In retaliation, the FRETILIN forces occupied the capital, Dili, and most of the remaining territory of East Timor by defeating Apodeti a pro-Indonesian Political wing and UDT.  

On August 16 in a nation-wide speech on the eve of the country’s 30th Independence anniversary, President Suharto of Indonesia stated that the door was open for Portuguese Timor to merge with Indonesia if the People there wanted so. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Adam Malik on September 13, 1985, on his return from New York stated that Indonesia was prepared to take any action if the situation in East Timor threatens her security.  

In the meanwhile the Indonesian Naval forces blockaded East Timor to prevent the supply of arms to the FRETILIN forces, and the Indonesian government sought a somewhat indirect diplomatic solution to the problem by requesting the establishment of a four power joint authority comprising of Indonesia, Portugal, Malaysia and Australia while Malaysia refused to participate, Portugal declined to join the military intervention proposed by Indonesia.  

51. Ibid.  
On 28 November 1975, the FRETILIN forces declared the Independence of East Timor. As no outside diplomatic solution was possible a genuine Fear of Security concerns prompted Indonesia to undertake its first ever large-scale military operation since independence. On 7th December 1975, with several thousand troops officially called volunteers Indonesia invaded East Timor and captured Dili the capital of East Timor and Timor's second city Bancan from FRETILIN. 53 Indonesia was surprised by the extent of criticism faced by it from the UN General Assembly in session. Indonesia broke off her relations with Portugal who accused of armed invasion in East Timor. FRETILIN's African friends, Mozambique and Angola succeeded in mobilising the support of the majority of African nations. 54 And predictably most of the communist states with the exception of Yugoslavia opposed Indonesia. China condemned the Indonesian action in East Timor as armed aggression. Even the small member countries of the UN condemned this action. Algeria proposed a draft resolution in the UN General assembly expressing a deep concern at the critical situation caused by the armed Indonesian intervention in East Timor. The resolution called on all states to respect the rights of

53. Ibid., p.216.
Timorese to self-determination, freedom and Independence. Indonesia was called upon to desist from further action in East Timor and to withdraw its forces from the territory. Even US spoke against the use of force by Indonesia in East Timor. The Algerian draft resolution was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly of the UN by a vote of 69 for (including Australia), 11 against and 38 abstentions (including US). Indonesia found herself defensive in the world body and reacted angrily to the UN resolutions. Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik stated that there were no Indonesian forces to withdraw and only volunteers supporting the anti-FRETILIN forces of UDT and Apodeti in East Timor. Of the ASEAN states Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand voted in favour of Indonesia with the notable exception of Singapore.

The Security Council of the UN discussed the East Timor issue between 15 and 22 December 1976, and in accordance with the principles of the charter and of the Declaration of Decolonisation of the UN. The Security Council unanimously passed a resolution which recognised the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence. The Security Council also deplored the intervention of Indonesia's armed forces in East Timor and

55. Ibid., p.18.
regretted that the Portuguese government had not fully discharged its responsibilities of administering power in East Timor under Chapter 11 of the charter. The resolution also called upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of the East Timorese People to self-determination in accordance with the General Assembly resolution. It asked the government of Indonesia "to withdraw without delay all its troops from East Timor" and requested Portugal "as the administering power" to cooperate with the United Nations "So as to enable the People of East Timor to exercise freely their right to self-determination". The Security council requested the Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to send urgently a special representative to East Timor for making an on the spot assessment of the situation and to establish contact with all the parties in East Timor and all states concerned in order to ensure the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

The Secretary-General in due course dispatched Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi as his special Representative to East Timor to make an on the spot assessment of the situation.

57. Ibid.
Mr. Winspeare in his report to the Secretary-General reported that he was unable to visit all the areas in East Timor, however he said that the people of East Timor should be consulted on the future status of their territory.\(^5\)\(^8\)

The East Timor problem was discussed once again in the Security Council in April 1976 along with the Secretary General's report. The Council passed a resolution which reaffirmed the right of the Timorese to self-determination and independence, and again called the Government of Indonesia to withdraw its forces from East Timor without any delay. Japan and US were absent when this resolution was passed by the Security Council.\(^5\)\(^9\)

Indonesia in an attempt to stop further discussion of east Timor in the U.N. speeded up the process of integration.\(^6\)\(^0\) On 31 May 1976 a popular Assembly of East Timor claiming to represent the 6,50,000 population approved unanimously a petition to integrate it with Indonesia. President Suharto of Indonesia accepted the petition from the so called provisional government of East Timor urging Indonesia to accept and ratify the merger of East Timor with

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59. Ibid.

Indonesia. Suharto sent a high level delegation to East Timor to "ascertain the wishes of the people" on July 17, 1976 Indonesia integrated East Timor and declared it as the 27th province of Indonesia. Earlier on 14 December 1975 the tiny enclave of Portuguese Timor called Occusi Ambeno in the Indonesian half of Timor island had declared itself as a part of Indonesia. The enclave was accepted as part of Indonesian Timor at a ceremony in Kupang. The enclave was unaffected by the fighting in East Timor and in fact the Indonesian flag had been flying on it since the fall of Dili in East Timor on 7 December 1975.

On 1 December 1976 the General Assembly of UN again passed a resolution rejecting the claim of Indonesia that East Timor had been integrated in Indonesia and it once again called upon Indonesia to withdraw all its forces from East Timor. This time the US joined along with Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand in protecting Indonesia. As Henry Kissinger observed in 1975, US had enough problems of great importance" in the world so US decided not make an issue of East Timor. It also felt that East Timor could be better Governed by Indonesia than by a leftist "democratic

While Australia and Singapore abstained, Russia and China voted in favour of the resolution.

Timor issue and its effect on Indonesia’s external relationship

Indonesia’s intervention in East Timor had affected to some extent her relations and her image with some of her friends. Indonesia’s relation with Australia got strained due to the East Timor crisis and Singapore’s absence in the UN General Assembly debates over Timor issue showed her negative opinion on Indonesia’s armed intervention in East Timor. Nevertheless Indonesian attitude towards the integration of East Timor was quite firm. The Indonesian Ambassador to the UN, Mr. Chaidir Anwar San told on 1 December 1976 that whatever happens in East Timor is the internal affair of the Republic of Indonesia as East Timor was integrated into Indonesia on 17 July 1976.

In an effort to promote support for her incorporation of East Timor from the middle of 1976 Jakarta started a diplomatic campaign. President Suharto during his general

65. Kalyani Bandyopadhyaya, Loc. Cit., p. 58
visits abroad and also during the talks with distinguished foreign visitors in Jakarta discussed East Timor’s integration with Indonesia and its justification. Indonesia’s diplomatic campaign has been particularly successful with Western countries, which have acknowledged the strategic justification of Indonesia in integrating East Timor. Likewise, the ASEAN countries with the exception of Singapore have supported the Indonesian action in East Timor in the United Nations from the start. Singapore abstained from voting in 1975 and 1976 UN General Assembly resolution, but from 1977 onwards it also voted in favour of Indonesia. 67

With the exception of Singapore which abstained in 1975 and 1976 UN General Assembly resolutions, all other ASEAN countries from 1975-1982 voted in favour of Indonesia in the UN General Assembly resolutions on the East Timor issue. The solidarity of the ASEAN though strained a little in the beginning on the question of East Timor when Singapore abstained in 1975 and 1976 UN General Assembly resolutions got strengthened in the end. From 1977 onwards all the ASEAN countries including Singapore voted in favour of Indonesia

on the East Timor issue in the UN General Assembly resolutions until 1983. When the decision was taken to shelve the East Timor issue in the UN General Assembly by mutual consent of the parties involved: Indonesia, Portugal, the UN recognised administering power and FRETILIN.

The effect of East Timor on Indonesia - Australia relations

The Australian - Indonesian relations suffered because of the Timor problem. Australia voted against Indonesia in the UN General Assembly on 12, December 1975 and on 17 July 1976 Indonesia officially incorporated East Timor as its 27th province. Earlier, on January 19, 1976 Australian Foreign Minister Peacock during his visit to Jakarta had talks with the Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik for three hours and discussed about the ways to promote mutual understanding on bilateral relations between the two countries. The Australian Foreign Minister reiterated the new Australian government’s determination to continue the tradition of close relations with Indonesia during his one hour discussion with President Suharto of Indonesia on January 20. President Suharto during his meeting with Peacock stated Indonesia’s position on East Timor issue stressing that Indonesia was not carrying out an
expansionist policy. Thus in 1976 Australia shifted her position and abstained when the UN General Assembly adopted its December 1, 1976 Resolution. Australia again abstained in 1977, and from 1978 onwards Australia started voting in favour of Indonesia. With the victory of the Labour party lead by Bob Hawke in 1983 Australia—Indonesian relations became strained. In 1984 both the Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke and his Foreign Minister Bill Hayden criticised Indonesia on its border problems with Papua New Guinea and the East Timor issue. The Indonesian foreign minister in reaction to this stated that diplomatic relations between his country and Australia would become worse if Australia continues its unfriendly attitude. However in 1985 there was a marked improvement in relation between the two nations as a result of the reaffirmation made by the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Bob Hawke to the Parliament that Australia recognised the Sovereignty of Indonesia over East Timor.

In the end of the same year the Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja visited Australia. His visit

68. News from Indonesia, New Delhi, Friday, 30 January 1976, p.1.


was very successful and he discussed the possibility of President Suharto eventually making a trip to Australia for the first time in a decade. But the downswing came when the Sydney Morning Herald on April 10, published an article about the alleged financial dealings of members of President Suharto's family. This resulted in the cancellation of Visit of Minister Yusuf Habibe to canberra and the possibility of any visit of Suharto to Australia. However relations were soon brought on an even Keel between the two countries and in 1988, after nearly a decade of negotiations Indonesia and Australia reached on an agreement on how to exploit the resources in the Timor Gap.\textsuperscript{72}

The "Free Papua Movement" in Irian Jaya and its effect on Indonesian Relations with Papua New Guinea

The existence of Free Papua Movement (OPM) can be traced to the fag end of the Dutch colonial rule. When the Dutch started facing International Pressure on the issue of (West Guinea) Irian Jaya with Indonesia, it made belated efforts to move its West Guinea territory towards Self government before the 1963. UN. Sanctioned Indonesian take over. The Indonesians after they took over West Guinea from the Dutch consolidated their control over the territory from

1963 to 1969. In 1969 they conducted the Act of free choice which legalised their sovereignty over West Guinea, they then renamed it as Irian Jaya. The Melanesian's of Irian Jaya felt that they had separate identity than the rest of Indonesia on the basis of Culture, Language, Tradition, Historical development and Geographical unity. They started an alternative Papua regime in 1971 with a secessionist programme. The free Papua movement (OPM) consist of a violative coalition of anti-Indonesian leaders and followers. Though the OPM does not have a strong armed strength the support from the native population boosts its political capability. The armed resistance of OPM does not seriously threaten the Indonesian control over Irian Jaya. Whenever the Indonesian forces take action against the OPM rebels, they after making guerrilla attacks, retreat across the international border to Papua New Guinea (PNG). The Indonesian forces some times cross the International border into PNG while chasing the OPM rebels. These incidents causes tension in Indonesian relations with PNG.


75. Donald E. Weather Bee, Loc. Cit., p.333.
PNG side which got Independence in 1975 the relationship with Indonesia was initially embedded in the newly independent state's foreign policy framework of "universalism" - that is, one of "friends to all, enemies to none". Thus initially PNG maintained a low foreign policy stance in the Region. But the relationship with Indonesia was tested by the frequent hostile exchanges between Indonesia and PNG over the OPM activities and Indonesian military action.76 Prime Minister Michael Somare of Papua New Guinea paid an official visit to Indonesia from 10 to 16 January 1977. Upon the invitation of President Suharto of Indonesia, Prime Minister Somare was accompanied by his wife Veronica Somare and High ranking officials.77

During this visit Indonesia had its first summit meeting with PNG where discussions were held on the issue of Indonesian hot pursuit and granting of permissive residence to Irian Jaya refugees by PNG. The PNG felt that it was a question of Sovereignty of its territory, while Indonesia felt that it was the issue rebel sanctuary. Indonesia's tough line upto and across the border if necessary, had the intended effect of neutralising the possible PNG sympathy

76. Ibid.
to OPM insurgents. The PNG government quickly adapted to the real situation and promised that PNG territory would not be used a base for anti-Indonesian activity. 78

On the other hand the public sympathy for the fellow Melanesians of Irian Jaya grew in PNG, further more fears about ultimate Indonesian intention towards the PNG grew and they feared that Indonesia had expansionist designs on PNG. 79

In summer 1978 Indonesian forces chasing OPM rebels crossed the PNG border, this incident caused further tensions in the bilateral relations between Indonesia and PNG. In response to PNG protests, Indonesia made a routine reply, first it denied that there were any border incursions by its forces, but added that if it had happened that it was unavoidable and it had no intention of violation PNG’s sovereignty.

In this tense and troubled situation the two governments modelled a relationship in which PNG, unhappily perhaps but realistically deferred to Indonesia on matters of border security. Throughout the years 1978 and 1979, the

78. Donald E. Weather Bee, Loc. Cit., p.333.

PNG government tightened its own internal policing of the border, exiled OPM activists and repatriated some illegal border crossers, PNG also accepted Indonesia’s territorial claims based on Indonesia’s archipelagic concept.\textsuperscript{80} Thus by the accommodating attitude of PNG, the bilateral relations between Indonesia and PNG were brought to an even keel. In June 1979 President Suharto visited Port Moresby the capital of PNG where Suharto and Somare the Prime Minister of PNG in a joint communique stated that they regarded the question of East Timor entirely as a domestic matter\textsuperscript{81}. Thus after the resettlement of its friction with PNG, Indonesia invited PNG to the 1979 ASEAN Foreign Minister’s meeting in Bali. This signified that Indonesia was prepared to assign PNG a special role in ASEAN.

In March 1980, the Somare government lost power and was replaced by a five party coalition government led by Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan’s People’s progress party. Chan’s first foreign visit as Prime Minister was to Jakarta in December 1980, where the official policy of PNG-Indonesia friendly co-operation was cemented\textsuperscript{82}. Michael Somare again


\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p.334.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
became the Prime Minister of PNG on 2 August 1982. As Jakarta, viewed Somare as more understanding and sensitive to border issue, it looked forward for a more understanding relationship with PNG. The continuation of friendly relations with PNG seemed more promising after the exchange of four memorandums of agreement formalising the joint border committee. But this was not be so. There was a border violation by Indonesia in 1983, after this PNG became more sensitive about the intentions of Indonesia. The PNG Defence Minister made a statement that he expected an invasion within 20 years.\textsuperscript{83} But these incidents were not allowed to go out of hand. PNG Prime Minister Somare reprimanded and demoted his outspoken Defence Minister. This friendly act of Somare, impressed Indonesia and its relationship with PNG were brought on an even keel and on 23rd July 1984 two memorandums of understanding were signed, one on defining the traditional cross border between the two countries and another on establishing a border communications technical teams respectively between the two countries.\textsuperscript{84} In 1986 the Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja visited Port Moresby where he signed the treaty of friendship between Indonesia and Papua New


Guinea with the PNG counterpart Legu Vagi, on 27 October 1986. 85

Thus Indonesia’s relationship with PNG due to the OPM never got out of hand, more because of the practical attitude shown by PNG. PNG knew that it was no match to Indonesia and it was impractical for it not to defer to the Indonesian sensitivity.