CHAPTER - I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INDONESIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
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Indonesia proclaimed herself Independent on Friday 17th August 1945. Sukarno read out the following statement signed by himself and Hatta:

"We the people of Indonesia hereby declare Indonesia’s independence". 1

This statement was broadcasted to the entire archipelago and to the outside world by Domei, the Japanese news agency through its short wave transmitter. On 18th August 1945, a republican constitution was promulgated and Sukarno and Hatta were elected as President and Vice-President respectively of the new state by a pre-independence preparatory committee.

At that time Indonesian foreign policy had Three main objectives namely: (1) to seek international recognition for her Independent Status; (2) to defend her independence against Dutch attempt to reinstate colonial rule in Indonesia; and (3) to seek a solution for its Independence struggle with the Dutch through a third country as mediator,

or through the United Nations (UN) forum. In line with these objectives the first diplomatic activity in which Indonesia participated was the Linggarjati Agreement Negotiations which was held on 25th March 1947, with Britain as the mediator.

This negotiation resulted in the Linggarjati Agreement. This agreement was violated by the Dutch when they launched military invasion on the Republic of Indonesia on 17th July 1947. This resulted in Prime Minister and concurrently Foreign Minister Sultan Sjahrir's visit to India where he met Jawaharial Nehru, with whose help the Indonesia-Dutch conflict was submitted to the UN. Along


3. The outcome of this agreement was that the Dutch recognised the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising de facto authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra islands. In return the Republic of Indonesia agreed to cooperate with the Dutch in the formation of a Sovereign democratic state on a federal basis to be called the United States of Indonesia.


5. An Asian relations Conference was held in New Delhi in 1947; This conference was convened by the Indian Council of World Affairs but practically, this was sponsored by the New provisional Government of India under the leadership of the provisional Prime Minister Nehru; Sjahrir arrived on the last day of the conference by a special plane made available to him by the Indian government.
with Australia, India succeeded in bringing the issue before the Security Council on 1st August 1947. With the efforts of India and Australia, a resolution for ceasefire was adopted. This indeed was a victory for Indonesia because the conflict between Indonesia and Dutch had become an international issue debated at the world's highest forum, the UN. The issue was no longer a domestic issue as the Dutch claimed.  

The ceasefire that had been agreed upon was violated by the Dutch troops, hence in the middle of August 1947 the UN Security Council held another session to deliberate on this issue. Sultan Sjahrir was invited to participate on behalf of the republic of Indonesia as its representative. Sultan Sjahrir advocated the need of forming a supervisory committee to enforce the ceasefire resolution adopted.  

On 25th August 1947 the UN - Security Council passed two more resolutions, namely: (1) the resolution proposed by People's Republic of China (PRC) and Australia on the placement of its representatives as the member countries of the committee (US, France, Belgium, England and China) in


Jakarta to supervise the execution of the ceasefire; and (2) the resolution proposed by the US on the convening of a Good Office Committee (GOC) to help in solving the problem in a peaceful way.8

The Good Office's Committee of the UN comprised representatives of Australia (chosen by Indonesia), Belgium (chosen by the Dutch) and the US (chosen by the two committee members). Though this committee did not possess any formal powers, it acted as a kind of protective devise against further Dutch military action. Talks were started for a second time on 8th December 1947; this time the talks were held on board in a US naval transport vessel Renville anchored off the coast of Jakarta. Another agreement was signed between Indonesia and Dutch on 17th and 19th January 1948 known as the Renville agreement.9

At the beginning of August 1948, Suprindo and Musso leader of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (here in after PKI) returned to Java from Moscow. The communist opposed the Renville Agreement and condemned the republic Government for giving into the pressure of Dutch and

US. Hatta defended the Renville agreement with the Dutch and in response to the communist call for the alignment of republic of Indonesia with the Soviet Union, on 2nd September 1948, Hatta argued before the Central Indonesian Committee in defence of his position. During the course of his argument he expounded his views of the appropriate course for Indonesia's foreign policy. He said:

"Have the Indonesian People fighting for their freedom... no other course of action open to them than to choose between being pro-Russian or pro-American? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of our national ideals? The Indonesian Government is of the opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a passive party in the area of International Politics but that it should be an active agent entitled to decide its own standpoint... The policy of the Republic of Indonesia must be resolved in the light of its own interests and should be executed in consonance with situations and facts it has to face.... The lines of Indonesia's policy cannot be determined by the bent of the policy of some other country which has its own interest to service (sic)."\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} According to the Renville Agreement, Indonesia gave substantial territorial concessions to the Dutch, with the understanding that the Dutch would conduct plebiscite in the areas captured by the Dutch, but the Dutch failed in their promise and US failed to provide the promised backing in the UN.

The policy of non-alignment (NAM) with power blocs, or the "Independent and active" foreign policy as Indonesians call it was the result of both domestic and International environment at that time.\textsuperscript{12} This independent and active foreign policy principle formed the basic core of Indonesia's foreign policy. Even though this principle has been followed at varying degrees by different governments at different times, this foreign policy principle was never officially abandoned.

In August 1949, a round table conference was organised in Hague. An agreement was signed between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic, the Dutch consented to an unconditional transfer of Sovereignty to a federal state in which the Republic of Indonesia was the Largest Unit and which became part of a loose consultative Netherlands - Indonesian Union headed by the Dutch Queen. The Indonesians agreed to tolerate continued Dutch control of West Irian. The 1945 constitution was abolished and a new constitutional form of

\textsuperscript{12} In her struggle for independence, Indonesia was in need of support from both the US and the USSR. On the domestic front there were three major forces: Communist, Muslims and Nationalist. The Communist preffered a pro-Moscow foreign policy, the Islamic parties wanted a pro US policy, The Nationalist wanted an independent foreign policy. Under these circumstances Indonesian government realised an "independent and active foreign policy" alone would bring about some sort of a national consensus.
the Federal System was established, this constitution was later called the 1950 constitution. This agreement was ratified by the Central Indonesian National Committee on 14th December 1949. The queen of Netherland's signature on 27th December 1949 gave legal status to the Republic of Indonesia. Thus legally speaking Indonesia got her independence only on 27th December 1949. Indonesia was officially accepted as the 16th member of the UN on 28 September 1950.\textsuperscript{13}

After Independence the major objective of Indonesian foreign policy was the re-integration of West-Irian. At the round table conference held at the Hague in 1949 the Dutch had agreed to negotiate the issue of West Irian with Indonesia by the end of 1950. In the issue of West-Irian, Indonesia no longer had the support of some countries that had previously supported Indonesia in her struggle for independence against the Dutch for example Australia.

Indonesia first tried to solve the West Irian issue with the Dutch bilaterally. In August 1950, Mohammed Natsir of Masjumi succeeded Mohammed Hatta as Prime Minister. His Foreign Minister was Mohammad Rum who had

\textsuperscript{13} Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Op. Cit., pp.34, 67 and 71.
played an important role in the negotiations with the Dutch and was the first High Commissioner to Netherlands. 14

The foreign policy approach of Natsir were similar to Hatta. He preferred a bilateral approach with the Dutch on West-Irian issue and refused to make West-Irian issue a matter of urgency. In March 1951 Natsir resigned, he was criticised for his approach on West-Irian issue. He was replaced by Dr. Sukiman Wirjo Sanjoyo another masjumi leader as Prime Minister. 15 Dr. Sukiman's Foreign Minister was Achmad Subardjo, who observed:

"Geo politically, Indonesia Set astride (Sic) at the cross road of South East Asia and forms a common meeting ground for the differing and perhaps conflicting interests that encompass us; It is to our interest and that of our neighbours that we refuse to take sides with this or that nation or group of nations—except in the interest of international peace and understanding— and keep ourselves clear of all entangling alliances directed against third parties." 16

Inspite of his observations it was Achmad Subdarjo who gave a dent to the Indonesian "Independent and active"

foreign policy principle. In January 1952, Foreign Minister Achmad Subdarjo and the US Ambassador in Jakarta, Merle Cochran signed an agreement on economic and military assistance, to be given by the United States of America (US). However, the government was obliged to accept the economic and military aid under the rules of lines of US Mutual Security Act of October 1951 which stated that a state accepting military assistance must contribute fully "to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength of the free world". The conditions of the US Mutual Security act were against the Indonesian policy of Active and Independent foreign policy. At this time, the Dutch had passed a constitutional amendment incorporating the territory of West-Irian into the Netherlands Kingdom. The government of Sukiman was forced to resign in February 1952 due to the above two factors.

Sukiman was replaced by the Partai Nationale Indonesia (PNI) leader Mr. Wilopo in April 1952 as the Prime Minister. Wilopo expressed the view that foreign policy was based on


18. For the essence of the act see Alexander Lavrentyev, USA and Asia, Sterling Publications Private Limited, New Delhi, 1982, p.16.

internal conditions. He said that the commitments or consequences resulting from Indonesia's foreign relations should not be such things which result in trouble in Indonesia's internal atmosphere. This indicated his sensitive understanding of foreign policy. Wilopo replaced the terms of the Achmad Subdarjo and Cochran Agreement which were earlier in line with the US Mutual Security Act of October 1951. This agreement with changed terms of reference was ultimately concluded in January 1953. This Wilopo government resigned at the beginning of June 1953.20

The important factors that influenced the Indonesian foreign policy and the governments during the 1955's were the West-Irian issue and adherence to the "Independent and active" foreign policy principle. This "independent and active" foreign policy principle was the result of both internal and external factors. The desire to achieve equality with the Western states and to resist new dominations was dear not only to the public but also to the national leaders, who saw the cold war alliances as new devices through which the older and powerful countries wanted to dominate the new countries. As Hatta has written:

20. Ibid., p.34.
"Nations that have recently become independent are strongly influenced by national sentiment and felt the need to maintain their self-respect. The memory of colonial status that bound them for centuries makes them resist anything they consider an attempt to colonize them again whether by economic or ideological domination. This Psychological factor profoundly influences Indonesia in her insistence upon an independent policy."

There was a further elaboration of Indonesia's independent—and active foreign policy by Hatta, according to him the three primary objectives of Indonesia's foreign policy were (a) to defend the freedom of the people and guard the security of the state; (b) to obtain from overseas those articles of daily necessity required for increasing the standard of living of the people...; and (c) to obtain capital equipment to rebuild, reconstruct and industrialise the country. He said that Indonesia's independent and active policy "Keep her from enmity with either party, preserve her from the damage to her own interests that would follow from taking sides and permits her to be friends with all nations on the basis of mutual respect." Hatta also stated that "Indonesia plays no favorites between the two opposed blocs and follows its own path through the various

international problems".22

Ali Sastroamidjojo, a PNI leader, succeeded Wilopo as Prime Minister in August 1953. Ali Sastroamidjojo recognising the emerging Afro-Asian group solidarity wanted to become a leader of the Afro-Asian Nations and pursued a vigorous foreign policy and wanted to gain for Indonesia a position of leadership among the newly independent nations "anti-colonial movement".

Thus Ali Sastroamidjojo in a statement to the House of Representatives in August 1953 stated that his government was convinced that close co-operation among Afro-Asian countries will strengthen the endeavours to achieve everlasting world peace, and therefore the Indonesian government considered co-operation with those countries as very important.23

Earlier Indonesia itself was a beneficiary of this anti-colonial approach of the newly independent countries. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that on January 1949 under India's initiative a conference of Asian Nations met in New Delhi to express support to the cause of Indonesian

22. Ibid., p.445.
Independence where Jawaharlal Nehru the then Indian Prime Minister stated that the Dutch action in Indonesia as the most naked and unabashed aggression.24

Ali Sastroamidjojo's endeavour was fully supported by the PKI under Aidit. The alliance between the PNI and PKI, which began with Ali Sastroamidjojo started the process of a new polarization of forces within Indonesia which was of important significance.

The post-Stalin changes in the Soviet foreign policy and the PKI's support to the Indonesian government brought about an improvement in relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union, embassies were opened between the two countries in 1954. This betterment in relations between Indonesia and Soviet Union was treated with suspicion by the U.S. Secretary of state John Foster Dulles. The Debacle of the French in Dien Bien Phu and the conclusion of the armistice agreements at Geneva on 20th July 1954 compelled the U.S. Government to sign a Southeast Asia collective Defence Treaty with Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and United Kingdom in a conference held at Manila in September 1954.25


This treaty, which subsequently became the SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) with Bangkok as its headquarters, was bitterly denounced by Indonesia and India. SEATO gave Ali Sastroamidjojo an opportunity to gain for his country a position of leadership in the anti-colonial movement of the Afro-Asian countries.

The Foreign policy of Ali Sastroamidjojo was aimed at re-integrating West-Irian with Indonesia. Ali Sastroamidjojo aside from continuing with efforts to seek a bilateral solution with the Dutch, he brought the West-Irian issue into the UN forum to exert influence over international public opinion, for this Indonesia needed the support of the newly independent Afro-Asian countries in the UN. Hence Ali Sastroamidjojo stressed the importance of co-operation among the Afro-Asian countries. Anti-colonialism was a common feature in the foreign policies of almost all the Afro-Asian countries, and Indonesia tried to rally these countries under the banner of anti-colonialism. The force of Afro-Asians gained strength as more and more countries of Asia and Africa gained Independence. Ali Sastroamidjojo wanted to give this force an institutional form, as Afro-Asian group was already formed at the UN, but this was not considered adequate for the purpose. In the first Colombo conference of the Prime Ministers of the five Asian
countries - Indonesia, India, Burma, Pakistan and Ceylon held in April 1954, at Colombo, the Indonesian premier Ali Sastroamidjojo proposed to hold an Afro-Asian conference. This proposal was accepted by other members and Ali Sastroamidjojo was asked to explore the possibility of holding such a conference.\(^{26}\)

The Colombo conference was a great triumph for Ali Sastroamidjojo. It gave him the opportunity of entering into extensive communications with different countries of Asia and Africa and this assured for Indonesia a position of leadership among the Afro-Asian countries. In September 1954 Ali Sastroamidjojo came to New Delhi to discuss the problem of the proposed Afro-Asian conference with Jawaharlal Nehru and found him extremely enthusiastic about it.

The five Asian Prime Ministers met at Bogor in Indonesia on 28 and 29 November 1954 and made detailed preparations about the conference in Bandung in a mountain resort in the western part of Java. Jawaharlal Nehru's suggestion to invite the People's Republic of China was accepted by Indonesia though it was opposed by Pakistan.\(^{27}\)


27. Kirdi Dipoyudo, Loc. Cit., p.477
The Bandung Conference of April 1955 (18 April to 24 April) under the Chairmanship of Ali Sastroamidjojo gave Indonesia the position of leadership in the anti-colonial movement of the Afro-Asian countries. The conference was attended by twenty nine countries of Asia and Africa and henceforth Bandung become a symbol of Afro-Asian unity.

"As for Indonesia the very fact that a conference of African and Asian nations had been held at Bandung on the clear initiative of Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo had enhanced Indonesia's prestige abroad." 29

Anti-colonialism which Indonesia inherited from her freedom movement and which remained the corner-stone of her foreign policy, was brought into prominence by President Sukarno in his opening address to the conference. He said:

"We are often told colonialism is dead, let us not be deceived or even soothed by that, say to colonialism is not dead. How can we say it is dead so long as vast areas of Asia and Africa are unfree. And, I beg of you do not think of colonialism only in the classic form

28. The Bandung Conference was attended by 29 countries (23 from Asia and 6 from Africa). These countries are Afghanistan, Burma, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Cambodia, China, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Philippines, Ceylon, South Vietnam, Japan, Egypt, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Sudan and Ethiopia.

which we of Indonesia and our brothers in indifferent parts of Asia and Africa know colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation".  

At the conference the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru advocated five principles (panchsheel) to be followed in interstate relations, these five principles were first (i) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (ii) Mutual non-aggression, (iii) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (iv) Equality and mutual benefit and (v) Peaceful co-existence. Though Jawaharlal Nehru played a remarkable role in the conference, his conspicuous paternalism resulted in a cooling of relations between Indonesia and India. And henceforth Indonesia tried to lead the Afro-Asian movement.

The Bandung conference supplied a solid foundation for Sino-Indonesian friendship on the one side and the PKI-PNI alliance on the other hand the impact of both on the political developments of Indonesia was of crucial nature.


The participating nations of the Afro-Asian conference agreed upon a resolution supporting West-Irian's re-integration into Indonesia, the members agreed that they would side with Indonesia in debate on the issue of West-Irian due to be held in the General Assembly of the UN.\textsuperscript{33}

In the backdrop of Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) which was formed in September 1954 at Manila, the joint communique of the Afro-Asian conference, appealed to all countries in the world to jointly make effort to attain world peace.\textsuperscript{34} This communique was in line with the Indonesian foreign policy's principle (of "Independent" and "active"), active in the sense working energetically for the preservation of world peace through endeavours supported by majority of the members of the UN as expounded by Mohammed Hatta the Vice-President of Indonesia in the American journal of foreign affairs in April 1953.\textsuperscript{35}

Burhanuddin Harahap of the Masjumi Party became the next Prime Minister after Ali Sastroamidjojo's government fell from office in August 1955. Burhanuddin also took the West-Irian issue to the UN. Burhanuddin's foreign policy


\textsuperscript{34} Roeslon Abdulgani, \textit{The Bandung Connection}, Guhung Agung, Jakarta, 1980, p.204.

objective was to improve relations with Western States including Australia which had openly opposed the Indonesia's claim of West-Irian. Burhanuddin's Foreign Minister was Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung who resumed negotiations with the Dutch on the West-Irian dispute. Burhanuddin faced the domestic opposition within the cabinet; he faced dissension and the open opposition of Sukarno over the conciliatory approach to the Western States and the resumption of negotiations with the Dutch.36

The Foreign Minister Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung started the negotiations in Hague in December 1955. In January 1956, an interim agreement was reached over dissolving the Union between Indonesia and Netherlands but no progress was made on the West-Irian dispute. This resulted in the intensification of domestic opposition to the negotiation with the Dutch. On February 13, 1956 the Indonesian government unilaterally withdrew from the Netherland-Indonesian Union. Burhanuddin, with some difficulty, secured the passage of the Bill abrogating the Union through the Parliament, but was obliged to give up office in early March 1956.37


In September 1956 general elections were held in Indonesia, no absolute majority was obtained by any party. This resulted in another coalition government of Ali Sastroamidjojo. Ali was appointed as the Prime Minister for the second time in 1956. The government made formal provision for the flow of foreign capital during the first year's economic plan promulgated in October 1956. The regional rebellions of 1957 in the outer islands caused the downfall of the second Ali government. On 14 March 1957, Ali Sastroamidjojo submitted his government's resignation.\(^{38}\)

In the wake of regional rebellions Sukarno proclaimed a nationwide state of emergency to control the rebellions in Indonesia. The armed forces central command supported Sukarno's call of emergency, the armed forces loyal to President Sukarno that was loyal to the Republic government crushed the regional rebellions by the start of 1958. The main reasons for the regional rebellion were (i) the growing economic disparity between Java and the outer regions. Most export produce of Indonesia were from the outer regions but in return they got little from the central government in Java; (ii) in July 1956, Vice-President Mohammad Hatta had resigned from his post. He was regarded as the

representative of non-Javanese interests and his resignation from the office caused concern in the outer islands. During this period of 1957-1958, the US was more inclined to the cause of the rebels and its stand on West-Irian dispute resulted in deteriorating relations with Indonesia.\(^{39}\)

Earlier on 21 February 1957 Sukarno had made a public statement in which he expressed the view that liberal democracy was alien to Indonesian values and culture and was responsible for the problems faced by Indonesia. This Konsepi or formula suggested the introduction of an alternate political system in tune with the spirit of Indonesian people.

On 8th April 1957 Dr. Djuanda Kartawidjaya succeeded Ali Sastroamidjojo as the Prime Minister of Indonesia. Dr. Djuanda headed an extra-Parliamentary Business Cabinet (Karya Kabinet) which was established by presidential decree of Sukarno.\(^{40}\) Dr. Subandrio who had earlier worked as Ambassador in London and Moscow and as Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, was appointed as the Foreign Minister by Dr. Djuanda. President Sukarno who became the main

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centre of power after the 8th April 1957 presidential decree establishing the business cabinet, started actively participating in foreign affairs. Earlier in 1956 in an effort to challenge the parliamentary political system which denied him constitutional power President Sukarno began to assert himself in foreign policy, in 1956 Sukarno had made an extended overseas trip to US, Western Europe, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and China. On September 1956 in Moscow Sukarno had taken the initiative in inspiring a joint communiqué signed by Foreign Minister Ruslon Abdulgani (of the second Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet which resigned on 14 March 1957) and the Soviet Foreign Minister. This joint communiqué was signed without the knowledge of the Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo. This propensity of personal initiative in foreign policy of Sukarno increased with the break down of parliamentary system.41

The West-Irian dispute was debated for the fourth time in the UN General Assembly in the month of November 1957. The third Indonesian initiative in the preceding February had failed. The draft resolution brought by Indonesia in the twelfth session of the UN General Assembly failed to

secure the two-thirds majority needed on 29 November 1957.\textsuperscript{42} On 30th November an unsuccessful attempt was made on the life of President Sukarno. These two events had serious consequences on the politics of Indonesia. The Prime Minister Djuanda brought all Dutch-owned enterprises under government control. More than 30,000 Dutch nationals emigrated from Indonesia, there was fierce anti-Dutch feeling among the Indonesian public. The Indonesian government started the systematic nationalization of all enterprises owned by the Dutch.\textsuperscript{43}.

International attitudes towards the West-Irian dispute became hardened because of the reactions in Indonesia, but Jakarta did not abandon its course. The Foreign Minister Subandrio stated that Indonesia was still prepared for a solution through negotiations with the Dutch, but added if no solution was reached through negotiation, Indonesia will feel compelled to embark upon a policy of preventing the development of Dutch interests in Indonesia, in the hope that this action may pressurise the Dutch government to take a wiser attitude on the West-Irian issue. On 13 December 1957 Prime Minister of Indonesia proclaimed the Archipelago

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p.110.

doctrine. Indonesia extended the breadth of territorial waters to twelve miles and also maintained that all waters, surrounding and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesian state, regardless of their extension of breadth, are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and, therefore, parts of the internal or national waters which are under the exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian state. 44

This archipelago doctrine claimed the same quality of sovereign jurisdiction over waters surrounding and intersecting the island territory of government of Indonesia as in the case of territorial waters. This formula was advocated by Mochtar Kusumaatmadja a young lawyer who twenty years later became the Foreign Minister of Indonesia.

This claim was influenced by the threat to the integrity of the state, which was threatened by regional rebellion in Sumatra, Molocus and Celebes islands. The extent of external involvement in these rebellions resulted in suspicion of western intent and vindicated the government’s commitment to Wawasan Nusantara (Archipelago outlook), which was reaffirmed by Sukarno by a presidential


The second general elections which was scheduled to be held in September 1959 was postponed by Prime Minister Djuanda on 22nd September 1959. The Djuanda government was criticised by its opponents who blamed it for the following basic problems faced by the country, (i) lack of economic development; (ii) non-improvement of the Food situation and various other issues. On 26 June 1958 Sukarno reshuffled the "Karya-Kabinet" of Djunanda amidst domestic pressures.\footnote{See Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics 1955-59 : The Emergence of Guided Democracy, K.P. Bagchi and Company, New Delhi, 1981, p.226.} Subandrio was retained as the Foreign Minister and President Sukarno assumed personal control over foreign policy; Subandrio echoed his leader Sukarno's voice in foreign policy issues.

Earlier on 22 April 1959 Sukarno had addressed a special session of the constituent assembly and appealed to the members to accept the 1945 Republican Constitution. Sukarno argued that if the 1945 Constitution was reintroduced the country would become stable and progress economically. He further stated that the Indonesian
revolution was not yet complete and the return to the 1945 Constitution would complete the national revolution. The constituent assembly rejected the President's appeal. On 5 July 1959, President Sukarno abolished the constituent assembly by a presidential decree and proclaimed the return to the 1945 Constitution. On 6th July Djuanda returned his mandate to the President. On 9th July the President formed a new cabinet called Kabinet Kardja and assumed the functions of both the head of state and government; he also assumed the office of Prime Minister. Subandrio was retained as the Foreign Minister, but he was little more than his master's voice. Henceforth, Sukarno took a monopolistic control over foreign policy. The "Independent" and "Active" foreign policy principle of Indonesia under went a change. This can be clearly inferred from the contents of the speech given by President Sukarno on September 30, 1960 before the UN General Assembly entitled "To Build the World Anew". In that speech though Sukarno did not abandon the Independent and active non-

47. Ibid., pp.252 and 253.

48. Ibid., p.258.

aligned principle and that of peaceful co-existence, he spoke on the need to build up the forces of the newly independent countries in an attempt to build a new world order, he said the prevailing world order was in favour of the Old Established Forces (here in after used as OLDEFOS) of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. He was of the opinion that OLDEFOS where exploiting the newly independent countries.  

He interpreted that the source of tension and problems in the world was not due to the cold war between the two super powers US and USSR, but because of the conflict between the new emerging forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of domination. Sukarno said that non-aligned countries must allay themselves with the new emerging forces that were challenging the imperialist colonialist order. With this radical ideology of Sukarno the "Independent" and "Active" (non-aligned) foreign policy of Indonesia gradually assumed a distinct tilt towards the socialist bloc.


President Sukarno during the guided democracy period was full of enthusiasm and zeal to convene a Second Afro-Asian conference, but his zeal was not shared by many Asian countries. In particular, the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru questioned the wisdom of holding such a conference again. But not all Asian and African nations shared the opinion of Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru. The Chinese government supported President Sukarno’s contention that a Second Afro-Asian conference should be convened. Thus when the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshall Chen Ji, visited Indonesia in April 1961, in a joint statement with Sukarno he stated that it was very necessary to convene a Second Afro-Asian conference in the shortest possible time.53

President Sukarno was determined to make the presence of Indonesia as a world power and aimed to emerge as the leader of the newly emerging independent Afro-Asian nations. For this Sukarno was determined to hold a second Afro-Asian conference; however, the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was not in favour of a second Afro-Asian conference where China would be a participant, because of the deteriorating Sino-Indian relations. Thus a second Afro-Asian Conference has not materialised. Jawaharlal Nehru

however agreed hesitantly to join the non-aligned conference - from which China would naturally be excluded - when it was proposed by Tito of Yugoslavia and President Nasser of the United Arab Republic (Egypt).  

President Sukarno, however welcomed the proposal enthusiastically and informed President Tito and President Nasser that Indonesia could be included among the sponsoring countries of the conference. President Sukarno’s main concern was to find an adequate forum in which he could introduce to the world his new conception of foreign policy and to express his views on the problems of the world.  

The conference of Head of States or Government, of twenty five non-aligned countries was held at Belgrade, Yugoslavia from 1 to 6 September 1961. President Sukarno was determined to win for his country a position of leadership in the conference and to impress the members with his theory of anti-colonial struggle. Indian Prime Minister, K. P. Misra (ed.), *Non-Alignment Frontiers and Dynamics*, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982, p.279.

The emergence of Non-Alignment movement could be traced to Asian Relations conference convened by the Indian Council of World Affairs, under the initiative of Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi (March 1947) and the conference of Asian Nations in New Delhi (January 1949).
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru also attended the conference. In this conference the two leaders were struggling for Mastery (viz., President Sukarno of Indonesia and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru). Sukarno stood for a militant anti-colonial policy in alliance with the communists. According to Sukarno the main purpose of the conference was to organise the anti-colonial forces and give the anti-colonial movement a new direction. But Nehru was of the opinion that the main purpose of the non-aligned conference was not to side with any power bloc and they should use their influence to bring the super powers to the negotiation table for the maintenance of peace. Nehru was of the opinion that the common interest of all the non-aligned nations lay in the promotion of peace.57

The members of the conference were however impressed by the romantic appeal of anti-colonialism than by the call of peace. The Belgrade conference was a great success for Sukarno. It was a success not with reference to any concrete gain for Indonesia, but from the point of view of prestige and glory. President Sukarno was acknowledged by a large number of nations as a great exponent of the anti-

colonial struggle. His ideas about the confrontation between the new emerging forces and the old established forces were accepted in the conference Declaration.\textsuperscript{58}

After the success of Belgrade, it had become a habit of President Sukarno to express on every available occasion his desire for another conference a second Belgrade. Sukarno's assumption of the role of leader of the Afro-Asian nations, and his drive to propagate the doctrine of the new emerging forces versus the old established forces of domination and exploitation as the principle which should underline the foreign policy of all non-aligned countries made him to put forward the idea of second Belgrade at every opportunity.\textsuperscript{59}

Sukarno was eager to project Indonesia as a crusader of the Afro-Asian struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Nevertheless Sukarno for the time being considered non-alignment meaningful for world peace. This was evident from his willingness to become a non-aligned emissary carrying the Belgrade conference statement on the Danger of war and peace to Washington.\textsuperscript{60}

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\textsuperscript{60} The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, September 1-6, Belgrade, 1961, pp.25-39.
\end{flushleft}
Ironically in fact, at this stage Indonesia was seeking a change in the US attitude of neutrality on the West Irian issue to one of active support for it against the Dutch. The change in the tone and temper of Indonesian foreign policy went hand in hand with a militaristic attitude on the West Irian issue. Sukarno’s West Irian policy was a mixture of threats to use force and offers to hold negotiations on Indonesian terms. US perceived that the Indonesian-Dutch tension over West Irian could lead to a situation of hot war in Southeast Asia and hence it changed its neutral posture and intervened and solved the West Irian issue to the satisfaction of Indonesia. Thus US pressure on the Dutch finally paved the way for the resumption of Indonesian-Dutch negotiations and the signing of the New York agreement of 15 August 1962. Thus Sukarno declared 1962 "A year of Triumph".61

Soon after the settlement of West Irian Problem, Sukarno Plunged Indonesia into another problem that is confrontation with Malaysia. Sukarno opposed the Federation of Malaysia because be viewed it as a manifestation of British neo-colonialism. The federation of Malaysia by the merger of Federation of Malaya with the three British crown

colonies of Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei (which was ruled by a Sultan on the advise of the British High Commissioner).

Initially he did not oppose the proposal for the Formation of Malaysia when it was announced by Malaya’s Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman on 27 May 1961, this can be clearly evidenced from the different statements of her national leaders. For example, Dr. Subandrio the then foreign minister of Indonesia in November 1961 in a letter to the New York Times wished the Malayan government well if it can succeed in this plan. Also Dr. Subandrio in the sixteenth General Assembly session of the UN on 9 November 1961, expressed his sympathetic attitude towards the Formation of Malaysia by stating that "... it should be noted that Indonesians are racially very closely related to the people of Malaya and the Philippines ... I assure you that from the Indonesian side there have never been any territorial claims whatsoever towards Malaya nor towards the Philippines".


Thus the early non objection to the Federation of Malaysia plan was reversed after the outbreak of a rebellion in Brunei on 8 December 1962. The rebellion was mounted by supporters of the Partai Ra’ayat (People’s Party) and its leader was A.M. Azohari who had taken part in Indonesia’s national independence movement. He still retained some political associations with the Republic. The party Ra’ayat opposed the merger of Brunei into the Federation of Malaysia and advocated the formation of an Independent state of Kalimantan Utara (North Borneo). This rebellion spilled over into adjacent Sarawak and Sabah British crown colonies in the island of Borneo. This rebellion attracted a sympathetic public response from within Indonesia. In an answer to the events in the Sultanate of Brunei and the British colonies of Sarawak and Sabah, Sukarno stated that what was taking place in Northern Borneo could not be separated from the movement of the Newly emerging forces.65 Sukarno viewed the proposal of Formation of Malaysia as nothing but a British neo-colonialist manifestation. He took the proposal in the perspective of his theory of world conflict between the OLDEFOS and Newly Emerging Forces (herein after used as NEFOS) and therefore opposed it. He stated he opposed the Formation of Malaysia because it was a

neo-colonialist manifestation and he did not want neo-
colonialism near Indonesia. On 20 January 1963 the
Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio publicly stated
the term confrontation to define Indonesia's policy towards
Malaysia, Sukarno also reaffirmed that Indonesia would carry
out a policy of confrontation with Malaysia. Sukarno was
supported by both the PKI and the Army in his stand against
Malaysia.

On 16 September 1963 the Federation of Malaysia was
proclaimed, Indonesia along with Philippines did not
recognise the Federation of Malaysia and as a protest
Malaysia severed her diplomatic relations with both
Indonesia and the Philippines. The confrontation resulted
in the straining of relations between Indonesia and the
western powers especially US. The Indonesian relations
with the US reached its lowest ebb after the publication
of the Tenku Abdul Rahman - Johnson statement in 1963 in

66. See J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesian-
Malaysia Dispute 1965-1966, Kuala Lumpur, 1974 for a
full account of the origins of the Malaysia issue and
its development.

67. For details see Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's
Confrontation of Malaysia: The Search for Motives", in
Asian Survey, Vol.IV, No.6, June, 1964, pp.904-913; and
M. Hatta, "One Indonesian view of the Malaysian issue",
which the US government unequivocally stated that it would support Malaysia in its stand against Indonesia. Indonesia’s confrontation with Malaysia resulted in the cancellation of all western aid commitments to her, the Indonesian economy was affected due to this. 68

The large military expenditure to promote the crush Malaysia programme caused corresponding increase in budget deficit. Also the Severance of Indonesia’s trade relations with Malaysia and Singapore caused a further decline in the country’s export earnings. Indonesia’s attempted diversion of the export trade route from Singapore and Malaysia, requiring different routes for ships, caused considerable expenditure. The quantum of money supply continued to increase resulting in an high inflation. The foreign exchange reserve was completely exhausted and exports declined to an all time low level. 69

**External support and opposition to Indonesia’s "Crush (Gajang) Malaysia" policy.**

USSR (Russia) gave only grudging support to Indonesia that too it gave only because it felt China’s influence was


increasing in Indonesia with the PKI reversing its previous pro-Moscow stance and establishing close links with China.\textsuperscript{70} The PKI criticised the Soviet Union in 1964 for not supporting Indonesia in her confrontation with Malaysia.

Hence in June 1964 the Soviet government sent Mikoyan the then Soviet Deputy Prime Minister to Jakarta to sort out the misunderstanding between Indonesia and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{71} Mikoyan and the Indonesia Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio issued a joint statement in Jakarta in which the Soviet Union’s support for the government of Indonesia was expressed, also an increase on Soviet military aid to Indonesia was promised. In October 1964 Dr. Subandrio visited Moscow and during his visit a military aid to Indonesia was expressed, also an increase on Soviet military aid to Indonesia was promised. In October 1964 Dr. Subandrio visited Moscow and during his visit a military agreement was signed.\textsuperscript{72} The Soviet Union also vetoed the Norwegian resolution branding Indonesia as an aggressor in the September 1964 session of the Security Council for its


\textsuperscript{71} Peter Boyce, \textit{Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy}, Sydney University Press, Sydney,1983, p.249.

confrontation policy towards Malaysia.\textsuperscript{73}

Philippines: The only other active supporter for Indonesia apart from China in its confrontation policy towards Malaysia was Philippines.

Though Philippines supported Indonesia in its confrontation policy against Malaysia, it also made efforts to sort out the difference between Indonesia and Malaysia.

On the initiative of President Macapagal of the Philippines, President Sukarno of Indonesia and Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaya met in Tokyo on 31 May 1963. After the conference, in a joint statement issued by the two leaders President Sukarno and Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaya expressed the hope that they would be able to solve their present problems peacefully and restore the relationship between the two countries to the level of year 1959 when the treaty of friendship between Malaya and Indonesia was signed. The two statesman also stated that in order to find out a method for the resolution of the present conflict, a meeting of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaya and Philippines would be held on 7 June.

\textsuperscript{73} UNSCOR, 1145th meeting, 10 September 1964, Doc. S/Pv.1145
The foreign ministers of the three states met in Manila from 7 to 11 June 1963 and adopted an important document known as the Manila Accord. They accepted President Macapagal's proposal for a loose confederation between Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines, without any country surrendering any portion of its sovereignty. This proposed confederation between Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia came to be known as Maphilindo. The three foreign ministers also recommended that a Summit meeting of the heads of the three government should be held by the end of July 1963.

The Manila Summit meeting was held from 30 July 1963 to 5 August 1963. The Summit meeting resulted in two important documents- the Manila Declaration and the Joint statement. In the Summit meeting the leaders Sukarno, Macapagal and Tunku Abdul Rahman accepted the Manila accord principle regarding the ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Sarawak and Sabah for the formation of Malaysia, by the UN Secretary General or by his representative prior to the formation of Malaysia.

The UN team, under Michelmore, arrived in Sarawak on 16 August 1963, though the Indonesian and Philippine observers

74. For details of the Manila accord see Appendix-2, G.P. Bhattacharjee, South East Asian Politics: Malaysia and Indonesia, Minerva Publishers, Calcutta, 1976.
75. Ibid., Appendix 3 and 4.
did not arrive before 1 September 1963, owing to a controversy about their number and role. The report of the UN mission was favourable for Malaysia and it was announced by the Secretary General on 14 September 1963. The UN report stated that a sizeable majority of the people of Sarawak and Sabah wanted to join Malaysia. But before this announcement was made, Tunku Abdul Rahman declared on 29 August that Malaysia would be formed on 16 September 1963. President Sukarno became furious at this announcement, which was in clear violation of the Manila Summit agreement. Hence on 15 September Indonesia announced that she does not recognise Malaysia, and Indonesian ambassador to Kuala Lumpur General G.P.H. Djati Kusomo, was recalled on 16 September, and henceforth Indonesian confrontation of Malaysia became more harsh.

United States: Had a sympathetic attitude towards the concept of Malaysia and opposed the Gajang Malaysia policy of Indonesia, though US had few contacts with Malaysia in 1963. When anti-British and anti-Malaysian mob violence broke out in Jakarta after the proclamation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963 President Kennedy of US strongly protested against the outbreak of violence in Indonesia.76

Yet the US did not want to completely isolate Indonesia and leave it to the clutches of China, which for its own interests was supporting and encouraging Indonesia against Malaysia. In January 1964 the US took an initiative to solve this matter peacefully, so the US Attorney-General Robert Kennedy visited Tokyo, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Jakarta and London. But this mission failed inspite of the note sent by the President of US to President Sukarno of Indonesia stating that the main obstacle for the development of friendly relations between US and Indonesia was Indonesia's policy toward Malaysia.\textsuperscript{77}

President Sukarno of Indonesia inspite of all this efforts did not change his extreme attitude towards Malaysia. Hence on 24 March 1964 the US Secretary of state announced that the US government had decided to stop giving any further aid to Indonesia. The International Monetary fund also withdrew its pledged aid of $ 50 million credit to Indonesia. The relations between US and Indonesia soured further after a speech by President Sukarno in a public meeting in the presence of US ambassador to Indonesia. In his speech Sukarno asked the Americans to go to hell with

their aid. On 10 September 1964 the US representative to the UN, Mr. Adlai Stevenson in his speech before the Security Council condemned Indonesia and asked her to stop its confrontation policy against Malaysia.

As the tension increased in the Malacca Straits, the US government extended the patrol activities of the US seventh fleet in Indian Ocean. President Sukarno considered this act of US as a threat to Indonesia. In response to this Sukarno in his characteristic fashion announced that the Indian Ocean should hence forth be called Indonesian Ocean. In December 1964 Malaysia was elected as a non-permanent (temporary) member of the UN Security Council. President Sukarno felt insulted by this incident and hence in January 1965 Indonesia left the UN and all its agencies including International Monetary Fund (IMF) in protest. The relations between US and Indonesia continued its downward trend. Thus in the beginning of 1965 serious demonstrations took place in Jakarta and other cities of Indonesia against US. Consequently the US Information Service closed all its libraries and reading rooms attached to it in Jakarta and other cities of Indonesia. The Indonesian government took


79. UNSCOR, 1145 meeting, 1964, Col.27.
over the management of all rubber plantations owned by Americans in Indonesia. The US government felt that it had to do something to arrest the downward trend in its relations with Indonesia. Hence in April 1965 it sent Ellsworth Bunker to bring about some improvement in its relations with Indonesia. Earlier Ellsworth Bunker had played an important role in resolving the West Irian dispute between the Dutch and Indonesia, but this second mission of Ellsworth Bunker was a complete failure. President Sukarno was in no mood to change his intransigent attitude towards US or Malaysia.

Britain: In September 1945, just after two weeks after the Japanese surrender the British forces regained the control of Malaya and the British territories of North Borneo and the Singapore island. Britain after giving independence to India in 1947, felt that it was better for her to give Independence to the British colonies in Southeast Asia also before the People of Southeast Asia themselves start agitating for Independence. Also Britain had become weak after the second world war and it was in no position to control her colonies forcefully.

Hence Britain wanted to give Independence to her possessions in Southeast Asia, but it did not want to give
Independence separately to Malay (Peninsular Malaysia), Singapore Island, Sarawak, Sabah and the Sultanate of Borneo. Because Britain felt that these small weak states would easily fall into communist hands or would be swallowed by neighbouring states, she wanted to create a Federation of all its five colonies and give independence to them, to be called as Malaysia. Britain gave Independence to Malaya on 31 August 1957.\textsuperscript{80} In July 1963 British initiated the London conference, and on the successful conclusion of the conference an agreement was signed on 9 July 1963 for the establishment of Malaysia. The agreement also provided for the transfer of British sovereignty in Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah to Malaysia on 31 August 1963.\textsuperscript{81}

Indonesia opposed this formation of Malaysia and Gajang (Crush) Malaysia Policy. Britain which had a defence agreement with Malaya and which was later extended to the whole of Malaysia, had no other way but to oppose Indonesia. Hence Britain started sending new forces, including Gurkha troops to defend Malaysia, especially Sarawak and Sabah.


\textsuperscript{81} The participants of the London conference include Britain, Independent Malaya and Representatives from the British colonies of Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei which had not yet gained independence.
Australia and New Zealand who were also associated with Britain in the Defence treaty of Malaysia also took a direct part in the struggle. The British forces stationed in Malaysia were purely defensive and they did not make any attempt to invade Indonesia. Though Britain did not sever diplomatic relations with Indonesia as Malaysia did, Britain did not take any diplomatic initiative to solve the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict.

CHINA: From the beginning of confrontation policy by Indonesia China unequivocally supported Indonesia. China perceived that Indonesia's extreme anticolonial and anti-western foreign policy was similar to her policy and thus encouraged and gave unstinted support to Indonesia for her Gajang Malaysia Policy. In April 1963 Liu Shao Chi, the Chinese Foreign Minister visited Jakarta and in a joint statement pledged that the government of the Republic Indonesia and the Chinese Government will give full support for the People of North Kalimantan (that is the province of Sarawak, Sabah and the Sultanate of Brunei) in their righteous struggle for the right of self-determination and independence and thus against the formation of Malaysia.82

On 4 November 1964, Sukarno went to Shanghai to hold bilateral talks with Chou Enlai, and on 27 November 1964, China's Foreign Minister and Vice-President Marshall Chen Yi paid a return visit to Indonesia. During his stay a joint Sino-Indonesia press release was issued. In this Chen Yi reaffirmed China's full support for Indonesia's confrontation policy with Malaysia.\(^{83}\) Marshall Chen Yi also offered a credit of hundred million dollars to Indonesia. After the mutual good will visits of the dignitaries of the two countries, the Sino-Indonesian relationship had reached the point of almost de facto Beijing-Jakarta axis, correspondingly Indonesia's internal tension was further heightened by PKI's demand for forming a peasants and workers militia to be known as the fifth force. PKI Chairman Aidit stated that the fifth force would mobilise fifteen million armed citizens for defending Indonesia in the event of an emergency. In May 1965 Piengchan the Chinese communist party politbureau member led the Chinese delegations visit to Indonesia on the forty fifth anniversary of the PKI. In a speech Piengchen praised

the PKI leadership, for its creative and correct policies and its demand for the fifth force he also stated that even more excellent accomplishments lay ahead for the PKI. Thus the Chinese support for Indonesia in its confrontation with Malaysia was taken advantage by the PKI, with the covert support of the Chinese communist party, it tried to upset the status quo in its struggle with the Indonesian army.

The coup attempt on 30 September 1965 allegedly by the PKI brought the Army to power. By dawn of 2 October 1965 the Army under the command of Major General Suharto suppressed the coup and on 15 October 1965, Sukarno under pressure from the Army appointed Suharto as the Army chief. 84 This action of Sukarno marked the end of guided democracy or the old order of Sukarno and heralded the beginning of the New Order led by Suharto.

84. For details of the coup and its origins see Justus M. Vander Kroef, Indonesia since Sukarno, Asia Pacific Press, Singapore, 1971, pp.1-17.