Unrelieved anxiety in modern life is a significant and pervasive problem. In fact, man has experienced anxiety as long as he has existed as a species. Nearly every individual meets with situations in which he feels tense and uncomfortable. Although anxiety can be stimulating at mild to moderate levels, most persons still find such tension to be distracting and discomforting. Most often anxiety has more serious and debilitating effects, not only mentally but physically as well. For example, many persons rely upon minor tranquillizers or alcohol to relieve anxiety which, though temporarily beneficial, can lead to serious accidents, chemical dependency or addiction.

Since 1950, experimental research on human anxiety has been facilitated by conceptual clarification of anxiety as a theoretical construct, and the appearance of a number of scales for measuring it. The intimate relationship between anxiety and psychopathology has spurred the research endeavours of psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, and the pervasive influence of anxiety on human behaviour has generated comparable empirical effort among learned theorists and other medical, social and behavioural scientists.

The major source of contention among psychologists, psychiatrists, counsellors, clinicians, medical men and the
like has been the differentiation between Stress, Threat, Anxiety and the State-Trait distinction of Anxiety. An important reason for this diversity and conflict has been a failure to specify the contexts in which Stress and Anxiety are presumed to occur. It seems reasonable to assume that stress or anxiety depends on the personal salience of a given situation for an individual. Personal salience, in turn, is a product of those personality variables that shape perceptions of self and the world. From a cognitive perspective, stress can be understood in terms of a call for action, a person's awareness of the need to do something about a given state of affairs (Sarason & Sarason, 1981). Many anxious people describe themselves as being tense and feel that something terrible will happen, even though they cannot specify the cause of their reaction. Whether the situation is real or imagined, the anxious person's self-preoccupation interferes with an orderly task-oriented approach to situational requirements. It seems clear that an understanding of the effects of stress and the prediction of behaviour must take into account the individual's perceptions of both the nature of the situation and his or her ability to meet it (Magnusson, 1981; Magnusson & Stattin, 1982).

Anxiety is most commonly used in an empirical sense to denote a complex reaction or response - a transitory state
or condition of the organism that varies in intensity and fluctuates over time. But the term anxiety is also used to refer to a personality trait, to individual differences in the extent to which people are characterized by anxiety states and by prominent defenses against such states. The term "anxiety" when used to refer to a complex process, implies a sequence of cognitive, affective, and behavioural events which are evoked by some form of stress initiated by external or internal cues perceived or interpreted by the individual as threatening. Thus to develop a comprehensive and well-defined theory of anxiety, the concepts of anxiety as a transitory state, as a relatively stable personality trait, and as a complex cognitive-emotional process should be clarified (See Spielberger, 1966a, 1972b, 1975).

In describing (general) anxiety, Sarason (1980) refers to an individual seeing himself/herself as ineffective in handling a (task) situation which is seen as difficult, challenging or threatening. During this confrontation the individual focuses on undesirable consequences of personal inadequacy, whilst self-deprecatory preoccupations interfere with task relevant cognitions. Thus the individual expects and anticipates failure and loss of regard by others. This characterization conceptualizes anxiety as a cognitive-emotional state which is antecedent or concomitant to overt
behaviour. Anxiety results not simply from testing but from the threat of a test or grade coupled with uncertainty about what to do to achieve a good grade. Probably the greatest focus of student anxiety is the course examination. In an objective test there are undoubtedly many questions which are frustrating and anxiety-provoking to the average student. When some students who are already anxious come to take the test, the test items further contribute cumulatively to their anxiety and thus when they encounter an item they cannot answer, frustration and anxiety are aroused and affect their ability to answer later items (McKeachie, 1984).

The great amount of research done on the topic of test anxiety gives evidence of both its complex nature and of its interest for psychology and education. Many students regard examinations as highly threatening (e.g. Bigard & Guyot, 1980; Mechanic, 1978). Thus test anxiety is an important consequence of examination stress in student life. While anxiety in test situations may actually facilitate the performance of some students, most often it is disruptive and leads to performance decrements. When the characteristics of anxiety are linked to academic or evaluative situations, one refers to them as Test Anxiety. Topman and Jansen (1984) assert that the definitions of Test Anxiety have changed since the 1920's. Starting as a 'non-specific bodily response to stress' (Cannon, 1929), the
phenomenon has changed both in content and form. Through a general disturbance within the person which is a specific complaint by itself, and a bunch of needless cognitive processes, it is now being considered as inefficient coping with the test situation. Subsequently the treatment of test anxiety has also changed concurrently with its definition. Psycho-analysis, Systematic Desensitization, and Rational Cognitive Restructuring have paved the way for the current practising of 'test taking skills' or 'cognitive-coping skills'. Other descriptions more specific for examination conditions do incorporate behavioural consequences. According to Sieber (1980), "Test Anxiety is a special case of general anxiety. It refers to those phenomenological and behavioural responses that accompany concern about possible failure" (P.17). "Test Anxiety is usually defined as a set of responses to a class of stimuli that have been associated in the individual's experience of evaluation or testing" (P.18).

Approximately twenty years ago, the theory of State and Trait anxiety (e.g. Head & Lindsey, 1983; Hodapp, Laux & Spielberger, 1982; Spielberger, 1966; Spielberger, O'Neil & Hansen, 1972) was central to explaining the phenomenon of test anxiety, and was supplemented by drive theory propositions (Spence & Spence, 1966). More recently, cognitive components of test anxiety have gained precedence, recognized among

Attempts to understand the dynamics of test anxiety got well underway in the 1950's, when researchers undertook two fundamentally different types of approaches. The first of these was guided by the Hullian Motivational concept. Researchers in the Hullian tradition (e.g. Taylor,1953,1958) attempted to show that anxiety operates like any other source of drive to improve performance on easy tasks and impede it on difficult ones. When drive or arousal becomes too high behaviour becomes disorganized and performance impairments occur. The principal opposing view (e.g., Mandler & Sarason, 1952; Nicholson, 1958; Sarason,1959) attributed the performance deficit of the high anxious students to the quantity of their distracting thoughts under stress. The second orientation to the dynamics of test anxiety (which has emerged as dominant in recent years) is often referred to with the terms "cognitive" and "attentional" (See, Sarason,1975,1978,1984; Sarason & stoops, 1978; Wine,1971,1980,1982). This view holds that the
Impairments which result due to test anxiety are not because of disruptive over-motivation, but are based on maladaptive cognitive tendencies which are less or not present at all among the low test-anxious. The recent appearance of no less than six edited books on test anxiety within a five year period (Sarason, 1980a; Krohne & Laux, 1982) and especially the four volumes of Advances in Test Anxiety Theory and Research (See Ploeg, Schwarzer & Spielberger, 1983, 1984, 1985; Schwarzer, Ploeg & Spielberger, 1982) attests to the concern of psychologists with a situation that we all confront at least occasionally: evaluation by others.

During the past three decades the educational world has given increasing attention to stress and anxiety-related problems in school, college and university communities in the United States (e.g., Deffenbacher, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1984; Phillips 1978; Sarason, 1972, 1975, 1978, 1980, 1984; Spielberger, Anton & Bedell, 1976) and in Europe (e.g., Bierman, 1977; Depreeuw, 1984; Jerusalem, 1985; Vermeil, 1976). In most of these studies, the evaluation of academic performance has been a central topic. But turning towards the test, as Sharma and Rao (1983) observe, one is made aware, that research in test anxiety has been very scant in India. Of the few Indian studies investigating the relationship between test anxiety and performance, researchers have consistently demonstrated that the high test-anxious
Individuals perform more poorly than their low test-anxious counterparts in a variety of contexts, for example, in learning tasks (Mohsin, 1972, Nijhawan, 1972, Sharma & Sud, 1982; Verma & Nijhawan, 1976) and anagram solution tasks (Sud, S. 1983; Sud, A. 1984). In case of verbal or patellar reflex conditioning (Dixit & Sharma, 1971a, 1971b; Nagpal & Sen, 1976), the findings obtained are contradictory. The negative relationship between anxiety and academic achievement has also been reported by a few researchers in India (e.g., Grewal & Kaur, 1981; Mookerjee, Singh & Singh, 1982; Rahal, 1983; Rao, 1974; Sharma, 1978; Singh & Kumar, 1977; Vishnoi, 1975).

Among researchers in the West reporting the deleterious performance of the high test-anxious subject as compared to the low test-anxious, studies have been done in several areas, for example, in anagram solution tasks (Carver et al., 1983, Deffenbacher, 1978; Sarason, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1984; Scheier & Carver, 1982), aptitude tests (Deffenbacher, 1977, 1984; Deffenbacher & Hazaleus, 1985) digit symbol tests (Mueller, 1977; Paulman & Kennelly, 1984; Sarason, 1984), problem solving tasks (Covington, 1983), mathematic tests (Fox & Houston, 1983; Hendel, 1980; Plake, Ansorge, Parker & Lowry, 1982), learning tasks (Geen, 1976; Glanzmann & Laux, 1978) and academic achievement (Minsel & Schwarzer, 1983, Schwarzer, 1975). Furthermore, it is reported that the debilitating effects of test anxiety on performance are
vested in the upper range of intelligence only—within the subgroup of high intelligent children it makes a great difference between being anxious or not, whereas the difference is less marked in low intelligent groups (see Ploeg, 1984; Sharma & Rao, 1983a, 1983b). In contrast, others have reported that high-trait anxiety facilitates the performance of most able children (e.g., Sharma, Dang & Spielberger, 1985; Verma, 1973). Recently, Sud A. (1984) has found that the detrimental effects of test anxiety on difficult performance tasks was more evident among high test-anxious-high-cognitive capacity high school girls, rather than among their low test-anxious counterparts. Summarily, although few researchers have successfully denoted test anxiety X intelligence interactions, its exact relationship still remains unclear. Some researchers have also observed that response patterns vary with differences in sex and task difficulty (Jerusalem, 1985). Although it is frequently assumed that the relationship between anxiety and performance is monotonically negative, e.g., as anxiety increases, performance decreases (See Nijhawan, 1972; Ploeg, 1984; Sharma & Rao, 1983, 1984; Sharma & Sud, 1982; Verma & Nijhawan, 1976), in a number of investigations demonstrating negative correlations between anxiety and a variety of academic outcomes reviewed by Tyron (1980), it is asserted that test anxiety is only one of the many factors affecting academic achievement.
Deffenbacher (1978) assesses that the high-test-anxious are as capable as the low-test-anxious, and they do not lack ability; but experimental studies have shown (see Deffenbacher, 1978, 1980, 1984; Sarason, 1980, 1984; Sud, S. 1983) that the performance of the highly test-anxious varies as a function of evaluative stress. Evaluative stress tends to elicit some type of "state anxiety" or behaviour which interferes with the performance of the highly anxious. When evaluative stress is low, the highly-anxious perform as well as the low-anxious. However, under high evaluative stress they perform at levels lower than either the low-anxious or themselves when stress is low (see Sarason, 1961, 1972, 1973, 1980, 1984).

Some interesting research projects have also demonstrated that persons, high and low, in test anxiety display equivalent degrees of physiological arousal while anticipating and taking tests (Holroyd, Westbrook, Wolf & Badhorn, 1978; Hollandsworth, Glazeski, Kirkland, Jones & Van Norman, 1979). The arousal is not greater among the test-anxious than among those who are not test-anxious (See also Mahoney, 1979 for conceptually similar findings from a different behavioural dimension). Apparently, it is not arousal per se that makes the difference between these two kinds of persons. What, then, does make the difference? What specifically are the sources of interference? What is it that the highly-anxious do under high-stress that
the less anxious do not do when stress is reduced?

Experimental studies of test anxiety have provided evidence that cognitive interference is an important factor in lowering the performance of highly test-anxious people. Experiments by Deffenbacher (1978, 1980, 1984), Sarason (1978, 1980, 1984); and Sarason & Stoops (1978) demonstrate that under test-like conditions, high-test-anxious scorers, more so than the low or middle scorers, report being preoccupied with questions such as how poorly they are doing, how other people are doing, and what the examiner will think about them. Thus, highly test-anxious subjects in situations that pose test-like challenges not only perform poorly but display relatively high levels of task-irrelevant thoughts. In non-test or non-evaluative situations, groups with different test-anxiety levels show either small or no differences in performance, and cognitive interference. If this Cognitive Attentional interpretation of test anxiety is valid, then as evaluative stress increases, anxiety-related interference of the highly test-anxious should also increase and time spent on task and performance should decrease. Wealth of evidence has been provided by Western researchers (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1984; Covington, 1983a; Deffenbacher, 1978, 1980, 1984; Deffenbacher & Hazaleus, 1981, Hollandworth et al., 1979; Holroyd & Appel, 1980; Meichenbaum, 1972; Morris, Davis & Hutchings, 1981; Sarason, 1972, 1978, 1984; Sarason & Stoops, 1978) and one Indian
researcher (Sud, S., 1983) supporting Sarason’s (1972) and Wine’s (1971, 1980) attentional interpretation of test-anxiety; that highly test anxious individuals engage in self-deprecatory rumination, and neglect or misinterpret readily-available task-relevant cues. Wine (1971, 1980) proposes that "the worry and self-critical cognitions distract students from task-requirements and interfere with the effective use of their time, thereby contributing to performance decrements". On this point in the literature of psychology three classes of cognitive distractors or interfering behaviours operating in test anxiety have been suggested; they are:

(1) Worry (ii) Emotionality (Liebert & Morris, 1967); and (iii) Task-Generated Interference (Deffenbacher, 1978).

Investigators (Deffenbacher, 1977, 1978; Kaplan, McCordick & Twitchell, 1979; Liebert & Morris, 1967; Morris et al., 1981) assess that this distinction between the Worry (W) and Emotionality (E) components represents a major development in the elucidation of the concept of test anxiety. Today a great deal of literature concerning this distinction is available (Deffenbacher, 1978, 1980, 1984; Jerusalem, 1985; Liebert & Morris, 1967; Morris Franklin & Ponath, 1983; Schwarzer et al., 1982; also see Ploeg et al., 1983, 1984, 1985). The concept of Task-Generated Interference (TGI) derived from the drive theories of anxiety (Spence and Spence, 1966; Spielberger, 1966) by Deffenbacher (1978) has recently gained support from
researchers (Bruck, 1978; Deffenbacher, 1978, 1980, 1984; Deffenbacher & Hazaleus, 1981, 1985; Sud, S., 1983) who have suggested that highly-anxious individuals are more susceptible to distraction from task-produced competing responses under conditions of high drive. Only three studies, two in the West (e.g., Deffenbacher, 1978; Deffenbacher & Hazaleus, 1985) and one in India (Sud, S., 1983) have traced all three sources of interference, W, E and TGI, in the same study, and these were laboratory studies. Therefore, recently Deffenbacher (1984) undertook to study these three sources of interference in class-room examinations and found that Worry was more primary and regressed upon performance much higher than Emotionality and Task Generated Interference. These findings are consistent with those of Deffenbacher and Hazaleus (1985), but suggest greater importance of worrisome ruminations than has been suggested in some recent reports (Bruch, 1981; Galassi, Frierson & Sharer 1981). Research has determined that the Worry component of test anxiety is the more useful antecedent of performance impairment (Deffenbacher, 1980, 1984; Deffenbacher & Hazaleus, 1981, 1985; Depreeuw, 1984; Hodapp, 1981; Hodapp & Henneberger, 1983; Morris et al., 1981; Sarason, 1980b, 1984; Wine, 1980, 1982). Researchers assert that evaluative stress for the test-anxious appears to elicit a tendency to become preoccupied with worrisome cognitions (Worry) and only secondarily with self-perceived affective autonomic arousal (Emotionality). Of the two, Worry is the greater, more important source of anxiety-
related interference that in turn may account for the consistent finding that Worry correlates strongly and negatively with academic performance even when common variance of Worry and Emotionality is controlled (Hadapp et al., 1983). Earlier Hodapp (1981) found a causal predominance of Worry over Emotionality, but findings by Schwarzer, Jerusalem and Lange (1982) were not able to confirm these results. Research has also determined that high levels of Emotionality have little, if any, affect on performance (Deffenbacher, 1980, 1984; Mueller & Thompson, 1984; Sarason, 1980, 1984; Schwarzer, 1984), perhaps because such arousal (within normal limits) demands little attention. While studying the inter-play of Worry and Emotionality with anxiety and cognitive interference in predicting test performance, Corcoran Macdougall and Scrbrough (1985) found that for males cognitive interference was the best predictor of academic performance and for female college students, Worry predominated - both variables accounting for seven percent of academic performance. In other words, their study has supported those research studies which have included sex as a critical variable in explaining how test anxiety influences performance. Wine (1980) has drawn special attention to the need for more "explicit examination of sex differences in test anxiety" (P.379).

An overview of test anxiety research in India points to the paucity of study in this domain as compared to the United States
and Europe. In fact, in India most researchers have dealt with general (trait) anxiety measures (see Sharma 1978a; Sharma and Rao, 1984). Of the 176 studies published up to 1976, 81% deal with general (trait) anxiety measures (Sharma, 1978a). The comprehensive reviews of anxiety research in India (Sharma, 1978a; and Sharma & Rao, 1984) highlight the fact that only 28% of the total studies deal with test anxiety in relation to background variables (e.g., gender differences, age, socio-economic status, educational levels etc.) 18% investigate the effects of personality correlates of test-anxious persons; 25% relate to intelligence and test anxiety, and only a meagre number of 14 studies relate test anxiety to performance. Treatment studies of test anxiety are conspicuous for their absence. Only three studies have been done so far, in which researchers have recognized the importance of the cognitive aspects in the treatment of test anxiety. Sharma & Sud (1982) employed cognitive modelling to alleviate test anxiety; earlier Kuruvilla (1981) had treated depression in a similar fashion. More recently, Sud;A. (1984) has developed an Attentional Skills Training programme which is in line with Meichenbaum's (1972) and Wine's (1971) Attention Training procedure. She has been successful in proving the effectiveness of Attentional Skills Training as compared to Systematic Rational Restructuring. More substantial research is required to delineate and modify the cognitive domain of test anxiety and especially more so far the high test-anxious
individual. Moreover, researchers suggest (Deffenbacher, 1978, 1980; Galassi et al., 1981; Sarason, 1972, 1975, 1978; Wine, 1971, 1980, 1982) that the ideal state during a test is one of low test anxiety, and, therefore, low test-anxious subjects form the best comparison group. In fact, recently Wine (1980, 1982) has highlighted the feelings and cognitions of the low-test anxious individuals also. In her bidirectional cognitive attentional model of test anxiety, she states that the low-test-anxious are not the exact opposites of the high-test-anxious subjects but rather differ in quality in terms of their cognitive structures and self-statements. In line with Wine's (1980) observations, Meichenbaum (1972), Sieber (1980) and Dusek (1980) consider test anxiety not as a unitary but as a multi-dimensional construct. For example as experimental studies posit (Carver & Scheir, 1984; Deffenbacher, 1980, 1984; Sarason, 1984) that the high test-anxious persons worry excessively, are more doubtful, less confident and begin self-deprecatory rumination quite quickly when faced with difficult tasks and more so under conditions of high stress. Persons low in test anxiety are less doubtful, more confident; difficulties usually lead to more neutral or positive assessments, followed quickly by a return to task engagement. The result is a relative absence of "self centred" phenomenology, and a relative absence of task impairment.

Some researchers have pointed out that the performance of the low test-anxious improves under conditions of experimentally
induced self-focus (Carver & Scheier, 1984) but becomes poorer under re-assuring instructions (Sarason, 1984). Much of the research within the cognitive-behavioural framework (Meichenbaum, 1977) has demonstrated that test-anxious individuals can improve their performance by rehearsing or observing coping responses that stay relevant to the task (e.g., Holroyd, 1976; Ribordy, Tracy & Bernotes, 1981; Sarason, 1975, 1984; Tobias, 1980; Wine, 1971, 1980) Kirkland & Hollandsworth (1980) have shown that a skills-training treatment raises students' grade-point averages and reduces attentional interference more than simple anxiety-reduction treatments, as for example Desensitization. Despite occasional contrary evidence (e.g., Cooley & Spiegler, 1980) it appears that cognitive training can indeed make a difference in people's cognitive functioning. A few investigations (Deffenbacher, 1980, Deffenbacher & Suinn, 1980) teaching test anxious people 'cognitive-coping skills', are gaining prominence in the test anxiety treatment domain. All such evidence attests to the validity of the Attentional Theory of test anxiety or the Direction-of-Attention-Hypothesis in the Western settings.

Recently, Sarason (1984) has concluded that task-orienting instructions that serve to reduce time spent worrying are becoming more effective in not only reducing the detrimental effects of anxiety on behaviour but also in improving grades.
and other performance measures which other treatments which are not Attentionally-Oriented fail to do (see also Tyron, 1980). More recently Deffenbacher and Hazaleus (1985) following Wine's (1971, 1980, 1982) assumptions on the effectiveness of Attentional Skills Training programmes, assert that should the importance of Worry replicate in future studies, then treatment programmes directed toward the alleviation of debilitating test anxiety in such situations should be directed towards cognitive restructur­ing of worrisome thoughts. It is unlikely that training in self-applied relaxation or task-oriented self-instruction will be enough. The highly anxious are likely to need assistance in truly changing their preoccupation with perfectionistic self-standards, self-criticism, the need to compare with others, implied personal failure in poor performance and the like. Not to alter these in more benign directions may simply leave too much of the cognitive variance unaccounted for, and the highly anxious may continue to distract themselves from the task in hand as they undo their task-oriented skills and self-instruction with worry.

THE PRESENT STUDY

The present study attempts an integrative and comprehensive approach to the validation of the Attentional Theory of Test Anxiety in Indian Setting. This has been done by introducing
Attentional Skills Training (Meichenbaum, 1972; Sud, A. 1984; Wine, 1971) as a short-term cognitive coping strategy as an independent variable. An empirical verification of the Attentional Theory not only seeks to wipe out the loopholes in advancing and developing a more structured and well-defined concept of test anxiety, but by employing Attentional Skills Training (AST) this study furthers the investigators' earlier study in 1983, on high-test-anxious high school boys performing under evaluative stress conditions and attempts to suffice the overwhelming necessity of alleviating test-anxiety in an evaluative setting of a culturally different sample of boys and girls in India.

Since the Cognitive Attentional view (see Wine, 1971, 1980, 1982) asserts that Worry and Task-Generated Interference (Deffenbacher, 1978, 1980, 1985) are the biggest source of interference, programmes containing cognitive restructuring of worrisome thoughts and training in task-oriented self-instruction hold the greatest promise of not only improving performance but in alleviating test anxiety in evaluative situations (e.g., Hahnloser, 1974; Holroyd, 1976). The present study attempts to validate these assertions and lessen the worry-state, modify the negative self-focus to a positive task-focus and improve performance on moderately difficult tasks of the high anxious-ego stress boys and girls with Attentional Skills Training.
This study has been conducted on a sample of 240 boys and girls (120 high and 120 low test-anxious). The low test-anxious subjects have also been included in this study, since not only do they form the best comparison group for the high test-anxious, but also form a control group similar to the no-stress control or the no-treatment control group. Evaluative stress introduced in this study, adopted from Sarason's (1961, 1972, 1973) ego-involving instructions, coupled with moderately difficult tasks, forms the most important aspect in determining the effectiveness of Attentional Skills Training in lessening test anxiety and improving performance. Both high and low test-anxious students have been exposed to equivalent degrees of evaluative stress after being given treatment in the form of a short-term cognitive coping strategy. This is to test firstly, whether the characteristic detrimental responses and performance differences diminish after treatment, thus shortening the range of difference between the high and low test-anxious, and also to test whether the changes brought about by treatment are maintained even after evaluative stress and especially more so of the high test-anxious persons. The evaluative stress group has been compared with a non-stress or control group given neutral instructions; this has been done because the best comparison for those under ego stress is the control group.

Two process measures state-worry and state-emotionality, have been included in this study and assessed at two different
points of time: pre-treatment and post-treatment, i.e. after evaluative stress instructions. As postulated by Tobias (1977a) and Becker (1982) these process measures are useful indices in determining whether treatments bring about any changes in the state test anxiety levels of students. Furthermore, the age, sex, educational level, socio-economic status, duration and place of giving intervention are controlled. The study has been conducted by the same therapist on subjects who are non-volunteers and are from a non-clinical population.

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The present study is an extension of the investigator's earlier study (Sud, S, 1983) which focussed mainly on studying the interfering effects of worry, emotionality and task-generated interference upon performance of high school boys, the results of which were interpreted as supportive of the Attentional Theory of test anxiety (Wine, 1971) and the findings of which were consistent with those of Deffenbacher's (1978) study in the United States. In this study, Attentional Skills Training has also been introduced, the effects of which have been studied on the three dependent measures of: (a) Process Measures; (b) Performance Measures and (c) Post-Task Self-Ratings. Specific research questions are as under:-
(a) **Process Measures**

(i) Do the high anxious-ego-stress groups of boys and girls report more worry-state and emotionality-state, as compared to their high anxious-control, the low anxious-ego stress or the low anxious-control counterparts?

(ii) Is Attentional Skills Training effective in the significant reduction of worry-state and emotionality-state of the high anxious-ego stress groups of boys and girls as compared to their not-treated counterparts, and is the reduction in worry-state and emotionality-state significantly more for this group as compared to its high anxious-control, the low anxious-ego stress or the low anxious-control counterparts?

(iii) Does Attentional Skills Training bring about any changes in worry-state or emotionality-state for the low test-anxious boys and girls regardless of stress conditions?

(b) **Performance Measures on Moderately difficult Tasks**

(i) Do the high anxious-ego stress groups of boys and girls perform more poorly than their high anxious-control, the low anxious-ego stress or the low anxious-control counterparts?
(ii) Is Attentional Skills Training effective in the improvement of performance of the high anxious-ego stress boys and girls as compared to their not-treated counterparts, and is the improvement significantly more for this group as compared to its high anxious-control, the low anxious-ego stress or the low anxious-control counterparts?

(iii) Does Attentional Skills Training bring about any improvement in performance of the low anxious boys and girls regardless of stress conditions?

(c) Post-Task Self-Ratings

(i) Do the high anxious-ego stress boys and girls report more task-generated interference and report spending less percentage of time on task as compared to their high anxious-control, the low anxious-ego stress or the low anxious-control counterparts?

(ii) Is Attentional Skills Training effective in lessening, task-generated interference and in increasing the percentage of time spent on task of the high anxious-ego stress boys and girls as compared to their not-treated counterparts, and is the improvement greater for this group as compared to its high anxious-control, the low anxious-ego stress or the low anxious-control counterparts?
(iii) Does Attentional Skills Training also bring about any such changes (as ordained in ii) in the low anxious boys and girls regardless of stress conditions?

In short, this study attempts a cross-cultural validation of the Attentional Theory of Test Anxiety. Hopefully, this will have important implications for the efficacy of cognitively-oriented treatment approaches or interventions in alleviating the detrimental consequences of test anxiety in Indian settings.