CHAPTER-I
INTRODUCTION

In a fundamental sense corruption is coefficient of statecraft. Even in a good state odors of corruption hang sneakily in to the corridors of power, but it is not un often that in some cases these odors spread, acquire the dimensions of environmental pollution and affect every fabric of the system.

Corruption is the largest single element to be found in India. All roads from the maternity hospital to the crematorium smell of corruption. No individual is free from it, no area can be found where corruption is not a ritual.

In recent years and especially in the 1990s a phenomenon broadly referred to as corruption has attracted a great deal of attention. In developed and developing countries, large or small, market oriented or otherwise, governments have fallen because of accusations of corruption, prominent politicians (including presidents and prime ministers of country) have lost their official positions and in some cases, whole political cases have been replaced.

Several arguments can be advanced that suggest which corruption is simply attracting more attention now than in the past:

First, the end of the cold war has stopped the political hypocrisy that had made the decision makers in some industrial countries ignore the political corruption that existed in particular countries, such as Zaire (now the democratic republic of Congo). As long as the latter were in the right political camp, there was a tendency to overlook obvious cases of high level corruption.

Second, perhaps because of lack of information or reluctance to talk about it by those familiar with these countries, there was also a
tendency not to focus on corruption in the centrally planned economics (Grassman-1982, Glasr and Gertesi-1987, Simis-1982 and Remnoc-1994).

Third, the increase in recent years in the number of countries with democratic governments and free and active media has created an environment in which discussion of corruption is no longer a taboo.

Fourth, in all its ramifications, globalization has brought individuals from countries with little corruption in to frequent contact with those from countries where corruption is endemic.

Fifth, a growing role has been played by non-governmental organizations, such as Transparency International, in publicizing the problems of corruption and in trying to create anti-corruption movements in many countries. Recently the international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank and other international organizations have been playing a growing role in the anti-corruption movement. In addition empirical studies of corruption have contributed to a greater awareness of the economic cost of the problem.

Sixth, the greater relevance of the market for economic decisions and the increased need to be competitive have created an environment in which the pursuit of efficiency has required greater importance and distortions attributed to corruption attract more attention.

Finally, the role played by the United States of America especially through its influence in some international institutions has been important. American policy makers have argued that American exporters have lost out in foreign deals because they have not been allowed by law to pay bribes to foreign officials for American companies, the payment of bribes to foreign officials is a criminal act and of course, the bribes paid can not be deducted as costs for tax purposes (Hines James R-1995).
Tanzi vito (1998) has hypothesized that the impact that high taxes, a high level of spending and new regulations have on acts of corruption is not immediate but rather a function of time, given the established norms of behavior. In a country with traditionally well functioning and honest bureaucracy, the short-term impact of a larger government role on public officials will be limited for some time, public officials will not be asked to perform corrupt acts and will reject bribery attempts and they will not initiate such acts. In countries without such tradition, the more invasive role of government, played through higher taxes, higher public spending and especially, more widespread regulations, would have a more immediate impact on the behavior of civil servants and on corruption.

Among the economic changes that have taken place in recent years, privatization has been most closely linked with corruption. There is question that public or state enterprises have been major source of corruption and especially of political corruption because they have occasionally been used to finance the activities of political parties and to provide jobs to the clienteles of particular political groups. This was clearly the case in Italy before tangentopoli and in many Latin American countries (Nordio-1997). Privatization of non-natural monopolies is necessary to reduce this form of corruption because it eliminates an instrument often used especially in political corruption. Unfortunately, the process of privatizing public or state enterprises has itself created situations whereby some individuals, ministers and high level political officials have the discretion to make the basic decision while others (managers and others) have information not available to outsiders so that they can use privatization to benefit themselves. The problems have been observed and reported in all regions of the world, but the abuses appear to have been particularly significant in the
transition economies (Kaufmam and Seigelbaum 1996) few phenomena are as puzzling as corruption. It is especially puzzling to know that everybody decries it in public and practices it private or at least finds it difficult to escape from its tentacles. So pervasive has it become today that it tends to generate a sense of exasperation, if not despair yet to combat it as it is cancerous enough to eat in to the very vital of social order. In order to combat corruption, it is necessary to acquire a diagnostic understanding of it. Such an understanding can be obtained from various perspectives, including economic, political and sociological some such understanding has already been generated by economists, political scientists and scholars of public administrations. Nothing much has been done from a sociological angle so that, the present study will attempt to look at corruption from a sociological perceptive i.e. bring in sharp focus its social dimensions without of course loosing sight of the other dimensions (D.L. Sharma-1999).

The problem of corruption is a complex one having deep roots and ramifications in the society as a whole. It can not be examined in isolation except as an integral part of the social and moral fabric of the society. It has suitable economic, political, ideological and social connotations. In its widest meaning, corruption includes improper or selfish exercise of power and influence attached to a public office or to the special position one occupies in public life.

The problem of corruption seems to have been a “taken for granted” reality in many parts of the world. In most developing countries like, India it is apparently seen as another problem to contend with as those nations grapple with the complex process of social and economic development. However, this apparent taken for granted ness hides a mine field of contentions and contestations that beset the issues of corruption in most societies. Groups with conflicting interest and
stakes in the system have varied perspectives on the nature of the problem and compete with one another to impose their particular constructions and influence the public discourse on the subject (Vinoda parvala-1996).

Most of the studies on corruption in the past two decades tended to rush to judgment about the malignant consequences of corruption, even before they gained a proper understanding of the phenomenon. Adopting a standard structural functional approach they analyzed corruption in a particular country as a “Dysfunction” caused by internal political, economic, administrative and cultural factors and one that needs to be rectified through appropriate policy actions. These studies viewed corruption as a set of objective conditions that can be observed and analyzed and largely ignored the dynamic of corruption and anti-corruption, such as how a set of putative conditions does.

Corruption: A Historical Perspective

Corruption is a global phenomenon. It is found almost in every society in one or the another form since time immemorial. In ancient times, the judges received bribes in Egyptian, Babilonian and Hebrew societies. In Rome bribe was a common feature in elections to public offices. In France, judicial offices were sold during the fifteenth century. England was described a sick hole of corruption in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the nineth century also corruption was so rampant in Britain that Gibbon described it as the most infallible symptom of constitutional liberty (seminar paper No-421 sept-1994).

In India Koutilya has referred in his “Arhasastra” (Samasastry-1967 PP-15-17) to embezzlement by government servants out of the state revenue. He has mentioned about forty types of embezzlement and corrupt practices adopted by government servants at the time of
three century B.C. during Ashok's regime, corruption prevailed on a lower scale (Majumdar-1960 P-113). In medieval society, scope for corruption was minimum because only a few authorities existed for the collection of taxes. So long they were praised rather than censured. During the British rule, bribes were accepted not only by the Indian officials but by the highly placed British officials too. Robert Clive and Warren Hastings were found corrupt to an extent that they were tried by a parliamentary committee after their return to England. The expansion of the economic activities during the First and Second World War opened new vistas of corruption in the country (Hallayya-1948 PP-13-51) war time controls, restrictions and scarcities provided ample opportunities for bribery, corruption and favouritism. After independence, through top political elite at the national level remained very honest for about one and half decades but after the third and fourth general elections, the new political elite lost people's confidence of being honest. The government employees in all public concerns at all levels started accepting huge bribes even for small considerations. Today both at the central and state levels the number of ministers with an honest image can be counted on fingers.

In India several major scandals have arisen, they are (Binayak Prasad-2001).

- 1949: Rs 216 crore jeep scandal case involving Krishna Menon who was India's ambassador to United Kingdom.
- 1981: HWD submarine deal, a kick-back of Rs 100 crore paid to certain middlemen.

❖ 1983: Churat lottery scandal allegedly implicating congress ministers Arjun Singh.

❖ 1988: Bofors gun deal-Rajiv Gandhi government was alleged to have received bribes to secure the Rs 1,600 crores contract.

❖ 1991: Purchase of the out dated westland helicopters.

❖ 1992: Multi crores securities scam exposed with Harsh Mehta at the helm.

❖ 1992: Karnataka chief minister S.Bangarappa forced to resign after being accused of involvement in classic computer deal.

❖ 1994: Sugar muddle Kalpanath Rai forced to resign on a basis of Gian Prakash committee report which alleged the lack of timely imports as the main reason for escalations of sugar price (Rs 650 crores).

❖ 1994: Telecom scam forced apposition from M.P.S over the lack of transparency in the bidding of the Telecom tenders on charges of favouritism.

❖ 1995: Rs 950 crore fodder scandal involving Bihar chief minister Lalu Prasad Yadav.

❖ 1995: Hawala scam-large scale involvement of political bodies and several bureaucrats in the illegal transactions and receipt of money through Hawala agent S.K. Jain.

❖ 1995: J.M.M. bribery scandal, four M.Ps of Jarkhand Mukti MORCHA (JMM) received money to vote against the no confidence motion of the Narasimha Rao's government. Narasimha Rao's convection is being completed.
❖ 1996: Urea scandal Advanced payment of Rs 133 crores to a little known Turkish firm, Karsan Ltd. for import of Urea which was never delivered.

❖ 1996: Mumbai port trust scandal- The chairman and the deputy chairman of this port trust allegedly floated government instructions and guidance in the allotment of prime commercial land to its counsel, Kiran Choudhary at a throw away price, causing the port trust huge losses.

❖ 2001: Thelka expose corruption in defence deal, the use of prostitutes in the probe creates heated debate on the property of such methods.

At present, India is viewed, in the corruption perception index 1999, as ranked at 73 in a list of 99 countries arranged for the purpose. (Deccan Herbld 31, October 2000). In a study conducted in 1995, the German non-governmental “Transparency International” organizations found New Zealand, Denmark and Singapore as honest countries (getting more marks out of ten) and Indonesia, china, Pakistan, Venezuela, Brazil, Philippines, India, Thailand, Italy and Maxico as corrupt countries (getting between 2 and 3 marks out of 10).

The aim of the present study is to obtain coherent conceptualizations of problems of corruption according to the view of post graduate (P.G.) students and Research Scholars in different department in two Universities. The study will compare conceptualizations of students in urban and rural origins to find out if there is a consensual or conflictual image of the problem among them. Over various aspects of corruption will be mapped out along the student’s attitudes and perception in Indian society.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The subject corruption is immensely vast and several studies have been previously made of it. It has various forms and equally numeral causes and consequences. As a result, the previous studies are not broad based and restricted to certain aspects and regions. Each region has its own peculiarities. A review of the relevant literature shows that different scholars have studied corruption from their own angle, based on the data collected by them in specific region. They have focused their investigation on social phenomenon, A review of their studies reveals that their study differs from each other in many respects. According to developmental activities in their regions social background and educational levels accordingly their findings or conclusions can not have a universal application.

Peter H. Odegaard (1965) observes that beyond the opportunities that an expanding economic life of America has offered corruption and the inability of the political organization to control it, there is the cultural milieu which has made corruption and racketeering an integral part of an American society. Corruption in the sense a productive of the way of life an acquisitive society where money talks where that which works in justified and where people are judged by what they have rather than what they are the growth and consolidation of American business in to ever larger units have increased the pressure of private interests upon public servants. But even more important is the fact that, they have created a society in which pecuniary values are dominant. In such a society prestige is measured in terms of wealth. Successful grafters and corruptors become respected and a million dollar a multitude sins.
Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins (1963) point out in the African context; one may be less guarded on the question of cost of corruption which many wealthy countries can afford to carry without noticing it, but which developing countries can hardly afford at all. The sums involved in some of the proved case of corruption in Africa would have brought considerable benefit to people for whom underprivileged is to mild a world if they had been properly spent. It may also be remarked that the agreeable cynicism of the Americans for example, towards corruption in high places in their native land is a luxury that the developing countries can not afford from another point of view. For these countries depend considerable on enthusiasm and youthful prides are very agonizing. The cynicism of many African intelligentsia today civil servants; professional men and students towards the politicians who they so recently venerated, the assumption by even larger number that local government is a racket which exists to line the pockets of councilors, the fatalistic acceptance of the power of petty bureaucracy after accompanied by extortion these are not the attitudes of progress and development.

Rauch and Evans (1997) have gathered information of the degree to which civil servants recruitment and promotions are merit based for 35 developing countries. Their results indicate that the less recruitment and promotions are based on merit the higher is the extent of corruption.

Max Weber (1947) the outstanding German sociologist, described what should be the characteristics of an ideal bureaucracy. He was aware that it has on the pride that individuals have in working for the government
may explain why, all things being equal some bureaucracies are much more efficient and much less vulnerable to corruption than others.

In the ideal bureaucracies described by Max Weber, the public official (as the agent of state) is faithful executor of the mandate and instructions that he receives from the state (the Principal). The public official is just a conduit or a direct and legitimate channel for the relationship between the state and the citizen. He would not distort the state citizen relationship. In this Weberian world no principal agent problems would develop. Unfortunately, in the real world, Weberian bureaucracies are rare in part because of characteristics of the bureaucracies themselves. The citizens may question the legitimacy of some state actions, attributing them to rent seeking by public officials and not to the pursuit of public interest. The state may have default fractured in to several power centers (ministries, public enterprises, independent institutions, sub national governments and so on) each pursuing some what distinct interests. Some times the political of these power centers are not consistent with one another and the instruction that emunate from these public centers are conflicting.

Klitgard (1988) has stated that, influences the relationship between 'Briber' and 'Bribee'. Any realistic strategy must start with an explicit recognition that are those who demand acts of corruption on the part of public sector employees and there are public employees willing for a price to perform these acts. There is thus both a demand for and supply of corruption and as is the case with all demands and supplies, the price plays a major role. Various incentives determine the elasticity of these supply and demand functions. In the basic case the briber wants something (a reduction in a cost or an increase in a benefit) from the public official has something to sell (i.e. power) and wants to be
compensated for the risk and the effort involved. However in the
background there is the state in the totality of its actions carried out by
the many agencies that constitute the public sector. To a large extent it is
the state that, through its many policies and actions, created the
environment and incentives that influence those who pay bribes and
those who accept or demand them.

Conception of corruption has been recently advanced by
Klitgaurd in terms of the following formula: $C=M+D-A$, in this
formulation, corruption is equal to monopoly coupled with discretion
without accountability. Thus when an organization or person has
monopoly over a good or service, has the discretion to decide who will
receive it, and is not accountable, it gives rise to corruption. This
conception of corruption falls between the diffused and the office
centric. Seductive in its own way this formulation has some serious
inadequacies. For example, the lack of accountability is a problematic
proposition. How can one determine corruption without the norm of
accountability. Corruption operates in a similar economic situation in
which things are in short supply while there is increasing behand for
them.

Lui (1985) has argued that time has different values for different
individuals depending on their level of income and the opportunity cost
of their time. Those for whom time is most valuable will offer bribes to
public officials to be allowed to economize on time by jumping in front
of the line that is by getting decisions more quickly.

Thus corruption can be efficient because it saves time for those
whom time has the greatest value. In a later paper Lui (1996) argued
that, while corruption may circumstances, it reduces growth because it
provides some individuals the incentive to acquire the kind of human capital that can be used to improve corruption opportunities.

**Van Rajjckeghem and Weder (1997)** has tested empirically to the relationship between wage level and corruption index with the use of cross-sectional data, they have been able to support the common intuition by finding satisfactory significant relationship between corruption and wage levels similar to that shown by the CC curve. They have speculated that while an increase in the wage level is likely to reduce it to minimal levels. In other words, the fight against corruption. Pursued exclusively on the basis of wage increases, can be very costly to the budget of a country and can achieve only part of the objective. Further more as argued above, even at high wages some individuals may continue to engage in corrupt practices.

In recent years, several countries (Argentina, Peru etc) have attempted to reduce corruption in particularly sensitive areas, such as customs and tax administrations by increasing the level of salaries for the public employees in these areas. These countries have also increased salary differentials to be able to retain and attract more able, productive and honest individuals over the years Singapore has pursued a wage policy aimed at reducing the temptation for public officials to engage in acts to corruption. Reportedly, the salaries of ministers and other high level officials in Singapore are among the highest in the world.

There has been some speculation in the theoretical economic literature that high wage may reduce the number of corrupt acts, while they may lead to demands for higher bribes on the part of those who continue to be corrupt. The reason is that high wages raise the opportunity cost of losing one’s job, while they not eliminate the greed on the part of some officials. Thus while the number of corrupt acts it
reduced the total amount of corruption money paid may not necessarily fall.

Assar Lindbeck (1998) has observed that, speculative that the wages paid to civil servants are important in determining the degree of corruption. He attributes the low corruption in Sweden in this century; high level administrators earned 12-15 times the salary of an average industrial worker. One can speculate that there may be corruption due to greed and corruption due to need CC represents the trade off between the level of corruption and the level of wages. The higher the wage level, the lower is corruption. Assume that or represents a level of wage consistent with the minimum required by the family of public employee for a decent living. Some public officials will be corrupt perhaps because of their own psychological or moral make up or because some of the bribes offered may be too large for some officials to resist. Thus it implies realistically that not officials respond in the same way to the same incentives in theoretical jargon agents are heterogeneous.

Mauro (1997) has emphasized that, in the post couple of years, several studies using cross sectional analysis and the available corruption indexes, have reported important quantitative results on the effect of corruption on economics variables. It reduces investment and as a consequence, reduces the rate of growth. Such reduction in investment is assumed to be caused by the higher costs and the uncertainty that corruption creates. In this analysis, the reduction in the rate of growth is a direct consequence of the decline in the investment rate. In words, the analysis is based on a productions function that makes growth a function of investment.
It reduces expenditure on education and health. Which does not lend itself easily to corrupt practices on the part of those who make budgetary decisions.

The code of Hammurabi king of Babylonea (2nd century B.C) (Quoted by Lasswell-1969) specially stated that if a man (in case) bears witness for grain or money (as a bribe) he himself shall bear penalty imposed that case.

Garry Backer (1968) has painted out in one of his business week columns. If we abolish the state, we abolish corruption. But of course quite apart from the fact that corruption can exist in the private sector a civilized society cannot function without a state must have many functions.

Backer’s classic analysis of crime prevention given the probability that the perfectrotor of crime would be caught; the penalty imposed plays an important role in determining the probability that criminal or illegal acts would like lace. In theory all things being equal corruption would be reduced by increasing the penalties on those who get caught. This analysis implies that the penalty structure existing in a country is an important factor in determining the extent of corruption in that country. The another important ingredient in Backer’s analysis is the probability that those who commit crimes would be caught. This lead to the role of institutional controls. The existence of these controls reflects to large extent the attitude of the political body toward this problem. Generally the most effective controls should be those that exist inside institutions. This is really the first line of defense. Honest and effective supervision good offices to exercise their controls.
Robert Kiltgoard, R.M. Ambarao & H.L. Parris (2000) has emphasized that, how might one develop a strategy for preventing corruption in a specific setting. They are stressed upon several steps, these are:

- Understanding corrupt systems, which require analytical tools.
- Diagnosing how specific corrupt systems now work in a particular context.
- Overcoming political and bureaucratic resistance and garnering support.
- Crafting a sequenced plan of action to heal corrupted systems, rapture a culture of transform city government.

The above steps to provide an overview; the municipal leaders might consider transform corruption.

John Gray Fables (Edit W.P.O Amaab, Sooprannien & Uprety-1999) has emphasized that, the preventive approach seeks not so much to sanction acts of corruption as to pre-empt them all together. Its fundamental purpose is to deter corrupt practices and ensure that private and official activities are carried out and exercised is a corruption free environment. He reveals that, there are two major techniques for combating of corruption such as indirect and direct techniques. Indirect techniques based on customs, tradition or soft law and partly explicit techniques based on positive law including procurement, campaign financing and financial management rules. The media’s influence on building public opinion has in money counters helpful tools is the reductions of corrupt acts be used to emphasize and publicize the positive side of the country’s efforts to prevent corruption. Indeed it may be more than just a matter of confidence that the exception of some countries such as India, were the press enjoys near freedom or Singapore where the Indians of corruption is remarkably
low-corruption appears to be rampant is countries without a free active and objective press.

Campaign finance regulation is a formidable understanding; but it is also an independence able tool in the combat against corruption. The absence of major campaign for ask related scandals is many of those other countries is not much an indicative those countries as it is a reflective the back of transparency and public account ability that characterize the electoral process and permeates the conduct of their public officials.

The legal section examines the contents of corruption laws and their application. It deals successively with the process of investigation of corruption offences and the judicial process, including the special rules of evidence and sanctions and penalties applicable to corruption offences.

Vito Tanzi (1998) is the Director as the J.M.S Fiscal affairs department has written a paper entitled “corruption around the world”. In which has surveyed and discussed the issues related to the causes, consequences and scope of corruption and possible corrective actions. It emphasizes the cost as corruption in terms of economic growth. It also emphasizes that the fight against corruption may not be cheep and can be independent from the reforms of the state. If corruption reforms are not made, corruption is likely to continue to be problem regardless of actions directly aimed at curtaining it.

Tanzi has explained the results suggesting that the corruption has an impact on the rate of economic growth of countries. It increases public investment because public investment project land themselves easily to manipulations by high-level officials to get bribes, it reduces expenditure for operation and maintenance for reasons similar to those
that reduce expenditure for education and health, it reduces the productivity of people investment and of a country's infrastructure and it reduces tax revenue, mainly because of the impact that it has on the tax administration and on customs, thus reducing the ability of the government to carry out needed public expenditure.

Richard Clutterbuck (1995) has explicitly in the chapter 'Human Rights and Corruption' that the worst offenders were the terrorists but this does not excuse those on the government side who accepted bribes or violated human rights nor undo the harm they did.

Corruption is endemic in Peru, as it is in many countries, rich and poor. In underdeveloped countries, this is almost inevitable in the context of their economies. The business and other middle classes, who travel and deal with business people and officials from the countries which invest and trade in Peru expect, not surprisingly, to have a lifestyle comparable with that of people of similar states in North America and European countries, in fact they may feel that they could be humiliating Peru if they did not on the other hand the much lower Peruvian G.N.P per capita is reflected in tax revenue so, for public servants at least, the government budget, just cannot afford this. Moreover the administrative structure is not efficient enough to extract anything approaching the taxes which the law lays down. Business people can organize their companies to pay themselves and their staffs reasonably high salaries and find ways of creative accounting to avoid paying the taxes that they should.

Corruption in the police and army, as well facilitating international drug trafficking invidibly also results in extortion from the public adds to the unpopularity already caused by abuses of human rights. It is a complex problem.
Corruption had been given a big boost in a policy introduced by
president Gancia in order to control the army. Gancia terminated the
system whereby they promoted and appointed their own senior officers
and he vested the government with the power to co-operate and
appoint higher commanders who were prepared to go along with his
left of centre ideology. It was alleged however that he chose corrupt
generals in the knowledge that their loyalty could be assured by the
threat of public exposure and prosecution.

As in Gancia's day, allegations of corruption of human rights
violations continued especially against Fuji mores chosen commander
general, Hermoza against when there was an attempted military coup
by dissident army officer in November 1992. The opportunity offered
by army for corruption have also been fully explicated by the drug
baren's who thank to the billons of dollars paid each year for cocaine by
addicts all over the world have plenty of money from which to pay the
bribes.

Sutherland (1940) has made a detailed and extensive study of the
problem as represented in the white collar criminals. Here corruption
may be equated with criminal act behavior. In fact criminal behavior
and corruption are correlated. The problem as represented in the illegal
activities of 70 of the largest manufacturing, mining and mercantile
corporations in America, is revealed in his book "White Collar Crime" (1949).

Thus the recent research of Sutherland has destroyed the validity
formerly attached to the belief that the upper middle class and upper
economic and social groups are much more law abiding than other
groups. On the other hand the upper middle and upper classes protect
themselves against the full measures of the law and thus tend to retain
the respect of the community. In fact criminal conduct is common place among major industrial leaders.

The upper middle class believe fundamentally in the validity of law and order even when they break their own laws. They have not always recognized that only when all groups accept the responsibility entailed in good citizenship that we may expect greater acceptance of the validity of the laws, when applied to lower class offenders. The inability of this class to appreciate in full this need results in the emergence and growth of white collar and economic crimes, render enforcement of the laws, themselves not sufficiently deterrent more difficult.

Sutherland researches on the white collar criminality have made us realize that criminality is a common human trait rather than confined to particular persons. If social acceptance makes one type of criminal respected another subject to the stern disapproval of the group, we will have to find the basis for reorganising our approach to the treatment of crime. But we shall reconcile differences in social definitions of crime only by altering the basic requirement for achieving respect from that of possessing wealth to one of accepting the responsibility for abiding by legal restrictions in order to promote the common good.

Le Vine (1975) writing explicitly on the culture of corruption, outlines a hierarchy of identification and trust among Ghanaians by which he seeks to show the relative importance of nuclear or extended family, close friends, clients or supporters over that of the country, the government and its institutions.
Bunkar (1985) had explicit points an organizational perspective an corruption that goes beyond the view that corruption is caused by varying degree of bureaucratic modernity. By comparing two government agencies, one of which is highly corrupt and the other less so, he suggests that corruption is caused by organizational and interpersonal variables. According to Bunker, corruption is most likely occurred in situation where there is a high degree of co-operative exchange between individual bureaucratic agents, and is less likely to occur where these relations are marked by conflict and opposition.

Carino and Guzman (1979) in their study on negative bureaucratic behavior in the Philippines, also reported on similar attitudes in that country. According to this study, done for the college of public administration, University of Philippines, certain norms were emerging from that of the effect of facilitating or encouraging corruption. Since success is conceived in terms of conspicuous consumption and other economic indication, successful practitioners of corruption find that they are not ostracized.... Adulation may even be forth coming because they now have success on two counts in amassing wealth and not being caught in the process.

Leslie Palmier (1985) has made the study The control of Bureaucratic Corruption. A case study in Asia in 1974-79 the study which follows is of the institutions created and measures are taken to control corruption in the administration of India, Hong Kong and Indonesia. Corruption in general, including the bureaucratic, has increased so greatly in the less developed countries that perhaps no argument is required to justify its study.
Poor pay is a powerful pressure towards corrupt gains, if only to make ends meet, as we have noted in the cases of Indian lower level officials, Hong Kong policemen, and the Indonesian bureaucracy as a whole. Public servants not paid enough to fulfill their usual obligations are only too likely to take advantage of whatever opportunities may arise for in authorized gains.

*Manu Smriti (Edit with Kulluka’s commentary 1929)* has suggested that, one should entrust a deposit to a person who is bom in a good family, is well conducted, knows Dharma, speaks the truth has a large family is wealthy and straight forward.

Dishonesty practiced by the depository or by deposits is a serious crime. Manu says that, a person who does not and he who demands from the depository what he never deposited with him shall both be punished like thieves or be compelled to pay fine equal to the value of the deposit dishonesty retained or falsely claimed. Manu recommends only fine to the value of the deposit in question.

Manu lays down that a deposit which has been stolen by the thieves or washed away by water or burnt by fire the depository shall not make it good if he has not taken a part of it for himself.

As regards dishonesty in respect of apportion of the amount of the debt and not the whole one. Manu says that, a debtor who falsely denied a certain portion of the debt actually taken by him and the creditor who falsely claims more than what he had actually given to the debtor, are to be fined double the amount denied or claimed falsely.

If a man claims a lost property kept in the state custody of which he is not the owner he commits the crime of making a false claim. Manu declares that a man claiming the ownership of the property deposited with a King as lost one, if he fails to correctly tell the time and place it
where it was lost, its color shape and size he is guilty of making a false claim and as such is liable to pay a fine to the King equal in value to the object claimed.

Katyayana (1933) defines utkoca (bribe) as what is obtained in these ways, viz. by giving (or threatening to give) false informative about a person as their or a felon, or as one who breaks the rules of decent conduct or as an adulterous person or by ponting out those who are of bad character of by spreading false report about a person. It is quite strange to find that Katyayana instead of condemning the bribe giver suggests that he should not be fined but the intermediary may be fined. The present day maximum that both the giver and taker of bribe are equally corrupt and punishable probably did not hold good during this period. But of the person accepting the bribe has been appointed or promoted to the office by the King he should be made to return the bribe and pay the fine eleven times as much to the kind. And where a person not holding a public appointment obtains some gratification of work done, he should not be held guilty and would not return what he received as reward or in gratitude.

Katyayana suggested that, a person offering the bribe should not be punished but those who accepted it should be fined and bribed royal officials should be compelled to return the bribe and pay a fine eleven times as much more over. The law givers were conscious of false accusation that might crop up of occasionally and therefore they prescribed heavy fine for those who made false accusation and laid special on the proof of the change.

In Mahabharata (S.N.Sinha and Basu 1933) the story highlights that among the hindu gods, Indra seem to have been a postmaster in the art
of corruption who indulges in immoral practices through the help of the heavenly nymphs has hardly any parallel. We are told that a great devotee named vestry out of wrath towards Indra Created a son with three heads. This weird youth called Trisira aspired as for the most coveted place occupied by Indra and devotee himself to severe religious practices to the upper hand of Eternal Lord of heaven. Seeing this Indra grew impatient and despondent and played his last trumps by engaging the heavenly hetairai for seducing the meaning Trisira in to the snares of sexual pleasures to make him lose all his super natural acquirements. However the lovely nymphs, in spite of their shameless display of physical beauty, dancing and singing, failed to arouse a single tinge of excitement in his heart and had to retain to their master sad and disappointed.

An inscription of Kulottunga (Quarter in Journal of the numisonation Sowety of India vol-42) has emphasized that, such endowments measure which made the temples flow with wealth. But the practice of mortaging temple land seems to have been a unique feature of this age which naturally raises several questions; why was temple land mortaged at all and now was money accruing from its spent? The origin of this practice may be traced to the stormy events that followed the death of the cola King parmeshwaravarama-2 on the question of succession to the throne. It is suggested that, turmoil might have promoted the priests to mortage temple land, but the silence about the details of such transactions suggests the possibility of embezzlement, the recurrence of which became a serious concern of the state in the following period. As a consequence inquires were ordered, embezzlements defeated and fines imposed on the culprits by the cola King Kulottanga-3. Sometimes temple records where either destroyed or removed with a sole motive of embezzling the funds donated for the
purpose of perpetual by burning the lamps by the devotes, which necessitated restorations of original records. It was therefore quite possible that the temple priests in collaboration with the authorities of village assembly misappropriated much of the deposit with little or no regard for the fines and curses. The method employed for such misappropriated was quite subtle the temple servants burnt lamps daily for a short while as a routine affair and their by saved ghee or oil which they later sold for there own benefit.

The result of these maneuverings war the temples could not enjoy the benefits of the full endowment made by the donors which was misappropriated by unfaithful tenants, the dishonest assembly authorities or accountants or the priests or a combination of them. The chola Kings took more interest in investigating in the affairs of the temple particularly endowment lands than the pallavas or the pandavas. Gross abuse created a serious problem which promoted Rajaraj-1 to order for the auditing the temple accounts for which some times complaints were also received from the tenants against the priests against the assembly.

In the Buddist texts (cowell 1894) had highlights that, we have many instances of corruption and bribery and the Buddha had to castigate his followers on many occasions. In the Jatakas we have the story of one of the most noted courtesans of varanasisama who lived in a palatial building and was the attraction of the wealthy nobals .Once she is said to have fallen in love with an exceedingly handsome robber at the very first sight while he has been laid along the street buy the police constables. She was so much enamoured of him that she secured the release of the criminal by bribing the Governor of the city. We have yet another story of the courtesan, Sulasa of Varanasi, who like shana, fell
in love with a robber named Sattuka, who has been dragged along to the place of execution with his hands fettered behind his back with all but the whole of her life's earning she bribed the police commissioner of the city and effected the freedom of the criminal, who became her exclusive paramour thereafter. All this instances who that most of the royal officials in early times were as corrupt and dishonest in their in day to-day dealings as there counterparts today.

Koutiya (Shamasstry-1929) Emphasize that, in his Arthasatstra, the existence of wide spread corruption. In a chapter entitled Asserting by temptations Purity or impurity in the chapter of minister the learned writer says that assisted by his prime minister and his high priest of King shall by offering temptations examine chapter of ministers appointed in his government. He goes on to explain the various types of allurements to which a prospective minister is subjected and concluded, “Teachers have decided that, in occurrence with ascertained purity, the king shall whose character has been tested under three pursuits of life religion, wealth, love and fear. He is more specific in another chapter called deletion of what is embezzled by Government servants out of state Revenue which reads like a Madera official report in modes of corruptions and corresponding punishments. According to this learned writer there are about forty ways of embezzlements.

The official rung vitiating the very adifice of administration can be judged from the following observation of Koutilya, some times the prescribed medicine may fail to reach the person of moral disease; the mind of valiant, through naturally kept stead fast may not when one vitiated and rippled under four kinds allurements return to and recover such corrupt officials (yukta) or clerk (upayukata) or a servant
(Tatpurusa) have misappropriated some form one or two panas or any other valuable thing and declares that they should be punished with first, middle-most and highest immurements and death respectively; and in that of commodities of inferior value, they should be compelled not only to restore same, but also may a fine equal to the value of the articles.

According to Koutilya are the several means employed by gold smiths to deceive the public “When by what is called triputaka, which consists of two parts of silver and one part of copper an equal portion of pure alluvial gold is replaced, that deceitful act is termed copper removal (sulbhavasatam); when by vellaka (a compound of silver and tikansana in equal portion) on a equal portion of a gold is replaced, it is turned vellaka removal, and when pure alluvial gold is replaced by that gold half of which is mixed with copper, it is termed gold removal (hemavasaritam)”.

Kalhana (Ed. And trans in M.A. Stein -1900) in his Rajatarangini has emphasized, citing several instances of corrupt practices among the officials he say that Bija became rather then a King by taking the recourse to unfair means to Ananda rose to high office by offering bribe to royal counsellors. That Kalhana thought probably down by decent and position towards the official class was by no more partial to the later, is shown by many hard hit he makes at the vices of kayasthas (the royal officials). The great mass of them was undoubtedly Brahmans by caste, which evident from Alana’s condemnation of Brahmans Sivartha as a rough kayastha about that time there did by Stangulation that rouge of official, the sivartha who had been a great intriguer.

In official circumstances they restored to solemn tests (prayapaves) as a powerful means of coercion which weak kings had
reason to dread. Moreover, they indulged in all kinds of corrupt practices which evoked bitter condemnation of this class by Kalhana as in the case of the kayasthas for whom they had nothing but contempt. The ignorance of this class, according to him, was equal to arrogance and their beneficial interference in the officers of the state was quite harmful to the society.

Kalhana has presented a graphic description in his narrative of the various punishments influenced upon these ungrateful and corrupt officials by the king Harshavaradhana, as if where with a vengeance. He is unmarked their real face by throwing light on their multipronged corrupt dealings which they adopted for cheating the people.

A young Professor (Venkatachalam 1998 has quoted) from the Institute of Development studies at Sussex University in Britain made an in depth study of the Krishna/Godavari irrigation and water management system in Andhra Pradesh, which exposed in detail institutionalized corruption. An article about this appeared in the press in October 1982 according to this study, the officials are able to manipulate supplies of water with a view to extorting money from the rich and poor farmers taking advantage of the vast distance between the main reservoir and the tail-end of the canal. According to this study the total taking from the corruption would be as much as Rupees one lakh per year. It also stated that, the officials were known to play heavy bribes to the authorities concerned for getting this lucrative post of Assistant Engineer in this irrigation system. The second level of corruptions is in the regulation of the flow of water in the fields by means of sluice gates. The hours of flow of water is done invariably between 11 p.m. and 4 a.m. a converted time for manipulation and extortion of bribes.
Suresh Kolhi (1975) has mentioned in his article "The psychology of corruption" corruption has been described by far "Eastern Economic Review" (Journal) as an "Asian lubricant" corruption in India is more deep rooted than in any other Asian country. Corruption in India starts from the top instead of the middle classes as is the case with other Asian countries. According to the editorial note of the above journals on reports of corruption from the various Asian countries "like the Gods and Goddess who abound in Asia, each with many faces many hands and many names, corruption in Asia has diverse aspects and numerous ingenious ways of extorting in illegal 'buck' currency controls, travel restrictions and the barbed wire entanglements of restrictions that are used by Asian governments in the name of economic planning have further stimulated its growth as to scarcities of resources and consumer commodities. Its the cruelest from is the exploitation of the poor who want food and medical care". Since most Asian countries are underdeveloped and are suffering from the strains of poor economic conditions and malnutrition, a certain amount of corruption is bound to exist. But the problem with India is that as time passes more and more people are swept by the wave of corruption.

K.T.Chandi (April, 1960) Prescribe standards seminar are to this issue on corruption held at Bombay. He was quoted as political commentator statement that, there can not be purity unless we are clear about what is pure. Standards of public conduct have to be prescribed in the light of changing realities. Some may say that there is corruption only when bribe is received, either financial or otherwise such a narrowing down of improper conduct is to compromise with many forms of insidious evil where motivations may not be direct or indirect financial benefits to
oneself. The love of power and the fear is losing a job, the fear incurring the displeasure of powerful groups the desire to avoid unpleasantness or painful intellectual effort are all equally strong motive forces as is a love of lucre. Corruption implies moral deterioration in nay from whatever may be the causative factors or the temptations. As a nation we must get away from the mood of compromising as that too is a form of corruption.

Mr. L. P. Singh (Quoted D.Venkatachalam-1998) a retired member of the Indian civil Service, while delivering the Amaranth the memorial lecture at Dharbhanga, Bihar in March 1983, observed that corruption the Bureaucracy had assumed, such propositions that there was no on all most universal belies that nothing could be hand without giving some kind of illegal gratifications. He quoted a middle level manufacturer as telling him that he has to pay bribes at 18 stages to get through a prefect unexceptionable proposal. In the lights of the admissions made by the two of the highest functionaries of the Government no amount of denied by If, the civil servants that corruption does not exist in administration will hold good are really honest and sincere, they should join the fight against the corruption and take every steps in its eradication.

Santhanam (1962) Committee has observed that, we were told that corruption and lack of integrity are rampant in transaction as relating to obtaining of quota certificates, essentiality certificates, license and there utilization. We were told that import licenses granted as export incentives are transferable and this cause serious damage both to domestic market and to our foreign exchange resources. It was also stated that, licenses for import of goods which are in no way connected
with the goods exported by an exporter are granted as indirect subsidy to recoup losses in exported. It was suggested to use in Bombay that export incentives should be given only on the shape of each and not as import licenses as these licenses are a fruitful source of accumulating unaccounted money and evasion of taxes.

The J. B. Kripalane committee (1953-55) on corruption confirms similar practices in the Railways. The Report says one sub contractor on the railways did enough to admit that railway contractors (Including Himself) made regular payments to the Engineering officials on a percentage basis. The following percentage break down of the amount of their bills was indicated by him.

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Engineer</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Engineer</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>P.W.D. supervisor</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Account section</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District pay clerk</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head clerk in XEN</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Misty/work in charge</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>3/4</td>
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<td>20</td>
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In another instance the same committee says that, the system of 'manual' (conventional bribe) is so universal that the givers and the takers do not think it morally wrong. There was an interesting case of a cane manager of a sugar mill issuing a following written instruction to the mill staff in charge at various sugar-cane loading centers. The following payments will be made as note below which please note and comply.
Station master----------12 per wagon
Guard----------------------3 per wagon
Driver etc-----------------2 per wagon
Loading charges--------1/4 per 100 mds

The rates of 'mamul' may appear to be low but considering the member of the wagons loaded; the amount would go into thousands. The mamuls wear regularly paid as corroborated by the entries relating to the payments in the daily cane and cash reports of the sugar mill.

The public accounts committee reported in their sixth report (third Loksabha) as follows, the committee are rather alarmed at such a large number of cases of underassessment involving considerable amount, detected in the test audit by the comptroller and auditor General when of an borne in mind that Scrutiny was limited to only a small percentage of case in 235 income taxwards out of 1310 words in country. It is significant to note that the number of cases in which defects and discrepancies involving under assessment to the extent of Rs 120,77 lakhs wear discovered amounts to about 10 percent of the total number of cases audited (i.e. 13,557 cases).

The committee tells us can exist only if there is some one willing to corrupt and capable of corrupting. We regret to say that both this willingness and capacity to corrupt is found in a large measure in the industrial and commercial classes. The ranks of these classes have been swelled by the speculators and adventures of the war period.

Mr. Swell (1975) The deputy speaker of Loksabha has charged the government of meghalaya for this kind of corruptions highlighted that public and private power or quite familiar with the sordid takes of corruption for example, the acquisition (through fraudulent and illegal means) of large areas of land by senior officials and political leaders the
abuse and exploitation of official position to enrich themselves direct by or indirect by using there relations as proxies, grant of favor to the members belonging to there case by over raiding the due procedure and over looking the claim of others by using favored officials as instrument the use of political position to defeat the purpose of judicial process; retantions of corrupt but well entrenched political basses in order to prevent loss of power in relation to apolitical party abuse of governmental machinery for party purpose launching enterprises with government support and then enriching themselves doing business with government in the name of firms owned by them bet normally managed by their wives. Use of public funds held in trust by statutory bodies to bolster U business concerns who act as financiers of public parties; and misappropriation of public funds or the inability of government to reader accounts for public expenditure.

Dilip, K Bhattacharyya and Susmita Ghosh (1988) have emphasized in their article “corruption in India and the hidden economy” this paper argues that corruption, terms of bribes and kickbacks are primarily generated by firms due to regulatory conditions. To recover the cast of bribery, firms hide their production output which then remains unrecorded in the official statistics. Hence by estimating the unrecorded income of the industrial sector, it as possible to examine the growth of corruption. A method for estimating sectoral unrecorded income is suggested in this paper, and form the estimated unrecorded income the industrial sector we demonstrate that the large increase in corruption signaled by recent reported cases are justifiable. Their empirical results also suggested that the disaggregated hidden economy estimates are more informative than aggregated estimates.
The current detection of corruption in India supports our estimation of the rate of increase in corruption from the estimated unrecorded income of the industrial sector, all though we have mentioned two sets of plausible estimates for the unrecorded income of the industrial sector; only one series of estimates is presented here. Our decision is influenced by the fact that the alternative estimates produce a similar time series movement.

We believe that we have successfully demonstrated the link between corruption and the hidden economy of the industrial sector. However it is natural to ask how the government can use this information to reduce corruptions. It is well known that to stop corrupt acts and actions have to be taken through the countries judicial system. following our approach it is possible to identify the times when corruption is increasing. Hence our method of identifying corruption will allow the government to identify the timings of the corruption and to take necessary actions to prevent further increase of corruptions.

Julian B. Roebuck and Thomas Baker (1974) have highlighted in their article "A typology of police corruption" this paper postulates an empirical typology of police corruption derived from a content analysis of the literature (1960-1972) and the police work experience of one of the authors. Police corruption is analyzed as a form of organizational deviance hinging primarily on informal police peer group norms. Contradictions among formal norms informal norms and situational rules are indicated eight type of police corruption are delineated; 1) Corruption of authority 2) Kick/backs 3) opportunistic theft 4) Shakedowns 5) Protection of illegal activities 6) The fix 7) Direct criminal activities and 8) Internal payoffs. The types are analyzed along several dimensions; i) acts and actors ii) norm violations iii) support
from peer group iv) organizational degree of deviant practices and v) police department relations.

The postulated typology does not infer a universality of any one or more types of police corruption divorced from cultural, temporal or spatial dimensions. Norms rules and sanctioning procedures pertaining to police corrupt behavior are relative in time and space; and therefore our typology would have to be empirically tested, retested and modified accordingly various types of police corrupt behavior may be where'd' in and out of any one police organization overtime periods i.e. corrupt styles may come and go, some types may be created within the context of the local situations or diffused from without.

Ambrose Pinto (1992) has highlighted institutionalized corruption in Karnataka, in this aspect mentioned in his article "Karnataka institutionalized corruption". It is concentration on Bangarappa as a chief minister of Karnataka during 1990 Bangarappa as chief minister has all but dismantled the civil service and demoralized the police force. The progressive intervention of elected politicians in the agencies of the government has led to a decomposition of the chain of command. But the party high command has not interfered, providing legitimacy to his rule, for he served party interests.

Bangarappa government patronage to the liquor lobby was transparent. On account of the civil servants closeness to the liquor lobby, he was not only brought back to the government but was made the additional chief secretary with charge of finance and exercise and later the acting chief secretary of Karnataka.

While rewarding corrupt officials and civil servants, with promotions the government also sidelined honest and sincere ones. In
that time, civil service was used in Karnataka for the collection of bribes. Transfer of officials had become a money minting business.

Balraj Mehata (1975) has revealed in his article “Black market; Black money”. The recent survey of the small scale industries, for instance revealed that more than 25 percent of those units are bogus or non existent. But they have been getting finance, raw materials, equipment and machinery on preferential basis for years. These supplies have evidently entered black market channels and have swelled unrecorded production and black market trade. This indeed is the meaning and significance of the so called parallel black money economy operating in the country. It is not something abstract and exotic. It is built in to the entire industrial and trade structure. The flourishing black market in such goods cannot possible be sustained for long except on the basis of unrecorded production and misuse of steel at different points.

There are other black professions, like the acceptance of illegal commissions by politicians and officials, which generate black money that is impossible to quantify and of course, there are traders keeping duplicate accounts, factories trying to evade excise, individuals evading taxes and host of others looking for ways of making unaccounted and untaxed money.

“The Bihar police commission report of” (1962) has highlighted on corruption that the corruption has been spread beyond the limits of general administration the police and judiciary. The problem of corruption has been considered by various police commission reports these reveal that, there is a complete unanimity among the witness on the point that corruption exists in the police and judged by its traditional and historical background. It also reveals that service of the
police increase it defying all administrative measures that have been adopted from time to time to tackle this problem. A well informed and enlightened witness who had some research in this regard favored the commission with his views. According to him force like the police could be divided in to two sections. The first section can be easily called the decision apparatus and the other is the submission or procedural apparatus. While the former takes the decision the latter attends to procedure and responsible for its execution.

The witnesses have, however not offered any concrete picture of the extent and nature of this melody. Majority of the witness are of the view that, the force in the lower rank of deputy superintendents.

In the view of this commission it is not of much practical value to ascertain accurately whether corruption has increased or decreased or is static, so long as it continues to exist it is not a minor administrative problem witnesses have indicated various opportunities that are available for resorting to corrupt practices in the discharge of people duties and also in the internal management of the force. In the past they were not considered as corrupt practice but is a democracy it is necessary that the superior officers set a high standard corruption, however should not never be judged in the narrow since and from the evidence that is available before the commission, it is cleared, that when some witness have said that there is a decrease in corruption they have awarded to the fact that there is very much less of extortion concoction and manipulation at present than before.

Das commission (Quoted in John B. Monterio 1966) summary of the charges leveled against Mr Kairon, the report says that, according to them chief minister of Punjab Sardar Pratap Sigh Kairon has brought the state of Punjab to the verge of ruin by his-mal-administration the un
abolished use of his officials position and power to derive pecuniary gains for himself the members of his family and relatives. Behind these general charges lie crimes which even when described by the Das commission in judiciary tempered language are very revealing on a charge that Mr. Kairon has use his influence to obtain an automobile agency for his son Sardar Surindar Singh Kairon has taken the advantage of his position as the son of chief minister and freely exploited the influence and power of his father for obtaining the agency and the developing his business and increasing the sales in different ways further he also dealing in the sales tax returns or making of the voluntary deposits. Without any effective step being taken against him and in getting away a pretty penalty as wholly inadequate to his lapses.

One more interesting episode in this sordid affair relates to transfer of ownership of the cinema. The letter of allotment issued in favor of Sardar Gurudit Singh has been paid no transfer of any right or little or any interests in the site shall be permitted without the previous sanction in writing of the estate officer. You will not sell the cinema site or building constructed on it and will run the same yourself for at least ten years. Within a year of this Sardar Surinder Singh wrote a letter to the estate officer intimating that Sardar Nazir Singh a partner of cinema has transformed his interest in the plot to him and playing that this plot be transferred to him. This gives a deep insight on how the civil servants and ministers moved in this affair.

Dev Dutt (Qouted by Suresh Kolhi 1975) has emphasized in his article “Corruption in political corruption as distinguished from administrative cannot be easily defined. But people are quite familiar with it. He further said that, political corruption reflects the pathological conditions of system with reference to the role of a certain
category of power elite. Every system has a character, a flavor of its own. It has also its own laws, norms, purposes and rationality and attitudes. Which for want of a better term, we call political culture. Political corruption is any action or inaction on the part of power elite and any process which leads to a major deviation from the political culture of a system motivated by oblique or extraneous considerations.

There is widespread practice of providing several benefits at concessional rates to the relatives of people in power. For instance, the political elite get timely and sometimes prior information about the ability of residential plots and agricultural land under developmental schemes, etc. In conclusion with bureaucracy, they grab land and other assets sometimes with the help of new legislation, sometimes by the use of administrative machinery and sometimes by fraud.

The second category of corruption includes the use of power and position for fringe personal benefits. For instance, free personal services not normally permitted for official duties i.e. to supply women, transport health requirements, to expedite action on cases pending in ministries, shopping spree, foreign visits, to get jobs for their relatives, etc.

Professor Herwitz's (quoted by John B. Monteiro-1996) has delivered public lectures in Britain and wrote a series of two articles for the modern revive, Calcutta, in early 1962, advocating an ombudsman for India, it was a lonely voice crying in the wilderness. Since then, men/better qualified and highly placed have advocated the institution for India and with good results. It looks as though India is on the threshold of accepting this institution.
It is important to realize that such an institution cannot cure all administrative ills. It will work successfully in a country, province or state that is already reasonably well governed. Where an administration is riddled with political patronage or corruption the problem is too big for an ombudsman and a reform of the whole system is required. Even where this is not the case, the need for additional protection against arbitrary administrative action is now so great in most commonwealth countries that other reforms will be needed if the institution is not to become overloaded.

Binayak Prasad (civil service chronicle October-2001) has explained in his article corruption at public places' an overview since independence. Assessing the enormity of his problem of the Supreme Court of India while giving a historic Judgment August 2001 remarked that, the tentacles of corruption for the protection of republic. If not intercepted and impeded form gripping the normal and orderly functioning of public offices through strong legislation executive and judicial exercises, the corrupt public servants could even paralyze the functioning of such institution and thereby hinder the democratic polity.

Dr.D.L.Sharma (1999) has emphasized in his essay on corruption; a Sociological Diagnosis. This essay is therefore designed to look at corruption from sociological perspective i.e. to bring in sharp focus its social dimensions without of course losing sight of other dimensions. In the interest of systematic exposition this essay is organized in to five parts. Part-I seeks to clarify the concept of corruption and distinguish its various forms. Part -II sketches its rising graph and increasing social acceptability in India. Part-III probes deep into its social causation. Part-
IV outlines its social effects. Part-V presents some policy positions to combat corruption.

It has become more widespread in the present times than ever before. We now witness corruption not only in bureaucracy and politics but also in industry and professions.

Corruption lies in the interface of the genetic composition of the individual and pattern of socialization. Not all individuals are alike in their genetic composition nor are they exposed to the same pattern of socialization. Some may have certain kinds of hormones in greater strength than others; some may be exposed to a balanced pattern of socialization while others may go through faulty socialization.

Given the variation in the genetic composition and the kind of socialization experiences of the various individuals, they are bound to vary in their ability to conform to social norms. Some of them are thus bound to take recourse to deviance from the given rules and norms. That explains why corruption like other forms of deviance is endemic in social organization.

Vinoda Parvala (1996) has collected for the study primarily through detailed interviews with selected members of five groups of elites in Andra Pradesh i.e. the political elites, the bureaucratic elites, the business elites, the judicial elites and media elites.

The study explores the fluidity of the concept of corruption and shows how the ambiguous and varied perception of the phenomenon of the corruption among the elites give raise politics of definition. The relative importance accorded to the problem of corruption by various elites is also interpreted in terms of the instrumental as well as symbolic functions such a rating serves for the different groups.
Problematicizes the objective etiologies of corruption constructed by most scholars and points out that the question of what causes of corruption is far from an uncontested terrain. It seeks to map out three contending doctrine of horrible consequences and the doctrine minimal consequences the doctrine of horrible consequences and the doctrine of positive consequences as they emerge from the elites response.

He had investigated the major institutional and other mechanisms in Andra Pradesh that are engaged in anti-corruption work within a framework of force and discourse.

Finally he offers a synthesis of the main arguments presented in the main arguments, presented in the constructed and negotiated character of the problem of corruption in Andra Pradesh and in India as a whole. It is pointed out that the response of the elites to various issues concerning corruption from a coherent and unified field of reality constructed by them. Further, he explores the structural linkages of interaction and influence among the between the various elite groups in order to demonstrate the contested and negotiated character of corruption.

Raj Gill (1975) has emphasized in his article “corruption in press”, that the press in India was corrupt as it will be absurd to exonerate it absolutely from this taint. The press in India largely is not corrupt. But it has been showing festering spots.

In 1967 General elections a leading political figure deputed a person of considerable status to look after the newsmen touring that particular constituency. The arrangements included free jeeps, accommodation in hotels and boozing and feasting once again it was a young defiant women reporter who exposed the racket. Later in another election, mid-term state assembly election to be precise, liberal use of
free transport, VIP lodging and boarding were the incentives offered to the guilible and weak newsman. Larger majority did their job honestly.

On the official front the forms of corruption are similar to that on the political front. The two parties have to reciprocate in order to earn the favors of newsmen. The objective of the official through is from the politician. He might need help of an influential newsmen to have his promotion case pushed up or to get a wet posting or to get a case against him filed that is mostly concerning his carrier or misdeed.

The inducements they offer also include Radio and T.V. assignment, ministerial entourage trips both in inland and abroad, remunerative book and pamphlet assignments, titles and awards memberships of official and committees getting criminal or other cases dropped and inquires scotched.

Surinder S. Jadhaka (1995) has emphasized in his research article “Bureaucratization, corruption and Depoliticisation” changing profile of credit co-operative societies in Rural Haryana. It based on intensive field study of three villages and three primary agricultural credit societies (PACS) selected from an agriculturally developed district of Haryana. The article argues that the success of the green revolution technology and the introduction of a new organization structure of the PACS have led to significant changes in the working of credit cooperatives.

The green revolution technology helped the big and the very big farmers to generate sizeable surplus. They no more depended on PACS for short-term crop loans. Their surplus took care of the short-term requirements.

Simultaneous bureaucratization of the PACS in the mid 1970's shifted the defactopower from managing committee and the elected
president to the secretary an Official appointed by district co-operative banks. The office of the president no longer offered a source of power and patronage. These developments have led to i) a withdrawal of the dominant Interest from the working of PACS leading to a near complete “Depoliticisation” of the institution ii) the Depoliticisation has transformed the institution in to a “typical corrupt organization of the state government and iii) the PACS have gradually became a source of credit for middle and small farmers and some non-agriculturalist members.

The change in social composition of active members, the bureaucratization of the institution and proper utilization of the PACS loans has resulted in a significant decline in default. Though there are many dead accounts-mostly because of default those who are currently active did not default very often. Most of the new organizational come into existence in 1976. There are some causes of willful default but most of these are of contingent nature rather than reflective of any trend. Apart from this work, one finds hardly a few published articles and books as conceptualization of the problem of corruption in the view of P.G students and Research scholars. And the fact that the phenomenon of corruption in Indian context, needs to be better understood and empirically explored gains significance in the absence of systematic and empirical studies undertaken in this field.