CHAPTER VI

PAKISTAN OR NO PAKISTAN?

Pakistan - an old idea:

The rift between the Muslim League and the Congress on the constitutional problem was growing wider with the implementation of the Provincial part of the 1935 Act. Similarly, the non-implementation of the Federal part of the Act contributed to it, and to the eventual partition of the country. Its defects apart, the Federal part had the merit of bringing about the unity of India, as Mr. V.P. Menon opines: "... if the all-India federation had materialised, it would have been the coping-stone to their (the British) contribution, and it would have made partition impossible." ¹ As explained in the foregoing, the league was completely frustrated over the outcome of the General Elections of 1937 and Mr. Jinnah forgot his own stance all along. He was, as is well-known, not an uncompromising communalist. But even he started condemning the provincial autonomy and the federal scheme — of course now on different grounds. He pointed out the so-called 'atrocities' by the Congress Ministries in the Provinces and declared that the interests of the Muslims

1. An Outline of Indian Constitutional History; 1965; p. 45.
and other minorities in the country would be at further jeopardy, if the Federal scheme of the 1935 Act were also to be implemented. He also expressed his opposition to 'a democratic system of parliamentary government'. He viewed it as a scheme favoured by the Congress to undermine the minorities' interests as it was based on 'counting of heads'. Such a system of government was not suitable to a vast country like India 'with different nationalities'. A Resolution of the Working Committee of the League of August 8, 1939 bitterly complained that the hopes once cherished by the Muslims that their position would be secured by the 'safeguards', had proved a complete illusion in the face of 'a permanent hostile communal majority', and it censured 'the utter neglect and indifference shown by the Viceroy and the Governors in the Congress Provinces in exercising their special powers to protect and secure justice to the minorities'.

This resolution reflected the change in the approach of the League. It was also a complete transformation in the outlook of Mr. Jinnah. Mr. Jinnah was all along an avowed nationalist, fighting for safeguards for his people. But he was driven to the desperate position of becoming a die-hard communalist. In the second place, he was also to become the man of the masses, which he was not, before.

Finally, there was a major ideological transformation in the League's stand and that was in the form of an awareness of being a separate national group. The nationalist feeling of the Muslims became more articulate. They ceased to think that they were merely a minority community. With this transformation, there was bound to be a change in their concept of the ultimate destiny.

It is in the light of these developments that one has to view the subsequent transformations in the Muslims' outlook. The League started to think in terms of formulating its own plans; and the Resolution passed at the Provincial Conference of the League at Harar in October 1938 needs a special mention in this connection. It recommended to the All-India Muslim League to review the entire question of what should be a suitable constitution for India, which will secure an honourable and legitimate status due to the Muslims, and further devise a scheme of constitution under which the Muslims may attain full independence. In the wake of the Harar Resolution came the Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League of March 24, 1940 demanding the creation of a separate state for the Muslims, comprising the Muslim-majority areas. The Lahore Resolution rejected the 1935 Reforms and called for a reconsideration of the reforms de novo, and it should be framed with the approval of the League.
It further:

Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign; that adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitutions for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Muslims are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them. 3

This Resolution of the Muslim-League started the

nation and kicked up a dust of controversy. But very often, this demand of the League and the attendant controversy was discussed and approached on purely sentimental grounds. To Ambedkar, there was nothing new and nothing startling in the Resolution. To any one who had followed the developments regarding the Hindu-Muslim antagonism, the tendency must have been clearly discernible and apparent. According to Ambedkar the demand for Pakistan was not the "...result of mere political distemper, ...it is a characteristic in the biological sense of the term, which the Muslim body politic has developed in the same manner as an organism develops a characteristic..." He was "not indignant about it; nor do I believe", he wrote, "that it can be smashed by shooting into similes and metaphors..." Such an interpretation of the Muslim attitude and the Lahore Resolution could come only from one who had thought over the problem without prejudice or preconceived notions.

The Resolution was an inevitable and logical culmination of the Muslim politics of India then. In his 'Residential Address to the League's Annual Session at Lahore in 1930 Sir Muhammad Iqbal had declared: "...I would like to see the Punjab, the North-West Frontier

4. *Pakistan or the Partition of India; 1946; p.xv.*
Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British empire and the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Moslem State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Moslems at least of North-West India. Of course, Sir Iqbal was not contemplating then, a separate sovereign Moslem State, as could be gathered from the remaining portions of his speech. Perhaps, he was only suggesting a consolidation of the Moslem areas of the North-West. Even this limited proposal for Muslim consolidation was not accepted then.

The idea of a separate Muslim state seems to have been first 'aired among the members of a group of young Indians in England at the time of the Round Table Conference'. This scheme was not viewed seriously by anyone and even the spokesmen of the Muslim League were reported to have dismissed it as a mere students' scheme, being 'chimerical and impracticable'. It was asked then: "while Burma is being separated from Hindoostan, it remains a mystery to us why Pakistan ... is to be forced into the Indian Federation". The scheme of Mr. Rahmat Ali was not favoured even by the British then, as they thought it


would be something of 'a revival of the old Muslim Empire' idea.

There were yet other plans proposed by individuals like Dr. Syed Abdul Latif, Sir Abdulla Haroon, Nawab Sir Muhammed Shah Nawaz Khan, Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, the Premier of the Punjab, and others. All these proposals came from individuals, mostly with an academic interest. Sir, Sikandar's scheme was viewed with some importance as it came from the Prime Minister of the Punjab. The importance of the Lahore Resolution, hence, lay in the fact that for the first time the Muslim League put forth the demand for a separate Muslim state as its 'official policy' and as the 'objective' to be achieved. The Resolution was also significant, as it made the creation of Pakistan a condition-precedent to any agreement with the Congress and the British before the transfer of power to Indian hands.

Ambedkar and the Demand for Pakistan:

It is already pointed out that Ambedkar tried to look at the demand for Pakistan as a dispassionate observer. His views were those of an individual, interested in placing before the public the facts of the situation in helping them to form their own opinions on this important issue. He was not applying standards of
speculative philosophy, as he was never one such, and his approach was that of a pragmatist. He also tried to be free from sentiments and emotions, as it would only vitiate the issue. So to him, the demand for Pakistan was in the natural course of development. The Lahore Resolution was only giving expression to what had happened in the country. This idea of "linking of these provinces", says Ambedkar, "is an age-old project put forth by successive Viceroy's, Administrators and Generals ... Punjab and North-West Frontier Province constituted a single province ever since Punjab was conquered by the British in 1849." 7 This continued to be so till 1901.

As to the Sind, if Punjab were to be under the British control by then, it would have been connected with Punjab. In the absence of it, Sind had to be tagged on to Bombay Province -- the only place from where Sind could be administered! Once the Punjab was conquered, the idea of joining Sind with Punjab was mooted, but was postponed on grounds of financial difficulties, lack of communications etc. There was also a proposal to create a trans-Indus Province which was not approved by the Secretary of State. "Had the British not acquired Baluchistan", wrote Ambedkar, "and had Lord Curson not thought of carving out the N-W.F.P. out of the Punjab, we would have witnessed long ago the creation of Pakistan as an administrative unit" —

7. Pakistan or the Partition of India; 1946; p.6.
though not as a separate state. Of course, then, such a question did not arise at all. 8

Even with regard to the demand for the Muslim areas in the Eastern part of the country, the idea was not new and strange. In this connection, the partition of Bengal in 1905 by Lord Curzon must be mentioned. Bengal was partitioned into Eastern and Western Bengal for administrative purposes, as claimed by Lord Curzon. But in fact it was an attempt to create a Muslim state in Eastern Bengal in as much as the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was, barring parts of Assam, a predominantly Muslim area ... If the partition of Bengal had not been annulled (in the year 1911), says Ambedkar, "the Muslim State in Eastern Bengal, instead of being a new project, would now have been 39 years old." 9

Further, the demand for Pakistan need not have come as a shocking proposition at all. It was quite in tune with the approach of the Congress party to the principle of carving out Linguistic Provinces. The Indian National Congress had accepted the principle of Linguistic Provinces in its programme, and it had adopted the linguistic principle for organising the Provincial branches. As it

was understood in the beginning, provinces were to be created purely on considerations of language and not of area, population, or finances. If such separation could be acceptable on linguistic grounds, why not separation of Pakistan on a more comprehensive principle of culture? The distinction between language and culture was not so serious and distinctive to Ambedkar. He said: "Linguistic difference is another name for cultural difference". He went even to the extent of asking "If there is nothing shocking in the separation of Karnataka and Andhra, what is there to shock in the demand for the separation of Pakistan?" He continued: "If it is disruptive in its effect, it is no more disruptive than the separation of Hindu provinces such as Karnataka from Maharashtra or Andhra from Madras. Pakistan is merely another manifestation of a cultural unit demanding freedom for the growth of its own distinctive culture." 10

Ambedkar seems to have adopted the same line of argument that was put forward for linguistic provinces to substantiate the demand for Pakistan. He seems to have believed that if linguistic provinces are necessary for the cultural and other developments, so also Pakistan for Muslims — a strange analogy! Ambedkar oversimplified the entire problem. He obviously overlooked the most

10. Ibid, p. 10.
fundamental difference between the two demands. The demand for creating linguistic provinces concerned only with the re-organising the then British Indian provinces chiefly on linguistic considerations, so that people speaking a particular language would constitute into a single administrative unit. It was hoped, that such a redrawing of the provinces within the Indian federation would provide a more convenient and natural basis for drawing the boundaries. This demand was never guided by any secessionist tendency. It was not that at all; whereas the demand for Pakistan, in terms of the Lahore Resolution was clearly for a separate sovereign State for Muslims to function independently. Ambedkar's contention would have been valid if the Muslim demand was only to re-organise the administrative units in the north-west and north-east on similar principles as that of linguistic provinces within the Indian polity. Hence his contention in this respect was rather misleading and he ignored the most obvious and a fundamental difference between the two claims. Anyway it was a poor and an inappropriate analogy that Ambedkar gave.

'A Nation Calling for a Home' — the Muslim case for Pakistan:

The Muslim demand for a separate state of their own was made in para 3 of the Lahore Resolution quoted above.

This para contains the demand that the areas in
which there is a predominant Muslim population should be incorporated into an independent state. In other words, it meant that the Punjab, the North-Western frontier province, Baluchistan and Sind in the North-West and Bengal in the East, instead of remaining as British Indian provinces, should be carved out as independent states outside British India. The language used in the resolution was rather ambiguous. But the basic demand was that these areas are to be separated from India and formed into a separate State.

The Muslim demand was based on the following grounds: (i) That "the Muslims by themselves constitute a separate nation and desire to have a national home" of their own; and (ii) because experience shows that the Hindus want to use their majority to treat the Muslims as though they were second class citizens in an alien state. 11

So there were two questions to be answered: whether the Muslims constituted a separate national group; and whether their position in a composite India would be what they feared to be. To take up the questions in the same order, the Muslims claimed that they did form a distinct and separate nationality in India. They were distinct from the Hindus in all respects, that is language,

religion, culture, historical traditions, their aspirations and such other fundamentals, though they were inhabiting the same land for centuries, which was due to historical accidents.

Ambedkar thought on similar lines. He believed that the Muslims of India constituted a separate and exclusive group to qualify themselves for a separate nationality. He proceeded on the basis of the definition of a nation given by Renan. To him "Nationality is a social feeling. It is a feeling of corporate sentiment of oneness which makes those who are charged with it feel that they are kith and kin. This national feeling... is at once a feeling of fellowship for one's own kith and kin and an anti-fellowship feeling for those who are not one's own kith and kin. It is a feeling of 'consciousness of kind' which on the one hand binds together those who have it, so strongly that it over-rides all differences arising out of economic conflicts or social gradations and, on the other, severs them from those who are not of their kind. It is a longing not to belong to any other group". The feeling of nationality is a double-edged weapon, which sometimes may help to bind a people together into a strong and eternal bond of union. On the other hand, it may also drive a wedge and separate a people to such hopeless proportions as to

make them develop invidious attitude for each other. The estrangement would be the natural outcome of the fears and suspicions that may creep into the relations among the two groups, particularly by the smaller group towards the dominant group. With this psychological attitude, the very feelings of nationality will be worked-up to such a pitch that they may reach a point of no return. That such a phenomenon was in operation is very clear from the analysis, given in the preceding chapter, of Hindu-Muslim relations in Indian politics. Looking back on these trends, one can easily formulate the following views, as Ambedkar did, as to the characteristics of the Muslims in India: (a) That they formed in themselves an exclusive group; (b) that they had come to develop a consciousness of kind; and (c) that the Muslims were possessed of a longing to belong to their own particular group and not to any other group that was non-Muslim. Naturally, the Muslim claim that they formed a separate nation must be accepted without any cavil. So much for their claim for a separate nationhood.

The other important point made by the Muslims was that only in a separate state of their own, their interests will be safe. They were bound to suffer, they believed, from indignities, oppressions and discriminations in a composite Indian polity, in which the
Hindu majority would dominate. To accept a single polity, and under one single Central Government for both Hindus and Muslims, would mean an abject surrender by Muslims and sure degradation. It was to 'escape from this degradation' that they clamoured for a polity of their own. They also argued, that once their claim for a separate nationality is conceded, the right of nations for self-determination would follow — a principle that was adumbrated in the Treaty of Versailles and which guided the territorial re-adjustments in Europe subsequently. Since then, nationalism has formed an adequate justification for creating mono-national states of the conception of John Stuart Mill, who declared: "It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities." Such a theory of nationality has also come to be 'imbedded in the democratic theory of the will of the people'. "This means", says Ambedkar, "that the demand by a nationality for a national state does not require to be supported by any list of grievances. The will of the people is enough to justify it". The Muslims in India did have some grievances, as they pointed out from time to time. Their experience under the Congress rule had shown them that mere constitutional safeguards would not be helpful to 'save them from the tyranny of the Hindu majority'. It may be

recalled here that the Hindu-Muslim antagonism was
deepened because of the refusal by the Congress to
recognise the Muslim League as the only representative
body of the Muslims, which it was not; and the refusal
by the Congress to form Coalition Ministries. But the
fact remained that the League, though was not the only
or the most representative Muslim organisation, had
managed to make itself the most vocal and clamorous,
perhaps due to the fact that it had the patronage and the
blessings of the British. Ambedkar thought, the Congress
should not have had any compunction to deal with it
( the League ) for the purpose of effecting a settlement
of the Hindu-Muslim question. The Muslims", he wrote,
"rightly interpret this attitude of the Congress as
an attempt to create divisions among them with a view to
cause confusion in their ranks and weaken their front." 14
Ambedkar, perhaps, thought that since the Congress
residents and Mr. Gandhi himself had chosen to
correspond and discuss in person with Mr. Jinnah as the
leader of the League, the Congress ought not to have
found any difficulty in recognising the League as the most
important Muslim organisation, though not the only
organisation. The Congress, however, argued on its
part that all the grievances of the Muslims, if any,
would be looked into and adequate safeguards would be

provided. But the feeling among the Muslims was that they were going to be 'subject races' under the proposed Swaraj Constitution, with Hindus constituting the governing class. That the minorities wanted was the recognition of their self-respect at the hands of the Congress than for mere good deeds on the part of the Congress. According to Ambedkar, no Indian, as a matter of fact, would argue for the retention of the British rule, just because it had done some good things. It was a question of one's own self-respect. A good government can never be a substitute for self-government. There is a limit to the sense of gratitude a people can be expected to show to others for their good deeds. Ambedkar, quoting the Irish patriot Daniel O'Connell, who had declared: "no man can be grateful at the cost of his self-respect, no woman can be grateful at the cost of her chastity, and no nation can be grateful at the cost of its honour", gave the required perspective to the Muslim demand. The Congress by refusing to agree to share power with the 'effective representatives' of the minority communities, only strengthened such an apprehension in the minds of the minorities. It is also important to understand the psychology of the Indian Muslims at the time of the demand. They constituted the ruling class for quite a long period in Indian history. Their position, ever since the advent of the British, was one of a subject race along with the Hindus. When once the British withdrew from India they
were to come under the Hindu rule. So their demand for a separate state was the 'proverbial last straw'. Ambedkar giving a list of grievances of the Muslims said: "From masters to fellow subjects was degradation enough, but a change from the status of fellow subjects to that of subjects of the Hindus is really humiliation. As it unnatural, ask the Muslims, if they seek an escape from so intolerable a position by the creation of separate national states, in which the Muslims can find a peaceful home and in which the conflict between a ruling race and a subject race can find no place to plague their lives?" 15

Thus, the Muslim case for Pakistan was presented by Ambedkar with enough justification in its favour. But one important thing that emerges from this discussion is that the Muslims, apart from any other thing, did not have the will and the desire to continue to be fellow-citizens with the Hindus in a composite India. Their demand had become so strong that it was almost irresistible. This was clearly and powerfully voiced by Mr. Jinnah in his "residential Address to the Thirtieth Session of the League in April, 1943. His utterances were sharper, and made with a new emphasis unlike on previous occasions. He said: "... the quickest way to the freedom of the people of India, both Hindus and Muslims, is Pakistan." He further charged the Congressmen of trying to "turn the whole of India into a Gandhi ashram"; but a Hindu Raj, he declared vehemently, 15. Ibid, pp. 31-32.
would be resisted "as long as life is left in a single Moslem". It is clear from this that the Muslims were determined to have Pakistan.

'The Hindu Case Against Pakistan' — Refuted:

The Hindu viewpoint, as it was expressed chiefly by the Indian National Congress and by individuals and other agencies, was that there was no point in the Muslim claim for a separate nation. The consensus was against any partition and vivisection of the country. They were not prepared to accept the viewpoint that the Muslims constituted a separate nationality in India. It was only one of the many minority communities that made the Indian nation. They argued that the Indian social life being what it was, there was a certain bond of integration between Muslim and Hindu society. There were no racial differences between the Hindus and the Indian Muslim, and besides, there was also linguistic unity. Historically speaking, the Hindus and Muslims lived together for centuries as to make them one people. India, moreover, is not claimed as the land of the Hindus or the Muslims exclusively. Hindus have all along followed a policy of religious tolerance towards Islam. They were free to profess their religion without any let or hindrance.

16. The Times of India, April, 26, 1943.
Islam had thrived in India as much as any other religion, like Christianity, Buddhism, let alone Hinduism. Such being the case, why should the Muslims think that they were different and their interests would not be safe in a composite polity of the composite India? - asked the Hindus.

Apart from these considerations the opposition to the Pakistan scheme was also due to the following reasons:

1. It involved the breaking-up of the unity of India.
2. The defence of India would be weakened.
3. The Communal problem would remain unsolved.

These objections were very well reflected in the writings of Dr. Jawaharlal Nehru also. While discussing the Cripps proposals, he had expressed against partition in the following words:

Any proposal to cut up India into parts was a painful one to contemplate; it went against all those deeply-felt sentiments and convictions that move people so powerfully. The whole nationalist movement of India had been based on India's unity, but the sentiment was older and deeper than the present phase of nationalism; it went far back into the remote periods of Indian history...

Apart from sentiment, there were solid reasons against partition. The social
and economic problems of India had reached a crisis, chiefly because of the policy of the British Government, which necessitated rapid and all-round progress if the gravest of disasters had to be averted. That progress could only take place with real and effective planning for the whole of India, for the various parts supplied each other's deficiencies. As a whole, India was to a large extent a powerful and self-sufficient unit, but each part by itself would be weak and dependent on others... To think of partitioning India at this stage went against the whole current of modern historical and economic development. It seemed to be fantastic in the extreme....

... this proposal was not a mere acceptance of Pakistan or a particular partition, but as that would have been, but something much worse, opening the door to the possibility of an indefinite number of partitions. It was a continuing menace to the freedom of India and a barrier to the fulfilment of the very promise that had been made.

The proposal for partition, it was thought, would lead to a number of difficulties. It would not be the end of a trouble but the beginning of a series of troubles.

17. The Discovery of India, 1966 edn. pp. 483-84
It would, according to Mr. Nehru, incite "all the reactionary, feudal, and socially backward groups to claim partition." Hence, he thought, it was not desirable in modern times to fall back upon such medieval and feudalistic solutions, but he came to accept the demand later on, not because it was justifiable in law and logic, but because it became unavoidable, and under the stress of circumstances. He, perhaps, realised that necessity knows neither law nor logic. The Congress also acquiesced to the Muslim demand later, as it was made a condition precedent for Indian independence. The Party was in a mood to count upon the present considerations in preference to the future ones, solely.

The opposition to the Pakistan demand could be classified into two broad categories, which formed the basis of Hindu argument: (1) sentimental ones; and (2) the practical difficulties and disadvantages. Ambedkar, as we know, always detested a sentimental approach to such socio-political problems that had to be examined on most pragmatic considerations. According to him, all points of historical contacts and unity were true to a point. It was also true that there were certain common features. They were, according to him, not the result of a conscious attempt to adopt to each other's ways. It was due to causes that were purely a part of the social
dynamics. The common features that were visible were due to the common environment to which both Hindus and Muslims were subjected for centuries. "The Hindu", according to Ambedkar, "is mistaking what is accidental and superficial for what is essential and fundamental."\(^{18}\)

In spite of these so-called common features, Indian history is full of wars between Hindus and Muslims and of communal riots. Both in the religious and political fields, the two peoples have had their mutual animosities. What environment, or race, or language can do in formulating a nation is very much limited. As Renan argued:

\[\text{It is no more the land than the race that makes a nation. The land provides a substratum, the field of battle and work; man provides the soul; man is everything in the formation of that sacred thing which is called a people. Nothing of material nature suffices for it ... A nation is a living soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which is true, are but one, constitute this soul.... One is the common possession of a rich heritage of memories; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together...}^{19}\]

\(^{18}\) *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, p. 18.

In the absence of these two things: (a) the actual consent; and (b) the desire to live together; and in the absence of rich heritage of memories, it was only wise and realistic to concede the Muslim demand.

The second part of the opposition to Pakistan scheme was on account of the attendant difficulties, and the consequent evil effects inherent in the scheme, which were terrible by any estimate. Such an apprehension was justified. But the point that one had reached in the constitutional and political development of the country was such that one had to grapple with the problem, however unpleasant it was. The difficulties were bound to be there. The Hindu argument that the areas demanded by the Muslims formed an integral part of North India, i.e., Aryavarta, historically and traditionally. This fact, however, could not be denied. But history bears testimony that the unity of northern India came to be broken up severely in the wake of Muslim invasions of India, and their rule for over seven centuries. They were out to destroy the Hindu faith by looting and plundering the Hindu kingdoms and temples and large-scale conversions of the Hindus to Islam under military threat and other forms of compulsion. 'Death or Islam' was the painful alternative before the Hindus during this long period of communal vandalism that was perpetrated
in the name of religion in the history of India. In the light of these historical truths, how could one hold that they constituted one single people? The consequences of Muslim invasions, said Ambedkar, have, therefore, "so profoundly altered the culture and character of northern areas, which it is now proposed to be included in Pakistan, that there is not only no unity between that area and the rest of India but that there is as a matter of fact a real antipathy between the two." So one should guard against any such historical sentiment. As Prof. Arnold Toynbee warns: "We must be on our guard against 'historical sentiment,' that is, against arguments taken from conditions which once existed or were supposed to exist, but which are no longer real at the present moment." This warning could not be ignored. As an aftermath of Muslim invasions and their imperial rule in India, one came across nothing but bitterness between the two, which was removed even under nearly two centuries of an unifying British rule, and political life. Besides, there was also a heavy deposit of Islamic culture on the land and one of the chief objectives of the Muslim invasions was to plant the seed of Islam, which was probably the only positive aspect of their rule and that too at the cost of Hinduism! Commenting on the effects of this so-called positive role of the Muslim rule,

20. Ibid, p. 46.
Ambedkar wrote:

The growth of this plant is remarkable. It is not a summer sapling. It is as great and as strong as an oak. Its growth is the thickest in Northern India. The successive invasions have deposited their 'silt' more there (in the North) than anywhere else, and have served as watering exercises of devoted gardeners. Its growth is so thick in Northern India that the remnants of Hindu and Buddhist culture are just shrubs. Even the Sikh axe could not fell this oak. It is only an unimaginative person who could fail to take notice of these facts or insist in the face of them that Pakistan means breaking up into two what is one whole. 21

The unity between the two areas, hence, was a myth. 21

Unity to be real, need not be geographical alone but it should be a spiritual one based on most abiding characteristics 'of kinship' and 'a feeling of being the kindred'. Ambedkar cited the instance of separation of Burma from India — the spiritual unity among which was stronger—to ask: "if the Hindus did not object to the severance of Burma from India, it is difficult to understand how the

Hindus can object to the severance of an area like Pakistan, which, to repeat, is politically detachable from, socially hostile and spiritually alien to, the rest of India. 22 Of course it is true, in the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, "Unity is always better than disunity, but an enforced unity is a sham and dangerous affair, full of explosive possibilities. Unity must be of the mind and heart, a sense of belonging together and of facing together those who attack it. I am convinced that there is that basic unity in India, but it has been overlaid and hidden to some extent by other forces. These latter may be temporary and artificial and may pass off, but they count to-day and no man can ignore them." 23 He was, perhaps inclined to think that partition was becoming inevitable due to the developments all along and he was right, for necessity knows no law or logic.

The next point in the arguments of the opponents of the Pakistan scheme was that it would weaken the defence of the country. The Pakistan scheme, if and when put through, would amount to the creation of a neighbour on both sides of India, who may not be friendly always. It will also weaken the frontiers by creating an unscientifically drawn frontier and also the armed forces. 24 Finally, it will create the problem of adequacy of

22. Ibid, p. 49.
resources for purposes of defence.

This was a formidable and forceful argument that had to be faced by the proponents of the Pakistan scheme. This can be viewed in retrospect in the light of that since the relations between Pakistan and India since partition, which have been never cordial. There are a number of irritants over issues like the Kashmir, the canal waters distribution, the evacuees' property, border violations and a number of other problems which have not been settled. Pakistan went even to the extent of committing unprovoked military aggression upon India in September, 1965 in an unholy collusion with China, and also misusing the American arms that were given to contain Communism! Neither the facts of the situation nor the international considerations warranted a resort to, and the use of military strength by Pakistan. Even after the termination of the war and acceptance of the Tashkent Declaration, the relations have not been cordial. Still the cloud of war hangs over the people. One of the most direct impacts of this situation in the Indo-Pak relations is the stepping up of military expenditure on both sides, to the utter detriment of their economic development. Is this due to the weak frontiers or a weak army?, or due to the attitude of Pakistan herself? It is now established, and the outcome of the war justifies
the view — that the inimical attitude of the Pakistani leaders is largely responsible for such an unfortunate situation. One may be inclined to think now, in retrospect, that if the Pakistan scheme were to be shelved then only, the problem would not have been there. But such an approach is hardly realistic and prudent. As examined already, nothing could have prevented the birth of Pakistan.

Ambedkar took pains, still, to examine the objections on grounds of defence, and he was of the opinion that the creation of Pakistan would not weaken the defence of the country. On the other hand, he contended, it will give India a more scientifically drawn and homogeneous frontier, and above all, a highly dependable armed force. From the point of view of resources also, India will be in a more advantageous position than Pakistan. He substantiated his arguments, in his characteristic way, by digging out a mass of facts and figures that would be helpful in convincing even the most recalcitrant person.

'Scientific Frontier' — a myth!

As to the question of a scientific frontier, Ambedkar thought, that it was nothing but a myth. If by a scientific
frontier it is meant that it should be a natural border that would be impregnable, then the very approach would be wrong. Geographical conditions, which were once considered to be decisive in such matters, are no longer so. The geo-political scientists like Sir Halford Mackinder, Karl Hanshofer and others who belonged to the determinist school, thought in the early part of the century that geography and geographical conditions alone determined the military and foreign policy of a country — its strength or weakness. Such a belief, which motivated leaders like Hitler and Mussolini to launch upon a policy of military expansion, is no longer valid and tenable. In the present world, with the highly developed and sophisticated techniques of war and defence, the natural frontiers are robbed of their former importance. 'Even where they are mighty mountains, the broadest streams, widest seas or far stretching deserts; they are no longer impregnable. The science of geo-politics is considerably modified and it has developed a new theory of "geographic possibility" in place of geographical determination. Moreover it is not possible to make a frontier scientific by drawing it on ethnologically homogeneous lines. In fact, while discussing the frontiers' problem in the North-west India, Mr. Davies said in his book "North-West Frontier" — "It would be impossible to demarcate on the North-west of our Indian Empire a frontier which would
satisfy ethnological, political and military requirements. To seek for a zone which traverses easily definable geographical features, which does not violate ethnic considerations by cutting through the territories of closely related tribes, and which at the same time serves as a political boundary, is utopian. The Pakistan scheme, according to Ambedkar, will only bring the boundary of Hindustan back to the Indus River. Hence there need not be any apprehensions on this count.

Furthermore, in the present scientific and technological era, given sufficient resources, a nation can overcome any difficulty that it might face by way of weak frontiers. Ambedkar thought, with a population of 80,283,931 and 178,513,919 and a revenue of Rs. 60,05,38,326 and Rs. 96,24,05,206 for Pakistan and India respectively (at that time) Hindustan will have adequate resources for its defence, taking into consideration the area, population and revenue.

A Safe Army — more important for defence:

The question of fighting forces, which occupies a more important place in a discussion on a country’s fighting ability, needed a careful scrutiny. The human factor is more important than a scientific frontier.

24. Quoted in Pakistan or the Partition of India, pp.51-52.
which can only create a sense of security in the minds of the people. On the other hand, a people may become even complacent, when they are under the illusion of a safe frontier, which is more dangerous. The opponents of Pakistan scheme pointed out that the armed forces of undivided India contained a heavy percentage of soldiers drawn from areas that were proposed to be separated from India. Even the Simon Commission Report testified to this fact and had come to the conclusion that only those areas coming under Pakistan can produce soldiers and that under Hindustan cannot.

Such a conclusion was based on, in the first place, the actual figures as to the composition of the Indian Army. Secondly, it was also based on an erroneous belief that only the people belonging to a particular area — the North-West — constituted the 'martial races'. The theory of martial races was nothing but a mythical conception and a bogey that was raised by the British rulers to justify their policy of discriminatory recruitment to armed forces. It was true that the British were drawing heavily for recruitment from these areas, particularly after the 1857 Mutiny. Before the Mutiny the percentage was almost negligible. How can a people come to be looked upon as a 'martial race' overnight? The conclusion of the Simon Commission was, therefore, untenable
and erroneous. As a matter of fact the Special Army Committee of 1879, which had an occasion to examine this question, had observed to the contrary; when it said that the predominance of the North-Westerners in the armed forces 'had nothing to do with their alleged fighting qualities but was due to the fact, that they helped the British to suppress the Mutiny in which the Bengal Army was so completely involved'. What happened after the Mutiny was, the British radically altered their recruitment policy, guided by its lessons, to eliminate those who were hostile and with a view to preventing any possible collusion among the armed personnel to rise in a rebellion against the British. Another study of the problem by an Indian expert also comes to similar conclusions. Mr. Chaudhri in his articles on 'The Martial Races of India' published in the Modern Review of July and September 1930; and of January and February 1931; concluded that such a distinction would be arbitrary and artificial. It had nothing to do with the fighting abilities of a people of certain areas. It may be recalled here, with a justifiable sense of pride, that during the time of Indo-Pak armed conflict of 1965, the Indian Army and Air Force were acknowledged superior to that of their counterparts, who are drawn from the so-called martial races. Our forces exhibited a high degree of morale and fighting ability, which was praised by foreigners; and reportedly,
by the Pak soldiers themselves. This event has amply exploded, further, the myth of the so-called martial races, though at an extraordinary heavy price.

Ambedkar probed into a far more vital aspect of the composition of the armed forces, and that is, its communal aspect. The Simon Commission either ignored this aspect or deliberately side-tracked it. The communal composition of the army was, to Ambedkar, "of far greater importance and complexity than those relating to the Indianization of the Army." He reproduced, in several tables, the figures regarding the communal composition from 1914 to 1930. He relied mostly on the figures compiled by Mr. Chaudhari. These figures warrant the following conclusions, as drawn by Ambedkar himself:

1. **a phenomenal rise in the strength of the Punjabi Musalman and the Pathan** — (from 11.1% in 1914 to 22.6% in 1930 and 6.2 to 6.5% respectively);

2. **a substantial reduction in the position of Sikhs from first to third** — (19.2% in 1914 to 13.58% in 1930);

3. **the degradation of the Rajputs to the fourth place** — (6.4% in 1914 to 2.55% in 1930); and

4. **the shutting out of the U.P. Brahmins, the "adrasi" Musalmans, and the Tamilians, both Brahmins and Non-Brahmins,"** (from 1.8% to nil, 3.5% to nil, 2.5% to nil
in 1914 and 1930 respectively). 25

According to Mr. Chaudhari's assessment then, the Moslems constituted 36% of the Indian Infantry and 30% of the Indian Cavalry. One difficulty in any such assessment since then was the non-availability of official figures. Repeated interpellations in the Central Legislature on the subject were consistently avoided by the Member for Defence. He gave either evasive replies or inadequate information. At last some indication was available from the replies given by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons on 4th July 1943. It stood at: Moslems 34%; Hindus and Sikhs 50%; Sikhs 10%; and Christians and the rest 6%. This was, obviously, the war-time composition when recruitment could not be on a policy of discrimination and selection on communal lines. During peace-time the composition was bound to be different. Un-official estimates put it at 60 to 70% for the Moslems. Even the most conservative estimate would put it at 50%, which, according to Ambedkar, should be alarming enough to the Hindus. If that were to be true, the recruitment was done in complete violation of the principles laid down by the Peel Commission and the Special

25. Ibid; p. 81.
Army Committee of 1879 which directed that there should be no preponderance to any community or nationality in the Army.

Then how could there be a preponderant position for the Muslims? It was possibly because the British wanted to counteract the Hindu agitation for wresting political power.

This was of great significance for a clear understanding of the communal policy of the British.

The foregoing discussion markedly points out, that at the time of the demand for Pakistan, (a) the Indian Army was predominantly Muslim in its composition; and (b) that the Muslims who predominated were from the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. It gave them the 'proud position' of being the 'gate keepers of India'. So, according to Ambedkar, the right approach to the problem by the Hindus should be 'in the light of this crucial fact'.

Ambedkar posed some hypothetical situations to point out how dangerous it was for the Hindus to depend on an Army so composed. In case of an attack on India, either by Russia or Afghanistan in the North-West, we might depend upon that Army to resist the Russian attack, but not the one by Afghanistan; as Muslim loyalties would be highly doubtful when it is a question of putting them to fight against an
Army of a Muslim country. In fact, the Muslim League had taken a stand that the Indian Army shall not be used against Muslim powers! The Khilafat Committee had also taken such a stand long before! In the light of these difficulties and dangerous possibilities, Ambedkar came to this conclusion:

If India remains politically one whole and the two-nation mentality created by Pakistan continues to be fostered, the Hindus will find themselves between the devil and the deep sea, so far as the defence of India is concerned. Having an Army, they will not be free to use it because the League objects. Using it, it will not be possible to depend upon it because its loyalty is doubtful. This is a position which is as pathetic as it is precarious ... India on account of these military limitations, will have to remain on terms of subordinate co-operation with the Muslim countries on her border, as do the Indian states under the British paramountcy. 26

So the question was: 'Should the Muslims be without and against or should they be within and against?' Any prudent person will prefer to have them without and against. Ambedkar believed and hoped, that it should be 'a consummation devoutly to be wished that the Muslims should be without'. The only way to bring about such a

consummation was to support the scheme of Pakistan. While hoping for the creation of Pakistan, Ambedkar had not ruled out the possibility of Pakistan becoming a constant irritant to India for some reason or the other. He had visualised, in case Pakistan takes to Arms against Hindustan, it can be faced effectively because: "Once Pakistan is created, Hindustan, having ample resources in men and money, can have an Army which it can call its own and there will be nobody to dictate as to how it should be used and against whom... The defence of Hindustan, far from being weakened by the creation of Pakistan, will be infinitely improved by it." 27. The Indo-Pak confrontation of 1965 has come to substantiate this anticipation and conclusion of his. He was convinced beyond doubt that 'a safe Army is better than a safe border' and to oppose the Pakistan scheme is to buy a sure weapon of their own destruction' for the Hindus.

The Question of Communal Peace Vis-à-Vis Partition:

The Pakistan project was opposed by the Hindus as it was incapable of bringing about communal peace. It was argued that it will not be helpful to establish peace and harmony among the two communities even after the creation of Pakistan, for the simple reason that it will leave behind, in both the countries, a large number of religious minorities - the Hindus in Pakistan and the

27. Ibid, p. 85.
Muslims in Hindustan. The communal composition of the areas was such that the problem of the communal minorities was bound to continue because religious groups were intermingled and overlapping in the population of these areas. So, if the Pakistan project was not going to solve the communal problem, it need not be accepted at all. There was no need to vivisect the country when we knew for certain that it will not solve the communal problem, which was the most fundamental reason for which partition was demanded.

Ambedkar realised the force in this argument and agreed that communal disharmony and tensions were bound to be there even after partition. But he thought, it could be minimised, though not completely removed. The communal problem, as it existed in undivided India, centred round mainly two things: (a) the communal statutory majority in the provinces based on separate electorates; and (b) the ushering-in of communal provinces like the Sind by the British. Ambedkar pointed out, the Communal Award was inequitable in as much as it accorded unequal treatment to the Muslim and the Hindu minorities in the matter of electorates. It was to this aspect of the communal representation that Ambedkar had his objections; though he was for a guaranteed representation for the minorities. The position was, communal peace would not be forthcoming if
Pakistan were to be formed on the then existing boundaries of the Provinces in the North-west and in Bengal, which were not single ethnic units. They were bound to remain mixed states with Muslim majority and Hindu minority, as before. To remedy this defect, Ambedkar had suggested two steps: (1) shifting of the boundary line (in a large part of the area) in certain cases; and (2) shifting of the population in certain other areas. Only by implementing these, there could be a nearly homogeneous, single ethnic state of Pakistan and the evils of communalism were likely to vanish. He suggested the formation of a homogeneous Muslim State, out of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam "by drawing their boundaries in such a way that the areas which are predominantly Hindu shall be excluded". 28 Whereas in the case of North-West Frontier Province and Sind, Hindus were not concentrated in any one district, but they were scattered and found in almost every district in 'small insignificant numbers'. However, they could not be allowed to live wherever they were. So in these two Provinces mere shifting of the boundaries was not the solution. In these areas the only remedy was to shift the population. Ambedkar thought, it was the only supreme remedy if communal peace was to prevail. Mere constitutional safeguards by way of fundamental rights to the minorities would not suffice in this respect.  

in Europe had shown that safeguards alone did not save the minorities from a ruthless war against them. So alien minority population was exchanged in Europe also, as between Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria, involving the exchanging of a population of nearly 20 million from one place to another. Such a huge operation and challenge was faced by these nations as they were convinced that 'the considerations of communal peace must outweigh every other consideration and difficulties. The operation was carried on under the auspices of the League of Nations during 1923-24. It may be recalled here that Dr. Syed Abdul Latif had also suggested a similar remedy for ensuring communal peace in the event of Pakistan's creation. Ambedkar thought that compared to the Greek-Turkish operation, the number of people involved here was far lesser and negligible. He went to the extent of saying: "it would be the height of folly to give up so sure a way to communal peace".

Then what about the large number of Muslims, about 20 million of them, that were to be left behind in British Hindustan? Ambedkar did not propose shifting of the entire Muslim population to Pakistan. Nor it was called for. He was satisfied with a composite Hindustan, after the creation of a homogeneous Pakistan. The Muslim minority in Hindustan will naturally "be better protected by the existence of separate Islamic States on the eastern and western borders of Hindustan than by their submersion in Hindustan". He did not accept Dr. Rehmat Ali's proposal
for total 'reciprocity' because he thought, perhaps, that the communal question in a divided India would be a minor one and also that all Muslims were not of the Muslim League's persuasion. There were nationalist Muslims and other non-Leaguers, who were not anxious to go to Pakistan. They had come to look upon themselves as fellow-citizens with the Hindus. It would not be proper and just to shift them by force much against their will. He wanted the exchange of population in the borders only. So to Ambedkar, the Pakistan scheme in the form it was projected, though was incapable of solving the communal problem totally and within Hindustan, "it substantially reduces its proportion and makes it of minor significance and much easier of peaceful solution". 29 It would liberate the Hindus from the turbulence of the Muslims as predominant partners. That would be a definite gain for the Hindus. Hence they should not have any reason to oppose the scheme of Pakistan.

We may pause here for a while to examine the wisdom and farsightedness of the suggestions of Ambedkar in this respect. This can best be done by examining them in the light of what happened subsequent to partition. Of course, it is possible to do so now in retrospect, as many ugly events have come to pass since then. The first suggestion of Ambedkar to draw the boundary lines, keeping in view the communal composition of the areas in question, was to

a large extent met with in the Radcliffe Award. But his suggestion, a more important one and a bold one at that, the shifting and exchanging of the population to bring about communal harmony, was scoffed at when it was made and hence was not accepted. The result was a series of acts of loot, plunder, arson, dislocation of life and all conceivable forms of incendiary activities on the part of the Muslims, Hindus and the Sikhs. The horrid tale of sufferings, privations and loss of property and life, even to-day, is shocking to the sentiment of any civilised people. What happened immediately before and after partition was announced? Was it not a shifting of population at the point of the knife and under clouds of fear, threat and suspicion? It remains, undoubtedly, the darkest spot in the history of Hindu-Muslim relations in the sub-continent. The migration of peoples on that occasion was described by Mr. Alan Campbell Johnson as 'one of the greatest movements of population in recorded history', as he saw the movement of population when it had just begun and was still 'a small segment of it'. 30

The migration of population was on a fantastic scale, which was unprecedented. It was all the more serious and painful as it was undertaken by the people under conditions of threat and horror, without any other direction.

They had to move out from their abodes, leaving behind their fortunes and kith and kin, to escape sure death and destruction. Only those who could withstand outrageous attacks on their modesty and dignity could think of remaining behind. Even during their trek to an unknown destination, where they hoped to have some safety, they were not sure of their lives, but still they gathered up their worldly goods, as much or rather as less as they could, and moved out. Prominent cities like Amritsar and Lahore on the borders were almost on flames continuously. What an atrocious outrage, pillage, carnage and sacrilege in the name of Religion! As seen by Campbell Johnson, the movement of people, uprooted from their hearths and homes, was so long that even after flying for over fifty miles by air one could not see the source of this stream of desperate human beings! At points of bottlenecks of this human traffic the appearance of a squatter's township was very common. The Muslim and Hindu-Sikh refugees were seen moving side by side, but in opposite directions with clashes very often. All conceivable modes of conveyance were pressed into use. The trains were always carrying refugees hundred times more than their usual capacities. Train journey was quite hazardous in view of the inhuman attacks on the trains. It is said that they would start with thousands of passengers but would often reach the other end with a few hundred survivors! At the receiving ends, in both the dominions,
the population movement created the most difficult problem of feeding and shelter for millions of refugees. The shifting of population had taken place even though the leaders had not accepted it and much against their will. What they wanted to avoid had actually happened. It was too late for them to arrange for shifting the population in an orderly manner, under the aegis of the state, the refugee movement also released a series of problems. Where they should go? Will it be an orderly settlement? — were some of the vital questions which had to be answered. "This raised," as Campbell Johnson wrote, "one of the greatest administrative problems of history, which was of course essentially an human problem. Hence, it had to be dealt with, with a great sense of urgency and any approach was to be necessarily humane. It was, however redeeming to know, in the words of Campbell Johnson again; "As far as human effort is concerned special credit is due to those responsible for health and food services on both sides of the border. A prodigious number of cholera injections, vaccinations and other inoculations have been carried out. India has flown large supplies of cholera vaccines to Pakistan. The works of mercy and healing shine out in the communal darkness." 32 Hindus and Muslims could have been saved.

32. Ibid, p. 249.
from all this orgy of killings, loot and destruction, and above all the unprecedented human suffering, only if the suggestion of Ambedkar to shift the population of some of the districts were to be accepted and implemented under the aegis of the State. He had the insight and the astuteness of a realist statesman, who could foresee and anticipate such a possibility and suggest a bold and a supreme remedy to save the Hindu and Muslims alike from acts of mutual attack and destruction. It was a tragic mistake committed by those who accepted partition, but were not bold enough to face the problems in a realistic manner. This is the verdict that history records painfully on this blackest tragedy of our history. How can we say that Ambedkar was not right in thinking that only an agreed, and organised shifting of population with State-aid was the best and the most feasible solution to the problem of communal conflicts in the sub-continent?

What Else — If Not Pakistan?

The demand for Pakistan had come to occupy the minds of all public-spirited individuals and organizations. Scholars and politicians alike, particularly scholar-politicians of Ambedkar's type, were reacting in their own way by giving their own suggestions. Most of them, in their own anxiety to preserve the unity of India by avoiding the vivisection of the land, suggested alternatives to Pakistan which, in Ambedkar's opinion
were, 'either no alternatives to Pakistan or worse than Pakistan' itself. The Muslims, on their part, did not have any alternative to give because they were not prepared to accept anything less than Pakistan. On March, 23, 1941, which was celebrated as 'Pakistan Day', Mr. Jinnah declared in his speech at Delhi that Pakistan was neither a counsel of despair nor a counter for political bargaining but a serious demand. 33 The League constitutionalized this demand at its Madras session of April, 1941, by writing the League Resolution into the constitution of the Muslim League as its objective, in place of its earlier objective which was 'a federation of free democratic states'. 34 Even then, if anyone were to hazard a guess as to what was in their minds, if they were to choose as an alternative to Pakistan for any reason. One could say that they would probably consent to a 50% share and place in everything. They might like to have such a facility for them in the legislature, administration, defence forces etc., and also insist on accepting Urdu as the national language, and not Hindi. The possibility of such a demand was not without any basis. Mr. Jinnah had firmly refused to

have anything to do with rearrangements at the centre which is not on a fifty-fifty basis. He did assert his position when he asked 5 of the 5 Muslim members included on the enlarged Defence Council of the Viceroy to resign. Three of the 5 Muslim members who belonged to the camp obeyed his directive and the remaining had to face expulsion for continuing on the Council. In this context it would be appropriate to recall also the wadhian compromise by evolving the 'Hindustani' -- which was a peculiar amalgam of the dominantly Sanskritised Hindi, and exclusively Arab-Persian language, Urdu. It may also be pointed out that Article XXV of the Constitution of the Indian National Congress provided that the proceedings of the All-India Congress Committee and the Working Committee shall ordinarily be conducted in Hindustani though other languages were also permissible, when the speaker was unable to use Hindustani. Amritma Gandhi thought, perhaps, it would help meeting the Muslim demand on the language question. Ambedkar, after a careful scrutiny and assessment of the possible consequences of conceding such demands of the Muslims, came to the conclusion that it would be worse than Pakistan and suicidal for the Hindus to accept them.

The Hindu alternative to Pakistan, as suggested by several individuals and organisations— chief among
then being Mr. V. V. Dabhar, the then President of the Hindu Mahasabha (in his Presidential Address at the annual session of the Sabha held at Calcutta in December, 1939), and Lala Hardayal. Savarkar was frank, bold, and very specific in his proposals. In his scheme, India that was made up of two nations shall not be divided, but the people of both nationalities "shall dwell in one country and shall live under the mantle of one single constitution; that the constitution shall be such that the Hindu nation will be enabled to occupy a predominant position that is due to it and the Muslim nation made to live in the position of subordinate co-operation with the Hindu nation." He was not prepared to guarantee secured seats, anywhere, for the Muslims.

Though he was to be complimented for his frankness, the scheme, as an alternative, was no solution to the problem. The substance of the Hindu alternative was to submerge and absorb the Muslims gradually, by pressing into use the authority of a central government, and as Lala Hardayal suggested, by launching a 'Shuddhi' and 'Sangathan' movement. This step was incompatible and inconsistent, in as much as it came from a staunch Hindu, because of the non-proselytising character of the Hindu religion. Further, it would be the height of folly to think of absorbing and assimilating a minor nation,
because, as Ambedkar puts it: "... it can never ensure a stable and peaceful future for the Hindus, for the simple reason that Muslims will never yield willing obedience to so dreadful an alternative." 35

On the question of the efficacy of a Central government for bringing about such an arrangement, Ambedkar was highly sceptical. The governmental machinery will be effective for the purpose, where 'race, language and religion do not stand in the way of fusion', as it happened in France, England, Italy and Germany. On the other hand, though under a single government, people in Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia failed to achieve unity because in these countries "race, language and religion were strong enough to counter and nullify the unifying power of government." Similarly, in India the genius of the people is to divide and not to unite. We were never united except under the British rule, which succeeded only in bringing all Indians under an united administrative system. It had also failed to forge a real unity among Indians. A sense of oneness was created to the minimum required degree during the freedom struggle in view of the common cause and aspirations.

35. Pakistan or the partition of India; p. 134.
But basically, in the very psychology of the people of India, according to Ambedkar: "there is ... no passion for unity, no desire for fusion. There is no desire to have a common dress. There is no desire to have a common language. There is no will to give up what is local and particular for something in which is national." This parochialist attitude of the Indians comes in the way of unity. He says further: "without such consciousness and without such desire to depend upon Government to bring about unification is to receive oneself." These observations of Ambedkar, made in the context of Pakistan, are of great significance and guidance for all times.

Even after partition and the elimination of Muslim nationality from the national life, the fissiparous tendencies that persist in the life of the country today can be analysed and explained fully in this perspective only. The charm that is supposed to be there in variety, may not be palatable always and beyond a limit. Unity in diversity is hard to achieve, though it is desirable and has become an attractive slogan.

There were also proposals to preserve the Hind Muslim unity by making political concessions to the Muslims by way of safeguards, to avert partition. Ambedkar

36. Ibid, p. 179.
37. Ibid, p. 179.
was convinced that in this particular case, any amount of safeguards to the Muslims in a composite polity would not bring about the desired political unity. Even granting that political unity could be achieved through such measures, it will not be sufficient to make a state a nation of an abiding character. There are instances in history when even a religious unity could not bring about political unity. The comparative stability in the early Roman Empire and the latter Holy Roman Empire was a case in point. The early Roman Empire, as is well-known, had achieved political unity without religious unity; whereas the Holy Roman Empire had religious unity, but not political unity and stability. Referring to the unifying force of Christianity, James Bryce wrote:

"It is on religion that the inmost and deepest life of a nation rests, because Divinity was divided, humanity had been divided, likewise; the doctrine of the unity of God now enforced the unity of men, who had been created in His image. The first lesson of Christianity was love, a love that was to join in one body those whom suspicion and prejudice and pride of race had hitherto kept apart. There was thus formed by the new religion a community of the faithful, a Holy Empire, designed to gather all men into its bosom, and standing opposed to the manifold polytheisms of the older world, exactly
as the universal sway of the Caesars
was contrasted with the innumerable
kingdoms and city republics that had
gone before it .... 38

Similarly, Ambedkar thought, the political unity even
if achieved in an unified India by making political
concessions to the Muslims, would still keep the Hindus
and Muslims divided, as they belonged to 'two distinct
species' of religion. He noted: "... For them
Divinity is divided and with the division of Divinity
their humanity is divided and with the division of
humanity they must remain divided. There is nothing to
bring them in one bosom." 39

Ambedkar, therefore, rejected the proposals for
the assimilation of the Muslim nationality and of giving
them political concessions as dangerous, impracticable
and useless alternatives to Pakistan. His conclusion was:

without social union, political unity is
difficult to be achieved. If achieved,
it would be as precarious as a summer
sapling, liable to be uprooted by the
gust of a hostile wind. With more
political unity, India may be a State,
but to be a State is not to be a
nation and a State, which is not a
nation, has small prospects of survival

in the struggle for existence. This is specially true where nationalism... is seeking everywhere to free itself by the destruction and a mixed and composite state therefore, lies not so much in external aggression as in the internal resurgence of nationalities which are fragmented, entrapped, suppressed and held against their will. Those who oppose Pakistan should not only bear this danger in mind but should also realize that this attempt on the part of suppressed nationalities to disrupt a mixed state and to found a separate home for themselves, instead of being condemned, finds ethical justification from the principle of self-determination. 40

He, thus, refuted both the alternatives of the Hindus; either of assimilation or that of showing them political concessions and thereby make them to live with the Hindus under one government as useless, dangerous and impracticable alternatives to Pakistan.

Lessons From Europe:

These scholarly observations of Ambedkar were obviously derived, not out of sentiment, or antipathy or
prejudice, but on a scientific study of the historical events of not only India but of Europe, which had become the hot-bed of national strifes in the early twentieth century. He recalled the fate of other countries which, like India, had sought to harmonise different nationalities. Pointing out to the developments in Turkey and Czechooslovakia, he advised the opponents of partition to open their eyes to those incidents and take lessons from them.

Turkey, which was an empire, was completely dismembered by 1906. But what happened after 1906 was more serious. Turkey was reduced to a small State called the Republic of Turkey with an area which was a miniature fraction of the old Empire. So also Czechooslovakia, which was born after First World War with Czeches, Slovaks and Ruthenians. It was a short-lived State, that is, for only two decades. By the Munich Pact of 30th September 1938, it became once more the slave of its former overlords.

Apart from other causes — "The true and the principal cause of the disruption of Turkey was the growth of the spirit of nationalism among its subject people. The Greek revolt, the revolt of the Serbs,
Bulgarians and other Balkans against the Turkish authority were no doubt represented as a conflict between Christianity and Islam... These revolts were simply the manifestations of spirit of nationalism by which they were generated. Turkish misrule and Christian antipathy to Islam were also there. Why even Arabs wanted to become independent of Turkey? It was because they were moved by Arab Nationalism and preferred to be Arab nationalists to being Turkish subjects. In Czechoslovakia too, the nationalism of the Slovaks, who were put to break up the unity of the State and secure the independence of Slovakia that was responsible for the disruption, and not the German aggression alone. The most important cause of these wars of disruption, as analysed by Mr. Sidney Brooks, was nationalism. Mr. Norman Angell, on the other hand, would say, it was not nationalism but the threat to nationalism which was the cause. To Mr. Robertson, nationalism was an irrational instinct, if not a positive hallucination, and the sooner humanity got rid of it the better for all. To Ambedkar: In whatever way the matter is put ... the lesson to be drawn is quite clear: that nationalism is a fact which can neither be eluded nor denied. He thought, along with Prof. Toynbee, nationalism is strong enough to produce war in spite of us. It has terribly proved itself to be no outworn creed, but a vital force to

41. Ibid, p. 203.
be reckoned with in the middle of the 20th century too. The disruptions of Turkey and Czechooslovakia " shows that neither local autonomy nor the bond of religion is sufficient to withstand the force of nationalism, once it is set on the go." 42 This is a lesson which the Hindus had to grasp. Ambedkar called upon the Hindus to ask themselves: " if the Greek, Balkan and Arab nationalism has blown up the Turkish State and if Slovak nationalism has caused the dismantling of Czechooslovakia, what is there to prevent Muslim nationalism from disrupting the Indian State? ..." If the Hindus refuse to take the obvious lesson from this, "... they will be sailing those shoal waters in which Turkey, Czechooslovakia and many others have foundered. If they wish to avoid shipwreck in mid ocean, they must lighten the draught by throwing overboard all superfluous Cargo." 43 before they launch on their career as a free people. In this the Hindus will not be the losers because, as Ambedkar puts it:

"The Muslim areas are an anomalous excrescence on Hindustan and Hindustan is an anomalous excrescence on them. Tied together they will make India the sick man of Asia. Welded together they will make India a heterogeneous unit. If Pakistan has the demerit of cutting away parts of India, it has also the merit of introducing harmony in place of conflict." 44 Partition will also provide

42. Ibid, p. 209.
44. Ibid, p. 212.
India a strong Central Government, which she cannot have without partition. Moreover, the nationalism of the Muslims was 'set on the go'. As such, nothing could prevent its fruition. If prevented, it would lead to social stagnation for both. Because of the mutual suspicions all along, the Hindus and Muslims alike have not launched on programmes of social reforms. That both suffered from social maladies was beyond dispute. The Muslim society in India was fully afflicted with a number of social evils as was the Hindu society. The social evils of child marriage, polygamy, concubinage, right for the man to divorce, the purdah and the caste were looked upon by the Muslims as part of their religion. Hence, they never thought of removing them. Thus, their social order had been a stagnated one in all respects. This stagnation would assume serious proportions so long the Hindus and Muslims remained under a single political set-up, because of the mutual fears and suspicions that went with it. The Hindus are no less sufferers in such a situation. So Ambedkar declared: '... Unless there is liberation of each from the other, there can be no doubt that this malaise of social stagnation will not be set right.' From all considerations — the political, social, religious and economic — Pakistan was, therefore, the most natural, obvious and indispensable remedy.
Philosophical Justification For Pakistani

The arguments for partition and all along been
carried on mainly from political, economic and socio-
logical considerations. It had been established that
Pakistan was warranted and found inescapable from all
these angles. But could one find a philosophical
justification for the scheme? If so, were the Muslims
putting forth their demand for Pakistan on well-
considered and universally accepted and recognised tenets
of political philosophy?

It was possible to bring in some principles of
political philosophy to substantiate and justify the
Muslim claim. But the Muslim League itself, including
Mr. Jinnah, had never drawn upon this source for their
demands. Either they were ignorant of the philosophical
dimensions of the problem, or they had not tried to focus
their demand in a philosophical perspective. Ambedkar,
as a scholar-politician, could make a dispassionate study
of the problem and could supply the philosophical justi-
fication for the scheme. He based it on the essential
distinction between 'a community' and 'a nation'.
Recognised political scientists like Henry Sidgwick have,
in fact, dealt with such questions and have accepted the
distinction between a 'community' and a 'nation'. They
have also permitted to these groups, the corresponding rights against the established governments. Ambedkar drew a distinction between the two, by adopting the criteria of their ultimate destiny. The Muslims were not a 'community' but a 'nation'. A state may have a number of communities, who feel ultimately that they are one, though opposed to each other in some respects, and may have their own quarrels over some domestic problems of privileges etc. But in a state composed of a series of nations, when one nation rises against the other, the conflict is one as to differences of ultimate destiny.' Hence the differences and distinctions in their political rights. If a nation "will not be satisfied unless the natural bond that binds them is dissolved, then prudence and even ethics demands", said Ambedkar, "that the bond shall be dissolved and they shall be free each to pursue its own destiny." 45

The Muslims were not conscious of this distinction, and the philosophical content of their demand; and as to their status as a distinct nationality. This was true till about 1935, from whence they were becoming slowly and dimly conscious of their nationality. Even Mr.-Jinnah was no exception to this. The Muslim demand came to be crystalised in terms of a separate nationality and expressed only in the Lahore Resolution of 1940 for the

45. Ibid, p. 322.
first time, because of an ideological transformation in Mr. Jinnah after 1933; and consequently there was a complete revolution in the Muslim ideology. Mr. Jinnah was a nationalist right from the beginning. He was accused of having played into the hands of the British because of this transformation in him. It was seemingly so, but the fact remained that Mr. Jinnah was a strong-willed man, his defects apart. In Abul Kalam's estimate: "Mr. Jinnah ... can never be suspected of being a tool in the hands of the British even by the worst of his enemies. He may be too self-opinionated, an egotist without the mask and has perhaps a degree of arrogance which is not compensated by any extra-ordinary intellect or equipment... At the same time, it is doubtful if there is a politician in India to whom the adjective incorruptible can be more fittingly applied... No one can buy him. For it must be said to his credit that he has never been a soldier of fortune. The customary Hindu explanation fails to account for the ideological transformation of Mr. Jinnah." 46 On the other hand, the real explanation for this transformation lies in the fact that what stands between the Muslims and the Hindus is a spiritual element, which "is formed by causes which take their origin in historical, religious, cultural and

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46. Ibid, p. 323.
social antipathy, of which political antipathy is only a reflection." 47 Further, it was, according to Ambedkar, due to "the dawn of a new vision pointing to a new destiny symbolized by a new name, Pakistan ... The magnetism of this new destiny cannot but draw the Muslims towards it. The pull is so great that even men like Jinnah have been violently shaken and have not been able to resist its force ..." 48 Such a motivation on their part, of course, did not emerge all of a sudden. It was there in a dim and hazy form. They did not give expression to it openly, either because they thought it was a dream almost incapable of realization, or because they were not aware of the philosophical justification for it. Thus there was nothing new, or sudden in the idea. The only thing was that what was once indistinct came to appear in full glow; and what was nameless had taken a name. Ambedkar felt that Jinnah, instead of being attracted by a religious organization that was the Muslim League for making a dominantly religious issue of the demand, should have worked it up on a national plane through the agency of a secular organization. He had enough philosophical justification for his cause; besides the religious. It was unfortunate that a nationalist like Jinnah too should have lent himself to be branded as a religious psychopath. According to Ambedkar, Jinnah had the ability

47. Ibid, p. 324.
48. Ibid, p. 32
to do it. But he, on the other hand, entered Muslim politics and helped rejuvenating the Muslim League that had become weaker, instead of secularising it. This extremely communal character and outlook of the Muslim League was one of the weaknesses in the Pakistan demand, and had made them think that they were only another community, and not a nation. Instead of basing their demand on sound philosophical principles, the Muslims, including that nationalist Jinnah, kicked up the bogey of religion, which was a strategic error. When it was rather difficult to convince the critics, they resorted to the Johnsonian method and said 'damn your arguments! we want Pakistan'. The position was, philosophical justification or no justification, they wanted Pakistan at any cost. So "Once it becomes certain", thought Iqbal, "that the Muslims want Pakistan there can be no doubt that the wise course would be to concede the principle of it." 49

The Muslim demand for Pakistan could be further strengthened by invoking that celebrated principle of the right of nations for self-determination that was responsible for radical shifting of boundaries and grand territorial re-adjustments in Europe, following the Treaty

of Versailles. What were the specific implications of this principle? In the first place, it meant the right to establish a government of the choice of the people. Secondly, it meant the right to obtain national independence from an alien race irrespective of the form of government. The agitation for Pakistan, according to Ambedkar, came under the latter meaning of the right to self-determination. Of course, in India the Muslims were an alien race; and once they were released from the British rule, they were to live separately from Hindustan. Further, Ambedkar agreed, it was not always necessary that a separate national group need think on the lines of virtual political separation. They might aspire for mere cultural independence only. They might demand territorial separation and political independence only, when their minds will be worked up to such a pitch and when they will no longer be willing to continue to co-exist as one political entity. Such a claim becomes all the more valid when geography permits a clear separation.

Geographical Configuration

The Lahore Resolution of 1940 meant redrawing the boundaries. To Ambedkar the geographical lay out permitted it in certain areas. He argued that in the case of the North-Western Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind, the Hindus and the Muslims were mixed up. Therefore,
a territorial separation was not possible. The case of the Punjab and Bengal stood on a different footing as the Hindus occupied two different areas that were contiguous with India and separable. "In these circumstances", thought Ambedkar, "there is no reason for conceding what the Muslim League seems to demand, namely, that the present boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal shall continue to be the boundaries of Western Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan". He was of the firm view that no minority should be allowed to suffer in order to comply with the League's demand. He asked, "If the Musalmans are not prepared to be content with safeguards against the tyranny of Hindu majority (in a composite India) why should the minorities be asked to be satisfied with the safeguards against the tyranny of the Muslim majority (in Pakistan)?" He could hold such a view, as he was not a partisan at all in his approach. He maintained a high degree of objectivity throughout. He suggested transfer of areas wherever possible and shifting of population wherever necessary to eliminate the minorities in the borders of both Hindustan and Pakistan. He thought, that was quite feasible. If considered in a cool and calm temper and faced boldly, shifting will be 'neither staggering nor baffling', he said.

Ambedkar's proposal for shifting of population

involved shifting only a manageable number of people. Those who were inclined to think along with Adam Smith that man is, of all the things, the most difficult cargo to transport, may have had their own fears. To allay such fears, Ambedkar pointed out, in Punjab and Bengal the boundaries were to be redrawn and the question of shifting did not arise in those cases. The Muslims residing in Hindustan did not propose to migrate to Pakistan en masse, nor did the League want it. So he thought, only if the two governments agreed on certain fundamental principles regarding transfer of property and such other essential issues, they could arrange for a smooth shifting of such population that would be willing to be shifted under state aid. A treaty embodying all such essentials could be arranged. He was also of the view that this state-aided transfer should be purely voluntary; and allowed only to members of a minority community. A suggestion, more or less to the same effect was made in the 'U.2 Formula' also. So Ambedkar said that the difficulties were not so serious and insurmountable as they were made out to be. No doubt the entire process was 'heart-rending' and 'painful'. "But once sentiment is banished and it is decided that there shall be Pakistan", Ambedkar reiterated, "the problems arising out of it are neither staggering nor baffling." 52 As a matter of fact his suggestion to shift the population came as an antidote to the poison of Pakistan.

52. Ibid, p. 382.
Ambedkar's Own Scheme:

The critics also alleged that he did not state his conclusions in concrete and specific terms and disposed off certain complicated problems in a brief and cavalier fashion. They were also at a loss to know whether Pakistan could be ushered in, in a just and peaceful manner. As there was some force in these charges, Ambedkar presented his conclusions on the issue in the concrete form of an Act of Parliament which, he called, 'The Indian Constitution (Preliminary Provisions) Act, of 194...'. It was called a 'Preliminary Provisions Act' as he thought the issue of Pakistan was really treated as a preliminary issue to the granting of Dominion Status or independence to India. In this particular scheme of his, he provided an answer to most of the questions that could be posed, such as, who should decide whether there shall be Pakistan or not, etc.,

In the first place, he wanted a poll to be taken separately of the Muslim and non-Muslim electors of the North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, Sind, Bengal, and of Baluchistan. If a majority of the Muslim voters favoured separation and a majority of the non-Muslim electors voted against separation, then a Boundary Commission should be appointed for preparing a list of such areas
and districts in the said Provinces, wherein the Muslim majority lived and they were to be called the Scheduled Districts, both in the east and the west, and they shall constitute Pakistan. He also provided for 'Arbitration', in case the Boundary Commission fails to draw the boundary by agreement.

After this, he provided for a second poll, only in the Scheduled Districts, to know whether they wanted separation forthwith. If the majority wanted it forthwith, two new states of Pakistan and Hindustan shall be ushered in. If the majority was against separation forthwith, a single constitution for British India as a whole shall be framed and no motion for separation shall be moved for ten years from the date of the new constitution. Further, he thought it proper to keep the doors open for re-union after a lapse of ten years' period of partition, if the Hindus and Muslims thought it proper. So he preferred 'union after a separation of ten years' to 'separation for ten years and union thereafter'. He had no objection to make the severance not altogether sharp and complete. But, contrary to his personal preferences, he actually provided for 'union after ten years' separation, if such a decision were to be taken after ten years. However, he emphasised on the prevalence of the will of the people in either case and at all stages.
Neither the British Government nor the parties concerned could be allowed to take an unilateral action. The democratic principle of the people's will should ultimately decide whether there shall be Pakistan or not. The public opinion had, therefore, to be helped by throwing light on the several aspects and viewpoints on the issue. Ambedkar's thoughts on Pakistan, as contained in his book, achieved this objective in an abundant manner.

Another suggestion made by him, as a part of his Pakistan scheme, was the setting up of a 'Council of India', in the event of two separate states coming into existence. The proposed Council of India was to consist of a President nominated in accordance with instructions from His Majesty and 40 members; twenty each from Pakistan and Hindustan. The Members were to be elected by the Lower Houses of Parliaments of the two States. It was to promote "mutual intercourse and uniformity in relation to matters affecting the whole of British India, and to providing for the administration of services which the two Parliaments mutually agree should be administered uniformly throughout the whole of British India, or which by virtue of this Act are to be administered." 53 He also provided for delegation of powers to the Council by the legislatures of both the countries from time to time. It was also to make laws with respect to railways and

53. Ibid, p. 386.
This, however, was not to take away the powers of the respective countries to undertake construction, extension, improvement etc., of these public utilities, situated exclusively in their own territories.

This suggestion for the Council of India was a very interesting suggestion of his, as it was capable of several interpretations. Was he having in his mind a Federation of Hindustan and Pakistan with the Council acting, in a way, as the general government? or was it to be a mere co-ordinating agency? If so, what was to be its duration? Did he conceive of it as a transitory arrangement for a smooth change over, or as a permanent one? But he himself hastened to add that it was not to be mistaken for a federation, and not even a confederation. "Its purpose", he said, "is to do nothing more than to serve as a coupling to link Pakistan to Hindustan until they are united under a single constitution." It was not a 'divorce' but was a 'judicial separation' which he had in mind.

Ambedkar also suggested a poll to be held again after 10 years on the question of separation or no separation? If the majority votes for separation, two separate States are to be declared by an Order-in-Council, and the Council of India shall be dissolved. If, on the other hand, the poll is in favour of united India, Pakistan
small cease to be a separate State and small form part of Hindustan. In that case the Council of India shall be replaced by a Legislature for United India by duly electing the Members to it. His suggestion regarding the Council of India was, it is clear, only to act as a co-ordinating agency, so long as there were two separate States.

The whole scheme that was given by him as an alternative to Pakistan contemplated the continuance of His Majesty's suzerainty over the two States for a minimum period of ten years, which was to be the period of experimentation and trial. During this time the Hindus could show that they could be trusted with authority, and the Muslims will have a reasonable period of ten years to try out Pakistan. In the light of what Ambedkar himself argued all along, such a possibility was a remote one so far its acceptability went. Excepting for the emphasis on the will of the people to decide the issue, the rest of the scheme sounded strange. The best part of his study was in his presentation of the two claims and his observations contained therein, rather than his own scheme. In the scheme itself the suggestion for communal plebiscite differed from the Cripps Proposals in so far as it had taken the Province as the deciding unit. Province could not be the basis, as the question on hand was not inter-provincial, but inter-communal. This
Proposal was based on the models in Europe, for e.g., the Irish Unity Conference, the Home Rule Amending Bill of Mr. Asquith and the Government of Ireland Act of 1920.

It was rather difficult to hold or even think of holding a plebiscite in those days of turmoil and confusion. India then, as Ambedkar himself accepted, was 'a political mad-house'. Still, he was hopeful about the possibility of holding a plebiscite. He was against any other agency like the British Government to be relied upon for deciding it. There was no reason why the British should do it. They would never take the odium on themselves even though they had done it in the case of Ireland. The experiences were so bitter that it served as a 'warning' to the British and not as a precedent. The British Government's stand was contained in the Mountbatten's plan which was as follows:

1. that the responsibility for Partition, if it comes, is to rest fairly upon the Indians themselves;

2. the Provinces, generally speaking, shall have the right to determine their own future;

3. Bengal and the Punjab are to be notionally partitioned for voting purposes;...to...

Alan Campbell Johnson: op. cit., p. 70.
It is interesting to recall here that 'The June 3rd Plan', which formed the basis of the transfer of power, recognised in para 3 of the Statement of the Plan 'that power should be transferred in accordance with the wishes of the Indian people themselves...'.

As a referendum was not a practical method, it was decided that the Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab should meet in two parts — the Muslim majority districts and the other containing the rest of the areas, and vote whether or not the province should be partitioned. A simple majority principle was followed. The Legislative Assembly of Sind was to take a decision at a special meeting. Only in the case of North-west Frontier Province and the district of Sylhet, in view of the special circumstances there, a referendum was to be held, in case the Punjab and Bengal vote for partition.

There was, therefore, a close approximation between the scheme of Ambedkar and the stand of the British Government, in spite of a slight modification. He was of the firm view that "A referendum by people in the Pakistan Provinces seems to me the safest and the most constitutional method of solving the problem of Pakistan." 55 He laid a special emphasis on the procedure

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55. *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, p. 397.
to be adopted, if the two states were to continue with friendly relations. It should be one of good-will with malice towards none. The "procedure must be such that it must not involve victory to one community and humiliation to the other. The method must be of peace with honour to both sides. I do not know", wrote Ambedkar, "if there is any other solution better calculated to achieve this end than the decision by a referendum of the people." He sounds prophetic in his utterances, when we view it in the light of Indo-Pak relations since partition.

**Conclusion**

The foregoing discussion on the Pakistan scheme, as presented and argued out by Ambedkar, warrants some comments in retrospect. We have seen that he has all along ably answered the vital questions posed by himself. He had, in the first place, concluded that the Hindu-Muslim unity was not necessary for the political advancement of the country. Even granting that it was necessary, it was beyond realisation in the light of the political developments in India during the twentieth century that shaped the pattern of Hindu-Muslim relations. Moreover, Hindus and Muslims constituted different racial, cultural and religious entities, whose social and political outlook were different, historically. That the Muslims were

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a nation had to be accepted 'without cavil'. The Hindus should have realised this position and proceeded on the basis that the demand for Pakistan was nothing but a call for a home-state or home-land of its own. With the Muslims becoming conscious of their nationhood, the idea of a home-state for them in this part of the world was 'set on the go'. Once it was 'set on the go' it would be unrealistic on the part of anyone to think that the Muslims could still be persuaded to work for a united India. Ambedkar was convinced that any amount of appeasement of the Muslims by political concessions and safeguards for them would not enlist willing co-operation from them. Why appease Muslims at the cost of other sections in India including the Hindus?, because the Muslims' conditions for a united India included concessions which were much more than what their population would warrant. Applying force was to be ruled out completely. Ambedkar looked upo the two-nation theory and the resultant formation of Hindustan and Pakistan as the most natural political organization, by dissolving the most incoherent whole that was India. So they could no longer be brought under a single constitution, and a single polity. Further, he was of the opinion that the vivisection of the country would not come in the way of Hindustan having adequate resources and defense as it leaves a 'safe army' for them. He argued that it was better to have 'Muslims whose loyalty to India is always doubtful, without war against; rather
than within and against*. A safe army, rid of the Muslim preponderance, would be better than a so-called safe border. In the interest of democracy, peace and progress it was necessary that the two nationalities were separated.

Ambedkar was not prepared to impose his views on anyone, though he was convinced beyond doubts as to their validity and feasibility. He was willing to provide for a period of trial by bringing about a judicial separation instead of a divorce between the Hindus and Muslims to start with, so that they will have an opportunity to learn by practice. He provided in his scheme for reunion after 10 years of separation, if the people vote for it in a referendum.

One may be curious to know as to why Ambedkar addressed all his arguments mostly to the Hindus. It was because he thought, as they were in a majority their views would count. He appealed to them to free themselves from 'a false sentiment of historical patriotism, a false conception of exclusive ownership of territory, and absence of willingness to think for oneself'. He addressed his arguments to those who had lost, what Carlyle called, 'the seeing eye'; and were 'walking in the glamour of certain vain illusions'. He also thought it proper to meet the objections raised by Sandhiji who thought partition
would be 'a moral wrong and a sin', and that 'Pakistan was only a fancy of Mr. Jinnah', without the support of the majority of the Muslims. "Partition of a country" was neither moral nor immoral. It is immoral. It is a social, political or military question. Sin has no place in it." 57 India was not the only country facing the problem of partition. A number of partitions took place in Europe, out of sheer necessity. So to bring in moral considerations would only side-track the issue without contributing to its solution. As to Mr. Jinnah, Ambedkar accepted that he was not a man of the masses for a long time. Mr. Jinnah was always for a high franchise so that the masses might be excluded. He had even suggested that the Congress should restrict its membership to matriculates. All this was true. But what transformation Jinnah had undergone, under the stress of circumstances, in the political life of the country, could not be overlooked. Mr. Jinnah did become a man of the masses in the late Thirties, and had not only become a believer in Islam, but was prepared 'to die for Islam'. It might not have come out of a genuine change in his mind and heart, but as a political strategy for mobilisation. His nationalism had taken a turn to Muslim Nationalism, as already discussed.

57. Ibid, p. 405.
Ambedkar had fully realised that the question of Pakistan was not just an academic question, which one could refuse to discuss or agree to discuss for discussion only. A solution had to be found long by agreement or even by arbitration, if necessary. Since agreement was not forthcoming 'arbitration by an International Board' was advisable. He ventured upon this constructive suggestion and asked for referring all the disputed points of the entire problem of the minorities in India including that of Pakistan to an International Board for arbitration. The Board was to be composed of 'persons drawn from countries outside the British Empire.' Each statutory minority in India was also to select its nominee to this Board. He wanted the British to give an undertaking to have nothing to do with the communal settlement and would only implement the 'award' given by the Board, embodying it in a Government of India Act, and agree to give Dominion Status to India. This suggestion was the best that could be thought of in the circumstances. It had many advantages. In his own words: (1) "It eliminated the fear of British interference in the communal settlement which has been offered by the Congress as an excuse for its not being able to settle the communal problem. (2) "It removes the objection of the Congress that by making the constitution subject to the consent of the minorities, the British Government has
placed a veto in the hands of the minorities over the constitutional progress of India." 58 The British should have also welcomed it as it would relieve them of the thankless job of resolving the communal question. These advantages apart, what Ambedkar was trying to stress was that the minorities should together decide the fate of the majority! In this respect the suggestion was not justifiable from standards of justice, fairplay and even political sagacity. With the nominees of the minorities on such an Arbitration Board, unanimous decision could not be expected and it also meant that the parties to the dispute, excepting the Hindus and the British, were to sit on the Board and vote. This also was not a sound proposition. An International Board of Arbitration without any of the parties to the dispute on it would have been a more convincing and acceptable suggestion. Moreover, his suggestion was in clear contradiction of his own scheme in 'the Indian Constitution (Preliminary Provisions) Act, in which he laid emphasis on a referendum at all stages 'as the safest and the most constitutional method'. This only indicates that he himself was not keen on giving his scheme as the only alternative. He had various solutions in his mind, all of which he did express. He was also perhaps convinced, on the basis of the 'pleadings' he himself had drawn,

58. Ibid, p. 413.
that there was no need for any other form of solution than partition. What he wrote in the last parts of the book was significant. He wrote: "What I have proposed may not be the answer to the question: What next? I don't know what else can be. All I know is that there will be no freedom for India without an answer. It must be decisive, it must be prompt and it must be satisfactory to the parties concerned." He was modest enough to say that what he suggested may not be the only solution. Nevertheless, the significance and value of his thoughts on Pakistan lay in the clarifications he provided for the several intricate points involved in the demand. By providing a philosophical justification and base for the demand, he fully succeeded in convincing the opponents that Pakistan was the only solution to the political deadlock in the country that was delaying independence. How many Indians had the courage of conviction to elaborate upon it, knowing fully well that it would be invoking the wrath of his fellow-citizens? He was even branded as unpatriotic and anti-national. One is reminded of Edmund Burke, who was known for his frankness and forthright observations. Burke's writings and philosophy had largely influenced Ambedkar's life and thinking. This was evident in his speeches and writings. It would be appropriate in this connection to refer to Burke's

Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, in which he had made a fervent plea for appreciating the stand of the American Colonists. He had pleaded for conciliation with the colonists, but it fell on deaf ears and history took its own course. The colonists declared their independence from the 'Mother Country'. If only the British government had heeded the warning of Burke — it can be said in retrospect — and had accepted the contention of the colonists by arranging for a smooth transfer of power, there would have been abundant good-will left among the two. History affords valuable lessons, such as these, to posterity. To those who contended that the demand for Pakistan was unjust, the only advice Ambedkar gave was not to forget history. He told them, in his reply to a debate on his book, in Poona:

They cannot make history who forget history. To bring down the preponderance of the Muslims in the Indian army and to make the army safe, it is wise to let out the hostile element. We will defend our land. Do not be under the false impression that Pakistan would be able to spread its Muslim empire over India. The Hindus will make it lick the dust. I confess I have my quarrel with the caste Hindus over some points, but I take a vow before you that I shall lay down my life in defence of our land.60

60. The Lokamanya, 20 February, 1942; quoted in Dhananjay Keer, op. cit., p. 339.
The patriot and the historian in Ambedkar pointed out once again that it was the sheer force of historical events and circumstances that had to be kept in view, and not the advocacies by persons like him. Top leaders of the Indian National Congress, including Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, gave in ultimately for the Pakistan demand realising that it had become a political necessity, which Ambedkar was emphasising since 1940, when he first published his book. It was never his intention to hold a brief for the Muslim League, or to fight for the Muslims' cause. His objective was to point out that Hindustan will be a stronger and a more peaceful country after partition. When he declared at the All-India Depressed Classes Conference at Nagpur in July, 1942 that 'the Muslims might turn out to be the very people against whom they (other minorities in the country) might have to raise the standard of revolt', Ambedkar was voicing his high sense of patriotism. It would, therefore, be a grave injustice to Ambedkar's nationalistic and patriotic feeling of fervour if any one were to think that he was playing into the hands of the British and the Muslims. His main anxiety all along was to make independent India that was to come, a more homogeneous entity, so that it may start off well on the path of progress and prosperity. He envisaged a free India in which there should be SOCIAL, ECONOMIC and POLITICAL to one and all.
An attempt has been made in the foregoing discussion to present, in as comprehensive a manner as possible, Ambedkar’s 'thoughts' on the Pakistan problem. It has been really a difficult task, in so far as it is an attempt to compress so varied, so scholarly and so exhaustive a treatment of the problem of Pakistan by Ambedkar in his masterly work. His work, *Thoughts on Pakistan, or Pakistan or the Partition of India*, was the only one of its kind on the subject that was appreciated for its candid and dispassionate treatment of the issue. Its coverage being so wide and so comprehensive in its political, economic, sociological and philosophical aspects that it was fit to be described as 'India's Political What is What'. It was, indeed, the 'magnum opus' of Ambedkar. "Written at a psychological moment", says the biographer of Ambedkar, "it fell like a bombshell on the heated atmosphere of the day. India's man of great learning, great constitutional pundit and politician of varied experience gave out his reflections on the political problem of India... with the cool intelligence of a doctor he viewed and examined the malady of India. A book by a vigorous man is unlikely to be dispassionate. The subject was dealt with candour, competence, knowledge, courage and excellence. *Thoughts on Pakistan* is a masterpiece in which learning and thinking are blended and displayed at their highest order.
It is entrancing in its magic, intriguing in its construction, terse in its style, and provocative in its manner. It is a model in scientific propagation! Of course, the book is not free from some element of propagation. It was bound to be there, though the learned author promised, in the introduction to the book, that "the aim is to explain but not to convert". The book was intended to be an 'analytical presentation of Indian history and Indian politics in their communal aspects', as if to justify its claim to be called 'the Indian Political what is what'. His intellectual modesty made him to disclaim a dispassionate approach but he believed that he wrote it, free from all prejudices. He actually set before himself the task of 'expounding the scheme of Pakistan in all its aspects', which he has done in an admirable and exhaustive manner. In the 'Epilogue' to the book Ambedkar himself claims that in 'drawing the pleadings', he followed that "prolix style so dear to the Victorian lawyers, under which the two sides plied one another with plea and replication, rejoinder and rebutter, surrejoinder and surrebutter and so on", so that, "a full statement of the case for and against Pakistan may be made." After giving his findings on the basis of facts 'true to the best of' his 'knowledge and belief', he invited the Hindus and the Muslims to give their findings. He posed, for their

benefit and facility, all possible questions that had to be answered by the public, while expressing either for or against Pakistan. This was no small an intellectual service that Ambedkar rendered in the political evolution of India. He was thus participating, in a positive and a very fitting manner, in the political life of the country by providing the much-needed food for thought on the problem. The Hindu and Muslim leaders and politicians were either too busy with their public activities, or were so much involved emotionally with the problem, that they were unable to give a cool consideration to the most burning problem of the country. The timing of the question was so crucial that without an answer to the question 'Pakistan or no Pakistan?' the stalemate in Indian politics would remain unresolved. It looked as if Indian independence was held at ransom on account of this issue. At such a moment Ambedkar came forward with his masterly analysis of the problem, full of intellectual candour and ballast, and, thereby, he provided a justification for agreeing to partition. As Aham Abdul Gaffar Khan is reported to have disclosed, two individuals were prominent in agreeing to partition from the Congress side, and they were Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Of course, it was Sri. C.Ajaepalachariar, whose was a lone voice then, that called out for an agreement on the issue between the League and the Congress when the
League was reiterating its claim for Pakistan as the only acceptable solution for the Indian constitutional problem. This was suggestive enough, coming as it did, from a senior leader of the Congress. The book gave an impetus to the Pakistan propaganda of even leaders like Rajagopalachariar in a way. It may not be too much to claim for Ambedkar, that such of the leaders amongst the Hindus, who were wavering on the issue and who were in a 'neither-reject-nor-accept' mood, were helped by the writing to find a philosophical justification to accept partition without any further oscillations. Ambedkar's pleadings convinced the Hindu opponents that partition would strengthen the position of the Hindus and would pave the way for an enduring peace and prosperity for India. Even the most reluctant of the opponents like Savarkar, Dr. Moonje, Mr. H.S. Kelkar, could not effectively refute the pleadings in the book, though they were terribly upset over it. This only showed that Ambedkar's arguments on the issue were irrefutable and perfect. Hence the importance of his writing and his thoughts on Pakistan.

But this was not all. To any keen student of Ambedkar, it would be very clear that in the course of his 'drawing the pleas' he was not just performing his job as a learned Barrister, but the scholar and prophet in Ambedkar was no less prominent. The critics, who
thought that Ambedkar drew only the pleadings, naturally were curious to know whether he had any scheme of his own. Of course, he has given a number of suggestions for action, as far instance, the transfer of population as a sovereign remedy for the communal problem. As Ambedkar himself pointed out, "... I have expressed my views in quite positive terms, if not on all, certainly on many questions. In particular I may refer to two of the most important ones in the controversy, namely, Are the Muslims a Nation, and Have they a case for Pakistan." Besides, he expressed his definite views on the resulting national frustration, if the Pakistan scheme were to die. He foresaw a terrible sense of frustration that would befall the whole nation and the Hindus and the Muslims alike. So he was actually pleading for partition and the creation of Pakistan and Hindustan into two separate nations. Ambedkar took great pains to highlight the fruits of his own independent line of thinking and research into the history of India, in the course of this great work of his. Thereby, he was helping the public of India and abroad to arrive at their own conclusions. In this striving of his, he brought to bear upon his thoughts his natural intelligence, perseverance, perceptibility and above all courage and honesty. He was sincere and had a legitimate

62. Pakistan or the Partition of India, p. 341.
interest of the nation at his heart, when he was presenting the Pakistan issue to the public. It would be naive, nay mischievous, on anybody's part to brand him on that account as un-Indian and anti-national. He was only unmasking the historical truths and bringing to the surface the political realities of the situation. Thus, he rendered an invaluable intellectual service to the nation at a very crucial period in the political and constitutional evolution of India.