PART TWO
In the first chapter we have seen how evil becomes a problem. In fact, evil has been considered as a problem first in the West. To be more precise, evil was a problem more in the West, than in the East. Except for this, all other philosophical problems are common for the West and the East. Evil is not a great problem for Indians but is an oddity; for rebirth clearly gives an explanation for the so-called evil. For the West rebirth is an oddity and evil remains a problem.

Here there are a few assumptions as we have found in the first chapter. (i) There is a God. (ii) He is all-powerful. (iii) He is all-good. (iv) He is all-knowing. (v) And there is evil. David Hume has expressed the problem in a more informal terms thus:

"Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But He is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to His intention? But He is Almighty."  

In brief, the problem of evil arises from the inexplicability of evil. The reflective man has evolved this problem as philosophical from the incompatibility between evil and God with His attributes.

Centuries before Christ, Epicurus (B.C.341-270) has formulated the problem thus:
"He is able, and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able. If He is willing, and unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance with God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and feeble, and therefore not God; if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from what source then are evils? or why does He not remove them?"

When we study the history of this problem we come to know that it also is a history of its solutions. It was at the hands of the great philosopher, St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.), that the problem got a definite shape and thorough analysis. He has given a nearly complete list of all possible future solutions to the problem of evil. So much so, after him not much change has occurred in the list of solutions. Therefore in this chapter we shall try to discover the western attempts to conceive the problem and the solutions offered by them specially Augustine. Our method will be, to simply study the important solutions in a logical manner, not chronological. I do not claim an exhaustive study here.

A. SURVEY OF THE CHRISTIAN SOLUTIONS

St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.)

Before entering into the works of Augustine a minimum equipment of his background with some bare details of his life and some sketchy characterisation of his intellectual and cultural contexts will help us to understand him and his works better.

Augustine was born in 354 A.D. in Thagaste, in the
Roman African Province of Numidia. His mother Monica was a devout Catholic and his father Pantucius was a non-Christian. Before going to Rome in 383 he was educated at Madaura and Carthage, specialising in rhetoric. Taken up by the passion for certitude in knowledge, first he followed Manicheanism, an Oriental version of Christianity founded by Mani in the third century A.D. in Persia.

Manicheanism involved a sharp distinction between good and evil. It also assumed that the evil is more active than good. According to this, good and evil are two originally independent principles. These two principles are envisaged in the perspective "Three Ages". In the first, the two kingdoms existed independently of each other. The second is a period of mingling. In the third age there will be a definite separation with the victory of the good over evil.

While in Rome, Augustine was drawn to a small Platonic group. In 384 he was appointed a professor of rhetoric in Milan where he met St. Ambrose who baptised him in 387. In the following year he returned to Carthage and then to Thagaste. In 391 he was ordained a priest in Hippo. Later he became the Bishop of Hippo and died in 430.

Among the various problems St. Augustine has dealt with in his voluminous works, the problem of evil must rank first. He found this to be the greatest challenge to his Christian faith and belief in God. Therefore, he has dealt with this problem with all seriousness throughout his life and his preoccupation to solve this problem can be seen in almost all his works, specially in 'Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil', 'The Free Choice of the will', 'Confessions', and 'The City of God'.
We have stated that Augustine has given a series of solutions, nearly a complete list of all future possible solutions, some of which he rejected in his later days, as heretical, e.g. Manichaean doctrine of two opposed powers. Augustine's treatment is generally considered the paradigm for all future philosophical handling of the problem. All the major figures who took up the problem to their bosoms relied on Augustine for advice and solace. For this reason we shall spend some time to study some relevant works of this great Saint and Philosopher on this issue.

In Augustine, we can find three formulations of the problem of evil. For him creation consists in three parts, so too there are three formulations. Not many have distinguished it this way. However, if we make clear at the outset the three levels of creation, it will facilitate our understanding of the problem going to be tackled. So we distinguish three creative levels i.e., superhuman, human and subhuman. All these three were of concern for Augustine. They deserved our special and separate attention too.

Now we shall go to some of his important works one by one and see how he deals with the problem.

a. The Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil

This is the first book Augustine wrote shortly after his conversion to Christianity in 386 A.D. In this, he sets forth the problem of evil as a dilemma: "Either Divine Providence does not reach to these outer limits of things where evil is or that surely all evils are committed by the will of God." Both horns of this dilemma are impious and detrimental to a God All powerful and All good.
The first horn of the dilemma rises from the negligence of God and the second horn charges God of ill-will or cruelty. Accordingly we shall call them negligence horn and cruelty horn respectively. When we formulated the problem, we dealt with the assumptions of omnipotence and omnibenevolence of God. The above dilemma with its horns will make the problem acute. The negligence horn attacks God's omnipotence and the cruelty horn destroys His omnibenevolence. Thus either way Augustine found the acuteness of the dilemma and the problem therein involved.

The solution he has proposed in the Divine Providence can be summed up under four headings.

1. **The Aesthetic Solution**

Augustine believed that the evil we see is seen narrowly and myopically. We have to understand the whole creation in its totality and with its purpose. This requires us to realise at least three things: (i) though we may find here and there some apparent evil in parts, the whole of creation is nonetheless good in general; (ii) tremendous good can come out of evil and really does come so; (iii) evil is necessary for the full harmony and goodness of the whole. Basing on these assumptions he proposes the Aesthetic Solution i.e. 'the-whole-is-good solution'. He writes:

"Thus it happens that whoever narrow-mindedly considers this life by itself alone is repelled by its enormous foulness, and turns away in sheer disgust. But, if he raises the eyes of the mind and broadens his field of vision and surveys all things as a whole, then he will find nothing unarranged, unclassed or unassigned to its own place."
2. The Teleological Solution

Augustine pursues in the same direction and shows that good arises within the whole and for the whole by the presence of 'part-evils'. This can be named as teleological solution or 'good comes from evil solution'. He has tried to convince the readers by illustrating it with an example:

"What more hideous than a hangman? What more cruel and ferocious than his character? Yet he holds a necessary post in the very midst of laws, and he is incorporated into the order of a well-regulated state..."^4

3. Prevention Solution

A third solution Augustine has put forward in the 'Divine Providence' is the prevention solution. Accordingly evils present in the society are necessary to prevent greater evils that could come about without them. Hence it seems that God just approves or permits the evil so as to avoid greater evils. Thus it is a prevention. So it is rightly called prevention solution, i.e. 'evils are necessary to prevent greater evil solution'. Augustine's delightful example is worth quoting:

"What can be mentioned more sordid, more bereft of decency, or more full of turpitude than prostitutes, procurers, and the other pests of that sort? Remove prostitutes from human affairs, and you will unsettle everything because of lusts ..."^5
4. Contrast Solution

The fourth and the last solution proposed in the 'Divine Providence' is contrast solution. With the analogy of a barnyard-cock-fight, he explains this solution. In the fight one of the combatants emerges battered, torn and bloody. This plainly points to the struggle for the good going on within, and finally emerging from the whole. As A.L. Herman puts "the production of good wouldn't be good unless there were evils, i.e., the struggle itself." Thus beauty exists and is understood in contrast with the ugly. And so it is known after contrast solution, i.e. evil is needed to contrast with good. In connection with the explanation of this solution Augustine writes, thus:

"And yet, by that very deformity (of the barnyard cock beaten in a fight) was the more perfect beauty of the contest in evidence."7

These are the four main solutions Augustine has put forward in the 'Divine Providence'. Now we shall proceed to his second famous work i.e. 'Free Choice of the Will'.

b. Free Choice of the Will

There are a number of solutions offered in this work of great repute. Almost all the solutions formed in the Divine Providence can be found here. Besides these, we can also find three more new attempts to solve this riddle.

Here Augustine has made a distinction of two kinds of evil which has important application in his later works.
The evil caused by man is called sin, and evil suffered by man is called punishment. This distinction is closely connected with the distinction of moral evil and physical evil. Now we shall see in brief the solutions added in this new work.

5. Man is free Solution

This solution mainly depends on the distinction, made above, of sin and punishment. Thus if sin is the evil and if it is caused by man, then, man is the cause of the evil and not God. Ultimately, it is the freedom of man which runs into evil. Therefore we call this, "Man-is-free-solution".

But this solution will lead to greater troubles, if omniscience is added to a God omnipotent and all good. Augustine himself has found the seeming contradiction between 'the man is free solution' and the omniscience of God. Now, if evil is considered as a punishment, it will directly implicate God in the production of evil. So in both cases, evil as sin and punishment one has to involve God directly or indirectly as the cause of evil. Augustine has tried his best to push the issue to the maximum analyzable.

Right in the start he presents the puzzle thus: there is indeed a problem "... as to how these two positions are not mutually opposed and incompatible." i.e. the fore-knowledge of God and freedom of man. By 'freedom of man' Augustine means the freedom of man in 'his power'. As far as the will is in our power, it is free. God may know what my future is. But this does not necessitate me to do in a particular way. I choose what I want. God is only a witness and not the cause. Hence God is not responsible
for my events, but I am. This is how Augustine proceeds with his arguments.

That which is not under our power is not free for us. And will is under our power. Therefore it is free. Here we do not deny the foreknowledge of God; yet we do will what we will. Hence power is mine and God knows it. The foreknowledge of God does not take away my freedom, since my freedom results from my will which is under my power.

One may find this ambiguous whether Augustine is trying to prove that our will is under our power. The word 'power' is a misleading term. Power can be real power and apparent. If our power is apparent then we have no real freedom. But Augustine seems to hold that the power is 'real'. If so, is not God's foreknowledge effective (for execution)? If not effective, God is not omniscient; if I can't do different from God's foreknowledge, I have no freedom. But Augustine has given an answer here. He says 'knowing the future' is quite different from 'compelling the future'. God only knows, but does not compel anybody. He is not the cause of all that He foreknows, e.g. evil.

With the above explanation what Augustine wants is to deal with the human evil as sin being different from superhuman and subhuman evils, and from human evil as punishment by appearing to a distinction between future events as known and future events as caused. This distinction will save God from getting involved in human sin and pin the blame on man. Here Augustine's main concern was to show that man is free and that he is the cause of his sins (evil) and that the evil he suffers is the result of the abuse of freedom. (Augustine developed this idea in a course of
If at all the above stand is okayed and approved, how then can we explain the evil suffered by innocent children? In the *Brothers Karamazov* Dostoievsky has beautifully expressed this theme of suffering of the innocent. Dimitri had a dream in which he saw the peasants starving and their children dying. See behold a passage describing the suffering of a small child:

"But why is it weeping? 'Mitya persisted stupidly 'Why are its little arms bare? Why don't they wrap it up?" The babe's cold, its little clothes are frozen and don't warm it'.

'But why is it? Why?, foolish Mitya still persisted. Why, they are poor people, burnt out. They've no bread ...

'No. No.' Mitya, as it were, still did not understand. 'Tell me why it is those poor mothers stand there? Why are people poor? Why is the babe poor? Why is the steppe barren? ...

Why don't they hug each other and kiss? Why don't they sing songs of joy? Why are they so dark from black misery; Why don't they feed the babe?" 14

What evils have they (children) done to undergo these sufferings? Augustine has tried to answer this as follows:
"But God accomplishes some good in reforming the lives of older people when they are chastised by the suffering and death of their little ones so dear to them. Why should this not happen since, once it is over, it will be as if it never happened for those who suffered it?"\(^{15}\)

Though this is not a convincing argument, tucked into this explanation we can find two specific solutions in the Free Choice of the Will.

6. The Discipline Solution

Augustine says that sufferings are sent by God to punish the wicked. Hence the sufferings of innocent children are punishments to the parents. Therefore such evils are all caused freely by man himself. By this kind of vindictive measures man is reformed better, thinks Augustine. Thus evil that we get, strengthens us and builds our character and so, this is called the discipline solution.

7. The Recompense Solution

Augustine goes on to say that the discipline aspect of the suffering will help man for a 'more righteous living' turning his mind towards "life eternal". However, this is not a sufficient justification for the suffering of children who are innocent. Why should children suffer for the sins of their parents? Here Augustine brings us the last solution of the Free Choice. These innocents will inherit the Kingdom of Heaven as a recompense for their suffering. In explaining the recompense solution Augustine writes: "... who can tell what recompense God in His hidden designs, has in store for these children ..."\(^{16}\) In brief,
this means that the sufferers will be adequately rewarded. The apparent evil can bring forth real good of Heaven as reward. Therefore this is rightly named as recompense solution. This may not be that unacceptable to the Augustinians with regard to light and easy sufferings. But how can we ward off thus extraordinary and hard suffering with such easy explanation as recompense? Granted that evils do all the things that the aesthetic, teleological, discipline and recompense solutions claim, why is there so much evil and excessive suffering? This remains a stumbling block to the Augustinians.

Subhuman suffering (animal suffering). This is another theme which appears in the 'Free Choice'. Till now in Augustine, we have been mainly concerned with human evil. But no theodicy will be considered complete unless it takes into account the suffering in the subhuman level. Therefore our concern will shift now from human evil to the problem of animal evil.

Augustine does not seem to hold that animals have souls which can sin and be punished. Therefore the earlier solutions will not hold good in the case of subhuman suffering.

For Augustine creation was man-centred and world is a stage for the drama of solution of man. Hence all that is created are created for man. They all in one voice proclaim and cry out that man must recognise his Creator.

According to Augustine "God's unity is given expression among the animals, and their sufferings and distresses are taken as a sign of their striving to attain unity, and
thereby imitate the unity of God", says A.I. Herman. Man is reminded of nature's limitation (created things have to be imperfect and limited) and the presence of God. Regarding the unity of the created world and the Creator, Augustins writes:

"The very fact of their suffering makes it quite clear how much these souls strive for unity in ruling over their bodies and imparting life to them ... Except for pain in the animal, we would have no evidence of the intense desire for unity in the lower living things ... (and) we would not be made sufficiently aware that all these have been constituted by the supreme, sublime, and unspeakable unity of the Creator."16a

This is not a solution for the theological problem of animal evil. No animal good seems to rise from this evil. Man can derive some good from this. Then, this takes us back to discipline solution or teleological solution. If heaven were open to animals also (as explained by Theillard de Chardin in his universal transformation in Christ) one could propose an animal recompense solution. But Augustine does not open heaven to the animals as they are irrational.

Superhuman evil

Unlike other philosophers, in the Free Choice, Augustine has dealt with, though only in a passing manner, a rare theme i.e., the problem of superhuman evil. How can all-beneficient and all-powerful God stand consistently with the presence of superhuman evil suffered by the fallen angels? He has posited the problem as a casual remark. And we do not find a systematic treatment for this problem in the Free Choice.
However he found that the problem of evil cannot be satisfactorily solved without taking into consideration the superhuman evil.

In the 'Confessions', we have a classical passage giving expression to this problem, but not solution. It reads thus:

"But, again I said: Who made me? Surely it was my God, not only Good but Goodness itself? Whence, then, my ability to wish evil and to refuse the good? ... Who placed this in me and planted the seedlings of bitterness in me, since my whole being is from my most sweet God? If the Devil is the originator, then what is the source of the Devil? If he, too, by a perverse act of will turned from a good angel into a devil, what is the source ... when he was made completely an angel by the best Creator?"17

There are also some texts in the Enchiridion, in which, it seems Augustine has directly implicated God in the animal and angel sufferings.18 But later he corrects it by saying that whatever happens, happens so because God so permits and they have to be ultimately good and just. He writes:

"Nothing, then comes about unless God wills it so, either through permitting it to happen or Himself performing it. There is no doubt that God does well even in permitting to happen that which happens ill. For He permits this only through a just judgement, and surely everything that is just is good. Therefore, although those things which are evil, in so far as they are evil are not good, still it is good that not only good
things exist but also evil. For, unless it were good that evil things also exist, they would never have been permitted to exist by the Omnipotent God ..."19

c. Confessions

In the Confessions also, Augustine has tackled the problem of evil and tried to solve it much as hithertofore. If to number the solutions he has attempted, we can roughly count five new approaches towards the solutions. The famous western solution i.e. that evil is only a privation of good, has been developed in this famous work of Augustine. It has predominated the Western Theodicies.

Augustine's Confessions is regarded as the only autobiography to come down to us from the European classical age.20

In this, we find Augustine a passionate man who is restless in search for certainty, a precise mathematical certitude. We find him both a sceptic and a believer or rather a passionate believer who had to traverse vast spaces of scepticism before reaching the absolute Truth. His depth in scriptures, familiarity with non-platonism and influence of classical paganism have taken clear expression in his famous work of Confessions.

Now we shall see the relevant new approaches found in Confessions

8. The Illusion Solution

According to this, Augustine seems to hold that evil is not real, but only an illusion, as the Advaitins.
It is certainly wrong to say that Augustine has articulated evil as an illusion. It is only a broad deduction. For, see how he states the problem and tries to solve:

"Here is God and here is what God has created. God is good ... and by far superior to these things. Yet, as a good being he created them good ... Whence then, is evil?"21

Resorting to the aesthetic solution he held that evil and good are better together than good alone.22 Yet we read, "... Thou hast made all things good ... very good. To Thee there is no evil at all; not merely to Thee, but to the totality of Thy creatures ... Now, in its parts, certain things may be considered evil because they are not in agreement with certain others."23 This forces us to conclude that Augustine took sometimes evil as an illusion against his professed belief in the reality of evil:

"(Evil is Real for,) where there is nothing to fear, we fear none-the-less. For that reason, either the evil which we fear does exist, or the fact that we do fear it, is evil."24

Since we are in an attempt to classify all the possibly attempted solutions we shall name this "evil is unreal" as "the illusion solution". Of course, this may hold good with regard to soft evils, but not with hard evils of life. Now, we shall proceed to privation solution which has taken illusion solution as its stepping stone.

9. Privation Solution

The illusion solution is more securely insinuated into another solution put forward in the Confessions. This
is the famous doctrine of evil as the privation of good. First Augustine doubts the reality of evil. Then he goes on to say that he does not know whether evil is the privation of good. This insinuation grows into a full-fledged commitment and says:

"Now what is the so-called evil but a privation of the good ... animals (afflicted) with diseases and wounds is nothing other than privation of health ... For a wound or disease is not a substance but a vice of the fleshly substance; the substance, surely something good, is flesh itself, its accidents being the afore-mentioned evils, that is, privations of that good which is called health. In like manner evils in the soul are privations of natural good."\(^{25}\)

The illusion solution was no way acceptable and convincing to Augustine and that is why he went a step further and wrestled with privation theme. Here one can see the influence of Christianity on Augustine after his retreat from Manichaeanism.

Here Augustine had to face a great dilemma. If one is to accept evil as a substance, he naturally falls into the Manichaean dualism. If it is explained away by saying that evil is not really real, one falls in illusion theory. Therefore Augustine argued that evil is only a privation of good. This we shall name as "privation solution".

10. **Impersonal Substance Solution**

Another solution found in 'Confessions' is generally called impersonal substance solution. This is
Manichaean solution to the problem of evil, basing on a substantial dualism. Augustine has publicly condemned this approach to the problem of evil. According to this view, good and evil proceed from two opposed infinite sources, but evil smaller and good larger, the good will have its final victory over the evil, — the Manichaeeans believed. Since the cause of evil is believed to be a separate substance which is impersonal this solution is called "Impersonal Substance Solution".

11. Personal Substance Solution

This is no way much different from the above solution. Here the causes of evil is believed to be a substance which is personal. Hence it is called "personal substance solution". Augustine has rejected both these solutions. True, these will solve the problem of evil; but they limit the power of God, since they are forces in the universe and since God is unable to stop them. These are not solutions approved and suggested by Augustine. But they are referred to in the 'Confessions'. Hence they deserve our attention during our survey of all the possible relevant solutions for the problem of evil.

At the end, Augustine returns to the "Man-is-free-solution" in the 'Confessions'. Man has sinned freely against God and he deserves the punishment and God rightly judges and pronounces the punishment. Hence God's justice is the cause of evil. This theme is found developed in the "City of God".

d. City of God

Before we enter into the 'City of God' with regard
to the problem of evil it is good to have some idea
of Augustine's views on man. In a way, this is necessary
for a proper understanding of all the solutions for the
problem of evil put forward by Augustine in general, and
in 'City of God' in particular.

**Idea of Man**

Augustine regarded man as a composite being of
body and soul. In Book I, Ch. 16, he declares: "... let
this stand as a firmly established truth: the virtue which
governs a good life controls, from the seat of the soul,
every member of the body, and the body is rendered holy by
the act of a holy will." Here we can find a link between
the body and soul through the mechanism of will. In Book
IV Ch. 12 he has distinguished between God and what he
creates, including man. They are related but not identical.

This relationship is analysed in Book V in terms of
"free will". Here he has explained fate in the pagan sense,
and in the Christian sense; for Augustine, it is nothing but
"Divine Providence". Pagan fate presupposes the influence
of stars independent of God's will; Christian fate or rather
"Divine Providence" implies God's will; since God is the
ultimate cause there is also room for "choice". He is the
cause of all causes although not of all choices.

Augustine foresaw the great problems in reconciling
'God's will' and 'man's free will'. A pagan philosopher
like Cicero rejected fate to save free will. If so, would
not God's will for Divine Providence as the ultimate cause
conflict with "free will of man?" Certainly it appears so.
That is why Cicero "gave up God". But Augustine formulated
the issue in terms of "foreknowledge". For, a Christian
has to save "God" as well as "free will". He argues that God knows both what we "could" do and what we "would" do. Then he goes on to contrast between 'fate' and 'choice', assigning the former to the weak and the latter to the strong.

Augustine is quite emphatic in the assertion of human freedom. He says, "the fact is that we do many things which we would most certainly not do if we did not choose to do them. The most obvious case is our willing itself ..." So relentless is his logic that he allows it to lead him to the assertion that an ever omnipotent God is not omnipotent in terms of His own constituent nature i.e. God is not omnipotent to choose to be not omnipotent. In Augustine's own words, "... He would not, of course be omnipotent, if He had to suffer anything against His will, it is precisely because He is omnipotent that for Him some things are impossible ..." The basis and the purpose of Augustine's work is clear from his words of conclusion: "As Christians and Philosophers, we profess both: foreknowledge as a part of our faith; free choice as a condition of responsible being. It is hard to live if one's faith in God is wrong..."

In theological language, this is important because sin has to be tied to the sinner as an act of free choice. God foresaw that man is free, and hence responsible for his sins. He says "... No man sins unless it is 'his choice to sin; and his choice not to sin, that too, God foresaw ..." It is easy to criticise this position as a logical impasse, (dead lock); but any amount of 'discussions of "freedom", if cast in absolute terms, would run only into quicksands. Logically it is arguable that man is not free under law in so far as he is limited by it. The democratic rationale
is that if a man accepts the law "freely", then the two do not conflict. In brief, Augustine recommends a liberal solution such that man can accept with free will a God who has foreknowledge. He supplements this with the notion that it is part of God's knowledge that man is free to do what he wants.

Not only has man will, he also has intelligence, as he is a rational creature. Augustine had also a clear idea of the 'Mind' in man and he held that this mind is made up of intelligence and will. Mind has a special function in relation to God, Augustine believed. It is through the mind that man can hear God speaking the truth. He says, "... For, He speaks to that part of man which is most excellent and which has nothing superior to it except God Himself ..." Man was created "to the image of God" and it is his mind which makes man separate from the beasts. But man's mind meant to be reasonable and intelligent, has been incapacitated in its efforts to follow God's unchangeable light, because of "dark and inveterate vices". Hence it needs to be instructed by faith and thus purified of its vices. It is at this point that Augustine introduces a relationship between Christ and mankind.

While dealing with the creation account, he has beautifully presented in Book XI, the hierarchical order found in the creation. The salient points can be summed up thus:

(i) There is a distinction between the creatures and the creator. (ii) There are different ranks and grades among the created world. (iii) The sentient are superior to non sentient for example, animals to bees. (iv) Among the sentient beings,
"the intelligent are higher to non-intelligent as with men and cattle." (v) Among the intelligent, "the immortal are superior to mortal as angels to men".

Though angels rank higher than men in the hierarchy of nature, in terms of will and love, in the scale of morality good men out-weigh angels, says Augustine. For, will and love are more important than the hierarchy of nature with regard to rational beings like men and angels.

Sometimes we can see Augustine denying the reality of evil. Since God is good, whatever God created also is good. If so, evil is then only non-existent and privation of good. This seems to be a vehement rejection of the Manichaen position. Even at this juncture, Augustine held that sin is a reality. If sin had not been committed, "this beautiful world could have been filled with created natures that are good ..."28

Man's distinctive faculty, one that is peculiar to him among animals, is to know what is true in a spiritual sense. This is the famous Augustinian illumination — our capacity for spiritual light. He relates this to man's interior perception, "by which we can distinguish what is just from what is unjust".29

Love is a central principle in Augustinian Psychology and Ethics. He argues that what we love in men who deserve to be loved is "love itself". He has combined knowledge and will in the notion of love, when he argues that a good man is called good, not because he knows what is good, but because he loves what is good.30
In Book XII, Augustine has given a rather thorough exposition of the problem of sin. Those who oppose God by sin are called God's enemies. Sin cannot harm God; but by sin, the sinner separates himself away from God. God's intention about man to be a social being and the social dimension of sin are clearly brought to light here.

It is in Books XIII and XIV that we find the Augustinian interpretation of the signal event of the Original Sin or Fall, which is the corner stone of Christian faith and in which lies all the feasible Christian solutions for the problem of evil.

Augustine believed that man was destined to be immortal and everlastingly happy, though he was not to be equated with angels. Man's history would have been totally different, if "our first parents had complied with the obligations of obedience."³¹

Dealing with the question of immortality, Augustine says that we have two kinds of death, the death of the body and the death of the soul. Death comes to the soul when God abandons it, just as death comes to the body "when the soul departs."³² He also speaks of the total death of the man — a death of body and soul. When soul abandoned by God, abandons the body, the total death takes place. This is also known as the second death in scriptural terms. "Be afraid of him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell",³³ says the Lord.

Man's mortality and all the rest of the evil are attributed to the first Fall (or first sin of disobedience) of our first parents. But why should their descendants be punished? Augustine's answer is that it follows from
"birth". In other words, by being born into human society, one inherits the Original Sin and its punishment. That is how we all have become heirs of death and victims of evil. Augustine writes: "... What the first man became by perversion and penalty, this his descendents are by birth-natures subject to sin and death." In the utilitarian sense, he says death is, though bad for sinners, good for saints. For, sainthood is attained through death. Wickedness makes a bad use not only of evil, but also of good. In the same way, holiness makes use not only of good, but also of evil.

With the Fall are associated (a) deprivation of divine grace, and (b) a sense of shame at nakedness. The Fall is interpreted as the starting point of the battle between spirit and the flesh — a characteristic of our post-fall — "Vitiated nature". It is important to note here that Augustine tries his best to throw the responsibility for sin on man, and this is logically related to his earlier efforts to safeguard the freedom of man. He does this by distinguishing between 'nature' and its subsequent 'defects'. God created the 'nature' of man as good, but "man, corrupt by choice and condemned by justice, has produced a progeny that is both corrupt and condemned." In the fall of one man all mankind fell. Augustine interpreted the Fall both as historical event and as a symbolic referent. For example, he interprets the garden as the Church and the four gospels as its four rivers.

In explaining the flesh-soul relationship, the flesh means not only the body, but the whole human nature. Body is not the source of all the evils that afflict the soul. In the first Fall, it was the soul that led to the corruption
of the body or flesh. For, man meant to do the will of God, freely chose to disobey God's will.

While interpreting the Original Sin, Augustine has brought out its social side too. Adam yielded to Eve "in obedience to a social compulsion as a husband to wife, as the only man in the world to the only woman." It seems that Augustine has tried to minimise the personal aspect of the Fall, giving it more a collective dimension.

The sum and substance of the Original Sin was the free violation of the virtue of obedience of the first parents to God who is supposed to be their mother, father and everything. Man is nothing without God, but in disobeying Him, he did not reach the absolute nothingness, but near to nothingness. As a result of the Fall, man became a "deserter from eternal life, doomed to eternal death". His only hope lay in grace. Indeed, Augustine suggests that God created man whom He knew would sin, because He wanted to reveal "how much was deserved by their guilt and condoned by His grace, and, also because the harmony of the whole reality which God has created and controls cannot be marred by the perverse discordance of those who sin ..."  

Speaking on the ultimate end of man Augustine says: "... eternal life is the supreme good and eternal death the supreme evil; and we should live rightly in order to obtain the one and avoid the other. Man's life on earth is not one of real happiness, but such happiness compared with the beatitude which is our end in eternity is, in point of fact, misery."  

This is in brief the Augustinian view on man, his origin, his fall, and his ultimate end. This brief account
is quite essential to have a proper understanding of the Augustinian solutions to the problem of evil in general, and the specific solutions offered in the *City of God* in particular. We shall now proceed to the next solution proposed in the *City of God*.

12. **Justice Solution**

Many of the solutions developed in the previous books can be found repeated in this, of course, may be with some modification. Here we shall confine ourselves to the justice solution which appears to be something new to the *City of God*. And this has influenced the later Christian world as a more feasible solution than others.

Augustine seems to hold that two things are accomplished in human suffering: first, God punishes man for his guilt or sin, and this is justly done. For, man deserves that suffering; and second, by means of them God could show His own grace to man at the same time. It is as if Augustine were to say that God through human suffering reveals His vengeful and benign aspects simultaneously to man. Since the evil men receive is considered as part of God's justice, we shall consider His justice solution.

The solution appears to take two forms in rationalising evil. Thus on the one hand, the suffering man undergoes is deserved, because God is an avenger and also just; on the other hand, the suffering man gets could be worse, but not so, because God is merciful and just. Thus God's anger and mercy, revenge and grace, make up for the suffering that happens to man. This is what justice solution means.

The problem of human freedom and divine foreknowledge remains a great threat to the justice solution. However,
Augustine argues here also that man sins freely because while God knows the future, He does not make that future. Also he says:

"God who both foresees all things and can do all things, when he distributes to each of His creatures their appropriate endowments, knows how to turn to good account both good and evil."^43

Here though the teleological solution may stand, problems about "endowments" will arise, e.g. why is one endowed with eyes and ears and another not? Does this contribute to the good of the whole? Further if God is all-powerful and all-knowing, then isn't He responsible, in some sense of that word, for what He knows?

**Enchiridion**

We have almost found all the solutions worked out by St. Augustine in the above four books. There is a fifth and final work, the *Enchiridion*, which also has dealt with this problem of evil. I have not succeeded in finding out any new solution or approach in this work. Many of the solutions presented in previous works are found here with some modifications. Throughout the work Augustine is pre-occupied with safeguarding the freedom and basic goodness of man and absolute goodness of God. It seems Augustine has a problem with "good" wherein it can mean "not-so-good".

"For if a man does not understand these things, who is he to reply to God? If he does understand them, he finds no better ground for replying. For, if he understands, he sees the whole human race was condemned in its rebellious head by so just
a divine judgment, that if no one were to be freed from it, no one could rightly blame the justice of God.\textsuperscript{44}

All created things are good, but not supremely good:

"All natural beings are good, since the Creator of every one of them is supremely good; but because, unlike their Creator, they are not supremely and unchangeably good, their good is capable of diminution (an evil) and increase."\textsuperscript{45}

In the above brief survey of the five works of Augustine, we were mainly trying to see how he tried to solve the problem and how many solutions he has dealt with. We have somehow numbered twelve solutions. It is important to note that all these twelve are not "really" solutions and many of them (such as personal substance, impersonal substance, illusion etc ...) are not accepted by Augustine even. Therefore we cannot hold him responsible for anything more than his mentioning them. So also the number can be considerably shortened since many of them are not distinct from one another, but interdependent.

Though Augustine has spent a good lot of time on aesthetic and teleological solutions, he seems to get the most joy out of contemplating the discipline and justice solutions. While dealing with the man-is-free-solution and privation solution he has readily understood the difficulties inherent in them in reconciling with God's omniscience and the reality of evil.
Plotinus and St. Thomas Aquinas

After St. Augustine, it was William Leibniz (1646-1716) who has tried to study the problem of evil with some depth and breadth. Before passing to Leibniz, there are two philosophers who deserve some attention of our study; for, they have spent considerable time to probe into this problem. They are Plotinus (205-270) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).

13. Necessary Solution

Plotinus has set forth his doctrine of the nature and source of evil in the First Ennead, eight tractate. He held that evil is necessary wherever good exists. He seems to arrive at this conclusion from his peculiar ontology.

According to the Plotinian ontology, the first metaphysical principle, the Good, produces or creates by a process of emanation. From it follows the intellect, and from the intellect emanates soul. From 'the Soul' emanates the individual souls and the universe as we understand it. These three divine entities - Good, Intellect and Soul — are without Evil, and wholly good only;

"Such is the untroubled, the blissful life of divine beings, and Evil has no place in it; if this were all, there would be no Evil but Good only, the first, the second, and the third Good."

But this is not all. Evil enters somehow and the problem then becomes one of determining whence it came and what it is.

For Plotinus evil is not a simple lack of good nor is
it a being like Intellect and Soul; but it is non-being but not non-existent. It is matter and it constitutes a primal evil or evil absolute, a power that stands at the lowest end of the plenum that constitutes all-that-is. Hence he holds that evil has an ontological entity.

Now where does this pure absolute evil come from? Plotinus argues that it is produced by necessity by the necessity of a plenum in the great chain of Being itself:

"But why does the existence of the Principle of Good necessarily comport the existence of the Principle of Evil? Is it because the All (The plenum) necessarily comports the existence of Matter? Yes: for, necessarily this all is made up of contraries; it could not exist if Matter did not." 47

By introducing the contrastive explanation with a stronger stress, the necessity is made logical and ontological rather than aesthetic of Augustine.

"As necessarily as there is Something after the First, so necessarily there is a Last: this last is Matter, the thing which has no residue of good in it; here is the necessity of Evil." 48

So the answer to the question 'why is there Evil?', is that it is entailed by the nature of the All—wherever there is a First there must be a Last. So too, wherever there is good, there has to be evil. Since evil is taken as necessary wherever good exists, we shall name this "necessary Solution". Now, is this a solution at all? Of course, it is a kind of explanation. But he is far from clear in his exposition.
This description of the origin of evil and his explanation of the relation of Evil to Good are far from being an adequate justification for the existence of Evil.

Our survey of St. Thomas Aquinas on the contribution to the problem of evil can be made very short. For, St. Thomas is essentially repetitive of St. Augustine. Thomas argues that God is the cause of the world and this created world good, and best as a whole. But best world has some inequalities and these have been placed there in order to enhance the perfection of the whole. For, the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things.

According to Aquinas the whole is good while the parts may not be:

"God and nature and any other agent make what is better in the whole, but not what is better in every single part, except in relation to the whole ..."

While dealing with the solutions, or rather in restating the solutions of Augustine, Aquinas seems to have found special interests in developing the privation, aesthetic and teleological solutions. These solutions have come down to us to this day as the most relevant and significant ones among the Catholics.

"... the theodicy developed by Augustine and later restated by Aquinas has remained essentially unchanged and is still being presented today by Catholic writers," says John Hick.
Now, we shall pass on to G.W. Leibniz whose period
is called "the golden age of theodices" and who is called
the "King of that age".

G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716)

Like St. Augustine, Leibniz has attempted hard to find
out some convincing solutions to evil and presented a number
of them, most of which are imitative in intent and content of
Augustine. Among the modern philosophers no one has gone in
that depth and breadth with this problem like Leibniz. His
Theodicy is the best thorough work on this problem.

Through this work he wanted to show that it is possible
for everything to depend upon God and for God to co-operate
with all the actions of creatures ... and nevertheless not
to be the author of sin. He also says that it is quite
possible for God to permit sin and misery and permit it without
being detrimental to His holiness and goodness, though he
could have avoided all these evils.53

In dealing with this problem Leibniz has made three
assumptions:

i. God is most perfect and wise.

ii. Out of His infinite goodness and wisdom He chose
    this world from a number of possible worlds.

iii. This world is the best of all possible worlds.54

Here two things deserve our special attention;

i. Leibniz's God, in a sense, appears to be limited.

ii. Leibniz does not hold this world as most perfect.
    But it is most perfect of all possible worlds;
may be because no created thing can be most
perfect as God, or all perfect. With these
tips in mind, we shall proceed for a short and
brief survey of the solutions put forward by
Leibniz.

14. The Best Alternative Solution

From the above assumptions he could easily arrive
at this solution. The evil we have now are better than
those God could have chosen from other possible worlds. The
supreme wisdom, united to goodness, that is no less infinite,
cannot but have chosen the best. For, he thinks that a
lesser evil is certainly a kind of good in presence of greater
evils, as a lesser good is some kind of evil in relation to
greater good. God does everything best in accordance with
this supreme reason. Hence he seems to hold that this is
the best alternative.

In fact, he has anticipated a possible objection why
couldn't God have found a better world? "For, He had to
choose one from the possible worlds. True, this is a limitation
on God. Well, then we must remember God cannot create another
God. Now, is this a limitation?"

15. God's Limitation Solution

If we further pursue on the above issue we will
land in another solution i.e. God's limitation solution, though
unacceptable to Leibniz and many others. This cannot be
attributed to Leibniz. This thinking finds its fullest
expression in J.S. Mill. According to this, the evil we have
is the result of a limitation in the choosing power of God,
the creator. This in its ultimate analysis takes us to the
conclusion that God is no more all-powerful. This is a direct assault on the nature of God's power. Personal, Impersonal substance, Best alternative and Limitation solutions directly deny the traditionally accepted aspects of the Divine nature; Its goodness and its power.

The best alternative solution led Leibniz to acknowledge the inherent imperfection of this world as a necessity. Here we find an almost replica of the Plotinian solution that evil is a necessity.

16. Metaphysical Evil Solution

The question of 'whence evil?' will bring us around to the problem of creation. The original imperfection of the creatures before sin is the answer; because the creature is limited in its essence. Thus the creature may be good; but falling short of the essence of God renders the creatures imperfect.

Here, there is a dilemma known as creator's dilemma. God, the creator could create in two ways: Either He could create others like Himself all perfect and then, there would be no problem of evil; or He could create others ontologically different from Himself; they would be imperfect and then evil would arise.

Since it is the second alternative which has come into existence, evil is bound and fated to happen since the creation is limited in its essence i.e. the creation qua creation is evil to begin with. As per this, the evil is brought about because of a basic flow in man's nature, but it is not a doing of man. What we have here is the metaphysical evil, which is a limitation inherent in the very stuff of
creation. Naturally the solution to the problem of metaphysical evil is just to explain evil i.e. evil is there in the creation because of the inherent imperfection and intransigency of the mutable creation. Since this is metaphysical in its nature, we shall call this 'metaphysical evil solution'.

17. The Metaphor Solution

In one way or other Leibniz has repeated almost all the solutions presented by his predecessors. While presenting the aesthetic and man-is-free-solutions, he has introduced a new solution i.e., metaphor solution.

Things said about God, have to be said in special ways. When we attribute affection, goodness and power to God, what are we attributing? Well, human predicates, i.e., predicates that name human properties. Are we right in doing this? Can we use the human language and human properties to the majesty of God with same way as used to men?

Leibniz holds that our language is not all expressive and that our speaking about God is only symbolic and metaphorical. Hence God is not good, all-powerful and all-knowing as man is; but God is Good, All-powerful and All-knowing in His own way and in the illimited sense. So the understanding of evil as problem doesn't arise, since our language communication cannot be similar with men and God.

18. Good Outweighs Evil Solution

As we have noted above, Leibniz believed that this is the best of all possible worlds. From this optimism we can draw a new solution. He writes:
"I would dare to maintain that even in this life, good exceed evil, that our comforts exceed our discomforts ... It is enough where God is concerned that there is incomparably more good than evil in the universe." 55

In this Leibniz has presented a solution. If evil is outweighed by good sufficiently to near a vanishing point, then obviously there is no problem of evil. The optimist Leibniz warded evil off to near extinction. When evil is considered constructive and ordinary and too soft, the problem doesn't arise or rather it is solved. Hence we call this "good outweighs evil solution".

19. **Pre-existence Solution**

Another solution Leibniz attempted, is the pre-existence solution. In explaining how the soul could be infected by Original Sin, he has presented three theories i.e. traduction, creation and pre-existence, the last of these three deserves our special consideration.

By analysing the cause of the actual sin, we reach to Original Sin as the root cause. But how the soul is infected by Original Sin? In answering this question Leibniz has expressed three opinions. Among these three, the pre-existence theory seems to be a contribution of Leibniz to the philosophical world of the West.

The souls have a pre-existence in another world where they happened to sin. On account of the sin committed in the former life (or other world) the souls are condemned to this prison of the human body. So this life is a life deserved by our past actions and hence, man is responsible
for evils i.e. his sins of the past life or pre-existence. Therefore we shall name this **Pre-existence Solution**.

Leibniz has spent a lot of time on some other solutions we have found in Augustine. There is no meaning in repeating them in our simple survey of the solutions, as they are not much different from Augustine. All the same his opinion on God's foreknowledge and human freedom deserves a small note in one sentence. According to him "God's foreknowledge does not make truth more determinate in the sense that what is true is true because it is foreseen; rather what is foreseen as true is true independently of its being foreseen."\(^{56}\)

In the *Theodicy* Leibniz has discussed also about the subhuman evil. It is not any way different from Augustine. He admits that the animals do suffer. They suffer for the benefit of the human beings.

To sum up, Leibniz has carried on the doctrine that evil is real and it serves a greater good. This we have seen in St. Augustine too. Leibniz has found three forms of evil, i.e., metaphysical, moral and physical, and approached them to be solved accordingly. He tried to show that metaphysical evil is necessary in this world, the best of all possible worlds. Regarding the moral and physical evil, God just permits them, because world is better with them than without them.

St. Augustine and Leibniz together have almost exhaustively analysed the evil-problem and suggested a number of solutions almost exhaustively. Besides these two there are many more who have pondered over this issue. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Josiah Royce (1855-1916) are two among them who deserve our special consideration.
20. Not-all-Powerful Solution

J.S. Mill in his famous theodicy work, *Three Essays*, seems to put forward an apparently new solution. According to this 'God is not all powerful'. This is not altogether a new solution. This is very similar to God's limitation solution, metaphysical evil solution and the best alternative solution. All these solutions ultimately turn to be a threat to the omnipotence of God. However they are not explicitly stated. But Mill articulated it and said that God is not all powerful, may be all good. On the problem of evil Mill writes:

"The only admissible moral theory of creation is that the Principle of God cannot at once and together subdue the powers of evil, either physical or moral ..."57

This means that God is not all powerful. The moral conclusion Mill arrives at from this is that since God the creator is not all powerful to execute all His good intentions, man's duty to himself, his fellow brethren, and God is to help the creator to perfect the creation.

21. The Mystery Solution

Josiah Royce, in his famous work, *The world and the Individual* has presented a number of solutions of the past. Of course, with some novelty of explanation. He approaches the problem by designating three separate positions with respect to the evil problem, each of which provides views on the nature of evil and a theodicy to explain that evil. The three positions are the mystical, the realist and the idealist. We do not need to spend much time for a detailed study of these.
After long and deep study over the problem of evil and after analysing the various traditional solutions, he seems to fix himself at the end on a new solution. I do not know if we can call this a solution at all. Since he found that no solution can adequately give a satisfactory explanation, he thought it better to hold that our human reason cannot give a perfectly justifiable account and hence evil will ever remain a mystery. Thus this is called mystery solution.

We have now seen twenty one solutions put forward by famous theodictists like St. Augustine, G.W. Leibniz and so on. John Hick is another one who deserves our attention. However since our present attempt is a survey of the various solution for evil, Hick does not seem to have any new solution to add to our list. Therefore we shall proceed towards the next step.

The above account may not give any new piece of information. It may even be called a cataloguing of the solutions offered by the West. I also do not claim anything more. But through this cataloguing, we can try for rearrangement of them and this rearrangement can give us sometimes some information as Ludwig Wittgenstein says:

"The problems are solved not by giving new information but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."

Selection of solutions

In the preceding historical survey of the solutions offered to the problem of evil, by the West, we can find
a good many repetitions. In this part we shall make an attempt to select the main solutions avoiding repetitions. In this reduction-process we shall keep in mind the generally accepted criteria of an adequate solution.

i. **Common sense acceptability**: The thought expressed must be clear and understandable and feasible to common sense. Thus the denial of the fact of evil violates this common sense criterion. This may be called a subjective criterion.

ii. **Logical consistency**: The solution offered must not contain any logical inconsistency or contradiction. Thus to say that God is omnipotent but He cannot control evil powers, violates this criterion of consistency. This is more a formal criterion.

iii. **Completeness**: The solution must be complete in explaining the problem. Thus if evil is explained as a discipline for man's character, how will we explain the animal suffering. A solution, to be a feasible one, must explain all the puzzles of the problem. This is the practical criterion.

All the solutions stated in the historical survey can be grouped under eight heads. Though we can categorise all the twenty one solutions under four heads relating to the three theological these; and evil thesis, grouping under eight heads would better facilitate our analysis.

1. **The Aesthetic Solution**

   According to this, the whole is good so too the end, though the parts in every bit may not be that good.
What is spoken about in the 'contrast-solution', 'Outweighs solution', 'Evil is necessary solution', and 'Recompense solution' is not much different in its ultimate analysis. In all these cases, the end, the whole, Heaven or the final good that comes from evil is much better than those collective smaller parts that are evil. This syncretised solution we shall call as 'aesthetic solution' which will include the above five solutions too.

2. **Discipline Solution**

According to this, evil disciplines man and builds up his character in such a way as to live Heavenward path. The teleological solution which says that good will ultimately come from evil is obviously included in the discipline solution. The recompense solution too can come under this as well as under aesthetic solution. In our reduction process these syncretised solutions can be named as the 'discipline solution'.

3. **Man is free Solution**

According to this the evil is caused by the misuse of the free will of man and hence he justly deserves punishment. Thus God sends punishment by permitting evil, for the sins committed now or in past life. This clearly includes the 'justice-solution' and the rebirth-solution. Hence these three can be grouped under one head of 'Man-is-free-solution'.

4. **Evil is illusion Solution**

This clearly denies the reality of evil. Ultimately evil is not real, but only an illusion. The privation-solution also holds that evil has no being of its own and that
evil is the privation of good. Both these solutions can be combined and called as 'evil-is-illusion-solution'.

5. **Not all powerful Solution**

This solution limits the power of God over evil and world. This is not a bona fide solution. Yet we shall include this in our 'select solutions'. There are five other similar solutions i.e. 'impersonal substance solution', 'personal substance solution', 'worse alternative solution', 'creator limitation solution' and 'prevention solution' which have captured the attention in the history. All these can be combined and brought under one head of "Not-all-powerful-Solution".

Under the above five heads we have included now eighteen solutions. The remaining three are not reducible and they cannot be grouped with any other one. They have their own independent nature and specific approach to the problems of evil. They are:

6. **Necessary Solution**

Evil is logically and metaphysically necessary for the existence of good.

7. **Metaphor Solution**

The language describing God is merely metaphorical. God is good and powerful, but not as man is.

8. **Mystery Solution**

Evil is a mystery. Hence no explanation.
Before we pass on from this to the analysis part, we have to note some conspicuous curiosities present in the select solutions. Some of these select solutions even do not deserve to be called solutions. For example, "Not-All-Powerful-Solution" since it clearly contradicts one of the theological theses, is no solution at all. So too 'evil-is-illusion-solution' is no real solution since it denies the evil thesis; the 'metaphor solution' and 'mystery solution' too are no sound solutions. Why then are they included in the select list? Because we have not thrown out any solution found in the historical survey, but only tried to avoid the repetitions, grouping similar ones under one head.

Now we will proceed to the analysis of the select solutions relating each of them to one or another of the assumptions of the three theological theses or evil thesis or all four together as the mystery solution seems to do. Thus we will try to bring out the apparent practical inconsistency of these solutions showing how they fail of the standard we adopt for an adequate solution.

B. SELECT SOLUTIONS AND A BRIEF ANALYSIS

In this section our method of procedure will be simply to state the select solutions one after another referring to the modern literature wherever possible and then, test their validity as solutions against our standard for adequacy. In this process some of the solutions will be such that we can get rid of them as inadequate by simply pointing out their obvious absurdities. Others may require a deeper analysis before we reject them.
1. **The Aesthetic Solution**

This can be summed up as follows: The whole is good though the parts are not that good. The good of the whole is heightened by contrast with the evil in parts, just as a painting is made more beautiful by its dark and sober colours contrasted with its lighter and happier tones. Thus the whole is better than its parts; and it in some way justifies those parts. Also it holds that the evil suffered is worth the good that will come from it later. This is a sort of "Jam Tomorrow, take woe today" (rejoice tomorrow, suffer today) solution, based on the scriptural promises.

The painting analogy would not hold good in our context. In paintings we can see the parts and the whole. The argument of the aesthetic solution rests on the assumption that there is an organic whole called the Universe. But this has to be proved. Who has seen or can see the actual universal whole? Again the comparison suggested between the good and light, and evil and dark are not quite tenable. The argument assumes that good and evil are opposites in the same sense that light and darkness are. But how they are alike has to be demonstrated. Even if this could be done, we have no assurance to show how the whole is better because of evil. This we have to wait and see. But "Wait and See" is no argument.

For the 'Jam tomorrow promise', the Scriptures seems to be the source. Here then we get involved in another discussion on the justification of Scriptures. The justification of Scriptures is notoriously inconclusive. The last resort of the defenders of aesthetic solution is the call to faith i.e. 'Have faith argument'. This will ultimately lead us to the mystery solution.
Another unsatisfactoriness of this solution is its inability to give an acceptable explanation for the suffering of the innocent, and of the subhuman beings. The 'Jam tomorrow' explanation is ridiculous with regard to extraordinary or acute suffering too.

Thus 'the whole is good, though the parts not approach of the aesthetic solution does not seem to be acceptable to the men of common sense. The unobservable whole spoken of, is an obscure language. The impossibility to give a satisfactory explanation, for the intense suffering in children and subhuman creatures makes the solution incomplete. Finally the aesthetic solution has to show in what way a future good (the whole which is good, which we have to 'wait and see') can justify the unbearable evil. If the individual (not the universe) is the whole that is being perfected by evil, then that is a whole we can see. This will be nothing but discipline solution. 61

2. The Discipline Solution

As we have seen earlier, this solution suggests that evil disciplines man and helps man to build up his character so as to perfect himself and reach the final reward. This is closely connected with the aesthetic solution making a promise for 'Jam-tomorrow'. This solution is more an expression of Christian faith. Leibniz says: "These evils serve to make the elect imitators of their master, and to increase their happiness." 62 Certainly, pain becomes more bearable when it is believed that it is for the soul's ennoblement and preparation for Heaven. Whale J.S. in his 'Christian Answer to the Problem of Evil' writes:

"The pains Christ had to bear may not give you and me a theory about pain, but they help us to
bear pain ... He who triumphed through pain
is with them in all their darkness and suffering." 63

Again we know that the evils spread widely and
generally are not according to one's merit so as to
discipline that person. The subhuman evil too cannot be
explained by this solution.

It is argued by C.S. Lewis that the survival of the
fittest through the mechanism of natural selection depends
on pain in animals. 64 Austin Farrer also argues that pain
is necessary for the simple survival of animals. 65

This argument is an interpretation of the discipline
solution in such a way as to apply to fitting animals to
survive or man to grow. The defender of this solution has
to show this relation in each case of evil with survival and
soul building. It is indeed commonsensically unacceptable
to say that even acute and extraordinary suffering also is
meant to discipline man and animals. It is only a wishful
thinking and underly optimistic attitude to assume that
all evil helps to build souls. This is an explanation very
close to that of aesthetic solution.

According to the traditional understanding of the
West, the animals have no 'souls' and hence they need no
discipline to build the souls. In such a case, how can we
explain the subhuman suffering according to discipline
solution. This solution fails to give a common sense
explanation also to extra-ordinary suffering.

As Peter Bertocci says, "it is not easy to forget in
a given life, suffering, specially to the degree often
experienced, is no way needed to deepen appreciation. It is
true that evil can ennoble a man's soul and discipline it.\textsuperscript{66} Also it is equally true (if not more) that evil can destroy his soul and his character.

The discipline solution, if accepted, will lead people to terrible catastrophes. If all our people come to think that evil matures souls then good deed would be to do evil deeds, producing suffering wherever possible ennobling souls and building up character all over the world. In such a society masochists and sadists would become the paragons of public behaviour.

3. **Man is free Solution**

According to this the cause of evil is attributed to the misuse of man's freedom. **Man is free solution** is an incomplete on right at its start. Since it cannot give a satisfactory justification for subhuman suffering and child suffering. Still, this is worth exploring; for, quite a vast literature has been written on this in the philosophical field.

This solution has two fundamental assumptions:

i. Evil is the result of the actual sins of man.

ii. Evil is the result of the first sin of Adam (Original Sin). These have their basis in the Holy Bible. In the Original Sin theory, the disobedience of Adam is the efficient cause of the fall and the sin, and consequently the suffering. This view is clearly found in Augustine, John Calvin, Josiah Royce and others. Royce goes a step further and says that the suffering of the subhuman beings and children are there because men let them for that. Thus he seems to strongly defend the discipline solution.
Jacques Maritain with St. Thomas Aquinas holds that every creature is naturally fallible; God cannot make a creature impeccable as He cannot make a square circle. According to John Hick, in creation God has two alternatives: produce a reality as perfect as Himself. This will be another God. Or, make a creature world, inferior to its Maker. The first alternative is ruled out; for, it is absurd. The second has to be necessarily imperfect.

This is a challengable stand. This is based on the assumption that anything that is created has to be imperfect. Should this be so necessarily? Metaphysical perfection may be an impossibility. But what we aim at is a moral perfection which a morally perfect God could grant to man, without making him a machine. But the upholders of the freedom solution argue that this is a matter of logical contradiction like square circle.

If the creation of perfect beings (at least morally) was not possible for God, it would have been better that He did not create such imperfect ones. For, there is no justification for so much imperfection (hard evil) as a consequence of free will. Thus goes the line of objection raised by the critics against 'man-is-free-solution'.

Another objection raised against is with regard to the inconsistency between man's freedom and God's foreknowledge. How much freedom His free creatures have? There is no point in saying that God's omniscience does not compel us to do this way. So too, to say God permits us to act this way is quite beside the point. It is not God's involvement with evil that is stressed, but man's freedom for choice.
and to act accordingly. This day, it is generally agreed that man's freedom is very minimal and the imputability is very marginal.

Again there are certain classes of events which the defenders of freedom solution have to explain convincingly. What satisfactory explanation can they give for the natural evils such as flood, earth quakes etc? How can one account for the defective birth and suffering of the innocent children? The man is free solution will remain unacceptable until the above problems can be solved in a commonsensically agreeable way.

B.P.H. D'Holbach has stated the problem briefly and clearly as follows:

"God is the author of all; and yet, we are assured that evil does not come from God. Whence then does it come? From man? But, who made man? God. Evil, then comes from God. If He had not made man as he is, moral evil or sin would not have existed in the world. The perversity of man is therefore chargeable to God." 59

Thus in the ultimate analysis God becomes responsible for the evil too. The man is free solution cannot save God from this great danger.

The inconsistency between the foreknowledge of God and free will of man, the inability to explain the suffering in animals and children etc. raise added objection and show us the incompleteness of the solution. However, this is held to be the most commonly accepted solution of West and we will consider this in the next chapter.
4. **Illusion Solution**

According to this evil is no reality. Many thinkers like Royce, Spinoza, Hegel and T.H. Green seem to agree with this view. Thus Spinoza says that all things are necessarily what they are and that in nature there is no good and no evil.\(^7^0\)

St. Augustine also expressed his view that evil is not ultimately real. The fact that with his privation solution he denied the metaphysical nature of evil, need not concern us. What has to bother us is the fact of suffering. We know for certain that men do suffer. This no sensible man can deny. Hence the illusion solution cannot satisfy men of common sense.

Commenting on the privative doctrine of evil, John Hick says that the notion of evil as a privation is no solution, but simply is an explanation on the nature of evil.\(^7^1\) Augustine treated evil as a privation, because he was in the Platonian tradition.

'How can one say that cancer is illusory and is no evil?' asks Henry Aiken. The illusion solution makes no sense of moral life. If nothing is evil, choice is pointless and responsibility has no meaning.\(^7^2\) Though there can be dispute on the nature of evil, whether objectively real or subjectively real, no one can deny the fact of the experience of evil. Now even if evil is granted to be an illusion that illusion itself is an evil and makes evil a reality and forces man to reject this solution as an inadequate one. If there is no evil, then millions of people have been deluded for thousands of years in the belief that there is evil. This itself is an evil.
5. The not All Powerful Solution

According to our above said criteria of an adequate solution this cannot be considered a bona fide solution, since it directly denies one of the theological thesis namely the 'Omnipotence of God'. But this has a place in the history of theodicy. This makes it worthy of our consideration.

According to this, in brief, God is beneficent but with limited power. J.S. Mill with David Hume seems to propose that God does not approve evil, but permits them, because every possible alternative would involve even greater evils than those present in this scheme of things. Summarising the opponent's position Leibniz says:

"Whoever does not choose the best course is lacking either in power, or knowledge, or goodness. God did not choose the best course in creating the world. Therefore God was lacking in power, or knowledge, or goodness."

Though Leibniz has a different approach from J.S. Mill and others both come to the same conclusion in different ways. The best-of-possible-world argument of Leibniz obviously lead to not-all-powerful solution. Evil in the world becomes a necessary consequence of creation. This, in turn, entails and can be reduced to 'necessary solution'.

In fact, this, not-powerful-solution cannot be a solution to the problem of evil. For, it radically denies one of the premises required to generate the very problem. Hence this is not a real solution, but a spurious one. Our three criteria of test cannot be applied here. However, this pseudo-solution points to the 'necessary solution'. 
6. **The Necessary Solution**

The defenders of this solution hold that evil is logically and metaphysically necessary for the existence of good. St. Augustine seems to be the first proponent of this view and he states:

"... There can be no evil where there is no good... Nothing evil exists in itself, but only as an evil aspect of some actual entity ... Evil has their source in good."\(^{75}\)

Leibniz, William James and G.E. Moore also seem to support this stand. Walter Stace says that God could not have created a world without evil. Stace concludes in his problem of Evil thus:

"Life in a perfect world is a logical impossibility ... God could not have created living beings who would never experience suffering and evil."\(^{76}\)

The major assumption of this solution is that a creature can never be perfect. This may be correct with regard to metaphysical perfection. But this need not entail moral imperfection. Why can't man be made able to act and behave rightly? In fact, all religions believe and teach that man lead a morally perfect life through discipline. Nay, in Christianity, it is an assured fact. Thus necessary solution loses its force and appeal and becomes unsatisfactory as the former ones.

Many seem to confuse the metaphysical being with moral imperfection. Often they take a leap from metaphysical imperfection of the creatures to a guaranteed moral
imperfection. Even if moral imperfection can be shown as a possibility, there is no guarantee that must be actualised. Even if good and evil are logically bound to each other, the necessary solution cannot justify the most outrageous acts of violence and suffering and satisfy the common sense.

7. The Metaphor Solution

According to this the language describing God are simply metaphysical. It cannot properly express the ways of God. It means that the ways of God are beyond human comprehension. This is an anti-intellectual approach. It ultimately leads to mystery solution. Henry Mansel seems to be a strong defender of this solution. Attacking Mansel's stand Mill writes:

"To say (as Mr. Mansel does) that God's goodness may be different in kind from men's goodness, what is it but saying, with a slight change of phraseology, that God may possibly not be good." 77

Mill further presses the point and says that to use language at all one must use the language we know:

"I know something of Man and Nature, not as they are in themselves, but as they are relatively to us; and it is relative to us, and not as he i.e. in himself, that I suppose myself to know of God. When I reject a doctrine as inconsistent with God's nature it is not as being inconsistent with what God is in himself, but with what he is as manifested to us." 78

In brief, Mill thinks that language must be used literally, or if it is not, then the meaning of the
non-literal expression must themselves be capable of literal translation or interpretation. Find below his own words:

"Language has no meaning for the words just, Merciful and Benevolent, save that in which we predicate them of our fellow-creatures; and unless that is what we intend to express by them, we have no business to employ the words."79

Sir William Hamilton also argued that man's concepts and comprehension are finite. But concepts pertaining to God have infinite comprehension. Thus man cannot think about God adequately. According to this, now infinite Goodness cannot be goodness. In other words, infinite Goodness and finite goodness appear to be contradictory, this indeed seems to be quite incomprehensible for common sense. Mansel as well as Hamilton do not face the problem at all. Through the metaphor solution the very problem is dissolved. Since the metaphor solution fails to put up any literal concept at all, its only alternative is to shut up (keep silent). Hence this is no solution at all.

To sum up, as the metaphor solution refuses to use literalistic language it cannot satisfy rational common sense. If at all this is accepted as a solution, it then leads to simple quietism. The inexplicability of the language (held by Metaphor Solution) leads us ultimately to Mystery Solution.

8. Mystery Solution

The defenders of this theory holds that evil is a mystery and problem of evil is a challenge to man's faith. This is an upshot of metaphor solution flowing into the
discipline solution in so far as this inexplicability leads to soul building. Bishop Joseph Butler, D. Hume, Paul Tillich etc. have expressed this view in their writings.

David Hume in *Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion* has Demea, a religiously orthodox soul, states the position in the following way:

"The question is not concerning the being but the nature of God. This, I affirm, from the infirmities of human understanding to be altogether incomprehensive and unknown to us. The essence of that supreme mind, his attributes, the manner of his existence ... these ... are mysterious to man."\(^{30}\)

Paul Tillich in his *Systematic Theology* says that God's creativity in the universe is identical with the divine mystery and beyond calculation and description.\(^{31}\)

To say that God or human freedom or evil is a mystery is to say that they are all above our understanding. It is an escapism and an intellectual surrender. This violates the common sense criterion. Besides this, the mystery solution will whither away the foundations of moral life for the religious man. H.J. Paton has a more compelling remark. An honest man cannot accept the telling that good in the world comes from God's goodness, while the evil shows that we cannot expect to understand the mystery of the divine will.\(^{32}\) In brief, the mystery solution cannot hold good on the same grounds with which an honest man would reject the metaphor and illusion solutions. The retreat into the mystical silence of mystery solution cannot satisfy men of common sense.

Very briefly put, we have seen that none of the eight
proferred solutions to problem of evil, can survive the standard test set for an adequate solution. We must conclude then that of the solutions examined, the eight reduced solutions or the twenty one original solutions, none will suffice to dissolve the problem we have examined. I think, this result must be inevitable for all such similar attempts undertaken within the context of the traditional Western approach to problem of evil.

There is a kind of logical weirdness in the Western approach. They have to satisfy two seemingly connected and seemingly incompatible demands. They want to keep God honorific with all His attributes and perfect in intent. The character of the world and man must always remain less honorific and imperfect in the intent. Wedding these demands break down into problems of different types.

When the specified properties of God are joined together, they bring about many practical inconsistency (not logical contradiction) known as the paradox of perfection, such as Cassandra paradox, paradox of divine fatalism, paradox of omnipotence etc.

When the predicates of God are conjoined with the predicates of the imperfection of man, here too one has to face with problems of inconsistency between the deity and the evil. If the paradox of perfection can be called 'problem internal to God', this second type can be called 'external problems'.

It is in an agonising puzzle that the Westerners attempted solutions by various subterfuges and nefarious logical devices, which they had to. In many solutions
they had to take recourse to chicanery and wiles. This holds good even to some of the select solutions.

The most commonly accepted and popularly held one among the select solutions is the 'man-is-free-solution'. It has the support of the Bible and it can prima facie save the face of God with all His attributes. According to this solution, it is the first parents (Adam and Eve) responsible for the evil in the world. When the first man (Adam) exercised his free will against God's will by disobedience, sin originated in the world. This Original Sin toppled the harmony of the universe, with him the whole cosmos had to pay the penalty. We shall now proceed to the next chapter for a clear account of Original Sin, — the Central thought of the West with regard to evil.
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