I

Introduction: The concept of intentionality in Husserl, Sartre and Merleau Ponty

The Phenomenology of dialogue is founded upon a notion of intentionality which differs from intentionality as explained in traditional phenomenological literature beginning from Edmund Husserl right up to Jean Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau Ponty. In the history of phenomenology the explication of the concept does not lead us beyond the impasse between subjectivity and objectivity; nor does it enable us to envision the epistemic range of humans beyond the dichotomy.

Intentionality of consciousness from the traditional phenomenological viewpoint claims that the world must be constructed as an object of Consciousness, a meaning for an ‘I’. A primacy of subjectivity as ‘I’ or agent continues through the writings of Husserl even in the later phase of his phenomenology where the world is acknowledged as lived-world or enironing world. As Josef Bleicher points out, “The central insight derivable from the transcendental reduction shows that within our consciousness there functions the self-given, absolute or primal ‘ego’ as the carrier of all meaning horizons and of the lebenswelt, “the ultimate unique centre of functioning in all constitution”. But the concern for other which was undercurrent in Husserl’s later phenomenology received further prominence in the existential
phenomenology of Sartre and Merleau Ponty. What is of much relevance today in the phenomenological exercise is an articulated concern for a type of experience in which something is given to me, indeed thrusts itself upon me, that can never be translated as a meaning 'for' me. In fact as Emmanuel Levinas observes it, Husserl’s phenomenology is a culmination of the entire western tradition of philosophical reflection, a tradition that has been “a destruction of consciousness”. According to Levinas, all notions of transcendence within the western epistemological tradition are related to a return, i.e., a movement of intentionality originating within the subject, perceiving a transcendence within the subject, perceiving a transcendence and then returning to the self in which the accumulated knowledge of experience is stored. But this notion of self as a centre point is now questionable because the experience of the other human being which is precisely an experience of something that manifests itself to me as not mine, as more than the thematic content of my own intentional consciousness. Intentionality – thesis therefore is fated to include a tension between an agent-oriented and the other-oriented reflection upon intentional acts. Whether it is possible to conceive of intentional acts as originating from a dialogical space which prioritizes neither ‘I’ as known or the other as known but instead proposes an alternative phenomenology called ‘phenomenology of dialogue’ and an alternative epistemology called ‘dialogical epistemology’ is the central concern of the work.

Intentionality-thesis in its traditional orientation:-
A. Husserl:-

With Franz Brantino, intentionality is merely a psychological characteristics of the mental life. As Husserl excluded psychologism from phenomenology, intentionality is conceived by him as more than a mental fact, it is a methodological concept within its framework of an investigation into the essential structure of knowledge. Husserl treated psychologism as an adjunct of naturalism. His critique of naturalism includes this conclusion of psychologism. His grounds for excluding psychologism from the realm of phenomenology may be briefly outlined as follows:-

1. Psychology cannot yield more than empirical universals, which results from generalization from physical phenomenon, physical dispositions and organic processes.
2. Psychologistics logic fails to recognize the fundamental distinction between ideal laws and real laws.
3. If logical laws originated in psychological factualities they would have psychological content. But no logical law is to be treated as a law of mental life.

The primary concept in the contest of phenomenological philosophy is that of intentionality and intentionality is the fundamental structure of consciousness. Intentionality of consciousness which means consciousness is always “consciousness of something” is an important theme of phenomenology having a continuous methodological and ontological significance.
From Brentano Husserl had absorbed the intentional theory of mind. According to it, intentionality characterizes mental acts such as judgments, beliefs, meanings, valuations, desires, loves, hatreds and so on. An intentional act, said Brentano, is always “about” or “of”. An intentional act may have as it objects an existentially mind-dependent entity or it may be an impossible thing such as the round square; or it may be something possible but unactualized, such as a golden mountain. Any mode of mentality may have its object an “intentionally inexistent” entity, namely, an entity that is neither physical nor existentially mind-dependent. In contrast to this, no physical action requiring an object can be performed upon an intentionally existent entity.

Husserl’s principal task is to give an account of the nature of consciousness. Husserl took up the explanation of the notion of intentionality in his work *Ideas*. Consciousness is understood by Husserl to be intentional. It is “relation to”. This relation is the foundational structure of consciousness. Husserl had mentioned in his writings that the concept of intentionality was borrowed from Brentano, according to whom, every physical phenomenon is characterized by what the medieval Scholastics called the intentional ‘inexistence’ of an object with a reference to a content. Husserl dependent on Brentano for the concept of intentionality, but he thought that the former had failed to grasp what intentionality really is and make it philosophically useful. Husserl thinks that a sense of phenomenon give rise to grave misgiving, as phenomenon in this sense means not only an appearing object as such, but it is also the object of certain intentional experiences.
Intentional experiences direct us in varying fashions to the present objects, but they do so in an *intentional sense*. The intended object may exist, but that does not make any phenomenological difference. The immanent contents are therefore merely intended or intentional, but what are called to be truly immanent contents are not intentional. Husserl thinks that Brentano’s use of the term “intentional” is ambiguous and he, therefore, chose his terms in such a way that presuppositions and ambiguities would be excluded. He avoided the expression “psychical phenomenon” and used the term “experience” or more exactly “intentional experience”. The term ‘intention’ indicates the characteristic of intention, that of the reference to something objective.

Husserl claims intentionality to be an essential characteristic of the sphere of experiences in general. Husserl says that all experiences participate in intentionality in the same way, though it may not be said that every experience has intentionality, as it has a temporal character. Intentionality has been understood by Husserl as the unique characteristics of experience to be consciousness of something. Intentionality includes experiences which come out either from the background of actual consciousness, as in the case of awakening of emotions, the first arousal of judgments and half-expressed wishes from different depths of background.

To determine the essence of intentionality in both its static and dynamic aspects, Husserl wants to describe the genesis and evolution of intentionality.
Intentional experiences occur as unities which come about through the giving of meaning. Husserl wants to make a distinction between the real components of our intentional experiences and the intentional correlates. The parts and phases of experience are to be distinguished by a real analysis which treats a particular experience as an object like any other. Husserl shows that it is the characteristic of all intentionalities that every intentional experience has its intentional object which is its objective meaning.

In his *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl takes up the nature of intentional analysis and points out that intentionality relating to any *cogito* which makes reference to the world is not exhausted by considering cogitations as actual lived experiences. In discussing the nature of intentional analysis Husserl points out that it is engaged in disclosing the potentialities in the actualities of consciousness. Husserl wants to make it clear that intentional analysis wants to disclose the potentialities implied in the actualities of consciousness. It is, according to him, the general method of elucidation and explication of meanings and as such it discloses and disengages these constituents which are necessarily implied in a certain meaning experienced in a given situation. Intentional analysis consists in going beyond what is given in direct sense experience and it is the “inner horizon” which plays its role as a co-determinant of the perceptual meaning.

The phenomenologists begins with consciousness, pure experience, in which he finds phenomena. At this point he must practice an epoche’ (abstention)
and ‘suspend’ judgments concerning the objective world by placing it in ‘brackets’. Our comprehensive *epoche*, the world between brackets excludes the world which is simply there in the natural’ empirical order from the subjects field. It presents in its stand the perceived experienced world as such. The practice of *epoche*, bracketing elements in the given, allows for *eidetic reduction*.

The corresponding ‘Reduction to the pure essence’, or in the respect of the judging thought, from factual to ‘essential’ universality is the ‘eidetic reduction’. Husserl regarded his Transcendental philosophy as ‘a science of essential being’, which deals with the things themselves. Transcendental phenomenology is founded on essences, the intelligible structure of things, whose subject matter is eidetic, ‘universals’ in the Platonic sense, which are intuited.

Intentionality of consciousness in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology refers to a ‘transcendental ego’ as a support to intentional acts of consciousness. But in existential phenomenology, the motion has been rejected. For Sartre this way of looking for a support of intentionality would further involve a fallacy of infinitive regress. Besides that, Sartre believed in a single unitary whole of consciousness on the basis of which he regarded Freudian distinction between Id and Ego for explaining bad faith. By his same conviction he would not accept the Husserlian distinction between empirical and reflection consciousness.
According to Husserl, reality is a stream of consciousness. Ideal in its objective nature, it is called noema, i.e., experienced object; while ideal in its subjective nature, it is noesis, i.e., the act of experiencing or perceiving. These two are synthesized into a single unity as a concrete integral whole. The concepts of noesis and noema are not restricted to perception of physical objects alone in their phenomenological order. Noesis and noema may also be applied to valueing, the object of value, such as moral values, religious values, aesthetic values. A religious experience or a moral experience is a noesis, while its objects, God or goodness is noema. In aesthetic experience, for example, noesis consists in the actual experiencing or appreciating music, whole music in its essence is noema. Thus the entire experiential field would be a field of noetic-noematic co-ordination.

In this manner, we find an attempt in Husserl's philosophy to unite the detached subject and independent (transcendent) object of older philosophy within a realm of subjectivity which is of a vectoral nature, directed upon an object meant as pure phenomenon. As Richard Kearney observes “Husserl endeavoured to recover philosophy’s true vocation as phenomenology by showing how the two poles of objectivity and subjectivity ---- which positive science tended to segregate on terms of a polar opposition ----- are inseparable, each being co-determined by the other in a primordial relation. The world is disclosed accordingly as a world that is always for consciousness.”
The approach of Husserl continues through his later work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”, and gives impetus to the articulation of existential phenomenology. Husserl’s bracketing of naturalistic standpoint to highlight the primacy of subjectivity as an enlivening factor in the composition of epistemic situation is quite in consonance with the critique of historicism based on a concept of second nature of positivists’ kind. The positivists’ understanding of human social world as an objective, mechanical and a prototype of natural world governed by impersonal laws is replaced by Husserl with the concept of ‘environing world’. In Husserl’s words: “Environing is a concept that has its place exclusively in the spiritual sphere. That we live in our own particular environing world, to which all our concerns and efforts are directed, points to an event that takes place purely in the spiritual order. Our environing world is a spiritual structure in us and in our historical life…. to look upon environing nature as in itself alien to spirit, and consequently to desire to support humanistic sciences with natural science and thus presumably to make the former exact, in nonsense.”

But before coming up with his critique of second nature as an objective, mechanical whole Husserl developed the notion of ‘transcendental ego’ as a support of all intentional acts. The transcendental ego, as a subject of knowing, including the psycho-physical or empirical ego. While Husserl’s existentialist successors accepted his basic phenomenological themes of the intentionality of consciousness and an unified epistemic field or space where consciousness and its object are jointly operative, they had to counter this notion of ‘transcendental ego’ leading towards a transcendental solipsism. It was left to Jean Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau Ponty to emphasize the
direct, experiential dimension of Husserl’s thought and set aside his idealist and transcendental-cum-egological view-point.

2. Sartre and Merleau Ponty:-

Sartre has his own reason for respecting the notion of transcendental ego. In the article “The transcendence of the Ego”, Sartre is intended to refute Husserl’s theory of consciousness based upon the concept of “transcendental ego”. But to Sartre the ego in Husserl’s conception, became ‘transcendent’, no longer transcendental. Despite Sartre’s description to the general theory of intentionality of consciousness, his rejection and criticism of Husserl’s concept of ‘transcendental ego’ alters the notion of intentionality in the light of the notion of pre-reflective Ego as opposed to transcendental Ego.

It is obvious that the dispute between Sartre and Husserl is methodological as well as theoretical. So the ‘transcendence of the Ego’ can be looked upon in an exposition of a theory of consciousness. The level is emphasized by Sartre. At the same time, it manifests Sartre’s disagreement with Kant’s critical philosophy and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.

However, the critique was suggested by Husserl himself in his later writings. In The Crises of the European sciences he said, “In our continually steaming perception of the world we are not isolated but rather stand within it in contact with other men. . . . in living with one another each can participate in the life of
the other. Thus in general, the world does not exist for isolated individuals but for the community of man...."

The passage also serves as a clue to an understanding of Merleau Ponty's philosophy as grounded upon a relationality, i.e., a man-world relationship revealed by 'intentionality' and 'life-world'. In his famous obituary essay on Merleau Ponty, Sartre said, "He (Merleau Ponty) was fascinated by 'real-life', by the sorrows and days of men". "We found in our first experience, the same master, Husserl made and waiting for us". The specific contributions of Merleau Ponty to phenomenological literature, to mention a few, are:- articulation of synoptic phenomenological method synthesizing its transcendental aspect and the inevitable worldly aspect relating a minimal content of experience, in short, the experienciability. The explanatory and emancipatory interest which humans cherish for him, could not be derided, for it is possible to do justice to this interest without incorporating the reality dimension into phenomenological method. Merleau Ponty says, "Phenomenology is the study of essences and accordingly its treatment of every problem is an attempt to define an essence, the essence of perception, or the essence of consciousness, for example. But phenomenology also a philosophy which replaces essences in existence and does not believe that man and the world can be understood save on the basis of their state of fact. It is a transcendental philosophy which suspends our spontaneous natural affirmations in order to understand them, but it is also a philosophy for which the world the always "already there" as an inalienable presence which precedes reflection. The whole effort of phenomenology is to recover this naïve contact with the world and to give it, at last, a philosophical status".
This world which is always already there is the lived world. Merleau Ponty projects this world in an integral relationship with men. Thus human existence in a sense, in conjunction with the existence of the world. It is not simply a physical mass but a meaningfully lived perspective, a lived ‘space’ (place).

The human body, therefore, received a centrality in Merleau Ponty’s thought. Intentional acts of consciousness are not detached from body. All bodily actions for Merleau Ponty are to be regarded not as responses to some stimuli, as B.F. Skinner thought, but as ‘existential modulations’. The ‘lived-space’ incorporates human body and vice-versa as its essential part. In *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau Ponty talks about humans as beings-in-the world. For him the objective world-in-itself or pure constituting Consciousness is not the starting point of phenomenology. It is their union which is the starting point there.

Merleau Ponty’s scheme straightway denies any form of scienticism with regard to our understanding human body and the world. In this context he brings about the notion of ‘body image’. The opposition between physical body and the non-physical mind is grounded upon a more primitive level of being-in-the world. So far as our bodily awareness is concerned the notion of ‘body-image’ is explicated “... My whole body for me is not an assemblage of our organs just opposed in space. I am in undivided possession of it and I know where each of my limbs is through a body image in which all are included.”
Thus for Merleau Ponty consciousness has a primitive contact with the world. He says, “The unity of the world, before being posited by knowledge in specific acts of identification, is ‘lived’ as is ready-made or already there.”

That is what known as ‘operative intentionality’, distinguished from the intentional acts or posited intentions. Operative intentionality is pre-predicative and non-thematic. It is the intentionality by which consciousness reveals a human setting around itself. Phenomenological reduction for Merleau Ponty leads to this man-world primitive unity. The pre-predicative non-thematic operative intentionality furnishes the text which our knowledge tries to translate into precise language.

Merleau Ponty’s own research interest focused from the start on the problems of perception. Merleau Ponty deliberately went even beyond Husserl, for whom pure phenomenology and the phenomenological philosophy based upon it were still two different things. According to Merleau Ponty Phenomenology commits us to a certain conception of being and to entire philosophy. It is not merely a preparatory discipline for it; it “envelops” it.

In Merleau Ponty’s first major book, phenomenology and particularly the term “phenomenology” do not yet occupy a very conspicuous place. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Merleau Ponty’s methodical and circumspect approach is mean to introduce phenomenology as the solution for the
problems of behaviour. To the term “phenomenon” Merleau Ponty assigns the functions of expressing “the intimate relation between the objects and the subject and the presence of solid structures in both which distinguish phenomena from mere appearances”; yet the term “essence” is almost conspicuous by its absence.

Merleau Ponty understood in the sense of an objective study of the things and of their external causal relations, in favour of a return to the *Lebenswelt*, the world as met in lived experience in the sense of the later Husserl. Phenomenological reduction, with its bracketing of belief in the reality of the natural world, for Husserl the lever for his phenomenological idealism, becomes for Merleau Ponty the device which permits us to discover the spontaneous surge of the life world. Similarly the *eidetic reduction*, for Husserl the way from existence to essence, becomes in Merleau Ponty’s hands a “means” rather than an “net” designed to catch the living relations of experience.

Intentionality, according to Husserl the fundamental structure of consciousness, its main theme and clue of the theory of constitution, assumes a new role in Merleau Ponty’s pattern. Ultimately Merleau Ponty aims at an “enlarged” conception of intentionality, which applies not only to our conscious acts but underlies our entire relations to the world and our “comportment” toward others. For Husserl’s philosophy was certainly not
world-centered, even though it became increasingly world-based when he decided on the fresh start from the description of the Lebenswelt.

The concept of lived world and the entire network implies an indeterminate perspective for human action. The signifies his understanding of freedom. It is not ‘absolute freedom’ of Sartrean kind. For Merleau Ponty life-world encounters us with its field of sedimented meanings ----- as a ‘text’, and history forms the context of my free action. Freedom does not start from nothingness but from an existential situation where my choice is rather pre-conscious, determined to an extent atleast by the minimal content of world and history, because we are mingled with the world and with other people in an inextricable intermixture.

Sartre, in his later philosophy, came close to Marxism and reviewed his earlier contentions regarding human relationships and man-world relationship. His ethics of inter-personal relationship underwent a change in his posthumously published Note Books as well.

The ethics of inter-personal relationship developed by Satre in his Being and Nothingness consists in individual’s struggle against the other who attempts to reduce his or her subjectivity to that of a thingly nature. He said, “conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others”.
However, if Sartre's concept of interpersonal relationship is necessarily conflictual for all time, the question remains 'how is pedagogic or educational practice possible within its framework?' Pedagogic practice pre-supposes relationship, mutuality and complementarity. But Sartre's concept of interpersonal relationship remains unchangeable and incorrigibly pressing. Therefore it defines the very possibility of a pedagogic situation. The ethical perception based upon this notion of interpersonal relationship is therefore a perception for struggle against the attempt to degrade the status of human subjectivity.

The ontological cleavage between being-for-itself and being-for-others, as we see it in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, is ultimately responsible for this ethical dilemma. This conflictual relation between these two consists in degrading one by the other. Any positive implicative of this relationship is rather impossible.

But in the later phase of the philosophization Sartre attempted to develop an alternative theory of human relations ----- particularly in his unpublished *Notebook for an Ethics* sometime in 1950's. (Ref. Thomas C. Anderson : Satre's two Ethics, 1993)

A much stronger argument can be made for Sartre by combining statements he makes in the *Notebook for an Ethics* with some in *Existentialism and
Humanism. In this later works Sartre asserts "I am obliged to will the freedom of other at the same time as mine." and others in support something like an appeal to universalization. He states first that when a person chooses the self he strives to become, 'he chooses all men'. This is because, "In effect there is not one of our acts that in creating the men whom we wish to be, does not create at the same time an image of man such as we judge he ought to be." In the later works Notebooks for an Ethics (1997-1998), Sartre talks about interpersonal relationship in a positive sense.

In this transition from early Husserl to later Husserl and from later Husserl to existential phenomenology of Sartre and Merleau Ponty, a distinct trend can be noticed — a trend which upholds the need for universalizing an alternative mode of intentionality in the light of the primacy of the other. This primacy is manifest in the explication of the concept of dialogue in contemporary philosophy.

After existential phenomenological deliberations of Sartre and Merleau Ponty, a different thrust can be marked so far as intentionality thesis is concerned, particularly in the hermeneutical philosophies of Jurgen Habermas and Hans-George Gadamar. A concept of dialogue merges there as reciprocal recognition of subjects with linguisticality as its essential component.
The concept of intentionality of consciousness, in this context, develops an ingredient of what is called the space-between the subjects. However this was not an inalien notion in the later philosophy of Husserl where the concepts like lived space and 'environing world' receive a special significance highlighting the role of the other.

But what is missing in these earlier developments in an exploration into the possibility of a different mode of intentionality of consciousness as an alternative of the usually accepted thesis of it available in the 'main-stream'. Phenomenological literature including some hermeneuticians. The epistemological bifurcation of subject and object as an essential requisite for acquisition of knowledge is incidentally challenged here.

But such incidental challenges could not pave the way for building an alternative intentionality – thesis and thereby a full fledged phenomenology of dialogue. Though Merleau Ponty's concept of 'non-thematic' or 'operative intentionality' speaks for a man-world unity and thereby a transcendence of subject object bifurcation, it is not adequate to explain dialogical mode of existence which is not necessarily and not always a non-thematic mode. Dialogical mode of intentionality is more inclusive, it includes both 'thematic' and 'non-thematic' intentional acts. Dialogical intentionality, for example, in literature and music is not necessary bereft of any theme. Hence intentionality of consciousness as shaped in varied contexts needs a radically different and a
deeper theoretical grounding which can do justice to narratives related to dialogical experiences.

In this context, the writings of Martin Buber, Mikhail Bakhtin and Emmanuel Levinas can be considered as offering an important direction.

**Buber, Bakhtin and Levinas**

Buber’s philosophy of dialogue views the human existence in relation and that in two fundamentally different kinds of relations. *I-It* and *I-Thou* relations. An *I-It* relation is the normal everyday relation of a human being towards the things surrounding him. Man can also consider his fellow human being as an *It* and that is what he does most of the time, he views the other from a distance, like a thing, a part of the environment. The *I-Thou* relation is radically different. The human being enter enters into it with his innermost and whole being, in a meeting, in a real dialogue.

An anthropological investigation puts it this way: “For modern, scientific man, the phenomenological world is primarily an “It”, for ancient and also for primitive man it is a “thou” .... The world appears to primitive man neither inanimate no empty but redundant with life.”

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Being dialogical, the I-Thou mode of existence brings us to the knowledge of the human being in his or her entirety which doesn’t exclude his or her competence dimension even as an ‘It’, i.e., competence dimension which speaks of the person’s ability to switch over to ‘I-It’ form of existence. But, if the very starting point of anthropological knowledge is non-dialogical or the I-It mode of existence, then the dialogical being of the person is excluded. It is excluded because in that case the space for communication is divided in terms of the primacy of the subject as the center point and the other who is the ‘object’ of knowledge is placed at a lower logical level. The main point is that I-Thou mode of existence speaks of the full potentiality of the other including his or her potentiality to become anything within I-It mode of existence as well.

This dialogue is an obvious master key to the assumptions that guided Bakhtin’s work throughout his whole career. Dialogue is present in one way or another through the notebooks he kept from his youth to his death at the age of 80. Bakhtin’s writings are animated and controlled by the principle of dialogue. He says, “I can mean what I say, but only indirectly, at a second remove, in words I give and take back to the community according to the protocols it observes. My voice can mean, but only with others — at times in chorus, at best of times in dialogue.”

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But what is essential for Bakhtin is not only the categories as such that get paired in author/hero; self/other and so forth, but in addition the architectonics governing relations between them. What counts in the simultaneity that makes it logical to treat concepts together. The point is that Bakhtin honours both things and the relation between them – one cannot be understood without the other.

Buber’s influence upon Mikhail Bakhtin led Bakhtin to envision a dialogical epistemology. Bakhtin’s philosophy is a pragmatically oriented theory of knowledge, more particularly, it is one of several modern epistemologies that seek to grasp human behaviour through the humans make of language. Bakhtin’s distinctive place among these is specified by dialogue concept of language he proposes a fundamental.

But for Emmanuel Levinas, on the intentional side of consciousness, self sees itself as an other. The self assumes the position. As opposed to unifying consciousness of cogito in Husserl, Levinas proposes an ethical subject whose consciousness is structured as responsibility for other prior to the realization of its own self. For Levinas, the conscious of Other is not a self enclosed absolute consciousness. The self assumes the position of the other to see itself as an other.
Levinas distinguishes his motion of ‘I’ from phenomenological transcendental notion of ‘I’ in which self consciousness not only affirms itself as an absolute being but also confirms itself as an ‘I’ in whose intentionality the world is created as noema. Contrastingly Levinas’ ‘I’ is just the signified mark of something that responds to the infinite, in itself it is empty. The signified merely recognizes that ‘I’ is just there beside its ‘other’. For Levinas, the signified marks the movement of experience within live human consciousness.

As concrete person is a singularity, which in being responsible stands out in the difference between ‘self’ and ‘other’. The ‘self’ is converted by the ‘other’ to give an answer for the ‘other’ and this converted self appears to itself as I, its person, this appearance effaces the difference between one’s intuited responsibility and one’s singularity. It is the person in singular, to whom the difference is effaced in an appearance of itself. This is how one is thrown back upon itself and called upon to answer for everyone else.

In this alternative framework of phenomenological thinking with a specific focus on dialogical existence, a tension between agent-oriented or ‘participant-oriented’ view of dialogue and a pure relation-oriented view of it can be marked. A comparative analysis of the approaches of these three thinkers may perhaps lead us to a more inclusivistic or consensus viewpoint. This viewpoint is expected to integrate different realms of dialogue, viz., *dialogue in language, dialogue preceding and over passing language.*

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Notes and References:-


8. Ibid, p-29.
