CHAPTER-5

GANDHI'S STANCE IN THE CASE OF: (i) SARDAR BHAGAT SINGH (ii) SIR MUHAMMAD ALI JINNAH

From the very beginning Gandhi emphasized the fact that his non-violence ideal is against the organized British brute force as well as unorganized extremist activities governing in and outside India. He was trying to strengthen the power of his non-violence ideal by exposing the violent forces at various levels. Correspondingly, violent occurrences were giving him opportunities to create public opinion in favor of his non-violence ideal.

I know that terrorism is taking a deeper root owing to the counter terrorism of the Government. The counter-terrorism is much more mischievous in its effect, because it is organized and corrupts a whole people. Instead of rooting out terrorism it creates an atmosphere for the approval of terrorist methods and thus gives them an artificial stimulus. It may not show immediate results, but it certainly prepares the future for wider activities along those lines.297

People who were opposed to these violent outcomes were joining Gandhi in his endeavors and becoming a part of the dialogue initiated by him on the non-violence ideal as discussed in the previous chapters. All of them aimed to have a collective thought process so to expose the violent forces around the globe. For the continuous working of his non-violence movement he was maintaining composure in his expression as well as dealings. He was trying to maintain consistency in his approach as he knew his opinion in either way is going to be assessed. Yet, he was confronted with the actions of some individuals whose very presence, ideology and actions tried to interrupt the consistency of his movement.

Consequently, Sardar Bhagat Singh and Sir Muhammad Ali Jinnah became the subject of their ongoing ‘channel of communication’. Therefore, the basic query through the chapter is how their steps changed the pace of Gandhi’s movements? How he managed to confront his position in both the cases? And how he saved the consistency of his movement in both the cases? Some related queries which are also essential to identify are: why a leader who was persistently working to create public opinion in favor of his non-violence ideal was not able to support the public opinion in Sardar Bhagat Singh’s case? Why a preacher of non-violence ideal has been narrowly portrayed as a responsible figure for the execution of Sardar Bhagat Singh and his comrades? Why Gandhi has been portrayed as powerless during the Partition of India? Why Gandhi was unable to convince Sir Muhammad Ali Jinnah?

SARDAR BHAGAT SINGH AND GANDHI
Many revolutionaries of the Punjab offered their lives for the freedom of India but the intensity which was gathered during Bhagat Singh and his comrade’s sacrifice emerged to be distinctive. ‘Bhagat Singh was a young Punjab revolutionary whose name first come into prominence in April, 1929, when during a sitting of the Legislative Assembly in Delhi he and an accomplice flung bombs from the gallery of the Chamber into the Government benches below. No one was killed. He was arrested, tried and sentenced to transportation for life. Later the existence of a conspiracy with wide ramifications was discovered. Bhagat Singh, among others, was charged as a member of this conspiracy with an offence under section 121, Indian Penal Code (waging war against the King-Emperor), and in particular with the murder of Mr. Saunders, a police officer, who had been shot in Lahore in December, 1928. The remarkable course that the proceedings in that case took brought Bhagat Singh into further prominence. By various devices-hunger-striking was only one- the prisoners succeeded in bringing the usual procedure of the law to a standstill. Eventually, it became necessary to have them tried by
a tribunal of three Judges constituted under a Special Ordinance. Bhagat Singh and two of his companions were sentenced to death on the murder charge. By this time he had become a hero to many of the youths of the country. Great efforts were made to secure for him a reprieve. They were prepared for the uncompromising sacrifices and which led them to try different tactics so to face the British irregularities stiffly. They with their prolonged Hunger Strike tried to expose the illegal behavior of the authorities which is well indicated from the above statement. Equally great efforts were made to find legal flaws in the long drawn-out procedure. All efforts failed. Nor was it only the revolutionary associations in the country who were sympathetic. The Congress whose creed is non-violence could not, of course, support methods of violence and murder, but in a carefully worded resolution moved by the President at the Karachi session of the Congress, the bravery and sacrifice of Bhagat Singh and his companions were extolled and their execution was characterized as an act of wanton vengeance. Sympathy was not confined even to Congress Party. The Nationalist Party- a confessedly constitutional party- walked out of the Assembly as a protest against the execution. It was even widely feared that the execution, coming when it did, would shake the position of Mahatma Gandhi himself. His Excellency the Viceroy explained publicly that though he was well aware of the interest taken in the fate of Bhagat Singh, he could discover no argument by which commutation of that sentence could have been


justified that would not have involved, if justice was to be equal, the commutation of all other sentences involving the death penalty.299

Their idealism was persuasive to create a ceaseless reverberation and was capable of challenging Gandhi’s position which is clearly indicated from in the above statement. The voices in favor of the revolutionaries appealed the Congress National leaders to save them by placing their commutation as a condition for the truce. Despite being pressurized from the various circles, Gandhi’s reluctance for adding the commutation as a condition for the truce has been suspected severely. Thus, Gandhi has been typically portrayed as one of the responsible figure in the issue of their execution. ‘The issue of Mahatma Gandhi’s attitude to Bhagat Singh’s trial and execution has sparked much controversy among historians and writers. Some writers allege that Gandhi could have saved Bhagat Singh’s life if he had wished, but regrettably, he didn’t and wouldn’t, and his failure in saving Bhagat Singh’s life from the gallows leaves a black spot on his political career. On the other hand, Gandhi’s own party workers, followers and some writers clarify with pathetic earnestness that Gandhi failed not because of his lack of interest in the well being of Bhagat Singh, but because of the conditioning circumstances which lay beyond his control.300 Dutta indicates as how Gandhi’s image was tarnished in Bhagat Singh’s case and also brings into notice the circumstances which were beyond Gandhi and Viceroy’s control. ‘Despite a general view prevalent in historical studies on Bhagat Singh that Gandhi and Irwin could on their own commute Bhagat Singh’s death sentence, this study shows that the issue of saving his and his comrades’ lives lay beyond Irwin and Gandhi, because they were not free and independent enough to do whatever they wished as is commonly assumed. They had to act within the framework of the British Imperial system operating in the country.’301 Whereas, Habib discard the above

299 Ibid.
301 Ibid., p.93.
kind of argument as he solely blame Gandhi for their executions and critically analyze Gandhi’s frank attitude against the revolutionary’s executions.

The revolutionaries and their activities were appreciated by their compatriots, irrespective of political affiliations. Congressmen like the two Nehrus, Bose, G. S. Vidyarthi and a host of others did not bring in the creed of non-violence and openly exhorted them to work for the country’s freedom. It was Gandhi alone who remained adamant and obsessed with his non-violence ideal and the gospel of love. On the one hand he was winning cooperation of the revolutionaries through C. R. Das and on the other hand he was appealing against the ‘mad worship’ of Bhagat Singh which, he believed, had “led to goondaism and degradation. Even after executions, when the All-India Bhagat Sigh-Rajguru-Sukhdev Memorial Committee approached Gandhi for his support, he bluntly dissociated himself from it as it aimed at immortalizing men who had followed the path of violence. The majority of the Congressmen did not believe in the dispensability of the non-violent creed and so, exhorted the revolutionaries to follow their own path to accelerate the pace of freedom struggle. But this was of hardly any practical value as Gandhian ideology was supreme in the Congress once it came to policy decisions and action. And we have seen what Gandhi’s attitude was.  

Habib like Sardar Mangal Singh is unconvinced with Gandhi’s argument against comparison of revolutionaries with the Sikh Gurus and the prominent leaders. ‘This is a hard or rather awkward question. But I dare not shirk it. In the first instance Guru Govind Singh and the others whose

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names are mentioned did not believe in secret murder. In the second, these patriots knew their work and their men, whereas the modern Indian Revolutionary does not know his work. He has not the men, he has not the atmosphere, that the patriots mentioned had. Though my views are derived from my theory of life I have not put them before the nation on that ground. I have based my opposition to the revolutionaries on the sole ground of expediency. Therefore, to compare their activities with those of Guru Govind Singh or Washington or Garibaldi or Lenin would be most misleading and dangerous. 303 Gaur established a similar kind of connectivity for Bhagat Singh’s deed with the sacrificing traditions of the Punjab. ‘His revolutionary militancy and non-conformism, as described in the popular Punjabi verses, are not simply of patriotic, nationalist or Leftist variety, but are also projected as rooted in the heroic and chivalric traditions of Punjab. 304

Chandra analyzes the revolutionaries through a different lens which is more rational to understand Gandhi and the revolutionary’s equation with one another. ‘In his illuminating article, ‘The Ideological Development of the Revolutionary Terrorists in Northern India in 1920’s, Bipan Chandra explained how Bhagat Singh and his co-workers, despite their dedication and single-mindedness had failed to realize their objects. According to him, Bhagat Singh and his comrades, the young and spirited, and ever anxious to produce quick results were urban based, and did not care to mobilize masses for consolidating their fighting strength to wage a united struggle against British power. Bhagat Singh and his associates were too confident to be prudent. They were in hurry to do things. They were dashing, bold, and patriotic but lacked political leadership and financial resources to coordinate their activities. They did not realize their own limitations nor the strength of their adversary and had neither the support of the bourgeoisie or the masses. They failed to gain moral ascendancy

301 CWMG, Vol. 76, Guru Govind Singh, Harijan, 12-7-1942, p. 270.

because the country and political parties were willing to accept their methods.\textsuperscript{305}

Mohan shares a logical criticism of the Atashi Chakkar Group against the Gandhian movements. ‘Non-violent Satyagraha would rank as an invincible weapon if the conditions governing it could be satisfactorily fulfilled. A particular moral and mental atmosphere is necessary for its success. But this atmosphere is very difficult to achieve, so difficult, that up to time, despite the efforts of Mahatma Gandhi, it has not been possible to bring it into existence....because they are under the under wrong impression that this form of struggle is easier than armed resistance...the absolute faith in Ahimsa and Satyagraha is mostly wanting in them...Besides, the lack of mental and moral climate, there was the provocative attitude of the Government. With the help of its repressive policy the Government would be able to incite the uneducated masses to violence. This would lead to the disintegration of any satyagraha movement, as it had happened in the case of non-cooperation movement.’\textsuperscript{306} She alleges the Gandhian movements for releasing the violent forces and consequently for the emergence of extremists. ‘Instead of being yet another evidence of the growing influence of Gandhi in the Indian politics, the Rowlatt agitation in the Punjab unleashed forces which created an ethos for experiments with revolutionary ideology and methods.’\textsuperscript{307} She also observes certain positive developments in Bhagat Singh which were supporting him for his advancement and constructive approach. ‘It is evident that Bhagat Singh’s ideas on nationalism, imperialism, social change and revolution

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\textsuperscript{305} Datta, pp. 97-98.

\textsuperscript{306} As cited in Kamlesh Mohan, \textit{Militant Nationalism in the Punjab (1919-1935)}, Manohar, New Delhi, 1985, pp. 212-13, The pamphlet, though issued by the Atashi Chakkar Group, did not profess a different ideology. One of the various reasons for the formation of the Group by the erstwhile members of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association, was to divert attention of the police to the new party. It was likely to give freedom of action to Chander Shekhar Azad. Hence, this pamphlet is regarded as a part of the HSRA literature.

\textsuperscript{307} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 11.
were neither static nor rigid. Reading of the revolutionary literature, discussions with his comrades and perception of difficulties in the application of violent and non-violent modes of struggle had guided the development of his ideology... One striking feature of the revolutionary ideology of Bhagat Singh was his disavowal of complete reliance on bombs, pistols and other instruments of violence. Obviously, maturity of outlook and intellectual honesty made him see the merit of making judicious use of violent and non-violent methods for building up a “United Socialist Republic” in India. After having an idea of scholarly viewpoints it is essential to take into account the immediate political response in regard to their execution. *The Times* observes the political response in such a manner.

There is another section which is gravely perturbed by what happened. And the point upon which they lay most stress is not the establishment of the new precedent, according to which when a minority section chooses to leave the House the rest may not do business of importance. What they concentrate upon with feelings of horror and dismay is the levity with which Diwan Bahadur Rangachariar dared to broadcast upon the people of India from his seat in the Assembly the cry that murder trial at Lahore was “A trial behind the back of the accused” and that “the vast majority of people firmly believe that Bhagat Singh at least was not concerned with the particular crime for which he was convicted and sentenced to death...There was a special open air meeting here in Delhi as recently as last week to express sympathy with the three accused men. None of the speakers suggested that they were not guilty and Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose who was the speaker, accepted the court’s conviction without question and

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308 Ibid., p. 225.
condemned the methods of violence, which the crime indicated."

The above observance indicates that the majority of political leaders were swayed with the sacrifices of the revolutionaries and which made them incapable to reason their atrocious actions and in consequence were skeptical with the evidences placed by the British officials. The Times provides the piece of information which describes the manner in which they executed their actions.

The Court found that “Sukhdev may be said to have been the brains of the conspiracy, while Bhagat Singh was his right arm,” and Shivram Raj Guru, a Mahratta, was a gunman, and he was evidently brought to Lahore to take part in the raid on the Punjab National Bank, Lahore, and in the murder of Mr. Scott which actions required a man skilled in the use of arms.”… Here is the court’s account of the crime: “Mr. Saunders...came out of the Police office followed by Head Constable Chanan Singh. Mr. Saunders started his motor cycle and began to ride slowly down the road after coming out of the Police office gate. Jai Gopal then made a sign upon which Shivram Raj Guru took out his revolver and, moving in the direction of Mr. Saunders, fired at him as soon s the motor bicycle was near. Mr. Saunders being hit, lifted up his hands and fell with his motor cycle on the road with one leg under the cycle. Bhagat Singh then ran up and discharged several shots from his automatic pistol into Mr. Saunders as he lay.’ The court say that Bhagat Singh’s participation in the Saunders murder is the most serious and important fact proved against him, and it is fully established by ample evidence.”. The Judges found Sukhdev was an organizer of violent revolution from 1927 onwards; was privy to

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309 The Times of India. Bhagat Singh’s Guilt and Tribunal Sentence, 26-3-1931, p. 10.
various plots and assisted in bomb making in Agra and
organized bomb making else-where. “He was backward in
taking part himself in acts of violence, but he must be held
nonetheless to be responsible for those acts, to the
execution of which his brains and organizing power made
an important contribution.”

The review of their act gives an idea that the master mind behind the
execution of their actions was Sukhdev. His posthumous letter explains
the intent behind their actions and their afterthoughts which emerged
after being unsuccessful. His posthumous letter through the columns of
_The Tribune_ is a part of Appendix. It as an important letter which was
made public after his execution and another open letter to Gandhi
provides his view point fairly.

We people did only two “actions,” one Saunders’ Murder
and the other Bomb in the Assembly. Prior to that we
made two or three attempts but did not succeed. In this
connection I can say this much that our actions were of
three kinds: - (1) Propaganda (2) Money (3) Special. Out
of these three our main attention was centered towards
actions for propaganda…For instance, take the case of
Saunders’ Murder: When Lala received _lathi_ blows we
saw that there was a great unrest in the country. Moreover,
the attitude of the Government added fuel to the fire. The
people make much annoyed. This was a very good
opportunity for us to attract public attention towards the
revolutionaries… To run away after the murder was not
our plot. We wished to enlighten the public that it was a
political murder and that its perpetrators were
revolutionaries and not the associates of Malangi. We
therefore, affixed posters after that and sent some for
publication. Alas, neither our leaders nor the press

[^310]: _Ibid._, p. 10.
rendered any assistance at that stage, and in order to deceive the Government they deceived their countrymen. We desired that should write in round about way that it was a political murder and was the result of Government’s policy and that it was responsible for such an action.... With this in view we wanted to infuse revolutionary ideals and tactics in the public and the expression of such ideas looks more glorified from the mouth of one who stands on the gallows for the cause. Our idea was that coming in direct conflict with the Government we should be able to frame a definite programme for our organization.  

Sukhdev clarifies that the way they had planned the things were not executed and were unable to convey the right message. They opted to convey their true spirit firstly through new tactics as like prolonged hunger strike inside the jail and finally by sacrificing their lives. The Times also indicates Bhagat Singh’s annoyance towards one of the misinterpreted message of their actions by The Civil and Military Gazette. Bhagat Singh then drew the attention of the Magistrate to the editorial comments of the Civil and Military Gazette on the hunger strike of the accused and said if he were outside the jail he would have taken the editor to task. He added that the Civil and Military Gazette had published wrong statements about the hunger strike in order to condemn the accused. One of the accused said that it was not the work of an Englishman. He plaintively added: “we are not only suffering the tortures of a hunger strike, but also of forced feeding and these malicious comments. The magistrate eventually promised to write to the editor concerned.” By conveying their spirit in a distinctive manner they posed a challenge to Gandhi as well his the non-violence ideal. Now here it is important to know what Gandhi has to say for these revolutionaries;

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311 The Tribune, Sukhdev’s Posthumous Letter, 28-3-1931, Appendix I.  
312 The Times of India, Lahore Trial: Reporters’, 6-8-1929, p. 11.
what was his stance at the time when they confronted him and placed him in an uncomfortable situation.

The open letter written by “One of the Many” is the late Sukhdev’s letter. The letter was delivered to me after his death... The writer is not “one of the many”. Many do not seek the gallows for political freedom. However condemnable political murder may be, it is not possible to withhold recognition of the love of the country and the courage which inspire such awful deeds. The writer does me less than justice when he says that I have made no more than sentimental appeals to the revolutionaries to call off their movement, and I claim on the contrary that I have given them hard acts which, though they have been often repeated in these columns, will bear recapitulation:...

Revolutionary murder cannot thrive in the Indian soil, Indian tradition, as history teaches us, being unfavorable to the growth of political violence... If the revolutionaries seek to convert the masses to their method, we would have to wait for indefinitely long time for it to permeate the masses and then to gain freedom. If the method of violence ever becomes popular, it is bound to recoil, as it has done in other countries, on our own heads... The revolutionaries have an ocular demonstration of the efficacy of the opposite method, i.e., non-violence, which has gone on in spite of sporadic cases of violence on their part and in spite even of violence occasionally done by the so-called votaries of non-violence. And seeing that the revolutionary party must work in secret, I have no other way open to me but that of making public appeals to its unknown members. I may say parenthetically that my
public appeals have not altogether fallen on deaf ears. I count many past revolutionaries among my co-workers.\textsuperscript{313}

\textit{Gandhi's approach as of a leader}

Gandhi while answering Sukhdev's open letter after his death gave a general message that he managed to save the pace of his movement which in itself shows the significance of his non-violence ideal. But how Gandhi managed to save his position and the pace of his movement? Firstly, Gandhi in agreement with the Congress working Committee clearly distinguished their general demands for the truce and the public demand in favor of the revolutionary's commutation.

Well, I was not on my defense, and so I did not bother you with the details of what I did to save Bhagat Singh and his comrades. I pleaded with the Viceroy as best I could. I brought all the persuasion at my command to bear on him. On the day fixed for the final interview with Bhagat Singh's relations I wrote a personal letter to the Viceroy on the morning of 23\textsuperscript{rd}. I poured my whole soul into it, but to no avail. I might have done one thing more, you say. I might have made the commutation a term of the settlement. It could not be so made. And to threaten withdrawal would be a breach of faith. The Working Committee had agreed with me in not making communication a condition precedent to truce. I could therefore only mention it apart from the settlement. I had hoped for magnanimity. My hope was not to materialize. But that can be no ground for breaking the settlement.\textsuperscript{314}

The sacrifices were applauded by the Indian National Congress resolution under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru. There also Gandhi differentiated the deed and zeal of the revolutionaries and only

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  \item \textsuperscript{313} CWMG, Vol. 46, 'One of the Many' (?, \textit{Young India}, 23-4-1931, 1971, pp. 29-30.
  \item \textsuperscript{314} Speech at Karachi Congress, \textit{Young India}, 2-4-1931, 1971, CWMG 45:351-52.
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appreciated the zeal while supporting the resolution. But most importantly it is essential to identify as why Gandhi was not able to support the public opinion in the particular case. ‘But I know too that performance of one’s duty should be independent of public opinion. I have all along held that one is bound to act according to what to ones appear to be right even though it may appear wrong to others. And experience has shown that that is the only correct course. I admit that there is always a possibility of one’s mistaking right for wrong and vice versa but often one learns to recognize wrong only through unconscious error. On the other hand if a man fails to follow the light within for fear of public opinion or any other similar reason he would never be able to know right from wrong and in the end lose all sense of distinction between the two.515 After acutely analyzing his writings I notice that his state as a leader was intensely complex. As if he would have favored the public opinion it would have encouraged their idealism of self-destructiveness in contrast to his optimism which is self-emancipating. By supporting their public opinion he would have entrapped himself by breaking the consistency as well as deceived his supporters and associates who firmly believe in the efficacy of the non-violence ideal. Thus in the course of Bhagat Singh’s case he defined the way he was operating while assessing the public opinion as according to him a leader should not be swayed in favor only. Evidently, he clarified the fact that a leader like him is not in a state to hinder the advancement of his movement which is much more perpetual in contrast to the revolutionary’s impulsiveness. Therefore, he was acting calculatingly while creating and evaluating a public opinion.

They question your integrity and sincerity and try to belittle you (and your case) by surreptitiously propagating an idea in Bengal that while you gave your active support to the resolution about Bhagat Singh at Karachi you severely criticized the late Deshandhu Das for his

responsibility in carrying out an exactly similar resolution at Faridpur Conference praising Gopinath Saha who lost his life on the gallows under exactly similar circumstances; and this they say you are not immune from provincial bias. They are taking every opportunity to undermine your influence in Bengal by appealing to the sentiment of local patriotism. They say that many Bengal youths sacrificed their lives even within this very year for the same cause for which Bhagat Singh and his comrades died.  

As always Gandhi was conscious in maintaining his steady behavior for avoiding false impressions. His appreciation for Bhagat Singh’s idealism was misconstrued and questioned later by the Bengali’s in Gopinath Saha’s case. So far his position as of a leader is identified which simplifies as how he was managing to overcome such intricacies which otherwise might have harmed the steadiness of his movement.

**Gandhi’s approach at personal level**

But it is equally important to know his personal endeavors in the case of Sardar Bhagat Singh and his comrades. Gandhi at his individual level endeavored to convince the Viceroy in a following manner.

> Popular opinion rightly or wrongly demands commutation. When there is no principle at stake, it is often a duty to respect it. In the present case the chances are that, if commutation is granted, internal peace is most likely to be promoted. In the event of execution, peace is undoubtedly in danger. Seeing that I am able to inform you that the revolutionary party has assured me that, in the event of these lives being spared, that party will stay its hands, suspension of sentence pending cessation of revolutionary murders becomes in my opinion a peremptory duty. Political murders have been condoned.

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before now. It is worthwhile saving these lives, if thereby many other innocent lives are likely to be saved and may be even revolutionary crime almost stamped out. Since you seem to value my influence such as it is in favor of peace, do not please unnecessarily make my position, difficult as it is, almost too difficult for future work. Execution is an irretrievable act. If you think there is the slightest chance of error of judgment, I would urge you to suspend for further review an act that is beyond recall.  

The Civil and Military Gazette places the Viceroy’s viewpoint regarding his helplessness to refute the public opinion. Viceroy acknowledged Gandhi’s efforts for the revolutionaries which are generally suspected. ‘I take full responsibility for the decision at which the Government arrived. I know of no heavier responsibility that rests upon the shoulders of a Viceroy than the decision of whether he should or should not make use of his special power by way of communication or remission of sentences. As I listened the other day to Mr. Gandhi putting the case for communication forcibly before me, I reflected first of what significance it surely was that the apostle of non-violence should so earnestly be pleading the cause of devotees of a creed so fundamentally opposite to his own. I reflected also upon the quality of responsibility that falls on those in whose hands it lies and whose duty it is to decide finally whether their fellowmen should live or die and I am free to confess that I should frankly regard that responsibility as an intolerable one to any man to support unless he guided his conduct by adherence to certain very clear and definite principles.’

Moreover, Gandhi shared the fact that the people close to the revolutionaries persuaded him to probe the matter acutely. Bhagat

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318 The Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, Refusal of clemency to Saunders murderers – Viceroy explains why sentences were not commuted-Lahore execution, 29-3-1931, p. 7.
Singh’s ideal character and grit overwhelmed him individually which he shared through the following extract of a correspondence with Lindsay. ‘There is a romance around the life of Bhagat Singh. He was no coward. From all enquiries made by me I find that he was a man of spotless character and of great daring. He exercised also great influence on some young men. Somehow or other he had developed a belief that political assassination had its use. It was impossible not to notice the execution, I believe quiet unwise, of Bhagat Singh and his comrades, whom the execution made martyrs. I have no doubt whatsoever that the execution has surrounded these lives with a halo which they would not otherwise have had… I however quiet agree with you there is undoubtedly a great deal of thoughtless approval of political murder. But many of us are doing everything we can to counteract the growth of the violent revolutionary movement. Whilst it is being held under check, I fear that the spirit that is at times breaking out in violence will not altogether die till India comes to her own. I am not publishing your letter because the end both you and I have in view is not likely to be served thereby.’

So far, a brief idea of the political leader’s response, British official viewpoint, Sukhdev’s confession, Gandhi’s viewpoint as a leader as well as individual and then Viceroy’s stance has been placed. However, after acutely analyzing all these observations I am able to identify his logical approach in the whole issue which distinguishes his skillful leadership too.

(a) British Indian Government again placed an act of ‘Dwyerism’ by brutally executing the revolutionaries and especially flouting the public opinion. To avoid the humiliation they valued Gandhi’s non-violence commitment and leadership. They were ready to placate the masses and thus gave a chance to concede the substantial demands which they were not willing to accept earlier.

319 CWMG, Vol. 46, Letter to Darcy Lindsay, 8-5- 1931, p. 120.
(b) Gandhi created a space for negotiation while being uncompromising for the non-violence ideal and placing reasonable demands. In accordance to Gandhi, if he would have placed the condition for the truce than surely none of the demands would have been conceded. He was not swayed by the public opinion as it would have weakened his position and have lost the opportunity to advance his movement. He rather strengthened his position by maintaining composure. The Tribune as well as The Times shares Gandhi’s approach at the time of truce which are as follows.

Gandhiji addressing the gathering, said in the twelve months past none thought of peace but as true sayagrhis it behoved them to be always prepared for peace as well as for war. The Working Committee, he continued had a chance of arriving at a truce and had taken advantage of this. He added there was nothing in terms of truce where of anyone need be ashamed. Proceeding he said satyagrhis had to stick to Justice and even if they were in a position to dictate terms to the opponents he should neither be unreasonable nor unfair. It was this spirit which prompted the Working Committee and himself to accept the truce.320

It is interesting to observe that he persistently alleged the Government for flouting the public opinion. “Opportunity Lost”, “As for the Government, I cannot help feeling that they have lost a golden opportunity of winning over the revolutionary party. It was their clear duty, in view of the settlement at least, to suspend indefinitely the executions. By their action they have put a severe strain upon the settlement and once more proved their capacity for flouting public opinion and for the exhibition of the immense brute power they possess. “The persistence in the exercise of their brute power is perhaps a portent showing that notwithstanding pompous and pious declarations, they do

320 The Tribune, “Why I accepted Truce” Gandhiji’s speech in Bombay, 19-3-1931.
not mean to part with their power." Thus he firmly faced the challenge to maintain the advancement of his non-violence movement. 'In my deliberate opinion the grave blunder committed by the Government has increased our power for winning freedom for which Bhagat Singh and his comrades have died. Let us not fritter away the opportunity by being betrayed into any angry action". Gandhi's approach was viewed with different perspectives in the House of Commons. Some conservatives felt humiliated while Liberals were trying to understand Gandhi and Irwin in a positive manner.

Once again India crowded the House of Commons to its full capacity yesterday when Mr. Wedgwood Benn rose to read out the terms of the agreement to which Lord Irwin and Mahatma Gandhi have put their hands. He recited it rather too rapidly to produce the proper effect, but members on all sides were quick to seize the main points of the historic document and everyone realized that a dramatic change had been made in the whole Indian situation. There were no two opinions about that, though very different conclusions were reached as to the significance and probable consequences of what had been done... There were it is true, a few mild cheers from the Conservative benches, but leaders and followers alike seemed to have grave doubts as to whether this was an occasion for rejoicing or for humiliation... A closer examination of the terms has convinced some of them, at any rate, that the Viceroy has made a much better deal than seemed possible a few days ago. When they come to weigh up the concessions which have clearly been made on both sides many are disposed to think that after all, Mr.

321 The Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, Protest against Lahore Executions-Demonstrations and Hartals, 26-3-1931, p. 7. & The Times of India, Gandhi on Lahore Executions, A tribute and a warning, 25-3-1931, p. 10.

322 The Tribune, Gandhi's Statement, 26-3-1931.
Gandhi has given up a good deal more than he has received. Not a few politicians in this country, with a considerable knowledge of India and of the Congress movement, are frankly surprised that the Mahatma has yielded so much. When his concessions are put alongside those which have come from the other side the folly of the diehards who are shrieking “surrender” and “treachery” becomes evident enough.  

The truce became the subject of the continuing dialogue among the supporters of the non-violence ideal. Gandhi not only created a space for the further negotiations but hopes for the positive developments too. Perhaps in some quarters friendly to India there is tendency to make more of what has been done than the actual stipulation of the agreement justify. There are people on the both sides who fly to superlatives as soon as any definite stages have been reached. Thus the “Daily Mail” splashes across its pages such foolish captions as “Viceroy complete surrender,” British on the Run,” and the like. On the other hand the “Daily Herald” and the “News Chronicle” have been writing as if an all round settlement had been reached, whereas only the first step (admittedly an important one) has been taken in that direction. What we have to contemplate is a truce, and a very worthy truce which puts an end to the bitterness and strife of the last of the last few years, and transfers the consideration of the whole problem to an atmosphere of reason and goodwill.  

**Level of understanding between Gandhi and the Revolutionaries**

The way Gandhi was open in indicting the Government for flouting the public opinion in a similar manner he was open in acknowledging Bhagat Singh’s ideal character.

Bhagat Singh did not wish to live. He refused to apologize; declined to file an appeal. If at all he would

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323 *The Tribune*, Mahatma Gandhi’s concessions surprise British politicians, 20-3-1931.

324 Ibid., 20-3-1931.
agree to live, he would do so for the sake of others; if at all he would agree to it, it would be in order that his death might not provoke anyone to indiscriminate murder. Bhagat Singh was not a devotee of non-violence, but he did not subscribe to the religion of violence; he was prepared to commit murder out of sense of helplessness. His last letter was as follows: “I have been arrested while waging a war. For me there can be no gallows. Put me into the mouth of a canon and blow me off.” These heroes had conquered the fear of death. Let us bow to them a thousand times for their heroism. By hanging these men, the Government has demonstrated its own brute nature, it has provided fresh proof of its arrogance resulting from its power by ignoring public opinion. From this hanging it may be concluded that it is not the intention of the Government to part with any real power to the people. The Government certainly had the right to hang these men...

While negotiating the settlement, Bhagat Singh’s hanging was weighing upon us. We had hoped that the Government would be cautious enough to pardon Bhagat Singh and his associate to the extent of remitting the sentence of hanging... by doing so under even such trying circumstances, our strength to get what we desire will increase rather decrease, while, if we break our pledge or violate the truce, we shall suffer loss of vigour, loss of strength and it will add to our present difficulties in reaching our objective.\textsuperscript{325}

Gandhi being a trainer knew the worth of these qualities as he was trying hard to train his co-workers with these mental faculties. Both Gandhi and Bhagat Singh acknowledged the logic of ‘‘brahmacharya’ too. The combination of these mental faculties can only lead a person to think

independently and guide the masses which according to Gandhi is the fundamental lesson to learn from his teachings. Seemingly, these qualities of the revolutionaries would have inspired their supporters who voiced collectively and aroused the masses too. Gandhi always exemplified the fact that before being a warrior of the non-violent movement one has to initially reform himself which in itself is a continuous intensification. In the similar manner Bhagat Singh had been working for his refinement and due to which he was constructive in thought despite being destructive in deeds which was acknowledged by Gandhi too.

As the youth will get more and more saturated with the psychology of revolution, it will come to have a clearer realization of national bondage and a growing, intense, unquenchable thirst for freedom. It will grow, this feeling of bondage, this insatiable desire for freedom, till, in their righteous anger, the infuriated youth will begin to kill the oppressors. Thus has terrorism been born in the country. It is a phase, a necessary, an inevitable phase of the revolution. Terrorism is not the complete revolution and the revolution is not complete without terrorism. This thesis can be supported by an analysis of any and every revolution in history. Terrorism instills fear in the hearts of oppressors, it brings hopes of revenge and redemption to the oppressed masses, it gives courage and self-confidence to the wavering, it shatters the spell of the superiority of the ruling class and raises that status of the subject race in the eyes of the world, because it is the most convincing proof of a nation’s hunger for freedom. Here in India, as in other countries in the past, terrorism will develop into the revolution and the revolution into independence, social, political and economic.326

326 Habib, p. 207.
Interestingly, Gandhi also recognized the similar viewpoint which is as follows. 'That can be true only in the sense that having tried violence again and again he has realized its futility. That is all. Would you maintain also that a person who has had a taste of vice is nearer to virtue than the one who had none?' 327 For that very logic he accepted revolutionaries request for joining him in his endeavors by surrendering themselves to him. From Punjab, Bhai Parmanand328, Sardar Prithvi Singh (Lahore Conspiracy Case 1915)329, Andaman prisoners (who gathered public opinion through their hunger strike accepted the futility of the ideal of violence330) joined him. Among the Andaman prisoners was B. K. Dutt who also surrendered Gandhi and joined him in his movement. 'Thirty-six years ago, on April 8, 1929, Dutt and Bhagat Singh threw a bomb from the visitor’s gallery in the Legislative Assembly in New Delhi in a symbolic challenge to the British might. Dutt was sentenced to life imprisonment and sent to jails in South India and then in the Andamans. He was released in 1938. During the “Quit India” movement he was again detained.'331 Correspondingly, Sukhdev wrote a letter to Gandhi in which he clarified the revolutionary’s stance and showed their annoyance too. They were expecting to have a convincing dialogue in response to Gandhi request to call off their movement. However, the revolutionaries viewpoint simplifies that their dynamic approach was leading them to confront the things in a much more logical manner.

Similarly as is evident from the very name-the Hindustan Socialist Republican Party- the revolutionaries stand for the establishment of the Socialist Republic which is not

330 Telegram to Andamans Prisoners, 30-8-1937, 1976, CWMG 66: 90.
331 The Times of India, The Revolutionary is dead, B. K. Dutt, 21-7-1965, p.1.
half-way house. They are bound to carry on the struggle till their goal is achieved and their ideal is consummated. But they would be quiet apt to change the tactics according to the changing circumstances and environments. Revolutionary struggle assumes different shapes at different times. It becomes sometimes open, sometimes hidden, sometimes purely agitational and sometimes a fierce life-and-death struggle. In the circumstances, there must be special factors, the consideration of which may prepare the revolutionaries to call off their movement. But no such definite idea has been advanced by you. Mere sentimental appeals do not and cannot count much in the revolutionary struggles. But in spite of all this, you are making public appeals asking them to call off their movement. Why should they do so? You have not mentioned any very definite thing. In these circumstances your appeals mean you are joining hands with the bureaucracy to crush that movement, and your appeals amount to preaching treachery, desertion and betrayal amongst them. If that were not the case, then the best thing for you would have been to approach some of the prominent revolutionaries and to talk over the whole thing with them. You ought to have tried to convince them to call off their movement. I do not think you also share the general conservative notion that the revolutionaries are devoid of reason, rejoicing in destruction and devastation. Let us inform you that in reality the case is quite the contrary. They always consider the pros and cons of every step they take and they fully realize the responsibility which they thus incur and they attach greater importance to the constructive phase of the revolutionary programme than to any other, though in the present circumstances
they cannot but occupy themselves with the destructive part of their programme.\textsuperscript{332}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Their idealism was persuasive to create a ceaseless reverberation and was capable of challenging Gandhi’s position too. To understand the equation between Gandhi and the revolutionaries I initially took a brief idea of scholarly viewpoints and then the immediate political response against the executions. The majority of political leaders were swayed with their sacrifices and which made them incapable to reason their atrocious actions and in consequence were skeptical with the evidences placed by the British officials. After that an important letter which was made public after Sukhdev’s execution i.e., his posthumous letter is taken into account through which he made himself clear that the way they had planned the things were not executed and were unable to convey the right message. They opted to convey their true spirit firstly through new tactics and finally by sacrificing their lives. By conveying their spirit in a distinctive manner they posed a challenge to the non-violence ideal. So to know what Gandhi has to say for these revolutionaries; what was his stance at the time when these revolutionaries confronted him and placed him in an uncomfortable situation I examined Gandhi’s approach in the Sardar Bhagat Singh’s case. Gandhi answered Sukhdev’s another open letter though the columns of \textit{Young India} after his death and gave a general message that he managed to save the pace of his movement which in itself shows the efficacy of his non-violence ideal. After that it is important to trace as how Gandhi with his leadership skills managed to save his position and the pace of his movement. Gandhi in agreement with the Congress working Committee clearly distinguished their general demands for the truce and the public demand in favor of the revolutionary’s commutation. These sacrifices were applauded by the Indian National Congress resolution under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru. Gandhi differentiated the deed and zeal of the revolutionaries and

\textsuperscript{332} CWMG, Vol. 46, Letter from Sukhdev, \textit{Young India}, 23-4-1931, pp. 397-98.
then appreciated their zeal while supporting the resolution. After acutely analyzing his writings I noticed that his state as a leader was intensely complex. If he would have favored the public opinion it would have encouraged their idealism of self-destructiveness in contrast to his optimism which is constructive. By supporting their public opinion he would have entrapped himself by breaking his consistency as well as deceived his supporters and associates who firmly believe in the efficacy of the non-violence ideal. Thus in the course of Bhagat Singh’s case he defined the way he was operating while assessing the public opinion. As according to him a leader should not be swayed in favor only. Evidently, he clarified the fact that a leader like him is not in a state to hinder the advancement of his movement which is much more perpetual in contrast to the revolutionary’s impulsiveness. He was acting calculatingly while creating and evaluating a public opinion. Therefore after analyzing Gandhi’s approach as a leader I am able to identify as how he was managing to overcome such intricacies which otherwise might have harmed the steadiness of his movement. However, it is equally important to know his endeavors at personal level. Gandhi at his individual level endeavored to convince the Viceroy through a personal letter. Viceroy’s viewpoint regarding his helplessness to refute the public opinion is also taken into account. Viceroy acknowledged Gandhi’s efforts for the revolutionaries which are generally suspected. Moreover, Gandhi shared the fact that the people close to the revolutionaries persuaded him to probe the matter acutely. Bhagat Singh’s ideal character and grit overwhelmed him individually.

However, after acutely analyzing all these observations I am able to identify his logical approach in the whole issue which distinguishes his skillful leadership. British Indian Government again placed an act of ‘Dwyerism’ by brutally executing the revolutionaries and especially flouting the public opinion. To avoid the humiliation they valued Gandhi’s non-violence commitment and leadership. They were ready to placate the masses and thus gave a chance to concede the substantial demands which they were not willing to accept earlier. Gandhi created a
space for negotiation while being uncompromising for the non-violence ideal and placing reasonable demands. In accordance to Gandhi, if he would have placed the condition for the truce than surely none of the demands would have been conceded. He was not swayed by the public opinion as it would have weakened his position and have lost the opportunity to advance his movement. He rather strengthened his position by maintaining composure. It is interesting to observe that he firmly alleged the Government for flouting the public opinion. Gandhi’s approach was viewed with different perspectives in the House of Commons. Conservatives felt humiliated while Liberals were trying to understand Gandhi and Irwin in a positive manner. The truce became the subject of the continuing dialogue among the supporters of the non-violence ideal. Gandhi not only created a space for the further negotiations but hopes for the positive developments too. The way Gandhi was open in indicting the Government for flouting public opinion in a similar manner he was open in acknowledging Bhagat Singh’s ideal character. Gandhi being a trainer knew the worth of these qualities as he was trying hard to train his co-workers with these mental faculties. The combination of these mental faculties can only lead a person to think independently and guide the masses which according to him is the fundamental lesson to learn from his teachings. Seemingly, these qualities of the revolutionaries would have inspired their followers who voiced collectively and aroused the masses in general. Gandhi always exemplified the fact that before being a warrior of the non-violent movement one has to initially reform himself which in itself is a continuous intensification. In the similar manner, Bhagat Singh had been working for his refinement and due to which he was constructive in thought despite being destructive in deeds which was acknowledged by Gandhi too. For that very logic Gandhi accepted many revolutionaries request to join him in his endeavors by surrendering themselves to him. Surprisingly among these Andaman prisoners was B. K. Dutt, one of the comrades of the revolutionaries who surrendered Gandhi and joined him in his movement too. Similarly Sukhdev wrote a letter to Gandhi in which he clarified the revolutionary’s stance and showed their annoyance.
too. They were expecting to have a convincing dialogue as Gandhi asked them to call off their movement which simplifies that their dynamic approach was leading them to confront the things in a much more logical manner. Interestingly, Bhagat Singh was able to follow the Gandhian maneuvers to reach the larger masses which was acknowledged and exploited by Bhagat Singh himself.

In a way Gandhi deserved our thanks for having brought the question up for discussion and thus having shown to the world at large that even the Congress—that stronghold of non-violence—is at least as much, if not more, with the revolutionaries as with him.\(^{333}\)

Precisely, the way these revolutionaries were able to create public opinion for their idealism, skilled themselves with the mental faculties, exploited Gandhian maneuvers by way of prolonged hunger strike implies that the dynamic approach of these revolutionaries was pushing them to have a convincing dialogue and to line up with the Gandhian strategies. Thus from a larger canvass it can be construed, if Gandhi and these martyrs of the Punjab would have communicated in time then these revolutionaries would have saved themselves from the gallows and the popular perception of being extremists.

**SIR MUHAMMAD ALI JINNAH AND GANDHI**

After understanding Gandhi’s progression as well as the advancement of his movements through the previous chapters it is imperative to locate his viewpoint during the Partition of India which is generally shadowed while narrating the tragedy of the Partition and especially involving the politics of the Punjab. Specifically, the facts which will help to clear his stance at the time of Partition are taken into account instead of repeating the whole narrative again. So the basic query through the chapter is why

\(^{333}\) Habib, p. 209.
a leader of immense stature has been portrayed as powerless at the time of Partition of India? What factors made him to be so helpless at the time when he was needed the most by the masses who had immense faith in his ideal? Why Gandhi calmly accepted the Congress decision for the Partition of India? It’s basically the primary source material and few analytical sources which provided an understanding to trace the reasons behind his powerlessness at the time of Partition. As discussed earlier, Gandhi always explained the fact that his movements are not only against the organized British brute force but also against the unorganized violence. Thus, both kind of violent forces were posing obstruction to his peaceful movements and at the same time providing reason to show the superiority of his non-violence ideal. So far he confronted his movements firmly in Sardar Bhagat’s Singh case but what interests me is whether any kind of obstruction was posed against his line of action in the later years? While tracing this kind of query, it is essential for me to trace some of the calculated steps of Sir Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

Gandhian movements had been condemned for various reasons right from the Rowlatt Satyagraha to the Partition of India as for releasing violent forces during Rowlatt Satyagraha; by involving religion with politics during the Non-Cooperation Movement; for calmly accepting the Congress decision for the Partition of India and so on. It was not only Indians but the British officials were also critically analyzing Gandhi’s maneuvers in a following manner.

By voicing in his own characteristic manner the injured feelings of his countrymen, Mr. Gandhi found it easy to take full advantage of the wave of nationalism which had been stimulated and intensified by the other events we have briefly mentioned. A little later he still further extended the scope of his movement to cover the achievement of “Swaraj”. This word, which had previously been understood to mean self-government, was permitted by him to bear a variety of interpretations. It shortly became a mirror of many facets, wherein each
section of opinion could behold the image of its own desires. To some it represented Mr. Gandhi’s own ideal of government of the self. Others read into it Dominion home-rule; to another party it represented complete independence; yet others interpreted it as Muslim supremacy.334

From the very beginning many Indians had apprehensions against his movements as well as leadership. But very few might had thought of impeding the pace of his movement by retracing some of his steps. ‘Six years younger than Gandhi, Jinnah had also studied law in England, but unlike Gandhi his main interest outside legal studies had been in politics and not in religion. Jinnah had in his youth come under the influence of Dadabhai Naraji; he was a friend of Gokhale and took to law and politics in Bombay. In his early forties he was a front-rank politician and took a prominent part in the conclusion of the Lucknow Pact in 1916, which brought the National Congress and the Muslim League on to a common platform. These were the years when he was described as the ‘ambassador of ‘Hindu-Muslim unity’. A new spirit is abroad,’ he said in 1916 and added, ‘but for a real new India to arise all petty and small things must be given up. She is now India irredenta and to be redeemed all Indians must offer to sacrifice not only their good things but all those evil things they cling to blindly-their hates and their divisions, their pride in what they should be thoroughly ashamed of, their quarrels and misunderstandings.’335 This was a beginning of a leader who was spirited to achieve something substantial but the forces of change altered the


Also see Aijaz Ahmad, Frontier Gandhi: Reflections on Muslim Nationalism in India, Social Scientist, Vol. 33, 1/2, (Jan.- Feb., 2005), pp. 24-39, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/35181159

335 Nanda, p. 404.
ways of many like him in India. ‘External influence and internal tensions crossed to produce undreamed-of mutations in society. Sometimes these external influences created new divisions, sometimes they merely exacerbated old ones. In the case of western education it provided new paths to influence and success in public life for those who took the opportunities it proffered: to those who lagged behind it held out new threats of failure and declining influence and prestige.’ Indeed, the changing scenario was providing space for the new leadership as well as off-putting the ones who were functioning within the Indian political arena. At the Congress’s Nagpur session in December 1920 when Gandhi’s non-cooperation programme was ratified, Jinnah alone had the courage of his convictions and spoke openly against non-cooperation. Speaking for the ‘intellectual and reasonable section’ of public opinion, Jinnah derided the false and dangerous religious frenzy which had confused Indian politics, and the zealots, both Hindu and Muslim, who were harming the national cause. Jinnah now resigned as a member of the Congress. This was a parting of the ways between Jinnah and the Congress under Gandhi, a parting which he always hoped would be temporary not permanent. But as revealing as his contempt and worries about Gandhi’s methods was his total antipathy to the religious militancy of those Muslims who had joined Gandhi in pushing the moderate nationalists out. However Nanda observers little differently from Jalal as there were other reasons too which were disagreeable to Jinnah against a new kind of leadership.

It was not only Gandhi’s politics which jarred upon Jinnah. Gandhi’s religious frame of mind, his habit of self-analysis, his emphasis on such abstractions as truth and non-violence, his conscious humility, his voluntary poverty—all these were alien to Jinnah’s own make-up and

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336 Brown, p. 33.

struck him either as a political irrelevance or as downright hypocrisy. There are indications that Jinnah even suffered from a feeling that he had been unfairly edged out of the forefront of the political stage by Gandhi.\textsuperscript{338}

After going through the following conversation from \textit{The Times} Nanda’s indication for Jinnah’s feelings sounds relative. Jinnah went far enough to link his own grievances at this particular phase of his political career with the Mussalman mind. Jinnah shared his state of mind quiet late but the statement poses some doubts as whether he was expressing the grievances of the Mussalman mind that were alike to his own in 1920’s? or whether he was aware of the Mussalman mind at the time of his given statement or was he working to know?

Mr. Jinnah went on to say that Congress leaders had always had at the back of their minds the idea that the Congress alone represented the country. That was the reason why there had been no settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims. The Congress had the idea that all that minorities could press for were safeguards as minorities. Mussalmans always had at the back of their mind during the last 25 years that they were a separate entity. Mr. Aney; “That was not the view of Mr. Jinnah in 1920”. Mr. Jinnah said the Lucknow pact was passed on the fundamental principle of two separate entities. Mr. Aney: I was there.” Mr. Jinnah: He may have been there, but he was not even heard of. That has been the idea at the back of the Mussalman mind. That is why the Mussalmans insisted upon the separation of Sind. Outwardly other reasons might have been given for it and against it but that was the real reason for it.”\textsuperscript{339}

\textsuperscript{338} Nanda, p. 405.

\textsuperscript{339} \textit{The Times of India}, 20-11-1940, “Muslims prepared to Die to achieve Pakistan”: Mr. Jinnah’s fighting speech in Assembly, p. 9.
However, Jinnah’s another statement in *The Times* is slightly clearer as it seems he has been working to educate Mussalman mind in accordance to his own convictions since long and was facing certain complexities too. Jinnah added: “The problem of India is one of the most complex and difficult, of which there is no parallel in the history of the world. It is by having your own minds clear, by proper understanding that you can convert others, specially in these days of organised propaganda which unfortunately stoops so low that there is so much of misrepresentation.”340 He was striving to create a niche by convincing the Mussalman mind but was not able to achieve which was clearer during the 1937 elections. Here, I cannot ignore to share Chandra’s observance which is rational to understand Jinnah’s state of affairs in this particular phase.

But the poor election results showed that none of Jinnah’s assumption were correct. Jinnah had now to decide what to do: To stick to his semi-nationalist, liberal communal politics which seemed to have exhausted its potentialities or to abandon communal politics. Both would mean going into political wilderness. The third alternative was to take to mass politics which in view of the semi-feudal and semi-loyalist social base of the League and his own socially, economically, and politically conservative views could only be based on the cries of Islam in danger and the danger of a Hindu raj. Jinnah decided in 1937-38 to opt for this last option. And once he took this decision he went all the way towards extreme communalism putting all the force and brilliance of his personality behind the new politics based on themes of hate and fear.341

340 *The Times of India*, 16-11-1942, “Start Provisional Govt. With Muslim Support”: Mr. Jinnah’s Plea for Pakistan: Offer to help war effort, p. 7.

341 Chandra, p. 435.
When Jinnah was using all his wits to achieve his ambitions there was a Mussalman leader of the Punjab who was conceptualizing a united India. Sikander Hyat Khan was the one who was trying to convince Gandhi with his political vision but his idea was merely appreciated by him as one of the constructive thought among the Mussalman mind. He considered each aspect of the impending complexities in a following manner.

I appreciate your remarks regarding acceptance of Dominion Status. I am aware that all the important political organizations in the country have now adopted ‘complete independence’ as their final goal, But I am sure you will agree with me that in the circumstances it would be inadvisable to clutch at a shadow and discard the substance if it happens to be within our grasp. After all, what we want is complete control over the administration and affairs of our country and this will be obtained if we get Dominion Status. I am fully aware of the fact that some of our fellow-countrymen would prefer to chase a will-o’-the-wisp rather than give up their demand for complete independence; but it would be for an eminent patriot and leader like you to persuade them to accept the substance and leave alone the shadow.  

**Jinnah’s First Step**

Before one should worry himself more, Jinnah directly gave a clarion call to the Mussalman community for showing strength against the Congress which according to League symbolizes Hindu power. ‘When the Congress ministers resigned in November 1939, as a protest against India’s participation in the war without her consent, Jinnah announced the celebration of a day of deliverance of Muslims ‘from tyranny’, oppression and injustice’ during two and a half years of Congress rule in which Muslim opinion was alleged to have been flouted, Muslim culture

destroyed, Muslim religious and social life attacked, and Muslim economic and political rights trampled upon.343 Wolpert acutely notices Jinnah’s impulsiveness while he was initially expressing the real significance of the day. ‘After the League Council had met, a correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph* interviewed Jinnah to ask what he meant by “direct action” and Jinnah at first replied that “there would be a mass illegal movement”; but when the correspondent showed him the text of his article before cabling it home, Jinnah changed “illegal” to unconstitutional’.344 Jinnah’s act initially astonished the leaders of his own community who felt an immediate need to clarify the actual position of the Muslim opinion and his frame of mind which had no parallels in the past through the columns of *The Tribune*.

“That the Congress,” they add, “has made mistakes and the Congressmen are making still greater mistakes nobody will deny, but it is possible for Mr. Jinnah alone to proclaim his new faith in the infallible wisdom, justice and benevolence of a foreign imperialism. We do not know if the Muslim League is in the pocket of Mr. Jinnah, but this we emphatically say that a vast number of Muslims all over India will refuse to have any respect for a League of which the conscience and the voice seems to be in the sole possession of a man so reactionary as Mr. Jinnah has shown himself to be.” What a sad end for a public man who not long ago was in front-rank of Indian Progressives and Home Rule Rulers! History, we know, is replete with instances in which the radical of one generation became the conservative of another, but we can recall no case, at least in our own country, in which a staunch nationalist and a passionate champion of freedom and democracy was turned into a thoroughgoing

343 Nanda, p. 408.
communalist and reactionary and a sworn enemy of democracy within practically the life time of a single generation as has been the case with Mr. Jinnah. 345

Some of the Hindu leaders had apprehensions for the Muslim extremism and so they were already preparing themselves to reciprocate in a similar manner. Chandra acutely observes the state of affairs to be the outcome of the forces of communalism. ‘Hindu communalism did not lag behind. Its political trajectory was of course different. The two main liberal communal leaders during the 1920s were Lajpat Rai and Madan Mohan Malaviya. Lajpat Rai died in 1928 and Malaviya, Finding himself in 1937 in the sort of situation in which Jinnah found himself in the same year, decided to retire from active politics, partly on grounds of health. But Hindu communalism would also not commit suicide; it too advanced to the extremist or the fascist phase. The logic of communalism brought other communal leaders to the fore. The Hindu Mahasabha made a sharp turn in the fascist direction under V. D. Savarkar’s leadership.’ 346 It seems Jinnah was anticipating for such time to exploit in his own favor so as to resonate his idea of ‘Pakistan’. The way people were responding for and against the ‘day of deliverance’, somewhere indicates that he was able to achieve what he was not with his prior modest efforts. Jalal emphasize that the idea of Pakistan was also kept vague for various reasons. She analyzes Jinnah’s conscious efforts to appease the Muslims of different classes and provinces by wittingly keeping the idea indefinite.

At no point between 1940 and 1947 was Jinnah able to resolve this fundamental contradiction. By deliberately keeping the demand for ‘Pakistan’ vague, and its territories undefined, Jinnah had made it possible for his followers to exploit the League’s communal line without

345 The Tribune, Universal Condemnation, 10-12-1939.
346 Chandra, pp. 436-437.
having to face its implications: the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. Indeed, Jinnah’s hope seems to have been that the principle of ‘Pakistan’ would be conceded before he had to deal with the question of non-Muslim minorities in these two provinces. It followed that he needed a settlement based on ‘Pakistan’ at the centre before his followers in the Muslim provinces were allowed to settle terms with the non-Muslim populations. But seven years of virulent propaganda for Pakistan, anathema to the non-Muslims, had helped to weaken supra-communal alliances and the internal systems of control by which social order was maintained in the Muslim provinces. Until too late, Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal, who thought they could use Jinnah and the League for their own provincial purposes, failed to realize the grave risks they ran by supporting a demand cast in communal terms.347

However, her argument for Jinnah is quite comparable to the analysis of British officials for Gandhi’s maneuvers. ‘He stood for the ideals and the civilization of India as against those of Europe; for the cult of the spinning wheel and the simple economics of the village, as against the factories, the railways and the “materialism” of the West. But among his allies were many whose political and economic outlook and way of life were European. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr. Gandhi never found it easy to define what “Swaraj” would mean in actual political practice; his accounts of it varied from time to time and were always nebulous.’348 Mr. Jinnah with his resonance calculatedly selected the new opponent and diverted the attention of the Mussalman opinion in opposition to Hindus. On the other hand, the communal organizations

were fostering themselves to deliver their exclusive powers at the pretext of the 'religion in danger'. They just needed an issue which Mr. Jinnah provided them to act upon and influence the Mussalman mind with his idea of 'separate identity'. By involving communal organizations he might not able to ignore the line of action with which he was once displeased i.e., involving religion with politics. Hasan’s analyses the origin of these alliances in a following manner.

After 1922, however, when the Khilafat movement lost its momentum – largely because of developments in Turkey which were beyond the control of Indian Muslims – the ulama and their allies were left high and dry; their moment of glory when they seemed to carry all before them on the political stage was over. But their influence on the religious and educational life of Muslims did not come to an end. In fact, as Hindu-Muslim relations began to deteriorate, the services of the ulama were enlisted to whip up communal discontent. In Bengal, leaders like Fazul Haq and Abdur Rahim effectively deployed the communal arguments against their Hindu opponents in the Swaraj Party. With the help of the politically conservative ulama, they incited their followers over the sensitive questions of cow-killing and music before mosques to exacerbate communal tension. The religious symbols of Islam cut across the dividing lines of class and caste and made it possible for Muslim leaders to rally a popular following. They were also assisted by the feeling that they possessed a trump card in that they could rally all Muslims to their side by the cry of ‘Islam in danger’. Organizations like the Tanzeem-ul-Islam and the Anjuman-i-Islam raised such slogans to arouse the religious passions of the newly enfranchised rural voters who were more susceptible to religious propaganda.
because of their grievance against zamindars and mahajans who, in the main, were Hindus.349

External and internal political developments were worrying the Muslim leaders in opposition to League due to their provincial interests. So far Jinnah was able to establish reasonable space for himself and due which the opposition also found in him a potential to represent their community’s demands. Alliances with some the Muslim leaders made his position better than before and which took him to a stature where he can articulate his concealed ambitions. Jalal acutely observes as how he exploits his position as of a ‘sole spokesman’. ‘With the British and the Congress sitting on the fence, Muslims, whatever their persuasion, saw the best security in having a strong spokesman in the final negotiations to the settle these difficult matters. That voice, however cracked, could only be that of Jinnah. If he had not yet succeeded in becoming the sole spokesman, at least Jinnah had warded off any rivals for that post. His own sheer nerve and intransigence, matched by a certain amount of dithering by his adversaries - whether British, Congressmen or Muslim politicians in the majority provinces - allowed Jinnah, potentially a broken reed in late 1945, to take the League into the elections on a groundswell of opinion rising in its favour.’ 350

Gandhi might be aware of Jinnah’s inept moves and so he took the initiative to comprehend the extent of his mind during various meetings which he shared explicitly with Casey, Bengal’s Governor.351 Nanda precisely sums up the futileness of their further negotiations too.

Gandhi suggested that while the principle for the demarcation of boundaries and the plebiscite could be

349 Hasan, pp. 307-08.
350 Jalal, pp. 135-36.
351 Wolpert, p. 253, ‘Gandhi did not believe “anything less would satisfy him.” Gandhi also told Casey that “he believed Jinnah to be a very ambitious man and that he had visions of linking up the Moslems of India with the Moslems in the Middle East and elsewhere and that he did not believe that he could be ridden off his dreams”.'
decided in advance, the actual partition, if it became inevitable, should follow and not precede the transfer of power from Britain to India. He hoped that, after the departure of the British, the communities would learn, in the bracing climate of freedom, to make mutual adjustments and the need for the partition of the country might never rise. What was Gandhi’s hope was Jinnah’s fear; the Muslim league leader did not want to take any risks and so made partition the pre-condition of Indian Independence...While these conversations were no more than a kind of re-education for Gandhi, to Jinnah they brought an accession of political strength. The fact that Gandhi had knocked at his door raised Jinnah’s prestige. For four years the Muslim League leader had not swerved an inch from the position he had adopted in March 1940; events had shown that intransigence paid dividends.352

However, something substantial was anticipated while Gandhi-Jinnah talks were taking place and so Gandhi’s views were taken into account by the The Times and News Chronicle too.353 Gandhi concluded: “We have parted as friends. These days have not been wasted. I am convinced that Jinnah is a good man. I hope we shall meet again. I am a man of prayer and shall pray for an understanding. In the meantime, it is duty of the public to digest the situation and bring pressure of their opinion upon us”.354 The only way out left with Gandhi was to raise the mass opinion against Jinnah’s amateur groundwork. Though, the repercussions of the resonance of Jinnah’s evolving idea of ‘Pakistan’ based on the religious cry started showing its signs. Initially it was sensed by the Punjab’s

352 Nanda, p. 479.
354 The Times of India, “Mr. Jinnah Under Hallucination”: Mr. Gandhi On Pakistan, 2-10-1944, p. 5.
Governor Glancy and he shared his anxiety with the concerning authorities so to plan the impending elections in accordance.

The aftermath of the Simla conference debacle was a governors meeting in New Delhi to help Wavell and Whitehall decide their next political move. Winter elections, most agreed, were now required, but the Punjab’s Governor Glancy argued vigorously against any elections till an economic planning conference could be called to expose the potential pitfalls of Pakistan. “Unless the Muslim League could be steered away from the crude version of Pakistan,” he insisted, “there would be civil war in the Punjab; and immediate Central elections might consolidate the Muslim League position.” Glancy feared that Punjab Muslims would vote on what might appear to them simply as a “religious issue”, and his concerns reflected Khizar’s deepest apprehensions as well. Bengal’s governor conceded that none of his leading Muslims “could explain what Pakistan meant. In the last resort they always fell back on Jinnah, e.g., they said that Jinnah was satisfied that Pakistan was economically sound therefore it must be so.” Casey thought time “an important factor,” since he doubted that Jinnah had “any real successor” and argued that the “Pakistan idea might go to pieces” without him. . .Glancy did his best to derail early elections, fearing Pakistan yet finding that throughout the Muslim districts of the Punjab since the Simla conference Jinnah’s “stock has been standing very high. . . .He has been hailed as the champion of Islam. . . .I must confess that I am gravely perturbed about the situation, because there is very serious danger of the elections been fought, so far as Muslims are concerned, on an entirely false issue. . . .The uniformed Muslim will be told that the question he is called on to answer at the Polls is – Are you a true believer or an
infidel and a traitor? . . . If Pakistan becomes an imminent reality, we shall be heading straight for blood-shed on a wider scale; non-Muslims, especially Sikhs, are not bluffing, they will not submit peacefully to a Government that is labeled ‘Muhammadan Raj.’” No Englishman so clearly foresaw the dreadful implications of the partition of the Punjab, yet Glancy’s voice from the hinterland elicited no echo in the rarified corridors of Whitehall.355

The repercussions emerging due to Jinnah’s calculated steps were seemingly meager for the British officials to take into account in comparison to the impending repercussions which can be emerge by ignoring the force of world opinion. The anxiety of the British Cabinet for deciding the line of action while leaving India is placed by Wolpert.

The British cabinet considered the foreign policy implications of “any action by His Majesty’s Government which appears to suggest that we are abandoning our position in India” and was warned by Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin that ‘As regards American public opinion, such sympathy as we might hope to get- and it would not be much- from liberal internationalist circles for a policy of abandonment would be infinitely outweighed to our disadvantage by the confirmation that far wider circles would see in such a policy of their assumption that we no longer had the means or resolution to face our responsibilities. . . . To sum up…any appearance of abandonment of our position in India without a solution would weaken our world position.356

The elections were announced keeping in account the wider prospects. However, one of the evidences shares the other side of the story too.

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355 Wolpert, pp. 247-249.

356 Ibid., p. 276.
Abdul Ghaffar Khan shared his experiences while the election campaign in which British officials in India openly supported the League canvassers. He also draws attention towards the shallowness of their religious propaganda for a liberal leader like him. ‘The issue at stake in this election of 1946- the last general election in United India-was: India or Pakistan, Hindu or Muslim, Islam or Kufir, temple or mosque. The Muslim League canvassers asked people: “Are you giving your vote to the mosque or to the temple?” Unlike the other Muslims in India, however, the Pathans were politically awake, they had perception, and nobody could mislead them in the name of Islam. They knew the real meaning of Islam. They had learnt this in their nationalist movement, they had learnt to make sacrifices to serve their country. Nowhere else in India had the Muslims participated in this kind of nationalist movement. The polling day came. The British went all out to help the Muslim League and hinder the Khudai Khitmatgars. But by the grace of God the Muslim League was defeated and we won the elections with a large majority.\textsuperscript{357}

\textbf{Second Step}

Interplay of factors during and after the IInd World War along with Jinnah’s efforts was working well to make his position stronger. Now why would he stop himself when he might be seeing himself nearer to his ambitions? Nevertheless, this time Constitutional adjustments displeased him and for the second time he vociferously called his Mussalman brethren to boycott the Constituent Assembly without contemplating the repercussions. ‘The Muslim League observed August 16, 1946, as the ‘Direct Action Day’. On that day Calcutta witnessed a communal riot, the scale and intensity of which had never been known in living memory.\textsuperscript{358}

Now here it is imperative to take into account the essential factor which was ignored by a leader like Jinnah. Here comes the experience of a skillful leader who can sense as well as control the pace of the movement.


\textsuperscript{358} Nanda, p. 493.
by discontinuing and pacifying the masses with something constructive and what an amateurish leader of a mass movement cannot. Nanda shares the acute observance of an experienced leader through the following lines. ‘Gandhi had sensed the explosive possibilities of this situation. ‘We are not yet in the midst of a civil war,’ he had commented on the Great Calcutta Killing, ‘but we are nearing it.’

As Gandhi says, ‘An able general always gives battle in his own time on the ground of his choice. He always retains the initiative in these respects and never allows it pass into the hands of the enemy. In a satyagraha campaign the mode of fight and the choice of tactics, e.g., whether to advance or retreat, offer civil resistance or organize non-violent strength through constructive work and purely selfless humanitarian service, are determined according to the exigencies of the situation.’

Gandhi’s Approach
Gandhi opted the graceful way of continuing the constructive work to pacify the violent forces released by Jinnah’s Direct Action. As he was still hopeful to show his line of action for which he has been working to expose the British brute force once again; bow them in favor of his non-violence ideal; to resonate the efficacy of his ideal globally. He frankly acknowledged the significance of a crucial factor i.e., the ‘public opinion’ in favor his non-violent mass movement which was possible only with the strength of Hindu-Muslim unity as it was previously seen during Non-Cooperation Movement. Gandhi shared the essence of public opinion with his ashram mates and revealed the ignorance of the Indian masses compared to the other countries of the world.

But I have one great thing with me and that is public opinion. Public opinion has tremendous power. In our

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359 Ibid., p. 501.
country the significance of this expression has not yet fully realized. In the English language, however, the expression has a forceful connotation. Even the king is helpless in the face of what the English call ‘public opinion’. Even the redoubtable Mr. Churchill, scion of a great family, a powerful orator and erudite scholar—certainly not an ignoramus like me—could not save his office in spite of all his achievements. It only means that public opinion in England is highly awake, no one can do anything in opposition to it. In India public opinion is not as vigilant as in England. Had it been so worthless fellow like me would not have presumed to become a mahatma. And even after I became a Mahatma everything that I did would not have been put up with. As it is, in India anyone who is called a mahatma ceases to be answerable to the public, whatever—right or wrong—he might do. Tolstoy had been a great warrior, but when he realized that war was not a good thing he gave up his life in trying to put an end to war. He has said that the greatest power on earth is public opinion and it is generated by truth and non-violence. That is what I am trying to do. But nothing is going to come of my efforts unless public opinion in India is informed with courage and truthfulness.361

Jinnah’s amateurish steps were not only supplementing the violent forces but at the same time facilitating the British Generals to have a narrow escape from the state of affairs which emerged only due to him. British officials were encouraging the division between the communities for saving themselves from the humiliation which they have to face for not countering the uncontrollable violent forces as this time they were not in a position to show their another act of Dwyerism. On the other side, they were not able to ignore the force of united non-violent action which

361 Speech at prayer meeting, 10-6-1947, 1983, CWMG 88:124.
could turn against them too. Wolpert acutely observes the inner state of affairs of the British intrigues.

The British director of central intelligence, Sir Norman P. A. Smith, informed Wavell that from the “British angle,” ‘the game so far has been well played...both Congress and the League have been brought into the Central Government....The Indian problem has been thereby thrust into its appropriate plane of communalism... an opportunity for orderly evacuation now presents itself...The fullest advantage should be taken of our present breathing space... Secretary of State’s control over civil officers should be abrogated at the earliest possible moment. This is only fair to the officers and has the political advantage that a decisive gesture of this kind will help to keep the problem on its correct communal plane...Grave communal disorder must not disturb us into action which would reintroduce anti-British agitation...The former is a natural, if ghastly, process tending in its own way to the solution of the Indian problem.’\(^{362}\)

Being experienced in all these maneuvers the Indian British Government took their line of action by sending their skillful general to seize the complex situation with swiftness. As Chandra states that political developments do not wait for anyone, and, so did happen in the form of Mountbatten Plan.

In our view, the root of Gandhiji’s helplessness was neither Jinnah’s intransigence nor his disciples’ alleged lust for power, but the communalization of his people... But political developments did not wait till a ‘blind man’ groping in the dark all alone’ found a way to the light. The

\(^{362}\) Wolpert, p. 307.
Mountbatten Plan confronted him and Gandhiji saw the inevitability of Partition in the ugly gashes left by riots on the country’s face and in the rigor mortis the Interim Government had fallen into. He walked bravely into the AICC meeting on 14th June, 1947 and asked Congressmen to accept Partition as an unavoidable necessity in the given circumstances, but to fight in the long run by not accepting it in their hearts. 363

Chandra indicates the helplessness of Gandhi and Jalal analyses Mr. Jinnah’s position to be poorer as she portrays Jinnah’s helplessness where he had no option except to accept the proposal placed to him. ‘He calculated that there would be time enough later to impose effective control over Muslim India once the more urgent battle with Congress and the British had been won. This proved to be a serious miscalculation which together with the millennial expectations aroused by an undefined cry for Pakistan was soon to push Jinnah into an uncomfortably tight corner. But, for the moment, he could use the League’s electoral success as an excuse to concentrate upon the three cornered game of constitutional haggling which after all was the Quaid-i- Azam’s greatest talent.’ 364 Chandra views Gandhi’s helplessness due to the forces of communalism but a constant companion of Gandhi views his helplessness in some another way. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur through the The Times clarifies Gandhi’s position and indicates that all the representatives of the communities together made his position worse and the final stroke was given by the Congress by accepting the division without him.

Sir, -In pursuance of my very brief note to the press contradicting Maulana Azad’s statement about Gandhiji having agreed to the partition of India, I would like the

363 Chandra, pp. 503-04.
public to share the following quotations from Gandhiji’s own pen in order to remind them of what were the true facts. On the 11th April 1947 Gandhiji wrote to Lord Mountbatten informing him that he had “failed to carry any of the members of Congress Working Committee with me except Badshah Khan.” In the same letter he said “Congressmen who are in Interim Government are stalwarts, seasoned servants of the nation and therefore, so far as the Congress point of view is concerned, they will be complete advisers. I would still love to take the place that the late C. F. Andrews took. He represented no one but himself. And if you ever need my service on its merit it will always be at your disposal.” Earlier in this same letter he had said “I felt sorry that I could not convince them of the correctness of my plan, from every point of view. Nor could they dislodge me from my position although I had not closed my mind against every argument. Thus I have to ask you to omit me from my consideration.” During the last week of May 1947 in Patna he said to Dr. Mahumud: “The Congress has practically decided to accept Partition. But I have been a fighter all my life. I am going to Delhi to fight a losing battle.’ Those of us who were near to him sensed his soul’s agony for he felt that the Congress was going to accept Partition. I remember well how sorrowful he was when I gave him the news that all the three parties- the Congress, the Muslim League and the Sikhs-had signed the Mountbatten Plan. More than once he said he was all alone because those who had been his colleagues in the freedom struggle were unable to understand his viewpoint. But whatever anyone said he “could never be party to the vivisection of India.” The actual decision for Partition was taken by the Congress in Delhi when Gandhiji was in Patna. Maulana Sahib, however, was present at the
meeting. One now wonders why he did not resign. As for Sardar Patel not taking enough precautions to protect Gandhiji, I cannot but regret what is an untrue statement. It was unfortunately some persons near Gandhiji who apprised him of the Sardar’s orders that everyone who came to the prayer meetings should be searched and Gandhiji rebelled against these precautions. I am also of the opinion that no amount of safety measures can really offer cent per cent protection against an assassin who is willing to lose his own life.365

Noteworthy Correspondences
Whereas, correspondences from ‘The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi’ in the name of Sir Stafford Cripps366 and Lord Mountbatten367 clarifies Gandhi’s state more rationally. Gandhi with his strength of mind and foresightedness was striving to attain something essential when all the leaders of the respective communities were busy struggling with one another and in addition were posing obstructions for him too. A skillful general can only sense the gravity of the impending repercussions and therefore save his position from the state of being completely routed. This was the essential exercise in such complexities to which others were unaware. He elaborated the matter of the letters litter earlier to Aruna Asaf Ali too.

They can hand over power either to the Muslims League or to the Congress, I do not mind which. If they hand it over to the Congress, the Congress will come to a just settlement with the League. But even if they make it over to the League, the Congress has nothing to fear. Only, let the transfer of power be complete and unqualified. The

365 The Times of India, Gandhiji and Partition, To the Editor, Amrit Kaur, 11-2-1959, p. 6.


367 Letter to Lord Mountbatten, 27/28-6-1947, CWMG 88:225, Appendix II.
way they do it will provide a test of their sincerity and honesty. So far the British have said that they had yielded to Congress non-violence; it was because of the non-violent struggle launched by the Congress that the Cabinet Mission was sent and the British Government made its famous declaration to withdraw from India. If this is really so, they should have no difficulty in handing over power to the Congress. But so far as I, for one, am concerned, they are free to ignore the Congress and hand over power to the League. They will then have then have bowed before the power of violence. For that is what the League swears by. We shall then pit our non-violence even against the League’s violence. Non-violence was meant not to give fight to the British only. It is ubiquitous in its application and scope. We shall settle with the League by offering our innocent blood to be split without spilling any and we will succeed.  

Gandhi neither bowed himself in front of Jinnah’s obdurate approach by not accepting his idea of ‘Pakistan’ and nor in front of the tactful counter plan of Lord Mountbatten for a narrow escape. Rather he determinedly cautioned Lord Cripps as well as Lord Mountbatten to make their position clear for the World opinion.

I pointed the initial mistake of the British being party to splitting India into two. It is not possible to undo the mistake. This does not in any way impinge upon the very admirable doctrine of fair play. Fair play demands I do not help the mistaken party to fancy that the mistake was no mistake but a belated and only a partial discharge of an obligation.  

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368 Discussion with Aruna Asaf Ali and Ashok Mehta, 6-5-1947, 1983, CWMG 87:422.

Conclusion
Right from the beginning Gandhi with the help of the masses of India had advanced in exposing the brute force of the Indian British Government and gathered the world opinion in favor of his non-violence ideal with his exclusive maneuvers. Gandhi had positioned all the factors to reverberate the efficacy of his non-violence ideal with the final withdrawal of the Indian British Government. He was waiting for the right issue to raise the public opinion so to gather support against the brute force. But before he could do anything Jinnah confused the state of affairs by wrongly educating the Mussalman mind against the Hindus. Indian British officials encouraged Jinnah’s naïve steps so as to save themselves from the non-violent forces created by Gandhi. Jinnah as an amateur player of the game tangled the strides which were earlier in favor of India and his skillful leader. Jalal states that Mr. Jinnah was waiting for the right time to define his idea of Pakistan but I observe that he was not able to trace the solution to the complexities created by his own unskillful leadership therefore confounding the others too. However, I found Jinnah’s steps to be akin to Gandhian maneuvers especially when imitated with naïveté. Gandhian movements use to be planned where he sets the stage with the co-players and the counter players and then channelize the raised the public opinion with a skill to take total control of the movement. However, Jinnah was successful in arranging the essential factors but lacked the skill of controlling the mass movement and was entrapped within his own naiveté. Then too Gandhi was able to manage his position internationally by determinedly confronting the British officials within the frame of ethical dilemma from where they could not seek any escape. Chandra views Gandhi’s non-violent mass movement in a similar logical manner.

Non-violence meant above all fighting on the terrain of moral force. Non-violent mass movements placed the colonial authorities in the wrong and exposed the underpinning of colonial state power in brute force, when the authorities used armed force against peaceful
In fact, a non-violent mass movement put the rulers on the horns of dilemma. If they hesitated to suppress it because it was peaceful, they lost an important part of their hegemony, because the civil resisters did break existing, colonial laws; not to take action against them amounted to the abdication of administrative authority and a confession of the lack of strength to rule. If they suppressed the movement by use of force, they still lost, for it was morally difficult to justify the suppression of a peaceful movement and non-violent law-breakers through the use force. They were in no-win situation.\textsuperscript{370}

As Chandra says the root cause for Gandhi’s helplessness was not Jinnah’s intransigence but Communalism. However, I observe that the root cause of Gandhi’s helplessness was Jinnah’s naïveté to control a mass movement, lack of skillful leaders, national leader’s custom of opportunism and the ignorance of masses. Undoubtedly, Jinnah was able to track Gandhi’s skills and technique more closely than anyone but his naïveté of controlling a mass movement took the satyagraha technique to its destructive side. One thing which cannot be ignored to differentiate is the limitation of Gandhi’s technique as for its efficient working a skillful leader is essential otherwise it can be as destructive as it was during the Partition of India. I will sum up with Gandhi’s viewpoint to clarify his state and his counter argument to overcome the limitations of his technique.

Satyagraha has been designed as an effective substitute for violence. This use is in its infancy and, therefore, not yet perfected. But as the author of modern satyagraha I cannot give up any of its manifold uses without forfeiting my claim to handle it in the spirit of a humble seeker.\textsuperscript{371} And again he says, ‘I regard

\textsuperscript{370} Chandra, p. 515.

myself as an expert on the subject, I regard it as my own independent discovery and, I look upon it as my dharma to show from time to time its applicability and its limitations. Not only am I totally unconcerned whether the changes are made or not but I regard them as harmful if everyone does not exercise his independent judgment. This criticism applies particularly to those who regard themselves as my followers. I do not approve of blind worship. I am very much opposed to it. Swaraj cannot be secured by it and, if secured, cannot be maintained. Hence, I would like to get work out my ‘followers’ so as to utilize also their intelligence.372

After analyzing approach in both the cases I observe a striking similarity in the cases of Sardar Bhagat Singh and Sir Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Interestingly these are the two individuals who were able to track Gandhian maneuvers closely for their desired motives. It’s the potential of the Gandhian maneuvers with which they were able to gather public opinion for their idealism. However, in both the cases Gandhi acted differently with his expertise to confront the odd situations in a tactful manner. In both the cases he proved the potential of his non-violence ideal. By not being swayed with the public opinion in Sardar Bhagat Singh’s case he confronted the British officials in a complex situation and which assisted him in his progression. In a similar manner he confronted the Indian British Government, Lord Cripps and Lord Mountbatten with the strength of the world opinion for his non-violence ideal.

372 Civil Disobedience in the Congress, Navajivan, 2-8-1925, CWMG 28:16.