Francis Robinson basically deals with the problems raised by the various theories of Muslim separatism. He points out that apart from being minority in both town and country, the Muslims had fundamental religious differences with the Hindus. Historically speaking, religion was an important factor in unifying the Muslims as well as dividing the Muslims. Firstly, there were important differences between the Sunnis and the Shias. Than Muslims were further divided by confrontation between their different interests in government services, land and religion. Muslim government servants and the landlords felt the pressure of change in the late Nineteenth century rather more than any other group; their power was most obviously reduced, their culture was most strongly attacked. Members of this elite (landlords and government servants) of Hindus and Muslims led the response of the United Provinces' society to


151 Ibid., p.13.

152 Ibid., p.25.

153 Ibid., p.84.
the modernising processes of British rule. They founded the associations which used to discuss the problems that British rule set for the Indians. They also discovered the solutions to these problems, such as colleges for the community education and political associations\textsuperscript{154}. Simultaneously, it was also felt that the traditional Indo-Islamic society was slowly being mined by the British rule. Moreover the British law was increasingly encroaching the Islamic law\textsuperscript{155}.

Focusing his attention on the Aligarh Movement, Francis is of the opinion that it is debatable whether Aligarh college and its founder would ever have been able to play the important role they did, if the government attention had not been focused especially on Muslim affairs\textsuperscript{156}. Undoubtedly, Syed Ahmed was the genius behind the Aligarh Movement, however it was the patron of the government that made the college and its managers a major political force. Without the favour of the government of India, Syed Ahmed would have never acquired the position and reputation that enabled him to found and lead all-India political organisations. Indeed, it is undeniable that the British policy in the second half of the Nineteenth century made a great contribution to the development of Muslim separatism\textsuperscript{157}. Moreover, in establishing the Muslims as a special and separate interest in the Indian constitution, the role of the Muslim-League was important\textsuperscript{158}. From the year 1909, the

\textsuperscript{154} Robinson, F. C. R. \textit{op. cit.}, p.32.

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Ibid.}, p.27.

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Ibid.}, p.126.

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Ibid.}, p.174.
principle of Muslim separateness was implemented in every constitutional change. In 1912, this claim of some Muslims gained acceptance from the leading organisation of the nationalists' politics, the Congress\textsuperscript{159}.

The role of the politicians and the priests in the Khilafat Movement illuminates the nature of Muslim separatist politics\textsuperscript{160}. Any alliance between the Ulma and the secular Muslim politicians rested on shaky foundations. Ulmas were prepared to ally with the secular Muslim politicians only when the later were concerned to press Muslim religious interests on government or to oppose the regime as a whole. Tajul-Islam Hashmi echoes same kind of feelings when he says that like the so-called Wahabi Movement of the Nineteenth century, the Khilafat Movement also had a tremendous impact on the Muslim masses of this region. The formal appearance of Ulma in the arena of politics injected a new dose of religious fervour into the body politics of the Muslim society. The withdrawal of the Movement reduced the importance of Nationalism, while the Pan-Islamism and the Muslim solidarity vis-a-vis Hindus emerged as more important issues among the Muslims, irrespective of class and profession\textsuperscript{161}.

It is true that the Muslims who made the Khilafat victory possible were the Ulma. They tried to push the Movement faster than the young party politicians wished to go. For most of the young party politicians, the alliance with the Ulma was a great embarrassment \textsuperscript{162}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{159} Robinson, F. C. R. : \textit{op. cit.}, p.1.

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., p.353.

\textsuperscript{161} The Indian Education and Social History Review, Vol. XXV No.2, April-June, 1988 (New Delhi, 1988) P.171.

\textsuperscript{162} Robinson, F. C. R. : \textit{op. cit.}, p.326.
\end{footnotesize}
Moreover, the introduction of elective government threatened the power of the Muslim landlords and the Muslim government servants. It is also noteworthy to say that Muslim as a community reached back into their cultural past to reinforce their attempts to come to terms with the challenges of British rule and in their turn produced a form of Hindu revivalism. This revivalism, the demands of which often cloaked direct competition for the government jobs, or seats on elected bodies, was another pressure which encouraged the Muslims to organise on a communal basis. Gradually the young party politicians took advantage of the Ulma from the year 1913 and dropped them after 1923.

The study of U.P. Muslims suggests that by most of the standards applied to most of the European nations, the Indian Muslims were not a separate nation. In fact they had no racial homogeneity, little common history and many conflicting interests. Some were descended from converts and others from Arabs, Turks, Persians, Afghans and Central Asians. Moreover, there was no deliberate attempt to foster communal hostility, indeed, the aim was to avoid the divide and rule policy. Nevertheless, the policymakers did need to divide Indian society in order to govern, they had to isolate the areas of opposition and the areas of support. Francis do believe that in the last years of British rule, Muslim demand for a separate homeland was so strong that neither the government nor the Congress could resist them.

164 Ibid., p.346
165 Ibid., p.348-349.
166 Ibid., p.1.
Consequently, a powerful agitation was launched for the Islamic republic of Pakistan, but small place was found for Islam in the ordering of Pakistan’s national life.

It is an interesting phenomenon that almost all the Cambridge historians have a consensus approach on the motives of the Western educated Indians. The viewpoint of C.A.Bayly echoes their {Cambridge} voices that the Western educated Indians wanted place and influence in the administration and that the so-called political agitations in the beginning were the handiwork of high caste elites, stood for selfish ends. Refuting this charge, Dr. S. R. Mehrotra emphasised the importance of education in the emergence of Nationalism. Dr. Mehrotra looked at the educated Indians as a class and the ideas they held common. That the Cambridge historians embarked on the study of Indian Nationalism in a nemierte manner that is to say that they followed the example of Lewis Nenier who explained the Eighteenth century English politics in terms of interests rather than ideas finding the explanation of political change not in speeches of the politicians but in the way in which they shouldered each other a side as they struggled down the corridors of power 167.

Bayly further argued that the Congress has functioned as a vehicle for the pursuits of parochial goals and advancement of local careers. This is unfortunate to listen and hard to believe, because the majority of the Indian leaders had a clean image. A feeling of serving the country and also making sacrifices for the home country made the minds of such leaders as selfless and patriotic. Hence, the charge that the Congress party and its leaders stood for personal gains was nothing but the British propaganda to degrade these leaders in the eyes of their own countrymen.

167 Asian Affairs Vol. 15 No.1-3. {1984} p.35.
According to Bayly, the British penetrated the Indian information system very collectively and often quite quickly because they could deploy greater financial resources than their rivals and also because they inherited the authority of the emperors and of the most powerful and well informed local rulers in Bengal and Awadh\textsuperscript{168}. In addition to this, the disintegration of the clan or kinship dominated the territories, the numerous developments resulting from technological advances, the gradual decline of the complicated forms of social objection, the changes in ideologies and the growing uniformity amongst the landholding peasantry and the rural labouring class were all major shifts from the past trends. They were primarily the result of a changed world situation. Although the English Company had initially used these trends in the Indian economy to its advantage, yet its expanding colonial demands ultimately destroyed these very trends\textsuperscript{169}.

According to Adam Smith, the reasoning of Laissez-faire is reflected in this argument that when American colony became independent, the British modified the theory of Whiteman's burden in India. William Hunter too points out that the tide of circumstances had compelled the Indian weaver to exchange the loom for plough. According to Lovet Frazer, the real cause of unrest in India sprang from that quickening of the new aspirations which swept throughout Asia as a result of the victories of Japan. The other change in the world situation, according to Hobsbaun was that between 1890-1995, Germany outstripped Great Britain in steel production and when the depression


\textsuperscript{169} The Indian Economic and Social History Review Vol. XXV. No.4 (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1988.) p.526.
lifted in 1932, British had seized to be the workshop of the world. However, it is crystal clear from the above account that the most important changing trend which had a negative impact in the Indian context was the British-Indian administrative policies and not the change in the world situation. This fact is proved when Lord Cornwallis in his minutes of 1790 mentioned that the heavy drain of wealth caused the large number of investments in Europe, the remittance of private fortune could not earn bullion from England in the form of export and thus a consequence depression in Indian agriculture and internal trade.

C. J. Baker in his article, Non-cooperation in South India in a book by C.J. Baker and D.A. Washbrook entitled, South India: Political Institutions and Political Change, 1880-1940 (Cambridge, 1976) states that the British government in South India in the mid-Nineteenth century was perched over a society which was closely controlled by those with mastery over its slowly developing economy. That the Non-cooperation campaign by Mahatma Gandhi, was sparked off by Montague-Chelmsford reforms.

Baker believes that between the governors and the mass of the government was interposed a stratum of local leaders and subordinate Indian administrators. Under this network the Raj linked not only the locality to province but also province to nation. However as long as the province remained a miscellany of localities loosely marshalled together under any aloof government, it was difficult for a provincial politics to emerge. Consequently, the disunity and the tranquillity of the Madras presidency proved as stultifying for the Indian politicians as it was for the foreign rulers. This is proved when 1857 passed without any


171 Ibid., p.22.
incident and even the rural agitations which afflicted parts of Northern, Western and Eastern India in the last quarter of the Nineteenth century found no echo in the South. On the part of the government, it became a tradition for St. George to resist any initiative for change or reform stemming from Calcutta or London. However for a brief time in 1916, the Home Rule League Movement united all the political factions of Madras behind Mylapore (a local business community) and Mrs. Annie Besant. It is noteworthy to say that as far as Mylapore were concerned, many groups resented the remarkable growth of their influence since the turn of the century. The banner around which these various groups clustered was the cause of the non-Brahmin community. The non-Brahmin community encompassed 98% of the provincial population. Baker went on to point out that the Brahmin Congress and many Brahmin public servants had now exposed the cause of Home Rule and it pledged the loyalty of the non-Brahmins to the British connection.

Mr. Sri Parkash also echoes similar kind of views when he states that a wide range of research has by now established the sub-castes or group of rich peasants who had given to play an important role in the local and provincial politics by the early Twentieth century, actually originated in the dominant castes which controlled land resources and power in villages even in pre-British India. Thus, it is true that in the beginning of the Twentieth century, caste identities became the most effective rallying point in the lower caste movements for economical and

172 Baker, C. J. op. cit., p. 11.
173 Ibid., p.25.
174 Ibid., p.27.
political rights. However it does not mean that the provincial politics bred only communism and casteism, in some provinces it did contribute to the Indian Freedom Struggle. For example, the British government was most unsympathetic to the Akali demands and tried to suppress. In the process, the Akali Movement established links with the Nationalists' Movement and got full support from the Nationalist leaders. In return, the Akalis gave a strong support to the Indian Freedom Struggle for quite a long time.

Carrying on his viewpoint further, Baker states that by 1920, the propaganda in Madras city emphasised the need to overcome the political Brahman, the Mylapore archetype. That the Justice Party never faced up to such dilemmas and its attempts to erect a social and political philosophy often seemed confusing and self-contradictory. From 1916-20, this did not help non-Brahman cause to develop into a mass movement. The battle for the leadership of the province under the dyarchy constitution was thus left to the Mylaporeans and Justicites. According to Baker, one of the chief obstacles in the way of Justice leaders' campaign for more non-Brahmins to be admitted to the public services was the absence of a large number of non-Brahmins seeking the more subordinate administrative jobs. The network of Justice Party, when it reached outside the city was no different- four of men whom Panagal nominated to district board presidencies in the early 1920's were Brahmins. That the dominant men of the villages formed a very distinctive elite and the degree of dominance differed greatly in the

177 Ibid., p.30.
178 Ibid., p.33.
179 Ibid., p.48.
180 Ibid., p.81.
different parts of the dry tract. On the other hand, the framework of the British rule had, if anything, strengthened the position of the village elite. Rural society, Baker declares, had been sharply stratified before the arrival of the British. That the sketch of the pattern of rural political alliances help to explain the sporadic appearance of the rhetoric of caste in local politics. Baker opines that one factor which shaped the style of politics in local government was that within local boards, the real power was concentrated in very few hands. Consequently, the ministry found that it had to give more solid support to its chosen agents in the deltaic tracts. Likewise, as in the deltaic areas, so in the big towns, local politicians supplemented their personal networks and their transitional empires by participating in the public agitational politics of the town.

The powers wielded by the local officials and by the village officers made them important officers at elections. That the electioneering used to began with negotiations between influential men in the constituency. Members of the local elite wished, if possible, to avoid the expense of contesting against their peers and in some cases, these preliminary conferences resulted in members being returned unopposed. According to Baker, a turning point came with the advent of the Swarajists, people were attracted to their cause because it promised to provide a vehicle for displacing the Justicites in the seat of power. At few other places of the province, men who resented the overbearing command of the leaders of the local government looked to the Swarajists for help. In practice, the Swarajist leaders could give little concrete assistance to

182 Ibid., P.140.
183 Ibid., P.145.
184 Ibid., P.152.
185 Ibid., P.160.
local politicians. In Baker’s opinion, Swarajists was an extra ordinary monster, at all-India level, it constrained a variety of dissident politicians, each with his particular reason for joining the alliance, in the province, it embarrassed the city Nationalists, jaded non-cooperators and disillusioned Justicites, in the localities it attracted a plethora of different interests pitted against the status quo in parish and province.\footnote{186}{Baker, C.J., op. cit., P.162.}

Baker states that it was the Simon Commission that brought the matters to a head. The Justice Party in their anger at the Coimbatore Confederation, had joined with the Congress in rejecting any co-operation with the Simon Commission on the ground that it included no Indian member.\footnote{187}{Ibid., p.176.} Thus it is clear from the above account that even the Cambridge historians like Baker recognised the Indian unity though on limited occasions.

The anti-Zamindar campaign appeared suddenly in 1930’s. The status and power of the Zamindars, according to Baker, depended more on their relationship to the sovereign power than on their economic base.\footnote{188}{Ibid., P.201.} That the Zamindars, they{British}had hoped would not only shoulder the burden of raising revenue, policing the countryside and setting the disputes within their demands but they would also be the staunch allies of the Raj. Interestingly enough, by the end of the Nineteenth century, the British had begun to feel that the Zamindars stood in the way of administrative advance.\footnote{189}{Ibid., P.203.} On the other hand due to Depression, the depressed class agitations which reached at its peak in late

\footnote{186}{Baker, C.J., op. cit., P.162.}
\footnote{187}{Ibid., p.176.}
\footnote{188}{Ibid., P.201.}
\footnote{189}{Ibid., P.203.}
1933, did not usher in a social revolution and after some heady months, the lower castes found that their actual position had changed very little. Baker analyses that the deltas found support for its agitations among the cream of local society. Wealthy landlords and the prominent traders poured funds into Congress agitation (Civil-Disobedience). During this agitation, several men came forward to protest at the way, the particular politicians had profited from posing as their leaders. The Congress, in due course, stated its aim as to takeover the entire structure of the Raj and beyond that its ideology was eclectic and uncontroversial. It promised to provide a framework for organisation at every level of the political process from locality to nation. That by 1936, even a district like Ramnad which had previously been considered a political backwater, had a flourishing Congress committee deeply involved in local politics. That the organisation of local board election campaigns by the Congress struck a nice balance between flexibility and continuity, between provincial direction and local control. After the election were known, both Congress and Justicites negotiated with the local leaders to ensure that the president would be elected under their flags. That the bargaining before the poll was as important a part of the contest as it had been in recent elections of post-independence India. Much of it revolved around the Congress nomination, but it used to continue even after this had been settled.

191 Ibid., P. 216.
192 Ibid., P. 268.
193 Ibid., P. 274.
194 Ibid., P. 281.
195 Ibid., p.300.
Attraction of the Congress in the province depended very much on its potential for capturing the new positions of power that were becoming available. Nevertheless, the command of the provincial Congress had always been a matter for factional disputes, but in 1930's, these disputes took on a new fervour and bitterness. However, with all the weaknesses of the Congress, the Justice Party could not match the new methods employed and the new prospects promised by the Congress. The party had never possessed the machinery for conducting a new campaign throughout the province, and being in such disarray in 1930's. By the early 1930, the props of the Justice edifice had been begun to crumble. The devolution of power and patronage had satisfied few. Moreover, in 1930's, the local government had become more important than it had ever been before, but it had also become far more difficult for local bosses to control. Consequently, the Raj was making it more difficult for its ministerial collaborators to govern.

Thus to conclude, the quarrel between Brahman and non-Brahman arose from the brief concentration of political interest on the affairs of the public services and of the provincial capital, where rivalries could, with advantage, be squeezed into a communal model. But in other sense, ruler's own fear of the dominance (and then the dissidence) of a handful of Brahmins in Mylapore, that ensured a petition for admission into positions of power would be couched in communal terms. That the appearance of the Indian National Congress in the late Nineteenth


197 Ibid., P. 305.

198 Ibid., P. 237.

199 Ibid., P. 322.
century reflected the way that certain matters in the government of the various provinces were decided on an all-India scale, and an all-India organisation was necessary if politicians wished to gain influence over other decisions. That Indian politicians could see that nothing could suffice except complete control over the ordering of politics in India. Lastly, the widening of the franchise and the increase in the number of seats did not radically change the character of persons elected, because of the fact that the vast majority hailed from the landed background, many with a sideline interest in commerce or rural industry.  