CHAPTER-7

ECHOES IN AUSTRALIA AND U.S.A.

The American and the Australian scholars joined the debate on Indian Freedom Struggle more or less at the same time when Cambridge School started specializing itself on the Indian Freedom Movement. Although their approach is quite different from that of Cambridge School, yet their dependency on the official documents of the British-Indian government compelled them to be slightly prejudiced against the Indian cause, thus sometimes they stagger in tracing out the true picture of the Indian Nationalist Movement.

The main focus of the work by J.H. Broomfield is on institutional politics, particularly the politics of the legislature between 1912-1927, which witnessed crucial developments in communal relations. Highlighting the communal bitterness present between the two castes in India, he probes the relevance of expression as to what extent the caste factor played a role in becoming a hurdle in the National Movement in India. That the heterogeneous composition of Calcutta’s population reflected its varied opportunities. That the main supply of men for personal services and labour for industry, transport and construction came from the poorer rural areas of Bihar, Eastern United Provinces and Orissa. These outside groups made up slightly less than half of city’s population.

Broomfield firmly believes that in the areas like Bengal, the Muslim peasantry was exposed to the economic exploitation by the upper classes, which were predominantly Hindus. At the beginning of the Twentieth century, Bengali rural and urban society differed in many

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aspects, yet they shared at least one feature: a common dominant elite. This elite was the Bhadralok of city, town and village that claimed and were accorded recognition as superior in social status to the mass of their followers\textsuperscript{202}. That the basic and the most rigidly maintained distinction between Bhadra and Abhadra, between high and low was Bhadralok’s abstention from the manual labour and their belief in the inferiority of the manual occupations. The other point of difference was that Bhadralok as a group had gained a new sense of cultural identity from their Nineteenth century experience in adopting local traditions to the challenging demands of their rapidly changing society\textsuperscript{203}. The enthusiasm with which the Bengal Bhadralok accepted and promoted English language and education, in marked contrast to the response of the landed elites in the surrounding provinces, gave them the lion’s share of the new opportunities for professional, administrative and clerical employment throughout Eastern and Northern India\textsuperscript{204}.

According to Broomfield, the partition of Bengal was an unambiguous demonstration of the British-Indian administration’s antipathy to the political aspirations and cultural ideals of the Bhadralok. That it revealed a thorough indifference to the creative potential of this elite and an insensitivity to the critical ideological choice with which the group was confronted. That how thoroughly the British misconducted the social and political forces with which they were dealing in Bengal was revealed by their unpreparedness for the outbursts which their measure provoked. Consequently, for Bhadralok intellectuals, the partition of Bengal and the agitation against it was a seminal experience that influenced their political thinking for forty years\textsuperscript{205}. Broomfield’s analysis further

\textsuperscript{202} Broomfield, J. H. :op. cit., p.5.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., p.11.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., p.8.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., p.3.
reveals that while the partition of Bengal united the Bhadralok in protest, but at the same time it revealed their unpopularity with other communities i.e. Oriya, Bihari, Assamese and Muslims. These dissenting voices, however could be explained away as the inevitable results of the British policies of divide and rule\textsuperscript{206}.

According to Broomfield, the critical point in the thinking of Bhadralok had been reached by the moderate Nationalists in Bengal during the middle of 1915 as the moderates demanded extension of the powers of the existing institutions\textsuperscript{207}. That in making their demands for reforms in 1915, the Bengal moderates were not motivated simply by a desire to further the constitutional ideals-they were also concerned to save themselves. Their political influence had been seriously weakened by their difficulties in the Morley-Minto councils and by the general trend of the government policy in 1914 and in early 1915. That in 1917, moderates were loosing the initiative to the extremists\textsuperscript{208}. The extremists on the other hand claimed that the proposed reforms (Montford) were hedged about so many provisions to protect the bureaucracy, the British commerce and loyal Indian groups, that the Nationalists would merely be consenting to their own ensnarement should they except them\textsuperscript{209}.

The war of 1914, had had a profoundly setting effect on the Bengal society and this social unrest was aggravated in the immediately post-War years by economic difficulties. Although after the Lucknow Pact, the Bhaderlok Muslim-Leagures were accused of selling out the Muslim community to the Hindus, and there was a reaction against collaboration, yet the decision of the Muslim politicians in the mid-

\textsuperscript{206} Broomfield, J.H.,op.cit., p.31.  
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., p.87.  
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., p.115.  
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., p.140.
twenties to stood aloof from the Hindu Bhadralok nationalists and to concentrate upon economic and social reforms marked a decisive shift in political power in Bengal. He says that Muslim politicians had made a discovery of profound significance: they had no need to serve the two masters. If they dispensed with Nationalism, they could also dispense with Hindu Bhadralok, for Muslim communal representation gave them an assured base from which to operate in council and Muslim numerical superiority gave them power in the community at large. Moreover, any extension of the electorate and any development of general political awareness worked in their favour. For the Bhadralok, the obvious line of defence against the threatened attack from the below was to oppose any radical extension of the franchise or the provision of the special legislative representation for the lower-classes. They believed that a restrictive franchise based on a property qualification be maintained. In addition to that, less easily disregarded were the fears expressed by many Hindu Bhadralok that Congress had endangered Hindu society by allying with the Muslims during the Non-cooperation Movement. Interestingly, the Congress leaders too tried to persuade the Muslims to unite their Khilafat committees with the new district Congress committees, which they refused, insisting that the two organisations existed for different purposes. Broomfield firmly believes that the aim of the Non-cooperation Movement had been to destroy the system of the government which made possible the outrages like Amritsar. However, despite all its achievements, the Movement had failed to do this. Undoubtedly the British

210 Broomfield, J. H., op. cit., p.298.
211 Ibid., p.281.
212 Ibid., p.160.
213 Ibid., p.237.
214 Ibid., p.207.
autocracy had been shaken to its foundations, but it had not been broken.

Assessing the issue of Partition of India, Broomfield underlines that a united Bengal defined by language and culture had always been a basic tenant of Hindu Bhadralok political faith, but now a cloud had risen to darken even this horizon. This was due to the fact that the Muslims had gained such an ascendancy in the provincial politics that they were talking of an independent sovereign Bengal under their domination. This theory gained such a strength that when the British announced in February, 1947 that they would leave India within fifteen months, the Bengal Congress and Hindu Mahasabha both appealed for the division of the province.

Thus to conclude, Broomfield explains communalism in terms of elite conflict in a plural society. The basic conflict, it is argued, was not between the Hindu and Muslim communities but between the competing elites of different communities. To support his viewpoint, Broomfield states that the skills which the political leaders had to command, if they were to be effective in the new situations, were those of brokerage and communication, they had to be capable of articulating and aggregating interests, of manipulating popular symbols and imaginary to give impression to wider political identities. The old elites were ill-fitted and ill-inclined to perform those rules. The meaning and purpose of this work is intelligible clearly from Broomfield's own statement that

216 Ibid., p.310.
217 Ibid., p.312.
the basic objective of the British policies in Bengal throughout this half-century was to combat Hindu Bhadralok exclusiveness, but the tragic effect of those policies was to reinforce that very characteristic. Obviously, by their actions, the British gave encouragement to the separatists, and when they finally yielded power it could only be the opposing governments of a divided Bengal.

Thomas R. Metcalf in his work entitled, The New Cambridge History of India; Ideologies of the Raj, analyses the fact that throughout the Raj and especially during the years of uncontested British supremacy from 1858 to 1918, the ideas that most powerfully informed British perceptions of India and its people were those of India’s difference. The Indian response to, and as the years went on, their interaction with, the various British descriptions of their land was complex and multifaceted. It involved simultaneous processes of acceptance, accommodation adaptation and rejection.

The theories of difference, the British defined, despite their claims to scientific precision, were never wholly coherent, nor were they free of internal contradictions. Often mutually inconsistent theories were cobbled together to achieve particular political purposes and controversy frequently erupted over how best to fit the ungainly facts of India’s social order into the proper modes of explanation. Undoubtedly, it is only with the coming of the British rule from the late Eighteenth century onward, did the notion that there existed distinct Hindus and Muslim communities in India take on a fixed shape. In part this was simply a product of administrative convenience. Metcalf further opined that


220 Ibid., p.133.
throughout the years of their rule over India, the British always sought like the imperial rulers everywhere to mobilize supporters from among their subjects\textsuperscript{221}.  

With the coming of the Twentieth century, the British in India had to confront an increasingly powerful and well organised National Movement\textsuperscript{222}. Oppressive measures were taken by the British-Indian government to suppress this mighty current of Nationalism. In this context, charging the British of mal-administration, Metcalf argues that at the Amritsar massacre, the use of unrestrained force was, however, hardly compatible with the proud commitments of the British in India to the rule of the law\textsuperscript{223}. In a satirical message, Metcalf remarked that neither the manoeuvrings of the conservative party leaders, nor Churchill’s impassioned defence of the Raj could destroy the Congress which held power in the majority of the Indian provinces from 1937 to 1939, or even halt the steady, if slow, march towards independence\textsuperscript{224}.  

Thus to conclude, Metcalf is right in stating that much in the ideology of difference nevertheless lived on. Within India, it left its marks, above all in the conception of India as a society informed by a passionate commitment to community and of public arena as a site where communities contested for power. As time went on and the central government itself, together with leaders of religiously based organisations, began openly to manipulate these communal loyalties for Partition's

\textsuperscript{221}Metcalf, Thomas R, op. cit., p.185.

\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., p.212.

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., p.229.

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid., p.232.
advantages, much ties became even more deeply embedded in the Indian society. In the end, Metcalf points out that forty years after independence the colonial construction of the Indian past lives on today.

Francis G. Hutchins in his work entitled, The illusion of Permanence highlights that the initial impact of the moral considerations of the British-Indian administration was the elimination of the Indians from positions of trust and responsibility and also concerned to protect the social order of the aristocracy. So, at a time when Englishmen and Indians were actually following the comparable patterns of behaviour, their arose misunderstanding because of the differing ways in which the same inclination was indulged in the two societies. Consequently, talking of racial theories, there were no more than the conventional impression of the Indian character appealed to such evident physical differences as that of skin, colour, which appeared to give them the quality of scientific objectivity.

Analysing the mutiny of 1857, Hutchins states that it has long been customary to assert that this mutiny resulted in a serious worsening of the relations between the English and the Indians. It is not correct to say that the mutiny caused the change in attitude. It was the British response to mutiny that gave a definite shape to imperial attitudes in the following decades, providing in abundance the justification and illustration of the presumed need for a new policy of governance.

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226 Ibid., p. 234.
228 Ibid., p. 58.
229 Ibid., p. 69.
230 Ibid., p. 79.
The fact that the mutiny provoked an immediate cry for repression, which was followed once the event was passed by a call for cautious retrenchment, reflected changes in both the social and intellectual conditions of British India.\footnote{Hutchins, Francis G. \textit{op. cit.}, p.80.}

Fiercely challenging the British approach, Hutchins states that England was a nation, one of several nations, but a nation in a world where the principle of Nationality was by and large absent. Amazingly, England has reserved the virtues of Nationality to herself and offered to India an alternative attraction of government by the imperial British nation. This contradictory British imperialism, precisely because it was national, was inescapably indiscriminatory in nature.\footnote{Ibid., p.149.} This is irony of the fact that England’s cohesiveness had won her an empire, but not to deny the Nationality to others. That although, the theories might be devided denying Indian Nationality as a logical impossibility, yet the theories could not dispose of Indian Nationalism once it did in fact exist.\footnote{Ibid., p.152.}

Analysing the state of bureaucracy in India, Hutchins describes that British officialdom felt the need for a powerful class of natives loyal to British rule because of the stake they would have in its perpetuation. Consequently, they supported the princes and landlords and justified their support by asserting that they were the natural leaders of the Indian society. A further aspect of the Indian society which seemed capable of exploitation for British was its division into myriad castes and communities. Making a seething attack on the Indian society, Hutchins argued that the Indian society was notoriously complex to be

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\footnote{Hutchins, Francis G. \textit{op. cit.}, p.80.}
\footnote{Ibid., p.149.}
\footnote{Ibid., p.152.}
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compartmentalized, consisting of hosts of desperate communities living more or less in isolation from one another\textsuperscript{234}. The British firmly believed that they had mastered the subtleties of Indian society and learned how to turn them to British advantage\textsuperscript{235}. This weakness is reflected in the Nationalist Movement which demonstrated the basic compatibility of the various groups of which Indian society was composed\textsuperscript{236}.

Stanley Wolpert in his work entitled, \textit{A New History of India}, shows his remarkable understanding skill of Indian affairs by stating that Indian Nationalism has always been a theme scored with religious, class, caste and regional variation. The emergence of National consciousness among the Indians during the Nineteenth century was primarily the product of responses both negative and positive, to the consolidation of British power\textsuperscript{237}. Gradually, it became painfully clear to more and more middle-class Indians, however, that no matter how well intentioned, or how powerful individual Englishmen like Ripon might be, the system they serve was fundamentally unresponsive and hostile to many basic Indian needs, aspirations and desires, it was cold, imperious, paternal and foreign\textsuperscript{238}. This fact is also endorsed by the statement of John Stuart Mill who states that it is an inherent condition of human affairs that no intention, however sincere, of protecting the interests of others can make it safe or salutary to tie up their hands. By their own hands only can any positive and durable improvement of their circumstances be worked out.

\textsuperscript{234} Hutchins, Francis G.:op. cit., p.174.

\textsuperscript{235} Ibid., p.182.

\textsuperscript{236}Ibid., p.189.


\textsuperscript{238} Ibid., p 256.
The most dangerous and potentially destructive challenge to India’s Nationalist Movement, according to Wolpert, came from Muslim leaders like Sir Sayid Ahmad Khan. The Muslim leader was determined to reverse the anti-Muslim sentiment aroused in the British by the war of 1857-58 and soon he became India’s first human bridge between Islamic traditions and Western thought.

On the economic front while India’s peasant population hovered on the knife edge of survival, Government revenue demand continued to grow in order to feed the fires of the wasteful frontier fighting, East and West. According to Vasant Kaiwar, the Colonial Government introduced a measure of clarity to the private property rights, bringing them into line with European norms of a single owner for a particular plot of land. This accompanied the tax burdens on the individual heads of households. Overlapping and often confused ownership rights disappeared under the colonial property settlements. However, this picture of revenue demands of Government policies lacks clarity. Infact, under new farming system of Bengal, the Government gave out the collection of land revenue on a contract basis. The contractor who offered to pay the largest amount from a certain district or sub-division was given full powers for a certain number of years. Obviously, such contractors would try and extort as much as possible during the period that they held the contract, it would no matter to them if the people were ruined and the production in the latter years declined. The grievances against this Government policy are reflected when in 1857, villages and taluqdas all over North India dropped off Government Officials destroyed court and official records and papers, and ejected the new auction

239 Hutchin, Francis G.: op. cit., p.263.
240 Ibid., p.268.
purchasers from the villages. Pathetically India's poverty continued to spread further and India's resources to be drained off to pay for British soldiers and home charges242.

On the political front Wolpert opines that a wide spread disillusionment to the Indians from the British Raj came in the aftermath of World War First when the Congress abandoned its policy of co-operation with the British Raj to follow Gandhi's revolutionary call for non-violent Non-Cooperation. The British Government started an era of repression and it was till 1930's that the repressive power of the British officialdom remained as formidable as ever243. Analysing the Quit India Movement of 1942, Wolpert remarks that the Non-Cooperation of 1942 brought nothing but detention and despair to the Indian Nationalist ranks244.

Coming on to the post-independence scenario, Wolpert believes that India's first seventeen years of independence were dominated by the goals and dynamic leadership of its gifted prime-minister Jawahar Lal Nehru. The fact that he achieved much less than he hoped to, hardly enjoyed the power that he seemed to, and inspired much more than he accompanied, by no means diminished his impact on Indian history or the significance of his legacy245. In the post-Nehru era, to fulfill her promise of abolishing poverty, Mrs. Indira Gandhi counted on more radical land reforms, the nationalization of more industries.246 In the end, Stanley Wolpert, in his strongly worded statement criticizes the ugly picture of the present day India by arguing that provincial unrest, with the potential for

242 Wolpert, Stanley :op. cit., p.201.
243 Ibid., p.201.
244 Ibid., p.338.
245 Ibid., p.351.
246 Ibid., p.201.
Bangladesh like separatism has spread across North-East Indian seven states during 1979, and also throughout the year of 1980.

A balanced approach followed by Stanley Wolport to appreciate and criticize the pre and post - independence scenario is indeed commendable. Another work of Stanley Wolpert entitled, *Tilak and Gokhale : Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India*, in no way intends to detract from the luster of significance of the roles of these remarkable leaders{Nehru-Gandhi}in bringing the dream of Indian nationhood to reality, but attempts, by focusing on the lives and ideas of their great pre-decessors, to place in a somewhat cleaner historical perspective, the elements of continuity in the movement of which Gandhi and Nehru so ably presided after 1920. Among Gandhi’s immediate pre-decessors in the labour of making modern India, the two men who exerted the most pervasive and permanent influence were Bal Gangadhar Tilak and G.K. Gokhale.

The half decade from 1880 to 1890, may be thought of them as the seed time of their personal conflict, sown in an area of increasing factionalism within the Deccan Educational Society and repeated later as a harvest of provincial and national political antagonism²⁴⁷. Being away from Deccan Educational Society reformers and having established his reputation as an orthodox leader in his effective battle against reforms, Tilak had either to build his own party or else oust his opponents from their entrenched positions of provincial political leadership. It was at Shivaji festival that Tilak’s opinion was at the root of nationality, social order and religion. Consequently, the revival of the

worship of Shivaji festival built the foundation, on which these essential pre-requisites for the commonweal could be firmly established\textsuperscript{248}. 

On the other hand, Gokhale in his every action laboured to prove to all Englishmen he met, that he was infact worthy of full equality with them at any level. His command of their written and spoken language, was flawless, his manners punctilious, his knowledge and information precise and well-grounded. Yet he was born to India and could therefore understand the ideas and anxieties as well as the demands of his countrymen far better than any foreigner\textsuperscript{249}. Infact, Gokhale was the living bridge connecting two civilizations, two cultures, two ideas of human conduct\textsuperscript{250}. Wolpert is full of praise for Gokhale, when he states that granted the reality of British power, however it was not easy to find an effective alternative to Gokhale's method of agitation.

The period following the suffering and tragedy of 1897, and preceding the first Partition of Bengal in 1905 was marked by an increasing tension and mistrust between the government and the governed on the one hand and by growing estrangement between the parties of Tilak and Gokhale on the other\textsuperscript{251}. It was because of the denied access to such normal channels for the expression of political opinion, that Indian youths turned more than ever after 1897, to secret societies, which had independence as their goal and armed revolution as the means to attain it\textsuperscript{252}. Consequently, with the growth of his revivalist and revolutionary

\textsuperscript{248} Wolpert, Stanley : op.cit., p.115.
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., p.115.
\textsuperscript{250} Ibid., p.116.
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., p.121.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid., p.123.
programme, Tilak’s attack upon Hindu reformers became more and more virulent. By cloaking Hindu orthodox faith in a pseudo scientific garb, Tilak appealed to his rational as well as his religious countrymen. Wolpert states that by the end of 1904, Tilak felt no such optimism and considered India’s connections with England as perfidious rather than providential.

A new urgency was imparted to Indian Nationalist aspirations by the Partition of Bengal. Both Tilak and Gokhale responded with an intensification of their demands, each in his own way. The years that followed witnessed their emergence as the foremost Nationalist spokesmen of their respective parties, the growing incompatibility of whose platforms resulted in the open split of the Congress at Surat in 1907. One of the best analyses of this split is that the fracture had come swiftly but its healing took a long time. For the next eight years, India’s Nationalist Movement remained a house divided against itself, half constitutional and half revolutionary in aspiration. It is true that Surat split not only weakened the Indian National Congress; it virtually destroyed its effectiveness till the Lucknow reunification of 1916. During these nine years, refusing to line together, the two parties found it all but impossible to exist separately. On the British side the Nationalists were hounded by the official repression, the Liberals abandoned by their own people. However in the next half a decade after Surat split, both parties came to appreciate the essential futility of their positions and to realise that a National Movement divided against itself was in fact no National Movement at all.

253 Wolpert, Stanley, op. cit., p.151.
254 Ibid., p.156.
255 Ibid., p.157.
256 Ibid., p.212.
257 Ibid., p.240.
Though Tilak had paid a warm tribute to Gokhale on his death, he could not have helped but to recognize that this death substantially strengthened his own position of leadership in the Nationalist Movement\textsuperscript{258}. Another point of difference between the two was the Montague-Chelmsford proposals of which the Liberals approved but the Congress under the dominant influence of Tilak and Besant considered disappointing and unsatisfactory\textsuperscript{259}. Finally as far as Tilak’s legacy is concerned, Gandhi certainly borrowed extensively from the Nationalist programme which Lokmanya had done so much to formulate and popularize\textsuperscript{260}.

Thus to conclude, the above account makes it crystal clear that the social and political philosophy of Tilak and Gokhale developed initially from their different responses to the spread of Western ideology over the sub-continent of India in the wake of the consolidation of British rule. While Gokhale was attracted by the humanitarianism and the Liberalism of progressive Western thought, on the other hand, Tilak was initially steeped in the lure of Hinduism than in the Western learning\textsuperscript{261}. So Tilak began to view British rule as a predatory foreign incubus rather than a blessing. Thus India’s most urgent need as Tilak saw it was to expel the foreigners and to restore Hinduism to Hindu rule. The most urgent need of his countrymen as Gokhale saw it was education. In his opinion of human nature, English as well as Indian, Gokhale followed

\textsuperscript{258} Wolpert Stanley: \textit{op. cit.}, 274.

\textsuperscript{259} Ibid., p.287.

\textsuperscript{260} Ibid., p.294.

\textsuperscript{261} Ibid., p.296.
an idealistic and optimistic approach. He believed in the progressive perfectibility of all mankind, through the agencies of education, the accurate dissemination of information and social and material amelioration. In voicing the political demands of his countrymen, he was eminently practical, moderate and invariably constructive. The leadership he offered to India was of evolutionary inclination. He was the moat rather than bridge between his world and that of the West262. On the other hand, in one sense, Tilak’s life may be seen as a protracted and loosing battle against the machinery of British justice263.

Well, the very sense of British justice is quite amusing, because of the fact that throughout their so-called glorious rule, the British put their paramount interests on the top, while framing any administrative policy or taking any welfare activity in India.

In his another work entitled _Morley and India_, Stanley Wolpert states that according to Morley, the surging tide of Nationalism swept over Britain in 1906, ushered in an era of change for India as well as a change so fundamental and pervasive that within half a decade the pattern was set for one of the most momentous historical transitions of modern times: the transformation of Britain’s Indian empire into the nation states of India and Pakistan. This era was identified with one of the revolutionary discontents as well as reforms, and for the Indian National Congress it marked the open split between Gokhale’s moderate conventionists and Tilak’s extreme new party264.

During the five years in office, Morley wrested relentlessly with the insoluble problem of trying to find some equitable

262 Wolpert, Stanley:op. cit.. p.300.

263 Ibid., p.303.

formula through which British democracy could continue to rule its largest
democracy. Throughout this half decade of change, Morley played a
unique role in the articulation and formulation of the reforms for which it
is the most famous. There is no denial of the fact that as an old
fashioned Gladstonian, Morley believed in the enduring virtues of peace,
retrenchment and reforms. However, Wolpert further states that the
reforms for which this half decade deserves to be best remembered were
constitutional innovations of fundamental and far reaching significance.

If anyone deserves to share credit with Morley for
initiating the reform scheme, than according to Wolpert, it is Gokhale
rather than Minto, although Gokhale’s role was of course advisory.
Analysing Morley’s contribution further, the writer states that he was the
leading architect of India’s political future, whose reforming zeal and
political shrewdness blazed the constitutional trail, Montague fearlessly
followed and without whose preliminary labors and victories in principle,
the long strides to responsible rule taken in 1919 and 1935 would hardly
has been possible. Morley in an essay entitled, British Democracy
described his act as a prudently guarded expansion of popular government
in India.

265 Wolpert, Stanley, op. cit., p.3.
266 Ibid., p.75.
267 Ibid., P.120.
268 Ibid., p.132.
269 Ibid., p.166.
270 Ibid., p.161.
Despite solemnly reiterated promises of equality of racial opportunity in recruitment for government services and of equal justice for all in India, White supremacy and racial discrimination remained the actual policy of the Raj, at Whitehall as well as in India, until the down of the Liberal era. Out of all the Indian problems, Hindu-Muslim communal conflict has been the thorniest, most deep rooted social problem of recent Indian history. Despite Nine centuries of co-existence on Indian soil, Islam and Hinduism never resolved their intrinsic tensions. Prior to 1906, however, there was no political communalism as such.

It was perhaps because of his long and intimate association with political affairs that Morley well understood the fact that the political reforms alone would not suffice to transform and modernize Indian society. Wolpert is however doubtful on the issue that like the decentralization, Morley’s educational reforms would hardly mature, bearing little fruit of his achievement by the end of his era. Yet thanks to his farsightedness and interest, institutions were created both in India and England, designed to bridge the growing gulf of misunderstanding and distrust between the Englishmen and Indians. Thus to conclude, for all the beneficial reforms he introduced to India, and for all the bloodshed and tragedy he may have averted both within and beyond its frontiers, Morley’s capitulation to the separate communal demand of the Muslims, only helped to intensify communal tension and conflict, while his failure to sponsor economic reforms did nothing to alleviate Indian poverty.

272 Ibid., p.185.
273 Ibid., p.208.
275 Ibid., p.236.
Praising the early Nationalists, McLane in his work entitled, *Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress*, states that the Indian National Congress in its first two decades had distinguished itself by bringing together Nationalists from all regions of India and by concentrating solely on those demands for reforms about which the majority of the English speaking Nationalists could agree. That the very survival of the Congress in a society of loose shifting alliances had been a substantial achievement. According to McLane, effective Nationalist leadership requires inspiring examples of how the interests of the nation may be placed above those of self. Surprisingly, the writer contradicts his own statement by criticizing the Congress and that it did not provide that kind of leadership. That only an occasional Congress leader subordinated his career and income to national purposes in a way which involved sacrifice or suffering. That on the whole, in all the twenty years in which the same group of men ran the Congress, its aim and tactics had changed insignificantly.

Defining the Congress relationship with the Muslim community, McLane states that although the Muslim apprehensions had been great enough to keep most of the Muslims out of the Congress, yet not so strong that Muslims formed an anti-Congress organisation of consequence during the first twenty years of the Congress. Muslims of Bengal, contrary to the prevailing current, resented efforts to reverse


277 Ibid., p.360.

278 Ibid., p.361.

279 Ibid., p.362.
Bengal partition and to stop them from buying foreign goods. So the Muslim community began to organise themselves in Bengal and elsewhere in order to protect the Muslim interests from the revivalists, predominantly the Hindu Nationalist Movement. That Muslims in Bengal grew more aggressive in demonstrating their support for partition after the Simla Delegation and the founding of the Muslim-League. With some of the vital developments such as the Movement for Swadeshi, Boycott and National education had spread throughout India in 1905, 1906 and 1907, and as extremists experimented with new form of political activity, the simmering conflict with the moderates and the extremists for the control of the Congress came to head.

Thus to conclude, there is no denying of the fact that although the Nineteenth century reformers deviced different methods and were also separated by time, they showed a remarkable unity of perspective and objectives. They are credited with giving a vision of prosperous modern India and subsequently, this vision got incorporated in the Indian National Movement. McLane could not however explain the rise of extremist faction in the early Congress which was indeed the result of a total reversal of the moderate approach of petitioning and praying to the Raj for concessions as well as a virtual rejection of their political programme.

Washbrook in his work entitled, The Emergence of Provincial Politics, The Madras Presidency; 1870-1920 primarily focuses his attention on the socio-political developments which became responsible for a gradual substitution of village level politics with that of national level.

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280 McLane, John R.: op. cit., p.363.
281 Ibid., p.364.
282 Ibid., p.366.
That the locality as a political notion was in decay, the province and the
nation were beginning to have a political meaning in much wider circles. It
is commendable to note that the success in bringing the base of political
awareness among the urbanites was despite the fact that the bulk of the
industrial bourgeoisie of Bombay and Gujrat and the professional trading
class in Bengal showed a lukewarm attitude towards the programmes of
the early Nationalists, i.e. the Swadeshi Movement. Washbrook thus
rightly recognises the emergence of national level politics involving the
people from different regions of India.

The major concern of this work is on the changing
political system of South India between 1870 and 1920. According to
Washbrook, it was the British government that prepared the ground for
the dissatisfaction of the people of Madras with the British government. It
was the lack of co-ordination and control between the levels of
government in Madras that caused this dissatisfaction. In addition to that,
there existed all the possibilities everywhere for the officials to practice
their private and discretionary government powers, regardless of the
orders of their superiors and of policy emanating from London, Calcutta
and even from Fort St. George.

Washbrook in a impartial approach rightly points out
that only a few collectors achieved Carole’s depth (efficient and important
British collectors) of local interest, but most of the collectors used their
vast resources and patronage and their influence to push forward the
careers of proteges and to aid temporarily, favoured social groups.
Stephen Henningham expresses similar kind of feelings when he says that
in Northern India in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries, several
great landed estates played a crucial part support of social and economic


284 Ibid., p.29.

285 Ibid., p.31.
order. A great difference in size and influence prevailed between the Raj Darbhanga and the mass of small estates of Bihar. That the large share of modern revenues which the government of India sucked off was instrumental less in drawing attention itself than in turning it back towards St. George’s administration. Making a seething attack on the British officials, Washbrook resents that the lower levels of the revenue department were riddled with bribery and corruption. Stephen Henningham verifies this fact by saying that even in Northern India, inefficiency and corruption and the disruptive activities of the village elite are mentioned frequently in the records of Raj Darbhanga.

Thus to conclude, the seed-bed of the most of India’s contemporary problems was prepared and developed during the British-Indian government as is clear from the expression of Washbrook. Therefore the British can not shirk this responsibility.

The main focus of Irschik’s work entitled, Politics and Social Conflict in South India: The Non-Brahman Movement and Tamil Separation, 1916-1929, is on the Brahman and Non-Brahman rivalry in South India in which the British sought to manage the Nationalist expression in modern India by encouraging regionalist feelings. Analysing this issue, he states that when the Justice Party was formed in late 1916, anti-Brahman sentiment was not a new phenomenon in Madras. Prior to that in 1880's and to even greater extent in the 1890's Non-Brahmans in many different capacities voiced their concern about the growing number of Brahmans in the public services, in the Indian National Congress and on the district boards, and about Brahmans in general as the dominant group in the religious and the social life of South India. In 1896, there were not sufficient non-Brahmans in the higher ranks of the government services to

287 Washbrook, D. A.; op. cit. , p.25.
support non-Brahman demands, where as by 1913, non-Brahmans' leaders could count on the backing of several important non-Brahmans in the government. In 1916-17, the Justice Party was able to develop a leadership and following that would have been impossible twenty years earlier.

According to Irschik, as far as the attitude of the I.C.S. and other members of the British bureaucracy in Madras was concerned, they were hostile to Brahman politicians and what they represented in 1869. That is proved when twenty years later, Mrs. Besant's Home Rule League Movement, with its Brahman support, seemed a much more alarming menace to the British Raj, coming as it did after some years of participation in the Swadeshi and terrorist agitations in Madras and elsewhere.

Government support to the anti-national or backward class movements in India has occurred in many contexts. Irschik points out that in granting assistance to the Justice Party, the British administration was probably seeking to do several things. First of all, the British seriously wanted to redress the social imbalance in Madras. According to principles of British justice, the Brahmans possessed far too much social and religious control over the non-Brahmans caste Hindus and the untouchables. Secondly, the British were still worried about saving the government services from complete domination by the Brahmans. Thus by encouraging the self-awareness of the non-Brahmans, the British could

290 Ibid., p.351.
291 Ibid., p.353.
help to popularize the need for a continued British connections with India, and in so doing, maintain the stability of the British position. All these motives in different ways played a part in shaping the British administration's reaction to non-Brahman demands. Thus one can easily make out from the above account that maintaining the British hegemony meant keeping the country divided.292

It is often assumed that the only effort of the non-Brahmans to power in Tamil Nad was to force the Tamil Brahmans out into the cold, driving them away from the professional life of Madras and cutting them off from the sources of power at both provincial and national levels. This hostility also forced Brahmans to rechannel their energies and interests into other areas of employment.293 One of the important areas in which the Brahmans' provincial role was altered was in the Tamil Nad Congress organisation. So when India attained independence, non-Brahmans were in control in most of the Congress leadership in the area.294

Thus to conclude, Tamil separatism, came to represent a distinct threat to Indian unity before and after the independence. Claims for a separate South Indian political entity have usually been expressed in terms of validity of Tamils and their culture as opposed to North Indian Sanskritic culture. Finally, Tamil separatist feeling and social conflict has perhaps brought about the decay of many traditional values; but it has also made Tamils more aware of their part in a developing India.295

292 Irschik, Eugene F.; op. cit., p.354.
293 Ibid., p.355.
295 Ibid., p.357.
The main concentration of D.A. Low's work entitled, Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle, 1917-1947, is on the peasants' movements in Gujrat which demonstrated that their real allies were not the British officials whose policies had helped them so much in the Nineteenth century, but the bourgeois Congressmen who were prepared to languish in gaol for peasants' rights for years. The second main focus is on army, which he says was the ultimate bulwark of the Raj and which the British always exercised\textsuperscript{296}. Except the fact that in the wake of Jallianwallah Bagh massacre in 1919, the British became reluctant to use the army to suppress the Nationalists' agitations and particularly reluctant to impose Martial law on a widespread scale\textsuperscript{297}. Gradually, a Nationalist sentiment was generated against the British rule because in many respects, it was a self-regarding autocracy which displayed crude racist attitudes, a strong propensity to distort India's economic circumstances for its own imperial ends and an unwarranted assurance in the efficacy of British remedies for India's ills\textsuperscript{298}.

According to Low, the peasant Nationalists of Gujrat (Patidars) were among the most dedicated of Gandhi's supporters. On several occasions they refused to pay their land revenue on the advice of the Congress leaders and often suffered great hardships as a result\textsuperscript{299}. There is a good example of the circumstances which led to a strong base of Gandhi's mass support. In 1899-1900, the local authorities in Kheda wanted to give generous suspensions of revenue, but the Bombay government callously ordered that the farmers should pay from their


\textsuperscript{297} Ibid., p.4.

\textsuperscript{298} Ibid., p.10.

\textsuperscript{299} Ibid., p.47.
savings. According to Irschik, British expectations about the taxes they could expect from the Jagirs were a rust of their historical experience.

However as there was no improvement in the conditions of agriculture and the fate of the peasantry, so in the years after 1900, a feeling grew among the lesser patidars that a golden age had been lost. Their anticipation of a smoother advance towards prosperity and caste purity had been shattered. Finally, to alleviate their bitterness, they turned to Gandhi. In due course as Gandhi became the leader of the Congress, an alliance was forged between the bourgeois Congressmen and the dominant peasants, which has been the cement of the Indian nation. It is noteworthy to say that in the period between 1900 to 1935, the chief material demand of the patidars was that land revenue should be decreased and Congress in due course supported this demand.

The first point in accounting for Gandhi's success in mobilising popular support in Bombay, according to D.A. Low, was the economic distress arising out of the War. Although the various classes and communities of Bombay that formed the part of the Nationalist alliance behind Gandhi, differed markedly in their response to the different phases of Non-cooperation that were introduced in the city of Bombay. But the strength of political and communal opinion behind Gandhi convinced the Viceroy Lord Irwin, of the need for a conciliatory gesture to appease Nationalist sentiment in the country. It was owing to the fact that the

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300 Low, D. A. op. cit., p.56.
303 Ibid., p.72.
304 Ibid., p.90.
305 Ibid., p.96.
frequency with which such massive demonstrations were organised by the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee around the fears in Congress circles, that the government of Bombay stood in danger of crumbling under the assault of Civil-Disobedience\textsuperscript{306}. Moreover the middle-class of Bombay which extended their support to Gandhi in 1930, constituted a powerful base for the Nationalist Movement in the city. The support of such classes, as the future was to demonstrate persuaded the British government of the respectability of the Congress. Yet the establishment of the relationship of 'Confidence' between the British government and the Congress, at the cost of alienating powerful classes and communities for the national cause was a consummation pregnant with disaster\textsuperscript{307}.

Thus to conclude, Low paints a true picture of the conditions of the Patidars in Maharashtra. It was because of the British oppressive policies that they lost faith in the sincerity of the government and turned towards Gandhian methods in order to protect their interests. In due course, they became a part of the struggle for the emancipation of the country from the British yoke. On the other hand, the British rulers in India sought to split the Nationalist ranks with a view to create a working entente with its less vehement sections\textsuperscript{308}.

Brian Stoddard in his work entitled, Congress and the Raj: The Structure of the Congress Politics in Coastal Andhra, 1925-37, brings out the idea that with the framework of modern Indian Nationalism, there were variations of political style and agitational politics both between

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\item[\textsuperscript{306}] Low, D. A., \textit{op. cit.}, p.101.
\item[\textsuperscript{307}] Ibid., p.105.
\item[\textsuperscript{308}] Ibid., p.25.
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and within British Indian provinces. For example, through the intermediaries, the coastal communities had been involved in considerable political activity. In practical terms a network of political associations had been established. In the intense constitutional activity, which ensued, this organisational expertise proved invaluable for Congress in Coastal Andhra. It is intermediaries which were responsible for translating community oriented expectations into nation oriented terms. Citing an example, Stoddard says that the Civil-Disobedience Movement of 1930, won most of the support amongst the locally pre-dominant landed groups which sympathised with the land revenue agitations, were most affected by the pressures bearing upon coastal society: falling grain prices, rising debt and the inheritance of the fragmented holidays as population level rose in the coastal districts.

Johannes H. Voigt in his article entitled, Cooperation or Confrontation? War and Congress Politics, 1939-42 analyses that the deteriorating international relations in the Thirties - the breakdown of trade between the nations and collapse of the international security system could not but influence the atmosphere of British-Indian


310 Stoddard, Brian :op cit., p.125.

311 Ibid., p.126.

312 Ibid., p.121.
relations. Consequently, confronted with aggressive powers, determined to erect new empires, Britain was forced to revise his imperial policy.

Analysing Indian National Movement, Voigt states that there were various reasons why the outbreak and early stages of War did not produce political concessions to enlist India's co-operation. Firstly, the former indifference of Congress party towards defence combined with Gandhi's adherence to Non-violence had fostered a sense of distrust. Secondly, even if an agreement on co-operation with the Congress under Nehru's leadership could have been reached, there would still have remained threats of a challenge from the 'Rights' by Gandhi and from the 'Left' by Bose. Thirdly, the administrative machinery in the provinces, functioning under section 93 of the government of India Act of 1935, came to be thought of as more efficient than the democratic system of responsible Congress government.

Lastly, accusing the British government, Voigt remarks that during the War, Indian opposition could be crushed by the overwhelming military force available in India. That is why the repressive measures of the Raj lost it much of the support it had hitherto commanded.

R.J. Moore in his article entitled, The Problem of Freedom with Unity: London's Indian Policy, 1917-1947 describes that the consequence of Britain's unwillingness or inability to transfer central authority earlier was due to the fact that the main Indian parties

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314 Voigt, Johannes H. in D.A. Low (ed.) op. cit. ; P.352.

315 Ibid., 369.
confronted the problem of governing the old united empire they could not agree on a solution. The failure of the Simla Conference was widely commented upon by British press on 6th July, 1945. Most papers agreed in placing the main responsibility on Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim-League for the breakdown, but on all sides the view was expressed that this setback would not affect the British determination to secure a satisfactory settlement.

The Price of freedom was Partition. This Partition was the result of the persistent efforts of the Muslim-League from 1940 onwards to obtain a separate homeland for the Muslims. British authorities in fact used the communal card in their moves to counter the National Movement which was growing from strength to strength. Because of this credibility to Pakistan, the League began to be recognised as a sole representative of the Muslims and this credibility gave the League the power to veto progress in political settlements. Even when their own interests inclined them towards remaining behind a united India, they proved incapable of standing up to Jinnah and tamely surrendered to the blackmail of Direct Action.

On the British part, the advantages of the empire acted as a powerful break on London's initiative. Because as long as India was a major area of trade and investment, a large contributor to the cost of imperial defence; and a fair field for the employment of British civil and military officers, the policy of gradual devolution was bound to seem a rationalization of self-interest.

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318 Moore, R. J. in D.A. Low (edited) : op. cit., P.399.
The main focus of Manor's article entitled *Gandhian Politics and the Challenge to the Princely Authority in Mysore, 1936-47*, is obviously, as the title suggests, on the princely state of Mysore. The writer states that once the Congress was installed in power, the organisational strength it had developed in the pre-independence period enabled the party to dominate the entire political scene in Mysore. In the pre-independence era, the reluctance of Mysore Congressmen to participate in the Quit India Struggle indicates that this preoccupation had caused them to lose sight of the importance and indeed the necessity of integrating their challenge from within Mysore with the larger challenge to the Raj.

One vital aspect of the activities of the Indian National Congress in the princely states is that the history of the Freedom Struggle in the Indian princely states shows that its policy was constantly changing in keeping with the situation in the country as a whole. Gradually, as the Movement gained its strength, the Congress was able to take clearer and bolder stand and by 1942, no distinction was maintained between the Movement in princely India and the British India.

According to Manor, during the decade after 1947, Congress leaders used the spoils of office to draw members of the dominant landed groups at the village level into close alliances with them. Though this view of Manor seems to be unbelievable, but even if it is supposed to be true than there is no harm in freedom fighters taking over the government and sharing the power with any Indian in the best interests of the country.

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320 Ibid., P. 405.
Describing the political conditions of Tamil Nad, David Arnold in his article entitled, The politics of Coalescence : The Congress in Tamil Nad, 1930-1937, states that the struggle for power in Madras Presidency was a three cornered contest. For example, at times, during the time of Dyarchy constitution (1920-37), the Congress and the Raj met in direct confrontation; more often the Congress was locked in conflict with the Justice Party, its provincial rival. The character of the Congress in Madras, was therefore formed by battling against an Indian opponent as much as by skirmishing with the Raj. So in order to defeat the Justice Party, the Congress had to create a party organisation broad enough in its social and political composition to outflank the Justicites. The defeat of the Justice Party however, did not open the way for a confrontation between the Congress and the Raj. Each successive setback for the Justice Party brought the Congress and the Madras government closure together, for both had interest in successful working of the reforms and an orderly transfer of power.

Thus to conclude, Congress thwarted from taking office might fall into the hands of Left Wing, a Congress in office would be a domesticated animal harnessed to the constitutional cart of which the British still held the reigns. It is also true that the outlook of the Justice Party was confined to a particular region, i.e. Madras presidency and that too for a particular community, but the Congress on the other hand, stood for a greater cause, i.e. the welfare of the whole of Indian community and lastly, the British-Indian government always stood for their vested interests in dealing with the Indian situation.

Max Harcourt In his article entitled, Kisan Population and Revolution in Rural India: The 1942 Disturbances in Bihar and East

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322 Ibid., p.260.
United Provinces, Max Harcourt states that in 1942, a major peasant rebellion broke out in most of the North-Central Bihar and the Banaras division of U.P. This rebellion resembled in scale, the peasant uprisings that transpired in the same region in 1857. As such it represented the culmination of a great upsurge in peasant populism in the Twentieth century, a political phenomenon that contributed much to the emergence of Nationalism in the area after 1917, but which had co-existed uneasily with the local Congress machines since the 1937 elections. That the relationship between the official Congress party organisation and the Kisans was very ambivalent. That the Congress leaders found them useful in periods of agitation or Civil-Disobedience when it was necessary to establish the party’s claim to mass support through processions and demonstrations. But even in times of agitation, the party leadership saw them as dangerous allies. According to Harcourt, the point of separation came when Russia entered the War, the Communist element within the Congress left and finally parted company with the main body, proclaiming the War now to be a People’s War and urging support for the government’s War efforts. This was the culmination of the organisational and ideological rivalry between communists and the original Congress societies which dated back to 1939.

Gyanendra Pandey in his article entitled, Rural Base of the Congress: The United Provinces, 1920-1940, highlights the importance of peasants during the Freedom Struggle. He further states that in early 1920’s, Congress leaders had acknowledged that the peasants must form the bulwark of the National Movement. In 1930, they were fully

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323 Harcourt, Max.: Kisan populism and revolution in rural India; the 1942 disturbances in Bihar and Eastern united provinces, in D.A. Low(ed), op. cit., ; P. 315.
324 Ibid., P. 328.
325 Ibid., P. 335.
aware of the fact that the success of the Civil-Disobedience Movement in U.P. was dependent upon peasant support. However, the hesitant approach of the Congress to peasant problems was not a transitory phenomenon. It was a product of leadership's understanding of the nature of the National Movement, ever since 1920, as a Movement representing all sections of Indian society equally. One of the important reasons of this unclear and hesitant policy was the clear composition of the party leadership and cadres.

Gyanendra Pandey further suggests that the small Zamindars and the upper-tenentry, provided the most important organisational men of the Congress in the district and tehsil, throughout the 1920's and 1930's. In the 1920's and 1930's, lack of study and consequent lack of clarity in Congress outlook was quite evident. In addition to that, it was also evident that the Congress spoke, as far as the rural areas were concerned, mainly for the classes below the big landlords and above the landless labourers. In the same fashion, Macdonald argued that in the beginning of the Twentieth century, Bihar was becoming a land of small landlords. Drawn mainly from the high caste Bhumihars, Brahmins and Rajputs, these small landlords along with well off tenants drawn from the same castes, dominated life at village level. Regarding the weakness of the Congress, Macdonald points out that although it had succeeded in capturing power in 1937 in Bihar, yet the moment of victory

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327 Ibid., P. 213.
328 Harcourt, Max : op. cit., P. 214.
329 Ibid., P. 218.
had also been a movement of disintegration, for the acceptance of office
had unleashed forces within the Bihar Congress which seriously weakened
it as a multi-interest party.\footnote{331} Robin Jeffrey in his article entitled, \textit{A Sanctified
Level-Congress in Travancore Politics, 1938-48}, analyses that there had
been attempts in the 1920's and 1930's to build an effective branch of the
Indian National Congress in Travancore; but the teachings of the Gandhian
Congress so cut across the communal issues which were the lifeblood of
Travancore politics that young and idealistic Travancoreans had to leave
the state in order to take part in Gandhi's campaign.\footnote{332} Religiously
speaking, Travancore was a staunchly theocratic state and its brand of
Hinduism had the most rigid and refined concepts of caste and ritual
pollution in India.\footnote{333} The turning point came when the imposition of
British suzerainty from the beginning of the Nineteenth century brought an
end to the cruelest punishment of low caste and gradually, the low caste
men acquired Western style of education from the 1860's, they began to
chip away from the religious law that banned them from roads, schools,
office-buildings, government services and temples.\footnote{334}

According to Jeffrey, in Travancore in those years it was difficult to be
both a Gandhian Nationalist and a politician with a following.\footnote{335} Although
during the War years, the state Congress attempted to conduct the
constructive programme of the Indian National Congress, yet it was the
Communist Party which succeeded in building a grass root level

\footnote{331}{Macdonald, G. \textit{op. cit.}, p.311.}
\footnote{332}{Jeffrey, Robin : \textit{A sanctified level-Congress in Travancore politics 1938- 48,}
in D.A. Low(ed), \textit{op. cit.}., P. 437.}
\footnote{333}{\textit{Ibid.}, p.437.}
\footnote{334}{\textit{Ibid.}, p.439.}
\footnote{335}{\textit{Ibid.}, p.447.}
organisation across caste lines during the War. Nevertheless, the state Congress still had its strength. Because it could rely on the personal followings and local influence of its leaders and this was often considerable.336

Lance Brennan's article entitled, From One Raj to Another: Congress Politics in Rohilkhand, focuses on the links between the village and the district arenas and on the influence of Gandhi and Nehru on both district and provincial arenas. The main concern of this work is on the development of the connections between the Congress leaders in the district of Rohilkhand and their provincial leaders in Lucknow and their influence, this development had upon the nature of the post-Independent Indian National Congress337. According to Brennan, it was during the electorate campaign of 1937, that the Congress recruited a large number of educated youngmen in Rohilkhand. These youngmen of whom some were the sons of Zamindars or of traders with strong links with rural castes, carried the Congress message into the villages at time when both, the small Zamindars as well as tenants were hard pressed by the Depression and receptive to the call for reduction in land revenue and rents338. That the problems of such urban Congressmen who previously had led the Congress Movement in Rohilkhand added a further dimension to the factional conflict. Consequently, they were under increasing pressure, not only because they did not have the numerical support of their rural based rivals but also because the policies of the Congress government did not always suit the interests of their traditional supporters339.

336 Jeffrey, Robin op. cit., p.457.
337 Brennan, Lance : From one Raj to Another : Congress Politics in Rohilkhand, in D. A. Low(ed) op. cit.,: P.477.
338 Ibid., P.477.
339 Ibid., p.483.
In the end, Brennan points out that the bitter factional conflict within the Congress marked the period of 1946-50, as submerged antagonisms surfaced at a time when politicians found that they were competing in a new administrative system for a much wider range of resources\textsuperscript{340}.

D.E.U. Baker in his article entitled, \textit{The Changing Leadership of the Congress in the Central Provinces and Berar, 1919-39}, says that this change had its basis in the differing conditions, of social and economic life in the Hindi and Marathi regions\textsuperscript{341}. Baker adds that the Hindi politicians had several advantages over Marathi politicians which enabled them to ensure leadership of the Congress. One such advantage was the organisation of the Congress itself. The Hindi region had an even greater advantage over the Marathi region in the allocation of Hindu seats which were the focus of the electoral activities of the Congress\textsuperscript{342}.

Thus to conclude, this whole chapter clarifies a number of British perceptions of the Indian Nationalism with many contradictions. For example, on the one hand, J.H. Broomfield explains the Patron-Client relationship in the Indian Freedom Movement, on the other hand, Stanley Wolepert thinks that more and more middle-class Indians right from the last quarter of the Nineteenth century began to believe that the system which was applied by the British-Indian government, remained unresponsive and hostile to many basic Indian needs, aspirations and desires. It was cold, imperious, paternal and foreign. Showing his brilliance, D.A. Washbrook rightly states that the seed-bed of contemporary Indian problems of today was prepared and developed by

\textsuperscript{340} Brennan, Lance \textit{op. cit.}, p.494.


\textsuperscript{342} \textit{Ibid.}, p.226.
the same alien government. Likewise, Thomas R. Metcalf opines that as various Indian communities contested for power, the British-Indian government began openly to manipulate these communal loyalties for its own advantages. In the end, R.J. Moore rightly observes that the Partition of India was the outcome of the persistent efforts of the Muslim-League from 1940 onwards to obtain separate homeland for the Muslims, yet his explanation in no way justifies the Two Nation Theory as propounded by the Cambridge School of historians.