CHAPTER IV
TRADE IN COCHIN UNDER THE PORTUGUESE: 1500-1570

With the arrival of the Portuguese, the trade in Cochin assumed new proportions and direction. Replacing its commercial rival, Calicut, Cochin had come to the central stage to play the dominant economic role in the Indian Ocean world. The transformation experienced in its trading activities could be studied under four categories: viz., 1. Local trade, 2. Inter-local trade, 3. Intra-Asian trade and 4. Indo-European trade. The local trade catered more to the urban needs, which augmented with the widening of the city boundaries. The inter-local trade centered in Cochin aimed at accruing profit not only by supplying what the city and the Estado da India\(^1\) required, but also by the exchange of commodities in the adjacent regions. The Portuguese participated in the intra-Asian trade both directly, by way of direct investment and indirectly, by way of controlling the movements of the native ships and merchants. Though in the country trade, the crown also participated to a certain extent, most of the transactions were done by licenced traders and illicit profit-makers. However the Portuguese crown gave the highest priority to the Indo-European trade. The grafting of the urban unit of Portuguese Cochin on to the native city and port, and its establishment as the commercial capital of the Estado da India was to integrate the various
spice-growing regions of the Indian Ocean with Lisbon, the Metropole. This chapter deals with these four strands of trading activities in Cochin during the period up to 1570 when king Sebastian of Portugal officially renounced the royal spice monopoly.²

Part - I

ASIAN TRADE

1. Local Trade

With the expansion of the city of Cochin and the increase in the number of city dwellers, the needs and demands for more and more commodities increased simultaneously. Both in Portuguese Cochin and in its native counterpart, various merchants began to put up shops to exploit the opportunities offered by local trade. Right from the early days of Portuguese settlement, Afonso de Albuquerque encouraged the *casados*³ to conduct the local trade and to start shops as bakers, shoemakers, tavern-keepers, and tailors.⁴ Rice and other food materials imported to the city formed the major commodity of transaction. Since rice was very scarce in this area, about 40,000 *candis* of rice were brought every year to Cochin. In order to avoid its hoarding and diversion to places where it could be sold at a higher price, the Municipality took up the responsibility of conducting rice-trade in Cochin through retail shops.⁵ The *bazaar* situated near the *pezo da pimenta*, the *Rua de Sa Domingos* and *Sapateiros* situated near the Dominican monastery, *Rua Direita* situated near the important institutions like the *Misericordia*, Bishop’s House, Municipal council and the cathedral.
church, *Rua de Coul* situated near St. Sebastian’s church, *Rua de Seda* situated near *Rua de Coulo, Rua dagoadolupe* situated near the Goadalupe were the important centres of local trade. The most thriving among them was *Rua Direita* because of its proximity to the principal urban institutions. The wealthy merchants established their business houses in this area. The new christians who came to Cochin from Portugal by 1530s were attracted by this mercantile pocket. Jacome de Olivares, who came in 1540 from Setubal (in Portugal), put up commercial centre in *Rua Direita* and began to sell pitch, porcelain as well as *pau-da-China*. Manuel Rodrigues, another new christian of the city, established a business house near this road to sell silk, clothes, carpets and other commodities. He used to sell velvets and silk to the monks of the Dominican order of Cochin. Leonor Caldeira also developed her commercial establishments by this principal street of Cochin. She was assisted by her daughter Clara and a black female slave in her business, which dealt with, “all varities of commodities” Simao* Nunes, the son of Leonor Caldeira following the family tradition of trade established a commercial centre near the same *Rua Direita* for trading in corals, camphor and other items. He remarked before the inquisitorial court of Lisbon that a Jew of native Cochin called Moisès Real, who was referred to as “the greatest known merchant of India”, had two business centres in Portuguese Cochin: one in *Rua Direita* and the other in the casa do vigario. It shows that the Portuguese as well as non-Portuguese began, by this time, to invest considerably in the local trade. But it also seems that with the imprisonment of the new Christian traders of Cochin in 1557 and with the
establishment of Inquisition in Cochin, the semitic merchants were deprived of opportunities to participate in the local trade of city.¹⁴

Eventually Muslim and Canerese merchants began to invest in this flourishing local trade. They put up shops inside the Portuguese Cochin. The authorities who saw the bulk of profit which these merchants were amassing began to extract from them one pardao by way of taxation.¹⁵ Commodities ranging from the category of necessities of life up to most sophisticated and luxurious goods were transacted in the local trade. Slave trade was equally active and vibrant. Young ones from Srilanka, Africa, Pegu and China were brought to Cochin and sold in to slavery. Most of these slaves were used for domestic work.¹⁶ Some of the natives were purchased in Cochin and were taken to foreign cities to be sold at high prices, as was the case with a certain Constança, a Malayali from Cochin, who was taken by Jácome de Olivares to Malacca for re-sale.¹⁷ With the intensification of the urban growth, the pattern of local trade began to be re-designed in such a way as to incorporate the diverse needs and interests of the consumers in Cochin.

2. Inter-local Trade

Inter-local trade became a necessity as Cochin, for its existence, had to depend on other regions. A good many of the commodities which the city of Cochin requird had to be imported from outside. In the initial phase, the natives played an active role in the inter-local trade. The Marakkars from the Coromandel coast, who had established themselves in Cochin before the
arrival of the Portuguese, were the greatest suppliers of rice and textiles to this city.\textsuperscript{18} This powerful clan had the monopoly of importing Coromandel rice, which was cheaper than the Canara rice,\textsuperscript{19} to Malabar. The family network and partnership that was extended along the rice-belt of the Kavery region enabled the \textit{Marakkars} to take part in the inter-local trade and to make regular supply of food materials to their customers in Cochin and Cannanore.\textsuperscript{20} These \textit{Marakkar} merchants were having not only common trade interest, but also group solidarity and partnership: all were friends and relatives. One of the powerful trades in the Kaveri Delta was the brother of Nine Marakkar, the merchant of Cochin. With the help of these family networks, the \textit{Marakkar} merchants used to bring rice, textiles and other goods from the various ports of Coromandel like Kunjimedu, Kilakarai and Kayalpatanam to Cochin\textsuperscript{21} Mame (Muhammed) Marakkar was the head of all the merchants of Cochin. He had built big ware-house in the native Cochin and stored up the grain (which he brought from the \textit{Coromandel} coast) to make constant supplies according to the needs of the city-dwellers.\textsuperscript{22} In 1503/4, when the Zamorin tried to block rice supply and thus to create an artificial famine in Cochin as a part of war-tactics, Duarte Pacheco made friendship with Mame (Muhammed) Marakkar to ensure regular supply of provisions in the city.\textsuperscript{23} The Marakkar clan continued to be very active in inter-local trade supplying the Cochinites with the necessities of life until the end of the Albuquerque era and until the emergence of \textit{Casados} as private traders of the Cochin, who were looking for every opportunity to replace the former.
Later the dominant role inter-local trade was taken up by the *casados* who supplied Cochin with rice from *Coromandel*, Canara and Bengal. Some of these food commodities seem to have been taken by the Jews back to native Cochin when they returned after selling pepper and sandalwood in the Portuguese city. The advent of the considerable number of new Christians (Jews Converted to Christianity) to the Portuguese city of Cochin from Spain and Portugal in 1530s, gave new dimension to the inter-local trade making it deeply connected with Judaic involvement. Isaac the Red and other Jews residing in the native city began to come to the Portuguese Cochin to take merchandise from the shop of Jacome de Oliveira, which he had brought from Malacca. At the same time, he had shop in native Cochin and in Portuguese city, which enabled him to conduct inter-city trade effectively. By 1540s, Luis Rodrigues, another new Christian merchant made frequent visits to native Cochin, “where lived the great merchants of the land and of transactions”. During these visits, he sold there the commodities which he had taken from Bengal, Ceylon and Malacca and collected wares for his next expedition. Isaac do Cairo, who was a big Jewish merchant of native Cochin and who had commercial links with west Asia, was associated with the new Christian traders of Portuguese city. Leonor Caldeira, who started business establishments in Portuguese Cochin, had a ware-house in native Cochin for storing rice and she used to go over there in connection with her business as well as to collect the money for the goods she had sold. In order to conduct the intra-local trade effectively, as we have already seen some Jews like Moises Real, who had the basis in native Cochin, began to
set up shops in the Portuguese city.\textsuperscript{31} This intra-local trade was not restricted to the native and European portions of settlement. Luis Rodrigues used to take weapons and artilleries to the Jewish traders of native Cochin, who in turn sold them to the native kings and chieftains of the adjacent lands.\textsuperscript{32} Commodities from Portuguese Cochin were taken to the markets of native city, which were further distributed to the neighbouring hinterlands through the network of local merchants. Almost for twenty years from 1530s to 1557 (during the period of flourishing private trade), the common economic interests and religious ties that existed between the Jews and the ex-Jews helped to create a vast network of intra-local trade.\textsuperscript{33} A few Muslim merchants of Cochin, whose position, by this time, had been reduced to that of peddlers and the Ezhava merchants also took part in this trade that extended up to the hinterland.

3. Intra-Asian trade

The trade of Cochin did not confine itself to the regional level; it extended to different parts of Asia. Cochin's link with intra-Asian trade became so important because of its junctional position flow of different varieties streams of commodities like textiles from Gujarat, Coromandel and Bengal, rice from Coromandel, Bengal and Canara, spices from Molucas, Sambatwa, Sunda, Ceylon and Canara, finished products like silk and porcelain etc., from China, European wares like copper, silver and vermellion from Lisbon intersected at Cochin making it an entrepot.\textsuperscript{34} In the processes of distribution, these commodities began to be brought to and exchanged
from Cochin with frequency.

Among the European commodities, copper was the greatest single item that was distributed over Indian Ocean regions by this trade network. Cherina Marakkar of Cochin and the Jews of Cochin used to purchase copper from the Portuguese at fourteen cruzados a quintal.\(^{35}\) It was taken to different parts of Asia for re-sale. In Diu and Cambay copper was in high demand.\(^{36}\)

In 1513 Lourenço Moreno took from Cochin 52459 kgs of copper to Cambay, where he saw a prospective market. He wrote to the king of Portugal for further supply of this metal, which India, in general, lacked.\(^{37}\) Copper was taken from Cochin also to Malacca for bringing back the produces of South East Asia.\(^{38}\) In 1543, we find the demand for copper in Cochin going up and large quantity of copper being transported from Quilon to Cochin.\(^{39}\)

The various spices from the extensive hinterland of Cochin formed another group of commodities that were exchanged in intra-Asian trade. Some of these spices were taken either directly from the hinterland of Cochin or from the port of Cochin where different branches of private trade, fabricated by individual entrepreneurs, ran almost parallel to the Estado arrangement. The crown and the individuals participated in the intra-Asian commerce in varying and disproportionate degrees and the commodities of exchange, very often, followed an intermingled pattern. Non-spice items formed the greatest cargo of this trade in Asia. But contraband items entered the list of merchandise because of royal concessions, licences, voyage-systems and
above all due to the network of private entrepreneurs established in Cochin.

On the basis of the space through which the commercial transactions were conducted, intra-Asian trade could be divided into two: 1. Trade through ghat routes which started from the hinterland of Cochin. 2. Trade through sea which started from the port of Cochin.

a. Intra-Asian Trade Through Land-Route across the Ghats

The land-routes across the ghats were the traditional links for the exchange of commodities of eastern and western coasts. Pack animals were used to carry rice, textiles and other goods of the Coromandel coast to the interior markets of hinterland in Kerala and to take pepper back to Tamilnadu. Kumily pass was the chief route taken by these Tamil merchants to carry merchandise to the interior markets of Turubuli (Thodupuzha), Irattuperha (Vadakkenkur), Thekkenkur, Kizhumalainadu, and Poonjar. The Munnar Pass was another outlet through which the Tamil traders reached Codemangalao (Kothamangalam), an interior market and north-eastern tip of Cochin’s hinterland. Many traders from east coast came to Zalakuti (Chalakudi) through Peringalkuthu for the exchange of pepper with Coromandel rice and textiles. As Aryankavu and Palaghat Passes, the only ghat-routes mentioned by early Indo-Portuguese historians, are located very far away from the spice-hinterlands of Cochin, the above mentioned three routes seem to be major land-outlets for the exchange of eastern and western commodities and for the diversion of spices, as far as Cochin was concerned. The Portuguese documents use the phrase “pela terra dentro” in
order to signify the trade through the ghat-routes.  

In the second decade of the sixteenth century, the total production of pepper of Malabar was about 16,000 bhars. Some 2000-2500 bhars were consumed domestically. 3000 bhars went to inland through the ghat-route. Some 500-600 bhars went to Diu by sea. Out of the remaining portion (9900 bhars), the Portuguese got some and the rest went to Diu, Ormuz, Red sea and Coromandel. This document shows that a very large amount of spices crossed ghat and that inland-trade was as significant as the sea-trade, right from the very beginning of the Portuguese establishment. As the diagram shows, out of the total pepper production in Malabar, 18.8% went through the ghat routes; while 25 per cent was taken through maritime routes for Asian trade. From the remaining, about 40.6 per cent of the total pepper was supposed to be taken to Europe in the early 16th century and 16.6 per cent was used domestically.

*Diagram Showing the Distribution of Pepper*

*Diagram -1*

A. Trade by sea  
B. Domestic consumption  
C. Trade by ghat-routes  
D. European Trade
Three routes could be pointed out for the heavy traffic of spices across the ghat: 1. Relatively higher price was given by these inland merchants. It provided an easy and safe outlet for the smugglers. 2. During the times of conflict of the hinterland with the Portuguese, spices were, instead of being taken to Cochin, diverted to the profitable ghat-routes. As the traders from the eastern coast used to give higher prices for spices in comparison to what the Portuguese paid at Cochin, the producers as well as the merchants preferred the ghat-traders. The king of Cochin remarked in 1516 that he found it difficult to arrange spices at the low rate given by the Portuguese, because much of it was taken to places where it was better paid. This reference to better pricing places must be to the ghat-route. This was further testified by a merchant who stopped the sale of spices to the Portuguese in Cochin. He explained the reason why he began to sell commodities to the traders of ghat-route by saying that these traders paid full and ready cash and purchased commodities at higher price, while the Portuguese paid partly in copper and partly in cash and purchased the goods at the low rate fixed by Vasco da Gama. Another document of 1545 says that the kings of Diamper (Udayamperur), Pimenta (Vadakkenkur), Cranganore, Cochin as well as the Christians of Diamper and Serra had got several opportunities and ways to sell pepper to those who paid a higher price. This gives the impression that the traders from east coast and their agents were collecting spices from almost all the hinterlands of Cochin. Moreover, the Tamil merchants, who used to distribute rice and textiles in these hinterlands of Cochin, took back to Tamilnadu pepper as return cargo. This reduced considerably the transportation cost and enabled these traders to reap large profit.
As the streams of ghat route were outside the Portuguese control systems, many found them to be a safer channel for smuggling pepper for intra-Asian trade. Spices were diverted and smuggled to the ghat right from the very production centres. In 1533, D. Joa* da Cruz refers to the usual route taken by the smugglers. He says that the large amount of pepper was taken from the kingdom of Vadakkenkur (whose king was Chempenecoy) to the great kingdom (of Vijaynagar) touching the lands of Lerta Morte Trbery (Ilêdathu Mûthedathu Tiruvady), Teque Cute Nayre (Thekkenkur king), Cherabacoy (Chirvay Koyil), Yreme Trebery (Rama Tiruvady), Unyque Trebery (Unnikê Tiruvady), and Ylamana Lambratry (Lamgualur Nampiyathiri, the king of Edappilly). It seems that the various routes from these places used to merge either into the ghat-outlet of Kumily or into the interior land-route that ran to Cape Comorin.

The flow of spices to Tamilnadu through the passes of Kumily and Munnar always used to be high, when there were conflicts with the Portuguese in the hinterland. Thus during the days of bitter war (1549-1552) fought in Bardela (Vaduthala) between Cochin as well as the Portuguese on one side and Vadakkenkur, Calicut as well as Tanore on the other side, spices did not reach Cochin to be taken to Portugal; but were diverted to the inland routes. The flow of spices from the hinterland to the ghat-route was so well established during the days of conflict that even after the end of war commodities did not appear in Cochin. So the king of Cochin went from king to king and trader to trader requesting them to make available pepper in Cochin for the Carreiras. Finally the Portuguese decided to resort to
military actions to ensure regular supply of spices from hinterland to the port of Cochin.\textsuperscript{54}

Out of the spices taken across the ghat to Tamilnadu, a significant portion was distributed all over India for domestic consumption. A considerable amount was taken to Bengal and China. But a great amount of this pepper was taken from the ports of Coromandel by the Gujaratis for re-distribution in the ports of Red-sea area.\textsuperscript{55} Thus the ghat route was an alternative arrangement by land for participation in Asian trade and its networks were woven through the loope-holes of the Portuguese control system.

**b. The Intra-Asian Trade by Sea**

The normal route for the intra-Asian trade originating from Cochin was through sea. The native merchant groups were using it for centuries. But with the establishments of the Portuguese rule in Cochin, the trade in Asian waters began to be shared by three different entrepreneurial groups viz., the Crown, the Private Portuguese enterprisers and the native merchants. The entry of the Portuguese into Asian trade created a mixed reaction of co-operation, competition, and conflict among the natives. Some of the enterprising merchants like the Gujaratis, who were engaged in the intra-Asian trade resorted to co-operation and became collaborators of Portuguese country trade.\textsuperscript{56} But a group of Muslim merchants resorted to compete a parallel sea-route touching all important Asian regions; but it ran outside the control systems of the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{57} A good many of the Muslim merchants
of Malabar, who were hit hard by the entry of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean region, were in conflict with the latter and they resorted to piracy as a way of trade in the Asian waters.\textsuperscript{58} It seems that they had side-dealings with the first group, as well.

On the other-hand, the Portuguese citizens of Cochin, who participated in the intra-Asian commerce represented a variety of persons including full-time traders, part-time traders conducting voyages and the officials who were trying to generate extra-income by investing in clandestine commerce.

The third party that participated in the commerce of Asian waters was the Portuguese crown which looked at country trade as an additional source of income. The participation of these three groups in the trade of Asia was realised not with the same degree of intensity and legitimacy. Moreover the commodities taken for the trade within Asia included a variety of items that encroached upon the royal monopoly. So the movement of the wares in Asia was controlled by licences and passes, so that it might not affect adversely the Lisbon-bound carreira. In general, based on its nature, intra-Asian trade could generally be divided into three: 1. Official Country Trade 2. Licenced Country Trade 3. Illicit Country Trade.

\textbf{i. Official Country Trade}

The crown participated in the intra-Asian trade by organising voyages to the eastern space of Indian Ocean, especially to the ports of Bay of Bengal, Archipelago and the Far East. The captains and other officers, of these vessels engaged in the country trade were nominated by the Royal
Chancellery, just like the officers of the fortresses and factories. Thus, for example, in March 1531, D. Joã III granted to one Tristá de Sousa, a fidalgo of the royal household, the captaincy of the trading carrack that goes from Cochin to Malacca, for a period of three years. The officers of the crown ships engaged in country trade, were entitled to have some privileges. They enjoyed, besides the regular salaries for their service, considerable amount of franchises which allowed them to participate in the profits of the enterprise. These could, also, be seen as steps to ensure more private participation in the crown’s official country trade. The opportunity to serve in the ships that took part in the official trade in Asian waters also considered as an honour and a reward for the services. Along with honour, they received a share of the profit, as well. At times they could, with royal ascent, give up the nomination in favour of a relative, or even sell it. Though the officers shared the profit, these commercial endeavours were primarily official as the crown did the investments and made the appointments.

The crown commercial voyages frequently left from Cochin. Thus, for example, Antonio Correia left from Cochin in April 1519 in a crown ship called Santiago Brandoa to the East. He carried along with him 21,500 pieces of Gujarati textiles and cumin from Cochin and took the following route: Cochin-Pasai-Malacca-Pasai-Martaban-Pasai-Malacca-Pasai-Cochin. The wares he carried from Cochin were exchanged for pepper in Pasai. This was again sold in Martaban from where he bought rice and sealing wax which he sold in Malacca. He went on buying and selling at each port and engaged himself in the chain of exchanges till January 1521 when he reached Cochin.
almost after twenty months. The ship of Antonio Correia was accompanied by two other ships, the names of which were Santiago and Santa Barbara, up to Malacca. These two vessels limited their routes to Cochin-Malacca-Cochin. The royal ships going to Malacca for trade used to have a stop-over in Coromandel in 1547 probably for taking different varieties of clothes from there.

The so-called Carreira do Coromandel with destinations to Pulicat and the Carreira de Pegu engaged in Pegu commerce were carriers of the interests of the crown in the intra-Asian trade. On 5th February 1546, Luis Mendes de Vasconcelos was made the captain of the Carreira do Coromandel that used to go to Malacca for trade. Since he went to Diu for its rescue, he was given many additional privileges; But the privilege charter makes it clear that this should, in no way, hinder the official trade. The detailed instructions to Luis Vasconcelos are as follows; he could go to Pulicat to make cargo of textiles and clothes; no other ship should be allowed to load cargos before having loaded the royal vessel; the captain of Malacca could screen the merchants who were going in the crown ship to Coromandel; he could nominate four merchants to this royal ship (to conduct trade to his advantage); but for the commodities they would carry, they should pay freight charges; He could also use some space of the ship to carry rice, for which he was not to pay freight charges; He could also use some space of the ship to carry rice, for which he was not to pay freight charge. However, in some cases the grantees were clearly instructed to make use of the service of the merchants only after loading the official ships engaged in the intra-Asian
trade. Thus, for instance, in 1547 Joã Ó Nunes, who was permitted to take two merchants along with him from Coromandel in his voyage to Martaban, was particularly asked to take the merchants only after having loaded the “ship of the king that was going to Pegu for trade”69 The crown and the grantees of the voyages found it profitable to trade with the ports bordering on the Bay of Bengal like Martaban, Mergui and the “tin ports” of the Malay peninsula. Even in 1550, we find Carreira de Pegu returning to Cochin after completing the annual Pegu voyage.70

ii. Licenced Country Trade

The Portuguese made the country trade a licenced commercial enterprise because of the fact that spices and other items, which were reserved to the royal crown were included in the wares, often taken for exchange within Asia. Despite Lisbon’s statutory ban on private movement of spices, the private enterpreneurs of Cochin prevailed upon the Estado officials to get licences to conduct trade on contraband items in Asian waters. The viceroys and the governors had begun to show favours to some individuals and had started, as early as the beginning of 1520s, to licence limited movement of pepper.72 By the late 1540s the Portuguese officials followed a liberal policy of issuing frequent licences to carry pepper within Asia to conduct commercial exchanges and often under the protection of these licences large amount of pepper was taken from Cochin to Bengal.73 The licences usually stipulated the amount of pepper that could be carried by an individual. In 1545 opinions were sought from ex-officials of India as to
whether this licenced trade should be permitted to continue in Bengal, as it was cheaper than the spices from Aceh and Sunda, sold by native merchants. But he also argued that the flow of pepper to Bengal would make it difficult to get sufficient pepper in Cochin to make cargo for the Lisbon-bound carracks. He and Jorge Cabral (the future governor of Portuguese India). He was also one among those who were consulted) further pointed out that it would also raise the prices of pepper in Cochin and would be detrimental to the European trade. But out of this polemic nothing came out and the licence system continued. The crown’s tacit approval to it encouraged the private enterprises and spices continued to be taken in large amount along with other commodities to different regions of Asia making the Portuguese authoritites, as Braudel says, mere “customs officials” or “tax-gathers”. This system continued for almost 50 years till the 1570s when legislations were again made with vigour to ban explicitly. The licenced trade could be divided into four: 1. The trade of the Casados 2. Trade by Voyages 3. Trade in ships with cartazes 4. Trade through contracts.

A. The Trade of the Casados

The Casados (family-men especially the Portuguese citizens married to native women) of Cochin enjoyed special freedom to conduct commerce by virtue of their Portuguese origin and marital status. It was a social group continuously increasing in number and economic power and consequently extending their influence both politically and commercially for setting up an empire of their own interests. They seemed to have exercised full freedom
to conduct trade with all Asian regions and on all commodities except the items reserved to royal monopoly. But they were also often seen as engaged in the trade of pepper, cloves and other spices all over Asia, which they carried on in most cases, with due permissions and viceregal licences. The maritime space between coastal India and South East Asia had been the active area of their commerce. They even had trade with the Red sea ports; but it was relatively minor, as the commerce from Malabar was dominated by shipping from Calicut and Cannanore.

As early as 1510s, Affonso de Albuquerque, the protagonist policy of mixed marriage, encouraged the Portuguese who married the native women to take up local-trade as a means of their livelihood. The taste of profit generated by this trade induced in them desire to participate in wider commercial network. Eventually the Portuguese with private interests got organised into a lobbying group, known as “the Cochin group”, with a view to staging organised opposition to the state of intervention, which Albuquerque had implemented by an elaborate system of fortresses. This move launched with the help of the king of Cochin was purely economic and was designed to get a liberal atmosphere, where the trade within Asia would be made over to the private parties. The nomination of Lopo Soares de Albergaria, who was a representative of the Cochin group, as the successor to Affonso de Albuquerque in 1515 was a victory to the private enterprisers. This new governor demarcated for them a space east of Cape Comorin which was relatively free of state interference.
The new situation favoured the private initiatives of the *casados*. With the voyage of Fernã Peres de Andrade, who was appointed in 1515 as the "captain for discovering the Bay of Bengal and China"\(^8\), Bengal and other eastern parts of Indian Ocean, along with Malacca, entered into the commercial geography of the Portuguese. Pepper and other commodities were taken from Cochin to Bengal and other ports of the Gangetic delta in exchange for sugar, rice and textiles.\(^8\) In 1518, D. Joã da Silveira sailed from Cochin to Bengal to explore the further commercial prospects of Gangetic delta.\(^8\) In 1522-23, Diogo Pereira, who was greatly associated with the private trade of Cochin, was moving about in Bengal and Pegu trying to open the doors for the commerce of pepper from Cochin and procuring wares in exchange.\(^8\) Along with various usual wares of exchange the *casados* used to take pepper and other contraband item, but often with permission. Diogo Pereira, on another occasion, took from Cochin pepper along with copper and silk to Cambay and Chaul and on sale he got 16,000 *pardaos* in gold.\(^8\) In return diverse types of cloths, indigo, sealing wax and gold were taken to Cochin.\(^8\) The white clothes of Cambay were in high demand for exchange for pepper, timber, areca and other spices.\(^9\) Some of this rice was again taken to Maldives in exchange for coir and cowries. Thus in the letter of the town of Cochin to D. Joã de Castro, mention is made that the main source of living for the citizens of Cochin was navigation and that they were sending for years to the islands of Maldives rice in exchange for coir and cowries.\(^9\) These cowries were again taken to Bengal, Pegu and China, where they were used as a monetary medium.\(^9\)
The *casados* also began to import horses from Ormuz to Cochin. Though Goa was the main Indian port of import for the horses from Arabia (2000 horses per year), the *casados* of Cochin attempted to try their luck by importing horses to Cochin. In 1533, D. Joã da Cruz with due permission imported horses to Cochin to be taken to the Fishery coast, Travancore and to the kingdoms of Chymbeenque (Tumbhichi Nayak) and Beteperemal (Vettum Perumal). In 1546 Henrique de Sousa Chichorro says that the horses taken to Cape Comorin from Ormuz via Cochin did not yield much profit. So he was asking permission to take sugar, rice and lac from Satgã (porto pequeno of Bengal) to Cochin. But in 1547, we find the Ouvidor of Cochin remarking that many *casados* of the city were taking horses to Cape Comorin from Cochin for trade and there they were enjoying with girls, while their wives and children were dying in hunger at home. During the period between 1546 and 47 we find many *casados* taking to Cape Comorin horses imported to Cochin from Ormus. This trade appeared to be so lucrative that even the new Christian traders (also *casados*) like Luis Rodrigues began to take horses to Cape Comorin for sale. By 1568 the number of horses imported to Cochin form Ormus for distribution in the kingdoms of South India created alarming situations in Goa as it adversely affected the revenue of the latter.

As early as 1520s the *casados* had begun to make use of large amount of timber for the construction of their ships. As the private trade increased, the need for the timber to build more ships equally increased. This began to affect adversely the royal ship-building centre of Cochin. In 1523, it was
reported that wood for ship-building was scarce in Cochin as it was well being purchased by Portuguese who had planned to settle in India, live by their own trade and die there.101 By 1540s, we find a lot of ships being built in Cochin in these centres. This was in response to the privileges they received for their participation in the rescue of Diu. It seems that most of those who got voyages for their service in Diu were *fidalgos* and those who received the privilege to construct ships were only *casados*.102 It is assumed from the simple logic that voyages were privileges to those who were not conducting trade regularly, while the means of livelihood for the *casados* was commerce. What the latter wanted was permission to build ships which was restricted because of the shortage of timber experienced in the royal ship-building centre.103 About more than twenty different *casados* were allowed in 1546-47 to construct ships in Malabar as a reward for their services to defend Diu104. It seems that a good majority of them were constructed in Cochin because of the advanced naval technology that was well used already in Cochin for the construction of royal ships. With the possession of large number of private ships at their disposal, the *casados* extended their commercial network to wider horizons.

How could the sudden rise of the *casados* in intra-Asian trade be accounted for? Most of the historians do not explain the reasons and factors that favoured the abrupt emergence of the *casados* and the replacement of the traditional Muslim merchants of Cochin by them from the pre-eminent position the latter held in inter-Asia commerce. Three incidents seem to have played major role in the transitional phase, whereby the *casados* came
out as principal merchant group. On the one hand, one could find the frequent attack and confiscation of Muslim ships in the name of *cartazes* by the Portuguese authorities, who favoured the private initiatives of the *casados* of Cochin. During the early days of Portuguese establishment the Muslim merchants of Cochin were their greatest allies and suppliers and it continued till the death of Affonso de Albuquerque.\(^\text{105}\) By 1520s, the Portuguese attitude towards them changed and the *Estado* officials began to use frequently *cartazes*, which authorised them to check and confiscate any vessel, as a convenient tool to weaken the commercial strength of these traditional Muslim traders (if not to destroy them) and to create out of their weakness a space for the emerging *casados*.\(^\text{106}\) Many of them became prey to the torture-tactics, to which Zaynuddin refers to as Portuguese highhandedness.\(^\text{107}\) He joined hands with Diogo Lopes, the governor and another Portuguese in 1522 to send pepper to Red sea. When it was loaded the very same Diogo Lopes confiscated the whole as contraband and appropriated the vessel. This turned him against the Portuguese and he later became a corsair to fight against them.\(^\text{108}\) By 1524, being intolerably fed up with the confiscation of the ships and the Portuguese oppression, the leading Muslim merchants of Cochin like Kunjali Marakkar, his brother Ahmad Marakkar, their uncle Muhammadali Marakkar and other dependents left Cochin and settled down in Calicut, with a Staunch resolution to fight against the Portuguese.\(^\text{109}\) This Kunjali Marakkar is the first reference to Kunjali ever made by Zaynuddin in his book. It is to be specially remembered that this offended Muslim merchant of Cochin, as some Kerala historians say, was the first Kunjali
(Kunjali later became a title to designate the Admiral of Calicut) who organised guerilla warfare and corsair activities against the Portuguese. Another important Muslim trader of Cochin to become a corsair when the Portuguese captured the two ships he sent to Cambay was Pate Marakkar. He had been a great friend and collaborator of the Portuguese in the early days of their establishments and had extensive commercial links in the Coromandel coast and in the gulf of Manar. On the confiscation of his ships, he went to Calicut and joined his nephew, Kunjali Marakkar as a corsair. It is to be specially noted that the casados of Cochin emerged as the principal traders of Asian waters only with the estrangement of the traditional Muslim merchant magnates from Cochin, which the Portuguese had brought out in an atmosphere of coercion and violence. With the transfer of residence to Calicut by prominent Muslim traders, the second-rate merchants of this group, who remained in Cochin were reduced to the role of peddling traders or petit shop-keepers. Those Muslim merchants, who were alienated from Cochin as well as the Portuguese system and moved to Calicut, had to resort to corsair activities as an alternative arrangement of trade.

On the other hand, the royal monopoly over the spice trade in Malacca and Moluccas ceased to exist in 1533 and 1537. This made the casados to bag huge profits by actively involving in the Bengal-Malacca, Coromandel-Malacca and Cochin-Malakka routes. In 1539, the trade in cloves and nutmegs was announced as free and every one was allowed to get it in the Moluccas; but one third of the transported amount had to be sold to the crown
at the buying price. This attracted the casados to the sources of spices in South East Asia. The diverse commodities like cloves from the Moluccas, the nutmeg and mace from Banda, pepper from Sumatra and Sunda, sandalwood from Timor, camphor from Borneo, benzoin from Sumatra, aloes from Sumatra and Cochin-China were brought to Malacca. Along with these plant products converged also on Malacca musk, sealing wax and precious stones from Burma, and North Siam, exported through Pegu, tin from the Malay Peninsula and some gold from Sumatra. From Malacca, though one part of these commodities went to China and Japan, a strong stream moved through the casados moved to Cochin, from where some were taken to Portugal and the rest to Cambay and Ormuz for distribution in West Asia. After the establishment of Macao in 1557, merchandise from China, especially finished goods like porcelains, silks, lacs, jewellery and minted brass began to be taken to Cochin and other Malabar ports with the help of the casados.

The Indian textiles were taken in large volume for exchange in the Archipelago, as the spices of South East Asia were to be paid in textiles rather than in money. The three main weaving places in India were Gujarat, Coromandel coast and the kingdom of Bengal. The casados took from Cochin pepper, ginger, coir, coconuts and other wares from China and Malacca to Diu, Surat and Chaul to collect raw cotton and textiles. Meanwhile the casados who were exchanging pepper for the rice of Coromandel began also to extend their links to Coromandel-Malacca trade carrying textiles from Nagapatanam and Mailapore to the entrepot of the Archipelago for the spices of South East Asia. The textiles from Bengal formed an important
commodity in the distribution trade of Cochin. The *casados* who used to take pepper from Cochin to Bengal played a crucial role in this textile trade. Though some were taken to Malacca, Cochin was the major outlet for the textiles of Bengal that came through the ports of Pipli, Chittagong, Satagon, and Dianga. By 1540s Bengal turned out to be the chief destination of the *casados* who conducted licenced trade on the pepper of Cochin.

The third factor was the relatively low customs duty that the native king collected from the *casados* of Cochin. As early as 1520s, the king of Cochin had begun to demand port dues from the private traders because of the fact that the port of Cochin was situated in his kingdom. But the Portuguese authorities were not prepared to give the native king, the customs taxes which they collected. In 1529, the king wrote to John III repeating his claim to the duties on all the ships that came from Malacca and Bengal and saying that this port dues on the private traders would lessen the burden of his expenditure. The governor, Lopo Vaz de Sampayo, who was deadly against the sharing of customs duties with the native ruler, reacted by interning the king of Cochin in his own palace, on this issue. Finally on 24th February, 1530 John III explicitly renounced all rights to customs-duties collected at Cochin and gave over this right to the native ruler considering the fact that the latter was the owner of the port of Cochin. It was later confirmed on 12th January, 1543 by Martim Afonso de Sousa, on 24th January, 1550 by Jorge Cabral, and on 17th November 1561 by Francisco Coutinho. Initially the rate of Customs duty at Cochin was 6 per cent and was equivalent to that of Goa and other Portuguese customs houses. To attract
more trade to Cochin, the native ruler reduced the rate to 3.5 per cent for the casado merchants, who could bring commodities directly to the port. All others who had wares destined for Cochin had to go first to Goa and pay 6 per cent duties there and only then were allowed to come to Cochin. But they evaded Goa by entering into side-deals with the *casados* of Cochin, who used to bring the goods through the customs-house claiming ownership.130 This led to a wider and deeper nexus, on the one hand, between the *casados* and the non-Muslim traditional merchants of Asian region and on the other hand between the *casados* and the king of Cochin who, emerging as a powerful lobby, had almost created a parallel commercial network sideling the *Estado* set up.

Along with the Portuguese, the new Christians who came to Cochin in 1530s from Portugal and Spain also began to exploit the trade opportunities in the Asian waters and by virtue of their status as family men, they also enjoyed the privilege of *casado* traders.131 Till 1557 they were virtually regarded as Portuguese citizens, with the privileges of *casados* and with right to become members in the Municipal council of Cochin.132 Making use of the economic freedom given to the *casados* some of them like Jacome de Oliveira and his brother-in-law Diogo Vaz used to conduct trade in South East Asian commodities in Malacca in exchange for the clothes taken from Cochin.133 Luis Rodrigues, another merchant from this group, had Malacca, Bengal, *Coromandel*, and Ceylon as the major destinations of his commercial transactions.134 But the participation of the *casados* from the new Christian group in the trade of Asia lasted only till 1557, when the
feelings of anti-semitism choked this enterprising group.

The casado traders of Cochin, who are often viewed as an emerging bourgeois class in the Portuguese empire by scholars like Rothermund, had achieved their economic stature and commercial growth in an atmosphere of vacum, created by the ouster of Muslim merchants. They were always a source of support and defence both economically and politically. But eventually there arose a conflict between *casados* and the mother-country born *fidalgos*, whom the crown preferred in distributing concessions and public charges. As Diogo de Couto in *Soldado Pratico* says, the Kingdom “could maintain only one more child” and all members of the Portuguese noble class, except the first-born who only inherited the family property, looked at India as a country where they could set up life and make wealth if they got the captaincy of some of its fortresses. The *casados* and the ecclesiastical dignitaries like Dom Jorge Temudo, the first bishop of Cochin, strongly opposed the mass reservation given to the *fidalgos*. He wrote that India needed only two dozens of good *fidalgos* to be appointed as the governors and the captains. The rest, the *casados* could manage by themselves. With the support of the ecclesiastical dignitaries, *casados* opposed the hegemony of the *fidalgos*, which the latter exercised in politics as governors and captains as well as in commerce which they used to enjoy as the grantees of frequent voyages. These *casados* had even developed a system almost parallel to and relatively independent of mother-country arrangements. By 1559 a rumour even spread that the *Estado da India*, taking advantage of the presence of Dom Constantino de Bragança, a noble
of royal blood, as viceroy, had cut the ties with Lisbon. The move against
the fidalgo-dominated Estado by the Casados, who had acquired sufficient
financial basis and had established trade networks all over Indian Ocean
regions independent of Estado control, had alarmed the Lisbon
administration. The crown felt it necessary to appease this group and
attempts were made to protect the casado trade from competition and to
reserve some lines to regional trade for them.142

B. Trade by Voyages

The second group of licensed trade was the voyages farmed out to
individuals on monopolistic basis. The voyages were of two types: 1. Those
rented to an individual for a fixed price. The individual concessionaries
could not use the state-owned ships; but had to use their own boats. 2.
Voyages conceded to individuals as honour and reward in recognition of
their meritorious service. Here the individual concessionaries could build
ships and send commodities to the destination permitted or could use the
space of the crown ships to transport the wares. Voyages of the first
category came into existence only after 1570. So here we are dealing only
with the voyages freely granted to the individuals on personal grounds like
reward for meritorious services and contributions.

Initially, as we have already seen, those who were to be rewarded and
honoured were allowed by the crown to take part in the official country trade
by making them officers in the ships for this purpose, which had ensured
them a considerable source of income and a share in profit. Later the
grantees of these benefices or voyages were not appointed as officers of the ships; but were given particular space in the crown ships for their cargo or could take the stipulated commodity in their own ships.

We have evidence of this type of voyages granted to individuals for a variety of reasons. On 21st February, 154 Manuel Lourenço, the legal advocate for the Order of the Franciscans of Cochin was conferred with a voyage to Bengal, in recognition of the services he rendered to the monastery. He was allowed to send the ships in 1548. Many Portuguese, who fought in the war of 1546 to protect Diu, were rewarded by D. João de Castro by granting voyages. Most of these voyages had Cochin as the boarding or terminal port. On 15th December 1546 one Diogo Lopes d’Aguiãr was allowed to send one big ship, two boats, one catur and two galeotas from Diu to Cochin, whenever he desired. On 16th December 1546, Antonio Leme was given the permission to get a ship built in Malabar and to send commodities to any of the ports of Bengal. From Cochin, its factor, Antonio Correia brought a caravela with a lot of soldiers (both native and Portuguese) to Diu. He provided these people engaged in war with food supplies and he remained with the captain fighting in the fortress. On 3rd February 1547, Antonio Correia was given permission to conduct a voyage to Malacca, each year. With the profit he got out of it, he was also instructed to look after an orphan girl who came from Portugal. On 19th February he was given another privilege to send a ship to Bengal every year. He was even given privileges, “to which no other person in Cochin was ever entitled”, to send ships and commodities outside and inside the limits of
Cochin. This privilege entitled him to conduct more or less a free trade. On 21st February 1547 Manoel de Sousa de Sepulveda was permitted to send a ship to Bengal, for having served in Diu and for having spent a lot of money to feed the fighting force.

Fernão* Peres de Andrade had come to Diu from Cochin in his own catur and he took along with him a lot of people for fighting. As a reward, he was permitted on 4th May 1547 to make or to buy a ship and to send commodities to Bengal in 1548. On 6th May 1547, one Francisco Fernandes Moricalle was allowed to conduct voyage to Bengal for having come to Diu from Cochin. These voyages were intended to honour exceptional services, which were at times rewarded also by allotting space in the city of Cochin—a plot near the fortress of Cochin was granted to Christovão de Azevedo—or by permitting the individuals—as in the case of Antonio Pereira—to buy or to make ships in Cochin to serve the crown (by collecting the spices for the Carreira da India.)

Some of the grantees like Antonio Cardosa and Duarte Barbudo were permitted to conduct voyages by sending clothes in the special space of the royal ship which went via Coromandel to Malacca. The voyage conceded to João Nunes on 19th March 1547 included the following privilege. He could go in his ship to Coromandel and from there he was allowed to take wares to Martaban. He was also allowed to take two merchants from Coromandel to Martaban after they had loaded the royal ship going to Pegu (Carreira de Pegu). Some others like Luis de Vasconcelos had a different
privilege in this voyage system. He was given the right in 1547 to nominate four merchants to the royal ship going to Coromandel (Carreira do Coromandel)\textsuperscript{155} On 11th July 1547, Francisco Fernandes was given the favour, along with the grant of voyage, to take with him four casados from Cochin for his trade in Malacca.\textsuperscript{156} Another voyage was granted on 17th February, 1548m to Sebastião Luis, alcaide-mor of Cochin, who could take commodities from Cochin for exchanging with the textiles and other goods of Bengal.\textsuperscript{157} The next day Alvares Teles, the factor of Cochin was also honoured and rewarded by giving two voyages to Maldives.\textsuperscript{158}

Though most of these voyages seem to have been granted to the fidalgos and to members of the higher social strata, some of the casados of Cochin were also seen as conferred with the privileges of voyages. On 23rd November 1547, Francisco da Silva, a casado of Cochin was given a grant of voyage by which he could send every year one ship each to Bengal, Arracão and Molucas.\textsuperscript{159} Two other casados of Cochin, one Gonçalves Caldeira and another Gomes de Carvalho obtained on 3rd February 1548 grants for conducting commercial voyages to Malacca.\textsuperscript{160}

Most of the voyages started from Cochin were conducted in the ships either built or bought in Cochin, as stipulated in the privilege charter. The high ship-building tradition and the advanced naval technology of Cochin must be the reason for associating voyages with ship-building, when concessions and privileges were made.
C. Trade of the Natives in Ships with Cartazes

Cartaz, which is a loan-word from Arabic “qirtas” meaning paper or document, was some sort of licence of movement or safe-conduct for navigation issued by the Portuguese to the native ships with an exclusive view to show that these vessels did not belong to enemy camp.\(^{161}\) The Portuguese considered that the right over the sea and the land which was conquered and discovered by them, exclusively belonged to them by virtue of the series of papal bulls issued from 1441 on, and that the Hindus, the Muslims and all other natives who wanted to ply their vessels in the sea should purchase cartazes.\(^{162}\) The ships that did not buy the cartazes were confiscated along with the wares, and the people on board were enslaved.\(^{163}\) The first written cartazes were issued in 1502 by Vasco da Gama who took a belligerent approach to every seafarer, except those of Cannanore, Cochin and Quilon.\(^{164}\) Since then (1502) a permanent fleet stayed in the Indian Ocean to protect Portuguese interests and to blockade the entry of spices to Red Sea. Usually the victims of the search conducted in the name of cartazes, were the Arabs and their allies like native Muslim merchants, and the Zamorin’s men. Though the cartaz was introduced as a part of implementing political hegemony it turned out equally to be an economic tool to control the movement of merchant ships.\(^{165}\) All the native ships had to take cartazes, which contained the following particulars: the name of the vessel and of the captain, the nature of the cargo, its origin and destination (which factors attest the economic significance of these licences) and the name of the authority issuing the cartaz.\(^{166}\) Initially these passes were issued from Cochin and then from Cannanore, Calicut (during the period of peace
1513-1525) and Diu. Though the fee charged for the *cartaz* was only one pardao (13 *fanams*) per ship, by 1535 the annual revenue from the sale of this safe-conduct in Cannanore alone was 8000 or 9000 *cruzados*, showing the degree and frequency with which the natives with licences were made to participate in the Asian trade.

The merchants of Cochin like Cherina Marakkar used to take *cartazes* from the Portuguese factory at Cochin in order to send merchandise toOrmuz. In the first decades of sixteenth century some of these passes were issued by local rulers like the king of Cochin who were friendly with the Portuguese; later they began to be emitted by the Portuguese with the recommendation and the approval of the native rulers of the Malabar coast. But when these native kings wanted to send ships, they also had to take *cartazes* from the Portuguese. The systme of *cartaz* required the ships to call at a Portuguese port, both coming and going to pay duties, as well. This diversion of merchant ships plying in the Indian Ocean to the Portuguese ports also provided wide possibilities of commercial transactions and exchange in these ports making them entrepots.

We have already seen how the principal Muslim traders of Cochin moved over to Calicut because of the atrocities they suffered in the name of *cartazes*. The second-rate Muslim merchants of Cochin who continued still to co-operate with the Portuguese, used to take *cartazes* for the shipment of their commodities. Thus in 1526 we find a Muslim merchant of Cochin taking *cartaz* from the Portuguese governor to go to Colombo for taking cinnamon
in his ships. Some of them had taken cartazes from Cochin to trade in the Fishery coast, which eventually led to some sort of religious tensions between the Christians and Muslims. So Fr. Gaspar Barzeus asked king John III not to issue cartazes to the Muslims sailing in the sea from Cochin to Chilau as these Muslims were creating lot of troubles for the missionary work in that area.

One great merchant, who appeared in the intra-Asian trade of 1540s and 1550s as a favourite of the Portuguese was Khwaja Shams-ud-din Giloni. He was actually a Persian by birth and an employee of Asad Khan of Belgaum. Asad Khan had a plan to buy a piece of land in Cannanore and to transfer his enormous wealth to Malabar. Shams-ud-din was deputed to realise this project. But with the death of Asad Khan the entire wealth passed into the hands of Shams-ud-din, estimated to be about 10 million ducates, which he used as the capital for his future commercial endeavours. In the process of converting black money into white and to ensure support and confirmation to his trade activities, he gave half of it to be sent to Portugal in bars of gold, besides the frequent monetary help he used to render to the Estado. In return he could establish a commercial empire with bases in Cannanore and Bassein which were linked with that of Mecca where his brother was running the business. In 1547, the Portuguese themselves (one D. Joa* da Cruz), as a token of gratitude for the service they received from Shams-ud-din, bought a plot in Cochin for 1605 pardaus for him and made arrangements for extending his commercial networks to Cochin. From Cochin and Cannanore he used to take cartazes to send commodities
to other trading centres. Manuel de Vasconcellos wrote from Cannanore to the governor that he could not prevent Shams-ud-din from sending pepper to Mecca, as all his ships, making voyage to that direction, had the cartazes issued by the governor.\textsuperscript{180}

\textit{Cartaz}, in nutshell, could be described as a symbol of state-of-war in the navigation zone against those who did not comply with the Portuguese system. However it was the principal legitimate means by which the natives could conduct trade in the Asian waters.

**D. Trade through Contracts**

Another way by which the Portuguese allowed the natives to participate in the country trade was by entering into contract with the local merchants to supply, in prescribed quantity, the commodities which were in high demand in Cochin. Most of these contracts with the indigenous merchants were concluded to ensure regular supply of food materials as well as ancilliary materials needed for ship-building like timber and coir. Thus, for instance, on 4th February, 1560, Jorge de Sousa Pereira, the captain-in-chief of the \textit{armada} went to the island of Maldives to conclude a contract with Mame (Muhammed) de Patyodor and Habrao (Abraham) Patyodor, the administrators of the islands for obtaining coir. As per the conditions of this contract, these administrators undertook the obligatoin of sending every year 150 \textit{bhares} of coir to Cochin on their own cost. Chaudela Marakkar, Ade Ramao, Ali Poera and Coje Ahmed, the Muslim merchants of native Cochin and the adjacent places like Palliport took up the responsibility of supplying
the stipulated quantity to Cochin. Usually these contracts were concluded for commodities, which, by virtue of their high demand, had to be supplied constantly and regularly.

**iii. Illicit Country Trade.**

Despite the vast system of fortresses and patrolling set up by the Portuguese, unlawful trade thrived as intensely as licensed trade. A great part of the illicit trade, conducted by the Portuguese with the connivance or outside the cognizance of the *Estado*’s authorities, was in contraband items like pepper and other spices. A network of illegal commercial transactions, with the active involvement of many Portuguese officials, *casados* and native merchants, spread from Cochin to all over Indian Ocean regions, in a manner almost parallel to the official licensed system. Broadly speaking, the illicit country trade could be divided into three: smuggling, cheating and corsair activities. These are nothing other than different degrees and stages involved in the process of smuggling. Meanwhile there developed also an illegal system of ware and vessel exchanges between the *casados* and the native merchants for avoiding the high customs duties and the Portuguese control. Its main purpose was to cheat the *Estado* as well as the native custom’s arrangement in Cochin. The final aspect was the corsair activities spear-headed by the anti-Portuguese Muslims of Malabar coast under the leadership of Kunjalis.
1. Smuggling

Smuggling as an unlawful country trade included a variety of illegal activities: The licences usually stipulated the quantity of pepper that could be carried by private individuals. But very often they used to take twice the amount stipulated by licence. It was not less frequent that the individuals were changing the destination mentioned in the licence and diverting the commodities to more profitable routes. In this vast atmosphere of confusion and difficulty in enforcement, many would not even bother to take viceregal licence for such shipment.\(^{182}\) In contrast to the smuggling through ghat-route, the smuggling by sea was often nourished by Estado officials and *casados* who had begun to set up an empire of private entrepreneurs after the death of Afonso de Albuquerque. By 1540s the Cochin group widened the network of their private interests in co-operation with Martim Afonso de Sousa (the very governor 1542-1545), Tomé Lopes (judge for the orphans and procurator of the king), and Pedro de Sequeira (treasurer). Later the captain Henrique de Sousa Chichorro, whom D. João de Castro sent to Cochin to check the private trading lobby of Cochin, being unable to act against them, joined hands with them.\(^{183}\) These officials raised fund for illicit trade by selling illegally the artillery to the native rulers. Tomé Lopes had been lending orphanage money to enterprising individuals to go to native states to buy pepper and to take it to profitable destinations.\(^{184}\) The captain of Cochin, Henrique de Sousa Chichorro allowed free movement for these illegal traders and he was dismissed from service in 1547 not preventing, depite the orders of the viceroy, a part of Portuguese population
of Cochin from departing for the trade of Bengal and Malacca, leaving the Malabar coast open to piracy and to the contraband trade with Aden and Red sea.\textsuperscript{185} The captain and other officials used to get handsome payoffs for the roles they played in helping “smuggling” trade in pepper. The smuggling of spices from Cochin had grown to such an extent that the accusation “went to Bengal without licence” could be seen endlessly repeated in Portuguese documents.\textsuperscript{186} Goertz, commenting on this reality, says that “pepper smuggling was a way of life in Cochin”.\textsuperscript{187}

By 1545 the pepper smuggling to Bengal, Pegu and China became so frequent that the European trade began to dwindle.\textsuperscript{188} These three regions were fed by the pepper not only of Cochin but also of Malacca and other South East Asian production centres.\textsuperscript{189} But it does not mean that this large volume of spices was consumed entirely and only in these places. Some of the documents even say that Bengal needed only less quantity of pepper, probably because of the overflow of this commodity from Cochin and South East Asia.\textsuperscript{190} Though a lot of pepper was going to China every year, in 1543 pepper was even brought back from China because of the excess and disproportionate supply, caused by private trade and smuggling.\textsuperscript{191} This excess flow reduced even the profit.\textsuperscript{192} So, in many cases pepper was also distributed and diverted to other places, once they reached the safe pockets of eastern Indian Ocean region. Thus, we come across find in 1545 atleast some instances when many Turkish traders from West Asia coming to Bengal, Pegu and Tenasserim to take pepper to Red sea.\textsuperscript{193} This risky long venture of the Turks seems to have been exceptional attempts to trade in
As illegal transactions in pepper increased, the officers of Cochin were directed to examine every ship going from this port to Bengal and Coromandel to see whether the pepper was unlawfully loaded. In 1546 we find that many ships that were engaged in pepper-smuggling in Cochin were captured and burnt. But it did not stop smuggling. On the contrary it flourished with the help of the natives. The Jews of Cochin were actively co-operating with the smugglers to get the necessary cargo. Thus we read that in 1546, the Jews of native Cochin were selling secretly pepper to be taken to Bengal. The enterprising casados visited the neighbouring kingdoms of Rapolim (Edappilly) Vadakkenkur, and Parur to collect the necessary pepper for the empire of smugglers. Moreover, a large number of casados used to go to the eastern space of Indian Ocean for illegal commercial traffic, as well. In certain cases, some of them seemed to have acted as agents of the big casado traders who had wider network in this belt. These principal merchants among them used to hire the services of the small-scale casado entrepreneurs to collect and to exchange commodities in Southeast Asia. The principal merchants seem to have invested the money for all transactions; but the small-scale traders did the local exchange of goods. A strong bond of solidarity and partnership, involving mutual trust and mutual defence, grew up among them. The clandestine elements were never absent in this system, as the extension of their commercial interests necessarily involved a certain amount of violation of the restrictions and regulations of the Estado. The most evident example of transaction of this
type of transaction might be that of João Fernandes Correia who claimed that the entire eastern coast of India from Cape Comorin to Satgão and whole of Bengal belonged to him. He used to take very large number of *casados* with him for trade. In 1547 he took with him 70 *casados* and went to the Fishery coast and Nagapatanam from where he and his mercantile team moved 300 leagues along the coast to Bengal. The fact that he had taken such a large number of people with him, (instead of the normal number of 10-15 men) shows that he was one of the chief merchants among the *casados*. On 25th December 1547 Ruy Gonçalves de Caminha wrote to the governor that João Fernandes Correia was doing all this illegally and without permission.\(^{198}\)

Much of the smuggled pepper went to the Red sea and Persian Gulf regions, as well.\(^{199}\) A good amount of it from the Persian Gulf reached Venice through Syria.\(^{200}\) By 1540s the spices and drugs that first arrived in Ormuz from Cochin and other ports were later taken by sea to Baçora (Basra). From Baçora, they were carried to Trypoly of Sirya by two routes: One by the desert of Arabia which terminated at the city of Damascus and the other by old Babylonia which now is called Bagdad. Babylonia the merchants travelled in caravans up to the city of Allepo. From Allepo the spices were taken to Trypoly of Sorya.\(^{201}\) It seems that the frustrated Muslim merchants who remained in Cochin as well as those who shifted allegiance to Calicut played a major role in smuggling out pepper to the Red sea ports. On 30th Septmeber 1541, Martim Correia wrote to the Portuguese crown that two ships loaded with pepper from Cochin were going to Mecca.\(^{202}\) The diversion of pepper to Sues-Red sea area appears to have become frequent
by mid-1540s. In 1546, Antonio de Sotomaior wrote that the Mecca ships were coming often to the Malabar coast for taking pepper.\textsuperscript{203} The anti-Portuguese feelings of the frustrated Muslim merchants seem to have been an important factor that kept vibrant the Red sea route which terminated finally at Venice. Moreover the Zamorin, the head and the brave symbol of this faction, also joined them, giving them protection, to send pepper to the various ports of West Asia.\textsuperscript{204} The rising Ottoman empire (which intervened in Indian Ocean in 1546-1554) began to give the required protection to this route, as it ensured them a considerable amount of protection rent.\textsuperscript{205}

2. IllegaIl Commercial Partnerships

Another illicit device developed in Cochin with regard to intra-Asian trade was commercial partnerships between \textit{casados} and the native merchants (especially Gujaratis), new Christian traders and Jews of native Cochin with a view to avoiding high customs duty and other trade regulations stipulated by the Portuguese. We do not know the extend to which the \textit{casados} and the native merchants arranged ware-vessel-exchanges, to ensure immunity and protection to the other commercial partners. However, the most evident fruit of this partnership, enjoyed by the indigenous merchants (other than the natives of Cochin), was the evasion of high customs duty of Goa. The Gujarati merchants who had goods from Southeast Asia destined for Cochin were bound to go to Goa to pay 6 per cent customs duty there and then only they could come to Cochin. However, the \textit{casados} of Cochin (just like the natives of Cochin) could take commodities directly to Cochin after paying
only 3.5 per cent customs duty to the native ruler, which was a concession and a privilege granted to them by the latter.\textsuperscript{206} The \textit{casados} made use of this opportunity to help their commercial partners from making extra-travel to Goa and from paying high duties there, by bringing the goods of the Gujaratis through the customs house of Cochin claiming ownership.\textsuperscript{207} This was a great cheating and caused severe loss to the revenue of the \textit{Estado}. But the king of Cochin, who profited out of it, encouraged this commercial partnership and maintained lower rate for the \textit{casados} throughout the period.

The new Christian group among the \textit{casados}, meanwhile, began another partnership with the Jewish traders providing them vessels for their commerce in the “paradises” of Portuguese private trade: Bengal, Siam (the port of Tenasserim), Pegu and Malacca; and from this last port, via Martaban, they arrived in Ceylon with goods from the Far East.\textsuperscript{208} Luis Rodrigues, one of the new Christians in Cochin, confessed before the inquisitors of Lisbon that he had taken a white Jewish trader in his vessel from Malacca to Ceylon.\textsuperscript{209} He also provided space in his ship for a Jewish trader whom he took with him from Malacca to Pegu.\textsuperscript{210} Jacome de Olivares, another new Christian of Cochin, had as his trade partner in Malacca a Jew from the native Cochin called Abra.\textsuperscript{211} He had established good commercial relations.\textsuperscript{212} This arrangement helped the new Christians to get the commodities easily from the hinterland through their Jewish partners; the Jews also equally profited, as they could move freely in the waters of Indian Ocean for trade, using the licence and vessel of the new Christian partners, a freedom which they enjoyed till 557 as Portuguese \textit{casados}.
3. Corsair Activities

Corsair activities, usually, do not fall under the category of trade. But most of the so-called corsairs who went along the west coast of India attacking the trade vessels of the Portuguese were ex-traders, viz., Kunjali and his men. They were alienated and converted to this life-style after their vessels had been confiscated and after they had been tortured by the Portuguese for want of cartazes.\(^{213}\) Since the Portuguese had made legal trade a property of the mighty and the powerful and those associated with them, the Kunjalis and his men with the support of the Zamorin resorted to force and violence with constant attacks on the Portuguese vessels, not only as a means of making profit, but also as a struggle to establish the right to free and equal status in maritime trade. They resorted to the very same acts, like confiscation of the commodities and all other cruelties, which they had experienced from the Portuguese. It was more a fight against the monopolistic policies of the Portuguese which left little outlet for legitimate trade. Some historians consider them as patriots and nationalists;\(^{214}\) while some others like M.N. Pearson picture them as something between pirate and privateer. According to him, some of them were pirates, some were corsairs, some were guerilla warriors and many were inoffensive traders.\(^{215}\)

-One should distinguish between piracy and privateeering: a pirate is a sea-robber acting on his own account, where as a privateer is an armed vessel owned and manned by private persons holding commission from Government an authorized to use it against hostile nation, especially in capture of merchant shipping.\(^{216}\) But in practice, it was not easy to
distinguish one from another, as the concept of legality from the side of the plunderer does not necessarily coincide with that of the plundered, and therefore a seizure lawful in the eyes of the former can appear as a pure act of piracy to the latter. Theoretically speaking, till the last decades of the sixteenth century, the estranged Muslim merchants had not developed into strict pirates.

The corsair activities organised by the Zamorin and his naval chieftain Kunjali seem to have had the co-operation of some Muslim merchants of Cochin, because of their close and continued association with Kunjali, their one-time collaborator in Cochin. Kunjali and others after having estranged from Cochin, intensified their commercial activities more in the gulf of Manar and Coromandel, as it was relatively a free zone, where they traded hand in hand with the Muslim merchants of native Cochin who had cartazes from the Portuguese officials. The armada which patrolled the Coromandel coast during this period could do little to contain them. In 1527, Pate Marakkar, the ex-merchant of Cochin who joined Kunjali, captured near Pulicat a ship coming from Malacca with lot of merchandise. Later these corsairs extended their pillage to Nagapatanam causing great obstacles and alarm to the Portuguese merchants settled down in Nagapatanam, Mailapore and Pulicat. These Muslim merchants of Cochin and the Kunjali’s men had special interests in the pearl trade of Fishery coast and in the cinnamon trade of Kotte which further collided with the commercial interests of the Portuguese. The situation became very tense by 1537 when direct confrontations began to take place. In 1538, Miguel Ferreira wrote to the
governor for sending three hundred men to expel these Muslim merchants from the kingdom of Kotte.  

Meanwhile, some *casados* of Cochin also joined hands with these corsairs and Muslim merchants. These Portuguese were living almost five or six leagues away from Cochin in places like Culimute (?) making armaments for Kunjali’s men and trading with them on contraband commodities. They built ships for the Muslim corsairs and helped the latter to enlarge their fleet. These *casados* with the help of the corsairs even attacked the fleet of the *Estado*, an act which had come out of common economic interests. The reason for the association of the *casados* with corsairs was explained by one Diogo Fernandes as due to the Muslim origin of the wives of the *casados*. In 1537, he wrote to king John III that these Portuguese were married to native women whose parents were Muslims, evidently referring to the fact that most of the *casados* were under the influence of Muslim merchants and corsairs.

In the military encounter of 1537-1539, the Muslim merchants of Cochin were divided into two groups; one group supported Pate Marakkar and Kunjali, their one-time collaborators while the other group stood with the Portuguese. In 1538 the Muslim merchants were defeated in Vedalai by Martim Afonso de Sousa and in the next year they were again decisively defeated in Negombo by the forces of Martim Afonso de Sousa and Miguel Ferreira. Kunjali Marakkar and Pate Marakkar, the leaders of the corsair activities, who had left Cochin in 1520s to fight against the Portuguese, were
beheaded in 1539 in Ceylon. After this event and especially after the termination of the peace which the Portuguese made with Calicut in 1540, the so-called corsair activities began to take two different types of operation: 1. To patrol the west coast with the tacit or explicit consent of the Zamorin, blockading the enemy and plundering the vessels of the Portuguese. 2. To send spices regularly to the Red sea-Venice route. The first mode of operation provided them the wealth for continued resistance and space for the vessels destined to Red sea. Most of the anti-Portuguese factors seem to have co-operated with these corsair endeavours, which was both political and economic outlets for the exercise of freedom. This corsair activity, as we have analysed above, did not develop as purely piratical; but as an alternative trade arrangement, where plundering and confiscation of the enemy vessels coincided with parallel shipment of commodities to destinations of their choice.

Thus the first seventy years of Portuguese establishment in Cochin witnessed intense and hectic commercial activities in Asian waters. It is very difficult to give the exact volume of intra-Asian trade for this period, except the one for the second decade of sixteenth century given by Afonso de Albuquerque. Though the crown through the career as and the nobles through the voyages participated in the country trade, the great bulk of it was transacted by casados and the mestiços who, with the help of Estado officials and native merchants, had set up a vast commercial network all over the Indian Ocean. This merchant class emerged at the expense of the native Muslim traders, though on common grounds they used to co-operate
each other. Often their trade transactions were conducted with the permission of Portuguese authorities; but in many cases they resorted to such ways and means which the Portuguese viewed as illegal to achieve their economic goals, and commercial transactions. Whether they conducted licenced trade or illicit trade as normally categorised by the Portuguese, their top priority was their personal economic interest and they were the least bothered about the crown’s commerce. Very often the dream of Albuquerque that the *casados* would be the strongest supporters of the *Estado* was seen to be collapsing atleast in the economic sphere. One might wonder whether intra-Asian trade by sea, starting from the port of Cochin or the country trade by land, starting from the hinterland of Cochin did ever take place during this period without direct or indirect involvement of the *casados* in one or other stages of transactions.

**Part - II**

**INDO-EUROPEAN TRADE**

The urban segment of Portuguese Cochin was grafted on to its Indian counterpart to integrate the various spice-growing centres of the Indian Ocean region through the port of Cochin (which belonged not to the Portuguese; but to the native ruler) with Lisbon and thus to make the surplus extracted from the production centres accrue at the Metropole. Though spices including pepper continued to reach Europe in varying and diverse proportions and situations through the traditional gate-way of Venice, Lisbon was the chief destination of the majority of the spices transhipped
from the Indian Ocean region through the port of Cochin. Besides spices, precious stones, slaves, clothes and even living animals were exported to Lisbon from Cochin; while copper and other precious metals and bullion formed the bulk of commodities of import. The Indo-European trade, which was controlled by the State till 1570 and carried out through the Cochin-Lisbon axis, was not static although this period. A substantial and marked difference could be seen between the early three decades and the succeeding period on matters related to this trade through the carreira route. So this study is divided into two parts: 1. Phase of monopoly and state-controlled trade (1500-1535) 2. Weakening of royal monopoly and intensification of private trade (1535-1570). The export-import trade of these phases is analysed taking into account the Indo-European background, which influenced greatly the pattern and organisation of commerce.

1. The Phase of Royal Monopoly and State-Controlled Trade (1500-1535)

The years from 1500 to 1535 were marked by several common features and characteristics, which made this period a chronological unit of study and assessment. The trade index of this period shows the greatest amount of transactions ever carried between Cochin and Lisbon. A contextual analysis of this phenomenon requires a brief reference to Indo-European situations without which 'the change over time' could not be properly understood.

Till 1530 Cochin was the commercial as well as the political headquarters of the Estado da India. It was in that year that the Governor Nuno da Cunha transferred the seat of Portuguese Asian Government from
Cochin to Goa. Because of the strong political and military base, Cochin during these years, not only received much attention and consideration but also created awe and fear among those native rulers and merchants who otherwise would have been reluctant to co-operate. The use of force and intimidation started with Cabral (1500) and continued by Vasco da Gama (1502) became the most important ingredient of the Portuguese policy of this period to seal off the traditional Red sea-Venice routes. Moreover, with the establishment of Cochin as the commercial capital, a long chain of fortresses at key strategic centres and the vigilant patrolling system along the coast were introduced to control the trade in the maritime space of Indian Ocean and to make it converge it at Cochin.

This period also witnessed the greatest amount of indigenous cooperation and assistance. Along with this native involvement, the Portuguese could incorporate the participation of Italian and German merchants in the commerce of Cochin which ensured regular supply of copper and silver required for the trade transactions in India. These various factors which influenced the export-import trade of Cochin are in detail analysed below:

A. Network of Fortresses

The nucleus of the Portuguese maritime trade activities in India was the network of fortresses erected on strategic and select places on the land along the coast. The long chain of fortresses along the strategic borders of the Indian Ocean was a symbol of vigilance and constant watch over trade
traffic. This fort-system, which extended fromOrmuz to Malacca, was meant to safeguard the royal monopoly on spice-trade.

As we have already seen, the first Portuguese fort was built in Cochin in 1503. Cochin as the “source of all pepper” and the principal supporter of the Portuguese in the fights against the Zamorin occupied the key position in this chain of fortresses. In 1505, Cochin was made the capital of the Estado da India by D. Francisco da Almeida. The next three forts, which were constructed by Almeida, were in and around Cochin: Kilwa (in Ceylon), Anjediva and Cannanore. Though the forts of Anjediva and Kilwa (constructed in 1505) played a very key role in the initial phase of Portuguese establishment, they were abandoned in 1507 and in 1512 respectively. The fortress of Cannanore was erected to control the movement of the spices of north Malabar. Its construction began in 1505 and was completed in 1508. The Viceroy D. Francisco da Almeida named it as the fortress of St. Angelo. Along with these forts in and around the production centres of spices, equal attention was given to the African coast where the first fort was built in Sofala, a place which supplied gold and ivory which began in 1505 on the order of D. Manuel. The work went on and it was completed in 1507 by captain Vasco Gomes. Meanwhile an initial step for a fortress was begun in Moçambique by erecting there a tower in 1507. In the same year, another fort was constructed in Socotra; but its life span was only till 1511.
Meanwhile a major incident took place in the Arabian sea which influenced greatly the further policies of fort establishment. It was the confrontation of the Portuguese in 1508/9 with the multi-continent forces near Diu. The four main parties viz., the Zamorin of Calicut, the ruler of Gujarat, the Arab merchants patronised by the Sultan of Egypt and the Venetian alliance to fight against the Portuguese and to revive the traditional route to eastern Mediterranean. But the Portuguese under Almeida, who having purchased the support of Malik Ayaz (the governor of Diu), came out victorious in the engagement off Diu on 3rd February 1509. With this defeat, Venice and its supporters had to accept temporarily the Portuguese as the masters of the spice-route and the Indian Ocean. But the Portuguese though they were victorious, had already taken a decision to move to a safer place, reasonably away from the troublesome Zamorin and at the same time a place from where they could control the movements of spice ships to Red sea-Venice routes. This led to the conquest of Goa by Afonso de Albuquerque in 1510 and the consequent erection of a fortress in the island of Tissuary or Tisvady. The next target was Malacca, the key port of South East Asia. The potentialties of Malacca as a trading centre were first exposed by Diogo de Sequeira in 1509. Afonso de Albuquerque conquered it on 17th July 1511 and built a fortress there. Afonso Albuquerque, then, made a move to get into the very camp of the enemy. He succeeded in getting the reigning Zamorin poisoned and installed his own nominee on the throne. Albuquerque concluded peace treaty with this Zamorin and managed to erect a fort in Calicut in 1513. But this treaty and fort lasted
only upto 1525 when the odd relationship had to be given up. After this, the estranged Muslim merchants from Cochin became the trusted lieutenants of the Zamorin. Meanwhile, the move of the Portuguese to fortify the strategic centres continued. In the extreme west, in the island of Ormuz was located the key port of the entire Persian gulf region. Though the construction of a fort had already begun in Ormuz in 1507, the Portuguese could not establish mastery over the land for some time. Afonso de Albuquerque recaptured the city from the Muslims and the work of the fortress was completed only in 1515. This fort, which was named as “Our Lady of Victory”, was referred to by Luis Figueiredo Falcão as the key of the Estado da India.

During the period of next Governors viz., Lopo Soares de Albergaria (1515-1518-the leader of the anti-Albuquerque group in India), and Diogo Lopes de Sequeira (1518-1521-who himself was a corrupt official) and Duarte de Menezes (1521-1524) private trade and corruption became rampant and spices began to enter Europe through Venice. Once more King João III realised the gravity of the situation and in order to purge the incompetent and corrupt ones, he sent Vasco da Gama to India in 1524 for the third time. But he died on Christmas eve of that year.

Even during these nine years of relative laxity, the Portuguese continued their policy of extending the chain of fortresses. A small fort was built in Colombo in Ceylon in 1518. Another fort was also built in the same year in Manar in the western coast of Ceylon. With the erection of these fortresses, as we have already seen, the Portuguese came into conflict
with the *Marakkar* traders, who had already concentrated in this area.

The attention of the Portuguese now turned to Quilon, another pepper port in Malabar, where the Muslim attacks threatened the Portuguese presence there. Though Afonso de Albuquerque had already established a factory in Quilon in 1503, it was only in 1519 that a fortress was erected in its place. This new fort was placed under the patronage of St. Thomas. Another Portuguese settlement was at Chaul, which originally belonged to the sultan of Ahamadnagar. In 1521, the governor Diogo Lopes de Sequeira constructed a fortress in this place. The extreme Southeast Asia, the land of cloves, nutmegs and mace was brought under the vigilant watch with the erection of a fortress by Antonio Brito, who was sent by governor Diogo Lopes de Sequeira in 1521 for this purpose. He laid the foundation of the fortress on 22nd June 1522 and it was named after St. John the Baptist.

The Governors who succeeded da Gama viz., Henrique de Meneses (1524-1526), Lopo Vaz de Sampaio (1526-1529) and Nuno da Cunha (1529-1538) were rather honest officials who wanted to improve the situation. During the time of Nuno da Cunha, a fortress was erected in Diu on 25th October 1535, on the spot conceded to the Portuguese by the sultan Bahadur Shah of Cambay.

This chain of fortresses had created some sort of militarised and centralised system, which, inspite of the thriving private trade through the loope-holes, controlled, to a great extent, the movements of the vessels and spices.
B. Armada and the Patrolling of the Coast

There were chiefly two *armadas* which conducted the patrolling of the western coast: 1. The *armada* of the north patrolling the coast from north of Cochin up to Cambay. 2. The *armada* of the south starting from Cochin and guarding the southern coast up to Cape Comorin. Initially there was only one *armada* for the entire west coast. We have an instance of 1507 when Viceroy D. Almeida sent eight ships under Dom Lourenco to Chaul to guard the coast.\(^{268}\) After 1510 a fleet was maintained to patrol the Canara and Malabar coasts and there was regular patrolling of this coast except during the monsoon months (the period between May and September).\(^{269}\) By 1520s the *armada* of south seemed to have been introduced to control the movements of spices from Cochin. On 11th February 1520, Pero Lopes de Sampaio was appointed as the captain of the *armada* of the south, who began to patrol the coast between Cochin and Pulicat.\(^{270}\) In 1522 this office was taken from Lopes de Sampaio. By 1524, we find Lope de Azevedo assuming the charge of this *armada*. He had introduced Cochin-Pulicat-Cochin as regular pattern in this patrolling of the southern coasts of India.\(^{271}\) Eventually the extension of the *armada* to Coromandel coast was dropped out and Cape Comorin was made the southern terminal point for the patrolling fleet starting from Cochin. As far as Cochin was concerned, the *armada* of the south, played the key role in checking the diversion of the spices.
This period was marked by the greatest amount of native co-operation which the Portuguese ever got from Malabar and which stands as the greatest factor responsible for the transhipment of large volume of spices from Cochin to Lisbon. Most important of it was the royal assistance extended by the native king. Cochin was a territory never conquered by the Portuguese; but a free gift given to them by the local ruler, when Cabral reached the port on 24th December 1500. Initially he protected them by accommodating them within his own palace when the Zamorin attacked Cochin in 1503 demanding the expulsion of the Portuguese from city, even against the plea made by the members of his own council to comply with the Zamorin’s demand, the native ruler stood by and for the Portuguese. The price that he had to pay for this commitment was that he lost the ablest three princes of the royal family in the battle ground (the other losses being much beyond quantification).^272 When the Portuguese lacked sufficient fund to buy spices, the king of Cochin either gave them loan or supplied commodities on credit. Thus the amount due to the native ruler from the Portuguese in 1513 was 10,000 ducats.\(^273\)

With the help of the king of Cochin, the Portuguese could recruit a great number of the natives for their military service (both Nairs and St. Thomas Christians), whose assistance was utilised not only for capturing Goa, Malacca and winning the Indian battles;\(^274\) but also for doing the auxiliary services related to commerce. It was only with the help of these natives that the Portuguese could establish themselves in India and conduct
the commerce. The great significance of the native co-operation would be evident only when we look at the Portuguese situation. Portugal, at this time, had only 1,100,000 people. The outbreak of famine and pestilence in Portugal in 1504 and 1506 affected adversely the economy of the mother country. Because the pestilence of 1506 about 120 men died in Lisbon and Tristão da Cunha did not get enough men from Portugal for his armada to Cochin. Even in the fleet of Tristão da Cunha seven men died because of this contagious disease, before the departure from Lisbon. In 1507, a plague which broke out in Alentejo took away the lives of 7500 people; an average of 30 to 120 lives per day. The situation was so grave in Portugal that they did not get enough men to be sent to India. In 1510, the king offered a lot of benefices and privileges to those who would come forward to serve in India. But, as Fortunato de Almeida says, despite this attractive offer, the Lisbon administration got only very few people to be sent to east. So the Portuguese had to depend heavily on the natives for all their enterprises in the Indian Ocean.

At first the Lusitanians had no other choice but to depend on the various native merchant groups for want of contact with the distant production centres of spices and for want of vast commercial networks which the native mercantile groups enviably enjoyed. Though many of the Muslim traders were, initially, against the Portuguese, the latter succeeded in winning over the co-operation of the leading merchants of the Marakkar clan who had commercial links in the coasts of Malabar, Coromandel and Ceylon. By 1504, Cherina Marakkar and Mamale Marakkar, the great
merchants of the land were befriended and were given 6000 cruzados (2000 in cash and 4000 in rice, copper and other merchandise) for supplying 3000 bhares of pepper for the ships that would be arriving Cochin in the fleet of Lopo Soares. They soon became the chief merchant agents of the Portuguese in Cochin. At a time when the Portuguese did not have strong base in India, it was these two merchants who procured pepper at cheaper price from the various parts of Malabar and supplied it to the Portuguese factory in Cochin. Eventually a legion of Muslim traders were enlisted into the category of collaborators. Though Edapilly was an enemy of Cochin, the Portuguese got the support of three prominent merchants of that place. Ali Apule, Coje Mappila and Abraham Mapila were the important merchants of Edapilly who used to supply regularly pepper to the Portuguese in Cochin. Though the Portuguese reached Ceylon in 1505, they could not till the second decade penetrate well into the cinnamon gardens. It was the Marakkar traders, especially Mitos Marakkar who were the chief suppliers of cinnamon to the Portuguese in Cochin to be taken to Lisbon. However, there were traders like Nino Marakkar, who besides supplying commodities to the Portuguese, were giving them ships and fighting force Nino once gave them 1500 soldiers to fight against the Zamorin. The commercial services of Cherina Marakkar, Mamale Marakkar and his brothers were so great and invaluable that the governor requested D. Manuel in 1513 to bestow some special privilege on them in recognition of their co-operation. But after the death of Afonso de Albuquerque, this relationship did not last long. The idea of crusade was very strong in the
decision making body of Portugal. D. Manuel asked the officials to prefer Christian (the emerging casado group as well as the native St. Thomas Christians) and Hindu traders and to keep the Muslim merchants away from trade activities. The initial signs of distance and conflict between the Portuguese and the Muslim traders became evident in their transactions as well. Some Muslim merchants began to supply to the Portuguese factory only the adulterated pepper and spices of inferior quality; while the best quality was often reserved to be sent to Red sea-Venice route. Slowly and by 1520s the emerging casado traders who had started to establish extensive commercial networks, had begun to step into the shoes of the traditional Muslim merchants. Most prominent among the latter were slowly ousted from the rank of collaborators and the frequent confiscation of the Muslim ships and cargos in the name of cartazes, as we have already seen, threw them into hostile camp. During this period of conflict a good many of the principal merchants of Cochin moved to Calicut under the leadership of Kunjali. But still, a group of them, though might have been second rate merchants, remained in Cochin continuing to co-operate with the Portuguese in their trade endeavours without whose assistance the Portuguese would not have been able to make grass-root contact with the producers.

Another prominent group from whom the Portuguese enlisted co-operation was the native Christians or the St. Thomas Christians. They formed the great majority of the growers of pepper and ginger which were taken to Portugal. They equally played a major role in the mercantile activities of Cochin the traders of Korran (might be Tamil Kurran) from whom
Francisco de Albuquerque bought 4000 bhares of well-dried pepper. The leading merchants who used to supply pepper to the Portuguese in Cochin from Quilon, Kayamkulam and even Edapilly were St. Thomas Christians. From Quilon (where the St. Thomas Christians had the privilege of keeping under their custody the seal and standard weight of the city) and from Kayamkulam, pepper was brought to Cochin by two leading merchants called Mathias and Bragaida Taquatome. In Cranganore, bishop Jacome Abuna, the spiritual head of this community, himself came forward to lead the cultivators to take pepper to the Portuguese factory in Cochin. During this period, the Portuguese were very keen on fostering the relationship with this community and ensuring their constant co-operation, as it was an easy way of penetrating into the distant hinterland. The St. Thomas Christians, on the other hand, viewed the Portuguese as brothers in faith and the Portuguese king as a Christian ally, and the latter used to protect them from the frequent attacks which the Muslims used to make on their bazars, churches and settlements in Cranganore.

Though anti-semitic feeling was very strong in the mother country during this period, it did not penetrate into Cochin with that intensity in the first half of this century. The Portuguese made use of Jews and their commercial links in the early days of their establishment in Cochin. It was Gaspar da Gama, a Jew taken from Anjedive and converted to Christianity by Vasco da Gama, who showed the way to Cabral to reach Cochin in 1500. The Jews of Cochin used to bring cloth from Cambay and sold it for pepper in Malabar. The pepper they collected was sold to the Portuguese factory
in Cochin. The relatively free atmosphere in Cochin attracted the Jews of Spain to this city, when there was a massive expulsion of the Jews in 1512. From 1533 on, the new Christians from Portugal also began to flow to Cochin. These Jewish elements from the Iberain Peninsula paved links of co-operation between the native Jews and the Portuguese in economic activities.

The Hindu assistance to the Portuguese in Cochin was in various capacities: as traders, fighters, spy-workers, negociators of trade and growers of spices. Hindus were also employed in the various categories of the service sector in the Portuguese city of Cochin. Though they did not have so great a capital as the Muslims, the contribution of Hindu merchant community was not insignificant. Yte Couna (Ittikunju), a Nair merchant used to bring pepper from Cranganore to the Portuguese. Thus, for instance, in 1508 an Ezhava cultivator took pepper and other spices directly to Cochin in exchange for cash and copper. Besides this, a number of Hindu merchant groups like the Chetties, Konganis, Gujaratis and the Canarese, co-operating with the Portuguese system, conducted trade in Cochin. The Nair militia of Cochin and the neighbouring principalities formed an important part of the fighting force that waged wars for the Portuguese. Tens and thousands of Nairs fought and died for the Portuguese in the early days of their establishment. Even the non-Nairs like the Pulayas (the low case aggrestic labourers) joined hands with the Portuguese to fight against the Zamorin and Duarte Pacheco asked the king of Cochin to elevate them to the rank of Nair caste.
The *Nairs* were also employed for the collection of pepper from the hinterland. Two *Nairs* were permanently employed for going to the distant production centres to get the spices for the *carreira da India*. For this job each of them was paid a monthly salary of 800 *reis* (19200 reis per year).\(^{308}\) One Panikkar and four Nairs who were employed to deal with pepper in the Portuguese factory and were given an annual remuneration of 5120 reis.\(^{309}\) Besides this, there was another native hand called “weigher” (*pesador*) of pepper, whose services were inevitable in the entire transactions and he was given an annual pay of 7200 reis.\(^{310}\)

The native co-operation was also available to the Portuguese as the care-takers of the weighing houses where the river-crafts brought pepper from hinterland, *coolie*-labourers who had to carry the sacks of pepper to and from boats, the store and weighting houses, guards who kept a watch on the commodities, makers of straw-mats, baskets and gunny bags (necessary for drying, packing and carrying pepper), suppliers of oil and candles for lighting.\(^{311}\)

In general, this first phase was marked by a remarkable response of co-operation from the various native factors which was responsible for, more than any other thing, a greater volume of export trade from Cochin.

**D. Price-Fixation and the Under-Pricing of the Commodities**

The price of the spices were lower in Cochin than that in Calicut and other spice-ports of Malabar. Thus in 1498 one *faracola* (8.31 Kgs) of
pepper in Cochin cost only 9 *panams* while the same quantity of pepper in Calicut cost 14 *panams*. But the entry of the Portuguese into the spice-market made the prices shoot up and the merchants were reluctant to sell their commodities at the old price offered by the Portuguese. The Manuoline strategy found price-fixation as the solution for the instability of the market. Accordingly, Vasco da Gama in consultation with the king of Cochin and the local merchants fixed the price of the spices on 3rd January 1503. As per this agreement, the price of a *bhar* (166.3 Kgs) of pepper was fixed at 152.5 *panams* (8.3 *cruzados*) and the king of Cochin was given half a *cruzado* per *bhar* as customs duty. This price-fixation was, indeed, an underpricing of the commodities, as the price for the same quantity of pepper in Calicut in 1500 was 360 *panams* and the loss for the merchants was almost 207.5 *panams* per *bhar*. The native merchants and the cultivators, who suffered this great loss, had no other easy outlet and so had to co-operate with the Portuguese. With low price in Cochin, the price of even Calicut was forced to be brought down and in 1516 one *bhar* of pepper there cost only 10.17 *cruzados*. It shows that the price of Calicut was reduced almost to the half and was brought near to that of Cochin. The price fixation, thus, developed into a mechanism to under-price the commodities of even other-ports of Malabar and the attraction in diverting spices to non-Portuguese ports of Malabar to gain big profit, by selling at high price, was drastically reduced. The possible alternative was to carry across the ghat to Tamilnadu and to tranship them from the ports of Choramandel coast to the traditional destinations in Asia. But this route,
besides being risky, seems to have involved much expense which reduced the percentage of profit. Though the price they would receive in Cairo and Venice was very high, the expenses incurred in risk factor, long and secret journey and the taxes to the lords of the lands through which they had to pass took away much of the possible profit. So even in this price-situation many of the indigenous merchants and cultivators were compelled to co-operate and to make available spices for the ships to Lisbon.

The following table shows that increase in the price of the commodities, effected with the entry of the Portuguese into Malabar was only a transient phenomenon. The price fixation and the treaty with the Zamorin made the price come down to a rate lower than that of the pre-Portuguese times. This price-reduction strategy was also used as a weapon to seal off diversion from the Malabar ports and to strengthen the Cochin-Lisbon route.

### Price of the Spices (Per Quintal in Ducats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Calicut</th>
<th>Cochin</th>
<th>Malabar after the entry of the Portuguese</th>
<th>Alexandria</th>
<th>Venice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>4.64d</td>
<td>5.96d</td>
<td>3.02d</td>
<td>2.98d</td>
<td>2.5d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginger</td>
<td>2.01d (dried)</td>
<td>1 Od</td>
<td>16d</td>
<td>14d</td>
<td>25d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloves</td>
<td>9.88d</td>
<td></td>
<td>26d</td>
<td>20d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinnamon</td>
<td>6.41d</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.00d</td>
<td>22d</td>
<td>25d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardomom</td>
<td>8.96d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Price</td>
<td>Exchange Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutmeg</td>
<td>7.40d</td>
<td>3.65d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sealing Wax</td>
<td>4.25d</td>
<td>2.00d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil Wood</td>
<td>2.64d</td>
<td>5.00d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aloe wood</td>
<td>132.82d</td>
<td>15.6d</td>
<td>25.6d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benzoin</td>
<td>2.01d</td>
<td>20.47d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camphor</td>
<td>53.13d</td>
<td>7.9d</td>
<td>74d</td>
<td>12.8d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>132.82d</td>
<td>78.88d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandal wood-red</td>
<td>1.35d</td>
<td>1.92d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandal wood-white</td>
<td>11.45d</td>
<td>19.06d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meanwhile there occurred a great fluctuation in the price of pepper in the three important re-export centres of spices viz., Cairo, Venice and Lisbon. In 1498, the price of pepper in Venice was 56 ducats per quintal. The news of Portuguese entry to Indian market made the price shoot up to about 100 ducats in February 1500. Where as in Cairo, it was 78 ducats in 1498. However the Portuguese discovery of the Cape route affected the price of this traditional commercial city as well. The price of pepper rose up to 90-102 ducats in 1500-1501. Meanwhile in Lisbon, the price of pepper in 1498-99 was 80 ducats. But by 1500-2 it fell to 40 ducats. By 1516, when the Portuguese had almost established sovereignty over the trade routes of Indian Ocean, the price indexes began to show a different trend. The price of Cairo shot up to 135 ducats in 1516 showing the difficulty in obtaining this commodity in the Sues area. Venice also seems to have had some difficulty in getting the spices during this period, as the price remained almost around 80 ducats in 1516. The abundant flow of pepper to Lisbon is evident from the fact that the price fell by 1504 to 20 ducats and below. In the following
year the price was fixed at 22 ducats and in 1516 it remained at this rate.\textsuperscript{330} These fluctuations are indicated by the following graph:

*Diagram indicating the Price-Fluctuations in Cairo, Venice and Lisbon in 1498, 1500 and 1516*

By keeping a fixed price both in Cochin and Malabar Coast (around 2.5 ducats) as well as in Lisbon (around 22 ducats during this period), the fluctuation in the market was controlled; but it under-priced the commodity. The higher prices in Cairo and Venice, though was an attraction, was nothing but the price offered for the risk in the diversion of pepper. The cultivators and the ordinary merchants were the victims of this under-pricing, who received only pre-Portuguese price for their commodities.
E. Monopolisation of the Spice Trade

The elements of force and violence introduced in the Indian Ocean region by the Portuguese with the systems of cartaz-armada-fortress were to bring the spice-route under a perfect monopoly. After the initial experiments of allowing the participation of private merchants (in the early years of the first decade of sixteenth century) the crown began to reserve the trade on spices as a royal monopoly. Right from 1510 on, the king barred the people going to India from trading in spices, drugs, sealing wax, dyes, indigo and benzoin. On 26th February 1518, the crown prohibited the Portuguese in India from buying and selling pepper, whether little or much. Eventually, the ban on trading in spices was extended to all other sections of traders. The king ordered that no one should be allowed to deal with pepper, and all ships which took pepper should be confiscated along with the commodity. The Ordenações da India issued on 8th September 1520 (at Evora) made pepper, cloves, ginger, cinnamon, maces, nutmeg, sealing wax, silk and borax as commodities reserved for the crown. The stringent measures to enforce the monopolistic trade in spices made the Cochin-Lisbon route relatively stronger.

Although, even during this period, the Portuguese could not have a perfect and monopolistic control over spice-trade in the Indian Ocean region, as we have already seen, and pepper as well as other spices continued to be taken to the Red sea-Venice route as well as to other destinations in Asia, commodities which entered Europe via Cochin-Lisbon axis was so great and significant that the Portuguese, as the greatest and continuous
suppliers of spices, exercised some sort of monopoly at least with regard to Europe.

**f. Careira Factor**

This period witnessed the greatest number of Naos of the *Carreira* operating in the Indian Ocean. An India-bound Nao of the *Carreira* with a crew of 120 men and boys usually carried at least 400 to 500 soldiers sent out for service in the East. The Portuguese despatched about 86 ships from Lisbon during the period from 1500 to 1505 and the sailors and soldiers aboard them must have numbered around 7000. For the first 35 years, about 365 ships departed from Portugal out of which 323 reached India. The average tonnage of these Naos ranged between 300 and 450. Usually the ships to India left Lisbon every year in March or April, considering the Monsoon factor of the Indian Ocean. An early departure from Lisbon would compel the ships to take an unavoidable and long stay at Moçambique (sometimes Melinde or Socotora), as further journey from there to India before the month of May, would be extremely risky and difficult because of the adverse monsoon wind. The ships which left Lisbon in March/April reached Cochin in September. These ships were loaded with the spices in October and November and they had to make the return voyage from Cochin to Lisbon in the second half of December and in most cases in the beginning of January. Otherwise they would miss the favourable winds. But the pepper was harvested in Malabar in late December or January. The processes of threshing and drying in the sun took considerable time. The Portuguese were not able to procure fresh supplies of pepper before late
February or March.\textsuperscript{344} So the ships of the Carreira had to be loaded with the supplies of the previous year which were stored in the various factories of south west India and brought to Cochin. These ships on their way back called on often Moçambique for fresh water and provisions\textsuperscript{345} and they reached Tejus between the middle of June and September.\textsuperscript{346} Thus the round voyage between Lisbon and Cochin took about a year and a half in the most suitable circumstances.\textsuperscript{347}

This period, though was the initial phase, witnessed less percentage of ship-wrecks. Though different reasons could be assigned as explanations for it, \textit{Caixas de Liberdade} or the liberty chests which the various officials and crew of the ships were allowed to take along with them to Portugal seem to have compelled the crew and officials to invest an additional care, alertness and caution originated from the fact that the crown was either unable or unwilling to pay adequate and full wages and consequently strove to recompense its servants by allowing them to import limited quantities of spices wholly or partly freight and duty free.\textsuperscript{348} These chests were to a standard measurement of six \textit{palmos de vara} (about four feet) in length by three in height and two and a half in breadth.\textsuperscript{349} The quantity of the commodities permitted to be taken to Portugal varied according to the status of the officials. Thus while captain-major could carry 15 \textit{caixas}, a cabin boy could take only 1 \textit{fardo} (bundle).\textsuperscript{350} This practice, as a boost to private initiative and enterprise, though tempted too many people to give more attention to the storage and safe-keeping of their own goods than to those of the crown, prompted them to conduct the home-ward journey of the \textit{Carreira}
more safely and securely as well and thus to gain profit for their entrepreneurial involvement.

The following statistics show that during this period (1500-1530) the percentage of losses in the home-ward ships (5.7 per cent) was less then when compared to the losses incurred in the outward voyages (10 per cent). Besides the table also points out the fact that the annual percentage of ships which safely reached India from Lisbon during this period (till 1529) was 9.3 out of which an annual average of 5.6 ships reached Portugal in 26 years during the period from 1501 to 1530.

**Movement of the Ships of the Carreira da India**

**Table 1. Outward Voyages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of ships departed from Portugal</th>
<th>lost/destroyed sent back</th>
<th>percentage of loss</th>
<th>No. of ships arrived in Cochin and Goa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1500-1509</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1510-1519</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1520-1529</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1530-1539</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1540-1549</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1550-1559</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1560-1569</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>551</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>485</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. **Homeward Voyages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of ships departed from Cochin and Goa</th>
<th>Destroyed/lost</th>
<th>Percentage of loss</th>
<th>No. of ships arrived in Lisbon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1501-1510</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lacks 1507)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1511-1520</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lacks 1516 &amp; 1520)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1521-1530</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lacks 1521)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1531-1540</td>
<td>Data not available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1541-1550</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(lacks 1546)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1551-1560</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1561-1570</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The *Carreira* system with the *liberdade* practice incorporated a space for private initiative whose outcome was safety and the carefulness with which the home-ward *Naos* of *Carreira* were attended to.

**G. The European Context**

The study on Cochin-Lisbon axis and the Indo-European trade relations requires a contextual analysis of various factors and developments in Europe which influenced the export-import indexes of Cochin.
1. The Portuguese Situation

The strong maritime and explorative traditions initiated by prince Henry the navigator and pursued by João II was taken by king Manuel, in the same line of continuity, as he ascended the Portuguese throne in 1495. He became the king only because Afonso, the son of Joao II and heir to the throne, was killed when his horse fell in 1491 and because João II had executed his other relatives for treason. It was chiefly because of the firm determination of this new king that the measures for Portuguese expansion and trade in the Indian Ocean were followed up and given top-priority. In a debate which took place at Monte-mor O Novo in the Alentejo during the month of December 1495, a faction of the councillors of the new king Manuel argued that Portugal should be content with the comparatively peaceful exploitation of what had already been discovered in Africa and that Portugal should give up Indian expedition as it might arouse the hostility of every monarch then involved in the Indian trade \footnote{355} and the big expenses involved in it. By voting with the councillors who wished to pursue the Indian entreprise, king Manuel took up the risks in and initiatives for the Indian voyages and trade. The first generation of officials and captains sent to India like Da Gama, Cabral, Almeida and Albuquerque realized what he had dreamt of, although the last three appointees of king Manuel (Lopo Soares de Albergaria, Diogo Lopes de Sequeira and Duarte de Meneses-Governors of India from 1515-1524) were proved to be bad lieutenants.

King Manuel, in order to announce the discoveries and to gain publicity for Portugal's conquests in India, sent an embassy of obedience to
Rome in 1505\textsuperscript{358} and in 1514.\textsuperscript{359} These embassies to the Pope were meant as means to come out of the smallness of Portugal imposed by geographical limits and to establish as well as to project a position in Europe equivalent to that of the recent achievements they made in their trade with India. With the establishment of Cochin-Lisbon axis, a great change was introduced in the organisation of commerce in Portugal. The \textit{Casa da Guine} which was established in the middle of the fifteenth century in Lagos in Algarve for the sake of African trade\textsuperscript{360} and later transferred to Lisbon under the name of \textit{Casa da Guine e Mina} (1480)\textsuperscript{361} was re-organised for conducting trade with India. By 1500, with the beginning of spice-trade it was renamed as \textit{Casa da India} and this transformation was essential as the Indian trade had already outstripped the other part of Portugal’s overseas trade in importance and potential.\textsuperscript{362} The \textit{Regimento} of 1509, according to which the \textit{Casa da India} was organised, makes it clear that all the three sections of India, Guinea and the slave trade-were subordinate to a single factor, generally known as the factor of the \textit{Casa da India}.\textsuperscript{363} It served as the ware-house for the commodities purchased from Europe to be sent to India. At the same time it also functioned almost like a market where the oriental goods were sold to whole-sale and retail merchants.\textsuperscript{364} It was necessary that the complete cargo from each ship was to be deposited directly in \textit{Casa da India} upon arriving at Lisbon. The factor of the \textit{Casa} informed the king of the size as well as of the composition of the cargo and entered in an account book all receipts and disbursements of the spices. The factor was also charged with maintaining overseas correspondence, keeping lists of all the ships and their crew and
checking on the factors in the overseas world. In effect he was the superintendent of practically all Portugal's overseas trade. Moreover the dues to the king from those who participated in Indian trade were also collected in the Casa da India. It had also the responsibility to pay in advance for the people who were sent to India in the annual fleets.

The spices brought to Lisbon from Cochin were distributed all over Mediterranean region through the Casa da India. In 1506 three Portuguese ships with brasil wood, pepper and other spices reached Valona. Later the Venetian senate even proposed to king John III in 1527 that the sales contract for all pepper imported to Lisbon be farmed out to Venice, after allowing for Portuguese home-consumption; but the project was never realised. By 1532, the royal ships from Portugal began to re-export the spices brought from Cochin to the cities of Marseilles in France and Genova in Italy. The trade with north Europe, especially the royal trade in Antwerp was also carried out through the Casa da India.

2. The Factory at Antwerp

The spices from Cochin that reached Casa da India were further taken to the Portuguese factory at Antwerp. With the establishment of Cochin-Lisbon commercial axis, Antwerp in Flanders had relegated Bruges into the background and had emerged as a great centre of re-distribution of Asian goods in Europe. The Portuguese collected copper and silver to be sent to Cochin and Goa from Antwerp where the merchants from Aachen area and south Germany (especially the Fuggers and Welsers) were selling both these
metals in increasing quantities. The first ship from Lisbon carrying spices from Cochin arrived at the Antwerp harbour, situated on the banks of the Scheldt river, in 1501. From 1503 the re-exports of Indian spices from Lisbon to Antwerp were large and regular. During this period (from 1503) Nikolaus of Rechterghem, who was from Aachen and commercially associated with Jacob Fugger, began to buy pepper from the Portuguese in Antwerp and sent to upper Germany. In 1508 the rights to the Portuguese crown monopoly of spices were leased to the Affaitadi and Gualterotti and they maintained this exclusive right till 1514. They took pepper to the fairs of Lyons and even to Italy. The South German merchants like the Fuggers and the Welsers became a part of this monopoly at third hand. In 1507 the Magna Societas of Ravensburg decided to buy pepper and spices henceforth at Antwerp. In 1512-1513 the Viennese merchants were complaining that they were getting less pepper and spices from Venice and hence they requested the emperor to authorize the foreign merchants to bring spices from Antwerp, Frankfurt or Nuremberg (which were supplied by the Antwerp factory). Flanders (and Antwerp) had maintained land connections with Cologne, Frankfurt and Nuremberg and it was a great centre of trade for the Hanseatic and English merchants who came by sea. With the establishment of Cochin-Lisbon-Antwerp commercial axis, we see in the first three decades of the sixteenth century, a phenomenon appearing in Europe by which the commercial centre of gravity was shifted from the Mediterranean (Venice) to the north-west Atlantic (Antwerp fed by Lisbon).
3. The Participation of the Italians and the Germans

The participation of the Italians and the Germans became inevitable because of three factors: 1. The mode of payment for the pepper of Malabar necessitated that large quantity of copper be imported to India which inevitably required the participation of the German and Italian copper merchants who held monopolistic control over the production and distribution of copper in Europe. From 1503 onwards, the mode of payment was fixed to be as three fourth of the price of pepper being paid in cash and one fourth in the form of copper.\(^{382}\) This seemed to have been an advantageous arrangement both for the Portuguese as well as for the natives. The partial exchange in copper gave an added profit to the Portuguese commercial endeavor, as one quintal of copper purchased at Flanders for 4.5 cruzados was exchanged at a value of 14 cruzados and the net profit after all expenses was around 5 cruzados per quintal.\(^{383}\) Initially, the payment in copper was not very much appreciated by some native merchants and cultivators, as it necessitated another exchange for cashing it. But very soon the demand for this metal in India, which lacked copper-sources, became very high as it began to be used in a very large scale for the making of house-hold utensils. Eventually the house-hold utensils made of copper and bronze became symbols of social status and aristocracy especially in Malabar, which further increased the demand for copper and continuous participation of the Italian and German copper dealers. Even in 1522, when the king of Cochin, necessitated by the scarcity of pepper in Cochin because of the Vaduthala war, made a contract with the native merchants for pepper-supply,
the condition stipulated by the latter was that they should get one-third of the price of pepper in copper.\textsuperscript{384} The foreigners especially the Germans were incorporated to get the required quantity of copper for every ship destined to India. 2. The difficulty felt in the initial phase, as we have already seen, to get enough Portuguese fighting force necessitated the incorporation of many Germans and Italians as soldiers and bombardeiros. 3. The Portuguese crown had also felt it necessary to make the wealthy entrepreneurs of Portugal, Italy and Germany involved in the Indian trade, at least in the initial years of establishment, for want of enough resources. The observations which Quirini made in 1506 throws some light on the general financial position of the Portuguese and on the role played by the financiers and wealthy merchants. He remarked that out of the annual income of 350,000 ducats, Portugal had to spend 300,000 ducats domestically and that the king had only 50,000 ducats at his disposal for the Indian enterprise. For fitting out ships to India and for the purchase of spices and other commodities in Kerala, the Portuguese king had to find out an extra amount of 170,000 ducats. The crown invested only 25 per cent of the total amount required for the purchase of the commodities and the remaining part was supplied by the financiers and the merchants.\textsuperscript{385}

A. The Italians

The Italian merchants who made their voyages to far-off Flanders in big merchant galleys and who stopped over at Lisbon on both the outward and return voyages began to play active role in Portugal from the thirteenth
Though the Venetians among the Italians were generally kept at bay, the Genoese and the Florentines were specially favoured. The Doria, the Lomellini, the Grimaldi, the Catanei and the Pessanha were the important Genoese families which took active role in the commercial and maritime activities of Portugal. Along with Cabral’s fleet a Genoese, probably Antonio Salvago, in company with Girolamo Sernigi (a Florentine) sent a ship to Cochin in 1500. In 1516 Andrea Corsali came to Kerala for trade. The Genoese continued to send ships along with the Portuguese fleet in the following years, as well. Thus, for instance, in 1518 we find Leonardo Nardi, from Genoa sending a ship to India in 1518.

The Florentines were great merchants and bankers in Portugal. By 1338 the famous Bardi family of bankers from Florence was given by the Portuguese crown the first chapter containing commercial privileges. The elimination of their merchant fleet in 1494 by the Pisans forced the Florentines to look abroad for investment opportunities. The commercial and financial needs created in Portugal with the expulsion of the Jews and the discovery of the Cape route gave the Florentines ample opportunities to involve in the commercial enterprises of the Lusitanians. The most prominent of the Florentine families was that of the Marchioni headed by Bartolomeo Marchioni. He was the richest man in Lisbon, at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It was from Bartolomeo Marchioni that John II secured for Pedro da Covilhão and Afonso de Paiva (for their travels to India and Ethiopia) in 1487 a letter of credit for 400 cruzados. The Anunciada, a small ship which went to India along with Cabral in 1500 was financed by
Bartolomeo and it brought back from Cochin 300 *chantara* of pepper, 160 *chantara* of cinnamon, 60 *chantara* of lac and 14 *chantara* of benzoin.\(^{395}\) In 1501, a consortium was formed under the leadership of Bartolomeo and out of the four ships of João da Nova, sent to India in 1501, two were despatched by the consortium. It was put under the captaincy of the Florentine Messer Fernam Vineti.\(^{396}\) Girolamo Sernigi, another Florentine financier in Lisbon,\(^{397}\) had participated in sending a ship to India along with the fleet of Cabral in 1500.\(^{38}\) In 1503, out of the nine ships which moved to Cochin in the fleet of Afonso de Albuquerque, four ships belonged to the merchants. The prominent among these merchant-groups were Girolamo Frescobaldi and Filippo Gualterotti, the great Florentine banking groups which had established their factoris in Flanders, and Girolamo Sernigi. Giovanni da Empoli was the Factor of these Italian ships.\(^{399}\) In 1505, joining hands with the German financiers, Bartolomeo and other Italians invested 29400 *cruzados* for their trade with Cochin.\(^{400}\) In 1506 also the Italian capitalistic groups, including the Genoese and Florentines with Bartolomeo Marchioni at the head, sent ships to India.\(^{401}\) Among the four private ships sent by Portugal (the voyage was organised by *Estado*) to Malacca under the captaincy of Diogo Mendes de Vasconcelos, one ships was commanded by the Italian Sernigi and the factor of another ship was said to have been the Italian Empoli.\(^{402}\) In 1512 Girolamo Sernigi fitted out a ship directly to Malacca and it returned to Lisbon in the next year.\(^{403}\) By 1515 the Factor Giovanni da Empoli had become a ship-owner and we see him in that year accompanying Lopo Soares, the new governor, as captain of his own ship.\(^{404}\)
The Affaitadi was another banking family from Italy that actively involved in the economic life of Portugal. Actually Giovanni Francesco de Affaitadi was from Cremona (which during this period was under the control of Venice) and he engaged himself at first in the sugar trade with the Portuguese island of Madeira. But with the arrival of Cabral’s fleet from India, the Affaitadi became interested in the trade in spices. Because of his wealth and his banking and commercial links, he occupied almost a diplomatic position at Lisbon. He participated in the trade with Cochin by sending Mateo do Begnino as his factor in the fleet of Vasco da Gama in 1502. He travelled with Estavão da Gama and in his letter (dated 30-03-1503), he narrates in detail to Giovanni Francesco de Affaitadi, his master, the trade conditions of Cochin. As we have already seen, the Affaitadi obtained exclusive trade rights in spices with Flanders for some time. The Portuguese received copper and silver in exchange for spices and these precious metals were in high demand for the Portuguese trade with India. They had, later, agents at Seville, Valencia and at Medina del Campo (where the largest fair in Spain was held), at London, at Lyons and in various cities in Italy and the Low country. Giovanni continued to be in Lisbon till his death in 1528 and later his nephew João Carlos de Affaitadi began to take care of the enterprise.

Many Italians came to India as soldiers, as well. Some of these Italian mercenaries on their arrival in India left the service of the Portuguese crown and entered the service of native rulers like the Milanese renegades who joined with the Zamorin or Khwaja Safar another Italian renegade who
served as governor of Diu later in 1538.\textsuperscript{412} However a good many of them seem to have continued their service in the Portuguese regiment.

B. The Germans

The first German merchants who established themselves in Portugal were said to have been the timber merchants. Timber, iron (for ship-building purpose) and the military goods like striking weapons from the ports of the Hanseatic League were brought in large quantities to Portugal. In 1433 Afonso Bernardes was the \textit{procurador} of all German and Flemish merchants in Lisbon.\textsuperscript{413} The German ships known as \textit{holks} (\textit{Urca} in Portuguese) were in high demand in Lisbon and they were used by John II (1481-1495) in his African expeditions.\textsuperscript{414} The German and Flemish soldiers had formed an important military group in Portugal during the time of John II and the German soldiers and \textit{bombardeiros} had established the Brotherhood of St. Bartholomaeus in Lisbon.\textsuperscript{415} The Brotherhood of soldiers was intimately associated with the German mercantile community in Lisbon and the chapel of St. Bartholomaeus was the centre of German religious activities in Portugal.\textsuperscript{416} The first Germans who came to India were soldiers from this Brotherhood of Bartholomaeus. They seem to have formed an important part of the artillerymen that accompanied every Portuguese ship to Cochin.\textsuperscript{417} The greatest number of German soldiers seems to have reached Cochin in 1502, along with Vasco da Gama.\textsuperscript{418} In 1503, these German soldiers built the chapel of St. Bartholomaeus near Calvetthy in Cochin.\textsuperscript{419} By 1525, the number of the German soldiers in Cochin rose to 50.\textsuperscript{420} In
1525, a request had been made to the Portuguese crown from Cochin to send 100 *bombardeiros* urgently to the East out of which half should be German mercenaries. The German soldiers were generally used for all the Portuguese battles of expansion and defence fought in Asia. Later by 1546, in the defence of Diu, some of these German *bombardeiros* took active participation. One among them was Antonio de Bos, who was given for his service 10 *parados* of salary out of which 2 *pardaos* were given extra for the fact that he was a foreigner.

Meanwhile the big German merchants, who had been trading at Venice for a long time, were forced in 1499-1500 to shift their business elsewhere because of the war which broke out between Sultan Bajesid II of Turkey and the Republic of Venice. So in 1501, as the diarist Marino Sanuto says, four German trading houses under the leadership of the Fuggers tried to conduct direct trade on spices with Levant through Genoa, though it did not bring about any desired result. The commercial developments in the Iberian peninsula attracted the German merchants to Lisbon. Anton Welser of Augsburg and Konrad Vöhlin of Memmingen and their company approached king Manuel through their representative, Simon Seitz. On December 12, 1502 Simon in the company of Lukas Rem and Scipio Lowenstein went to Spain and leaving Rem behind in Spain, the other continued on to Lisbon.

There he was aided in the negotiations by Valentim Fernandes, a printer from Moravia who was influential in the Portuguese court. Simon Seitz
concluded a treaty with the Portuguese crown on 13th February, 1503 by which not only these companies but also all the German merchants who had the capital of 10000 ducats were given the privileges to conduct trade in Lisbon and to participate in the spice-trade of India. The German merchants could buy in small or large amounts, spices or brazil wood or any other wares from India or other places as yet undiscovered lands, without paying any duties, unless they bought these wares from the fleet and from the ships coming from India. It seems that shortly after this contract, the German merchants began to participate directly in Indian trade and began to come to India. Peter Holzschuher, the German merchant who died in Calicut in 1504, seems to have reached Cochin as a result of this contract. He came to India along with Afonso de Albuquerque in 1503. Moreover, as per this contract, timber, tar, and pitch from north Germany, items which were in short supply in Lisbon and very essential for the construction of ships, were brought to Portugal at a duty of 10 per cent or less. King Manuel maintained good relation with the Germans as they ultimately controlled the production and distribution of most of the silver, copper and lead of Europe which in turn were essential for trade with India. In 1504 two younger Welser merchants came to Lisbon for going out to India. Earlier the Welser agents had already come down to Lisbon through Antwerp with letters from Emperor Maximilian and Archduke Philip the Fair for this purpose. These agents brought with them the metals and merchandise worth the amount of 20000 ducats. The Portuguese king refused these young Welser merchants’ offer to invest in the fleet to India and to accompany Lopo Saores to India.
However, the German merchants from Augsburg and Nürnberg continued their efforts to participate directly in Indian trade. In August 1504, Lukas Rem signed a contract with king Manuel in the name of the above-said merchants by which the German merchants got permission along with the Italian syndicates to send three ships of their own to Cochin. They were also allowed to send their own agents to buy spices; but they were put under the supervision of the Portuguese royal factor. The cargoes which these merchants brought to Lisbon from India were to be turned over to the crown. The Portuguese king was said to have been forced to make concessions to the merchants because of his financial inability in 1504-1505 to fit out from his own resources alone the fleet of twenty-two ships under Francisco de Almeida.

Along with the fleet of Almeida (1505), the German-Italian syndicate sent three ships: “Leonarda”, “Rafael” and “Hieronymus”. The German merchants who took part in this Indian expedition were the Welsers, the Fuggers, the Gossenbrotys, the Hochstetters, the Imhofs and Hirschvogel. Anton Welser had already established a firm in Augsburg in 1496 in company with his brother-in-law Conrad Vohlin of Memmingen and it was called Anton Welser, Conrad Vohlin and Company. This company, which had-based its activities on the silver mines of Tyrol, flourished suddenly. As we have already seen, in 1503 a Welser factory was founded in Lisbon and from that year till 1508 Lukas Rem acted as the Factor of this factory. In the Indian expedition of 1505, the Welsers invested an amount of 20,000 cruzados. The Fuggers of Augsburg, especially Ulrich Fugger (who died
in 1510) and Jacob Fugger (often called Jacob the Rich 1459-1522) had
great economic influence all over Europe as great bankers and merchants.\textsuperscript{441} They had started trade in copper in 1495.\textsuperscript{442} Eventually they bought up the
entire copper and silver of Tyrol especially of Schwarz. The loans which
they used to advance to the Archduke Sigismund of Tyrol and Emperor
Maxmilian I enabled the Fuggers to have monopolistic hold over these
mines.\textsuperscript{443} The ownership of copper and silver mines made the participation
of the Fuggers in the Indian trade inevitable. In the Indian expedition of
1505, the Fuggers invested an amount of 4000 \textit{cruzados}.\textsuperscript{444} Another big
business house in Augsburg was of the Hochstetters. Ambrosius Höchstetter,
the had of this business house\textsuperscript{445} invested an amount of 4000 \textit{cruzados} in
1505 for sending ships to India.\textsuperscript{446} The Imhofs were an important trading
house in Nürnberg. By the end of the fifteenth century Endres Imhof formed
a consortium of which the Welsers of Augsburg was a member.\textsuperscript{447} They had
a branch in Lisbon and in 1505, they invested 3000 \textit{cruzados} in the ships
sent by the German-Italian syndicate to Cochin.\textsuperscript{448} The Gossenbrots were
members of the copper syndicate of the Fuggers along with Paumgartner and
the Herwarts.\textsuperscript{449} They invested an amount of 3000 \textit{cruzados} in the Indian
expedition of 1505.\textsuperscript{450} The Hirschvogels were another trading house of
Nürnberg and had a factory in Lisbon.\textsuperscript{451} In Indian expedition of 1505, they
invested 2000 \textit{cruzados}.\textsuperscript{452} Balthasar Sprenger was sent to India as the agent
of the German merchants and he was in the ship \textit{Leonarda}.\textsuperscript{453} Hans Mayr,
another German was also in the fleet as the authroized representative of the
Portuguese Crown and as writer in the ship \textit{Rafael}.\textsuperscript{454} These German-Italian
merchant syndicate which participated in the trade with Cochin and Cannanore in 1505 brought to Europe 12000 quintals of pepper. After paying 30 per cent to the crown, these merchants had 8400 quintals with them which was worth the value of 168000 cruzados and the profit was around 160 per cent.\textsuperscript{455} As the price of the spices fell drastically in Lisbon with the arrival of the last ships, the crown decreed that the private merchants like the Germans and the Italians should place their cargo in the ware-house of the \textit{Casa da India} under lock and key. In order to stabilise the price and to ensure profit, the king further decreed that these merchants should buy their pepper back again at a price dictated by the crown.\textsuperscript{456} This disillusioned the German merchants and the Welser company instituted legal proceedings against the crown for the breach of contract.\textsuperscript{457} The Welsers had every reason for this move as they had invested the greatest share in the expedition of 1505 and moreover they were also said to have invested a considerable amount in the next Indian expedition of 1506 through their representative Lukas Rem.\textsuperscript{458} The legal move from the Welsers enraged the king who forbade the active participation of foreign merchants in the spice-trade with India.\textsuperscript{459} But the king was very often compelled to allow exceptions to this law, as he did with the Italian and Portuguese private traders.\textsuperscript{460}

\text{The big German merchants like the Welsers and the Fuggers, henceforth, began to concentrate more on the re-export trade in Europe. The Welsers, who had factories in Nürnberg, Venice, Danzig, Milan, Rome, Genoa, Freiburg, Bern, Zurich, Lyons, Saragossa, Antwerp and Lisbon,\textsuperscript{461} entered into contracts with the Portuguese crown to purchase a stipulated}
quantity of pepper at Lisbon to be taken to Antwerp and other places for re-sale. They continued to supply the copper and silver to the Portuguese factory at Antwerp to be taken to India. The Portuguese king needed 5000-6000 quintals of copper every year to be taken to India. The Fuggers who had monopolistic control over the copper fields of Europe were invited to participate in copper-pepper contracts. He was even ready to buy 15000 quintals of pepper annually for six years. (But this project did not materialize.) But the Fuggers’ plan to purchase spices against copper had also strong competition from the Hochstetters and had also to face strong opposition and agitations from the Lutherans who were against the monopoly of the upper Germans. However, the main concern of the Fuggers’ factory in Lisbon was spices. From here the spices seem to have been distributed to various places of Europe, like Narva, Reval, Riga and Kiew (in Russia), Danzig, Thorn, Warsaw, Krakau, Lemberg (in Poland), Klausenburg, Pest, Often and Banska Bystrica (in Hungary), Augsburg, Ulm, Nurnberg (in Germany) and so on, where the Fuggers had factories and agents. Far above and besides the role of distribution of spices, the Fuggers supplied copper and silver (from the copper fields of Sweden, Denmark, Hungary and Tyrol) required for the purchase of spices in India to the Portuguese king either at the factory in Antwerp or the Casa da India in Lisbon. In 1519 Rui Fernandes de Almada, the secretary of the factory in Flanders, went to Augsburg to meet Jacob Fugger and he made a contract with the Fugger for the supply of 12000 quintals copper to be taken to India for the next two years.
Meanwhile some other Germans were looking for opportunities to continue direct trade with India. Since the crown was not ready to share spice-trade with any other private trader, these German merchants began to concentrate on diamond, pearls and precious stones. The Hirschvogels of Nurnberg sent the sixteen year old Lazarus Nurnberg to India. On 2nd April, 1517 he left Lisbon for India. He reached Goa and spent some time in Cannanore and remained in Cochin for considerable time. The Herwarts of Augsburg, who were specialised in jewels and pearls, sent Jorg Imhoff to India to procure precious stones. Imhoff travelled to Goa, Cannanore and spent some time in Cochin to collect commodities for the master. The Hirschvogels employed Jorg Pock to collect precious stones from India. He left for India in 1520. In search of pearls and jewels he travelled to Goa, Cannanore and to the kingdom of Vijayanagara. In 1522 he spent some time in Cochin in connection with his business. Thus even when the royal monopoly was upheld, the economic participation of independent and foreign private traders was allowed, of course in varying degrees, in the Indian trade both on spice and non-spice items. The Portuguese would not have been able to collect and mobilise copper and silver required for the Indian trade and to effect the timely distribution of spices in Europe without the involvement and co-operation of these private entrepreneurs.

The Volume of Export Trade during the Period between 1500-1535

In 1506, the Venetian ambassador Vincenzo Quirini estimated that 25000 to 30000 quintals of spices, out of which 2/3 was pepper, were exported annually from Cochin, Cannanore and Quilon. According to the
estimate of Ca'Masser, another Venetian, the total quantity of annual export exceeded 35000 quintals.\textsuperscript{475} in 1509, an amount of 40000 quintals of pepper was taken to Lisbon from Cochin.\textsuperscript{476} By the end of 1512, Affonso de Albuquerque wrote to the king that he would be sending 38000 quintals of spices to Lisbon.\textsuperscript{477} The five ships which left Cochin in 1518 carried 50000 quintals of pepper besides large quantity of ginger and other spices.\textsuperscript{478} In 1519, the volume of export trade increased to 56000 quintals of pepper and 20000 quintals of other spices.\textsuperscript{479} A few details regarding the volume of export to Lisbon are given below:

**EXPORT TO LISBON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>1501\textsuperscript{480}</th>
<th>1502\textsuperscript{481}</th>
<th>1503\textsuperscript{482}</th>
<th>1504\textsuperscript{483}</th>
<th>1505\textsuperscript{484}</th>
<th>1506\textsuperscript{485}</th>
<th>1513\textsuperscript{486}</th>
<th>1514\textsuperscript{487}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>104920</td>
<td>52459</td>
<td>944262</td>
<td>524590</td>
<td>1154120</td>
<td>907534</td>
<td>1050249</td>
<td>1070865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginger</td>
<td>20984</td>
<td>2623</td>
<td>6820</td>
<td>23607</td>
<td>36722</td>
<td>210203</td>
<td>213131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinnamon</td>
<td>31476</td>
<td>23607</td>
<td>314754</td>
<td>26230</td>
<td>18361</td>
<td>66518</td>
<td>42650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloves</td>
<td>23607</td>
<td>10492</td>
<td>2623</td>
<td>1102</td>
<td></td>
<td>2098</td>
<td>708</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lac</td>
<td>3148</td>
<td>1312</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasil wood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3148</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2361</td>
<td>3804</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camphor</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>525</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mace</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>367</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus we see that relatively larger volume of spices were taken to Lisbon from Cochin and other ports of Malabar. A good number of them were not local products; but they were brought from other parts, as we have already seen, and re-exported from Cochin. During the period from 1515, we find Malabar spices entering Europe through Red sea-Venice route;\textsuperscript{488} (but the volume of his trade was insignificantly very low). However it does not mean
that the export trade to Lisbon dwindled. On the contrary there was a remarkable increase in the volume of Lisbon trade, which was mainly because of the intensification of commercial activities in Cochin and because of the increase in production.

The following table, in comparison with the above one, shows an upward trend in the export trade of 1517 and 1519. Though the same record could not be maintained in the 1520s, the volume of spices that reached Lisbon from Cochin and other ports of Malabar was increasingly high.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities (in Kilograms)</th>
<th>1517&lt;sup&gt;489&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1519&lt;sup&gt;490&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1523&lt;sup&gt;491&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1526&lt;sup&gt;492&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1530&lt;sup&gt;493&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1531&lt;sup&gt;494&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>2309875</td>
<td>1836065</td>
<td>393442</td>
<td>1049200</td>
<td>809862</td>
<td>989902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginger</td>
<td>129574</td>
<td>15738</td>
<td>120658</td>
<td>17836</td>
<td>46636</td>
<td>17889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinnamon</td>
<td>16551</td>
<td>41967</td>
<td>10492</td>
<td>52459</td>
<td>38085</td>
<td>27436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloves</td>
<td>9755</td>
<td>34623</td>
<td>62951</td>
<td>31476</td>
<td>37403</td>
<td>31318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mace</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>2098</td>
<td>3148</td>
<td>10492</td>
<td>4879</td>
<td>4249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutmeg</td>
<td></td>
<td>6295</td>
<td>39344</td>
<td></td>
<td>9757</td>
<td>6295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camphor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13115</td>
<td></td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandal wood</td>
<td>787</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1626</td>
<td></td>
<td>1784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhubarb</td>
<td>4669</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incense</td>
<td>2256</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamarind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>735</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The general trend of spice-export from Cochin is depicted below with the help of a graph. The sources mentioned above are used to draw the
graph, whose main function is to depict the ups and downs of export of the principal three commodities viz., pepper, ginger and cinnamon. As it clearly shows the pepper curve stands up above the ginger and cinnamon curves. Right from the period immediately after the establishment of the Portuguese capital in Cochin in 1505, we find the pepper curve relatively going up, a phenomenon which continued upto 1519-1520.

The Export of Spices from Cochin during the Period from 1500-1531

![Diagram - 3](image)

(A=Pepper, B=Ginger, C=Cinnamon)

The early part of 1520s, marked by the emergence of private trade, the official laxity and the estrangement of Muslim merchant magnates of Cochin witnessed less pepper supply, causing the curve to fall steep. But the vigilance and the strong measures taken with the arrival of Vasco da Gama
in 1524 and the steps followed by his successors helped to improve the situation, which fact is evident from the again-upward-moving curve. Ginger seems to have been the second greatest commodity exported from Cochin. But, as the graph shows, sometimes the cinnamon brought from Ceylon occupied second position in the export-trade.

During this period, though the greater part of the export consisted of pepper, ginger and cinnamon other spices like cloves, nutmeg and mace were also exported to Lisbon in large quantities. Besides these spices, precious stones, cotton cloths (both painted and white), silk, pearls, and seed-pearls were also exported to Lisbon by private persons in the name of *liberdades*. In 1502 João de Nova brought from Cochin precious stones worth 4000 *cruzados*. All these pearls, silk and precious stones taken to Portugal were required to be paid a tax of *quarto* and *vintena*. After the declaration of spices as royal monopoly, as we have already seen, the non-Portuguese Europeans especially the Germans began to concentrate more on the trade in pearls and precious stones, which they took to Europe through their agents like Lazarus Nürnberg, Jorg Imhof and Jorg Pock.

**Commodities**

• Vasco da Gama after his first encounter with the market of Calicut in 1498, came back to Portugal with the list of commodities that could be imported into Malabar. Gold, silver, coral and scarlet were the items which were in high demand in Calicut and the Zamorin suggested in his letter that
they could be imported into Kerala. Cabral returned to Lisbon collecting information about the price of copper (45 panams per faracola), lead (18 panams per faracola), silver (54 panams per faracola), alum (20 panams per faracola), white coral (1000 panams per faracola), branched coral (700 panams per faracola) and bastard coral (300 panams per faracola) in Calicut. Because of the high demand for copper in Cochin, this metal had become an important means for trade-transaction from 1502 onwards. A partial payment of the spices had to be made in copper. The 3000 Faß pepper which Vasco da Gama bought from Cochin in 1502 was paid partly in copper and the remaining price was paid in cash (bar money) and opium. In the first decade of 16th century, an annual amount of 4000 quintals of copper, which rose to 6000 quintals in the second decade, coral, vermillion, mercury, tin and lead were imported to Cochin. Initially it was from Cochin that copper was distributed to Gujarat and other parts of India. In 1513 one banean merchant of Gujarat estimated that an amount of 30000 or 40000 quintals of copper was required in India. The participation of German and Italian merchants (who had monopolistic control over the production and distribution of copper in Europe) in the Portuguese trade with India, ensured regular supply of copper to be imported to Cochin. It is estimated that the merchandise which each ship brought from Lisbon to Malabar was worth 50000 cruzados. During the period between 1510-1518, copper worth 49464 cruzados, silver equivalent to 16107 cruzados, coral worth 13750 cruzados and lead valuing 3582 cruzados were imported into Cochin. The following table gives a picture of the volume of import into Cochin.
VOLUME OF IMPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>1502-1506</th>
<th>1506-1507</th>
<th>1510-1518</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>60 macros, 2 oncas</td>
<td>5 macros, 6 oitavas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>½ oitava</td>
<td>405 macros, 7 oncas</td>
<td>2478 macros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>2 oitavas</td>
<td>745-11/2</td>
<td>1167-0-261/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4122-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coral</td>
<td>3999 oncas</td>
<td></td>
<td>10308 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermillion</td>
<td>42-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>54-1-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
<td>598-1-131/2 597-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the high demand for copper, the volume of this metal imported into Cochin increased in later period. Even ivory from African coasts was also brought to Cochin. The register of 22nd January 1528, signed by Afonso Mexia, the vedor da Fazenda of Cochin, gives the following details about the commodities imported into Cochin.⁵⁰⁵

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>5700 quintals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alumstone</td>
<td>360 quintals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory</td>
<td>542 quintals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>596 quintals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>26 quintals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked coral</td>
<td>18731 oncas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Besides the gold from Europe (which came from Guine, Mina and Arguin), the yellow metal from Sofala was also brought to Cochin. In 1507 the ship *Rinha Belem* took to Malabar ports an amount of 4000 *miticais* of gold from Sofala. The value of gold taken annually to Cochin and Goa, during this period, varied from 12000 to 29000 *cruzados*. Most of the silver that was imported into Cochin came from the German merchants. The silver which the ships brought annually to Cochin and Goa was about 2000 to 4500 *marcos* and its value ranged between 12000 and 27000 *cruzados*. Copper, which was in high demand for the purchase of pepper, formed the major part of the imports into Cochin. The Portuguese who bought pepper and other spices with gold and silver bullions induced some to say that it was India which discovered Portugal referring it as a phenomenon of adverse trade-balance in mercantilistic terminology. But these precious metals were often used to generate further profit in the system of multiple transactions and the flow of bullions was intended to maximise the profit. As these precious metals imported from Portugal to Cochin were meant to accumulate wealth in home-country through further transactions, the balance of the trade was never adverse for the Portuguese during this period.

2. The Weakening of Royal Monopoly and the Intensification of Private Trade (1535-1570)

The commercial activities of the Portuguese began to take a different turn after 1535. Though private trade was not unknown during the first three decades of the sixteenth century, it became rampant with the fourth decade.
This period also witnessed some sort of relaxation and weakening in the royal arrangements made to maintain the monopoly. Spices began to enter Europe via Venice in continuous and increasing proportions. Scholars like Hildebrandt call this phenomenon experienced during this period as Oligopoly in contrast to the monopolistic phase of early decades. The commodities reserved to the crown became wares of regular Asian trade both for the Portuguese and non-Portuguese merchants. The export of spices from Cochin to Lisbon began to show downward trends. A variety of reasons could be given as explanations for this development among which I would like to highlight the major three: 1. The exigency to incorporate the Portuguese individuals into trade 2. Tensions in the hinterland 3. The general economic crisis.

1. The Exigency to permit Private Trade

In order to understand the reasons for allowing the private trade on mass basis, one should see the general situation of the Portuguese in India and mother country. When king Manuel died at the close of 1521, his nineteen-year-old son by Maria of Spain ascended the throne. During his regin, from 1521 onwards, we find recurring famine and pestilence visiting Portugal, which compelled many to move to India to have a better living. In 1521 a great famine broke out in Portugal and the poverty situation continued in 1522 whose effects were felt in the succeeding years. A great pestilence broke out in Lisbon and Coimbra in 1524 which took way 373 lives. In 1530-1531 the pestilence returned to Portugal, of which Lisbon
was the most severely affected zone. There the people entered into clashes and fights with the Jews accusing the latter for the cause of frequent pestilences.\textsuperscript{517} As the disease was contagious, the inhabitants began to flee the capital and the eyewitness remarks that Lisbon was a completely deserted city.\textsuperscript{518} The Braga area was affected by famine in 1539. In 1546 famine related sufferings began to torture Beiras, Alentejo and Lisbon for many months and people of the capital resorted even to robbery for their living.\textsuperscript{519} The famine of 1555-1557 and the pestilence of 1563-1566 lasted long and the people in Coimbra, in order to get relieved of it, conducted even processions praying for God’s mercy.\textsuperscript{520} The pestilence which came to Lisbon in 1569 was so great that in the months of July and August, there was no day without 600 or 700 deaths; about 50 to 60 people were buried in the same grave.\textsuperscript{521} These famines and pestilences were followed by successive waves of migration to India which, they hopped, would be better than the miserable life-condition at home.\textsuperscript{522} Most of them came as soldiers; later they married and settled down in the prospective trade centres like Cochin and Goa. As a result the number of the Portuguese in Cochin began to increase. On 12th July 1527 Luis Martins from Portalegre wrote that there were 1000 Portuguese men in Cochin; but the number of \textit{casados} were only 160.\textsuperscript{523} Later with the flow of people from the mother country as a result of the natural catastrophies, the number of \textit{casados} increased and along with it private trade also thrived. According to the documents of 15th May 1546 there were 570 Portuguese in Cochin out of which 343 were \textit{casados}.\textsuperscript{524}
Within five years the number of the *casados* in Cochin still rose up to 500, as per the data of 16th January 1551. These new comers began to take up trade as a means of their livelihood and to co-operate with the first generation of *casados*, who had already established a vast commercial network. The Portuguese authorities had to accommodate themselves to this situation and adopt a policy in which sufficient space was carved out for the commercial enterprise of this people. Chances for decent livelihood and opportunities for private initiatives were offered to them through the system of licences, voyages and other trade concessions about which we have already seen. Even their participation in the diversions of pepper also seems to have been tacitly allowed, to a certain extent. The governor Jorge Cabral (1549-1550) wrote that over half of the Portuguese in Asia refused to obey his mobilization orders for the Diu campaign, implicitly meaning that they were not interested in royal service; but only in private trade.

The crown seems to have encourage these traders not only because commerce provided a livelihood to them; but also because they were slowly emerging as a substitute to the prominent and traditional Muslim merchants who left Cochin to Calicut. So the creation of a mercantile class from the Portuguese was a need of the time. Some sort of relaxation in the royal monopoly was allowed in such a way that their private initiatives might get better exposure. On the other hand, with regard to the *quintaladas*, the voyages, licences and other trade concessions, they had created a system in which the king was required only less to pay while the individuals had to earn the rest by his personal initiatives. When the crown itself faced a
financial crisis at home, this arrangement saved the king from paying the due salary and at the same time it secured for him an extra income by way of customs duty.

During this period, the private participants began to overload the liberty chests and other spaces of the Lisbon-bound royal ships, with personal merchandise which led to frequent ship-wrecks. Though in the first phase, as we have already seen, liberty chest was a mechanism by which the crown ensured safe conduct of home-ward carreira, from 1540s onwards, the practice of giving spaces on royal vessels for the private entrepreneurs turned out to be detrimental to them affecting their life-span. A good many of the ships that departed from Cochin during this period to Lisbon were wrecked, as we read in Historia Tragico Maritima, because of overload. Besides merchandise, even human cargo were loaded from Cochin to the maximum without looking into the capacity of the vessels whom the private traders took for sale in Lisbon. The most striking case was that of ship Sao Joao which left Cochin on 3rd February 1552 but sank into the Ocean near the coast of Natal (Africa) on 24th June 1552. It took 4500 quintals of pepper from Quilon and 7500 quintals of pepper from Cochin. Besides these, we do not know how much the officials loaded in the liberty chests. Because of the war between Cochin and Vadakkenkur king in Vaduthala, the ship did not get so much pepper as they had expected from Cochin. But they filled the space with human cargo. A large number of slaves were taken from Cochin slave market. The reporter of this ship-wreck says that there were about 500 men in this sunk ship, most of whom were slaves from Cochin.
During the years between 1541 to 1550 five out of forty six ships (10.9 per cent loss) engaged in home-ward journey were lost. During the period between 1551 to 1560, the percentage of loss increased to 31.1 per cent, where fourteen out of forty five Lisbon-bound ships got destroyed. The percentage of loss for the period between 1561 to 1570 was 13.6 per cent and five out of thirty seven vessels that made home-ward journey were lost. It is specially to be noted that the percentage of ship-wrecks increased with the liberal phase of private trade. The voyages within Asia for which the space of the crown ships was often parcelled out, the liberty chests granted to the officials of the vessels, the practice by which the private traders overloaded the Lisbon-bound ships with the human and non-human cargo, not only reduced the space for crown’s commodities, but also affected negatively the longevity of Carreira ships which often led to their destruction in the deep seas.

2. Tensions in the Hinterland

This period was marked by a diminishing trend in native co-operation and the beginning of tensions in the hinterland. There were two types of tensions: 1. Political tensions between Cranganore and Cochin and another between Cochin and the Pepper (Vadakkenkur) kingdom which led to the Vaduthala war (1549-1552). 2. Religious, which led to some sort of estrangement of Jewish traders and the merchant-cum-cultivator group of St. Thomas Christians, by the end of 1550s.
The quarrels between Cochin and Cranganore started by 1540. On 23rd December 1541, D. Estavão da Gama wrote to the Portuguese king about the tensions between these kingdoms which adversely affected the trade in Cochin. The bone of contention among them was the claims over the principal temples of Cranganore. In those days temples played a great role in the State formation. Temples which were situated in the territories of other kings were used as tools for exercising hegemony; Moreover, temple was a source of royal revenue, too. The dispute was chiefly over the temples of Tribanchyaqualaa (Thiruvanchikulam) and Chiriguorumba which were situated in Cranganore. The king of Cochin claimed complete rights over the Thiruvanchikulam temple (which was the principal temple of this royal family before it was transferred to Cochin) and its money and half of the share of Chiriguorumba temple. Only 1/5 of the revenue from the latter went to the Cranganore king; 3/5 of the income was supposed to go to the king of Cochin and the remaining 1/5 went to Biliarty Coilo (Villiarvattam Kovil). The king of Cochin sent his men from Cochin to collect money from these temples and to guard them. In 1548, these temple guards sent by the Cochin king were killed by the ruler of Cranganore and appropriated the entire temple money. The quarrel over the revenue dragged Cochin into a tense phase of relationship with Cranganore whose ruler had already switched over allegiance to Calicut. The conflict went on till 1560s. Though this tension did not explode into the shape of a battle, it affected the free flow of spices from the hinterlands in and around Cranganore.
Still worse was the tension that fomented between Cochin and Vadakkenkur over Bardela (Vaduthala) which was ruled over by Vadakkenur chief. In the process of territorial expansion, the king of Cochin claimed lordship over Vaduthala and its temple from where the latter began to take money.\textsuperscript{533} These tensions could not be patched up and finally it led in 1549 to the outbreak of a long and bitter war which continued up to 1552. The king of Vadakkenkur was supported by the Zamorin of Calicut and the newly converted Christian king of Tanore,\textsuperscript{534} who even went from king to king canvassing help for the Vadakkenkur and Calicut kings.\textsuperscript{535} On the other hand, the king of Cochin was supported by the Portuguese. He met the combined forces of Vadakkenkur, the Zamorin and Tanore in Chembe and Vaduthala areas which were then under the Vadakkenkur kingdom.\textsuperscript{536} Some 30,000 native soldiers and 600 Portuguese fought for Cochin.\textsuperscript{537} In the course of the war, the king of Vadakkenkur was killed in the battle field, which caused much uproar leading the soldiers of Vadakkenkur to form a \textit{Chaverpada} to avenge the death of their king. They ran amoc killing everyone they saw and burning the city of native Cochin and \textit{Castelo de Cima}.\textsuperscript{538} The economic result of this continuous war that lasted up to 1552 was that spices stopped to come to Cochin for transhipment to Lisbon.\textsuperscript{539} Most of the spices were diverted to different destinations through the ghat-route. The king of Cochin felt it duty-bound to reciprocate the help he received from the Portuguese: he went from king to king and trader for making available pepper in Cochin for transhipment to Lisbon. He made contracts with the native merchants for this, accepting all their terms and conditions. The most
important condition of this contract was that the Portuguese should pay $\frac{2}{3}$ of the price in cash and the remaining $\frac{1}{3}$ in copper, the most demanded metal in Malabar for the manufacture of house-hold utensils.\textsuperscript{540} These two areas of political conflict intensified the ghat-route traffic, providing only very little commodity at the port of Cochin.\textsuperscript{541} Moreover the shadow of these tensions helped the private entrepreneurs to get these diversion-routes linked with their commercial empire already established.

This period also witnessed the widening of the areas of conflict. The Portuguese, during this time, had robbed the temple treasure of Tevelakkara and had taken away two casks of pure gold and precious stones from it which antagonised the Hindus of Quilon and Kayamkulam.\textsuperscript{542} They refused to supply further pepper to the Portuguese. The Brahmins of the locality threatened in 1547 that if 1800 \textit{pardaos} taken from this temple were not paid, they would see to it that no pepper would reach Quilon.\textsuperscript{543} In the face of strong opposition and cutting of pepper supply, king John III ordered the wealth to be returned to the temple.\textsuperscript{544} After the temple robbery of Tevelakkara the Portuguese plotted to take the treasure of Pallurithi temple, which was the family temple of the Pallurithi \textit{tavazhi} of Cochin royal family. Francisco da Silva, the captain of Cochin, took along with him 500 men and entered the temple when the Pallurithi chief was away from the town. In the attempt to plunder the temple, three were killed and many were injured. The plunder of the family temple of Pallurithi \textit{tavazhi} by the Portuguese very much antagonised the king of Cochin,\textsuperscript{545} who already was in conflict with the Portuguese over the issue of converting his subjects to Christianity.\textsuperscript{546}
As the tension increased, the Portuguese tried to win the cooperation and good will of the native king by offering him a palace in 1555 (the present day Mattancherry palace), constructed at the expense of the former.\textsuperscript{547} This was followed by the raising of customs duty paid by the Portuguese to the native king from 213 \textit{reis} (1/2 \textit{cruzados}) to 900 \textit{reis} (2 \textit{saotomes}) per \textit{bhar} in 1569.\textsuperscript{548} This succeeded temporarily in patching up the tensions that arose with the native king.

The religious tensions which affected adversely the Cochin trade began with the transplantation of European religious concepts to India. The anti-semitic measures designed for Portugal and Spain as well as the Protestant reformation movements which occupied the centre-stage in Europe made the Portuguese to look at everything strange in India with suspicion and doubt. The Manueline tolerance, if there was any, was set aside and the religious fanaticism of John III was transplanted to the East.\textsuperscript{549} Instead of looking at common and basic points of cooperation, the attempt was to find out as many points of differences as possible and to categorise them as a part of heresy. This move antagonised the partners of the Portuguese commerce like the Jews and St. Thomas Christians.

The inquisition established in Lisbon for dealing with the new Christian who were said to be following Jewish practices was eventually extended to Cochin. By 1557, the new Christian traders of Cochin began to be arrested and tried in the Inquisitorial court of Cochin one by one.\textsuperscript{550} The result of the first round trial in Cochin was that they lost all their wealth and the fruit of
all their commerce which they had conducted for years, as all of them were found to be guilty of the charges. Later they were taken to Goa and finally to the Inquisition of Lisbon where all of them, except one were punished as offenders of faith. The captain of Cochin strongly reacted against this large-scale arrest and transportation of new Christians to Lisbon accusing it as a part of the strategy to deprive Cochin of its eminent merchants. This incident, on the other hand, spread panic and fear among the Jews of native Cochin in general who began to look at the Portuguese with increased suspicion and viewed them as the greatest enemies. They feared that if the approach of the Portuguese towards the new Christians, who had collaborated with the latter in all their endeavours including the battle against Vadekkenkur king (1549-1552), was so cruel like this, then the fate of the Jews who were always hated by the Portuguese would be still worse. Their fear was based on the fact that all these new Christians were punished for their participation in Jewish ceremonies their contribution for the construction of Kadavumbhagam synagogue in native Cochin, which was built between 1539-1550, from which they inferred that the next target of Portuguese attack would be the Jews. Meanwhile another development took place in Mattancherry. Many Jews from Cranganore migrated to native Cochin because of the religious persecutions they had in their traditional abode. The last group of these successive waves of migration reached Mattancherry by 1564-1565. The king of Cochin received them into the native part of the city and gave them space for their settlement adjacent to his palace. According to the paradesi tradition, this part of land was given by
the king to Samuel Castiel, David Belila, Efraim Sala and Joseph Levi, who
constructed the paradesi synagogue (the only surviving synagogue in
Mattancherry) and the Jews’ town in 1568. With the advent of this group
the strength of the Jews increased and the anti-Portuguese feelings cemented
their ties of solidarity. Under the umbrella of the royal protection from the
king of Cochin, the Jews of Cochin began to develop a parallel commercial
arrangement and from this time on, we find the Jews-in-conflict emerging as
the greatest agents of pepper diversion in Cochin.

The steps for ensuring the co-operation of the St. Thomas Christians
were taken also during the time of John III, who used to fund greatly for the
study of the seminarians of this community either in Portugal or in
Cranganore, though the purpose of this study-expenditure was to get them
latinised which would ensure them as regular collaborators for the
Portuguese ecclesiastical and commercial systems. The cultivators and the
merchants had grievances against the fraudulent practices of the Portuguese,
who used to under-weigh their commodities using false weights. This must
have prompted many to sell their commodities to the non-Portuguese. This
was a matter of concern for the Portuguese officials and some of them
including St. Francis Xavier wrote to the crown about this fact. King John III
wrote to the concerned officials repeatedly to redress the grievances which
the community of St. Thomas Christians had against the Portuguese traders
who resorted to mal-practices in the weighing of pepper. But it seems that
despite crown’s interference, fraudulent practices continued to exist in pepper
dealings. Moreover, along with the phase of co-operation, some of the
Portuguese clergy like Pe. Alvaro Penteado, and Pe. Michael Carneiro had begun to label St. Thomas Christians as heretics and the non-Latin practices were accused of Nestorian heresy. When Mar Joseph came to Malabar from Persian Chaldean Church to take charge as the Bishop of this community, the Portuguese tried to arrest him accusing heresy. It created much tension among the principal cultivator group in the hinterland. In 1557, the St. Thomas Christians organised an amocos or suicide squad comprising 2000 soldiers to protect their bishop from being arrested. Seeds of unrest were sowed among the pepper producers, who deemed their liturgical and ecclesiatical traditions greater than the commercial link with the Portuguese. In spite of the strong resistance from the St. Thomas Christians, their bishop Mar Abraham was arrested and taken to Lisbon as a heretic. In the trial that was conducted there, he succeeded in convincing the crown of his innocence and he came back to Malabar in 1565. But two years later he was again arrested with the same accusations and in the trial that was conducted in the first council of Goa, the accusation was confirmed that he was a heretic. From Goa, he was sent to Lisbon from where he was again sent to Rome where he died in 1569. The arrest of their bishop and the way in which the latter was treated accusing of heresy, antagonised the majority of the pepper growing St. Thomas Christians, who had been under the jurisdiction of this bishop. This tension which started by the end of 1550s continued although the next decades causing downward flow of pepper to Cochin.
3. The General Economic Crisis

Portugal had been experiencing terrible economic crisis in 1521-1524-1535 and 1545-1552 which affected the Indian situation along with the above mentioned factors. It was actually the balance sheet of the famines and pestilences which affected Portugal during these years. Added to it, the heavy expenses incurred in the royal marriages, and the settlement of Moluccan issue. drained the Portuguese exchequer. Thus for instance, in 1526, king John III paid 900,000 cruzados to the spanish emperor Charles V as dowry for the marriage of his sister Isabella with the latter, the largest dowry in European history. As per the matrimonial negotiations between the two crowns the amount of dowry was to be paid in three instalments of 50,000 quintals of pepper at the Portuguese factory of Antwerp. Three years later the Portuguese crown paid another amount of 350,000 cruzados to the Spanish emperor to settle the Spanish claims over Moluccas. These and other related issues led to the flow of about 1,790,000 cruzados to Spain from Portugal, causing the debt of John III to rise upto 1,946,000 cruzados. Meanwhile, the factory at Antwerp, which was the centre of the distribution of spices in the north Europe and collection centre of wares to India from Germany and other northern countries registered a debt of enormous amount. By the end of 1548 decision was taken by John III to close this royal factory and on 15th February 1549 it came into effect. The strain on the finance of the mother country began to affect the economic activities in India. The amount sent to the Portuguese factories in India both for the payment of Portuguese officers as well as for the purchase of spices began to dwindle.
Very often complaint is found to be registered that the fleet from Portugal was coming without sufficient money. Thus for instance in the letter of Martim Afonso de Souza to the king dated 24th December 1537, we read that the ships which recently arrived in Cochin were without money. Later we find this economic crisis becoming acute as the number of ships coming to Cochin for taking cargo was decreasing. On 28th December 1541, Miguel de Cunha wrote to the crown that in that year no ship came to Cochin from the kingdom. Moreover, the Germans who used to participate in the Indian trade in the early decades of sixteenth century were facing another problem. The waves of protestant reformation in Germany has triggered off peasant uprising and revolt against the monopolists who used to supply to the Portuguese copper and other merchandise for exchange in India. The protestant move against the catholic monopolists like the Fuggers and other merchant magnates affected, to a certain extent, the commercial activities in Germany, which still tightened the Portuguese position to supply in Cochin the wares of exchange in sufficient quantities.

On the Indian side, the existing political order was undergoing a significant phase of change with some economic repercussions. The Turks had begun to enter the Indian seas quite frequently from 1538 on, when the Turkish fleet came under Sulaiman Pasha to capture Diu. Though with the advent of Viceroy Garcia de Noronha (1538-1540) they had to retreat, they changed their activities to Persian gulf region where they thwarted the Portuguese control. Meanwhile the Turkish sultan had made a contract-suggestion to the Portuguese king through a letter dated 28th May 1544 that
the Portuguese could supply 4000 Zentner (1 Zentner = 50 kg) pepper and other
drugs to the Turkish governor in Aden, without causing damage to the
Portuguese commerce. He showed his readiness to buy these spices as the
French and Venetians were purchasing from them. But this dream was not
realised and the sultan’s fleet continued its tightening control in the Persian
gulf. In 1546 they conquered Basra, the gate of the Tigris and Euphrates
valleys and the eastern terminus of the desert-route to Aleppo. In 1551 and
1553 too, they sent fleets to Indian Ocean and captured the Portuguese
held-Muscat (though they abandoned it later after destroying the city). This
hindered the Portuguese trade with the Persian gulf ports which reduced the amount of income generated locally through Asian trade. Along
with these maritime developments, significant changes could be seen in the
mainland of India, as well. The combined forces of Muslim rulers under
Adil Shah of Bijapore and Qutbul-Mulk of Golconda defeated the
Vijayanagara king Rama Raya in the battle of Talicotta on 23rd January
1565. The great significance of the battle of Talicotta was that it sealed
the fate of the Vijayanagara kingdom, which had been the major market for
the horses imported by the Portuguese through Goa and Cochin and a major
source of diamonds and other precious stones taken to Lisbon. In this
changed situation, the league of Muslim rulers of Bijapore, Ahmadnagar,
and Achin joined by Zamorin of Calicut seemed to overwhelm the
Portuguese settlements in the Indian Ocean regions. Many scholars like Luis
Filipe Thomaz view that the fall of Vijayanagara kingdom was followed by
a period of acute crisis, both political and economic, for the Estado da India
which lasted from 1565 to 1575.\(^{578}\) Meanwhile, though the economic situation did not improve, the course of the political developments was moving towards a safer direction. The Moghuls who had already established a base\(^{579}\) in north India in 1526, were tightening their grip over the rest of the country especially with the ascension of Akbar (1556-1605). The southward march of Akbar resulted in the destruction of the kingdom of Cambay and the conquest of half of Ahmadnagar. This move from the unexpected corner made Adil Shah and other traditional anti-Portuguese forces to concentrate on the safety of their own land rather than to fight against the Lusitanians.\(^{580}\)

Out of the troubled situation mentioned above, the Portuguese could make political profit, and strengthen their position by erecting further fortresses. The space for the erection of a fortress in Bacaim was given to the Portuguese by the sultan Bahadur Shah of Cambay in virtue of a contract ratified on 23rd December 1534. The governor Nuno da Cunha laid here the foundation stone for the fortress in March 1536.\(^{581}\) The fortress of Daman was given to the Portuguese by the sultan of Cambay and the Viceroy D. Constantino Bragança occupied it on 2nd February 1559. It was given the name of our Lady of Purification.\(^{582}\) After the downfall of the Vijayanagara empire, three fortresses were erected in Canara: the fortress of St. Sebastian constructed in Mangalore in 1568 by the Viceroy D. Antao de Noronha,\(^{583}\) the fortress of Barcelor constructed by the viceroy D. Luis de Ataide in 1568\(^ {584}\) and the fortress of Onor (Honawar) erected by the same Viceroy in 1569.\(^ {585}\) The general picture we get for this period is that the political position of the
Portuguese in India was more stable than ever. But the entire Portuguese structure, at the same time, was tormented by economic ills, which assumed chronic proportions in matters related to export trade.

The economic ills, which emerged out of the situations mentioned above led to the revival of eastern Mediterranean trade. Lourenco Pires de Tavora, the Portuguese ambassador to the papal court reported in 16560 to Lisbon that 40,000 hundred weighs of pepper and other spices were entering Alexandria annually. He says that while very little came to Lisbon, so much went to the dominion of the Turks. Ferdinand Braudel says that the quantities of spices arriving at Lisbon by 1560 were just about equal to those entering Alexandria. The imports of spices to Venice, which controlled most of the trade with Syria and Egypt, was said to have reached the level of pre-Portuguese period. In the changed situation even the prominent foreign merchants began to change their commercial establishments. Thus, for instance, in 1558, the Fuggers closed their business house of Lisbon and in the following years they began to buy pepper directly at Alexandria from whence, via Ragusa and Fiume, they transported the commodities directly into central Europe. Eventually Venice also began to face sharp competition in the levant from the French, Genoese and Ragusans. The years after the death of Sulaiman the Magnificent in 1566 were characterised by the outbreak of disorders in the Ottoman empire and revolts in places like Arabia and Yemen. The peaceful relationship existed between Venice and the Turks in 1570 over the control of Cyprus. By this time, the French cities like Marseilles were trying to exploit this situation of tensions to establish
hegemony over the spice trade in the Levant.\textsuperscript{591} Because of the large flow of spices, the prices in Levantine and Egyptian marts began to come down to a lower level than that which existed in the market services through Lisbon, which attracted other Europeans as well, to enter into commercial competition in the eastern Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{592}

\textbf{The Volume of Export}

For want of continuous data, the volume of export trade to Europe via Lisbon could not be exactly presented. However, the available sources give us an impression that despite the factors mentioned above and the entry of considerable amount of pepper into Europe via Venice, the \textit{carreira} used to take equally enormous quantity of spices to Lisbon. The increase in the production, growth of which was supposed to have been 1340 quintals per year,\textsuperscript{593} must have been the reason for the relatively high volume of pepper-export to Portugal, even when great volume was diverted to traditional routes and other commercial destinations within Asia. In 1545, the ship "St.Thomas" alone was loaded with 9860 quintals of pepper from Cochin and moved towards the Kingdom.\textsuperscript{594} In 1546, five ships and an amount of 41266 \textit{pardaos} were sent from Lisbon to buy spices.\textsuperscript{595} These five ships were loaded with 40,000 quintals of spices out of which 36412 quintals were pepper. On 26th January 1547, Francisco da Maya wrote to the governor that the profit that the crown would get out of this transaction would be 1200000 \textit{cruzados}.\textsuperscript{596} In 1547, four ships were sent to Cochin with 30000 \textit{cruzados} for the pepper purchase. These ships carried back to Lisbon 23827
quintals of pepper. On 29th January 1552, Joao Anes wrote to the crown that five ships from Cochin were moving to Lisbon. We do not know for certain, how much spices were taken in each of them, as this transhipment took place during the difficult days of Vaduthala war when spices did not reach Cochin regularly. However, we have evidence that one of these ships, Sao Joao which wrecked near African coast, alone had 12000 quintals of pepper. A few details regarding the volume of export from Cochin to Lisbon are given below:

**Volume of Export from Cochin 1545-1552**

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<th>Commodities</th>
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<td>517246</td>
<td>1910138</td>
<td>1249941</td>
<td>629508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginger</td>
<td>81784</td>
<td>50466</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinnamon</td>
<td>8551</td>
<td>15371</td>
<td>11381</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutmeg</td>
<td>8341</td>
<td>37614</td>
<td>7449</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mace</td>
<td>1836</td>
<td>14479</td>
<td>4197</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Incense</td>
<td></td>
<td>2833</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sealing Wax</td>
<td>5141</td>
<td>14636</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Medicinal drugs</td>
<td>2518</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Benzoin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1259</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aloe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>262</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camphor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long pepper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>525</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The available data should not lead one to the misunderstanding that there was regular and constant export trade to Lisbon during this period in
the volume as stated above. The fact that frequency with which the spices were taken to Lisbon was increasingly diminishing could also be seen from the lack of documents for the European trade from Cochin for this period. The transhipment of 1547 and 1548 shows an improvement of the situation, which was the result of the vigilant steps taken by Estado authorities which included even the transfer of officials involved in private trade. But the volume of trade decreased considerably from the next year onwards because of the outbreak of Vaduthala war and other related tensions. These facts are depicted in the following diagram to show the general trend of this period:

Pepper export from Cochin to Lisbon 1545 - 1552

Diagram - 4

(A=Year 1545, B=Year 1547, C=Year 1548, D=Year 1552)

Besides spices, a good variety of other commodities and animals were exported to Portugal from Cochin. Thus, for instance, as we read in the letter of Ruy Goncalvez de Caminha dated 2nd January 1548, elephants were sent to Lisbon from Cochin. On 30th December 1548, Cosme Anes wrote to the king from Cochin that he was purchasing very precious diamonds for the
crown which he found to be the most perfect and valuable thing in the land.\textsuperscript{606} Precious stones were brought from different places to Cochin to be taken to the kingdom. On 24th January 1551, Sebastian Ferreira wrote to the Portuguese queen that the precious stones brought by Diogo Vaz from Ceylon and the gold necklace and bracelets offered by Bhuvaneka Bahu were already sent to Lisbon from Cochin.\textsuperscript{607} Other items like coir, necessary for ship-building, were also exported from Cochin. The newly converted king of Maldives had, as we read in the letter of Henrique de Souza Chichorro dated 8th January 1557, offered to deliver 500 \textit{bhars} of \textit{coir} every year to Cochin to be taken to Portugal.\textsuperscript{608}

It is worth giving a diagram presenting the total volume of pepper-export to Europe from Cochin during the period between 1500 and 1570, so as to enable one to understand the transactions conducted in Cochin.

\textit{Total Volume of Trade in Pepper with Portugal(1500-1570)}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{pepper-trade-diagram.png}
\caption{Total Volume of Pepper Trade with Portugal (1500-1570).}
\end{figure}

$X$ \textit{axis} = \textit{Years}  \\
$Y$ \textit{axis} = \textit{Pepper in kilograms}
For want of continuous data, one cannot depict all the trends of trade in this diagram. Still, this graphic presentation shows that even in 1540's, when private trade thrived in Cochin, some attempts were made by the Portuguese, at least occasionally, to despatch more cargo to Lisbon. The interrupted tendencies of the trade-index to move upward is to be understood against this background.

Thus the commercial activities fostered by the Portuguese in Cochin included different strands. The groupings into local, intra-local, intra-Asian and Indo-European trades are done to understand properly the nature of this strand-structure. The participation of German and Italian merchants in Indo-European trade, the under-pricing of the commodities by determining a fixed price, and the liberty chests provided for the officials of the ships, were all first steps of the initial phase to organise Indian trade. But they proved very decisive as the German and Italian participation ensured regular supply of copper for exchange in Cochin, the price-fixation ensured constant supply of commodities at cheaper rate for about a century, the practice of encouraging private initiatives through liberty chests was extended to other fields where entrepreneurial commercial concessions were given as reward and recognition for the service. There was a marked difference between the first phase which ended with 1535 and the second phase which started with 1535 and ended with 1570. In the first phase we find relatively great volume of spices going to Lisbon in which process, the continuous co-operation and assistance of the natives played a very key role. The different native mercantile communities, with vast resources and wide net-works enabled
the Portuguese to get the commodities without much strain and difficulty. In the second phase we see these traditional merchants being slowly replaced by the casado traders. Since the later did not have sufficient ressources and net-works as the traditional merchant groups had, the casados began to concentrate more on aquiring them rather than feeding the carreiras of the crown. Private trade and even illegal commercial traffic too, which dominated the commercial scenario of the period from 1535 to 1570, to a certain extent, were an exigency of the time. With the increase of tenstions in the hinterland and the gradual estrangement of pepper growing communities, the diversion of pepper became a frequent phenomena. The result was that from 1535 onwards, the indexes of Indo-European trade began to show diminishing trands, while the commerce in Asia and with Venice registered an upward growth.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Many Indian writers resent the usage "Estado da India" or "Portuguese Empire in India" as the Portuguese could never occupy significant land area of the Indian subcontinent. What they possessed was some disjointed territory or tiny footholds on the coastal belts of India, which were established for the free flow of their trade and which actually appeared to be insignificant on the map of India. K.N. Menon, *Portuguese Pockets in India*, New Delhi, 1953, pp.7-10. Luis Filipe Thomaz has, in his collection of essays, evolved the concept of the Portuguese "network" and not an "empire" to describe "Estado da India" and thus he tries to purge the pejorative connotations attached to it. Luis Filipe Thomaz, *De Ceuta a Timor*, Lisboa, 1994. In another place, he says that the Estado da India was a thalassocracy rather than a clearly defined territory. Luis Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago during the 16th Century" in *Archipel* 18 (1979) SPAFA Consultation Workshop on Research in Maritime Shipping and Trade Networks in South East Asia (1-W7) Cisarua, West Java Nov. 20-27, 1984, p.75 Estado da India had less land-space and more maritime-space. It could be called a maritime empire with naval bases at strategic trade centres as well as outlets from the hinterland. Though the geo-physical size of these footholds might have been tiny, the external control and influence which they exercised over the exchange systems of the coastal India must not be underestimated.


3. The word *casados* means married men or family men. They were the Portuguese who were usually married to the native women and were allowed to leave the royal service and to settle down as citizens as well as traders.


6. See the city plan of Cochin in Luis da Silveira, *Livro das Plantas das Fortalezas, Cidades e Povoações do Estado da India Oriental, com as Descrições do Maritimo dos Reinos e Províncias onde estão situados e outros Portos Principais daquelas partes: Contribuição para a Historia das Fortalezas dos Portugueses no Ultramar,*


8. ANTT, *Inquisição de Lisboa*, Proc. 5265 fols. 45 and 55. *Pau-da-China* is a creeper seen in China, Japan and Western India and is classified under the name of *Smilax China*. It was often used to cure venereal diseases.


14. The details about the imprisonment and inquisition procedures were mentioned in chapter III where the institution of the *Inquisition of Cochin* was dealt with.

15. K.S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad, *op cit.*, doc. 14, p. 27.


18. Etymologically the word "marakkar" means captain or owner of a ship and is derived from the Tamil word "Marakalam" meaning ship. For details see O.K. Nambiar, *The Kunjalis, Admirals of Calicut*, London, 1963, p. 76. By the end of the fifteenth century these traders seem to have established themselves in Cochin. Ludovico di Varthema says that Mamale Marakkar of Cochin was the "richest man in the country". Ludovico di Varthema, *The Travels of Ludovico di Varthema in Egypt, Syria, Arabia Deserta and Arabia Felix, in Persia, India and Ethiopia: 1503-1508*, London, 1863, p. 106. Barros also says that Mamale Marakkar and Cherina Marakkar were the leading merchants of Cochin. The ship with seven elephants which Cabral captured on Zamorin's bid belonged to Cherina Marakkar, who sent them to Cambay. João de Barros, *Decadas II*, liv. V, cap. VI, p. 140; For details about the trade of Marakkars with Choromandel coast in rice and textiles see Genevieve Bouchon "Les Musulmans du Kerala à L'Époque de La Découverte Portugaise" in *Mare Luso-Indicum*, II-5, Paris, 1973, pp. 52-54; Jorge Manuel Flores "The Straits of Ceylon and the Maritime Trade in Early Sixteenth Century India:


20. During the failed expedition to Malacca in 1506, Francisco Pereira, Estevão de Vilhena, Nine Marakkar and one of Gaspar da Gama’s sons arrived in a port of Coromandel where they were welcomed by a brother of Nine Marakkar, who was a great merchant of that port. Raymundo Bulhão de Pato, Cartas..., tom.II, pp.377-378; For more details about the family network of the Marakkar Muslim merchants see Genevieve Bouchon, "Les Musulmans du Kerala à L’Époque de La Découverte.." pp.52-53. These Marakkars especially Cherina Marakkar of Cochin used to sell rice even to the Portuguese factory of Cannanore in 1516. ANTT, Nucleo Antigo, No.804, fol.37.


27. ANTT, Inquisição de Lisboa, Proc.5265, fols.37; 45-47.


29. Diogo Vaz, a new Christian of Cochin, was one among them who was even said to be taken by Isaac to Cairo, the capital of Egypt.ANTT, Inquisição de Lisboa, Proc.7296. fol.77. For more details about the activities of Isaac do Cairo see, José Alberto R.Silva Tavim "Os Judeus e a Expansão Portuguesa an India durante o Seculo XVI. O Exemplo de Isaac do Cairo: Espião, Lingua e Judeu de Cochim de Cima." in Arquivos do Centro Cultural Calouste Gulbenkian, Vol.XXXIII, Lisboa, 1994, pp.167-187.


33. For more details about the mercantile ties between the Jews and new Christians during this period, see Jose Alberto Rodrigues da Silva "Outras Gentes em Outras Routas: Judeus e Cristãos-novos de Cochim-Entre Santa Cruz de Cochin e
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35. ANTT, Nucleo Antigo, n."804, fol.10; See also K.S.Mathew, Portuguese Trade with India, p.175.


39. See the letters of Alexis de Sousa sent from Cochin to Francisco Correia the captain of Quilon dated 19-12-1542; 2-1-1543, 22-12-1543 which speak about the copper that was being sold to Cochin by the captain of Quilon. Biblioteca do Palacio da Ajuda, India Portuguesa, 51-8-43, fols.61-62; On 16th January 1544, we find Alexis de Souza sending money to Francisco Correia for the copper the former bought from him.Ibid., 51-8-43, fol.63.

40. Fernao Lopes de Castanheda, Historia do Descobrimento..., tom.V, p.7; Gaspar Correia, Lendas da India, tom.II, pp.558-559. By 1547, the land routes were said to have had two directions: One towards south to Cape Comorin while the other which was more frequent to Coromandel across the ghats. See the letter of Manuel Lobato to the governor written on 25th August 1547. Elaine Sanceau, Colecção de Sao Lourenço, Vol.II, p.390. From Cape Comorin these spices were again taken to Masulipatanam, Orissa, and Bengal by the lobby which was engaged in illegal trade transactions. See Elaine Sanceau, Colecção de Sao Lourenço, Vol.III, p.356.

41. For details about these hinterland-routes see the second chapter on Native Cochin and the Hinterlands.

42. Kothamangalam was an important pepper growing area of this period. Jan Kieniewicz. "Pepper Gardens and Market in Pre-Colonial Malabar" in Moyen Orient and Ocean Indien XVIe-XIXeS., 3, Paris, 1986. p.2; For more details see second chapter.

43. Zaruquly (Chalakkudy) was referred to as a main centre of pepper deviation to Tamil Nadu.Luys da Costa, in Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa, Vol.III, Lisbon, 1963, p.315.


45. For more details see M.N.Pearson, Coastal Western India, pp.27-32.

The main sources for this graph are R.A.Bulhão Pato, *Cartas* ... tom.IV, pp.174-176; tom.III, p.258; The details for European trade were furnished by Marino Sanuto which are further explained below in this chapter. These details are carefully analysed against the study already done by Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, *Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial*, Vol.III, Editorial Presença, Lisboa,1982, pp.73-74; K.S.Mathew, *Portuguese Trade with India*, pp.115-145.

This is based on a report sent to the crown in 1533 explaining the reasons why the latter got so little pepper. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 50, doc.65.


ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 52, doc.25.

The tension between Cochin and Vadakkenkur fomented over Bardela (Vaduthala) and its temple from where the king of Cochin had taken away the money. Elaine Sanceau, *Coleção de São Lourenço*, Vol.III, p.15; As per the obligations of the treaty concluded between the Portuguese and the Zamorin in 1540, the Zamorin undertook not to wage direct war with Cochin and the Portuguese. Faria y Sousa, *op cit.*, tom.II, p.14; C.Achyuta Menon, *op cit.*, p.82. But when the Vadakkenkur king started war he found a loop-hole in this treaty whereby he joinned the enemy of Cochin, i.e., the Vadakkenkur king and began to wage an indirect war with the Portuguese. The association of Tanore king and Zamorin with the Vadakkenkur king made this fight fierce both on land and waterANTT, *Chancellaria de D.João III, Privilegios*, I fol.10v; III, fol.51v; 168v; ANTT, *Gavetas*, 15,Maço 20,doc.8.

ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 87, doc.50.

See for details Diogo Couto, *Decada* VI, part.II. Book X, Chaps.15 and 17; *Decada VII*, part.I, Book I chaps.6 and 7; Francisco de Andrade, *Chronica do Muyto alto e Muyto Poderoso Rey destes Reynos de Portugal, D.JoãoIII*, part.III, Coimbra, MDCCLXXXXVI, p.168; 470; parte.IV; p.240.

ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 30, doc.36; see also M.N. Pearson, *Coastal Western India: Studies from the Portuguese Records*, New Delhi, 1981, p.30; For the details of the routes through which this pepper was taken through the ghat-route to Bengal and China see the map of Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, *L'Économie de L'Empire Portugais aux Xve et XVIe Siècles*, Paris, 1969.

The partnership between the *casados* anmd the Gujarati merchants would be discusssed later in this chapter.

This route free from the zone of Portuguese influence was created and encouraged by Zamorin, Kunjali’s men as well as Mamale of Cannanore who possessed Maldives. This was the usual route for the anti-Portuguese merchant groups. For details see Genevieve Bouchon, "Les Musulmans du Kerala à L’Époque de la Découverte", p.41; Genevieve Bouchon, "Sixteenth Century Malabar and the Indian Ocean" in Ashin Das Gupta and M.N. Pearson(eds.), *India and the Indian Ocean*
The so-called piratical activities to which they resorted to were not mere plunder of the vessels, though it was a part of the strategy to block the ships of the enemy. It also had a trade dimension, which created safe space for the anti-Portuguese vessels to ply to destinations of their interests. For further details see the discussion on corsair activities.

Luis Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the seas of the Archipelago during the 16th Century" p.77.

See the royal letter from Palmela dated 15-3-1531, ANTT, Chancelaria de D. João III, liv.º 9 fol.18.

For details see Luis Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago during the 16th Century", p.77.

ANTT, Nucleo Antigo, No.807. The details of this voyage are given in Luis Filipe Thomaz, A Viagem de Antonio Correia a Pegu em 1519, Lisbon, 1975; See also Genevieve Bouchon, "Les Premiers Voyages Portugaises á Pasai et á Pegou" Archipel, 18(1979), pp.127-156.

Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Cochin in Decline, 1600-1650: Myth and Manipulation in the Estado da India" in Roderich Ptak, Portuguese Asia: Aspects in History and Economic History (Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries), Stuttgart, 1987, p.64.


Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Decline in Cochin, 1600-1650" p.65.
73. Ibid., p.66.
74. ANTT, Corpo Chronologico, I, Maço 76 doc. 8.
77. Sanjay Subrahmaniam, "Decline in Cochin", 1600-1650, p.67.
79. Some sort of vague geographical division between them for commerce in the Indian Ocean seem to have existed throughout the period under consideration. The strong link which the Muslim merchants of Kerala had with their co-religionists in Red Sea area and the equally strong anti-Portuguese feelings that prevailed among them, might have compelled the casados, besides the freedom they got in the maritime space east of Cape Comorin, to look for more receptive trade centres in the South East Asia.
80. Cf.Supra No.4.
82. The king of Cochin was interested more in the trade of Cochin than in the well-being of Estado da India. So he joined hands with the casados giving them tax-concessions. He turned against Albuquerque after the peace treaty which the latter concluded with the Zamorin. ANTT, Chancelaria de D. Manuel, I, liv.911, fol.83 (Albuquerque got the hostile Zamorin poisoned and installed his own nominee on the throne of Calicut and it was with this new Zamorin that he concluded peace treaty) The king of Cochin strongly protested against this move and even wrote letters to D. Manuel manifesting his displeasure over Albuquerque's alliance with Zamorin. ANTT, Cartas dos Vice-Reis da India, doc.69. With the transfer of the capital of the Estado from Cochin to Goa in 1530, the king's alignment with the private traders became more evident, as the casados were his main source of income. He began to encourage them by taking a benevolent approach and
by reducing the customs.

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86. Genevieve Bouchon and Luis Filipe Thomaz (ed.), *Voyage dans les Deltas du Gange et de l'Irraouadday*, pp.56-60.

87. Luis Filipe Thomaz, "Diogo Pereira, O Malabar", p.50-64.

88. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Cartas...tom. I*, p.197.

89. Luis Filipe Thomaz, *A Viagem de Antonio Correia a Pegu em 1519*, p.36.


91. Sanjay Subrahmanyan, "Cochin in Decline..." p.63.


94. These 2000 horses imported yearly from Arabia to Goa brought an annual income of 100000 Xerafins by way of Customs duties. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 87, doc.2.

95. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 52, doc. 25. Chymbechenaque and Beteperemal seem to have been the rulers of southern territories of present day Tamil Nadu.


99. Antonio Ferreira gave witness before the Inquisition court of Lisbon that Luis Rodrigues used to take horses beyond Cape Comorin to sell them in Bembar (Vembar in the Pearl Fishery coast). ANTT, *Inquisição de Lisboa*, Proc. 12292, fol.82.


102. For details about the favours and privileges granted to those who defended Diu, see Antonio Baião, *Historia Quinhentista do Segundo cêrco de Dio*, pp.296-333. These grants were basically of two nature: 1. The privilege to conduct specific voyages in
the crown ships or in personal vessels. 2. The privilege for mere ship-building without any specific mention of voyages.


105. For details about the co-operation of the Muslim traders till the death of Afonso de Albuquerque see K.S. Mathew, *Portuguese Trade with India in the Sixteenth Century*, pp. 100-106; Genevieve Bouchon, *Les Musulmans du Kerala...*, pp. 52-53.

106. Though *cartazes* were introduced right from 1502 on, the Muslim traders became the constant victims of raid and torture, conducted in the name of this safe-conduct, only after the death of Albuquerque. It was partly because of the change in the policy of king Manuel which explicitly demanded the officers to favour merchant-groups other than Muslims. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Cartas...* tom. I, p. 306. But the moves against the merchant-groups of the Muslim community became more evident and organised with the assumption of offices by those who supported the private entreprenuerial class among the Portuguese in Cochin.

107. Zaynuddin writes: "Every vessel, however small, being provided with a distinct pass.... and if this pass was not to be found, they would invariably make a seizure of the ship, its crew and its cargo. Zaynuddin Shaykh, *Tuhfat-ul-Mujahidin*, tran. S. Muhammed Husain Nainar, Madras, 1942, pp. 89-91.


110. A.P. Ibrahim Kunju, *Studies in Medieval Kerala*, Trivandrum, 1975, p. 60. These Muslim merchants from Cochin seem to have got prominence in Calicut, in the vacuum already created by the foreign Muslims (who controlled traditionally the chief affairs of Calicut), when they left Calicut to places like Hormuz, Gujarat, Vijayaganagar and Red sea ports in 1513 as a reaction against the peace treaty which the Portuguese made with the Zamorin. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Cartas...*, Tom. I, p. 126.


114. Kunjali was said to be the cousin of Pate Marakkar see the letter of Francisco de Sousa Tavares written to D. John III dated 14th January 1535. *As Gavetas da Torre do Tombo*, Vol. X, Lisboa, 1975, p. 577. But Diogo Couto says that Kunjali was the brother of Pate Marakkar. Diogo Couto, *Da Asia, Decada V*, part 2, p. 4.
After these incidents the Muslim merchants of Cochin appear only very occasionally in Portuguese documents, a factor which attests considerable amount of degradation from the economic importance and the role which they used to have. Some of them seem to have resorted to peddling trade. About the nature of peddling trade Rothermund writes: "The trader conducts his small scale business on his own account. He is the unit of decision making. He buys and sells on the spot whatever he thinks fit and can adjust to the situation of various markets immediately. If he is an itinerant trader he can choose his route himself and change it at short notice. He can, therefore, easily avoid political pressure or other hazards; but his commercial intelligence is naturally limited as he has to find out about everything for himself". D. Rothermund, *Asian Trade and European Expansion in the Age of Mercantilism*, Delhi, 1981, p.7; Some of them began to put up small shops for their livelihood. K.S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad, *Emergence of Cochin*, doc.14, pp.27-28.

See the treatise on the drugs and spices of Malacca dated 23rd September 1533, ANTT, *Cartas dos Vice-Reis*, n."21; see also Luis Filipe Thomaz, *Os Portugueses em Malacca (1511-1580)*, Vol.II, Mestrado thesis submitted at the Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, 1964, doc.98, pp.278: Luis Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago during the 16th Century", p.76.; Even during the time of royal monopoly some individuals used to receive licence to carry contraband goods from South East Asia to Cochin. Thus, for example Rui Araujo, the first agent of Malacca, received licence to send to Cochin 29000 kgs. of cloves every year. The letter of king D. Manuel to Rui Araujo, dated 2nd March 1514, ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, II, Maço 42 doc. 260; See also the permission given to Martim Afonso de Melo dated 26th March 1521, ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, II, Maço 84, doc.54.


Diogo de Couto, *Da Asia, Decada VI*, liv°.viii, p.19; Luis Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago...", p.76.


Luis Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the seas of the Archipelago...", p.83: From 1522 onwards (till the temporary closing of China gate), the Portuguese had regular carreira from Cochin to China. There were usually three ships or junks in this annual chinese expedition. Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, "Os Portugueses e o Oriente" in *Ensaios*, Vol.II, pp.243-244.

See the details of the negotiations connected with the establishment of the


124. Right from 1526, we have evidence of Benagalese clothes being brought to Cochin for sale. For example see the case of Manoel da Garna, who was the factor and captain of the coast of Coromandel and who brought textiles from Bengal to Cochin. ANTT, *Nucleo Antigo*, No.808, fols.5-6.

125. Bengal was the chief destination because of the high price that prevailed there. In 1545, a secret enquiry was made by the governor as to know the price of Bengal. It led to the discovery of the fact that the net profit from each *Zentner* was 950 reis. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, II Maço 240, doc.60; During 1540s we find lot of treatises on the navigation to Bengal, attesting the frequency with which the ships used to visit the ports of Bengal. See for example A Fontoura da Costa (ed.), *Livro de Marinharia de Bernardo Fernandes* (cerca de 1548), Lisboa, 1940, pp.89-91; Jacinto Ignacio de Brito Rebello, *Livro de Marinharia: Tratado da Agulha de Marear de João de Lisboa*.Roteiros, Sondas e Outros Conhecimentos relativos à Navegação, *Codice do Seculo XVI*, Lisboa, 1903, p.233.

126. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 52, doc.23.


129. K.S.Mathew and Afzal Ahmad,(ed.), *Emergence of Cochin....*, doc.53, pp.73-84.


131. This exodus of New Christians to Cochin began with the anti-semitic religious policy taken by king John III. The bula *Cum ad nihil magis* issued by pope Clement VIII on 17th December 1531 (at the request of John III) and the law of 14th June 1532 prohibiting the exit of the New Christians from the kingdom were the first steps to purge the latter from the semitic practices. On 23rd May 1536, "the Holy Office" for inquisitorial proceedings, was established in Portugal by pope Paul III to deal with them on matters of faith. In this adverse situation many New Christians,

132. It was in 1557 that these New Christians were arrested and began to be accused of semitic practices. The inquiry in Cochin against them was spearheaded by the Jesuit Gonçalo da Silveira. For details particularly Ana Cannas da Cunha, *A inquisição no Estado da India: Origens* (1539-1560) pt.2, Lisboa, 1995; These New Christians could until then come to any high post in *Estado da India* like any other Portuguese citizen. For example Jácome Olivares was made a member of the Municipal council of Cochin. But the very moment they came to know that he was a New Christian, he was expelled from the council. ANTT, *Inquisição de Lisboa*, Proc.5265, fol.36.


134. His route seems to have been Malacca -Pegu-Martaban-Ceylon-Cochin, Cochin-Mergui (in the coast of Tennaserim in Siam)-Pegu-Cochin,Cochin-Nagapatanam-Bengal. For details see, ANTT, *Inquisição de Lisboa*, Proc.12292, fols.4, 17-22,33, 36-38, 42-43, 72, 77-79, 82.


139. Joseph Wicki, "Duas Relações sobre a situação da India Portuguesa nos anos de 1568 e 1569" in *Studia*, N.º 8, Lisboa, 1961, pp.200-201. This comment was made when he was in the office of Archbishop of Goa in 1569.


141. See the letter of Lourenço Pires de Tavora (the Portuguese ambassador in Rome) written to the king on 19th July 1561 in Luis Augusto·Rebello da Silva, *Corpo Diplomático Português*, Vol.IX, Lisboa, 1910, p.303; This news reached Rome via Alexandria and Venice and finally the ears of the Portuguese ambassador.

142. Luis Filipe Thomaz, "Portuguese Control on the Arabian Sea and the Bay of
Bengal-A Comparative Study" A paper presented in the Conference on Bay of Bengal in New Delhi, Dec.1994, p.27.

143. Luis Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago", p.77; Voyages of the second category were, as we have already seen, rewards and recognitions and so the crown happily provided space in the royal vessels. Thus in 1548, D.Pedro da Silva was given the permission to bring yearly 20 bhares of mace and 80 bhares of nutmeg in the royal ship, besides the privilege to send a ship twice a year to Bengal, Pegu and Molucas. Bibliotheca da Ajuda, Livro das Mercês que fez D. João de Castro (1545-1548), 51-8-46, fol.57.

144. Antonio Baião, Historia Quinhentista do Segundo cérco de Dio, p.312; On 25th June1547, he was again allowed to send one more ship to Porto Grande of Bengal, Ibid., p.327; See also Bibliotheca do Palacio da Ajuda, Livro das Mercés que fez D João de Castro, 51-8-46, fol.129.


146. Ibid.

147. Ibid., pp.306 and 309-310.

148. Ibid., p.312.

149. Ibid., p.321.

150. Ibid; See also Bibliotheca do Palacio da Ajuda, Livro das Mercês que fez D João de Castro, 51-8-46, fol.121.

151. Antonio Baião, Historia Quinhentista do Segundo cérco de Dio, p.328; See also Bibliotheca do Palacio da Ajuda, Livro das Mercês que fez D. João de Castro, 51-8-46 fol.129v.

152. Antonio Baião, Historia Quinhentista do Segundo cérco de Dio, p.321; Some others like Francisco de Sequeira who had the habit of the Order of Christ and who came to Diu from Cochin with four of his catus was given 45000 Reis and the permission to build a ship in Malabar. Bibliotheca do Palacio da Ajuda, Livro das Mercês que fez D João de Castro, 51-8-46 fol.122.

153. Ibid., p.315.

154. Ibid., pp.315-316.

155. Ibid., p.308.


158. ANTT, Chancellaria de D. João III, Doações, 69 fol. 98v; On 22nd November 1547 Alvares Teles had been granted the permission to send ships from Chittagong to Pegu and Malacca. Bibliotheca do Palacio da Ajuda, Livro das Mercês que fez D. João de Castro, 51-8-46, fol.170.


162. C.R.Boxer, *The Portuguese Sea-born Empire 1415-1825*, London, 1969, pp.20-23: By the papal bull Romanus Pontifex of 8th January 1455, pope Nicolas V granted to the prince Henry the Navigator the exclusive right to navigate in the seas south of cape Bojador. *Monumenta Henricina* (collection and organisation of the documents were done by Pe. Antonio Joaquim Dias Dinis; but published without the name of the author), Vol.XII, Coimbra, 1974, doc.36, pp.71-79. It was further confirmed by later bull like *Inter cetera* of 13th March 1456. *Ibid.*, doc.137, pp286-288; Through the famous papal bulls like *Inter cetera* and *Exime Devotionis* of 13th May 1493, *Inter cetera* of 14th May 1493 and Dudum siquidem of 26th September 1493, pope Alexander VI granted to the Catholic kings the regions discovered by Columbus and divided the world between Portugal and Spain. Luis Adão da Fonseca and José Manuel Ruiz Asenzio(ed.), *Corpus Documental del Tratado de Tordesillas*, Valladolid, 1995, doc.75, 76, 77 & 91 pp.119-130 & 137-139. The Portuguese believed that they had full sovereignty over the maritime space occupied by them and granted to them by the popes, who, they believed, were the competent, supreme and universal authorities to distribute among the faithful those lands and areas which were not under Christian control. Most of the Indo-Portuguese scholars hold the view that "sovereignty of the seas" or *mare clausum* as propounded by João de Barros is the basis of cartaz system. K.S.Mathew, "Portuguese Trade with India and the Theory of Royal Monopoly in the Sixteenth Century", *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Waltair, 1979, pp.389-396; C.R.Boxer, João do Barros: Portuguese Humanist and Historian of Asia, New Delhi, 1981, p.100. This view is recently questioned by Luis Filipe Thomaz by citing numerous examples from XIIth century onwards, when safe-conducts were used often for navigation. See Luis Filipe Thomaz, "Portuguese Control on the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal - A Comparative Study", pp.1-22. It seems that though the practice of safe-conducts was there from early XIIth century, the papal bulls gave jurisdictional weight to the claims of these passes and that is why papal intervention, demarcating a particular space in the sea, was always sought after.

163. Zaynuddin Shaykh, *Tuhfat-ul-Mujahidin*, pp.89-91; Luis Filipe Thomaz says that the practice of enslavement of crews and passengers of ships caught in the sea was unprecedented in the Indian Ocean, eventhough some sort of safe-conducts for travel and considerable corsair activities existed in this region prior to the arrival of the Portuguese. The target of the eastern marauders was ship and its cargo; not the human beings. The practice of enslavement was introduced by the Portuguese and also by the Turks who intervened in Indian Ocean since 1508. Luis Filipe Thomaz,
"Portuguese Control on the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal", pp.8-9.


165. According to Luis Filipe Thomaz _cartaz_ was a means to establish political hegemony and sovereignty over the seas and had less economic significance. For details see, Luis Filipe Thomaz, "Portuguese Control on the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal". But the large network of fortresses and frequent patrolling in the west coast, careful scrutiny of the shipments to Red sea ports, large and strict restrictions for issuing _cartazes_ to west Asia (not even the intimate friends of the Portuguese did get _cartaz_ to Red sea ports) were introduced with economic purposes and with a view that the contraband commodities did not enter Europe through the ports of West Asia. So one has to accept that though _cartaz_ had often been a political symbol, it was equally an economic tool as well, to control the movements of ships from going to Red sea -Venice Route. For all practical purposes _cartaz_ was a licence which the native traders should, invariably, possess for their commercial movements.

166. Luis Filipe Thomaz, "Portuguese Control on the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal", p.23.


171. M.N. Pearson, _Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat_, pp.41-44.


175. Faria y Sousa, _op.cit._, tom.II, pp.87-88; F.C. Danvers, _The Portuguese in India_, Vol.II, p.285; Asad Khan was the protector of the kingdom of Bijapur when Ismail Adil Shah died (1510-1534); Mohamed Kasim Ferishta, _History of the Rise of the Mohamedan Power in India_, Vol.III, New Delhi, 1981, p.44.
176. Faria y Sousa, *op. cit.*, tom.II, pp.87-88; In 1545, he swore by touching Koran that he had already given 750000 gold *pardaos* to the Portuguese king and 30000 gold *pardaos* to the governor Martim Afonso de Sousa (20000 for him and 10000 by way of jewellery for his wife) ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 76, doc.103.

177. In 1544, he was said to have given 70000 gold *pardaos* for the Portuguese fleet. Luís de Sousa, *Annaes de El Rei Dom João Terceiro*, Lisboa, 1844, p.413; In the previous year the governor Martim Afonso de Sousa had come over to Cannanore to collect an amount of 400,000 *cruzados* from Shams-ud-din.Diogo do Couto, *Da Asia Decada V*, parte, II, pp.388-389.


183. R.O.W.Goertz "The Portuguese in Cochin in the Mid-Sixteenth Century" in Indica, March September 1986, Vol.23, Nos.1&2, pp.63-67; see also R.O.W.Goertz, "The Portuguese in Cochin in the Mid-Sixteenth Century" in *Studia*, 49,1989, pp.5-38. Though both the articles are of the same title, there is substantial difference between the two.


188. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 77, doc.15, doc.25 and doc.27. On 8th January 1547, Henrique de Sousa Chichorro wrote to governor to hinder this large scale-pepper-smuggle to Bengal. ANTT,*Coleçao de Sao Lourenço*, Vol.IV, fol.520; The men of Martim Afonso de Sousa in Cochin were very active in this pepper smuggling to Bengal.Elaine Sanceau, *Coleção de São Lourenço*, Vol.II, p.283.

189. About 12-15 Chinese junks were sent yearly to get pepper from these places.ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 77, doc.18; ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, II, Maço 240, doc.57.
190. On 26th November 1545, Bernaldim de Souza wrote that Bengal needed only less pepper than what was brought there. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 77, doc.30.

191. On 15th May, 1546 Henrique de Souza Chichorro wrote to the governor that Alexis de Souza permitted the Chinese junks to load pepper from Cochin. Bibliotheca do Palacio da Ajuda, *India Portuguesa*, 51-8-43. These transactions seem to have been conducted with the help of the promoters of private trade. In 1543 and 1544 the pepper that reached China seem to have caused excess supply. So in these two years the traders had to bring pepper back from China. See the letter of Duarte de Miranda d'Azevedo, Goa, dated 27th November 1545. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 77, doc.31.

192. See the remarks of Domingos Rabelo about pepper diversion to China written in 1545 in ANTT, *Cartas dos Vice-Reis da India*, n.°75. He says that the pepper that reached China was in such a great quantity that the profit out of it was very less.

193. See the remarks of João Fernandes o Galego about the flow of pepper to various destinations in the Indian Ocean in ANTT, *Cartas dos Vice-Reis da India*, n.°75.


196. *Ibid.*, Vol.II, pp.304-307. The native merchants from the Jewish and the Muslim communities had better networks and opportunities for penetrating into the hinterland. So they were often used by the smugglers for collecting the cargo from the production centres.

197. For details see R.O.W.Goertz, "The Portuguese in Cochin..." in *Indica*, p.66.


199. See the remarks of Cosme Anes about the diversion of pepper to various places like Ormuz, Bengal, Pegu, Dabul. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 77, doc.27. From 1540s the Red sea -Venice route became again very active and lot of documents speak about this fact. Thus, for example, on 16th October 1541, Estevão da Gama wrote to the king that pepper and other contraband items were continuously taken to Sues and Mecca. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 70, doc.109; In another letter of Estevão da Gama to the king dated 25-10-1541 detailed report about the diversion of pepper to Suez and Red sea area was given. ANTT, *Gavetas*, 18, Maço 5, doc.19 The Muslim merchants of Cochin seem to have engaged themselves in collecting spices for these illegal networks. Elaine Sanceau, *Colecção de São Lourenço*, Vol.III, p.449.

200. See the reports on pepper traffic given by Domingos Rodrigues d'Azevedo, Bibliotheca do Palacio da Ajuda, *India Portuguesa*, 51-8-45, fol.151.

201. Adelino de Almeida Calado, *Livro que trata das cousas da India e do Japão*, p.74.


204. Zamorin used to send pepper and other commodities regularly to Mecca as testified by the king of Tanore in his letter to the Portuguese crown. See the letter of king of Tanore dated 6-1-1549 in ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, III, Maço17, doc.11.


206. Cf.Supra nota.130.

207. Sanjay Subrahmanyam ,"Cochin in Decline....".p.68.


213. Cf, Supra notas. 109, 110, 111.


217. Luis Filipe Thomaz, "Portuguese Control on the Arabian sea and the Bay of Bengal".p.2.


219. This armada was meant to guard the coast of Ceylon and Coromandel against the diversion of pepper, cinnamon and other spices. In the early part of sixteenth century, it was very vigilant, although in the later part the patrolling of the east
coast seems to have ceased to exist, when the armada starting from Cochin began to stop at Cape Comorin as its terminal point. Initially this armada used to centre its activities in Ceylon and Coromandel. For details see Regimento de Pero Lopes de Sampaio, Evora, 11-2-1520, in ANTT, Livro do Registo de Leis e Regimentos de D.Manuel, fols.134-136; With the time of Lopo de Azevedo, who was appointed as the captain of this armada in 1524, the armada began to take the pattern of Cochin-Pulicat-Cochin as the frequent route. ANTT, Corpo Chronologico, II, Maço 113, doc.174; doc.176; See also Jorge Manuel Costa da Silva Flores, Os Portugueses e o Mar de Ceilão 1498-1543: Trato, Diplomacia, e Guerra, pp.175-178.

221. João de Barros, Decada IV, parte 4, p.25.
224. The letter of Diogo Fernandes to D.John III dated 1st June 1537, in ANTT, Corpo Chronologico, II, Maço211, doc.65, fols.5-6.
227. João de Barros, Decada IV, livro 8, chap..12-14; Diogo do Couto, Da Asia, Decada V, chap.2.4-6; and 8; See also Jorge Manuel Flores, Os Portugueses e o Mar de Ceilão 1498-1543, p.221.
228. For the details of the treaty see Faria y Souza, op.cit., tom.II, p.14; This atmosphere of alliance, as we have already seen, ended with the outbreak of Cochin-Vadakkenkur war in which Zamorin took an anti-Portuguese stand.
229. Cf.Supra not. 46.
230. Actually Albuquerque, who encouraged the mixed marriage by allowing the Portuguese to marry native women, had the dream that his policy would create a body of people to whom could be entrusted the defence and protection of the Estado. K.M.Panikkar, A History of Kerala 1498-1801, p.84.
231. With the war of Chioggia in 1381, Venice established commercial superiority over Genoa and began to expand their activities in eastern Mediterranean
without opposition. The Venetians built up an extensive network of colonies in Greece, Cyprus, Crete, Rhodes and many other small islands. With the acquisition of commercial privileges in Constantinople from the rulers of the Byzantine empire, they were permitted to develop lucrative trading links with the Black sea and the Levant. G. Luzzatto, *Storia Economica di Venezia dal XI al XVI secolo*, Venice, 1961, pp.139-180; F.C. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic*, Baltimore, 1973, pp.65-85; 188-201. Even after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, the Venetians continued to enjoy almost the same commercial privileges, as the Turks were unable to dispense with the Venetians’ commercial service as carriers. The Venetians were permitted to keep an autonomous merchant colony in Constantinople, ruled over by a Venetian representative, the bailo, who exercised justice according to Venetian law. F.C. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic*, pp.99-100; 234-237. During the period before the sixteenth century, spices and other oriental commodities entered Europe chiefly through Venice. K.N. Chaudhuri says that in the fifteenth century the East-West axis comprising Malacca, Calicut, Cambay, Aden, Cairo, Alexandria and Venice held together the whole of Indian Ocean and the eastern Mediterranean. K.N. Chaudhuri, *Asia Before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750*, New York, 1990, p. 343. Though the Portuguese made spice-trade a royal monopoly, they could not seal off, permenantly, the Venice-route.

232. This had been the voyage pattern taken by the *Carreira da India*. This route reached Europe via Cape of Good Hope. The *Carreira da India* was born at the time when the first exploration voyages to the Indian Ocean were organized. Geneviève Bouchon, "Glimpses of the Beginnings of the" *Carreira da India" *(1500-1518)*" in Teotonio R de Souza, *Indo-Portuguese History: Old Issues, New Questions*, New Delhi, 1985, p.40. For further details about this and about the *Carreira da India* see C. R. Boxer, "The *Carreira da India* (Ships, Men, Cargoes, Voyages)" in *O Centro de Estudos Historico Ultramarinos e as Comemoracoes Henriquinas*, Lisbon, 1961, pp.33-82; C.R.Boxer, "The Principal Ports of Call in the *Carreira da India* (16th -18th Centuries)" in *Recueils de la Societe Jean Bodin XXXIII Les grandes escalas Zeme partie: Les temps modernes*, Brussels, 1972.pp.29-65; C.R.Boxer, "Portuguese Roteiros 1500-1700" in *The Mariner’s Mirror*, XX, London, 1934. pp.171-186.


235. Tome Lopes in Gian Battista Ramusio, *Delle Navigazione Viaggi*, Vol.I, Venice, 1550. fol.143-156. There are three more original documents which speak about the activities of Vasco da Gama in Malabar in his second voyage. 1. The Flemish account called *Calcoen*; but it is less reliable. 2. The letter of the Italian
Mateo d Begnino who was the agent of the Affaitati from Cremona and who had gone on board a ship of "Mercadores" commanded by Giovanni Bounagrazia (it is very often quoted in this work as it appears to be more objective and important as far as the economic dimensions are concerned) 3. A document recently discovered in the National Library of Wien (Austria) by Christine von Rhor. It gives some new informations about what happened in Malabar when Vasco da Gama reached there for the second time. All these three documents are edited and translated in to German by Gernot Giertz, *Vasco da Gama, die Entdeckung des Seewegs nach Indien: Ein Augenzeugenbericht*, Tübingen, 1980, pp.186-193; 211-213; 151-179 respectively.

236. For details see chapter III.
252. Bailey W. Diffie and George D. Winius, *op.cit.*, pp.273-275. Gaspar Gonsalves wrote to the king that Lopo Soares came to India in an evil hour. His whole attention was not for the service of the king but for the traffic. Before he came "the whole world" was at peace and everybody obeyed them. But now the situation had become so worse that even the low-caste fishermen (*Mukkavas*) were in revolt. ANTT, *Gavetas*, Maco 6, doc.51.

253. It was Diogo Lopes who confiscated the commodities and vessels of Kutti Ali after having made arrangements with the latter to send them to Red sea. The pro-Portuguese Kutti Ali, as a consequence, became anti-Portuguese and began to engage in corsair activities. R.S. Whiteway, *op cit.*, p.196.

254. A document of this period says that mariners were deserting the royal service and were joining hands with the private traders. The Portuguese officials bought pepper in Cochin for their own illegal private trade at prices higher than the fixed official price at which it was bought for the king. Now the local merchants wanted to sell all their pepper at this high price. The writer (who was a native official of the king of Cochin) further says that private trade had eaten into the very vitals of Portuguese commercial administration. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maco 27, doc.69. In 1519, when governor was engaged in the duty of cruising Red sea, other officials in Malabar took this opportunity to send pepper to Cambay in the ships of the "pirates" of Malabar. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maco 25, doc.108.

255. Henry E.J. Stanley, *op.cit.*, pp.405-406. Vasco da Gama was buried in the principal chapel (present day St. Francis church) of St. Antony in Cochin. In 1538 his body was removed from there and taken to Lisbon. It now lies buried in The Church of St. Jeronymus in Belem, Lisbon which was built almost with the money from India.


263. *Ibid*.

264. It was Henrique de Meneses who stormed Ponnani, the naval station of the Zamorin. Faria y Sousa, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, p.284.

265. In 1526 Henrique de Meneses died. Then there arose a strong dispute over the governorship, as Pero Mascarenhas and Lopo Vaz de Sampaio had legitimate
claims to the Office. By the first order from the king of Portugal Pero Mascarenhas should have been the governor. But then he was away in Malacca. In the meantime new orders were received from Lisbon appointing Lopo Vaz de Sampaio as governor. Lopo Vaz was supported by the fidalgos and by the officials of the Camara of Goa. Diogo de Couto, *op. cit.*, IV, i, p.3. The residents of Cochin and the Municpality of Cochin also lobbied strongly for the selection of Lopo Vaz. All the residents of Cochin went in bare-foot procession to the churches with their wives and children, with many tears and prayers begging God to inspire the judges not to choose Pero Mascarenhas as governor: Barros, *op. cit.*, IV, ii, p.6. The dispute ended by choosing Lopo Vaz.


271. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, II, Maço 114, docs.21; 41; 44; 45; 46; 47; 129. For details see Jorge Manuel Costa da Silva Flores, *Os Portugueses e o Mar de Ceilão: 1498-1543*, pp.177-178.


274. For the conquest of Goa about 100 Malayalee soldiers were utilised out of which 80 seem to have been from Cochin. see the letter of Afonso de Albuquerque dated 1st April 1512 in Jose Ramos Coelho(ed.), *Alguns Documentos do Archivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo acerca das navegações e Conquistas Portuguezas*, Lisboa, 1892, p.238; For further details see Fortunato de Almeida, *Historia de Portugal (1385-1580)*, tom.III, Coimbra.1925, p.572; A.J.R.Russell-Wood, *A World on the Move: The Portuguese in Africa, Asia and America, 1415-1808*, Manchester, 1992, p.18.

275. It is the estimate of Costa Lobo, *Historia da Sociedade em Portugal no Seculo XV*, lisbon, p.32; C.R.Boxer says that later it increased slowly to about 11/2 or 13/4 million.C.R.Boxer, "War and Trade in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea (1600-1650)", in *The Great Circle, Journal of the Australian Association for Maritime History*, 1/2, Nedlands, Western Australia, 1979, p.6.


285. Raymundo Bulhão pato, *Cartas...*tom.II, pp.377-378; Chilay Marakkar was another native Muslim merchant who gave his ship for the use of the Portuguese. He provided ships for sending commodities to Goa. *Ibid.,* tom.VI, p.31.


292. Walter de Gray Birch, *The Commentaries...*p.15. By 1504 this privilege was taken away from them by the king because of the fault and negligence of one of their members.


295. The Muslim forces of Calicut attacked the churches and the settlement of St.Thomas Christians in Cranganore in 1523-1524. Vasco da Gama, to whom the members of
this community complained against this, promised to re-build the church. For
the middle of the Sixteenth Century), Bangalore, 1984, pp.302-303; João Paulo
Oliveira e Costa, "Os Portugueses e a Cristandade Siro-Malabar (1498-1530)", in

297. The anti-semitic moves began in Portugal from 1496 when all the Jews were asked
to leave the kingdom. Moreover the crown took all the Jewish children below 14
years for giving formation in Christian faith. See for details Damião Peres(ed.),
Historia de Portugal Edição Monumental, vol.III, Barcelos, MCMXXXI, p.221;
Joaquim Verissimo Serrão, Historia de Portugal, O seculo de Ouro (1495-1580), Lisboa, 1978, pp.16-17.

298. Franz Hümerich, "Estudo Critico sobre o Roteiro da Primeira Viagem de Vasco
da Gama 1497-1499 "Traducao do Comandanta Moura Bras, in Diario da Viagem
de Vasco da Gama, vol.II, porto, 1945, pp.242, 268; Marino Sanuto, op.cit., vol.IV,
cols.66-67. He accompanied Vasco da Gama in his second voyage. From 1505 to
1509 he rendered service to the viceroy D.Francisco de Almeida in commercial
matters as well as an interpreter. see S.S Pissurlencar, Agentes da Diplomatica
Portuguesa na India, Bastora, 1952, p.552.


300. Mosses Pereyra de Paiva, Notisias dos Judeos de Cochim, (the first edition was in
Amsterdam,1687), Lisboa, 1923, p.8;

301. For details see Ana Cannas da Cunha, A Inquisição no Estado da India. origens
(1539-1560), Lisboa, 1995, p.218; see also José Alberto Rodrigues da Silva Tavim,
"Outras Gentes em Outras Rotas: Judeus e Cristãos-novos de Cochim-entre Santa
Cruz de Cochim e Mattancherry, entre o Imperio Portugues e o Medio Orient", A
paper presented in the VIII Seminario Internacional de Historia Indo-Portuguesa-

302. Cf.Supra nota 287.


304. A.B.de Bragança Pereira, Arquivo Portugues Oriental, tom.IV, vol.I, parte, I, Bastora,
1937, p.296.

305. K.S.Mathew and Afzal Ahmad, Emergence of Cochin...., doc.53, pp.73-83.

306. Around 10000 to 15000 native soldiers were supposed to have been involved in
each battle waged for the Portuguese in the early years. By 1534, about 20000 Nair
soldiers joined hands with the Portuguese in the war against Calicut. Faria y Souza,

307. R.S.Whiteway, op.cit., p.101, The descendants of these Pulayas, thus raised to the
status of Nairs still retain the elevated position. T.H.P.Chentharasserry, Keralal


316. Of course there were outlets like the smuggling -route to Coramandel which ran accross the ghat (Raymundo Antonio de Bulhao Pato, *Cartas....tom.IV*, p.175) and another route which ran to Gujarat by sea. (Barros, *Decada III*, ix, pp.2-5).While the first route was relatively more expensive and time-consuming, the second route was more risky and the commodities were being sent to Gujarat always under the possible danger of being captured by the Portuguese. These two routes were active although the period of our study; but the intensity of the traffic fluctuated on the basis of the degree of risk element involved in it and the tightening of patrolling of the coast. In the first decades of sixteenth century, when the west-coast was strongly patrolled, these routes seemed expensive and risky and in the absence of other easy and profitable outlets, the producers and the native merchants had no other go but to co-operate with the Portuguese.

317. For details see the price-list given by Duarte Barbosa, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, pp.226ff.

318. As we have already seen this route which ran accross the ghat to Coramandel ports from the pepper growing hinterland which was situated on the periphery of Portuguese control systems was always active. They who took the commodities to the markets situated in the outer periphery (we have already seen these markets in detail, when we discussed the Cochin-hinterland relationship), where the traders of ghat-route flocked together, could make profit. And the geographical accessibility of the producers and native merchants to these markets, determined the amount of profit accrued from this trade. But, actually only those producers and native traders who were in and around these market centres could really reap profit; For others, because of the long and time-consuming transportation required and the customs duties to be paid in each kingdom, taking commodities to the inland market was same as carrying them down to the port of Cochin, as far as
profit was concerned.

319 Gernot Giertz, *op. cit.*, p.143. This document says that the price of one *faraçola* of pepper in Calicut was 14 *panams*.


322. Gernot Giertz,*op.cit.*, p.143. This document says that during the time of the first voyage of da Gama, the price of one *faraçola* of pepper in Cochin was nine *panams*.


331. For want of sufficient capital, the crown had initially looked to private traders as mercantile collaborators. The details would be elaborated below.

332. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maco 8, doc.68.


336. The merchants of Calicut like Mohammed Marakkar used to send pepper to Cairo even during this period of royal monopoly. Raymundo Bulhão Pato, *Cartas...*, tom.I, pp.179-180 In 1513 about 13 ships with pepper left for Mecca and Aden from Malabar. *Ibid.*, tom.III, p.50. Usually these commodities were taken in small, light, oared craft called *parses*. Because of their small size these paroes could easily escape the big Portuguese ships. In 1524, Vasco da Gama saw a lot of them making their way to north. Barros, Decada III, ix, p.2. In 1525 some 53 of these pepper ships of the Malabar traders were caught and burnt. *Ibid.*, p.5. Thus, even though the Red sea route was risky, it was often active even in the early phase of Portuguese establishment which was characterised by strict patrolling.
337. The ships associated with the Carreira da India were first and foremost Naos which were big ships. There is a difference between a Nao and Galeao; but in practice it is blurred. A ship that started life as a Carrack (Nao) might end it as a galleon and vice versa. C.R. Boxer, The Carreira da India (ships, Men, Cargoes, Voyages), O Centro de Estudos Historicos Ultramarinos e as Comemoracões Henriquinas, Lisbon, 1961, p.34.


340. C.R. Boxer, The Carreira da India, p.3.

341. Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, Vol.III, (Editorial Presenca), lisboa, 1982, pp.43-44. All the ships to India started their voyages after the prayers and blessings in the "capela do Restelo" and later in the church of Belem.

342. Ibid, p.45.

343. Ibid.


345. Mocambique was called often for fresh water and provisions, although through voyages between Lisbon and Goa without calling at any place enroute were quite common C.R. Boxer, The Carreira da India, p.56.


348. C.R. Boxer, The Carreira da India, p.53; The officials in the Casa da India deducted the duties and other shares due to the crown according to the authorization given to various officials. Damião Peres (ed.), Regimento das Cazas das Indias e Mina (Manuscrito Inedito), Coimbra, 1947, p. 56. The officials were expected to pay to the king the vintena (1/20) and quarto (1/4) of the quantities when they arrived at the Casa da India and it was almost 28.75 per cent of the total. ANTT, Nucleo Antigo, No.705, fols.4-12. First of all the vintena was deducted from the whole amount and then quarto was taken from the remaining part of the commodities. Moreover a five per cent was deducted from the rest for the construction of the Mosteiro de Jeronimo at Belem.Ibid., No.903, fol.5. See also K. S. Mathew, Portuguese Trade with India in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 85-86. The Caderno dos Officiais da India gives a detailed list of the spices loaded as quintaladas and other liberdades. Nearly 300 people are registered as recipients of these chests. See for details G. Bouchon, Navires et Cargaigns retour de l'Inde en 1518, Caderno dos Officiaes da India da Carreguacam das Naos que vieram o anno da bxiiij (Tdt.Nucleo Antigo, 705), Paris, Societe d'Histoire

349. Damião Peres, Regimento das Cazas das Indias e Mina, pp.147-148; C.R. Boxer, The Carreira da India, p.53.


351. For details about the number of the India-bound ships see Luiz de Figueiredo Falcão Livro em que se contem toda a Fazenda e Real Patrimonio dos Reinos de Portugal, India e Ilhas Adjacentes, pp.137-154; Faria y Sousa, op.cit., pp.424-426; Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, Vol.III, p.49; Fortunato de Almeida, Historia de Portugal, III, Coimbra, 1925, pp.433-435.

352. Ibid., Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, Vol.III, p.49.


355. Both Damião de Gois and Barros give two different reasons for the proposal to abandon India project. It seems to me that the arguments given by both Gois and Barros must have been used by the councillors to substantiate their view-points. For the reasons given by Gois see Damião de Gois, Cronica do Felicissimo Rey. Manuel, Vol.I, Coimbra, 1949-1955, p.48.

356. Barros, Da Asia, Decada I, bk.4, ch.1.

357. Though these pioneer officials did well in their Indian service, most of them were not well treated by the home-government. Thus Duarte Pacheco ended his life in utter poverty. Almeida was suddenly dismissed and compelled to hand over power to Albuquerque and on his way back he died in Africa near the Cape of Good Hope, when a surrise attack by the natives with poisoned arrows caught him and his landing party too far from their boat. In the same way Albuquerque was also suddenly dismissed hearing only the views of anti-Albuquerque intriguers. King Manuel repented when news arrived of Albuquerque's success at Ormuz and simultaneously of the Egyptian fleet about to descend on India and challenge Portuguese power again. In a letter of March 20, 1516, not having heard of Albuquerque's death, Manuel commanded him to remain in India and take charge of the fleet to repel the invader. Afterwards he ordered the bastard son of Albuquerque called Braz to change his name officially to afonso, so that he might have Albuquerque's name ever at his side, which gave him opportunity to write the Comentaries. For details see Joaquim Verissimo Serrão, Historia de Portugal, vol.III, p.32; Bailey W.Diffie and Georg D.Winius, Foundations of the Portuguese Empire 1415-1580, Minneapolis, 1977, p.273.

359. Ibid., p.167. King Manuel maintained good relationship with the Pope Leo X, who was the second son of Lorenzo Medici and the real ruler of the Republic of Florence. In 1516 King Manuel sent to this medici Pope 5093 quintals of pepper, 1093 quintals of cloves, 1093 quintals of cinnamon, 1593 quintals of ginger, 693 quintals of nutmeg, 1093 quintals of Malagueta and 493 quintals benzoin. But the ship carrying these commodities was lost near Genoa. Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, Vol.III, p.178.


361. For details see Gustavo Couto, Historia da Antiga Casa da India, Lisbon, 1932.


363. For details see Damião Peres (ed.), Regimento das Cazas das Indias e Mina, Coimbra, 1947, pp.1-10.

364. Ibid., pp.29-30; 65-66.

365. Francisco P. Mendes da Luz, O Conselho da India, Lisbon, 1952, pp.42-47. All the financial affairs were handled through the Casa. Ibid., p.59-68.

366. Damião Peres, Regimento das Cazas das Indias e Mina, p.56.

367. Ibid., pp. 71-74.


373. Herman van der Wee, "Structural Changes in European Long-Distance Trade, and Particularly in the Re-export Trade from South to North 1350-1750" in The


375. Herman van der Wee, "Structural Changes in European Long-Distance Trade", p.28


381. During the first three decades of sixteenth century, especially with the opening of Cochin -Lisbon commercial axis and with the concentration of German and Italian merchants in Lisbon and Antwerp the supremacy of Mediterranean ports began to dwindle and Atlantic became the focal area of commercial activities.


384. This document is dated 4th January 1552(Cochin) in ANTT, Corpo Chronologico, I, Maço 87, doc.50.


386. Bailey W. Diffie and George D. Winius, op. cit., p.209; In 1278, a Genoese by name Don Vivaldo had become a citizen of Lisbon and was active in civic affairs. Bailey W.Diffie, Prelude to Empire: Portugal Overseas before Henry the Navigator, Lincoln,1960, pp.50-51.

387. Bailey W.Diffie, op. cit., p.210; King Dinis banished the Venetian colony after 1309 as the Venetians were allied with his enemies. Bailey W.Diffie, Prelude to Empire, pp.103-104.


407. For more details see the Letter of Mateo de Begnino written on 30 the March 1503 in Gernot Giertz, *Vasco da Gama, die Entdeckung des Seewegs nach Indien: Ein Augenbericht 1497-1499*, Tübingen, 1980, pp.30; 210-211.


411. These two Milanese, John Maria and peter Antony, were said to have made 400 guns and cast lot of cannons for Zamorin. George Percy Badger(ed.), *The Travels of Ludovico di Varthema in Egypt, Syria, Arabia Deserta and Arabia Felix in Persia, India and Ethiopia A.D. 1503 to 1508*, New York, 1863, p.260; O.K. Nambiar, *op. cit.*, pp.49-51.


415. Ibid., p.296.
416. Horst G. W. Nuáer, Fruhe Deutsche Entdecker: Asien in Berichten unbekannter
417. Ibid., pp.112-113; Damião de Gois, Chronica do Felicissimo Rei Dom Manuel,
418. There were many Geman as well as Flemish soldiers with Vasco da Gama. It is
believed that one (Flemish soldier) among them, who travelled with Vasco da
Gama in 1502, wrote "Calcoen" (Calicut), the short travel report in German. For
419. Antonio Silva Rego, Documentação para a Historia das Missoes do Padroado,
vol.1, doc.105, p.217.
421. ANTT, Coleção de S. Vicente, Caixa 11,1-36.
422. Bibliotheca da Ajuda, Livro das Merces que fez D. João de Castro,
51-8-46, fol.123v; see also Antonio Baião, Historia quinhetista .., p.323.
423. Franz Hümerich, Die Erste Deutsche Handelsfahrt nach Indien 1505/06:
Ein Unternemender Welser, Fugger und anderer Augsburger sowie Nürnberger
Hauser, München, 1922, p.9.
424. Marino Sanuto, op. cit., Vol.IV, p.28; Konrad Haebler, Die Überseeischen
Unternehmungen der Welser und ihrer Gesselschafter, Leipzig, 1903, p.6.
425. Ibid., pp.9-10.
427. Franz Hümerich, Die Erste Deutsche Handelsfahrt nach Indien, p.11.
428. Johannes Philip Cassel, Priviegia und Handelsfreiheten, welche die Könige von
Portugal ehedem den deutschen Kauflleuten zu Lissabon ertheilt haben, Bremen,
1771, pp.5ff.
429. Ibid., p.7ff.
430. Wolfgang von Stromer, "Oberdeutsche Unternehmungen im Handel mit der
Iberischen Halbinsel im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert", in Herman Kellenbenz, Fremde
Kauflleute auf der iberischen Halbinsel ", pp. 156-169. The travel report of
Peter Holzschuhler is preserved in "Paumgartnerschen Usancenbuch" in Fürstlich
Waldburg-Zeilschen archive in Leutkirch. The full text is given in Horst G.W. Nuáer,
op. cit., pp.142-151.
433. Konrad Haebler, Die Überseeischen Unternehmungen der Welser, pp. 15-16;
B. Greiff, Tagebuch des Lucas Rem, pp. 163-166. It gives, in detail, the letter of
Anton Welser. see also Marino Sanuto, op. cit., Vol. I, p.26. The crown refused their
offer saying that he wanted in the future to make the Indian trade a royal monopoly.


439. B.Greiff, *Tagebuch des Lucas Rem*, pp.8-9; 82-84.


442. The copper-fields of Hungary were the mos important source of Fuggers' trade. Richard Ehrenberg, *op cit*, p.67.


446. Franz Hümmerich, *Quellen und Untersuchungen zur Fahrt*, p.67.


454. Franz Hümerich, *Die Erste Deutsche Handelsfahrt nach Indien*, pp.22-23; For the travel report of Hans Mayr (both in Portuguese and with German translation) see Franz Hümerich, *Quellen und Untersuchungen zur Fahrt*, pp.127-151.

455. *Ibid.*, p.67; Out of the 30%, 25% went to the king and 5% was to the support of Belem.

456. Though the crown had, previously, allowed the merchants to sell their wares freely, on 1st January 1505, king Manuel decreed that the private cargoes (after paying the royal share) had to be sold out of the ware houses by the king's officials at the fixed price. This change in the selling procedure was objected to by the German merchants. This decision was taken as the spices was piling up higher in the warehouses after 1503. Moreover the vessels of the German merchants had brought two-thirds of the fleets' total cargo. In May 1506, there were about 40,000 hundredweight of spices in the warehouses. The king feared that these private merchants in their eagerness to convert their commodities into cash would sell below the fixed prices. Then the king would be in difficulty to sell his wares and he would have to depend again on these merchants financially for fitting out the fleet of the next year. For details see Franz Hümerich, *Die Erste Deutsche Handelsfahrt nach Indien*, pp.135-139.

457. The merchants contended that the king was unilaterally setting aside the contract of 1504 and so instituted a suit against the crown in the hope of obtaining a judicial order to release their merchandise. Donald F.Lach, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, Book I, p.111.


459. The immediate response of the crown was to ordain that the sale of the spices belonging to the merchants should not begin until there were no spices of the crown in the *Casa da India*. But the king required the help of the private merchants to obtain precious metals and before the fitting out of the fleet of the following year, the whole matter had to be compromised. So in 1507 a new selling system was established by which the pepper was consigned to a group of private commercial contractors. They were given a greater degree of freedom in selling the pepper. They were bound to keep to the fixed price as their minimum sale price but were permitted to add about 2.3 ducats per hundred weight as their service fees. They could accept payment partly in cash and in goods which could be taken to India. The private merchants could remove their wares in small lots from the warehouses and and dispose of them freely. For details see Franz Hümerich, *Die Erste Deutsche Handelsfahrt nach Indien*, pp.137-142.

460. Although the German merchants were not again permitted to send their own agents to India, they continued to invest in later fleets. Donald F.Lach, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, Book I, p.111.

461. For details see the list of factories and agents of Welsers mentioned in Herman Kellenbenz, "Gewerbe und Handel 1500-1648" in *Handbuch der Deutschen*


466. *Ibid.*, p.53. The Fuggers were active in spice (distribution) trade till 1522.


476. Raymundo Antonio Bulhão de Pato, *Cartas...tom.III*, p.298.
483. Ca'Masser, op.cit., p.73; The German sources speak of 20000 quintals of spices taken from Malabar ports to Lisbon. b.Greiff, Tagebuch des Lucas Rem, p.158.
484. Ca'Masser, op.cit., p.74.
486. Only the merchandise brought by the three ships in August is accounted here. M.Sanuto, op.cit., tom.XVII, p.191.
487. Here the commodities brought by the remaining two ships of 1513 and the five ships of 1514 are combined together to give the statistics. See for details M.Sanuto, op.cit., Tom.XVIII, p.143 and Ibid., Tom.XXV, pp.594-595.
488. But the amount of principal spices that entered Europe via Venice was relatively very meager. Thus in 1515, the pepper that reached Venice through the traditional route was only 25 quintals; ginger 1540 quintals; cinnamon 45 quintals; cloves 85 quintals; mace 40 quintals. M.Sanuto, op.cit., Tom. XIX, pp. 446-447; The volume of spices taken to Venice in 1518 was still less. 10 quintals of pepper; 457 quintals of ginger, 111 quintals of cinnamon, 23 quintals of cloves and 40 quintals of mace formed the principal merchandise that reached Venice. M.Sanuto, op.cit., tom. XXV, p.621. In 1522 the quantity of spices which entered Venice was remarkably insignificant. Venice got only 88 quintals of pepper, 98 quintals of ginger, 51 quintals of cinnamon, 29 quintals of cloves, 6 quintals of nutmeg and 1 quintal mace. M.Sanuto, op.cit., tom.XXXII, pp.438-439.
491. Ibid., p.74.
505. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maco 3, Doc.29.
511. The reference to the adverse trade-balance is made by C.R.Boxer by quoting an official dispatch written from Cannanore in 1534 and another anecdote, first recorded in a manuscript of the period between 1550-1570. The anecdote is as follows: when Vasco da Gama arrived back in Portugal in 1499 he was enthusiastically received by king Manuel and his court. Meanwhile the count of Vimioso asked Da Gama what merchandise could be got from India and what the Indians wanted in exchange. The discoverer replied that what could be brought from India included pepper, cinnamon, ginger, amber and musk; what the Indians
demanded in exchange was gold, silver, velvet and scarlet and cloth. To which the count retorted: In that case it seems to me that it is they who have discovered us. Quoted by C.R.Boxer, Portuguese Conquest and Commerce in Southern Asia: 1500-1750, (Variorum), Hampshire, 1985, p.ix.


517. The people believed that pestilence and other calamities were divine punishment for the tolerance which the church was showing towards the Jews and the heretics. Alexandre Herculano, Historia da Origem e Estabelecimento da Inquisição em Portugal, tom.I, ed. by Jorge Borges de Macedo, p.171; Joaquim Verissimo Serrão, Historia de Portugal, vol.III, pp.51 and 292 Antonio Sergio, Obras Completas de Antonio Sergio: Introdução Geografico-Sociologica á Historia de Portugal, critical edition guided by Castelo Branco Chaves, Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Rui Gracio and Joel Serrão, Lisboa, 1976, pp.191-192.


520. Ibid., p.293.


523.- ANTT, Gavetas, 15-17-19.


525. The letter of the viceroy written to the king dated 16th January 1551 in ANTT, Corpo Chronologico, II, Maço242, doc.44.

526. ANTT, Corpo Chronologico, I, Maço 76, doc.8.


529. Cf. Supra nota 352. See also the table given above in the text.

530. ANTT, *Gavetas* 20-1-45.

531. The letter of the king of Cochin written to the governor dated 31st January 1548 in Elaine Sanceau, *Colecção de São Lourenço*, vol.III, p.9. The letter was written for the king by one Marcos Roiz Dalemanha, who probably must have been a German who entered the service of the native ruler. See also the letter of the king of Cranganore *Ibid.*, vol.III, p.17.


534. John Soarez, the vicar of the fort of Chale (Chalium) baptized the king of Tanore. *The Jesuit Archive of Goa*, 10 Letter of D.João the king of Tanore to the bishop of Goa, fol.136; Faria y Souza, *op.cit.*, tom.II, p.133; For further details regarding this conversion see D.Ferrolí, *The Jesuits in Malabar*, vol.I. Bangalore, 1939, pp.130-137. Later he returned to his old ways.

535. The Tanore king asked the nobles and the small kings to support zamorin and to send pepper to Calicut, instead of sending it to Cochin. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 87, doc.50. Later the Tanore king justified his action saying that he was a Christian in true spirit and that he would die as a believer in Christ. The support to Zamorin was necessary as he was a vassal of Calicut and he would have lost the kingdom, had he not stood by Zamorin. The letter of D.João, the king of Tanore written to the Portuguese crown in 1552. ANTT, *Gavetas*, 15-21-6.

536. The Viceroy gives a detailed account of this struggle in his letter to the Portuguese king dated 16th January 1551 in ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, II, Maço 242, doc. 44; See also ANTT, *Gavetas* 15-20-8.


538. *Ibid. Chaverpada* means the retainers of the dead king who run amuck in order to avenge the death of the king and they usually would die in this attempt. This practice of suicidal squad was prevalent in South India, especially in Kerala. This prevailed among even non-Nair martial groups like the St.Thomas Christians, as well.

539. The continuous fighting hindered the transport of pepper. Even after 1552 also, the pepper king obstructed the movement of spice-ships. Faria y Souza, *op.cit.*, tom.II, p.159.

540. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, maço 87, doc.50.

541. On 26th January 1549, Cosme Anes wrote from Cochin to the Portuguese crown that the trade was going down in Cochin for the last three years (even before the outbreak of Vaduthala war and the reason for this must have been the tensions that
grew between Cranganore and Cochin) and that the small boats and other carriers of pepper were lying unused in Cochin de Cima. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 82, doc.36.

542. During this period the Portuguese resorted to temple wealth as a source of income. On the order of John III, they tried to rob Tremele (Thirumala or Thiruvannamala), which they could not because of bad weather. Then they came to Tebelicare (Thevalakkara and took two casks of pure gold and precious stones under the leadership of Martim Afonso de Souza. Diogo do Couto, *Decadas*, Liv.IX, cap.VII, pp.93-99; Faria y Souza, *op.cit.*, tom.II, pp.72-83; Elaine Sanceau, *Colecção de São Lourenço*, vol.II, p.390.


546. The king even threatened to confiscate the property of the converts and to deprive them of job. For details see George Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier· His Life, His Times*, vol.III, trans. by Joseph Costelloe, Rome, 1980, p.306.


549. For a study on the change in the religious approach with the accession of John III, see Joaquim Verissimo Serrão, *Historia de Portugal*, vol.III, pp.50-58; 260-262.


551. As all of the new Christian traders were arrested almost simultaneously, they could in no way protect their hard-earned wealth, which they had to leave behind when they were transported to Goa and Lisbon.

552. These new Christians were sent from Cochin to Goa in 1558 or 1559. See Ana Cannas da Cunha, *op.cit.*, p.136. They were further taken to Lisbon in August, 1560. *Ibid.*, p.168; The documents relating to Maria Nunes (ANTT, *Inquisição de Lisboa: proc.6369*), wife of Jácome Olivares and to Simão Nunes (his brother-in-law: proc.4516) and his wife Elvira Rodrigues (proc.4656) testify this date. Only Leonor Caldeira, the oldest among them, was sent free. ANTT, *Inquisição de Lisboa*, proc.7296 de Leonor Caldeira, fols.12 and 138-139.

553. The captain of Cochin, Diogo Alvares Teles accused the inquisitors of emptying the city of inhabitants under the pretext of inquiry against the new Christians. Over this dispute between Belchior Carneiro and Diogo Alvares Teles see the testimony of

554. The one-time juiz dos orfãos in Cochin, Estêvão Rebelo, gave testimony before the Inquisition that Jacome Olivares had served with arms and horse in the war with the Pepper king. ANTT, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 5265, fol. 42.

555. ANTT, Inquisição de Lisboa, proc. 7296, fol. 77; Jose Alberto Rodrigues da Silva Tavim, "From Setubal to the Sublime Porte", p. 113.


559. In Cranganore Fr. Vicente de Lagos OFM founded a Seminary for the St. Thomas Christians. BPE, Nucleo de Manuscritos da Casa Forte C IX/2-3, Maço 3, doc. 15, fol. 5v. In 1548, there were 70 Seminarians, 10 Deacons and 3 priests, all belonging to St. Thomas Christian community. The crown used to give 100,000 reis for their sustenance. ANTT, Corpo Chronologico, I, Maço 80, doc. 7. Moreover, many were sent to Portugal for higher studies. Thus in 1539, there were 4 students in Lisbon. Georg Schurhammer, "Three Letters of Mar Jacob Bishop of Malabar, 1503-1550" pp. 81-82; In 1549, there were 2 Seminarians in Coimbra. ANTT, Corpo Chronologico, I, Maço 82, doc. 1; in 1550, there were altogether 4 Seminarians in Portugal from this community. ANTT. Corpo Chronologico, I, Maço 83, doc. 71.


565. Damião Peres (ed.), Historia de Portugal, Edição Monumental, vol. III, p. 261; A. Braamcamp Freire, Vida e Obras de Gil Vicente, Trovadore Mestre da Balança,


569. Freire Luís de Sousa, *Anais de Dom João III*, pp.421-424; Fortunato de Almeida, *Historia de Portugal*, vol.III, p.564; With the closing of Portuguese factory of Antwerp, many merchants left the place. The first who left Antwerp were the maranos, followed by the German, Baltic and English Protestants. Most of the catholic traders of France, Italy and Germany who were doing business in Flanders transferred their activities to Hamburg, the Rhenish cities, Zurich, Rouen and Lyons. By 1560, some of the chief spice-contractors like Affaitadi were forced into bankruptcy. For details see Jervis Wegg, *The Decline of Antwerp under Philip of Spain*, London, 1924; Donald F.Lach, *op cit.*, vol.I, book I, p.127.


571. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 71, doc.42.


574. The letter of the Sultan to the Portuguese crown in ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 74, doc.108.


577. The trade in horse by the Portuguese and in precious metals by the Portuguese and the Germans has already been treated above.


579. John Briggs, *History of the Rise of the Mahommedan power in India till the year AD*
1612, tran from the original Persian of Mahomed Kasim Ferishta, vol.II, New Delhi, 1989, pp.5ff.

580. Diogo do Couto, in his "Dialogo do Soldado Práctico", has the soldier say that only their fear of Akbar's attacking them kept the other Muslim rulers from continuing their fights against the Portuguese. Diogo do Couto, O Soldado Práctico, ed, by Rodrigues Lapa, Lisboa, 1954, pp.113-114.


583. S.S.Pissurlencar, Regimento das Fortalezas, p.494; This fortress was at the junctional point of two rivers which separated the land into the kingdom of Bangher (Bangher) and the kingdom of the queen of Olala (Ullal). The latter which was in the south of Mangalore used to pay tribute of vassalage to the Portuguese crown. Henry Heras, The Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara, vol.I, Madras, 1927, p.188.

584. Antonio Bocarro, O Livro das Plantas de todas as Fortalezas..., p.313; Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas, que a Coroa de Portugal tem nas Partes da India; E das Capitanias, E Mais Cargos, Que Nelle ha, E da Importancia Delles, Preface by Francisco P.Mendes da Luz, in Boletim da Bibliotheca da Universidade de Coimbra, vol.XXI, Coimbra, 1953, p.63.


591. For further details see Aldo Stella, "La crisi economica veneziana della seconda metà del secolo XVI", in Archivo Veneto, Ser.5, LVIII, 1962, pp.42-44; The emergence of Marseilles as an important distributing centre of spices is discussed by R.Gascon, "Un siècle du commerce des épices à Lyon. Fin Xve-fin XVle siècles", Annales. Economies, sociétés, civilisations, XV, No.4, pp.648-650.


594. See the letter of Braz d'Araujo written to the king dated 15th December 1545 in ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, III, Maço16,doc.22.


596. See the letter of Francisco da Maya written to the governor dated 25th January 1547 in ANTT, *Colecção de São Lourenço*, vol.IV, fol.326.


600. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, III, Maço 16, doc.22.


604. Cf.Supra n.185.


606. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 83, doc.60.

607. ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 86, doc.11.

608. see the letter of Henrique de Chichorro Souza written to the king dated 8th January 1557 in ANTT, *Corpo Chronologico*, I, Maço 100, doc.65.