CHAPTER V

TRADE IN COCHIN UNDER THE PORTUGUESE: 1570-1663

The official renouncement of royal monopoly over spices in 1570 coincided with a new phase in Cochin's commercial history. During the period between 1570 and 1663, the organisation of local, inter-local, intra-Asian as well as Indo-European trade underwent very significant changes. The general pattern in the trade of Cochin was not uniform although these ninety three years. The marked difference in the trade could be noticed from around 1612 when the ships of carreira da India stopped coming to Cochin and when the casado traders left Cochin in large numbers to other prospective trade centres. The Indo-European trade of this period through the Cape route was conducted by different arrangements like farming out to contractors consisting of Germans, Italians as well as the Portuguese (1570-1598). The contract-phase was followed by the crown's re-entry into the spice-trade (1599-1663) which, for a short interval, was conducted also with the help of the navetas of the casados of Cochin (1628-1638) and by the Portuguese India Company (1629-1634), as well. Meanwhile the private traders of Cochin were extending the boundaries of their commercial empire within Asia. A large number of voyage-concessions accorded to the Portuguese individuals and
institutions which in most cases were conducted by private entrepreneurs who had large commercial net-works, gave an added boom to intra-Asian trade. However the diversion of pepper at a large-scale from the hinterland of Cochin to the Coromandel coast through the ghat-route, coinciding with diminishing supply of pepper in Cochin, made the enterprising casados to shift their trading activities more to the eastern coast by the second decade of the seventeenth century, creating a crisis in Cochin's trade. With increasing tensions in the hinterland, which accelerated this diversion and with increasing pressure on the Portuguese navigational lines from the Dutch and the English, the different strands of commerce emanating from Cochin became feeble and slender by the end of the 1630's. However, navigational lines to Moçambique and European commerce via Goa-Cape route were still operating from Cochin even in the troubled days of 1650's. This chapter deals with the different layers of trade transactions conducted in Cochin during the period between 1570 and 1663.

Part-1

ASIAN TRADE

1. The Organisation of Local and Inter-local Trade

- Cochin, being the most opulent and populous city in Portuguese India, second only to Goa, had a high demand for a variety of commodities for local consumption and for maintaining its sophisticated life-style. Almost all the articles transacted in local trade were imported from outside. Foodmaterials, especially rice was a very rare commodity, whose demand
was always on the increase. In 1585, a road with a width of 25 palms, which started from the sea-side and went through the *casa da moeda* and *casa da feitoria*, was constructed to connect the populous pockets with the square where the food-materials were distributed. Every year more than 40,000 *candis* of rice were brought to the city, which the captains and other officials of Cochin joined hands to hoard in their houses and godowns, with a view to selling it later at a higher price. This created artificial shortage of food materials in the city and the residents had to pay very high prices for them, especially during the rainy season. A good volume of this hoarded rice was also taken from these private godowns to the interior parts of Malabar where it was sold at a very high profit. So the Municipality of Cochin took a decision to open fifteen retail shops for the sale of food-materials. On 18th April 1592 Matias de Albuquerque, the viceroy, ratified this decision. As per the royal order of 22nd January, 1593, Dom Philip decreed that rice should be sold only through these retail shops opened and operated under the jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cochin. Those who violated this order would be punished by a fine of fifty *cruzados* and two years of exile to Daman. The state intervention in the local trade was inevitable as far as trade transactions on food-materials were concerned. In the city of Portuguese Cochin, there were two big godowns owned by the state for the storing of rice and other food-materials. When they fell into dilapidated condition, the viceroy Francisco da Gama ordered on 7th April 1598 to repair these godowns with the money taken from the "one per cent " collected from the merchants for maintaining the cleanliness of the city.
This period, as well, especially after the 1590's witnessed the entry of many new Christians into the commerce of Cochin and their dominance in the local trade as well as intra-Asian trade. Most of them seem to have reached Cochin after 1592 as factors and collection agents of the contractors of Indian trade whose main partners in Portugal were new Christians. Duarte Gomes Solis (1561-1630), a new Christian who came to Cochin in 1586 was one among them.\(^7\) This period of Contract trade (1592-1598) offered a good pretext for many new Christians of Portugal to come over to Cochin and to take up the commercial opportunities given by this city.\(^8\) Thus, in 1596, when Chryztoph Pawlowski from Poland visited Cochin, he could see only new Christian merchants trading in the city of Santa Cruz.\(^9\) Linschotten also testifies to the semitic dominance in Cochin in the local as well as intra-Asian trade of this period.\(^10\) The memories of the immediate past, when the judaizing new Christians of Cochin were subjugated to inquisitional procedures in the 1560's with which we have already dealt with in the last chapter, must have prompted the new Christians engaged in local trade to make some compromise with catholic teachings, at least in the initial days, to protect their commercial interests.

Caesar Frederick who visited Cochin during the period between 1563 and 1581 remarked that "the great quantity of silk that came from China and the great volume of sugar that came from Bengal (for which the married citizens were not required to pay any customs) formed the two principal commodities that were traded in Cochin's market."\(^11\) Simultaneously, there arose a high demand for coins for carrying on trade in the city as well as with
neighbouring regions. On 28th March, 1577, the governor Monis Barreto permitted the Municipality of Cochin to issue copper coins called *bazaruccos.* This was in addition to the various copper and silver coins that were minted and circulated in Cochin, as we have already seen, right from the beginning of Portuguese period.

Rice, silk, sugar, textiles and copper were the important commodities that were transacted in inter-local trade. These wares were taken from the market of Santa Cruz of Cochin to native Cochin and to the interior as well as distant parts of Malabar, very often in exchange for pepper and other spices. Large quantities of arecanut and coir were also brought to Cochin for trade. Moreover, as a part of the inter-local trade, pieces of artillery were taken from Cochin to different parts of Malabar for sale. Thus, in 1598, we find a Jew from Cochin selling artillery to the king of Travancore.

However, it seems that after 1612, there was a set-back to the local trade and even to the inter-local trade, as many *casados* quitted Cochin. In January 1615, Dom Diogo Coutinho, who was the captain of Cochin for the period between 1614-1627, wrote to the Portuguese king that Cochin was then lacking in nobility and that this city was much depopulated. A similar hint to the general condition of local and inter-local trade was given also by king Philip in his letter addressed to the viceroy, on 11th February 1616 that the city of Cochin was, as per the information he got, in a very difficult state and that it was abandoned by its citizens. This migration of people from Cochin took place mainly because of the shortage of spices and other
commodities felt in Cochin as a result of the tensions which the Portuguese had with the pepper-growers in the hinterland and also because of the Dutch blockade in the South East Asia.\textsuperscript{17} The depopulation of the city seemed to have continued throughout the remaining years of Portuguese rule which reduced considerably the ratio of the consumer class, affecting adversely the volume of local trade and indirectly the intra-local trade.

2. The Ghat-route and the Intra-Asian Trade by Land

This period witnessed a proportionately high volume of trade transactions through the ghat-route. The contemporary evidences suggest that the spices taken from the hinterland of Cochin through the ghat and other land-routes for intra-Asian distribution were superior in quality and higher in volume, when compared to those taken from the port of Cochin to Europe. Thus, Caesar Frederick writes:"... the Pepper that goeth for Portugale is not so good as that which goeth for Mecca, because that in times past the officers of the king of Portugale made a contract with the king of Cochin, in the name of the king of Portugale, for prizes of Pepper, and by reason of that agreement between them at that time made, the price can neither rise or fall, which is a very lowe and base price, and for this cause the villaines bring it to the Portugales, greene and full of filthe. The Moores of Mecca that give a better price, have it cleane and drie and better conditioned. All the Spices and drugs that are brought to Mecca are stolen from thence (Cochin) as contrabanda...."\textsuperscript{18} It seems that most of these traders bought the commodities directly from the farmers through their agents and
peddling-traders operating in the hinterland. The higher price offered by these traders was an attraction to the growers. Though the diversion of the spices through the ghat-route and the despatch of pepper from Coromandel ports to Mecca may seem to have been an expensive affair, it appears that in reality it was not so. The Tamil merchants who used to distribute rice and textiles in the pepper growing hinterland of central Kerala, brought back pepper to the Coromandel ports as return cargo, which reduced considerably the transportation cost.

The volume of spices taken across the ghat to Tamilnadu for intra-Asian trade increased considerably during the contract-period (1570-1598). As the burden of procuring necessary cargo for Europe ultimately fell upon the German and Italian agents of the contractors in Cochin and other parts of Malabar, a good many of the Portuguese citizens also seemed to have linked themselves with the ghat-route-trade. On 26th December 1587, Ferdinand Cron, the agent of the Fuggers and the Welsers in Cochin, writes that although about 300,000 quintals of pepper were produced yearly in India, only very little came into the hands of the contractors to be taken to Europe. The main reason for this phenomenon was the high price that prevailed in the hinterland, which was offered by the traders who took spices to the regions across the ghats. These big merchants with the help of a large caravan of 800 to 1000 oxen used to carry the pepper to Coromandel coast from where they were sent to Tartaria, Mogor (Mogul territory), Arabia, Persia, Pegu and China. Francisco da Costa, the writer of the factory of Cochin during the period between 1586
and 1607, also says that much of the pepper was diverted through the ghat-routes to destinations like Bengal, Masulipatnam and other places. He further gives the information that the volume of the spices that went from the hinterland through these routes was relatively high, about 19,000 bhares of pepper: from Canharapely (Kanjirappilly) and Tecanqutes (the kingdom of Thekkenkur) 4000 bhares, from Iratepely (Erattupetta) 1000 bhares, from Erimamoly (Erumely) 3000 bhares, from Zaruquly (Chalakkudi) 5000 bhares, from Corgeira (Kodakara) 3000 bhares, from Paleacate Cheri (it must be Palakkad Churam or pass) 3000 bhares.21

This shows that the volume taken through the ghat-route was relatively high when compared to the annual average of pepper exported from India to Europe during the period between 1590 and 1598. It was only 628653 kilograms22, while the total production of pepper from Onor to Travancore, in the beginning of seventeenth century was 100,000 bhares or 258,000 quintals (16630000 kilograms).23 On the basis of these data we can have an idea of the volume of ghat-route trade. Only 3.1 per cent of the total pepper was exported to Europe. The ghat-route commerce was almost five times greater than that of European trade and 15.5 per cent of the total production was taken through the ghat-route for Asian commerce. The remaining 81.4 per cent included the share of domestic consumption and the volume of pepper taken for intra-Asian trade. It shows also that the European trade on pepper conducted by the Portuguese during this period was very insignificant, when compared to the other strands of commerce confined to Asia.
Kumily pass was the common outlet for the commodities taken from places like Erattupetta, Kanjirappilly and Erumely to Tamilnadu for further distribution. The spices from Chalakkudi reached Tamilnadu through Peringalkuthu and those from Kodakara through Kormala. Among these, Kumily pass, into which the land-routes from the Vadakkenkur and Thekkenkur kingdoms merged, seems to have been the most frequented and heavily used mountain-route. When the archbishop Dom Alexis de Meneses visited the St.Thomas Christians of the hinterland, he happened to meet many traders coming through this route to take pepper in exchange for the textiles of Tamilnadu.

One of the royal documents dated 6th February, 1580 mentions that the crown was informed about the paucity of the pepper in the weighing place of
Cochin, the main reason for which was that the merchants who got money from the king of Cochin for bringing spices, bought them at higher prices and with the help of the people of the native Cochin sold them to the traders of the ghat-route who came with the oxen. On 6th February 1587, the viceroy was asked by the crown to take all the necessary steps to prevent the diversion of spices through these ghat-routes. But nothing could stop this well-established trade-traffic. This phenomenon continued uninterruptedly although the remaining period of Portuguese occupation. However some effort was taken to counter this flow of spices by increasing the price of pepper in 1632.

Though the various native kings, who had sway over the hinterland, were given subsidies and monetary rewards to prevent the diversion of commodities through the ghat-routes, the entire situation was out of their control. On the one hand the traders associated with the land-route used to give relatively higher price. On the other hand, many of the St. Thomas Christians, the principal pepper-cultivators, who had already estranged themselves from the Portuguese because of their policies of grafting colonial-latin-structure on the latter, had begun to co-operate with the traders of the ghat-route. For them, this route provided an opening to ventilate their opposition and resistance to the Portuguese designs of latinizing their liturgy and practices. The seeds of this tension between the St. Thomas Christians and the Portuguese were already sown, when the latter labelled the native Christian group as nestorian heretics and began to condemn their social practices, religious rites and ceremonies as heresy.
Though Pope Pius IV (1559-1565) had ordered that the administration of this native Christian community should be divided between the two Chaldean bishops, Mar Joseph and Mar Elias sent by the Patriarch Mar Abdiso and though the Diocese of Angamali, to which the Malabar Christians belonged, was never put under the *padroado* jurisdiction, the council of Goa (1575) proclaimed that the St. Thomas Christians should be governed by the king of Portugal. Moreover, another bishop, Mar Abraham, who arrived in Malabar in 1566 from Persia as the bishop of the St. Thomas Christians, evading the Portuguese blockade, was also accused of Nestorian heresy in the third council of Goa (1585). By usurping ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the native Christians, the Portuguese under the leadership of archbishop Dom Alexis Meneses launched an organised programme to turn the former away from non-Latin rites, ceremonies and practices as well as to make them conform to Latin tradition. With little command over native (and Syriac) languages and with little knowledge of native cultural practices, it seems, hasty steps were taken to call everything which was found to be non-European and which did not correspond to western Latin tradition as heresy. This move evoked much opposition from the St. Thomas Christian community and especially from the Archdeacon, who became the symbol of resistance against the Portuguese after the death of Mar Abraham in 1597. He convened a Synod in Angamali where the priests of this community pledged to uphold the traditions of the church without any change and not to allow the priests trained in Latin tradition at the Vaippinkotta Seminary to enter the church of the St. Thomas Christians. They also
resolved not to accept any Latin bishop; but the one sent by the Patriarch (of Chaldean church)\(^3\). A rebellion had already broken out in the hinterland: the leading pepper-cultivators went against the Portuguese who were trying to impose on the former the Latin ecclesiastical traditions. Reasons other than religious ones also seem to have been in operation behind this move. The Portuguese insistence on the uniformity of not only faith but also rituals, customs and practices seems to have been motivated also by economic as well as political targets: to ensure easy penetration into the distant spice-hinterland. It appeared to have been an indirect way of controlling the producers of the spices. As a continuation of this project, the Archbishop of Goa, Dom Alexis Meneses convened a synod in Diamper (Udayamperur) in 1599, according to the canons of which a good many of the St.Thomas Christians were converted to Latin traditions\(^3\).

However, a great majority, which was the powerful and wealthy group among them, led by their Archdeacon, continued their resistance against the Portuguese and the Padroado in order to preserve their age-old traditions and practices. The religious tensions in the hinterland were eventually transferred to the economic activities of Cochin and the supply of the spices from the hinterland in the port of Cochin to be exported to Europe began to show drastic downward trends. The agitated cultivators and merchants of the St.Thomas Christians were reluctant to co-operate with the Portuguese trade in Cochin\(^3\). They, in turn, found the lucrative ghat-route as an easy way of taking part in the resistance against the Portuguese whom they had begun to view as their enemies. Here, it is to be specially noted that the
ghat-route witnessed unprecedented flow of spices during this period of tension in the hinterland.

The Portuguese authorities in Lisbon had already taken note of the estrangement of this community and the damage they caused to the trade in Cochin by their participation in the ghat-route trade networks. In January 1601, two royal letters were sent to the viceroy, Aires de Saldanha, asking him to favour specially the St. Thomas Christians and to win their good-will. The diplomatic visit of the archbishop Dom Alexis Meneses to the churches of this community to enforce the Synod decisions and to win back their co-operation did not yield good results. During the years between 1603 and 1605, the pepper supply to the Portuguese factory in Cochin became scanty. So the Portuguese made strenuous efforts to placate and persuade the merchants of the St. Thomas Christians as well as their Archdeacon to make available spices in Cochin. Nevertheless, the outcome of this move was not positive. On the other hand, with the diminishing supply of pepper in Cochin and with the increasing flow of pepper from the hinterland of Cochin to Coromandel coast through the ghat-route, there commenced a mass exodus of casados from 1612 onwards, from Cochin to Nagapatanam, Mailapore and other parts of eastern coast to take advantage of the changed situation. Some of them even moved to Bengal, Pegu and Ceylon. These casados, with the new base in Coromandel, made higher profit by distributing the pepper coming through the ghat-route to Bengal, Pegu and China. Even the Dutch in Masulipatnam and Pulicate began to buy pepper increasingly from the traders of ghat-route.
However this tension between the pepper-growers of the native Christian community and the Portuguese was not a temporary phenomenon: on the contrary it continued through out the remaining years of Portuguese phase until it finally burst out into an open rebellion in 1652-1653. The sparks kindled in the hinterland when the St.Thomas Christians heard that Ahatullah, a syrian bishop sent to Malabar from the Chaldean church was drowned by the Portuguese in the sea. On 3rd January 1653, members of this community led by Archdeacon and their clergy assembled at Mattancherry (native Cochin), in the vicinity of the Portuguese city of Cochin and touching the cross they pledged (which later came to be known in history as Coonan Cross Oath) not to allow themselves to be subjugated further by the Portuguese and the Jesuits. Then they assembled at Alengad where twelve priests laid hands on the Archdeacon to "consecrate" him a bishop. With the making of this schismatic bishop, the revolt of the influential section of the St.Thomas Christians against the Portuguese turned out to be complete and decisive. The religious tensions were not constrained to the limits of rites and celebrations; but were always transferred into economic sphere. Anti-Portuguese feelings influenced, through out this period, the economic transactions of the St.Thomas Christians. Incidentally, the ghat-route-trade offered to the Malabar Christians an apt outlet to show their spirit of rebellion and resistance against the Portuguese.

Moreover the coastal wars that were fought between Cochin and Calicut as well as Cochin and Parur obstructed the trade in Cochin, which in turn favoured the ghat-route commerce. The king of Cochin had already begun
to feel uneasiness, when the Portuguese joined hands with Zamorin to
attack Kunjali in 1599.\textsuperscript{44} The former feared that this new relationship would
be harmful to the trade interests of Cochin. So, in order to disrupt it, the ruler
of Cochin invaded the territory of Koratty Caimal, who was a feudatory of
Zamorin. The ruler of Calicut, who had by this time defeated Kunjali and
captured Kottakkal with the help of the Portuguese\textsuperscript{45}, was, therefore,
compelled to launch attacks against Cochin. By 1614, Zamorin occupied the
northern part of Cranganore and continued the war against the Perumpadappu
king for which he got also the support of the king of Parur.\textsuperscript{46} Though the
Portuguese were able to compel the king of Parur to sign a peace-treaty, the
state of war prevailed in and around Cochin which adversely affected the
supply of spices to the Portuguese factory. The coastal war, with interrupted
intensity, continued upto 1626 when peace was finally established between
Cochin and Calicut through the mediation of Pe.Francisco Doliveira, the
rector of the Jesuit college of Cochin.\textsuperscript{47} The belligerent atmosphere that had
prevailed in Cochin, for almost twenty seven years, also favoured the
ghat-route trade.

The only period when the ghat-route registered less flow of pepper was
the one between 1621 and 1629, when there broke out a war in the interior
land \textit{(terra firma)} obstructing the ghat-route commerce. Though the exact
names of the kingdoms that were engaged in the war are not
mentioned in this Portuguese document, they seems to have been located on
the eastern border of the hinterland of Cochin through which the ghat-route
passed. The passage of pepper to Tamilnadu was so much disturbed by this
war that the merchants had no other option but to take the commodity to Cochin. This contributed to a fresh flow of pepper to Cochin where this phenomenon even effected a fall in the price.48

Thus, we find that, during this period the hinterland of Cochin was often only loosely integrated with the economic orbit of Cochin. It appeared more, on the other hand, as a source for inland and ghat-route commerce than as a hinterland for Cochin. The majority of the local rulers in the hinterland, who were given better monetary rewards by the traders of the interior, were permitting the spices to be diverted through the ghat-route. Among them, only the pepper king and the king of Turuguli (Thodupuzha), as observed by Francisco da Costa in the beginning of seventeenth century, were making genuine efforts to ensure regular deliveries of pepper to the Portuguese factory in Cochin.49 It is to be here specially mentioned that the intensity of the ghat-route commerce, whose frequency was augmented unprecedently by the tension between the Portuguese and the pepper-grower-cum-trader group of St.Thomas Christians, had sapped the vitality of economic life of Cochin during the period between 1600 and 1663.

3. The Maritime Trade within Asia

Three distinct chronological phases could be noticed in the intra-Asian trade by sea, which emanated from Cochin: 1. The period from 1570 to 1600 when the intra Asian trade reached the highest level. 2. The period from 1600 to 1622 when much of the hinterland and trade-space linked
with Cochin's commercial empire was curtailed and cut off because of the tensions with St. Thomas Christians and because of the Dutch occupation of South East Asia respectively. 3. The period from 1622 to 1663 when trade in Asian waters was stifled because of the overwhelming tensions, both domestic and external.

During this period, the crown abstained from participating in the country trade emanating from Cochin. Still, much of the intra-Asian trade by sea was left in the hands of Portuguese citizens and the native traders who supported Portuguese interests. However, it does not mean that the trade conducted in Cochin was always subservient to the Portuguese commercial designs. On the contrary, there flourished, as well, the notorious "illegal commerce" by the natives as well as the Lusitanians, which violated the trade-restrictions imposed by the Portuguese authorities. The trade of Cochin conducted within Asia could be divided generally into two: 1. Licenced Country Trade and 2. Illicit Country Trade

i. Licensed Country Trade

With the reorganisation of trade in 1570, the nature of licensed trade underwent considerable alterations. On the one hand, laws were made to ban the practice of issuing licences for pepper trade within Asia. Though these royal orders issued from Lisbon and Valladolid were not seriously implemented in Cochin and even when pepper was, as Boccarro testifies, continued to be taken from Cochin to Bengal in the early seventeenth century, the frequency of the ships that moved under strict licence-system
seems to have diminished considerably. Instead, the voyages conceded and farmed out to individuals and institutions, which were-in most cases- further sold out to real traders, became an oft-resorted alternative to licensed trade.

Moreover, the cartazes were continued to be used increasingly as an "economic pass" rather than a "political-allegiance-certificate". For all practical purposes, the natives began to view the cartazes as a trade licence which conferred on them considerable economic freedom. Thus, the licensed country trade of this period could be divided into three: 1. The trade of the Casados 2. Trade by Voyages 3. Trade in ships with cartazes.

A. The Trade of the Casados within Asia

The *casados* of Cochin had already become by 1570 a powerful mercantile group with considerable capital resources and vast commercial net-works. The crisis which the *Estado* experienced during the years between 1565 and 1570 as well as the liberal policy which the crown followed during the contract-trade-period (1570-1597) had prepared a favourable commercial atmosphere for the *casados*. During the period between 1570 and 1600, the *casados* virtually turned Cochin into one of the biggest entrepots of Asia. The important commodities taken from Cochin to the trade-centres, situated in the eastern space of Indian Ocean, were pepper, textiles, wild-cinnamon, flour, wine, olive-oil, gun-powder, almonds and dried grapes. From Bengal the *casados* of Cochin brought to this port large quantity of sugar, rice, laciron, textiles, long pepper, wheat, saltpeter etc. Rice and other food-materials, during this period, were in high demand
not only in Cochin but also throughout Kerala. So the rice-ports of Bengal and Pegu were often frequented by the *casados* of Cochin to take maximum advantage of the trade in food-materials. On 17th May 1590 they brought to the city of Santa Cruz 900 candis of rice from Bengal and 500 candis from Pegu.\(^5^4\) This transaction in rice was conducted in exchange for the pepper taken from Cochin. This barter proved to be more profitable and rice was frequently brought to Cochin from these distant ports of Bengal and Pegu, as testified by the trade-records of 1592 and 1597.\(^5^5\) Bengal was also a great production centre of textiles and was ranked along with the other large centres of Gujarat and Coromandel, even in the seventeenth century.\(^5^6\) Textiles were bought from Bengal in exchange also for the pepper taken by the *casados* from Cochin. In 1580s and 1590s, the khasas, malmals and silks of Bengal formed a great share in the entire cargo of textiles brought to Cochin, both for Asian and European trade.\(^5^7\)

However, the frequency of the cargo-ships that plied between Cochin and Bengal seems to have diminished considerably in the seventeenth century, due to the paucity of pepper that arrived in Cochin because of the tensions between the Portuguese as well as the St. Thomas Christians in the hinterland and due to the Dutch menace that often obstructed the routine-trade. Even then, in 1615, we do find mention of Bengal ships coming to Cochin for trade and the customs revenue from Bengal commerce was relatively significant.\(^5^8\) Moreover, the textile-items from Bengal like the khasas and malmals used to figure in the list of the commodities taken from Cochin to Portugal, as we see, for example, in the
case of goods carried by the ship Nossa Senhora da Luz in 1615. Antonio Bocarro writing his Livro das Plantas by 1630 says that the *casado* traders of Cochin continued to send pepper to the Bengal port of Pipli and that the Bengal-Cochin trade of this period was worth 40,000 *xerafins* a year. But this trade with Bengal does not seem to have continued further for a long time. After 1632, with the capture of Hughli from the Portuguese by the Mughal general Qasim Khan, one of the most profitable commercial links, which the *casados* of Cochin had enviously maintained for such a long period, was almost cut off.

It was almost with the same frequency that the ports of Coromandel coast were visited by the *casado* traders of Cochin, in the last three decades of sixteenth century, for collecting textiles and food-materials. Thus, for example, on 17th May 1590, the *casados* brought to Cochin from Nagapatanam 400 candis of rice for which four candis were given to Thome Roiz, the collector of "the one per cent ", as share for the city of Cochin. The settlers of Cochin continued to bring rice frequently from Nagapatanam in the subsequent years, as well, as we see from the trade-records of 1592 and 1597. Besides foodmaterials, textiles formed a great portion of the commodities taken from the ports of Coromandel (among which Mailapore and Nagapatanam were the prominent ones) to Cochin. In 1605, the crown asked the Viceroy to see to it that the textiles brought from Coromandel ports were sold only in exchange for spices and drugs. This royal direction was supposed to have been given to attract more spices from the hinterland to Cochin. However, as we have already seen, with the arrival of great
volume of spices in Coromandel ports directly from the hinterland of Cochin through the ghat-route, many *casados* of Cochin shifted their sphere of activities to Mailapore and Nagapatanam, as early as 1612. It gave them a secure and a better position to maintain their commercial links with Bengal, Pegu and Malacca and to bag greater profit out of the barter-trade. With the intensification of the tensions between the Portuguese and the St. Thomas Christians, the major pepper-growing group, the flow of spices from the hinterland to Coromandel through the ghat-route increased unprecedently, which attracted more and more settlers of Cochin to Coromandel. The large scale diversion of spices to the eastern coast and the subsequent exodus of the *casados* to Coromandel ports had tremendous impact on the commercial activities and the urban life of Cochin, causing it to fall off drastically. By 1616, most of the enterprising *casados* had left Cochin. And by 1640, as Agostinho de Almeida Gato (the ouvidor of the city of Cochin) says, that about half of the inhabitants of Cochin had left the city and most of its residential areas were depopulated. Those who remained in the city were suffering because of acute poverty (caused by the lack of trading activities). Many who had been brought up in luxury, were seen to be begging from door to door; a good number of women resorted to prostitution to support themselves and their families. However, it seems that the *casados* continued to maintain with less frequency, even during this period, the lucrative commercial traffic between Cochin and the Coromandel ports. Thus, we see, for example, in 1644 the casados taking large quantity of cotton clothes, both white and coloured, to the various parts of the *Estado* including Cochin.
With the liberalisation of spice trade in 1570, Malacca was proclaimed a free port and it was decreed that the spices bought there should not pay duties or fees on being taken to Goa and Cochin. The *casados* of Cochin took a better advantage of this trade-concession than their counterparts in Goa, as they were required to pay only less tax to the native ruler upon their arrival. During the last decades of sixteenth century, many *casado* traders from Cochin used to conduct frequent commercial trips to Malacca, where they, as in 1588 for example, through their trade tactics controlled the price of the market to their advantage. Some of them also used to take commodities from Malacca and South East Asia to Coromandel ports in exchange for textiles and were bagging considerable profit. However, the crown often desired that this trade be conducted directly with Cochin or Goa so that the *Estado* also might profit out of it by extracting the customs. In 1591 a royal order was issued notifying that no commercial embarkation from Malacca should be made to Santhome (Mailapore), Nagapatanam or any other ports except to Cochin or Goa under the penalty of losing their merchandise. This notice was affixed in the various public places of the city of Malacca.

The role played by Malacca in the commercial life of the *casados* of Cochin was much that the city of Santa Cruz sent every possible help to defend the former, which was under threat. In 1589, the food supplies sent to Malacca by the city of Cochin with a view to defending its fortress was worth 16,700 *pardaos*. The *casados* paid this amount entirely not directly from their own pockets; but from the one per cent which the city
levied on the commodities that reached Cochin. Malacca was so dear to the commerce of the settlers of Cochin that besides food supplies, a lot of money was collected from the traders of this Malabar port to be sent to the rescue of the former. About 1356 xerifins were collected in cash from the casado traders of Cochin, by way of one per cent taxation, to help Malacca during the period between 1587 and 1598. A substantial contribution became necessary in 1605, when Martim Afonso de Castro's armada was sent to Malacca for its defence. Even the Casa de Misericordia of Cochin, on official request, paid a loan of 19,000 xerifins towards its expenditure. However, with the mounting pressure from the anti-Portuguese powers on Malacca in the seventeenth century, the commercial links established by the casados of Cochin with this exchange-centre of South East Asia began to feel increased strains. Still, some casados of Cochin took private initiative to bring pepper from Malacca to Cochin. In 1615, some casados of Cochin went to Malacca and fetched 2000 quintals of pepper. In some rare cases they enjoyed even the freedom and permission to sell it to the traders of their own choice, as well. This seems to have continued for sometime. In 1616, Manoel de Fonsequa, a citizen of Cochin from whom the Estado often borrowed money for pepper purchase, was also found to be engaged in the pepper trade of Malacca. He used to buy pepper from Malacca with his own personal money and bring it to Cochin. In the second and third decades of the seventeenth century, the Malacca trade began to dwindle. However, later with the capture of Malacca in 1641 by the Dutch, Cochin's commercial link with this traditional port of South East Asia was totally cut off.
China, into which penetration was made possible after 1560 via Macao and Malacca,\textsuperscript{75} was always a prospective market for the *casados*. A large volume of silk and porcelain was brought to Cochin from Chinese production centres by the *casados*.\textsuperscript{76} It is also believed that the settlers of Cochin had involvement in the trade of copper which was taken to India in bulk quantity from China. There were instances when the individual traders were given licences to bring 12 quintals of copper per year.\textsuperscript{77} Further, there were many cases, as for example in 1597, when ships from China were stopped at Cochin to unload the copper there.\textsuperscript{78} The hands of the *casado* traders behind this deal became more evident as the frequency, with which the Chinese ships destined to Goa were stopped at Cochin for unloading the merchandise under the pretext of bad monsoon, increased.\textsuperscript{79} This metal was in high demand in Kerala as the flow of copper from Europe ceased by the end of sixteenth century. Copper was required not only for the minting of coins, but also for the manufacturing of household-utensils of the aristocratic families in South India, particularly in Kerala.

With the Dutch blockade, the navigational lines between Cochin and China as well as other South East Asian countries were frequently interrupted. The expulsion of the Portuguese from Ternate in 1570 and their loss of Amboina and Tidore to the Dutch in 1605 made it difficult for the *casados* to trade in cloves, nutmegs and mace. After 1605, these Indonesian spices reached Cochin only very seldom in Goa.\textsuperscript{80} However, the *casados* of Cochin continued to send ships occasionally to other parts of South East Asia. There are examples for the maritime movements even between Cochin
and Manilla during this period. In a document dated 11th October 1632, mention is made about a ship going from Cochin to Manilla with 800 slaves.\textsuperscript{81} Again, in the middle of 1630s, the traders of Cochin were said to have taken their ships to Macão, as well\textsuperscript{82}, which also suggests that they must have also played some part in the Macão-Nagasaki exchange-trade. Even in 1650's, the casado trade with China continued, even though the frequency was less. In 1655, we hear about a ship engaged in the Cochin-Macão trade being captured by the Dutch.\textsuperscript{83}

One of the important and interesting features of this period (1570-1663) was that the armada of the south, instituted initially to prevent the diversion of the spices, began to be used increasingly for protecting the private trade of the casados whose commercial empire stretched into the eastern space of Indian Ocean. It was because of the constant threat from the corsairs that the ships of casados were given fleet-protection from Cape Comorin to Cochin. The duty of conducting the coastal-patrolling up to Comorin fell upon the shoulders of the city of Cochin and for maintaining this armada, the city extracted "one per cent" duty from every trader of this port.\textsuperscript{84} Even the ships from China destined to Goa were also asked to enter the port of Cochin\textsuperscript{85} so that the city might get "one per cent share" towards the expense of the armada. With the conversion of the southern armada into a military arrangement to protect the private trade of the casados of Cochin, the municipality of this city was given the right to appoint the captain-in-chief of these armadas, as in 1589, for example, when the viceroy D.Duarte de Menezes issued orders to the same effect.\textsuperscript{86} During the
period between 1587 and 1598, the amount which the city of Santa Cruz paid for conducting the patrolling upto Cape Comorin was twenty five thousand and seventy eight *parado* and it was collected as "one per cent" from the traders. Some of these fleet that were used for patrolling consisted of many ships, as in the case of the fleet of Fernando Lobo whose patrolling vessels were thirteen in number.

The following table gives the amount spent by the city of Cochin, during the period from 1587 to 1598, for rendering protection to the casado traders coming from eastern part of Indian Ocean:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Captains of the Armada</th>
<th>Expense: Pardao</th>
<th>Tangas</th>
<th>Reis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1587</td>
<td>Costa Manoel Botelho</td>
<td>5288</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1588</td>
<td>-not known-</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1589</td>
<td>D. Jeronimo da Azevedo</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1590</td>
<td>João Correa</td>
<td>2434</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1591</td>
<td>-not known-</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1592</td>
<td>-not known-</td>
<td>1507</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>Alvaro da Branches de Pendeo</td>
<td>4497</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1594</td>
<td>-not known-</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1595</td>
<td>Fernando Lobo</td>
<td>3080</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1596</td>
<td>Fernando Lobo</td>
<td>2874</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1597</td>
<td>Rui Dias de San Paio</td>
<td>2444</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1598</td>
<td>Diogo Couto</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows the keen interest which the city of Cochin took in promoting and protecting the commerce of the *casados*, eventhough it also
betrays the elements of negligence shown in some years. The transformation of the southern armada from a mechanism to safeguard the royal trade into one to protect the private trade of the casados was a typical example of how the various Estado institutions were, during this period, made to serve and safeguard the private interests as well as initiatives of the Portuguese citizens, rather than those of the crown. During this period, especially towards the end of the sixteenth century, the merchant ships were asked to travel in caravans or small groups which were guarded by a fleet and the cafila system, as this caravan arrangement was often called, was made a common practice in the seventeenth century to withstand the threat from the Dutch and the corsairs. 

Antonio Bocarro refers to the fleet which used to take from Cape Comorin, till the end of summer, the caravans of merchant ships coming from Fishery coast, Coromandel ports and Bengal to Cochin. In the second and third decades of seventeenth century, as in 1621, for example, the casado traders of Cochin coming from China and Malacca were moving in cafilas or caravans upto Cape Comorin from where they were taken to Cochin under the guard of an armada consisting normally of a galley and fifteen ships. By 1640s, the Dutch tightened their control over Indian Ocean and were obstructing the casados from maintaining commercial links with China and Malacca.

Corresponding to the maritime movements linking Cochin with the ports in the eastern space of Indian Ocean, the casados developed trade-relations with the Maldives as a supplementary commercial activity. The casados brought to Cochin coir, which was in high demand for
the various purposes of the private ships as well as those of the carreira, and cowries, which were again taken from Cochin as a monetary medium for buying slaves from western African ports, indigo and textiles from Gujarat, food-materials and clothes from Bengal, Pegu and Coromandel. The king of Maldives, who had fled to Cochin in 1552 and had become a christian, was residing in the city of Santa Cruz, during this period, under the name of D.Manuel. The Portuguese forces conquered the islands of Maldives in 1554 and defeating the new king Hassan, they built a fortress in Male and compelled the islands to pay annual tribute to their old sovereign, now residents of Cochin. D.Manuel in Cochin used to sell annual voyages to Maldives, which made available coir and cowries for the casados of Cochin, to be taken to Bengal and Gujarat. However, because of the native resistance, which became strong with the support of the Muslim merchants of Malabar, the Portuguese entered into an agreement in 1567 accepting the sovereignty of the native Muslim king.

Meanwhile, the external commerce of the islands was agreed to be given to the Portuguese, while Dom Manuel, the exiled king in Cochin was to get, besides cowries, 500 quintals of coir as annual tribute and was given the right to have a ware-house with his own factor in Male. From the commodities that arrived Cochin for the exiled king, the Portuguese collected one third as a tribute to them. However, as a result of this arrangement, a large quantity of coir and cowries began to reach Cochin from Maldives, by way of trade-rights enjoyed by and the tribute given to the members of the royal family in exile in Cochin (like D.Manuel, later his
sons D.João and D.Paulo and finally on the death of D.João, his son D.Filipe) and by way of direct participation of the Portuguese in the trade of the islands. Besides this, the members of this royal family like D.Filipe used to collect some taxes from every ship coming from Maldives to Cochin and other Portuguese ports, by virtue of being their old sovereign.98

Francisco Pyrard de Laval observed during the years 1606-1607 that annually four ships with the capacity of 140 toneladas were taking coir and cowries from these islands to Cochin.99 The casado traders of Cochin seem to have taken greater advantage of this Maldive-commerce by carrying cowries and coir to Bengal and Gujarat for exchange trade. In Gujarat, one candil of coir was sold at 13 xeralfins and 1 tanga.100 The Portuguese often forced the ships coming from the islands to sell the commodities to them without paying taxes to the royal family in exile.101 Even though D.Jeronimo de Azevedo in 1615 decreed that due share should be given to D.Filipe, the heir of the royal family in exile in the city of Santa Cruz, for the coir and the cowries brought to Cochin, the situation continued to be the same and almost the entire commodity coming to Cochin from the islands went into the hands of the Portuguese which were further distributed all over Asia through the casado net-works.102 In the procurement and distribution of these commodities, the casados were frequently in competition with the king of Cannanore, who exercised great control over the politics and the commerce of Maldives, and his merchants.103 By 1620s, the Portuguese made compromise with the king of Cannanore and were reluctant to enter into his political and commercial dominion with a view to avoiding the Dutch
occupation of the islands and to ensuring the regular arrival of ships from Maldives in Cochin. In fact, with the diminishing supply of pepper in Cochin, the coir and cowries from Maldives began to occupy prime position in the wares used by the *casados* for exchanges in the ports of Bengal and Gujarat.

The trade of the *casados* with the island of Ceylon continued even during this period. Cinnamon and precious stones, both for European trade as well as for intra-Asian commerce were used to be brought to Cochin by the settlers of Cochin. In 1598 as well as in 1601, when Vimala Dharma Suriya declared himself the king of Ceylon and when the Portuguese found their position threatened in the island, an army of the St. Thomas Christians (obviously from the pro-Portuguese group) was raised by D. Alexis Meneses and by the prince of Cochin respectively for the defence of the Portuguese interests in Ceylon. The special interest of the settlers of Cochin in the affairs of Ceylon was very evident from the fact that some 130 Portuguese citizens of Cochin came forward in 1630 under D. Filipe Mascarenhas along with many native soldiers to defend this island. Besides this, the city of Santa Cruz, even in the midst of economic pressure it was undergoing, offered 800 candis of rice towards the same purpose. This service of the city did not go unrewarded. In 1635, we find the merchants of Cochin going to Ceylon for procuring cinnamon. It was evidently a reward for Cochin's participation in the defence of Ceylon. It was to be seen against the background of many pre-1630 requests, like the one continuously made by the Municipal council of Cochin from 1622 to 1629 for importing 50 *bhars*
of cinnamon without paying customs duties with a view to installing armories, which were often rejected. It seems that, though a portion of the cinnamon brought to Cochin was taken for intra-Asian commerce, a great bulk of it was reserved for European export.

The coastal Malabar used to depend greatly on the rice-ports of Canara, as well, for obtaining the necessary food-stuffs. During the great drought and famine of 1587, to which Ferdinand Cron refers, the demand for food materials was unprecedentedly on the increase. The casados used to import great volume of rice to Cochin during the period immediately after 1587 (especially till 1598) from the ports of Canara, Bengal and Coromandel. Mangalore was one of the important ports of Canara from which the settlers of Cochin used to bring rice to the city of Santa Cruz.

The casados played a considerable role in re-distributing the production of Canara and rice was used to be taken from Cochin occasionally to feed Malacca as well as Ceylon and to Maldives for the exchange of commodities. Rice-trade with Canara was often hindered by the Dutch and English blockade. Some of the rice-ships of the casados of Cochin coming from Canara were captured by the English, as in the case of the vessel captured by the British ship Dragon from Canara coast on 24th January 1613. Despite this fact, it seems that the casados had to depend more on Canara rice, with the diminishing availability of food materials from Coromandel and Bengal, caused by the tightening of Dutch blockade and by the loss of Bengal in 1632. Meanwhile, the war of succession,
which began in Ikkeri (Canara) in 1629 between Virappa and Virabadra, had already begun to obstruct the flow of food-materials to Goa and Cochin. In 1630, the price of the food materials increased considerably and both Cochin as well as Goa were lacking in food-supply. Though the new viceroy, Pero da Silva, made contract with Virabadra in 1635 to obtain necessary food-stuffs, Cochin's situation did not seem to have made any significant improvement. There is every reason to believe that the misery and famine which had visited the city of Santa Cruz by the end of 1630s, had though been linked with the absence of trade and consequent economic crisis, was aggravated by the shortage of adequate food-supply, which became still worse when many casados who were trading on food-materials had already transferred their residence and spheres of activities, in the changed circumstances, to more prospective locations.

Private trade of the casados with Goa was very little when compared with other commercial routes. Cochin-Goa route was associated more with European trade than with intra-Asian commerce. However in 1615, D.Diogo Coutinho observed that the commodities which the settlers of the city of Santa Cruz were taking from Cochin to Goa valued 30 to 40,000 xerafins.

The ports of Gujarat, from where commodities were taken to Persia, Arabia, East Africa and Europe via West Asia, were the leading and long-standing commercial targets of the casados of Cochin. Though the old sultanate of Gujarat was incorporated into the Mughal territory in 1573, the settlers of Cochin procured the wares through the Portuguese bases in Chaul,
Baçaim, Damão and Diu. The *casados* took to Gujarat spices from Cochin, wares from China and Malacca, coir and cowries from Maldives in exchange for textiles, indigo as well as opium. Coconuts turned out also to be a major commodity sent to the ports of Cambay from Cochin and other Malabar ports, as observed by Thomas Best in 1613.\textsuperscript{118} Some of these commodities were further taken from here to the ports of West Asia, as well, using *cartazes*.

The *casado* trade between Cochin and the ports of Gujarat was always a controversial one, as on the one hand the partners of the *casados*, the *bania* traders, used to send textiles and other commodities to the port of Cochin in the name of the settlers of the city of Santa Cruz, with a view to avoiding the Portuguese customs of Goa (where the customs rate was six per cent). The benefit of this illegal partnership was that the *bania* merchants were required to pay only three and a half per cent to the king of Cochin and the one per cent tax to the city, as the wares were claimed by the residents of the city. However, this illegal partnership prevailed not only with Gujarat trade. Even from China and Malacca, the native partners of the *casados* were also bringing commodities to Cochin and paying only concessional rate to the native king under the label of the settlers of the city of Santa Cruz and thus used to evade the excessive Portuguese customs-rate.\textsuperscript{119} But what was special with Gujarat-Cochin trade was that because of the illegal partnership established between the *casados* as well as the *bania* merchants with a view to evading the customs house of Goa, as estimated in 1612, the *Estado* was loosing an annual amount of 20,000 *pardaos* per year,\textsuperscript{120} a heavy loss
when compared to the possible profit that could be gathered from the declining navigational lines of the east. To solve this problem, as early as 1583, the Portuguese authorities had made secret negotiations with the king of Cochin to equalise the customs rate of Cochin with that of Goa, by raising the rate of *casado* settlers to 6 percent which was to be paid to the native king and by imposing on all compulsory exit-tax to the Portuguese Treasury. This must have also been a part of the strategy to centralise trade in Goa and to minimise the commercial attractions which Cochin had. However, this deal provoked great protest and some 15,000 armed men (10,000 local Christians and 5000 Portuguese) marched into the church of St. John in Cochin to defend their liberties. The crowd even attacked the captain in his fort, who took refuge in the royal house of the king. The authorities were compelled to reconsider this legislation. According to the agreement, made by the newly arrived viceroy D. Duarte de Menezes on 12th December 1584, (a) the *casados* were required to pay only 3.5 percent to the king of Cochin and no export duties, (b) the unmarried Portuguese citizens of the city had to pay 6 percent to the Portuguese Treasury at Cochin, (c) all non-Portuguese including the Muslims, Jews, Venetians, Armenians, local Christians and those Christians residing south of Cochin were to pay usual 6 percent duties to the king and (d) all *casados* not resident in Cochin had to pay 6 percent on entry and exit to the Portuguese customs officials. This again provided loop-hole to the *bania* merchants to take clothes and commodities to Cochin, by-passing Goa and attributing ownership to the *casados*. As another solution to this problem, an order was issued, on 23rd
November 1607, asking the *bania* merchants of Chaul who were taking commodities to Cochin to pay customs duties at Goa.\textsuperscript{124} However, the king of Cochin, who always favoured the alliance between the *casados* of Cochin and the native traders to attract more trade to his port, complained in 1613 and in 1615 that this decision was an encroachment on his privilege and was a violation of the contract made in 1584.\textsuperscript{125} It is to be, here, admitted that the partnership between the settlers of Cochin and the native merchants of Gujarat made easier and smoother the re-distribution trade of the *casados* centered around Cochin. On the other hand, the *casado* traders of Cochin, who were bringing commodities from eastern space of Indian Ocean and had paid customs duties to the king of Cochin, were permitted, in 1607, to carry merchandise to the ports of Gujarat without paying customs duties at Goa; they were required to take with them only the certificate for having paid tax at Cochin.\textsuperscript{126} But, for all other commodities taken from Cochin, they were to pay duties at Goa. The high customs-rate prevalent in Goa took away a great share of the profit accrued in the *casado's* commerce with Gujarat.

Meanwhile, by 1630's the *casados* had to face stiff competition from the English and the Dutch in the western littoral of India. However, even when the trade with eastern space of Indian Ocean had to be abandoned because of Dutch threat and later with the loss of Bengal, the commerce with Gujarat remained to be a hopeful resort, perhaps the last resort for the *casados* of Cochin. But, it did not seem to have last long. The obligation that all the *casados* of Cochin trading with the ports of Gujarat had to pay customs at Goa ruined even this branch of commerce. The advantage of the
commerce with eastern space of Indian Ocean was that, there was no customs house for them other than that of Cochin, where they had a concessional rate. But the ruinous regulations imposed on Gujarat commerce was that the embarkations from Cochin had to pay almost double the rate of Cochin to the customs house of Goa, where the officials were always maintaining antipathetic feelings towards the casados of Santa Cruz, who were said to have been affluent and who even often appeared to be a menace to the Estado because of their parallel commercial and strategic networks. This attempt to tax the casados of Cochin at Goa played a crucial role in the decadence of Cochin's trade, as explained by the document of 7th October 1644. This letter of the city says that the decline of the commerce of Santa Cruz was because of the compulsory customs duties, which the casados of Cochin were obliged to pay at Goa, each time they moved to north (evidently Gujarat ports). The city narrated the state of its poverty and suffering and it was hopefully requesting the crown for the permission to conduct trade with the ports of Gujarat without paying customs at Goa, a concession which the early kings of Portugal had granted to the casados before.127

Ormuz in the Persian gulf provided an attractive exchange centre for the casados. Very often the commercial links of the residents of Cochin with Ormuz seemed to have been maintained through the ports of Gujarat and occasionally through Goa. However, the casados also made frequent direct-trips to this port of the Persian Gulf to bring horses to Cochin, whose distribution in south India continued to give them attractive trade
prospects, even after the disintegration of the Vijayanagara kingdom. These horses, though were to be paid 40 ducats as customs to the Portuguese in Ormuz, were sold in south India for a value varying from 300 to 1000 ducats. Though some of the ships were carrying 80 horses and some even 124 horses to Goa, as observed by Caesar Frederick and Ralph Fitch respectively in their voyage from Ormuz to Goa, we do not know the approximate tonnage of the vessels or the number of the horses taken to Cochin. It is believed that it amounted to considerable proportions. That must have been the reason why the crown made special intervention on 3rd March 1594 by saying that the import of horses from Ormuz to Cochin and Canara was prejudicial to the royal service and that instead of it, they should be taken to Goa, where the Estado might extract customs duty. As the taxes that were levied on the horses in Cochin went to native king, there was strong pressure to centralise the trade on horses in Goa, which was a great source of revenue to the Portuguese Treasury. But still it seems that the casado trade in the horses continued at least for some more time in Cochin, as we see in the letter of king Philip I dated 2nd January 1596, for instance. It is highly probable that the settlers of Cochin took with them large volume of various spices including pepper to Ormuz in exchange for horses. This assumption is further cemented and strengthened by the testimony of Leonhard Rauwolf, who happened to see on 2nd December 1574 as many as twentyfive ships loaded with the spices and drugs of India reaching Baghdad via Ormuz and Basra. He adds that besides horses, corals, emeralds, saffron, chermes-berries, raisins, dates, figs, almonds,
and Turkish handkerchiefs were also taken to India, in return.\textsuperscript{135} Even in the early decades of seventeenth century, when the Dutch and English vessels made appearances in the Arabian sea, the shipping between Cochin and Ormuz continued, although it was with less frequency.\textsuperscript{136} But it seems that by the end of the second decade of the seventeenth century the pressure of these European powers on this navigational line as well, increased. Nevertheless, with the fall of Ormuz in 1622 (into the hands of the English and the Shah of Persia), the links of the Cochin’s \textit{casados} with the caravan-route-trade was cut off, which had tremendous effect on the economic life of Cochin.\textsuperscript{137} As the \textit{casado} net-works in the western space of Indian Ocean were intimately linked with commerce of Ormuz, its loss caused a general slackening of trade, which consequently worsened further the commercial position of the city of Santa Cruz.

The socio-economic position of all the \textit{casados} were not always the same. The period between 1570 and 1600, which witnessed heavy traffic of private trade, seems to have introduced some sort of stratification among the settlers of the city of Cochin, on the basis of capital accumulated through commerce. 1. On the top of this ladder stood the rich, who were few in number and who had amassed huge wealth through private trade. To this group could also be added the upper middle class, some of whom were also associated with administrative responsibilities. 2. They were followed by the middle class, who were the ordinary traders; but had already by this time acquired sufficient capital resources and wide commercial net-works. They seemed to have formed the bulk of the population of Cochin. 3. The next
group comprised the lower middle class who were assisting the traders of the above classes as collection agents and peddling traders. It seems that the number of the *casados* who belonged to this category was not too small. The number of very poor people seems to have been very few in the period up to 1600, although there existed also some who were visited by misfortunes like orphans, widows and those infected with uncurable diseases. But the entire picture changes by 1610 from whence the number of the poor people increased much more. The first category, especially the rich ones among the *casados* like Manuel da Fonseca, Isabel Ferreira, and Francisco Barbosa used to provide huge loans to the *Estado* for conducting pepper-trade. In the second decade of seventeenth century, the loan given by them amounted to 60,000 *cruzados*, which the *casados* were never paid back. Again, it was some of these rich settlers, as we see later, who began to undertake the contract to tranship spices to Portugal. When the rich *casados* continued their commercial activities with their base in Cochin, a good many of the adventurous middle class and lower middle-class trading settlers of the city shifted their commercial bases in the second half of the seventeenth century to the eastern space of Indian Ocean, especially Nagapatanam, Mylapore, Bengal, Pegu and even Ceylon in the south, which offered better trade prospects. Some seems to have even preferred the Portuguese bases in Gujarat like Diu, Daman and Chaul. As we have already seen, the mass exodus of the *casados* began by 1612. Dom Diogo Coutinho mentions about the depopulation of the city and the decline of trade as early as January 1615. On 6th February 1616, king
Philip refers to the same problem of depopulation experienced in Cochin and the slackening of trade. The viceroy D.Jeronimo de Azevedo refers in his letter addressed to the Portuguese king dated March 1617, to the great losses and damges which "the rebels" (rebeldes) had caused to the city of Cochin to the point of reducing its population to one third. (a ponto de só uma terça parte estar habitada). The reduction of city population to one-third was caused by the mass exodus of citizens from Cochin to other prospective destinations in the eastern space of Indian Ocean and to Gujarat area. This migration seems to have been mainly because of (1) the shortage of pepper supply in Cochin caused by the tensions with St. Thomas Christians (which the operators in the eastern part of Indian Ocean got in plenty for their trade from Coromandel ports as supplied by the ghat-route) and (2) the frequent blockade which the Dutch, the English and the Danes were creating on the navigational lines to Cochin, which even destroyed a great many of the casado-ships conducting trade with the eastern space of Indian Ocean, as observed by Antonio Bocarro in 1635. Operations from Coromandel and Gujarat bases seem to have placed them in an advantageous position to adjust their commercial routes according to the movements of the enemies. With the arrival of the casados from Cochin the population of the Portuguese bases in Coromandel coast swelled and their economic condition began to improve. Thus, in 1644, for example, there were 800 Portuguese citizens with more than 20 fidalgos in Nagapatanam. Besides this, the number of people who used to come for confession was about 30,000 souls (It must have been the approximate number of
confessions heard in a year.). The Portuguese settlement in Nagapatanam had become by this time richer and greater than the city of Cochin. Even after arriving in the new bases of operations, these *casados* continued to enjoy almost the same commercial privileges which they used to have in Cochin. From Nagapatanam and other Coromandel bases, they continued to send commodities to China, Malacca and Bengal even during these troubled days. However, they were required to pay to the Portuguese Treasury of Nagapatanam the entry-tax only at the rate paid by the settlers of Cochin.

The attempt to transplant the commercial ambient of Cochin into Nagapatanam was evident from the various efforts taken by these traders of this Coromandel port for securing the same rights and commercial privileges enjoyed by the residents of the city of Santa Cruz, as is demonstrated by the document of 29th November 1645.

When Nagapatanam and other bases, to which a great number of enterprising settlers of Cochin moved, grew in prosperity and richness, Cochin, which had been an opulent city sunk into poverty and misery. The flight of the middle class traders from Cochin, who had chiefly been responsible for the opulence of the city, had worsened the economic position of Santa Cruz as well as of those who stayed over in the city and made the number of the poor people increase unprecedentedly. The miserable situation, which arose as a result of the lack of trade, struck hard the members of the upper middle-class and, as Agostinho de Almeida
observed in 1640s, "those who were brought up luxuriously in the midst of prosperity". Many resorted to begging and prostitution. Thinking that this misery was caused by the wrath of God, the settlers of Cochin even began to practise self-torture, penance and fasting to have the mercy of the Almighty and to get the opulence back to the city. Though the general public was suffering, it seems that some of the casados still continued their commercial activities and used to send very occasionally ships to Macão in China, as for instance in 1643 as well as in 1655 (this vessel along with the one sent from Goa was captured by the Dutch) and to the ports of gulf of Cambay in 1644.

**B. Trade by Voyages**

With the re-organisation of trade in 1570, the voyages to the Spice Islands and other prospective centres turned into a regular means of licensed trade. As the eastern part of Indian Ocean did not have effective means of control, there was lot of abuse, waste as well as thefts and the profit that went to royal treasury from the trade conducted with these centres was small and irregular. So the crown began to resort to indirect exploitation by renting out voyages to these places for a fixed price. The *Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas que a Coroa de Portugal tem nas partes da India* written around 1580 gives details about the selling price of these voyages to the ports in Bay of Bengal, South East Asia, China as well as Japan and the net average profit bagged from each voyage. Though Cochin was not mentioned in it as the port of embarkation or the destination, it seems that some of the
settlers of Cochin used to buy these voyages either directly from the crown or from the concessionaries. But the quite usual form of voyages that departed from Cochin, were those freely granted by the crown to individuals and institutions as reward and recognition for their meritorious service. These voyages were also conceded by the crown as a way of showing its benevolence and giving some source of income to the recipients. Thus, the king of Cochin was granted two voyages to China, by D. Sebastian in return for the help he might render for the fortification of the city of Santa Cruz. Another voyage to China was also said to have been conceded to the king of Cochin by 1587, probably to win the good-will and permission for the same fortification works. On 8th March 1589, the city of Cochin was granted two voyages to China for raising fund for its fortification. However, this construction work moved very slowly and this delay was caused purposely not only to get more voyages in its name but also to stop the very work of the fortress, as the fortification would hinder the smooth trade on contraband items that thrived in Cochin.

On 15th February 1594, we find mention of another voyage from Cochin to China granted for the same purpose. Eventually, the fortification of this city seems to have been a pretext for undertaking profitable voyages to China. One is compelled to think so, as the work of the city-wall remained to be unattended to, while the city acquired more and more voyages to China. Thus, for instance, on 8th February 1602, the city of Santa Cruz obtained another voyage to China. Again, on 15th February 1603, this city was granted two more voyages to the same destination and for the same
purpose. It seems that most of the voyages conceded to the institutions like the city of Cochin, as in the above case, and to the individuals were sold further to actual traders, who had wider net-works. In one of the letters dated 23rd January 1604, the captain of Cochin gives interesting information about the entire business associated with some of the voyages conceded to the city. King Philip II had granted a voyage of China to the city of Cochin for its fortification. But the viceroy Aires de Saldanha sold this voyage for 27,000 pardaos out of which he gave only 2000 to the city. With this money, instead of attending to fortification, the city built six ships and went to Cape Comorin to take food-materials. The most interesting thing with the voyages conceded for the fortification of the city was that by 1615 only a bastion was built in the city and the remaining money went into the pockets of the individuals, as in the case of any trade transaction.

Sometimes these voyages were granted with a view to finding funds for social and charitable activities of the city. Thus, in 1591, for example, the city of Cochin was accorded two voyages from Coromandel to Malacca and the profit accruing from it had to be spent for the marriage of the orphans of the city. With the tightening of Dutch blockade, the practice of granting voyages from Coromandel to Malacca gained special significance, as this route, besides bringing huge profit in the exchange-trade of Indian and South East Asian commodities, did not have the risk of being attacked by the Dutch while circumnavigating the cape of Comorin. This route seems to have been used with frequency even in the 1630s. Thus, for instance, on 28th February 1635 we hear about a certain Antonio Fogasse de Britto
who was granted a voyage from Coromandel to Malacca for raising money for the marriage of one of his daughters\textsuperscript{163} and on 31st March 1635 one Luis da Mota Leyte who was conceded two voyages from Coromandel to Malacca.\textsuperscript{164}

By 1640s, Moçambique became one of the principal targets of the voyages made from Cochin, mainly because of the fact that eastern space of Indian Ocean was often threatened by Dutch presence. During this period, we see the city of Cochin making requests for two voyages to Moçambique. In the reply which the city received, mention was also made about the large number of applicants waiting for the voyage to Moçambique.\textsuperscript{165} By 1650s even the religious orders of Cochin resorted to Moçambique voyages as a source of income for their multifarious activities. For instance, on 22nd December 1653, the rector of the Jesuit College of Cochin asked the crown for a voyage to Moçambique to overcome the great poverty that the college was experiencing.\textsuperscript{166} The next month, that is on 31st January 1654, the crown conceded the request. The crown also recalled specially the great service rendered by this college, while according the voyage to Moçambique.\textsuperscript{167}

In most cases, these voyages conceded to individuals and institutions were again sold to real traders, who had better commercial experience and net-works. Thus the two Japan voyage-concessions conferred to Dona Margarida, the queen of Spain to make money for the Augustinian monastery of Encarnação in Madrid,\textsuperscript{168} were handed over to Ferdinandad Cron to conduct the trade and send the money to Europe.\textsuperscript{169} Cron acted as a
middleman who again sold it to real traders who conducted the navigation. He secured a share of 13,000 xerafins as profit after having transacted on one of these voyages. The casados, who used to buy many of these voyages from the concessionaries, seem to have reaped the lions share of the profit by converting it into actual trade, while the original recipients of the voyages seem to have got only very meagre amount.

C. Trade of the Natives in Ships with Cartazes

Even during this period, the cartazes were increasingly used by the natives almost like a licence for the transhipping of contraband items to the ports of Red sea and Persian gulf. Still the Portuguese authorities used to issue cartazes almost regularly to their friends and allies like the kings of Cochin, Calicut and Cannanore. Rama Varma, the king of Cochin (1601-1615) used to send ships to Mecca using the cartazes issued by the viceroy Aires de Saldanha from 1603 onwards. In 1604, he sent 4000 quintals of pepper, besides large quantity of iron, timber and other contraband items, to Mecca using the label of cartazes. The king procured pepper and other commodities from the hinterland with the help of the Jewish and Muslim merchants of the native Cochin. It seems that the estranged group of the St.Thomas Christians also co-operated with this project. Moreover, Rodrigo Rebelo, the Portuguese secretary of the native king was also said to have been involved in these attempts of the native entrepreneurs to send annually two ships with 4000 quintals of pepper to Red Sea, under the cover of cartazes. With the native king's participation in pepper trade using cartazes, the Jewish and Muslim merchants began to
collect pepper from hinterland and to hide the spices for the king's ships. It led to an increase in the price as well as shortage of the commodity for Portuguese commerce. Moreover, the sending of iron and timber by the ruler of Cochin to the ports of Red sea- which the Turks were using for the building of ships-created great alarm and commotion among the Portuguese authorities. D.Philip II repeatedly wrote letters in 1605 and 1606 to the concerned officials of India asking them not to allow the king to send contraband items to Mecca. In 1607, we find D.Philip II writing letter to the king of Cochin in gratitude for the measures taken by the latter to make available spices for transhipment to Lisbon. However, he refused to allow further to cartazes the native ruler of Cochin.

The native merchants of Cochin were also despatching commodities under the cover of cartazes. Thus, we see, for example, in January 1613 three native ships carrying wares from Cochin to Cambay with cartaz issued by the Portuguese authorities. Besides this, ordinary merchants of Cannanore and Cochin were also conducting trade with places like Maldives under the cover of cartazes. In the seventeenth century, cartazes were said to have been frequently issued to the ships going to Maldives for the trade on cowries and coir. On 23rd January 1615, we find the viceroy D.Jeronimo de Azevedo writing to Philip II to prohibit the issuing of cartazes destined to Maldives. In 1626, the captain of Tanur and Chale (Chalium) was issuing cartaz at a high rate of 30 to 40 pardaos. When the king of Tanur complained against this excessive rate, the place of issuing the cartaz was changed to Goa.
Very often the ship carrying *cartaz* was more than a symbol that it was making the voyage accepting the political hegemony of the Portuguese; for all practical purposes, it had more economic significance and was considered as a way by which the natives could conduct trade within the system of licences.

**ii. Illicit Country Trade**

This period also witnessed the networks of illicit country trade emanating from Cochin and spreading all along the Indian Ocean rim, almost parallel to and sometimes even hand in hand with the licensed trade. A long queue of entrepreneurs, both Indian as well as Europeans, were operating behind the so-called "illegal trade-transactions". It is to be specially remembered that the term "illegal" and "illicit" were used from the Portuguese view, for the sake of better understanding as in the last chapter, eventhough the natives carried on this trade as a legitimate economic activity.

The trade in contraband items without proper permission often termed as smuggling, the "illegal" partnership between the *casados* and the native merchants by which they exchanged wares and vessels, as we have already seen, to avoid higher customs duties and the corsair activities linked with commerce could be treated as part of the "illicit" trade. This illicit commerce thrived since the second half of the sixteenth century, not only because the entrepreneurs circumvented the Portuguese blockade, but also because the Portuguese had abandoned the attempt to hinder navigation to
the ports of Red sea and Persian gulf by means of force.\textsuperscript{182}

\textbf{A. Smuggling and "Illegal" Trade-transactions.}

The smuggling trade from Cochin with the west Asian ports assumed significant proportions during this period, which was also marked by various phases of tensions and conflicts with the pepper-cultivators from the St. Thomas Christian community of the hinterland, native rulers of Cochin. The already estranged Muslim and Jewish merchants seem to have got the co-operation of these antagonised native Christians and rulers of Cochin in smuggling out commodities including spices to the ports of Red sea and Persian gulf. Nevertheless, the Portuguese officials and the \textit{casados} of Cochin were also frequently associated with this net-work, incorporating this stream with the licensed trade.

The merchants, as observed by Caesar Frederick, who had side-deals with the smuggling trade bought spices at higher price and so they used to get clean and better conditioned pepper. He adds further "all the spices and drugs that are brought to Mecca, are stolen from thence (Cochin) as contrabanda."\textsuperscript{183} When he speaks about the Ormuz trade, he says" They lade ships in Cochin for Portugale and for Ormus, but they that goe for Ormus carrie no Pepper but by Contrabanda, as for Sinamome they easilie get leave to carrie that away, for all other Spices and drugs they may liberally carie them to Ormus or Cambaia, and so all other merchandize which come from other places."\textsuperscript{184} It seems that very often vessels carrying different wares were used to smuggle out the pepper and other prohibited commodities.
Sometimes, the smuggling of prohibited commodities including pepper, cinnamon, cloves, timber and iron to different destinations in Asia were carried out under the pretext of taking them to Portuguese fortresses. The Portuguese authorities in Lisbon were always worried about the diversion of spices, though they did not seem to have taken effective measures to prevent the same. By 1599, the viceroy was asked to furnish details about the practice of conducting "illegal" trade in prohibited items with Red sea and other parts in Asia. Later, in the letter of the secretary of the state written around 1597 to D. Francisco da Gama, special directions were given not to allow any ship to carry pepper toOrmuz and Mascate.

But the routes of the "illegal" traders were often linked with different navigational lines and could not, in any way, be checked by the ineffective control system of the Portuguese. The most prominent among them ran through the islands of Maldives. This was the route often taken by the king of Cannanore, Calicut and the Muslim merchants to sent commodities to Mecca. This navigational line was almost in the hands of the Muslim merchants and their allies. Even the captains of Cochin who used to send ships to Maldives, under the pretext of acquiring cowries and coir, were said to have been associated with this traditional net-work, running into the ports of Red sea and Persian gulf. The natives of Malabar, including their kings, found Maldives as a good base for their west Asian contacts (both for licensed as well as illicit trade), as, for example, in case of the king of Cochin, who took there pepper, timber, iron and food-materials with a view to sending them to Mecca, as we have already seen, under the cover of
Another channel for diverting spices to these destinations was offered by the ports Gujarat. The pepper taken from Cochin to the ports of Cambay were taken, further to Ormuz and to the ports of Arabia. Thus, for instance, in 1611 eight vessels and in 1612 twelve ships loaded with pepper were taken from Diu, Daman and Chaul to these destinations. The Muslim and the Hindu merchants were said to have played a major role in this illicit trade-transactions. This does not mean that the direct smuggling from Cochin decreased. On 18th February 1619, the Bishop of Cochin wrote that lot of pepper and cinnamon (Malabar cinnamon) were taken from Cochin and other ports of Malabar to Ormuz and other parts of Asia, evidently without licence. Even after the fall of Ormuz, pepper was continued to be smuggled out to Muscate. On 24th January 1629, the viceroy Conde de Linhares was asked through a royal letter to take rigorous steps to prevent the flow of spices to Muscate.

Meanwhile, smuggling and illegal trade-transactions with links in Cochin thrived under the very nose of Estado establishments in Goa. The head of this project was one Rama Queny who had the charge and responsibility of collecting pepper for the Portuguese India Company. He was permitted to collect in his ware-house 60 candis of pepper every year. But under this guise, he collected large quantity of pepper coming from Cochin. By 1633, he was said to have become very rich and the principal merchant of Goa through this trade in smuggled pepper. On 10th February 1633, the king in
his letter to the viceroy refers to the fact that Rama Queny used to buy almost the entire pepper that was brought from Cochin and sold it through his shop. He transacted in pepper and other spice items outside the Portuguese system and often the company itself had to buy pepper from this rich merchant.\textsuperscript{194}

Even in the eastern part of Indian Ocean smuggling-trade thrived as intensely as licensed one. Though there were frequent orders, as in 1589, for example, to prevent the trade with Bengal, Borneo, Solor, Java, Sunda, Japan and Siam which were conducted without proper licences and permissions\textsuperscript{195}, they seem to have remained dead letters. A document of 1592 suggests that the \textit{casados} were also engaged in illegal traffic in human cargo, which they carried from China as well as Malacca and distributed to the profitable markets of Malabar coast on their way to Cochin. The document says that many Portuguese merchants and a great number of people who were brought from China and Malacca, used to get down before the ships reaching the port of Cochin, leaving only very few people on board to protect the cargo. These people, assumed to be slaves, were brought without due permission from the authorities.\textsuperscript{196} In the third decade of the seventeenth century, we hear that the smuggling to Bengal was on the increase, as the punishment given to the smugglers was not corporal, but only pecuniary.\textsuperscript{197} Even the captains of Malabar like the captain of Tanur and Chale were great merchants of Cochin and making use of their official status they used to trade on contraband items. These merchant-officials were a threat and a problem not only to the ordinary traders but also to the native
kings, whose customs revenue they never bothered to pay. In 1627, it is said that the captain of Tanur and Chale was a great merchant of Cochin; but he never paid the customs duties of Cochin either to the native ruler or to the Portuguese treasury.198

B. Illegal Commercial Partnerships

This, as a trade system developed by the casados and the native traders, consisted of ware-vessel-exchanges to avoid high customs duty and other commercial regulations imposed by the Estado authorities. As we have already seen, the native merchants who were to pay 6 percent customs duties, were helped by their partners, the casados of Cochin by claiming the ownership of their wares and thus by enabling them to pay only the concessional rate of 3.5 percent to the king of Cochin. This partnership-business saved the natives from paying excessive customs, even though the revenue loss incurred thereby on the Estado was considerably big.199 Another side of this illegal partnership was the use of the vessels of the native merchants for the transhipping of goods of the casados. This seems to have had two advantages for the partners: on the one hand, the native traders could evade the high customs duties for their commodities attributing ownership of the entire cargo to the casados. On the other hand, the casados used the native connections to despatch commodities to non-Portuguese ports and destinations. The matter came before the crown. On 9th October 1596, the Portuguese king issued an order asking the casados not to use the ships of the chatins (the native private traders) to carry out the
trade of Cochin with northern ports, under the penalty of loosing both the ship and the merchandise. This order was made known public by affixing notice on the fortress of Cochin. But even in the early seventeenth century, many casados used to send commodities in the vessels of the natives especially banias; but it seems that it was an arrangement mainly to avoid the blockade imposed by the Dutch and the English.

The concessional customs rate charged from the casados by the native king of Cochin, attracted many native merchants of Cochin to join hands with the married settlers of the city to despatch wares. On 6th April 1601, the crown asked the casados not to send commodities that actually did not belong to them. On 6th January 1602, the crown again asked Aires de Saldanha not to allow the moradores (meaning residents—here included both the natives and the non-married Portuguese) of Cochin to send merchandise to Goa in the name of the casados, paying only concessional customs duty to the king of Cochin and thus causing great financial loss to the Portuguese treasury of Goa, where they should have actually paid.

C. Corsair Activities

The so-called corsair activities, with bases all along Malabar coast, consisted of mainly two streams of operations: on the one hand, there was the stream of piratical activities targeted at the plundering of Portuguese vessels, on the other hand, this was supplemented by another strong stream interwoven with the native trade networks targeted more at diverting commodities to Mecca. Both were inseparably inter-linked. The armada
of Malabar had the double responsibility of curbing the corsair activities spearheaded by the Muslims of Malabar and obstructing their links with Mecca-trade, as, for instance, we see in the royal letter of 13th March 1587 addressed to D.Duarte Meneses. A German document of this period sent from India and received in Augsburg on 15th December 1588 says that the entire western coast right from Diu upto Cape Comorin was infested by the activities of Malabar corsairs. Meanwhile, the Muslim merchants of the native Cochin also seem to have continued their links with these corsairs, who, besides being of same faith, were inter-related by family ties and commercial partnerships, as well.

To counter the threat from the corsairs, as we have already seen, the Portuguese passed legislations by the end of sixteenth century that the merchant ships were to move in caravans or cafilas. This caravan arrangements only reduced the frequency of the movements of Portuguese vessels, while the trade and corsair activities of the Malabar Muslims, on the other hand, thrived uninterruptedly under the leadership of Kunjali Marakkar. Gradually, with the weakening of Portuguese position, the group linked with corsair activities began to wield more and more economic and political power, encroaching even upon the sovereignty of their very patron, the Zamorin. Kunjali Marakkar's assumption of the titles like "Lord of the Arabian Sea", "prince of Navigation" were viewed as great threat to the suzerainty of the Zamorin who, therefore, joined hands with the Lusitanians to lay siege to the fort of Kunjali in Pudupatanam and to capture him. Meanwhile, the king of Cochin began communications with Kunjali
promising to help him in the fight against the Zamorin and the Portuguese. This intervention of the king of Cochin in favour of Kunjali was probably to show his displeasure towards the peace treaty recently established between the Zamorin and the Portuguese. Still another reason, far stronger than this, seems to have played the key-role. It is nothing other than the fact that the Muslim merchants of native Cochin who had links with Kunjali's corsair empire must have prevailed upon the king of Cochin to come to the rescue of their leader. However, Kunjali was finally arrested in March 1600 and was taken to Goa to be beheaded. But the Portuguese could not put an end to the corsair activities, which continued further almost with same intensity.

Royal letters were again sent to the Portuguese officials of India, as, for example, in the case of the one written to Aires de Saldanha on 12th February 1603, asking the latter to hunt down the "pirates" of Malabar. Meanwhile, there appears to have had some understanding between the Muslim merchants operating from the corsair net-work and the non-Portuguese Europeans in the early phase of their establishments. Thus, for example, Nicholas Downton who came to India to establish contacts for English trade by 1614-15 was in friendly terms with the Malabar Muslims. In February 1615, one Mousa Attale from Malabar came to visit Nicholas Downton and made agreements with the English to conduct "mutuall trade and traffique one with another". Nicholas even gave him some letters which were written personally by him and which could be utilised as a certificate for conducting this reciprocal-trade. The friendship between the corsairs
of Malabar and the English (probably also with the Dutch) must have been a part of the tactics to create a commercial partnership between the forces which oppose the Portuguese trade system. This arrangement helped the Malabar Muslims to send commodities to Red sea ports and other destinations even when the English and the Dutch blockaded Portuguese navigational lines. Thus, we see, for example, in 1621 vessels from India, including one from Cochin—probably all operating from this net-work—reaching Mocha for trade.213

Eventhough the Zamorin played a major role in annihilating Kunjali who appeared to be a threat to his sovereign position, the former continued to patronise ordinary corsair activities as ever before, since it was also a part of his trade strategy. Calicut was the main rallying point for the corsairs, who often used to sell the goods robbed from the Portuguese publically in its market, as observed by Pietro Della Valle in 1624.214 The same Zamorin-corsair link was operating in the transhipping of pepper from Panane (Ponnani) to Mecca on 29th October 1624.215 By 1630s, when the movements of the mercntile ships diminished, it was often the Portuguese vessels moving to Cochin after having evaded or defeated the Dutch that were preyed upon by them. Thus, for instance, in 1637, as observed by Peter Mundy, the Portuguese ship which was coming to Cochin from Malacca and which the Malabar corsairs captured in the Malabar coast had some Dutch prisoners whom the Portuguese had taken from the straight of Malacca. The corsairs sold the commodities, which were looted from the Portuguese vessel, in the coastal markets through their local
net-works. In succeeding years, we find the corsair activities emerging to menacing proportions, offering to the Portuguese at times even more serious threat than the Dutch and the English, who were also frequently attacked by the corsair-gang. The Patriarch of Ethiopia in his letter dated 21st December 1642 says that the Malabar corsairs were increasingly concentrating their activities along the ports of Gujarat and in other parts of the west coast to prey upon the merchant ships coming from Sind, Muscate, Baçora and Mombaça. They eventually widened their resources and net-works recruiting more personnel for maritime operations. Jean Baptiste Tavernier while mentioning the Muslim corsairs who operated under the patronage of the Zamorin says that they used to go in squadrons consisting of 10 to 15 vessels (sometimes 25 to 30 vessels as when the English captain Mr.Clerc was attacked), with 200 to 250 men in each vessel, to attack the European ships. By the middle of the seventeenth century, all the Europeans including the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English became the target of their frequent attacks. It had evolved into an anti-European maritime campaign with bases all over Malabar including Cochin. It gives the impression that had there been only the Portuguese as their enemy, the corsairs would have, with these vast personal and material resources, easily erased them from the scene and became the supreme masters of the Indian Ocean by this time. However, the Portuguese inability to contain the corsair activities reduced the maritime position of the Lusitanians into a mere bi-annual exercise of coastal patrolling by the armada. Except for the two periodical coastal patrolling made by the armada, the vast sea-shore of
India was, predominantly, under the suzerainty of corsairs for the rest of the year.

**The Volume of Asian Trade and Imports in Cochin**

The volume of the various streams of intra-Asian trade that converged at Cochin could not be quantified commodity-wise, for want of continuous records. But from the one per cent tax which the city of Cochin levied on the various commodities brought to the port, one could almost draw a rough picture about the volume of intra-Asian commerce and in particular about the volume of imports made from other Asian ports to Cochin. During the period from 1587 to 1598 the total amount of money received as one per cent duty, from the various commodities imported, by the city of Cochin was 88,195 *pardaos*, 4 *tangas* and 32 *reis.*

The one per cent share that went to the city from the rice-trade of this period was 1515 *candis* and 11.5 *paras*. An addition of 264.25 *fardos* of rice was also collected during this period from the rice-ships. The one per cent share from the wheat trade was 10 paras.

**Imports into Cochin: 1587-1598**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount in <em>Pardaos</em></th>
<th>Commodity Rice in kgs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1587</td>
<td>849200</td>
<td>154423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1588</td>
<td>529300</td>
<td>1235876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table shows that there was an average import of 734900 *pardaos* per year during the period between 1587 and 1598. The annual average of rice import during this period was about 386830 kilograms. Though we do not have any document to assess the volume of export made in the intra-Asian trade, there is every reason to believe that the exports almost equalled the imports. But one has to be very cautious here as this figure showing high volume of intra-Asian trade could be attributed only to the period between 1570 to 1600 and not to the later period where trade in Asian waters fell drastically. Even in the seventeenth century, one is compelled to assume on the basis of the available sources that the trade-indexes for the period between 1620 and 1663 were tremendously at lower ebb when compared to the commerce of the first two decades of the century.

A graphic presentation of the above table would give a glimpse into the ups and downs of the import trade. It is interesting to note that the relative fall in import-trade corresponds with the years in which less money was
spent on the coastal-patrolling by the city of Cochin as, for instance, in 1588 (300 pardaos), in 1594 (120 pardaos) or in 1598 (515 pardaos). However the armada-factor could not be held responsible as the sole factor for the fluctuations in the trade-indexes, as in the case of 1589 when only 593 pardaos were spent by the city of Cochin for coastal patrolling, while the import was 845900 pardaos.\(^{223}\)

This picture of import-trade also shows that Cochin's trade on food commodities and non-food items went on hand in hand almost with equal velocity, although some fluctuations are also noticeable. The diagram throws light on the rice-import to Cochin which increased considerably from 1588 onwards and it is probably because of the great increase in the demand for food-stuffs in Malabar, as a result of the severe drought about which mention was made by Ferdinand Cron in December 1587.\(^{224}\)

*Intra-Asian Trade and the volume of Import in Cochin*

\[\text{Data A} = \text{Trade in non-Food Commodities valued in Pardaos} \]
\[\text{Data B} = \text{Trade in Food Commodities (Rice)} \]
As the one per cent tax to the city was charged from the natives as well as the casados and, moreover, as all the vessels including those which were used to smuggle out pepper and other contraband items imported commodities to the port of Cochin through proper channel paying the required duties, the figure presented above seems to incorporate almost all the different streams of intra-Asian commerce that were conducted in Cochin.

**Part-II**

**INDO-EUROPEAN TRADE**

The European trade of Cochin underwent different phases of organisational and managerial innovations during this period. While the casados and the ordinary Portuguese were increasingly engaging themselves, either independently or in association with the natives, in Asian trade, European commerce turned out to be a tough task for the Estado. The crown realised the gravity of the pro-Asian trends of casado traders, especially of the "illicit" trade transactions, as well as the mounting pressure on the Indo-European trade. The royal attempt to overcome this situation, led to several phases of innovations in the organisation of Indo-European commerce: 1. The Phase of Contract trade (1570-1598) 2. Re-introduction of the direct trade by the crown (1598-1629; 1634-1663) 3. Trade through Portuguese India Company (1629-1634) 4. The participation of the casados of Cochin in the European commerce (1628-1638)
1. Indo-European Trade during the Contract Phase (1570-1598)

With the death of D.John III on 11th June 1557, the Portuguese government passed into the hands of regents for some time as the next candidate D.Sebastian was a minor. The regency period, marked by a great amount of confusion, ended by 1568 when D.Sebastian took up the reins of the government. By this time, most of the spice-trade in the East as well as at home-country had fallen into the hands of private individuals, who had amassed huge fortunes mostly through illicit trade. The crown, on the other hand, which could not contain the illegal activities, had to bear all the burden of maintaining and protecting the vast trade empire, whose benefits, in most cases, were enjoyed by the private profiteers. In this situation, in order to reduce the crown's obligations king Sebastian promulgated a new *regimento* liberalising the Indo-European commerce. As per the new rules, all the subjects of the king of Portugal might trade privately in the products of India under the condition that all colonial goods, including spices, would be brought to Lisbon for payment of duties. Private trade was legally permitted in some ports of Malabar coast, as well. By 1575, D.Sebastian, who had stepped down from the role of merchant monarch and who was confronted with heavy expenses, began to give the spice monopoly to private contractors. In this new system of pepper trade, there were two contracts: the European contract which included the rights of distribution and sale in Europe as well as the Indian contract which included the right of purchase in the marts of India. Though the south German merchants were prepared in 1575 to enter into European contract of pepper distribution, the
Portuguese court, which viewed it as an effort of Spain and her Fugger associates to extend their commercial designs to Portugal, thwarted the move.\textsuperscript{228} Finally in the last months of the same year, the pepper contract was awarded for five years to Konrad Rott, an Augsburg merchant who, though had been doing business in the Iberian Peninsula for long time, was not one of the really great merchants. He pledged himself to buy 12,000 quintals of pepper in the first year and 20,000 thereafter at 34 ducats per quintal. Rott, who soon found it difficult to carry out the project alone, sold three-eighths of his contract to Giacomo dei Bardi and Company of Florence.\textsuperscript{229}

In 1578, Rott entered into India contract and sent Gabriel Holzschuher of Nürnberg to Cochin on 4th April 1579 as his trade agent and to procure pepper for his ships.\textsuperscript{230} Rott's entry into Indian trade coincided with the great tragedy of Alcaçer Quibir, where the very king Sebastian of Portugal along with a great many leading nobles were killed in the crusade against Morocco. Much of the wealth of Portugal, including the portable wealth of leading families, were to be paid out as ransom for the \textit{fidalgos} who were taken as prisoners in Morocco.\textsuperscript{231} During this critical period, though Cardinal Henry, who was then seventy seven years old, ascended the throne,\textsuperscript{232} the Indo-European trade and especially the pepper trade with Cochin was in the hands of the intrepid Konrad Rott.

With the acquisition of India Contract, Rott tried to establish a world pepper monopoly. He divided the value of his contracts into thirty shares out of which he sold ten to Portuguese firms and seven and a half to Italian
firms while the remaining twelve and a half he kept for himself. Once the pepper from Cochin and other Malabar ports came into the hands of Rott and his enterprise was organised in southern Europe, he entered into negotiations with the Elector Augustus of Saxony in 1579 to establish a base in Leipzig from where pepper could be distributed to Germany, the Netherlands, the Baltic states and Poland. In this connection, the elector organised the Thuringian Company with a view to exchanging copper and tin for the pepper from Rott. However, by 1580 this great scheme of the elector to control the spice trade of northern Europe was abandoned and Rott went bankrupt.

From 1580 on, Giovanni Rovellasca, an Italian merchant from Milan took up the Indian part of the contract that had already and originally been concluded by Rott and began to control Cochin's pepper trade with Europe. The entry of Rovellasca into Indian trade, with base in Cochin, coincided with the union of the crowns of Spain and Portugal under Philip II. Upon the death of childless Cardinal Henry in 1580, Philip's army entered Portugal and in 1581 he was proclaimed the king of Portugal by the Cortes as Philip I. The terms of the Agreement of Union made at Tomar in 1581 provided that the Spanish and Portuguese overseas empires would be kept separate and each administered by its own officials. During the reign of this Habsburg king, the Secretary of State for India continued to operate as a separate administrative department in Lisbon and Casa da India had the responsibility of the sale and distribution of the commodities from Cochin and other parts of Asia. The Casa da India, during this period, was
buying pepper from the holders of India contract at the lowest possible price and selling to the holders of European contract at the highest possible price. This arrangement through the Casa da India helped to extract as much profit as possible from the contracting system, with minimum investment and risk from the Portuguese side.237

Filippo Sassetti (1540-1588) the great Florentine Humanist and one-time commercial agent of the Cappioni in Spain and Portugal was sent out to Cochin as the factor for Rovellasca's Commercial enterprise in India. He arrived in Cochin in November 1583 and worked as the supervisor for Rovellasca not only till the expiry of the first contract but even upto his death in 1588 at Goa.238 Marx Wolfmüller, who was associated with Konrad Rott in Augsburg came to India in 1583/4, to help Filippo Sassetti in this enterprise.239 Meanwhile, Gabriel Holzschuher, who had served Rott in Cochin till his bankruptcy, was then in Malabar and his service was also bought for the enterprise of Giovanni Battista Rovellasca.240 Rovellasca's Indian contract which continued upto 1585 was supported in Europe also by some Italians and by a Spanish branch of the Fuggers.241 Meanwhile, as we have already seen, the private traders who had bases in Cochin and other Malabar ports were increasingly supplying Levant with pepper which flowed into the Italian cities. At this time Philip, who was in dire need of money because of his wars with the Netherlands and later with the English, began to negotiate with Venice as early as 1581 to make them part-takers in the pepper distribution of Europe. With the expiry of Rovellasca's European contract in 1585, he was even ready to sell 30,000 quintals annually to the
Venetians at the rate of 30 ducats per quintal, which was much lower than the price to the European contractors that varied between 36 to 38.\textsuperscript{242} Neither Venice nor any other Italian cities were ready to buy this pepper-distribution-contract in Europe from Portugal.

We, unfortunately, do not have enough details for the volume of trade carried out during the contract under Rott and Rovallesca. But there are evidences which say that the agents of these contractors did not confine themselves to pepper trade alone, even though the agreement was only for it. We are told that besides pepper, a lot of nutmeg and ginger, which were not included in the contract, were also brought to Lisbon during the years from 1579 till 1581.\textsuperscript{243}

In 1586, through the negotiations conducted in Spain by Giraldo Paris, who was a noble of Limburg and a copper trader, a new Asian contract was concluded between Philip I and Giovanni Rovellasca. As per the terms of the agreement signed at Valencia on February 15, 1586, the "contractors" were to equip five ships annually for a period of six years (1586-1591) to India and Malacca (in some years five vessels to India and one to Malacca). The holders of the Asian contract had to send annually 170,000 cruzados for the purchase of 30,000 quintal of pepper and had to deliver it to the Casa da India. Again, they had to pay 24,000 cruzados each year to the king for the vessels that would be used for the contract trade. The contractors could also send their own agents to India to conduct the trade. For their maintenance, the holders of contract were given the special
privilege to import free of duty 450 quintals of "drugs" including cloves and cinnamon which the contractors themselves could sell in Europe. The purchasing price of the pepper was fixed at 5 2/3 cruzados per quintal. The pepper taken to Casa da India was to be sold at 12 cruzados per quintal and they might receive an additional amount of 4 cruzados for the freight and transhipping cost. Rovellasca and Paris were also allowed to bring associates into their contract. It was not long before the Markus, Math "us Welser and Company bought 41 2/3 percent (5/12 share) of the Asian contract. Out of this Octavian and Philip Edward Fugger bought 25 percent (3/12 share) of the contract for "Georg Fuggerischen Erben", in 1587. Meanwhile Giovanni Battista Rovellasca kept 58 1/3 percent (7/12 shares) of the contract with him.

Ferdinand Cron (ca.1559-1637) the son of Heinrich Cron, the Mayor of Augsburg, represented the Fuggers and the Welsers in Cochin. He reached Goa in 1587, but as the chief factor of these south German firms (with annual salary of 1000 fl.). He concentrated his activities in Cochin to mobilise native co-operation and to ensure regular transhipment of pepper to Europe. He was assisted by Christian Schneeberger, who was another agent of the Fuggers, and who had reached Goa along with Cron, in the efforts to procure pepper. His baes of operation were Cochin and Quilon. When he became sick by 1588, Gabriel Holzschuher, who was previously acting as the trade-agent for Konrad Rot and later for Rovellasca in Cochin took up the charge of Quilon. Marx Wolfmüller, who had previously served Sassetti for the Rovellasca, entered the service of Ferdinand Cron in
1586/7 and he was the chief collection agent of the Welsers and the Fuggers in Cannanore.\textsuperscript{249} Sebastian. Zangmeister was another link in Malabar in this collection net-work of the German contractors.\textsuperscript{250}

Meanwhile, the interests of the Rovellasca were represented in India by some Italian agents, who were operating right from the beginning of the first contract. Filippo Sassetti in Cochin continued to be the principal factor of the Rovellasca firm even during this contract.\textsuperscript{251} He was assisted by another Italian (probably from Florence) called Oratio Nereti.\textsuperscript{252} In connection with the processes of procuring pepper, he also seems to have concentrated his activities in Cochin. Along with these two, Filippo Margera, another Italian was also in Cochin in the service of Rovellasca.\textsuperscript{253} These agents of the contractors procured pepper from Cochin, Cannanore and Quilon with the help of native merchants and very often paying higher prices.\textsuperscript{254}

However, in no single year could the Italian-German syndicates deliver the stipulated 30,000 quintals of pepper in Lisbon. Because of the private traders, who, as we have already seen, were diverting pepper from Cochin and other Malabar ports to other parts of Asia as well as to eastern Mediterranean-routes, the agents of the contractors found it difficult to achieve the target of trade in India. Meanwhile, Malacca was under siege from the Achineses of Sumatra in 1586. Though a fleet sent from India could relieve the siege, the situation was no better for the contractors in the following years\textsuperscript{255}. The international situation also contributed in no less amount to the non-achieving of the target of contract. The English, who had
been looking for a northern route to Cathay and India since 1553\textsuperscript{256}, had emerged as a prospective commercial nation with the circumnavigation of the world by Francis Drake in 1580.

Meanwhile, the Dutch, who were struggling to throw away the yoke of Spanish hegemony, continued their fighting against Spain and Portugal.\textsuperscript{257} The outbreak of war between Spain and England in 1585 merged the interests of the protestant England and the Dutch against the catholic Iberian states. Mutual trade was forbidden by both the warring factions. Ships returning to Portugal from India were increasingly captured and looted by the English and Dutch corsairs.\textsuperscript{258} This coincided with the transfer of European spice market to Amsterdam, which was necessitated by the fall of Antwerp into the hands of the Spaniards in 1585.\textsuperscript{259} The menace from the English and the Dutch, the greatest maritime powers of northern Europe, increased with the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588.\textsuperscript{260}

Though six ships left Lisbon in March 1586, the first ship "Santa Maria" shortly after its departure was attacked by the English near Azores and had to return with damages. One of the biggest vessels among them, "S.Felipe" did not reach India for trade. Instead, it took from Moçambique the wares that belonged to the previous contract and on its way back to Portugal it fell into the hands of the English corsairs.\textsuperscript{261} The third vessel "S.Salvador" turned out to be a distressed ship in the east African coast. With tattered mast, it was taken to Ormuz.\textsuperscript{262} Only three ships reached India for taking the pepper collected by Ferdinand Cron and other agents of the contractors. However,
among them, the "Reliquias", which was loaded with 1638 quintals of pepper sank into the sea at the mouth of Goa. Finally what was brought to Europe in 1587 by the remaining two ships, the "S.Thomé" and the "Nostra Señora de Concepción", was 10368 quintals of pepper, almost only one-third of the amount called for in the contract. In the first year, this enterprise which invested a capital of 194000 cruzados brought only 164979 cruzados and 80 reales in return.

The five ships of 1588, loaded with pepper reached safe in Lisbon. The agents of the contractors could send 22963 quintals from Cochin, Quilon, Cannanore and Canara. On sale of this cargo, the contractors obtained about 365262 cruzados.

The trade of 1589 also fared relatively well. Out of total cargo of 30042 quintals of pepper loaded in India, 24163 quintals reached Portugal, on 16th September 1589. The vessel "S.Salvador", which set out in 1586 and then taken to Ormuz, also joined this year to take pepper to Europe. However "S.Thomé", which carried 5877 quintals of pepper got drowned near the coast of South Africa on its home-bound voyage. Still, about 80 of the cargo reached Metropole safe. The value of this cargo was about 382400 cruzados.

In the next year, the vessels left Lisbon very late, only on 20th May 1590. However the ship "Santa Cruz" was broken before leaving the mouth of Lisbon. Three ships, the "Nostra Señora de Concepción", the "S.Cristobal" and the "S.Juan Battista", were about to fall into the hands of the English
corsairs and had to go back home because of adverse wind. Only the fifth ship, "S. Antonio", which carried the viceroy Mathias de Albuquerque and sailed to Brasil, reached India and that too one year after its departure from Lisbon. As this ship came late at an odd time, there was no transhipment of spices from India that year. So the contractors received back a great portion of their payment made for 1590. On 4th April 1591, in the last year of the contract, six vessels were fitted out to India and Malacca from Lisbon. Of these, only "S. Cristobal" reached Portugal in 1592 with a cargo of 8438 quintal pepper. The "Santa Cruz" burnt down while trying to flee from the English corsairs. Three vessels, the "Buen Jesu", the "S. Bernardo" and the "S. Luiz" seem to have been drowned on their way back home. The sixth ship, "Madre de Dios" with a cargo of 7101 quintal of pepper, on its way back, fell into the hands of the English in Atlantic and was taken to England. In 1592. The efforts of the contractors and the special intervention of the German Kaiser, who wrote letters to Queen Elisabeth on 25th January 1595 and 4th August 1597 to get back the "Madre de Dios" did not find any result. It is estimated that what was delivered to the Casa da India, over the entire contract period, did not reach 1/2 of the stipulated amount of pepper.

Meanwhile Philip, whose fortunes increased with the large quantity of silver flowing into Castile from America, wanted to have a corresponding control over the pepper trade by reorganising its administration and introducing a centralising programme in Portugal. He passed a decree on 20th November 1591 abolishing the old financial offices and the system of
vedores. In its place, he created a Council of Finance composed of men of his own choice. The spice trade and the Casa da India were put under this council. Eventually almost all the agencies of Portugal's home government and overseas management were brought under its umbrella making the centralisation complete.²⁷³ This reorganisation hid underneath also the desire to take back the pepper trade for the Iberians, once the Indian contract of the Italian-German Syndicates terminated in 1591.²⁷⁴

However the termination of this Indian contract was not followed by crown's direct trade. On the other hand, a new contract was negotiated in 1592 for a period of five years with Tomas Ximenes for bringing pepper from India.²⁷⁵ The Indian contract was taken up by a Portuguese syndicate consisting of Pero Rodrigues of Lisbon, Fernão Ximenes, João Monteiro, Henrique Dias, André Ximenes, Heitor Mendes de Brito, Luis Gomes Furtado and Jorge Rodrigues Solis, all belonging to the group of new Christians.²⁷⁶. As per the conditions of this contract, the signatories were required to deposit 170000 cruzados de dez reales (silver) which they should use for the purchase of 30,000 quintals of pepper.²⁷⁷ Meanwhile shipping service to India was handed over to another group of contractors to whom André Ximenes and his associates had to pay 4800 cruzados for each vessel towards the cost of repair and maintenance.²⁷⁸ These contractors could send to Cochin and Goa their own trade agents, which gave the new Christians fresh opportunity to despatch to Cochin and Goa members of their community for trade. It seems that many of the new Christian traders whom Polanswski and Linschotten saw in Cochin must have come first as
agents of these contractors. The clause of the contract for making use of their own agents to buy pepper in advance from Onor, Barcelor, Mangalore, Cochin and Quilon was used as a loop-hole for sending further men from this community to Cochin. Some of them seems to have shifted later to the profitable private trade abandoning the agent-job. As a result, this period of contract trade did not succeed in collecting what the Italian-German syndicates did in the previous contract.

Meanwhile a European contract was signed on 8th April 1591, between Philip I (of Portugal) and a group of his creditors for ensuring regular distribution of pepper in Europe. These merchants who saw in this contract an opportunity to recover their money that had already been borrowed by Philip I (of Portugal), formed a syndicate to enter this contract. The European contract was divided into thirty two shares out of which André Ximenes, a Portuguese banker and a merchant doing business in Lisbon and Antwerp, bought twelve shares. The Fuggers had seven shares, while the Welsers took five. G.B:Rovellasca and Giraldo Paris together kept four shares and the Spanish merchants Francisco & Pedro Malvenda of Bourgos had the remaining four shares. Later Ximenes bought two more shares from Malvenda. The Portuguese crown, which bought the pepper from the holders of Asian contract at sixteen cruzados per quintal, sold it to the syndicate at thirty eight cruzados 218 reis.
Meanwhile the signatories of European contract agreed among themselves to sell the pepper in Europe at forty to forty two cruzados per quintal. The merchant magnates sold their stocks at reduced price to smaller contractors of Lisbon and elsewhere. Pepper was in great demand in the markets of northern Europe and the holders of European contract began to send large shipments of pepper to the Hanseatic cities like Danzig, Lübeck and Hamburg, as well as to Middleburg and Amsterdam from where it was distributed all over northern Europe. Hamburg which was least affected by the Anglo-Dutch-Spanish war turned out to be the safest distribution centre in the northern Europe. Out of the pepper that was sent in 1591, Hamburg received the greatest share with 48.3 percent, Amsterdam stood the second with 28.3 percent and Lübeck 23.4 percent. Meanwhile, the Fuggers sold their seven shares in the early 1592 to Ruy Lopez d'Evora, who was associated with André Ximenes.

Thus, during the period between 1570 and 1598, the contract trade provided a wider distribution net-work in Europe to the pepper taken from Cochin. But there was a diminishing trend in the movement of vessels between India and Lisbon. Though the vessels of the Carreira da India of this period were bigger in size and in tonnage, which solved the problem raised by the paucity of ships, the hectic overloading of the cargo led many of them into frequent wrecks. Even if some vessels could return to the Atlantic safe, many did not reach Lisbon, where they were captured either
by the British or Dutch corsairs.\textsuperscript{284} Thus during the period between 1570 and 1579 fifty-four ships left Lisbon out of which only fifty one reached India. On the return journey to Lisbon (1571-1580), forty four vessels left India out of which one ship was lost. During the next decade (1580-1589) though the vessels despatched to India increased to fifty six, only forty seven reached India. The number of loss on the return trip (1581-1590) rose to five and only forty one ships arrived in Lisbon. The last decade of sixteenth century witnessed the lowest number of ships sent from Portugal in that century. Out of forty four vessels, only thirty seven touched the ports of India. This decade also registers the record of the greatest number (16 ships) of vessels lost on return journey (especially between the years 1500 and 1663). During the period between 1591 and 1600, thirty-nine vessels moved to The Metropole; but only twenty three reached Lisbon,\textsuperscript{285} because of the heavy losses, incurred on the vessels of carreira by way of wrecks and capture by the British and Dutch corsairs. What was extracted and exported from Cochin did not enter the Metropole in the same measure and volume.

However, while dealing with the export-trade of pepper from Cochin (which, for want of separate details, could not be dissociated from the general account of pepper-export from the ports of West coast of India), I would like to present the volume of pepper sent from India, instead of that which reached Lisbon. A detailed table of the pepper trade during the contract period is given below:
Export Trade of Pepper during the Contract Period: 1582-1598

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quantity (in kilograms)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1582</td>
<td>1127675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1587</td>
<td>629715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1588</td>
<td>1204409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1589</td>
<td>1575703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1590</td>
<td>1242121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1592</td>
<td>815021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>262336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1594</td>
<td>341792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1595</td>
<td>923697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1596</td>
<td>142349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1597</td>
<td>887821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1598</td>
<td>414093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the period of contract-trade witnessed the recuperation of the export-trade of pepper with Europe. The annual average of the export, during this period, was 797228 kilograms. Because of the hard work of the Italians under Filippo Sassetti and the Germans under Ferdinand Cron and Christian Schneeberger, the quantity of pepper that was sent from Cochin and other ports of Malabar remained significantly high till 1592. During the next six years, when export-trade from India was again carried out by a syndicate, whose leading figure was Ximenes, the volume of export to Europe began to show diminishing trends and in 1598, the year in which Philip I died, only 414093 kilograms of pepper were sent from Malabar. Though the contractors from Portugal sent their own agents to Cochin and tried to collect necessary cargo for the vessels to Lisbon, the tensions in
the hinterland and the alienation of the pepper-growing community of St. Thomas Christians from the Portuguese, which by this time assumed alarming dimensions, obstructed them from realizing their target. The tensions were renewed when Mar Abraham refused to ordain the priests trained in Latin tradition at the Vaipinkotta Seminary. Moreover, he abstained from attending the fourth Provincial Council of Goa in 1592. In the succeeding years tensions mounted and it became open and acute with the death of Mar Abraham and the convocation of Diamper Synod in 1599. While the non-Portuguese Europeans like the Italians and the Germans managed to collect large quantity of pepper for European trade, till 1592, with an annual average of 1099108 kilograms, the Portuguese contractors could not procure even the half of it during the period between 1593 and 1598, when the annual average was only 495348 kilograms. It evidently points to the fact that the anti-Portuguese feelings of the St. Thomas Christians had already begun to work negatively on the European commerce of Cochin of this period. Its repercussion was so great that no contractor dared to come forward in the succeeding years to take up the Indian trade. The various commercial trends exhibited during this contract period are illustrated down below with the help of a diagram. The ups and downs of the indexes of this diagram indicating European export-trade should be analysed against the general background of the hinterland and the ever-active intra-Asian trade that thrived in in Cochin under the leadership of the casados.
Export of pepper to Europe: 1582-1598

\[ X \text{ Axis} = \text{Years of Export} \]
\[ Y \text{ Axis} = \text{Quantity of Pepper in thousand kilograms.} \]

In general, the contract phase made Cochin’s commerce with Europe as hectic as its Asian trade. Despite tensions in the hinterland relatively better performance was made in 1595 and 1597.

Besides pepper, other spices also entered Europe via Cochin. For want of continuous documents, we cannot assess their volume of trade. In 1588, different commodities like 91027 kilograms of cinnamon, 85336kgs. of indigo, 11120kgs. of nutmeg, 71463 kgs. of ginger, 24232kgs of cowry shells as well as 1271 boxes of silk and textiles were sent to Lisbon.289 It seems that the export of non-pepper commodities approached almost this figure, during this period. After the expulsion of the Portuguese from Ternate in 1570, there seems to have been a diminishing trend in the export of colves, nutmeg and mace from Cochin, during this period290, eventhough some
casado traders of Cochin still appear to have continued supplying these sophisticated spices in their home-city.

2. Re-introduction of the Direct Trade by the Crown (1598-1629; 1634-1663)

The accession of Philip II (Philip III of Spain) to the throne of Portugal in 1598 coincided with the termination of both the Indian as well as European contracts. The export-trade from India fell again into the hands of the crown in 1599 with the termination of the contract of the Portuguese syndicates. Meanwhile, because of the heavy losses incurred by the contractors and especially with the bankruptcy of Konrad Rott and Rovellasca, the merchant syndicates were not at all interested in taking up further commerce with India. In this situation, the Portuguese crown was required again to conduct the trade directly. In general, the direct trade by the crown seems to have continued up to 1663, even though we have clear evidence for an interval of some years (from 1628-1638), when Indo-European trade from Cochin was conducted both by the casados of Cochin as well as by the Portuguese India Company for some time. Besides this, there were stray cases of native enterprising factors being invited to send ships to Lisbon. One most striking example was that of the king of Cochin who was invited in 1626 to take part in Indo-European commerce and to send vessels to Portugal.²⁹¹

The situation in Cochin and Malabar had changed a lot by 1598. The most important among them was that the local king of Cochin, who had
amassed huge wealth by way of customs duty from private trade, emerged as a powerful factor often asserting his claims and postulating his interests in the fore-front. King Kesava Rama Varma who was ruling Cochin since 1565 was not at all content with the Portuguese, right from their customs reform in 1583 which, as we have already seen, antagonised the native as well as casado traders of Cochin. The popular revolt which followed, was said to have had the backing of the king Kesava Rama Varma, who feared a mass diversion of trade from his port.\textsuperscript{292} Though the conditions of the final agreement made on 8th January 1585 were so-prepared as to satisfy the demands of the native king and his commercial associates, the casado traders of Cochin\textsuperscript{293}, customs duty continued to be bone of contention between the Portuguese and Kesava Rama Varma although the life-span of the latter. Thus for example, on 5th January 1598 he sent two ambassadors to the viceroy Conde de Vidigueira, when a Chinese junk carrying the merchandise of the casados of Cochin and resting in Nagapatanam was asked by the viceroy not to call the port of Cochin to pay the customs for the commodities of the casados. Finally even when the vessel called at Cochin, nothing was unloaded there inspite of constant insistence from the chief officer (\textit{Regeredor-mor})of the king of Cochin.\textsuperscript{294} It was a part of the strategy to sidetrack the ruler of Cochin who was amassing huge wealth by way of customs duty and to make the customs money accrue in Goa where the \textit{Estado} establishments were suffering from severe financial crisis.\textsuperscript{295} Still worse was the financial condition of the home-government which was pre-occupied more with the severe famine
and the terrific pestilence that broke out in Portugal from November 1598 to August 1599. The by-passing of the customs-house of the king of Cochin, necessitated by increasing strain on Portuguese finances, irritated the former who in his letter to the viceroy dated 19th September 1599 insisted that the merchandise which the *casados* of Cochin brought from south (the commercial-space east of Cape Comorin) must be unloaded in Cochin for the payment of regular customs duties. He also showed his displeasure in the further attempt of the viceroy, who tried to prevent the Chinese ships carrying the merchandise of the *casados* from touching Cochin.

This coincided, as mentioned by Conde de Vidigueira in his letter of 1599 to Philip I, with the mounting tensions between the Portuguese and the natives of Cochin who had rallied under Pandaro Paramo, the chief officer of the king of Cochin. Though it began as a dispute between a Brahmin, an officer (*recebedor*) of the king of Cochin and a citizen of Santa Cruz, it spread like a revolt against the Portuguese. Actually it was the extension and popular expression of the anti-Portuguese feelings nurtured by the local ruler. The king Kesava Rama Varma who maintained deep ill-feelings against the Portuguese seems to have tacitly approved and kindled this popular revolt against the Lusitanians. It is further verified by the fact that the prince of Cochin, who intervened to pacify the situation and prevented the rebellion from spreading into the entire city, was deprived of all his charges and responsibilities by his father. Moreover, the Lusitanian alliance with Calicut, the eternal enemy of Cochin, to capture Kunjali increased the hostilities in the ruler of Cochin who immediately began to make
correspondence with Kunjali offering him every possible help. Another area of tension between the king of Cochin and the Portuguese consisted in the fortification of the city of Santa Cruz. The reasons for it were both political and commercial. However, the commercial reasons seem to have played major role by this time. Both the local ruler and the casados of Cochin feared that the attempt to build a wall around the entire Portuguese settlement, especially one on the water-front would hinder and close down the places which the private traders of the city were using for the trade in contraband items. This heightened the resistance and opposition to the attempts for the fortification of the city.298

It was against this background of tensions that king Kesava Rama Varma died in September 1600 in Bengal (80 leagues away from Ganges), where he had gone for immersing the mortal remains of her mother.299 Prince Godavarma, who ruled Cochin during the absence of him and later for some time after the death of Kesava Varma began to take strong anti-Portuguese steps. He sent men to kill Sidra Mena (Chandra Menon), the pro-Portuguese regedor mor. He, moreover, demanded 12080 pardaos, which the Estado owed the king of Cochin as copa-dues, as condition for permitting the fortification of the city.300 As the debts of the Portuguese to the king of Cochin increased with mounting financial crisis, strain in the relationship between the two seems to have increased proportionately. On the death of Godavarma in March 1601, Virakerala, who was then 28 years old ascended the throne on 13th October 1602.301 His reign coincided with the diminishing flow of spices from Cochin to Europe, whose root-causes could
be attributed to the tension in the hinterland that broke out between the pepper-growing group of St. Thomas Christians and the Portuguese and to the consequent diversion of spices to Choromandel coast directly from the production centres through the ghat-route. There was no loading of ships in Cochin in 1604. During the period between 1606 and 1609 (both the years inclusive) no ship departed from Cochin to Portugal. The spices which were collected during the four years were sent to Lisbon only in 1610 and the volume thus sent was very meagre i.e., only 4170 quintals. In the first decade of seventeenth century only thirteen ships left India with pepper cargoes. Out of this, six ships departed in 1600 with 32,415 quintals of pepper and four ships in 1603 with 21,349 quintals. In 1602, two ships departed India with only 7598 quintals. Though there is no means to find out the exact figure of pepper export from Cochin to Lisbon from this description, which covers the volume of export trade from entire India (and it includes lot of pepper from Karnataka) to Europe, it still throws light into the prevailing phenomenon that the transhipment of spices to Europe was irregular and very meagre, when compared to the total production in India which was estimated to be 258000 quintals per year. The only exception was in 1600 and 1603. Corresponding to this dwindling phenomenon in the European trade, private trade, which was sponsored by the native king, thrived in the first decade of seventeenth century. As we have already seen, about 1605 the king of Cochin bagged about 60,000 pardaos annually from the customs, which indicates that the private trade had gone upto double the volume in comparison with the period from 1587 to 1598. By
1612 the customs revenue which the native ruler used to get from private trade went up to 70,000 to 80,000 pardaos indicating further increase. It also shows that the king of Cochin was patronising more and more pro-Asian trade policy, as the Asian commerce brought to him more revenue than the copa and the annual subsidies of the Portuguese, which in most cases, were not paid in time.

This period, as indicated by the viceroy Rui Lourenço de Tavara in his report on the purchase of pepper for the period between 1606 and 1610, also witnessed a very poor organisation as far as the procurement of the pepper was concerned. It was usually bought in winter, immediately before the arrival of the ships from Europe. This means that the Portuguese could buy only that portion of pepper which was left out after being taken to ghat-route and other Asian destinations or unripe pepper. As the Portuguese, for want of sufficient money to pay the prices in advance, had not taken much effort to buy and collect pepper during the harvest season, which fell between late December and January or during the period thereafter especially in the months between February and May, when it would be available in the market after proper seasoning, a great portion of it was taken to the ghat-route. Along with this organisational failure, the corrupt officials made things still worse in Cochin. There was much falsification of weights in the factory, by which two types of weights viz., the light quintal (45.9 kilogram) and heavy quintal (52.46 kilogram) were used for cheating. Garcia de Melo, who came to Cochin in 1605 as the vedor da
fazenda, was accused of serious corruption and was arrested and sent back to Lisbon in 1610.\textsuperscript{311}

Meanwhile, with the decreasing flow of spices to Cochin, preference was given to the pepper ports of Canara, the chief among them being Onor, Barcelor and Mangalore. The pepper ports of Canara were more safe and secure compared to the port of Cochin which was open to Dutch threats of varying degrees from 1602 onwards. Though the prospects for high volume of pepper trade were found in Canara by viceroy D.Antonio de Noronha as early as 1565,\textsuperscript{312} it seems that the Canara pepper began to overtake the Cochin's export index only by the beginning of the seventeenth century. In 1602, two ships from Portugal brought 66,000 cruzados as pepper money. The governor Archbishop D.Alexis Menesis did not allow Garcia de Melo, the vedor da Fazenda of Cochin to take this money for purchasing pepper from Cochin, on the ground that Dutch were moving about around Cochin. The pepper money was, then, taken to Canara for procuring sufficient cargo for the ships of carreira.\textsuperscript{313}

With mounting financial strain on the Portuguese treasury, the casados of Cochin were invited to lend money for procuring cargo for the Europe-bound vessels. As one Portuguese document testifies, though sufficient money used to reach Cochin and other pepper trading centres for the purchase of commodities during the period of contract trade, the situation changed with the re-introduction of crown's trade. The money that came to India from Portugal was so meagre that very often cash was
borrowed from the casados at 10 interest rate.\textsuperscript{314} In 1606, an amount of 93744 xeralfins was borrowed by Garcia de Melo, the \textit{vedor da Fazenda} of Cochin, from the casados of Cochin at the rate of 10 for the purchase of 8918 quintals of pepper from Cochin, Quilon, Cannanore and Malacca.\textsuperscript{315} Besides this, some silver vessels used in the churches of Cochin and some belonging to the casados, as well, were pawned at the casa da \textit{Misericordia} of Cochin under the initiative of the bishop to raise sufficient money for the pepper in 1606.\textsuperscript{313} The general financial condition of the Portuguese treasury in Cochin during these years was so worse that the soldiers and even the ecclesiastical office-holders including the priests, who were used to have been paid punctually, did not receive their salaries for months.\textsuperscript{316}

Meanwhile the Portuguese authorities made a contract with Jorge Rodrigues Solis, a ship owner, to send vessels of not less than 500 tons, to India for the period between 1602 and 1608 (both inclusive). He was required to send annually seven ships to the East, out of which five were to be destined to India and the remaining two to Malacca. The India men should take 1000 soldiers, while the vessels to Malacca should take with it 400.\textsuperscript{318} However, in this case shipping was not co-ordinated with trade. This contract for the equipment of ships to India coincided with an abortive attempt to farm out the distribution of the spices in Europe to contractors. The main aim behind this negotiation was to oust the Dutch from the markets of Germany, where the former had begun to supply spices of the East in great bulk by the end of the last decade of the sixteenth century. The contract was negotiated with João Conserbeque, the consul of the Germans
and the contractors were expected to supply the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Lübeck and Danzig with the Portuguese spices. The crown promised to sell pepper to the contractors at the reduced rate of 30 cruzados. Though this subsidised rate would cause an annual loss of 50000 to 60000 cruzados to the crown, it wanted to re-capture the European market, especially the German ones and thus to eliminate the Dutch from the pepper trade. Though this project was not materialised, the Portuguese expelled the Dutch merchants from Lisbon in 1605 when D.Pedro de Castilho was the viceroy of Portugal.

The Dutch who made their successful voyage to the East as early as 1595 by-passing the Portuguese control system raised a severe threat to the Portuguese commerce. The Compagnie van Veere formed in 1594 despatched five ships in 1595 from Texel under the command of Cornelius van Houtman. These vessels avoided all Portuguese stations by skipping India and sailing to Bantam in western Java through Sundra straits. During the period between 2nd April 1595 and 21st December 1599, thirty seven Dutch vessels moved to the East out of which the first vessel departed for the Netherlands in 1597. In 1602, the various Dutch companies were amalgamated into the Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (V.O,C.-The United East India Company) in order to reduce the rivalry of different companies. Meanwhile, another trade rival had entered the waters of Indian Ocean, with the formation of East India Company (E I.C.) in 1600, which was given by Royal charter the "exclusive right to trade beyond the
Cape of Good Hope". Though the first English embarkation in 1601 took place at a time when England was still at war with Spain and Portugal, the second British voyage was in 1604 when peace prevailed between two ...ns. Actually, it was the Dutch Company, which raised challenges to the Portuguese in Malabar, where the Dutch made first appearance in Cochin 1602 and later in 1604 to make treaty with Zamorin. The Dutch under Van der Hagen obtained permission to trade at Calicut and to build a fort for their protection. Later, Zamorin was further visited by Paulus Van Caerden in 1607 and by Admiral Verhoff in 1608, when the ruler of Calicut asked the admiral for six ships to occupy Goa and Cochin. These developments occurred at a time, when Calicut was waging war with Cochin, which we have already seen. In the first decade of the seventeenth century, though the vessels from Netherlands were continuously operating against the Portuguese especially from 1603 on, the Dutch threat did not assume critical dimensions as far as the trade of Cochin was concerned. This, as we have already seen, is further testified by the high volume of intra-Asian trade of Cochin. Besides the casual attacks directed against Goa or Moçambique and the capture of Portuguese vessels, the main concentration of the Dutch was in Indonesia where they had conquered Jakatra in western Java. Converting its name into Batavia, they made it the chief Dutch naval and military base and centre of their administration in the East. The Twelve Years Truce (also known as the Truce of Antwerp 1609-1621), which was secretly
arranged in 1609 by Philip III's (Philip II of Portugal) Spanish minister, the Duke of Lerma lessened relatively the danger from the Dutch to the Portuguese establishments in Malabar for some time in the next decade. Though the Dutch expansion activities continued in the East even during this period and the Dutch envoys continued to visit Calicut in 1610 (Cornelis Jacobs Van Breekvelt and Hans Bullard from Coromandel) as well as in 1616 (Van den Broecke as instructed by Dutch Governor-General of Batavia) and there were cases when they even blockaded and captured Portuguese vessels, the Dutch military operations in Malabar assumed alarming dimensions only by the end of 1610s and especially with the termination of the Antwerp Truce in 1621. However, the great number of Dutch vessels with high tonnage, which used to enter the Indian Ocean during this period, offered the real and the greatest challenge to the Portuguese, who were lagging far behind as far as shipping was concerned. Many of the Dutch ships had an average tonnage varying between 300 to 800 in the first decade of the seventeenth century, even though there existed also some vessels which were of low-tonnage. In the later part it varied from 500 to 1100. The following table indicating the movements of the Dutch and Portuguese vessels for the period between 1600 and 1663 shows how poor was the Portuguese performance.
The Outward-bound Voyages to Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Portugal Departure</th>
<th>Portugal Arrival in India</th>
<th>Netherlands Departure</th>
<th>Netherlands Arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1600-1609</td>
<td>333 68</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1610-1619</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1620-1629</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630-1635</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1636-1640</td>
<td>334 14</td>
<td>11 or 12</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1641-1650</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32 or 33</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1651-1660</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29 or 30</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1661-1665</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The home-bound voyages of the Portuguese vessels had several problems in contrast with the Dutch. Besides the number of vessels in which the Portuguese stood far behind the Dutch, some of these ships were old and dilapidated. Overloading of such vessels with personal merchandise and liberty chests led to frequent wrecks. Though the continual ship-wrecks prompted the Portuguese authorities to intervene in 1625 by means of "Carrack's Bill of Lading"\textsuperscript{336}, the situation did not improve. There were also cases when some of the returning ships were captured either by the Dutch or by the English. Though the following table shows that the figure of loss was not extra-ordinarily high, in comparison with previous period, it equally indicates that the Portuguese had been reduced to the size of pigmies before the Dutch as far as the movements of ships concerned. For want of data, we are able to furnish details of the home-bound voyages of the Portuguese vessels only for the period upto 1635.
### The Movement of Ships from East to Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Portugal Departure</th>
<th>Portugal Arrival in Lisbon</th>
<th>Netherlands Departure</th>
<th>Netherlands Arrival in Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1601-1610</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>1611-1620</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>1621-1630</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>1631-1635</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>1636-1640</td>
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<td>1641-1650</td>
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<td>1651-1660</td>
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<td>102</td>
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<tr>
<td>1661-1665</td>
<td></td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the second decade of seventeenth century significant changes were noticeable in Cochin. A detailed picture of these changes connected with the pepper trade in Cochin and the fund raised for the same during this period is given in papers dealing with the enquiry procedures against Diogo Coutinho, the *vedor da Fazenda* of Cochin. In 1610 only 124000 cruzados reached Cochin as pepper money. In order to raise further fund for the purchase of pepper, D.Diogo Coutinho borrowed 69145 xerifins from the *casados* of Cochin at the rate of 10. In the month of December of the same year another loan of 52831 xerifins was raised from the *casados* at the rate of 9 for a period of two years for the same purpose. In 1611, the amount borrowed from the *casados* increased to 71200 xerifins and that too, at 10. Out of this 193176 xerifins, a portion i.e., 36192 xerifins was used to clear the debts of money which was borrowed earlier by Garcia de Melo.
from the *casados*.\textsuperscript{340} The remaining portion was mostly used for buying pepper from Cochin, Panane (Ponnani) Pallur (Palayur) Chetua, Tanur, Cannanore and Parur.\textsuperscript{341} This document also suggests that strenuous attempts were made to placate the merchants of the St.Thomas Christians and to win their co-operation for the purchase of pepper from the hinterland. The merchants of this community were given one *Xerafin* extra for each *bhar* of pepper that they brought to Cochin as a special remuneration for not diverting the commodity to ghat-route and other destinations. Thus the merchants of St.Thomas Christians earned 440 *xerafins* extra for 440 *bhars* of pepper. The Tarega (Tharaka) merchants, also belonging to this group, were given special prizes and gifts like sandal wood, and knives.\textsuperscript{342} The Tarega (Tharaka) of Canhur (Kanjoor) and the Cassanar Alexander (a priest of this community), who received 1000 and 1250 *xerafins* respectively from Diogo Coutinho, were prominent merchants who co-operated with the Portuguese trade even during the time of tensions. The Archbishop of Cranganore was given a special gift of 534 *xerafins* so that the St.Thomas Christians, who were subjected to him, might loyally supply the spices only to the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{343} These all could be seen as part of the steps to bring the estranged communities back to co-operative tracks.

Thus raising fund from the local sources and ensuring co-operation of the estranged community of St.Thomas Christians, Diogo Coutinho succeeded in 1611 in loading in Cochin 4895 quintals of pepper in the ship of *Nossa Senhora dos Remedios* and 3511 quintals in the ship of *Santa Elena*, which happened to be the last vessels of *carreira* to leave Cochin.\textsuperscript{344} Out of
the total volume of 440991 kilograms of pepper collected in Cochin, 129084 came from Quilon and Kayamkulam and 47283 from Ponnani. With the help of a contract made with the Aderajão (Ali Raja?) of Cannanore 52498 kilograms were fetched from north Malabar. The share from Malacca was only 4818 kilograms. The rest 207308 kilograms were collected from the hinterland of Cochin alone and that too because of the efforts taken by Diogo Coutinho to purchase the co-operation of the estranged groups. However, another aspect of this entire project was that the debt of the crown to the casados of Cochin increased to 76972 xerufs. Though this was a sum of money raised by Diogo Coutinho for the purchase of pepper, the crown could not repay it and this fact made difficult the possibilities of taking loan from casados in the future.

After the departure of the ships Nossa Senhora dos Remedios and Santa Elena (1611), the vessels of Carreira da India stopped reaching Cochin to take pepper and other commodities directly from this port. It seems that the dwindling of pepper supply in Cochin because of the tensions in the hinterland, the extra-expenses incurred in purchasing their co-operation and the fear of the Dutch must have prompted the Portuguese authorities to take such a decision. As the ships of the Carreira began to depart only from Goa from 1612 onwards, pepper was taken first from Cochin to Goa in smaller vessels, often operated and manned by the casados of Cochin.

However, this change in the route of carreira adversely affected the private trade from Cochin to Lisbon, which was conducted, almost on a
regular basis, in the ships of the *carreia* under the cover of liberty chests.\(^{349}\) There was a general protest from the king of Cochin and the *casados* against this decision not to send the ships of *carreira* to load directly from Cochin. The officials of the Municpality of Cochin made continuous requests as late as 1624 to the Portuguese authorities to reconsider this decision and to despatch at least one vessel from Portugal to the port of Cochin, as it had been in the past.\(^{350}\) But the Goan lobby, who wanted to centralize commerce there (they knew very well that the centralisation of Indo-European commerce in Goa would eventually help them to centralise there the distributive trade as well as the intra-Asian commerce, upon which much of Cochin's prosperity depended) had gained upper hand in decision making and the petitions were rejected saying that Cochin was unsafe because of Dutch presence along the coast of Malabar and that the pepper of Canara which was dearer to the Europeans was available in Goa in great quantity.\(^{351}\) The availability of relatively high volume of pepper from Canara in Goa was a major reason to abandon the request of Cochin, where supply was fluctuating with the tensions in the hinterland. However, the pro-Cochin group argued that the pepper from Canara, that was available in Goa in great volume, was very costly and the preference shown to the Canara pepper to that of Cochin would mean heavy loss to the *Estado*. Actually, the price of one *bhar* pepper in Canara was 73 *xerufs* while it was only 48 *xerufs* in Cochin. There was a price-difference of 25 *xerufs* in each *bhar* of pepper. Nuno Vaz de Castelo Branco, the *vedor da Fazenda* of Cochin argues in 1618 that in that year itself 300 *bhrs* of
pepper bought from Mangalore caused a loss of 7500 xerifins to the Portuguese treasury (when compared to the price of Cochin). Even the bishop of Cochin came openly against the Goan lobby in 1619 saying that the decision to load all the vessels of Carreira in Goa would mean an extra expense of 24000 pardaos for each ship (extra expense incurred in the collection, transportation, weighing, loading and re-loading etc., of the commodities in various places of shipment). Moreover the pepper that was bought from different ports reached very late in Goa, which often delayed and thus risked the home-bound vessels of carreira. Since the pepper of Cochin was rather better (this statement contradicts the argument of the Goan lobby which says that Canara pepper was the best) and cheaper among that which was available in India, the crown could save more than 30,000 pardaos in each ship if the pepper would be loaded in Cochin (instead of the costly pepper of Canara). Subsequent to this phenomenon, the distributive trade of Cochin which consisted mostly in exchanging the wares of Europe with the Asian commodities declined drastically, as well, once the vessels of carreira stopped touching this port.

During the period between 1612 and 1620 the pepper from Canara formed 2/3 of the total export from India. The annual average of pepper transhipped from Karnataka increased to 6480 heavy quintals. The years succeeding 1611, which were marked by a period when the carreira ships stopped taking pepper directly from Cochin and when the tension between the Portuguese and their native collaborators mounted, the pepper export from Cochin fell to its lowest ebb. During the period between 1612 and
1620, the annual average export of pepper from the entire India to Lisbon was 9219 heavy quintals out of which the annual average share from Cochin was only less than 1500 heavy quintals. The volume of pepper exported from Cochin in 1615 was 2475 quintals and in 1616 it was 4000 quintals. In the following years, it fell drastically. In 1618, it was only 491 quintals. In the next year, the pepper export from Cochin was 814 quintals which again fell sharply in 1620 when only 83 heavy quintals of pepper were exported from Cochin. The crisis in supply and finance was so acute that the efforts of viceroy Jeronimo de Azevedo to pawn his gold and silver in 1617 to raise money for the annual pepper fleet to Cochin could not improve figures of export-trade.

From 1612 onwards began the mass exodus of casado traders from Cochin to Coromandel coast to trade on the pepper reaching there in great volume from the one-time-hinterland of Cochin through the ghat-route. Some of the casados even went to Ceylon, Bengal and Pegu as they found the trade-atmosphere of Cochin worsening with the diminishing pepper supply in Cochin. On 26th January 1615, Diogo Coutinho wrote that for the last three years (i.e., from 1612 on) the casados, leaving their wives and children in Cochin, were trading outside Cochin and were not touching the city of Santa Cruz. They used to take their commodities to Goa paying the customs there, which they should have done at Cochin. The king of Cochin who came to know of it demanded this customs money for himself which he calculated to be around 13-14000 pardaos. By 1616, most of the enterprising casado merchants of Cochin left the city, pulling it into a
critical phase as far as its commerce was concerned. This mass exodus of enterprising *casado* traders from the city and the by-passing of Cochin by some *casado* traders reduced the income of the king of Cochin. The heavy fall in the customs revenue of the native ruler made things still worse, which was characterised by the straining of his relationship with the Portuguese. He lost no time in contacting the Dutch. In 1618, the king of Cochin invited the Dutch to visit his land assuring them that they would always be welcome in there and requested the Dutch, then or later on, to expell the Portuguese who were treating him harshly.\textsuperscript{362}

However, the threat from the Dutch, who were bound by the Antwerp Truce, did not take serious and critical dimensions in this decade. In its place, the English, who were keeping a low profile in the first decade of the seventeenth century, began to raise serious challenges to the Portuguese. Open conflicts between the two nations broke out off Surat in 1612. The English, who were led by captain Thomas Best defeated the Portuguese force and could establish their first base in Surat in December of the same year.\textsuperscript{363} The Portuguese were again defeated off Swally near Surat in 1614-15 by the naval force under Thomas Best.\textsuperscript{364} This was followed by the entry of the English into Malabar coast. In March 1615-1616, captain Keelinge arrived at Cranganore (which was then conquered and occupied by the Zamorin) and obtained liberty of trade and permission the from zamorin to open a factory. Both the English and the ruler of Calicut had entered into an agreement to join their forces and to expell the Portuguese from Cochin.\textsuperscript{365}
The third decade of the seventeenth century put the European trade of Cochin in a very awkward position. On 31st March 1621, king Philip III (Philip II of Portugal) died in Madrid and Philip IV ascended the throne.\textsuperscript{366} This coincided with the termination of Antwerp Truce and the renewal of open conflicts with the Dutch. Dutch plans to attack Cochin and other Portuguese possessions on the Malabar coast had already begun as early as 1919, when the Anglo-Dutch treaty was concluded for concerted military operations against the Portuguese. As per this treaty, a joint fleet consisting of nine ships and two pinnaces, with 754 men on the Dutch and 385 men on the English vessels. The joint fleet was despatched in the autumn of 1621 under Admiral Dedell and vice-admiral Fitzherbert. They were advised to blockade and attack the Portuguese by sailing along the coast from Cape Comorin to Cochin and thence to Goa. The joint operation was also meant to make use, besides making a surprise attack on the Portuguese, of trade opportunities availed by the native kings\textsuperscript{367}. Though the result of this enterprise was not known in details, it seems to have marked the beginning of open conflicts between the Dutch and the Portuguese off Cochin and in the succeeding years it assumed alarming dimensions. Against the background of frequent blockade of Portuguese vessels, and further troubled by less funds and very little military-defence-materials, Cochin with ruined fortress could be saved, wrote the viceroy Francisco da Gama in 1623, only by making peace with the Dutch on any terms even to allowing them trade at Portuguese ports.\textsuperscript{368} But in the European atmosphere of thirty years war, waged between the catholics and the protestants,
nobody in the home-government thought about the advantage of such peace efforts with the protestant Dutch traders. The general view was to settle things through the power of the sword.

Meanwhile, with the fall of Ormuz on 22nd April 1622 into the hands of the English and the Shah of Persia, Cochin's link with the traditional caravan route was almost cut off. The Dutch and British blockade of the gates of Persian gulf and Red sea, not only made the private trade with eastern Mediterranean difficult but also drained the profit of the king of Cochin, which he gathered either directly by sending ships to these destinations or indirectly by collecting taxes from those who participated in the commerce of this traditional route. The continuous strain on the income of the native king irritated him further, which led to frequent clashes with the Portuguese. Because of financial difficulties, the Portuguese could not pay him *copa* from 1622 on and we hear that he was not paid the annual *copa* money for the next ten years, which worsened further the relationship between the two. Meanwhile, Calicut, which was continuously waging wars with Cochin for more than quarter of a century, began to be frequently visited by the Dutch in the hope of fishing in the troubled waters. In 1625 Van Speult made a treaty with the Zamorin by which the latter obliged himself to supply 3000 candis of pepper to V.O.C.  

During the years after 1621 there broke out a long war in the interior which hindered the flow of spices through the ghat-route. With the temporary closure of ghat-route more pepper began to reach Cochin, which
even reduced the price of the commodity there.\textsuperscript{373} This, inspite of the strained relationship between the native ruler and the Portuguese and the mounting threats from the Dutch, was followed by an increase in the volume of export from Cochin during the period from 1621 till 1630, which even superceded the export from Canara. The annual average of pepper export from Cochin increased to 5106 quintals while that of Canara was only 4888 quintals.\textsuperscript{374} Against this background, attempts were made to fulfill the oft-repeated orders from the Lisbon authorities that 2/3 of the pepper be bought from Cochin.\textsuperscript{372} But that target was beyond the reach. With the termination of the Calicut-Cochin war in 1626, which was brought about by the mediation of rector of the Jesuit college of Cochin,\textsuperscript{376} Calicut abstained, temporarily, from providing base for Dutch operations. The end of coastal wars had positive results on the export trade of Cochin. Relatively higher volume of pepper was collected in Cochin for transhipment to Lisbon in the atmosphere of peace that followed. Even an agreement was made between the king of Cochin and the viceroy the changed atmosphere of 1626 to send one ship of pepper to Portugal. But as Diogo Coutinho, the \textit{vedor da Fazenda} was not included in the negotiations, the entire project remained cancelled.\textsuperscript{377} However, the period immediately after the peace with Calicut, viz., from 1626 to 1629, witnessed an increase in the annual export of pepper from Cochin. It rose to 4947 heavy quintals.\textsuperscript{378}

Though the peace with Calicut contributed to the relative improvement of the European trade from Cochin, the relationship of the king of Cochin, Vira Kerala Varma with the Portuguese continued to be strained. The native
ruler was distancing himself more and more away from the Portuguese as years passed by. In his policy decisions he was greatly influenced by Jewish councillors, which always gave an anti-Portuguese tone to his activities. It is believed that Samuel Castiel, who had, by this time, begun to serve the king of Cochin as a translator and interpreter (a capacity which gave a lot of opportunities for manipulations) was the most important one among them. Vira Kerala Varma was looking for new allies. Eventually he began diplomatic contacts with Iskandar Muda, the sultan of Aceh. The initial steps of this relationship started with the arrival of Acehnese ambassadors in Malabar in 1627, when they were warmly received and protected by the king of Cochin in his kingdom. Meantime, the estranged king was trying to re-take the land and properties granted by his predecessors to the Portuguese under various pretexts. The most striking case among them was the attempt in 1629 to capture the island of Bendure (Venduruthi), which had been granted to D.Gaspar de Azevedo by an early king of Cochin and which he was enjoying as his personal property. The king re-took it, amidst lot of protests and tensions, under the pretext of arresting a murderer.

The general atmosphere of mutual mistrust and ill-feelings was exhibited by another incident of 1630 when one Desembargador from Goa came to Cochin with the orders from viceroy to make contract with the king of Cochin to make one galleão (which could accommodate 60 pieces of artelleries), one braça and two gales. The Desembargador asked for the security for the money which he was entrusting the king for the construction
of the ships. The ruler of Cochin, who was deeply irritated by this, replied "the kings are not required to give security". With this reply the project was wound up. Still worser was ist effects, as these incidenys intensified tensions between the native ruler and the Portuguese at a time, when, as the same document states, the Company office of Goa was "waiting each moment eagerly" for the arrival of the fleet from Cochin with pepper. Thus, though the peace with Calicut offered a favourable atmosphere for European trade, the estrangement of the king of Cochin hindered the Portuguese from achieving a remarkable progress in this export-trade, making the indexes of export-trade remain far below the volume of the sixteenth century.

This coincided with two different organisational arrangements which the Portuguese made in Cochin, besides the crown commerce, to conduct pepper trade with Europe: As we shall see later, the financially well-off casados of Cochin were made to participate in European commerce by allowing them to send pepper directly to Lisbon from 1628 onwards and almost simultaneously, i.e., from 1629 onwards the Portuguese India company also began to enter into the export trade of Cochin. Thus, though there were two different channels to carry out the European commerce, besides the crown's trade, the quantum of pepper that was carried through the ghat-route increased considerably by 1630's with the termination of wars in the interior. The resumption of ghat-route
commerce made it difficult to get pepper in Cochin at the old prices. So an attempt was made to attract more pepper to Cochin by increasing the price in 1632.\textsuperscript{386}

However this did not seem to have helped to improve the European trade which was almost on the verge of extinction. The period from 1635 to 1645 which was ruled by Goda Varma witnessed the tension between the Portuguese and the native ruler reaching the highest boiling point. In 1635, the Muringur tavazhi, which was about to become extinct, was merged into the Elaya tavazhi and the heir apparent of the latter branch of royal family, Goda Varma, was made the king of Cochin.\textsuperscript{387} He was often described as a great enemy of the Portuguese\textsuperscript{388}, which also suggests that in a situation of declining fortunes, he was trying to distance himself from the Portuguese. By 1640, the Elaya tavazhi was reduced to two members: himself and a princess. So he adopted some princes ses from all the surviving collateral branches viz., Palluruthi, Chazhur and even from the anti-Portuguese branch of the Mutta tavazhi.\textsuperscript{389} Adoption of a prince from the Mutta tavazhi, which the Portuguese disliked although the period and whose members they always had kept away from coming to power, was suggestive of the anti-Lusitanian feelings that Goda Varma nurtured. Though it happened at a time when Portugal regained its independence from Spain (1640) and D.João IV from the house of Bragança became the king of Portugal, which was followed by a ten-years truce signed between the Lusitanians and Holland,\textsuperscript{390} Goda Varma was fully aware of the declining position of the Portuguese in the East who were eventually replaced by the
Dutch. The latter had already made treaty with the king of Kandy as early as 1638 and captured Trincomalee in 1639 and Negombo as well as Galle in 1640. This was followed by the fall of Malacca in 1641, which marked cutting of the navigational lines of the Portuguese with south East Asia permanently. Meanwhile, the Dutch increasingly began to use Ceylon as base for their operations in Malabar. On 20th May 1642, the ruler of Porcad, a former ally of the Portuguese and of the king of Cochin, entered into treaty with the Dutch for pepper trade. In 1643, 236584 lbs of pepper and 3043 lbs of dry ginger were bought by V.O.C., from Malabar. On 1st March 1643, the king of Kayamkulam entered into treaty with P.S.Groes, a senior merchant of V.O.C., by which the former agreed to deliver all the pepper produced in his territory to the Dutch. With the deepening of Dutch commercial operations along the Malabar coast strengthened by the political treaties, the general political scene in Cochin changed considerably.

Unprecedented in the history of both the Cochins, tension fomented acutely between the natives of Cochin de Cima and the citizens of the city of Santa Cruz by 1640s. On 17th august 1642, the Patare regedormor (the chief officer) of the king of Cochin and his people were said to have destroyed into pieces the statues of St.Mary and St.Antony. It was also pointed out that they broke one big cross and made a ladder out of it. The tempo of the conflict increased with the breaking of a church in Bendurte (Venduruthi), destruction of crosses in Palaurte (Palluruthi), occupation of palm-trees of the casados in the region of Sam Tomé. These excesses
were said to have been part of the reactions to the murder of a *regedor* (officer) of the king of Cochin by the Portuguese in 1630. Besides this, cow-slaughter in the city (in 1643 there were 150 cases of cow-slaughter in the city of Santa Cruz), frightening and disturbing of the people by shooting of canons, were said to have been the chief atrocities that provoked the inhabitants of the native Cochin. Underneath these religious tensions and mutual accusations, one could notice a wide gap of estrangement in the relationship between the Portuguese and the natives, which could also be explained as the exteriorisation of the tensions that existed between the native ruler and the Portuguese. The tense situation affected adversely the meagre trade which the Portuguese were conducting in low profile. In 1643, it was said that the king of Cochin did not allow anything to come to the Portuguese city and the general atmosphere was almost like one under economic sanctions.

In order to establish good relationship with the native ruler, the city of Santa Cruz sent Antonio de Pinho da Costa, João Correa da Silveira and Miguel Freire Dalmeida who were people with experience and good contacts with Goda Varma. The representation yielded fruits and an agreement was made between the king of Cochin and the Portuguese in the church of Mattancherry on 22nd July 1643, pledging mutually to remedy the excesses from both sides. But this peace seems to have only short lived as from August of the same year onwards, we hear about further tensions between the two parties. These tensions reached the culmination with the murder in 1643 by some *casados* of Samuel Castiel, who was an influential
Jewish trader of Cochin and very close to Goda Varma. His role as the interpreter and translator of the king of Cochin was believed to have been used to infuse anti-Portuguese feelings into the latter and that must have been the reason why Samuel Castiel was selected as the target of attack.404

By the middle of 1640's, with the termination of the Thirty Years war, the position of the Dutch in the East was greatly improved by the treaty of Westphallia. Meanwhile with the death of Goda Varma in 1645, feud broke out in the royal family of Cochin between the Palluruthi tavazhi and the member adopted from the Mutta tavazhi.405 In course of time, in the internal conflicts and royal intrigues, which had shaken the very structure of the Perumpadappu Swarupam, the old queen gained the upper hand. She expelled the member of the Mutta tavazhi, who was then ruling the kingdom of Cochin and placed one of her nephews, instead, on the throne in 1653. This, being contrary to the tradition of the land, created a lot of opposition from the kings of the neighbourhood, especially from Carturte (Kadathuruthy, the seat of Vadakkenkur kingdom), from the kingdoms of Paru (Parur), Mangate (Alengad), Rapolim (Edappilly) and of course from the Zamorin, as well.406 Paying little attention to these oppositions, the queen approached the Portuguese authorities to get approval for her nephew as the official ruler and get him crowned with the crown of gold, which D. Manuel had sent to India through Francisco da Almeida in 1505 for crowning the then king of Cochin.407 In the beginning i.e., till 1655 the Portuguese tried to maintain neutrality in this family feud, neither supporting the steps of the queen nor opposing the prince of Mutta tavazhi.408
But later the Portuguese seems to have changed their approach to favour the queen's choice. The change in the stand of the Portuguese must have been caused by the Dutch conquest of Colombo in 1656, which gave the message that the danger to the Portuguese strongholds in Malabar was imminent. Even in this changed situation the old queen went further with her own schemes and plans. In 1658, ignoring the claims of the Mutta tavazhi, five princes from Tanur (Vettathu) royal family were adopted and given the right to succeed. This heightened the tension. The prince of Mutta tavazhi appealed to the Zamorin, who immediately came forward to champion the former's cause. The Portuguese supported the Tanur adoptees. In 1661, the Zamorin, the prince of the Mutta tavazhi and Paliathachan (the hereditary Prime Minister of Cochin and the chief of the island of Vaypin) made agreement with the Dutch to capture Cochin and offered every help for the expedition. In the ensuing battle, which was fought mainly to capture Cochin, the ruling king of Cochin and his two nephews (adoptees from Tanur royal family) were killed and the old queen was arrested and taken as a captive. Though all the resources of the kingdom of Cochin and the neighbouring places like Angamali were mobilised to defend the city of Cochin, it fell before the combined forces of the Dutch-Zamorin-Mutta tavazhi axis on 5th January 1663. Goda Varma, a Tanur adoptee and the heir apparent to the throne of Cochin was expelled from the kingdom by the Dutch. Even after loosing everything, this intrepid warrior with a handful of soldiers continued fighting for the Portuguese till 1680, with the loyalty of a friend and a collaborator.
During the years between 1631 to 1634 the annual average of crown's trade from India was 7089 quintals.\textsuperscript{417} In 1635, the total pepper supplied from Cochin and Quilon for two ships named \textit{Capitania} and \textit{Nossa Senhora de Belem} (under crown trade) was only 4910 quintals.\textsuperscript{418} But in the subsequent years, amidst the mounting tensions, the European trade from Cochin seems to have reached its lowest level.

Though there are no continuous documents available for quantifying the volume of trade for this period, a narrow and feeble strand of European commerce is visible at random intervals. It suggests that besides the \textit{casado} trade with Lisbon, which continued to exist almost up to 1640, crown trade also continued simultaneously. But the increase of pepper-price in Malabar made the transactions less frequent. The frequent Dutch blockade made things still worse in Malabar and Canara, as well. Thus, in 1637, though pepper money was brought to Cochin, Quilon and Canara for the purchase of the commodity and a contract with Sancara da Gama was made for getting 2000 quintals of pepper from Canara, Goa did not get sufficient pepper for the loading of the ship \textit{S.João de Cruz}. So it was decided to fill the space with 1200 quintals of cinnamon brought from Ceylon.\textsuperscript{419} In March 1641, the viceroy sent 12 ships in the fleet to bring pepper from Cochin to Goa from where the cargo was despatched to Lisbon.\textsuperscript{420} Very often the lack of appropriate exchange money created problems, even during this period. On 29th November 1643, a request was made to the crown to send pepper-money to Cochin, Quilon and to Canara only in the gold coin called \textit{São Tomé}. (usually the pepper money that was despatched during this period was in
uncoined gold and silver in the form of Spanish reals-of-eight. But in all the pepper transactions in Malabar and Canara, the gold *São Tomé*, which was struck at the mint in Goa since 1548 was used.) For want of this coin, the factors were finding it difficult to get the necessary pepper for the ships of the kingdom. But even then the European commerce pulled on. In 1648, besides pepper, cinnamon from Ceylon and bastard cinnamon from Cochin and Quilon were sent to Lisbon through the liberty chests.

Even during the troubled years of 1650's pepper was collected from Cochin for European commerce. Thus, on 23rd September 1654 we hear that 123537 kilograms of pepper were taken from Cochin and Quilon. The share from Cochin was 73548 kilograms while that of Quilon was 49989 kilograms. The Europe bound vessels were loaded with Cochin pepper even in 1656, showing that the trade did not die out completely in Cochin eventhough the various internal and external tensions, that had already begun to suck the vitality of its economic activities, reached their highest water-level.

Crown’s Pepper-Trade with Cochin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pepper in Kilograms</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pepper in Kilograms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1704163</td>
<td>1621</td>
<td>226627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602</td>
<td>398591</td>
<td>1622</td>
<td>18046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1603</td>
<td>1119969</td>
<td>1623</td>
<td>324098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1610</td>
<td>218758</td>
<td>1624-25</td>
<td>199138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1611</td>
<td>440991</td>
<td>1626</td>
<td>369843</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However the crown's trade formed only one of the three strands of European commerce. The Portuguese India Company and the *casados* of Cochin also undertook the European commerce from Cochin as a different organisational arrangement. So both these alternative commercial arrangements are also dealt with here in order to understand better the Indo-European commerce organised in Cochin.

### 3. The Indo-European Trade from Cochin through the Portuguese India Company (1629-1634)

Inspired by the Dutch and the English East India Companies, a company named Portuguese India Company (P.I.C.) was founded to conduct trade with India. The idea of the company, whose initial discussions were traced back as early as to 1619, got special attention of the Portuguese authorities by 1624 with the work of D.Jorge Mascarenhas. On 27th August 1628, the Portuguese India Company was founded by a royal decree. It received a sixty-eight clause charter. The liberal contributions from crown, which amounted to 1,500,000 *cruzados* and formed almost 2/3 of the total investment and from various Municipalities of Portugal whose contribution was about 3,18867 *cruzados* provided the
financial assets for the company. Unlike other European companies, which had powers to found factories, organise settlements, make war and peace, sign treaties, and govern the Asians and Europeans in their trading posts, the Portuguese India Company did not exercise political and military powers. Actually, it was grafted on to an existing administrative system and it was required to perform only commercial functions.429

In Lisbon, the company had a board of directors consisting of a president and six directors. All the directors, except Garcia de Melo and Luis de Figueiredo Falcão and the president Jorge Mascarenhas (who were officers in the royal service), were members of Lisbon business community. Some of these directors like Garcia de Melo (the former vedor da Fazenda of Cochin (1605-1610) who was suspended in 1610 for malpractices) and Francisco Dias Mendes de Britto (whose father had been a member of the syndicate which contracted for the pepper trade with India for the five years period 1592-1597) were associated with Cochin in one way or another.430

Under this board of Lisbon, a subordinate board of administration was organized in Goa after the arrival of the viceroy, D. Miguel de Noronha, the fourth Count of Linhares in October 1629.431 In Cochin, the Company's affairs were handled by an administrator whose name was Antonio de Pinho da Costa.432 Pepper collected from Cochin was sent in small vessels to Goa for further transhipment to Lisbon.

In order to conduct trade, the company despatched during the period between 1629 and 1634 nine large carracks. The company's first ships, which brought with them the new viceroy, the count of Linhares, reached
Goa in 1629 and the second outward-bound ships reached in 1630. In 1631, the company vessels had to break the voyage and return because of bad weather and the attempt to send three ships in May 1632 also failed. The delays and losses which it suffered in these two years worsened the financial position of the company. It became increasingly difficult to meet the expenses of P.I.C. Coinciding with this financial crisis, there was a strong criticism that the company had only decreased the trade of Portugal with India and that it, besides spending all the capital given, had incurred a net loss. Lot of money was wasted on the duplicated arrangements made for the company. Liquidation of the company and resumption of the Indian trade by the Treasury Council was the only solution that appeared acceptable before the Lisbon authorities. On 12th April, 1632 the crown declaring that the company was in poor financial condition for further operations and that it failed to attract private capital for Indian trade for which it was formed, announced officially the liquidation of Portuguese India Company. Though the company was liquidated in 1633, the last company ships left Goa to Portugal in 1634. So the trade conducted through the company during the period between 1629 and 1634 is dealt with here.

**The volume of pepper-export under company trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pepper in Kilograms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1630</td>
<td>572194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1631</td>
<td>476376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1633</td>
<td>509174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1634</td>
<td>475410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Besides pepper, which accounted for 81 per cent of India’s total export to Portugal in 1630, 96 per cent in 1631 and 98 per cent in 1633, other commodities like indigo, saltpeter, cowries, rice, ebony were also exported to Lisbon. In 1630, 1500 bales of rice, 1638 paras of cowries, 7682 kilograms of saltpeter, 14973 kilograms of indigo were taken to Europe. Saltpeter exported in 1631 was 4370 kilograms and in 1633 it was only 2622. During this period between 1629 and 1634, when the Indian trade was left to the P.I.C., pepper from Cochin and other spice-ports entered Lisbon through channels other than that of company. It gives us the impression that the crown trade was not fully suppressed during this phase. In the meantime, the casados of Cochin were also furnishing the Metropole with pepper in relatively significant quantity.

4. The Pepper-Trade of the Casados of Cochin with Portugal (1628-1638)

This was another arrangement made in Cochin to revive the trade and to ensure more supply of pepper in Lisbon, on the basis of a royal letter dated 17th April 1626. It was on 9th January 1627 that the Portuguese authorities in Goa made the contract with André Simões, a casado of Cochin, to send one naveta (ship) every year to Portugal. With this the casados were given an opportunity to take part in Indo-European commerce. This naveta was supposed to carry at least 2000 quintals of pepper. As per the conditions of the contract, if the pepper-money was provided by the crown, the ship-owning citizens of Cochin would be paid 4½ cruzados for every quintal of pepper taken to Portugal. If the pepper-money was not given by
the crown, the *casados* could collect the pepper from Cochin and Quilon according to the order of *vedor da Fazenda* of Cochin and send it to the kingdom. There they would get 19 *cruzados* for each quintal upon the delivery of cargo. But the ship-owner must bear all the expenses and the risk factors. The money would be paid to them within 30 days after the delivery of pepper. The pepper of the *casados* unloaded and sold to the *casa da India*, would be free of the usual duties and levies which were charged on pepper brought by others.\(^{438}\) The commodity that was entrusted by the *casados* in the *casa da India* would not be mixed up with other consignments of pepper and the factor of the *naveta* would be given a key of the warehouse where it was stored. It was the *vedor da Fazenda* of Cochin who had to examine and decide the quality of pepper and give the certificate as to whether the pepper was to be allowed to be taken to the kingdom or prohibited depending, on the quality.\(^{439}\)

There was a desire, when this agreement was contracted, to make the king of Cochin participate in this trade of the *casados*. So a clause was made to request the native ruler to enter into this contract with 2 to 3,000 *xerafins* or with an amount as he desired. Moreover, it was also stipulated that the ship-owners should pay the customs duties due to the king of Cochin. This contract was to be made known to the officers of the Municipal council of Cochin, so that other citizens of the city also might join this enterprise.\(^{440}\)

The ship-owners could send up to 800 *paras* of cowries in their vessels to Portugal, on the condition that they might sell the commodity only to the
king or that they might sell it to others only with royal permission. They could also take with them 150 *bhars* of cinnamon coming from Ceylon, on the order of the viceroy. The viceroy would give the ship-owners the technical experts like the pilot, assistant-pilot, sailors and 4 *bombardeiros*. The captain and other officials of the *naveta* were entitled to the privileges of liberty chests and other provisions enjoyed by the officers of the vessels of *carreira da India*. The Portuguese authorities would provide them with 10 to 12 pieces of artilleries and necessary gun-powder. The duration of this first contract was three years which was again renewed or remade in the next decade, as well.

The first *naveta* under this contract left Cochin to Lisbon in 1628 with a cargo of more than 2000 quintals of pepper. The second *naveta*, whose captain was Francisco Freire de Andrade and which left Cochin on 22nd December 1629, carried more than 3500 quintals of pepper. It reached Lisbon in 1630.

Unfortunately, we do not have details for the *naveta* which departed from Cochin in 1630. However, meanwhile, there arose dispute in Lisbon between the officials of the *Casa da India* and the agent of the *casados* over the payment of duties on the pepper of 1629. The agent of the *casados* also argued that the price must be raised above 19 *cruzados*. The captain of the *naveta*, Francisco Freire de Andrade submitted a petition to the court at Valladolid and thus succeeded in delivering the cargo without duties. But the purchase price remained the same.
We do not have enough evidence for the naveta-trade of the casados in the years immediately after the termination of the first contract. But it is highly probable that against the background of the declaration, which the crown made in the early 1630's that settlers from any part of the Estado could send vessels on the Cape-route with due permission from the council of State of Goa, the naveta-trade continued, at least occasionally.

The next known contract for the naveta trade from Cochin was made in 1635. However, it seems that this contract was made not with the individual casados but with the Municipal council of the city of Cochin. It was in 1635 that the city of Cochin made request for permission to send one naveta each year to conduct trade with the kingdom. In 1636, a naveta of the casados was laden in Cochin under the supervision of Antonio de Pinho da Costa, who was previously nominated to the post of administrator of the Portuguese India Company in Cochin. For want of enough pepper, he persuaded the viceroy to get the permission for taking cinnamon instead. This and the naveta of the following year (1637), as well, reached the kingdom, and their captains received the payment upon the delivery of the cargo in the Casa da India. The last naveta of this series, called Santa Maria Madre de Deus, left Cochin for Portugal under the captaincy of Luis de Freitas de Maçedo on 11th February 1638. Five months after departing from Cochin, it was forced to put in at Moçambique. Finally the naveta reached Lisbon in May 1639, almost fifteen months after its departure from
Cinnamon brought from Ceylon was one of the chief commodities laden from Cochin, even in this *naveta,* *Santa Maria Madre de Deus.* Upon reaching Lisbon, Luis de Freitas de Maçedo, the captain of the *naveta* asked for new and fresh valuation for this commodity which he had entrusted to the *Casa da India.* Besides spices, the *casados* used to despatch diamonds and other precious stones to Portugal in their *navetas.* In the *naveta,* which departed from Cochin in 1638, Gaspar Ribeiro had sent diamonds and some other precious stones through a sailor to Lisbon, which were later taken by the captain of the fortress of Cascaes.

Though the volume of pepper exported in the *navetas* was not available for all the years of this period, the terms of the contract, which was made with the *casados,* make us conclude that almost 2000 quintals of pepper or a mixed-cargo of pepper and cinnamon for the same weight departed from Cochin to Lisbon in each year.

**Total Volume of Exports from India to Europe: 1570-1663**

The pepper and other commodities taken from India during this period at different phases through different channels and arrangements are given below so that we may have an over-all view of Indian trade with Europe. This table includes the cargo taken from the entire India including Canara, Cochin and other ports of Malabar. The commodities taken through contract traders, crown ships, Portuguese India Company and *casado navetas* are combined together, where it is applicable, to present this table.
For the period between 1636 and 1663, very little data are available for quantifying the trade. However, the figure of 1654 gives a rough picture of the trade that was carried out during these troubled days. A graphic presentation of these trade activities would show how the mounting tensions from within, i.e., from their one-time collaborators as well as from outside, i.e., from European rival powers, had slendered, at different phases and stages, the flow of pepper to Portugal after 1592. It also shows that,
inspite of the various trade arrangements made at different times, the index of pepper trade often remained far below in the seventeenth century than that of the contract trade of 1586-1591, which, of course, represents only the average volume of the sixteenth century.

**Diagram showing the Trade of Pepper during the Period between 1570-1654**

Pepper formed almost 70 to 96 per cent of India's total trade with Portugal, even though the pepper-export fell to probably 50 per cent of the average level of the sixteenth century commerce. Indigo, which was in high demand in Europe as a blue dye and grown in north India especially in Sarkhej in Gujarat and Biana near Agra, often stood in the second place. In 1587 and 1588, a total of 4457 quintals and in 1600, 1918 bales of indigo were exported to Europe. But during the period between 1601 and 1610, the annual average of indigo was only 215 quintals. The export of this
commodity in 1616 was 1227 quintals 2 arrobas, in 1617, it was 1500 quintals. But in the following two years it fell sharply: 825 quintals in 1618 and 794 quintals and 2 arrobas in 1619.\(^{457}\) In 1630, indigo was 11 per cent of the total value of Portuguese India Company's exports.\(^{458}\) The export of cinnamon, another spice which although this period was brought from Ceylon, was 1598 quintals for 1587 and 1735 quintals for 1588. In 1600, it rose to 3934 quintals. However in the first decade of the seventeenth century, the average annual export of cinnamon fell to 962 quintals.\(^{459}\) As we have already seen, after 1635, with the diminishing availability of pepper, cinnamon began to occupy a substantial portion of the cargo-space of the Europe-bound vessels. Both the crown vessels and the *casado navetas* began to carry increasingly cinnamon to Portugal, as they failed to procure the required quantity of pepper.\(^{460}\) The export of ginger, another spice grown in Malabar, fluctuated although this period. The volume in 1587 was 499 quintals, in 1588, it was 1750; but in 1600 it decreased to 899 quintals. The annual average of ginger exported to Lisbon for the period between 1601 and 1610 was only 316 quintals.\(^{461}\) As we have already seen, after the fall of Ternate in 1570, cloves, nutmegs, mace and other South East Asian spices were exported less frequently from India to Portugal. Only 388 quintals of nutmeg, 382 quintals of cloves and 99 quintals of mace were exported during the two years period of 1587 and 1588. Of these three spices, only cloves occupied somewhat significant place in the cargo-list of the succeeding years. In 1600, a volume of 3114 quintals cloves was sent to Lisbon and during the period between 1601 and 1610, the annual average of
this commodity exported from India was only 249 quintals. Silk and textiles, coming from Bengal, Cambay and Coromandel coast, formed an important cargo of the Portugal-bound vessels. In 1587, 372 chests and 411 bales of textiles and silk were exported; however in 1588 the export of cloth increased to 2004 chests. In 1600, the five ships that departed from India took with them 414 chests, 151 big bales and 442 small bales of cloths. There was an average of 296 chests, 289 big bales and 1091 small bales of textiles and silk in the commodity list for the export trade of the period between 1601 and 1610.

Saltpeter, which was in short supply in Europe, was another important commodity that was earnestly procured for the Portugal-bound carracks. Cochin acted as an intermediary port for the saltpeter coming from Coromandel coast, Bengal and Madura. Sind, Cambay, Barcelor, Bijapur were other centres of supply. In 1625, Jorge de Sousa Pegado had supplied 200 quintals of saltpeter in Goa. In 1630, the export of saltpeter to Portugal was 168 quintals which decreased to 95 quintals in 1631. The export of this commodity again increased to 200 quintals in 1632. But in the following year, the figure fell to 57. Often the saltpeter was sent to Portugal after having refined it in the new gun-powder plant constructed at Panelim in Goa by viceroy Linhares by early 1630's., although there were cases when high quality saltpeter was sent directly to Lisbon.

In 1616, the crown prohibited the private trade on coir and other naval materials. The aim behind this move was to get coir for the ship-building
activities of Portugal. Both coir and cowries, commodities coming from Maldives, were exported to Lisbon on a monopolistic basis. In 1624-25, Bartolomeu Sanches Correia was authorised to export 1000 quintals of cowries. In 1625, we find Francisco Tinoco de Carvalho sending cowries for the construction work of the monastery of Encarnação of Madrid. However, during the company trade, the volume of cowrie-export was so low that the Lisbon board gave instructions to stop further shipments of this commodity.

Another item that was frequently exported to the kingdom was diamonds and other precious stones. Most of these precious stones came from Ceylon, Bijapur, Golconda and Madura. Cochin was the southern base where the precious stones from Madura and Ceylon were collected for export to Europe. In the eastern coast, Mailapore was often used for penetrating into the mines of Golconda. In 1609, we hear about the despatching of the precious diamond rocha velha to the kingdom. In 1624, D.Francisco da Gama sent in the liberty chest of Manuel dos Anjos about 157 diamonds to Portugal. Two years later, in 1626, the same Manuel dos Anjos was said to have received diamonds from Antonio Costa to be given to the countess of Vidigueira. Jacques de Coutre, the Augsburger Ferdinand Cron who had previously been the agent of the Fuggers and the Welsers in Cochin and Goa, the new Christian traders viz., Fernão Jorge and his brother Francisco da Silveira were the prominent traders on diamonds and precious stones which they exported to Europe almost on routine basis. D.Miguel de Noronha, the viceroy and fourth count of Noronha, was another
entrepreneur, who collected diamonds from Bijapur through agents and brokers like the new Christian Vicente Ribeiro, whom the viceroy appointed as the chief gem broker.\textsuperscript{475} Some of the diamonds exported to Europe by him valued \(70,000\) to \(100,000\) ducats.\textsuperscript{476} Thus a variety of commodities were also exported to Europe, though the per centage of their composition in export-list was very less when compared with pepper.

\textbf{The Volume of Imports: 1570-1663}

Precious metals including gold, silver and copper formed important commodities of import. Though some copper was said to have been imported from Europe to India during the contract trade conducted by the Italians and Germans (1586-1591),\textsuperscript{477} this phenomenon did not continue long. The copper crisis in Europe caused by the shortage of this metal experienced towards the end of sixteenth century, compelled the Portuguese to look more to Chinese copper. From 1590 onwards, we find the chinese copper taking precedence over European copper.\textsuperscript{478} During this period, silver and gold were the important metals that were sent to India as pepper money. However, as Linschottten said, silver in the form of "Spanish reals of eight" was the greatest ware imported from Europe.\textsuperscript{479} Silver from Spain, ofcourse supplied by South America, formed almost 60 to 68 per cent of total imports and the profit on the sale of this metal was about 25 to 40 per cent in the the end of sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries. The merchants and money dealers of the native states of India were the common buyers of this metal. In 1629, silver worth 29,481milréis (which
was 62 per cent of the total import to India) was imported to India and the profit accrued from the sale of this specie was 70 per cent. In 1630, silver worth 22,695 milréis were imported to India. It registered 68 per cent of total cargo imported. With increasing supply, this consignment was sold at a price 30 per cent lower than that of 1629 and despite this, the sale of silver in 1630 produced a profit of 53%.  

If only less gold was imported to India in the sixteenth century, as this metal was worth more in Europe, it was the contrary in the seventeenth century. Gold became a common commodity of import. In 1627, about 80 per cent of the pepper money (32,847 out of 40,000 cruzados) was sent to India in gold and uncoined gold had higher demand in the market than silver. In 1629, uncoined gold, gold bullion, worth 15,184 milréis (i.e., 32 per cent of the total imports) was imported to India. Besides this, a small fraction in four-cruzado gold pieces worth 2884 milréis also was despatched to India. Both these consignments formed one third of the total pepper money for 1629 and their sale fetched almost 62 per cent profit. In 1630, gold worth 6,349 milréis (i.e., almost 19% of total imports) was brought to India and its sale made a profit of 56 per cent. Besides the import of gold bars on carracks from Europe, lot of gold came to India from Moçambique. A good volume of this precious metal was sold in open market in Goa and was taken all over India by the merchants and money dealers. But a considerable portion of this gold was used also for minting SãoTomé, the gold coin which was used for buying pepper in Cochin and Quilon. Gold other than in the coin-form of São Tomé was priced less in
Cochin and Quilon: a mark of gold in 1629 was worth only 185 *xerifins* 2 *tangas* in Cochin and 176 *xerifins* 2 *tangas* 30 réis in Quilon, whereas it was 196 *xerifins* 4 *tangas* in Goa.\(^{485}\)

Besides these precious metals, corals (which was collected from Italy and composed 13 per cent of the total imports in 1630),\(^{486}\) mercury, European cloth, jewellery, small arms, German toys etc were the other commodities that were imported to India at different phases.\(^{487}\)

Thus we see the trade of Cochin for the period between 1570 and 1663 undergoing several changes. Both the intra-Ásian as well as the Indo-European commerce consisted of different strands. Though the usual form of intra-Asian trade fostered by the Portuguese authorities was the ones carried out by licenses as well as cartazes and through the grant of voyages, there also continued the highly organised "system of mixed economy", in which the officials of the *Estado* joining hands with private traders to send commodities to Asian destinations. Along with this, there flourished "illegal partnerships" between the *casados* and the native merchants, which comprised ware and vessel exchange programmes. This exchange was not one-sided, but reciprocal, depending on the exigencies of time. It was so chalked out that the native merchants might escape the heavy rate prevalent in Portuguese customs houses and the *casados* might escape the threats from other European powers. From 1612 onwards, with the mass exodus of *casado* traders to more prospective trade-centres as a result of diminishing supply of pepper in Cochin, we find a declining trend in the intra-Asian
commerce., which entered a critical phase by the third decade of the seventeenth century. The Indo-European commerce, conducted by different contractors till 1597, registered less supply of commodities in the last decade of sixteenth century. Though the crown took up the trade in 1598 and continued it till 1663, the situation did not improve. The arrangements made in 1628 to transship pepper to Portugal through the navetas of the casados of Cochin (1628-1638) and by means of Portuguese India Company (1629-1634), though could be considered as extra streams of European commerce, were suggestive of crown's desire to revive the Cape-route trade. However the European trade was beyond recuperation from 1590s and from early 1600's onwards. Both the intra-Asian as well as Indo-European commerce were hit hard by the diminishing flow of pepper to Cochin, caused by the tension between the St. Thomas Christians and the Portuguese and the subsequent diversion of the commodity to ghat-route. With tensions in the hinterland, the Portuguese had to confront less co-operative and more assertive kings in Cochin, who had more reasons to get alienated as his revenue began to fall with decreasing trade. Along with these two internal problems, which had already sucked the vitality of Cochin's trade, there came the external enemy: the rival European powers viz., the Dutch and the English which obstructed the Portuguese navigational lines. It was actually the mounting problems and tensions in the hinterland and from the one-time collaborators of the Portuguese that had eaten up the flesh of Cochin; but the remaining marrow, which continued as a vague symbol of trade till 1663, was devoured finally by the superior force of the Dutch.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


2. K.S.Mathew and Afzal Ahmad, *Emergence of Cochin*..., doc.55, p.86.

3. *Ibid.*, doc.63, p.95. There was a high demand for the food-materials in Malabar especially after the great drought and famine of 1587, to which Ferdinand Cron makes reference. For details see below n.110. The food shortage must have been increasingly felt in Cochin as many took rice to the interior parts of Malabar, where it was better priced.


6. *Ibid.*, doc.66, p.100. The "one per cent money" was often used for the welfare activities of the city.

7. Duarte Gomes Solis was administrator general of pepper employed by the new Christian merchant magnate, Heitor Mendes de Brito, who was also his future father-in-law. For more details about Duarte Gomes Solis, see José Calvet de Magalhães. "Duarte Gomes Solis", Studia 19 (1966), pp.119-171.

8. For details see below n.272 and 273.


17. For details see below n.-14.


19. The Portuguese citizens appear to have acted as main distributors of spices coming to Coromandel coast through the ghat-route.


22. For elaborate and separate list of the export trade of pepper for this period see below n.-286.


28. For detailed account of the monetary rewards given to the native rulers see chapter II.

29. Dom Alexis Meneses claimed that he was visiting the churches of St. Thomas Christians to bring them back to Roman Catholic Church. AHU, *Caixas da Índia*, Caixa 1, doc.20, fol.4-5; But as Eugene Tisséran says, this community had always believed in and acknowledged the supremacy of pope. E. Tisséran, *op. cit.*, pp.18-19. It was a time, when, against the background of Protestant Reformation in Europe, every non-Latin liturgical tradition, religious practices and celebrations other than Western Latin tradition was looked upon with suspicion and often termed as heresy. With little command over native and Syriac (in which the liturgical celebrations of this community were conducted) languages and with little knowledge of the cultural and social life of this community, hasty steps were taken to
call everything, which were found to be non-European and which did not conform to Latin tradition as heretical practices. The label of Nestorianism, an easy and general epithet often mistakenly used to categorise all the Christians, who were using Syriac as liturgical language, was attributed to the St. Thomas Christians. The moves of the Portuguese which culminated in Diamper Synod (1599), was motivated with the belief that they could make St. Thomas Christians catholics only by making their rites and practices conformed to Latin tradition. So, many prefer to call this phenomenon undertaken by the Portuguese as a process of latinisation. For further details see Joseph C. Panjikaran, "Christianity in Malabar with Special Reference to the St. Thomas Christians of the syro-Malabar Rite", in Orientalia Christiana, vol. VI, 1926, pp. 103-105.


31. Ibid. Angamali was a diocese that was existing prior to the advent of the Portuguese and all the St. Thomas Christians were ecclesiastically under this diocese till the second council of Goa.

32. For further details see D'sa, History of the Catholic Church in India, vol. I, Bombay, 1910, p. 167; The details about the Jesuit charges of Nestorianism, of which Mar Abraham was accused, could be found in Ferroli, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 172-176.

33. Here it is to be mentioned that most of the pre-Diamper liturgy and practices, which were condemned as heresy by the Portuguese, are slowly re-introduced in the present day Syro-Malabar catholic rite of the St. Thomas Christians, as a part of the attempt to preserve its age-old traditions.

34. K.M. Panikkar, Malabar and the Portuguese, p. 190.


36. During this tension period and especially after the Synod of Diamper, the supply of pepper from Cochin to Portugal became less in comparison with the early figures. For details, see the discussions on the Indo-European trade, below nos. 302-305.

37. HAG, Livro das Monções, No. 7 (1601-1603), Royal letter sent to viceroy Aires de Saldanha dated 2-1-1601, fol. 21-24; another letter dated 22-1-1601, fol. 27-30.

38. After the synod of Diamper, Archbishop D. Alexis Meneses visited the churches of the St. Thomas Christians to make them accept the synodal decisions. For details see Antonio de Gouveia, op. cit., pp. 198ff.


40. AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa, 2, doc. 107, The letter of the city council of Cochin sent to Philip II (Philip III of Spain) giving account of the economic condition of Cochin dated 21-12-1613.

AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 22 doc.23, dated 4-3-1653. It speaks about the syrian bishop (the document mentions that this dignitary was a syrian patriarch) who was detained by the Portuguese in Goa. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 23, doc.20 dated 5-2-1655. Report on the causes of the rebellion which was spearheaded by the archdeacon and the priests of the hinterland. For more details on the rebellion of St.Thomas Christians see Jacob Kollaparambil, *The St.Thomas Christians' Revolution in 1653*, Kottayam, 1981; Jacob Kollaparambil, *The Archdeacon of all India*, Kottayam, 1972.

*Ibid.*, During this tension period the queen of Cochin was said to have supported the cause of the St.Thomas Christians. see S.S.Pissurlencar, *Assentos do Conselho do Estado*, vol.III (1644-1658), doc.149, pp.274-278.

Though the Kunjalis were the traditional admirals of Zamorin, tensions between them broke out with the accession of Muhammad Kunjali Marakkar (popularly known as Kunjali IV) as the chief of Kottakkal in 1595. He began to assert himself and assumed the title of "the king the Malabar Moors" and "Lord of the Indian seas". This antagonized Zamorin, who joining hands with the Portuguese, launched attacks on the fort at Kottakkal. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 1, doc.20, fol.11; Faria Y Sousa, *op.cit.*, vol.III, pp.99-100; F.C.Danvers, *The Portugues in India*, vol.II, p.112.; A.P.Ibrahim Kunju, *Studies in Medieval Kerala History*, Trivandrum, 1975, pp.81-82.


Faria Y Sousa says that Zamorin had an added reason in attacking Cranganore as he wanted to occupy the temple of the city where the ancient rulers of Malabar used to be crowned. Faria Y Sousa, *op.cit.*, vol.III, p.204.


AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 8, doc.38, dated 29-10-1624.

Antonio da Silva Rego, *Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa*, vol.III, p.312; Francisco da Costa also says that during his service period he had never found vessels from Porcad bringing pepper to Cochin. Similarly, the pepper supply from Mangatti (Alengad), Parur, from the land of Quarto d'Alva (Karta of Alwaye) to Cochin also became very less. *Ibid*.

Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Cochin in Decline,1600-1650: Myth and Manipulation in the Estado da India", in *Portuguese Asia*, p.67.


*Relação das Plantas & Dezcripções de todas as Fortalezas, Cidades e Povoações*,
p.39. It seems that the gun-powder exported from Cochin to eastern space was very less, as most of the saltpeter that reached Cochin came from Bengal. There is the possibility that the gun-powder mentioned here could be of the refined category.


54. RNL, Fundo Geral, 1980, "Livro das Despezas de hum Porcento", fol.25.

55. Ibid., fols.12; 40.

56. For details on the Portuguese trade in textiles, see Afzal Ahmad, "Indian Textiles and the Portuguese Trade in the Seventeenth Century (1600-1663)", in Studia 48, 1989, pp.213-236.


58. AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 3A, doc.162, dated 23-12-1615.

59. AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 3, doc.152.

60. Antonio Bocarro, Livro das Plantas, p.353.

61. BNL, Fundo Geral, 1980, Livro das Despezas de hum Porcento, fol.25.

62. Ibid., fols.16; 40.

63. HAG, Livro das Monções, no.6-B (1605), fols.39-40.

64. Biblioteca Publica de Evora, MSS. Codice No.CXVI/1-23, fols.2-4.

65. AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 16, doc.34, fol.21, dated 12-2-21644.


67. The customs rate in Goa was 6 per cent, while the casados had a concessional rate in Cochin where they were to pay only 3.5 per cent. For details see the discussion on customs duties of Cochin given below.


72. ANTT, Documentos Remetidos da India, Livro 28, fol.158 letter of the king sent to the viceroy dated 31-3-1631; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Cochin in Decline...", pp.73-74.
According to Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, about 75,000 quintals of pepper worth 1½ million cruzados of gold were consumed in China. Almost ¾ of the production of South East Asia and ¼ of Malabar pepper were taken to Chinese markets. Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Ensaios, vol. II, Sobre História Universal, Lisboa, 1968, p. 233.

After the opening up of Chinese ports to Portuguese traders, *casados* stepped into this lucrative trade.


Ibid., pp. 750; 761.

Ibid., Fasciculo I, Parte 2, p. 229; During this period we find the Chinese junks carrying the cargo of the *casados* of Cochin coming frequently to India and the king of Cochin used to demand that these Chinese vessels carrying the merchandise of the *casados* of Cochin should touch Cochin and pay the customs duties to him as usual. In 1583 and 1598, these junks were said to have called at Nagapatanam. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 169; For further details about the Chinese junk that touched Nagapatanam in 1598 see below no. 294.

A. R. Disney, *Twilight of the Pepper Empire: Portuguese Trade in Southwest India in the Early Seventeenth Century*, Cambridge, 1978, p. 120.

Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa No. 8, pp. 71-72.

AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 10, doc. 105, dated 30-12-1633; In 1643, we hear about another ship which departed from Cochin to China. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 15, doc. 116, dated 30-12-1643.

AHU, *Caixas da India*. Caixa 23, doc. 20, dated 5-2-1655. Though two ships, one from Cochin and another from Goa, moved to China in this year, both of them were captured by the Dutch.


BNL, *Fundo Geral*, Codice No. 1980, Livro das Despezas de hum porcento, fol. 3.

Ibid., fols. 24; 26. Later with the appearance of the Dutch, the Portuguese intensified and strengthened the patrolling system using more vessels.

BNL, *Fundo Geral*, Codice No. 1980, "Livro das Despezas de hum porcento", fols. 4-11.

M. N. Pearson, *Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat*, p. 46.
After the capture of Malacca by the Dutch in 1641, the vessels coming from the eastern space of Indian Ocean, almost stopped touching Cochin. From 1640's onwards, we hear that the vessels even from Nagapatanam and Mailapore were not coming regularly to Cochin. AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 15, doc. 108, 28-12-1643.


Ibid; João Manuel de Almeida Teles e Cunha, op cit., pp.399-400.

Ibid, pp.400-402; Antonio de Bulhão Pato(ed.), Documentos Remetidos da India ou Livro das Mongões, vol.I, Lisboa, 1884, pp.262-263; Even in 1645, the members of the royal family of Maldives, who were living in Cochin, used to enjoy this privilege. Dom Pedro Infant and later, on his death, his son D.Manuel were entitled to have 500 xerafins of pension. AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 17 A, doc. 167, dated 5-7-1645.


ANTT, MSS, S.Vicente, doc.26, fol.s.93-94, dated 5-3-1626; ANTT, ML 816, fol.258.

João Manuel de Almeida Teles e Cunha, op.cit., p.400.


AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 3 A, doc.179 fol.s.1;7, dated 30-12-1615.

HAG, Livro das Mongões, No.7 (1600-1603), Letter of the Princepe Real to the bishop of Cochin, dated 15-1-1598; HAG, Livro das Mongões, No.8 (1601-1602), royal letter to viceroy Aires de Saldanha, 22-2-1601; In 1591, the anti-Portuguese Puviraja Pandaram, the ruler of Jaffna, was attacked and killed. Thereafter, in the meeting of chief men of Jaffna, often called the Convention of Nallur (1591), the king of Portugal was proclaimed the king of Jaffna, and a local ruler Hendaramana Sinha was appointed for routine governace. Meanwhile, with the death of childless
Dharmapala in 1597, the kingdom of Kotte also passed into the hands of the Portuguese as per his will and the king of Portugal became its official ruler. But Vimala Dharma Suriya, who seized the throne of Kandy under the name Don Juan of Austria (later he abandoned this foreign name and took sinhalese name), declared himself the ruler of Ceylon and raised serious challenge to the entire scheme of the Portuguese to master the island. From 1602 onwards, he got the support of the Dutch in the battles against the Portuguese. The wars mentioned here were those waged to regain the Kandyan throne from Vimala Dharma Suriya (and from Senarat, who succeeded Dharma Suriya in 1604), which had previously been ruled by catholic kings. For details, see L.H. Horace Perera, *Ceylon under Western Rule*, London, 1959, pp.20-48.

107. HAG, *Livro das Monções*, No.14 (1630-1631), fol.336, dated 23-10-1630; The intervention of the citizens of Cochin became necessary in Ceylon when the king of Kandy attacked Kotte, the Portuguese stronghold, in 1627. The war continued and in 1630, 4 Mudaliyars and 2000 soldiers who were fighting for the Portuguese deserted and joined Kandy. Moreover, Constantine de Sa, the captain-general was killed and the Portuguese could not conquer Kandy. For details, see L.H. Horace Perera, *op.cit.*, p.47.

108. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 11A, doc.205, dated 6-12-1635; As we shall see below, most of the cinnamon, thus, brought by the *casados* from Ceylon was taken to Portugal in *navetas*.


111. For more details. see BNL, *Fundo Geral*, Codice No.1980. Livro das Despezas de hum porcento...(*Taboada*) fols.5-16.


118. William Foster, *The Voyage of Thomas Best*, ..., pp.148-149;188.
120. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 2, doc.4, dated 12-1-1612; Caixa 2, doc.73, dated 23-12-1612.
122. *Bid.*
123. K.S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad, *Emergence of Cochin*, doc.53, pp.77-83
125. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 3 A doc.179, dated 30-12-1615.
126. K.S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad, *Emergence of Cochin*, doc 74, pp.11-112
128. Most of these horses imported to Cochin were sold by the *casados* in the kingdoms of Tamilnadu and some in Kerala.
133. HAG, *Livro das Monções* No.4 (1595-1598), fols.672-678, the royal instructions given to the viceroy Conde de Vidigueira, dated 2-1-1596.
136. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Cochin in Decline...,pp.78-79.
138. For a detailed list of the *casados* of Cochin with considerable capital, who used to lend money to the Portuguese Treasury, see AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 2 doc.89, fols.1-4;11;15 dated 27-1-1613.
139. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 3, doc.174, dated 2-1-1616; Another document of 1616 speaks about the money which the Royal Treasury owed to Manuel da Fonseca, the casado of Cochin AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 4, doc.133.
140. Cf.Supra n.40.
141. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 3, doc.29, dated 25-1-1615; see also Caixa 3, doc.31, dated 25-1-1615.

143. HAG, Livro das Monções, No. 12 (1613-1617), fols. 254-280, dated March 1617.


146. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 17, doc. 42, dated 3-12-1644.


149. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 15, doc. 116, dated 30-12-1643.

150. Cf. Supra n. 83.

151. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 17, doc. 13, dated 7-10-1644.

152. "The Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas que a Coroa de Portugal tem nas partes da India", published by Francisco Mendes da Luz in *Boletim da Biblioteca da Universidade de Coimbra*, vol. XXI, Coimbra, 1953; For detailed table of voyages, see Luis Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago during the 16th Century", p. 87.

153. HAG, Livro das Monções, No. 3A (1585-1589), fols. 325-328.


156. For details see, BNL, Codice No. 1976, fol. 158-159, Letter of Conde de Vidigueira sent to Philip in 1599.

157. HAG, Livro das Monções, No. 2 A (1583-1595), fols. 128-137, Royal letter sent to the viceroy Matias de Albuquerque dated 15-2-1594.

158. HAG, Livro das Monções, No. 7 (1600-1603), fol. 100.

159. Ibid., fols. 193-195.


162. HAG, Livro das Monções, No. 3-A (1589-1593), fols. 419-425, dated 12-1-1591.


164. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 11, doc. 134, dated 31-3-1635.

165. ANTT, *Documentos Remetidos*, Livro 61, fols. 113-114.

166. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 22, doc. 71, dated 22-12-1653.


168. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 1, doc. 110, dated 26-1-1611.


172. HAG, Livro das Monções, No.7(1600-1603), fols. 192-195, royal letter sent to Aires de Saldanha, dated 15-2-1603.

173. HAG, Livro das Monções, No. 6 A(1604-1605), fols. 71; 77; 79 all these three letters were dated 15-3-1605; ANTT, MSS, S Vicente. 14, fols.161, letter of Philip II (of Portugal) sent to D.Alexis de Meneses, dated 15-5-1605.


175. HAG, Livro das Monções, No.6 A (1604-1605), fol.79, Royal letter sent to the bishop of Cochin, dated 15-3-1605.

176. Ibid., fol. 77.

177. Ibid., fols. 75, 77; 118.

178. Ibid., fol. 117.

179. William Foster(ed.), The Voyage of Thomas Best, p.188.

180. Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa, No.4, p.759, the letter of D.Jeronimo de Azevedo sent to Philip II dated 23-1-1615; Atleast from 1612 on wards, we come to know that the cartazes were issued to Maldives on regular basis. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, Documentos Remetidos da India, vol.II, p.259.

181. BNL, Fundo Geral, Codice No.1975, fols.172-172v, dated 6-2-1627. Cartazes were also issued to the rulers of Coromandel coast in exchange for food-supply. Thus from 1591on, the Portuguese began to issue cartazes to the king of Masulipatanam in exchange for an annual supply of 300 candis of rice. HAG, Livro das Monções, No.3-B (1589-1591) fol. 4224-425, dated 12-1-1591.

182. Niels Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, p. 89.


184. Ibid., pp. 394-395.

185. Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa, No. 2, pp. 177-178. This diversion of commodities seems to have taken place through the distributive net-work, and
often with the knowledge and approval of some bureaucrats of the Estado da India.

186. AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 1, doc. 12, dated c.1590.
187. HAG, Livro das Monções, No. 2-B (1595-1601), fol. 425.
190. Cf.Supra n.173 and 188.
191. AHU, Caixas da India Caixa 2, doc. 119.
192. AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 6 doc. 41, dated 18-2-1619.
193. Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina, No.5, p. 106. After the fall of Ormuz., Muscate turned out to be the commercial destination of many private traders.
194 HAG, Livro das Monções, No. 17 (1632-1633), fol. 216, the letter of the king to the viceroy, dated 10-2-1633; HAG, Livro das Monções, No.18(1633), fol.81, letter of the king to the viceroy dated 10-2-1633.
197. BNL, Fundo Geral, Codice No.1816, fol.151, report on the illegal pepper trade of Cochin with Bengal, dated 25-1-1624.
198. BNL, Fundo Geral, Codice No. 1975, fol. 172, letter of the viceroy sent to the king dated 6-2-1627.
199. Cf.Supra n.120 and 123.
201. This was the usual way resorted to by the casados to escape the English blockade. The natives would either escape the enemy for being a native or would be made the scape-goat. Thomas Best gives a striking example, where the English captain Hermon capturing a vessel tortured some bania merchants mistaking them to be Portuguese casados. Hermon did not believe that they were natives and he caused them hung upon a tree by "their hands, fingers and heads" to make them confess that they were Portuguese. William Foster, Thomas Best, pp. 129-130. However, the transhipment of wares in the vessels of banias usually provided some sort of immunity to the casados from the blockade of the enemies.
202. HAG, Livro das Monções, No. 7 (1600-1603), fol. 35-44, Letter of the king to viceroy, Aires de Saldanha, dated 6-1-1601.
203. HAG, Livro das Monções, No. 8 (1601-1602), fols. 44-45, Royal letter sent to Aires de Saldanha, dated 6-1-1602.
204. As we have already seen in the last chapter, corsair activities could not be
considered as mere piracy; on the other hand it was an alternative trade arrangement developed in Malabar coast.

205. HAG, Livro das Monções, No. 3-a (1585-1589), fol. s.180-181, Royal letter sent to uarte Meneses, dated 13-3-1587.


207. Cf. Supra n. 90.

208. Cf. Supra n. 44.


210. For details see, C.R.Boxer and Frazão de Vasconcelos, André Furtado de Mendonça (1558-1610), Lisboa, 1956, pp. 21-35.

211. HAG, Livros das Monções, No.7 (1600-1603), fol.161-164, Royal letter sent to Aires de Saldanha, dated 12-2-1603.


214. James Talboys Wheller and Michael Macmillan,, op.cit., p. 34.

215. AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 8, doc. 38, dated 29-10-1624.


217. AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 14 A, doc.136, dated 21-12-1642.


219. With the establishment of several trade-centres by these powers, the commercial opportunities left for the corsairs in Indian Ocean were curtailed considerably. Therefore, they considered every European vessel plying in Asian waters as an encroachment upon their birth-right.


221. Ibid.

222. Ibid., fols. 5-16.

223. Cf.Supra n. 89.

224. Cf.Supra n. 110.


226. Mendes da Luz, op.cit., pp.73-74; Vicente Almeida d'Eça, op.cit, chapter II.

228. In 1578, the Fuggers alone held an amount of 40,000 ducats of Portuguese notes. For further details, see K. Häbler, "Die Fugger und der spanische Gewürzhandel" in *Zeitschrift des historischen Vereins für Schwaben und Neuburg*, XIX, 1892, p. 40.


230. For further details, see the letter sent by Gabriel Holzschuher on 10th January 1580, from Cochin to Konrad Rott. Nationalbibliothek Wien, Cod. 8953, fol. 23-28.


232. *Ibid.*, p. 80-81. Cardinal Henry wanted to marry the queen mother of France. But he was blocked by Philip II of Spain in his efforts to get dispensation from the vow of celibacy and to get married.


236. Mendes da Luz, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.

237. On details about the price see below n. 244 and n. 278.


239. Later Marx Wolfmüller served Ferdinand Cron when the latter reached Cochin in 1587 as the agent of the welser and the Fuggers. See below n. 249.

240. Gabriel Holzschuher also shifted his service to the German firms after 1587. See
below n.247.


243. AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 1, doc, 7A, dated 16-7-1598.

244. For details about the terms and conditions of this contract, see Reinhard Hildebrandt, Die "Georg Fuggerischen Erben", appendix, pp.191-196, F.A.MSS.Codice No.46.1.fols.33-38; M.A.H.Fitzler "Der Anteil der deutschen an der Kolonial politik Philipp's II von spanien in Asien", in Vierteljahrschrift für Social und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, vol.28, 1935, pp. 243-281.


247. F.A.MSS cod. No.46.1. fols.47v; 78v, Letter of Ferdinand Cron sent from Cochin, dated 26-12-1587.

248. Ibid., fol.56.

249. Ibid., fol.56v.

250. Ibid., fols.78-79.

251. Ibid., fols. 54v, 55v, 64v; 66; Cf.Supra n.238;

252. F.A.MSS Cod. No.46.1. fol.44v, letter of Ferdinand Cron sent from Cochin, dated 26-12-1587.

253. Ibid., 44v, 47v.

254. For details, see Ibid., fols. 48; 51-53.


257. The Union of Seven Provinces took place in January 1579 at Utrecht and was ratified by the States in July 1581. With this event, the Dutch intensified the struggle for independence.

258. In 1585, D.Antonio, the Prior do Crato got the support of England and queen Elisabeth's attack of Portugal was organised also with a view to installing Prior do Crato on the throne of Portugal. For more details, see Joaquim Verissimo Serrão,
*Historia de Portugal*, vol.IV, pp.37-38. During this period, the English corsair activities in the Atlantic were often spearheaded by Francis Drake and with Queen Elizabeth's consent. After the circumnavigation of Drake, Philip called upon Elizabeth to punish him for having entered into the area of the so-called Portuguese monopoly. But the queen refused the Spanish demand and went further to knight Drake. Francis Drake was considered by the English as a pioneer in the British maritime enterprise. For details, see J.A. Williamson, *The Age of Drake*, Oxford, 1938; Julian Corbett, *Drake and the Thudor Navy, with an History of the Rise of England as a Maritime Power*, vol.I-II, London, 1898.


262. Ibid., p.158; F.A.46.1 fol.48, letter of Ferdinand Cron sent from Cochin, dated 26-12-1587.

263. F.A.46.1 fols. 47v-48, letter of Ferdinand Cron sent from Cochin, dated 2-12-1587; R.Hildebrandt, *Die "Georg Fuggerischen Erben"*, p.158.

264. Ibid., F.A.46.1 fols.48-49; Archivo general de Simancas. *Secretarias Provinciales*, libro 1551, fols.213-215. The cargo-list of the 3 ships departed from Goa is furnished here.


268 Ibid.


278. BNL, *Fundo Geral* Codice No.1977, fol.213, dated 4-4-1597.
279. Cf.Supra n.9 and 10.
284. These so-called corsairs used to plunder in the Atlantic the Portuguese vessels coming from India. Many documents speak about the robbing of Portuguese vessels by the English pirates. For example, see Nationalbibliothek, Wien, Cod.No.8955, fol.23; During the period between 1580 and 1594, about 28 ships coming from India were captured or destroyed by the English. See for details, Luiz Figueiredo Falcão, *Livro em que se contem toda a Fazenda e Real Patrimonio dos Reinos de Portugal, India e Ilhas adjacentes e outras Particularidades*, Lisboa, 1859, pp.137-186; Manuel Lopes de Almeida, *Memorial de Pêro Roiz Soares*, to. I, Coimbra, 1953, p.302. Because of the constant capturing by the English corsairs, Portugal was not having enough vessels to be fitted out to India. Joaquim Verissimo Serrão, *Historia de Portugal*, vol.IV, pp.44; 154.
289. F.A.Codex No.46.1.cargo-list furnished by Filippo Sassetti, dated 23-1-1588;

Cf. *Supra* n.80.

See below n.374.

Cf. *Supra* n.121 and 122.

Cf. *Supra* n.123.


For details on the financial crisis of the Estado especially during the period between 1595 and 1610, see João Manuel de Teles e Cunha, *op.cit.*, pp.319-331; A.R.Disney, *Twilight of the Pepper Empire*, pp.50-70.

Joaquim Verissimo Serrão, *História de Portugal*, vol.IV, p.50; Eduardo Freire de Oliveira, *Elementos para a História do Município de Lisboa*, to. II, Lisboa, 1887, p.120.


Niels Steensgaard, *Carracks, Caravans and Companies*, p.166; Fernand Braudel and R.Romano, *Navires et marchandises à l'entrée du port de Livourne, 1547-1611*, Paris,1911, p.68: AHU, *Caixas da India*. Caixa 1, doc.101, dated 25-2-1611. But this document says that in 1606,a cargo 8918 quintals of pepper was bought from Cochin, Quilon and Cannaore. But it was transhipped to Portugal only in 1610. See document 101, fol.1.

Niels Steensgaard, *Carracka, Caravans and Companies*, p.166.

Cf. *Supra* n.23.

Cf. *Supra* n.300 and below n.

310. The heavy quintal was lacking half *arroba* (almost 6.6 kilograms) for a quintal and the light quintal was lacking 2 arráteis (almost 1 kilogram) for a quintal. *Ibid*; AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 2, doc. 86, letter of Francisco Rebelo Rodovalho sent to Philip II, dated 13-1-1613; Raymundo Antonio de Bulhao Pato, *Documentos Remettidos da India*, vol. II, pp. 6-8.


312. BNL, Cod. No. 11410, fols. 129v-130, *Orçamento de 1612*, about the pepper that goes to Portugal.


314. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 4, doc. 133, year 1616. It became all the more necessary against the background of the strong financial crisis, which the *Estado* was experiencing.


316. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 2, doc. 107, dated 1-12-1613.

317. *Ibid*.

318. BNL, Cod. No. 11410, fols. 29-29v, Summary of the contract concluded with Jorge Rodrigues Solis, in 1602.

319. For details about this European contract, see ANTT, MSS. S. Vicente, 26, fols. 294-295.


325. For details, see John Bruce, *Annals of the Honorable East India Company*, pp.136-147.


327. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 1, doc.101, *Devassa feito ao vedor da Fazenda*.


330. It seems that only from this period onwards, the Dutch turned openly against the Portuguese possessions in the Indian Ocean.


332. For details, see J.R.Bruijn, F.S.Gaastra and I.Schöffer with assistance of E.S.van Eyck van Heslinga, *op. cit.*, vol.II, pp.2-150.


339. For details, see AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 2, doc.89, dated 27-1-1613.

340. *Ibid.*, fols.1-4, details about the pepper-money and the money borrowed from the *casados*.


347. For details on the financial indebtedness of the crown to the *casados* of Cochin, see AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 4, doc.133, year 1616. The transfer of the commercial activities of the enterprising *casados* from Cochin to Coromandel coast and elsewhere followed by a dull-phase in the trade of Cochin, made it all the more difficult for the Portuguese to raise fund locally from the dwellers of the city.
348. For detailed list of *casados*, who were engaged in the transport of pepper from Quilon to Cochin and from Cochin to Goa, see AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 8, doc.129; Caixa 8-A, doc.231, dated 16-2-1626; Caixa 9, doc.26, dated 6-12-1625. Manuel Carvalho, Antonio José, Pero Ribeiro, João Lopes, Paulo Moreno were some among them.
349. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Cochin in Decline", p.72.
350. See for details, AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 3, doc.29, dated 25-1-1615; Caixa 3, doc.34, dated 29-1-1615; Caixa 8, doc.66, dated 25-1-1624.
351. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 5, doc.62, the letter of Nuno Vaz de Castelo Branco sent to Philip II (of Portugal) dated 1-2-1618; See the opinion especially of Garcia de Melo in the same document; Lisbon, 28-11-1618.
352. *Ibid*. See the letter of Nuno Vaz de Castelo; For further details on the difference of pepper price in Cochin and Canara, see AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa, doc.68, dated 12-12-1612.
354. A.R.Disney, *Twilight of Pepper Empire*, see appendix, p.162.
355. For details, see the table given below.
357. A.R.Disney, Twilight of Pepper Empire, p.162.
358. *Ibid*.
367. M.Antoinette P.Roelofsz, *De Vestiging der Nederlanders*, pp.51-52; See also William Foster, *The English Factories in India, 1618-1621: A Calendar of


369. For details on the fall of Ormuz and the structural crisis see, Niels Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies, pp.193-342; However, after the fall of Ormuz, Portuguese tried to concentrate more on Muscate.

370. The flow of commodities through the traditional caravan route, which the Portuguese could not completely blockade, almost stopped with the entry of the Dutch and the English into Persian gulf and Red Sea area. For details see, Niels Steensgaard, Caravana, Carracks and Companies, pp.345-411.


373. Cf.Supra n.48.

374. For details, see the table of pepper-export given below.

375. AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 9-A, doc.185, in 1626.


378. For details, see the table of pepper-export given below.


380. When Antonio Bocarro visited Cochin, Samuel Castiel was an interpreter and translator of the king of Cochin. See for details, ANTT, Inquisição de Lisboa, Cadernos do Promotor, Livro20 (Caderno 9), fols. 437v-438; Pedro d'Azevedo, "O Bocarro Francês e os Judeus de Cochim e de Hamburgo", Archivo Histórico Portugués, vol.VII, 1910, pp.186-191; José Alberto Rodrigues da Silva Tavim, "From Setubal to the Sublime Porte," p.120. The Castiel family had been exercising the charge of the Mudaliar since 1570. For details about Samuel Castiel, who was exercising the charge of Mudaliar and was having great influence over the native king, see ANTT, Livros das Monções, No.40, fol.132; No.42, fol.21, the letter of the viceroy pero da Silva sent to the king, dated 25-11-1637.

381. ANTT, Livros das Monções, No.24, fols. 69v-70, letter of the Conde-Almirante sent to the king, dated 24-2-1627; ANTT, Livros das Monções, No.27, fol.156,
letter of the king of Portugal sent to the viceroy of India, dated 6-3-1630; ANTT, Documentos Remetidos da India, Livro 24, fols.69v-70; Sanjay Subrahmanym, "Cochin in Decline", p.83.


383. HAG, Livros das Monções, No.13-A (1629-1630), fol.10, dated 3-1-1630.

384. HAG, Livros das Monções, No.14 (1630-1631), fols.184-185, dated 5-12-1630. This document also suggests that the ship-building industry thrived in native Cochin, as well.

385. Ibid.

386. Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa, No.8, p.100; With the termination of war in the interior regions, the ghat-route commerce got revived and the price of pepper in Cochin marked an increase from 1628 onwards. In that year it rose to 11-4-48 xerafins per quintal, which was the price that prevailed in Cochin before the outbreak of war in the interior regions. João Manuel Teles e Cunha, op cit.,p.456.

387. C.Achyuta Menon, op.cit., p.79.

388. This distance maintained by the local ruler got widened all the more, with the decreasing flow of income from the customs. From 1630's onwards, we hear that the king of Cochin was getting only very little customs revenue from the port, because of the decline of trade. HAG, Livros das Monções, No.14 (1630-1631), fol.29, dated 12-11-1630.

389. C.Achyuta Menon, op.cit., p.79.


391. L.H.Horace Perera, Ceylon under Western Rule, pp.79-80.


393. K.M.Panikkar, Malabar and the Dutch, p.3.


398. Ibid., pp.435-436.

399. Ibid., pp.431-432.

400. El Rey nao deixava vir nada á ella (Cochin city) Ibid.,p.431.
1. Ibid., 432.

2. For details of the agreement, see Ibid., pp.435-439.


4. ANTT, Documentos Remetidos, Livro 50 fol. 110, Livro 56, fols. 27; 212; Sanjay Subrahmanian, "Cochin in Decline," p.82; The assassination of the Regedor mor, the chief officer (which post Samuel Castiel seems to have borne, as well, at the time of his death) of the king of Cochin, created great damage to the relationship between the Portuguese and the native ruler. For details, see AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 15, doc.27, dated 28-11-1643; Caixa 15, doc.52, dated 4-12-1643; Caixa 23, doc.10,26-1-1655.

5. K.M.Panikkar, Malabar and the Portuguese, p.155.

6. For details about the expulsion of the ruling king from the Mutta tavazhi, see AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 23, doc.20, dated 5-2-1655, carta no.15; S.S.Pissurlencar, Assentos do Conselho do Estado, vol.III (1644-1658), Bastora,1955, pp.148-149; 560-561. Some authors say that the Palluruthi prince, who was installed as king with the help of the Portuguese, died about the year 1650 and was succeeded by Rama Varma, the prince adopted from the Chazhur branch. C.Achyuta Menon, op.cit., p.87. There is the possibility that the nephew of the queen, as mentioned in the Portuguese documents, must have been this prince adopted from the Chazhur branch. For the response of other native rulers on this issue see, S.S.Pissurlencar, Assentos do Conselho do Estado, vol.III, pp.149;272.

7. Ibid., pp.560-561.

8. Ibid., pp.149; 198; 367; 577.


10. K.M.Panikkar, Malabar and the Portuguese, p.156; C.Achyuta Menon, op.cit., p.88.


12. The Prince of the Mutta tavazhi contacted the Dutch authorities at Colombo in order to get back the kingdom and to expel the Portuguese from Cochin. It was against these circumstances that the Council of Ceylon decided to send van der Meyden to Malabar. On 12th March 1661, Paliathachan, the traditional chief Ministers of Cochin, signed a treaty with the Dutch to fight against the Portuguese. The Zamorin concluded a treaty with the Dutch by which he agreed that if the Dutch should succeed in setting on the throne of Cochin the Mutta tavazhi prince, then Zamorin and the king of Cochin would bear the whole coast. A Translation of a Record Grandhavari in the State Archives, pp.v-vi; T.I.Poonen, A Survey of the Rise of the Dutch, pp.72; 75; A.Galletti, The Dutch in Malabar, New Delhi, 1984, p.121.


15. Ibid.; AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 25-A, doc.205, dated 14-4-1663; doc.220, dated
11-5-1663.

416. Goda Varma calling himself "irmão da Coroa de Portugal" continued the offensive. For details see, S.S.Pissurilencar, *Assentos do Conselho do Estado*, vol.IV, pp.525-529; 532-533; 566-568.

417. For details, see the table of pepper export given below.


419. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 13, doc.10, dated 8-1-1638.


422. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 20, doc.60, dated 9-11-1648.


428. A.R.Disney, *The Twilight of the Pepper Empire*, pp.84-85;159-160.

429. Ibid., 87.

430. Ibid., 88-93.


432. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 10, doc.90, dated 11-11-1633; HAG, *Livros da Monções*, No.17 (1632-1633), fol.208, dated 16-3-1632; Antonio de Pinho da Costa had served earlier as the captain-General-elect of Mailapore and vedor da Fazenda of Ceylon. Later he was associated with the sending of navetas from Cochin to Lisbon. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Cochin in Decline", p.76.


434. Ibid., p.148.

436. Ibid., pp.164-165; 168.

437. Even during the period of Company trade, crown vessels used to bring pepper to Portugal. A.R.Disney says that the pepper that reached Lisbon in 1632 was shipped on behalf of the crown. Ibid., p.162.

438. BNL, Cod.No.11410, fols.173-178, contract to send *navetas* to Lisbon from Cochin.

439. Ibid., fol.174v.

440. Ibid., p.175v-176.

441. Ibid., fol.174-175.

442. Ibid., fol.173v.

443. Ibid., fol.176.

444. Andre Simois was the captain of this *naveta*, called *Madre de Deus*, which departed from Cochin on 9th January 1628. For details, see AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 22-A, doc.122, fol.15, dated 13-8-1653; see also BNL, Cod. No.11410, fol.91-92, letter of the captain of the *naveta* (of 1629) sent to Philip III, dated 1-6-1630; ANTT, *Documentos Remetidos*, Livro 26, fols.123, 349, 581.

445. BNL, Cod. No.11410, fols.91-92v, Letter of the captain (Francisco Freire de Andrade) of the *naveta* sent to Philip III, dated 1-6-1630.

446. Biblioteca da Ajuda, Cod.51-X-1, fols.120-122, dated 9-12-1631.

447. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Cochin in Decline", p.76; ANTT, *Documentos Remetidos*, Livro 37, fol.247 The Portuguese authorities in India feared that this arrangement would only increase the loss of competent sea-men to the Dutch.


450. AHU, *Caixas da India*, Caixa 13-A, doc.162, fols.1-1v, dated 8-6-1639.


454. Cf.Supra n.283; n.422; n.432; Besides, the details for the total export of pepper from India to Portugal during the period between 1612 and 1634 were taken from A.R.Disney, *Twilight of the Pepper Empire*, p.162.

455. The above-mentioned source is used for this graph.


463. For details, see the cargo-list of 1588 given in F.A. Cod.46.1; Archivo General de Simancas, *Secretarias Provinciales*, libro 1551, fols.213-215; Niels steensgaard, *Carracks, Caravans and Companies*, p.166.


478. By the end of 1580 the annual import of copper to Goa and Cochin from China was 2000-3000 quintals. The Jesuits were actively involved in this copper trade. BNL, Fundo Geral Cd. No. 11410, fols. 123-124; Boletim da Ultramarina Portuguesa, No. 2, p. 298; João Manuel Teles e Cunha, op. cit., pp. 374-376.

479. A.R. Disney, Twilight of the Pepper Empire, p. 103.

480. Ibid., pp. 103-104; 178.

481. Ibid., p. 104.

482. Ibid., pp. 104-105.

483. AHU, Caixas da India, Caixa 10, doc. 10, 6-8-1631.

484. A.R. Disney, Twilight of the Pepper Empire, pp. 104-105.

485. Ibid. p. 105.

486. Ibid.

487. Ibid., p. 106.