IV. CREATIVITY: AN EXISTENTIAL VIEW OF ART (A STUDY OF SARTRE'S AESTHETIC THEORY)
For Sartre, the starting point of all philosophic thought, whether aesthetic or epistemological, is man's "Being". Being is distinguished into two types: Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself. In-itself is the transcendent essence of human existence and hence it is beyond the framework of space and time. It is the image which man keeps of himself, that which he intends to pursue in the course of his life. And so far as it is man's image of himself, it is always the transcendent essence which he tries to reach. Being in-itself is identical with itself, it is the complete and plentiful being as against the for-itself which is perpetually seeking completion. It is

1Catherine Rau has given a brief summary of Sartre's views on aesthetics emanating from his essays, Situation II, and his study of the Psychology of Imagination. Catherine Rau, however has not taken the philosophical views of Sartre that can be derived from his Being and Nothingness, Transcendence of the Ego. See Catherine Rau, "The Aesthetic Views of Jean-Paul Sartre", Jour. of Aesthetics & Art Criticism, Vol. IX (1950-51).

2"The in-itself is full of itself, and no more total plenitude can be imagined, no more perfect equivalence of content to container. There is not the slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which nothingness might slip in." J-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans., Hazel Barnes (N.Y. 1956), p. 74.
the negative aspect of being, negating its own essence and at the same time seeking to pursue its essence. In order to reach its essence it is for-ever trying to fulfil itself and so far as it is in the process of fulfilment it can never be complete. For it will then cease to be the for-itself and submerge into the In-itself.

For-itself is marked by an inherent dialectic — it is constantly trying to be what it is not and consequently negating what it already is. This perpetually transcending For-itself is the human consciousness which through its choice of itself is projecting itself towards an essence. The state of consciousness always implies a thing of which one is conscious of and thus it presupposes a transcendence towards something. Consciousness here is reaching beyond itself towards that which it is conscious of and therefore it is essentially in a state of flight from itself. Being-in-itself, on the other hand has no connection with anything extraneous to it. It is complete in itself and absolutely positive, there is not a fraction of negation in it. Therefore, the distinction between 'within' and 'without' is meaningless for the in-itself; it is, as Sartre would call it, the 'solid being'; it is what it is. Here there is no gulf between what it is and what it intends to be; for being itself is the fulfilled and completed aspect of man's being. It must be marked here that this dual aspect
of being is meaningful only in the context of man; for-itself and in-itself are the two aspects of man's being - his perpetually evanescent consciousness and his essence respectively. The in-itself in the context of man's life would be his past so far it is dead and inert, beyond his control. Or his future so far as it is reflected in his image of himself. Being-in-itself is pure and untainted being, while the for-itself is the nothingness - it can never be classified and defined because it is in a constant flux.

Being and Nothingness, though opposed to each other, are at the same time, interrelated. It is only through Being that Nothingness arises, yet Nothingness denies Being. Coming out of Being and being a flight from Being, Nothingness is also a pursuit of Being in the sense it looks towards Being as a goal to be reached. This immense gap between Being and Nothingness does perpetually remain, because in so far as Being is pure affirmation and Nothingness negation, they can never be submerged into one another. Nothingness is the peculiarity of human existence, and existence in this sense is different from bare survival. Man's consciousness which makes him a project for himself is what marks his existence. Existence cannot be defined because man first exists and then makes any definitions of existence possible.
'One does not find, one does not disclose nothingness, in the manner in which one can find, disclose a being. Nothingness is always an elsewhere. It is the obligation for the for-itself never to exist except in the form of an elsewhere in relation to itself, to exist as a being which perpetually effects in itself a break in being... Thus nothingness is the hole of being, this fall of the in-itself towards the self, the fall by which the for-itself is constituted. But this nothingness can only "be made-to-be" if its borrowed existence is correlative with a nihilating act on the part of being. This perpetual act by which the in-itself degenerates into presence to itself we shall call an ontological act. Nothingness is the putting into question of being by being — that is, precisely consciousness or for-itself*. It is an absolute event which comes to being by means of being and which without having being, is perpetually sustained by being. Since being-in-itself is isolated in its being by its total positivity no being can produce being and nothing can happen to being through being — except for nothingness. Nothingness is the peculiar possibility of being and its unique possibility. Yet this original possibility appears only in the absolute act which realizes it. Since nothingness is nothingness of being, it can come to being only through being itself. Of course it comes to being through a particular being, which is human reality. But this being is constituted as human reality inasmuch as this being is nothing but the original project of its own nothingness. Human reality is being in so far as within its being and for its being it is the unique foundation of nothingness at the heart of being.'3

This above quoted long passage which attempts to explain the relation between being and nothingness appears to be extremely confusing because of the incessant use

*Here it seems there is a misprint, instead of for-itself it is printed for-self.

3Ibid., pp. 78-79.
of terms "being" and "nothingness" and the varied meanings attached to them. In simpler words the passage in question has the following implications:—

a) Being and Nothingness are not entities but two dimensions of man's life — Being refers to that aspect which is identical with itself. It can be man's physical existence, the physiological aspect of man which can be dissected and defined in terms of definite physiological organs, their operations and functions. It can also be man's past which is beyond change. Thus being refers to that which is complete and categorizable about man. Thus the human reality combines in itself both being and nothingness.

b) Nothingness is the denial of any completion, it is a lack and points to incessant change.

c) Nothingness depends on Being for its existence. Unless man's physical being is there, his consciousness cannot arise. And it is this consciousness of man which negates the plentitude of Being for it transcends itself. It points towards the fulfilled Being which it desires to be and constantly tries to catch this essence which it desires to make of itself. In this process of transcendence, it is reduced to flux and thus creates a lack in itself between that which it is and that which it wants to be — its projected essence. This is the peculiar nature of Nothingness: it arises as the very denial of plentitude.
and Being and self-identity and yet it is seeking to be a plentitude.

Since the in-itself is complete and fulfilled being, and it has no relation to anything external, it is in other words a windowless monad and thus it cannot have any relation to the world. The world on the other hand is nothing but a construct of what is seen of the externality through the for-itself. Thus world cannot be a static totality of things, since it is a resultant of the intentionality of human consciousness. This, however, does not imply that Sartre is an epistemological idealist. He does believe in the independent existence of the external world apart from the human mind. Yet at the same time if this external world has to have any significance and meaning, it must be in terms of the human consciousness that is projecting itself towards it. Man looks towards the world with reference to his possibilities and desires. And thus

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"As for the world - i.e., the totality of beings as they exist within the compass of the circuit of self-ness - this can be only what human reality surpasses toward itself.... Without the world there is no self-ness, no person; without selfness, without the person, there is no world.... It would be absurd to say that the world as it is known is known as mine. Yet this quality of "my-ness" in the world is a fugitive structure, always present, a structure which I live. The world(is) mine because it is haunted by possibles, and the consciousness of each of these is a possible self-consciousness which I am; it is these possibles as such which give the world its unity and its meaning as the world." _Ibid_, p. 104.
the world ceases to be a totality of objects and things, complete and fulfilled like the In-itself and becomes linked with man's intention. But this in no way implies that the existence of the external world depends on man's consciousness. Sartre takes for granted the independent existence of the external world -- he is an epistemological realist, but he at the same time holds that 'my world' as I look at it is born out of 'my' free and conscious intention. We shall see in the course of this chapter that this peculiar freedom is reflected in all human action, for to act is to consciously choose a certain alternative.

Furthermore, since consciousness always implies the positing of an object, it varies according to the manner in which the object is posited. There are three types of consciousness: perceptual, conceptual and imaginative. The imaginative consciousness posits its object in a different manner from that of a perceptual consciousness.5

5 "Every consciousness posits its object, but each does so in its own way. Perception, for instance, posits its object as existing. The image also includes an act of belief, or a positional act. This act can assume four forms and no more: it can posit the object as non-existent, or as absent, or as existing elsewhere; it can also "neutralize" itself, that is, not posit its object as existing. Two of these acts are negations; the fourth corresponds to a suspension or neutralization of the proposition. The third, which is positive, assumes an implicit negation of the actual and present existence of the object .... The positional act is constitutive of the consciousness of the image." J-P. Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination. (New York, 1948), p. 16.
consciousness is dependent upon the existence of the object perceived, while the imaginative consciousness implies the non-existence or absence of the imagined object. Imagination operates on the basis of the negation of that which is here and now. The imaginative act results in the creation of an unreal object. Unreal can be taken as the opposite of the 'real' — of 'what there is' and this is confined by Sartre to the level of man's sensible experience. The structure of imagination is defined as "something which is nothingness in relation to the world and in relation to which the world is nothing." There is a relation of mutual negation between imagination and reality. The imaginative consciousness is only possible with the annihilation of the consciousness of reality (or at least its shutting up for a while).

"... the formation of an imaginative consciousness is accompanied,... by an annihilation of a perceptual consciousness and vice versa. As long as I am looking at this table I cannot form an image of Peter; but if the unreal Peter arises before me all of a sudden, the table which is before my eyes disappears, leaves the scene."  

Objects of the external world share a common space-time reference frame. The space and time do not merely

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6 Ibid., p. 271.
7 Ibid., p. 171.
8 "All real existence occurs with present, past and future structures, therefore past and future as essential structures of the real, are also real,..." Ibid., p. 264.
refer to the objects and events present here and now but they refer to past and future too. In this sense the memory images of the past events and anticipations of the future are different from the temporal relations that form an imaginary object. The 'imaginary object' has its own space and time which begins and ends with the imaginative act of visualizing this object, apart from that they have no parallel with the space and time that govern the external world. The imaginary objects as opposed to the objects in the external world are marked by their unreality.

"... the object as an image is an unreality. It is no doubt present, but, at the same time, it is out of reach." 10

Therefore, the attitude towards an unreal object is different from that towards the real. The attitude of consciousness determines the difference between reality and unreality. 11 There is no pre-established dualism... every unreal object carrying its own time and space occurs without any solidarity with any other object... it has no environment, it is independent, isolated -- through lack and not through excess; it acts on nothing and nothing acts on it; it is without consequence in the full sense of the term." Ibid., p. 193.

10 Ibid., pp. 177-78.

11 "There is not a world of images and a world of objects. Every object, whether it is present as an external perception or appears to intimate sense, can function as a present reality or as an image, depending on what center of reference has been chosen. The two worlds, real and imaginary, are composed of the same objects: only the grouping and interpretation of these objects varies. What defines the imaginary world and also the world of the real is an attitude of consciousness." Ibid., p. 27.
between the imaginary and the real, the distinction is marked by the particular intention of consciousness. The same object can be visualized as an image or as a reality. Clarifying the meaning of 'unreality', Sartre gives the example of his friend Peter whom he desires to see. This desire causes the image of Peter to appear.

"We do not mean to say that Peter himself is unreal. The imaginative intentions that grasp him are equally real. Nor is it to be assumed that there are two Peters, the real one and the unreal one who is the correlative of my actual consciousness. The only Peter I know and envision is the real one, who really lives in that real room in Paris. But he does not appear to me here. He is not in the room where I am writing. He appears to me in his real room, in the room in which he really is. There is but one Peter and he is precisely the one who is not there; not to be there is his essential quality: in a moment Peter occurs to me as being in D Street, that is, as being absent. And this absence of Peter, that which I see directly, which constitutes the essential structure of my image, is precisely a nuance that colours the image completely, and it is this we call his unreality." 12

"Imaginary object" is therefore a term (used for convenience) to denote the consciousness of object as an image. It does not imply any parallelism between the real and imaginary. Image being the product of the act of consciousness which visualizes an absent or non-existent object, is a mental analogy to the visualized object. There are two types of images—images which are created through the rearrangement of the perceived objects and

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those which are created from the 'mental world' of feelings and emotions. In the mental image there is no objective content because it does not have any externalized analogue, while the images that borrow material from the external world employ this material as their sensory residue. This residue is analogous to the image; therefore, when presented before the beholder it helps him to recreate the same image. The painted canvas, the musical score are examples of such material or 'sensible residues'. The images with the sensible residue stand midway between the mental images on the one hand and perceptual consciousness on the other. The sketch is a material thing so far as it is a sheet of paper with ink-marks on it and it is perceived like any other object. Yet it is not an object, for apart from the intentionality of the observer to conjure these ink-marks into a coherent human form it is nothing. This is known as the phenomenon of quasi-observation: implying that what one perceives in an image is given by one's knowledge. Sartre gives the example of an actress who is imitating Maurice Chivalier, she can be seen to be doing so only by that spectator who is acquainted with Maurice Chivalier.

\[13\]...when the truly imaginative consciousness wanes, there remains a sensible residue which is describable; namely the painted canvas or the spot on the wall. In repeating certain movements or in permitting the lines and the colours of the painting to act upon us, we could at least reconstruct "the analogue"... from this sensible residue, and do so without actually forming the imaginative consciousness over again.' Ibid., p. 76.
For only then can he transcend the physical appearance
of the actress and conjure through her physical being,
the image of Maurice Chivalier. Therefore, the image is
not identical with its material analogue. It transcends
the material analogue through which it emerges. Thus the
laying of pigments on the canvas is not a painting, nor
the totality of printed sheets a novel. The painted forms
are not identical with the colour-patches. Any attempts
to brighten the canvas do not brighten the painting. This
perpetual transcendence from the given holds true about
every image that employs a sensory analogue; whether the
sensory analogue is visual or auditory, it is irrelevant
and this is what marks its unreality. The actor who enact
the role of Hamlet transplants himself into the character
of the Prince of Denmark and thus makes himself unreal.

<sup>1</sup> When I see Maurice Chevalier the perception
involves a certain affective reaction. This feeling
projects on the physiognomy of Maurice Chevalier a certain
indefinable quality which we might call his "meaning". In
the consciousness of imitation this affective reaction is
awakened by the intentioned knowledge and becomes incorpo­
rated into the intentional synthesis from the very
beginning of the signs and the intuitive realization. The
affective sense of Chevalier's face will appear correlatively
on the face of Franconay. It is this affective meaning
which brings about the synthetic union of the various signs,
which animates their frozen barrenness, which gives them
life and a certain density... it is in fact this object
as an image that we see on the body of the impersonator:
the signs united by an affective meaning, that is, the
expressive something. That is the first time, but not the
last, that we see feeling supplant the real intuitive
elements of perception in order to realize the object as
"It is not the character who becomes real in the actor, it is the actor who becomes unreal in his character."\textsuperscript{15}

What holds in the case of the actor holds in the case of the audience too; the latter transcends the perceptual consciousness and visualizes the image of Hamlet which represents itself through the actor.

The problem which now requires examination is the nature of the art-object. From the preceding discussion of images, it is evident that the artistic creations are not objects in the sense in which we talk of objects and things in the external world. Like the things in the external world they do not belong to the spatio-temporal framework of the common sense. Therefore art-object, using the term object in a wider sense, refers to a class which has the following characteristics:

a) Art-objects are images with a sensory residue;

b) organic unity;

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 278.

Similar to this is the relation between the artist and his creation. Cf. one of the remarks from the notebooks of Antoine Roquentin where he writes about Monsieur de Rollebon — the character around whom his book is centered. He says, "Monsieur de Rollebon was my partner: he needed me in order to be and I needed him in order not to feel my being.... His task was to perform. He stood in front of me and had taken possession of my life in order to perform his life for me. I no longer noticed that I existed, I no longer existed in myself, but in him;... each of my movements had its significance outside, there, just in front of me, in him...."

c) transcendence from the given towards a realm of unreality; and
d) imaginary feelings.

Taking these characteristics one by one, the first and foremost is the sensory character of the artistic creation. The painter constructs a sensory analogue for his image and this helps the spectator to reconstruct that image from this sensory symbolism. The sensory analogue is created by all arts, though it varies according to the particular medium; the painter uses colours and lines while the musician sounds and the dancer his bodily movements. What is common to all these is the construction of a sensory form analogous to the mental image.

Each element in this sensory object is organically related to the other, thus the art-object represents itself as an organic whole which cannot be dissected.

Another distinguishing characteristic of the art-object is its perpetual transcendence from its material analogue. The art-object is not identical with its

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16 That which is real, we must not fail to note, are the results of the brush strokes, the stickiness of the canvas, its grain, the polish spread over the colors. But all this does not constitute the object of esthetic appreciation. What is "beautiful" is something which cannot be experienced as a perception and which, by its very nature, is out of the world. We have just shown that it cannot be brightened, for instance, by projecting a light beam on the canvas: it is the canvas that is brightened and not the painting... the aim of the artist was to construct a whole of real colors which enable this unreal to manifest itself. The painting should then be conceived as a material
material medium through which it emerges. The latter merely acts as a stimulant to evoke the unreal.

Further, the art-object is unreal; forming in itself its own space and time relations which cannot be reconciled with the common sense world of every day events. Leonardo's Mona Lisa which occupies a certain amount of space in the museum and Beethoven's musical works when played in a concert do take a certain amount of time; but the space and time relations which form these two art works are not the space and time of every day life. The time of the musical symphony starts unfolding from its first movement to its final end and it has no concern with the 'actual' time at which it started. The same applies to the sequence of events in a novel or a drama, it has no relation with the events of the external world. Art objects therefore, are autonomous, they cannot be assimilated in the objects of the real world (the concept of reality here implies that which is given of the world through the perceptual consciousness).

It has been seen that art is unreal. Why then does man create art? This is the question which immediately arises in this context. All creative activity according

thing visited from time to time (every time that the spectator assumes the imaginative attitude) by an unreal which is precisely the painted object." Ibid., p. 275.
to Sartre derives its impetus from Being-for-others. Art is an expression-language (the term 'language' here is taken in a wider sense and does not merely refer to verbal-language) that reveals the others. Without language there cannot be any awareness possible — awareness of oneself as well as the others. Therefore, language becomes valuable as a means of revealing the other in his essential freedom. Thus, "One of the chief motives of artistic creation is certainly the need of feeling that we are essential in relationship to the world." The artist does not create merely for himself; at the basis of all art-activity remains a hypothetical audience to whom the artist is communicating. The very attempt to concretize his image in terms of a sensuous form implies that the artist has (directly or indirectly) in mind a beholder of his creation.


18 "Thus, it is not true that one writes for one-self. That would be the worst blow.... The creative act is only an incomplete and abstract moment in the production of a work. If the author existed alone he would be able to write as much as he liked; the work as object would never see the light of day and he would either have to put down his pen or despair. But the operation of writing implies that of reading as its dialectical correlative and these two connected acts necessitate two distinct agents. It is the joint effort of author and reader which brings upon the scene that concrete and imaginary object which is the work of the mind. There is no art except for and by others." Ibid., pp. 29-30.
The art-work emerges as the result of the collaboration between the artist and the audience. The artist embodies his image in terms of an art-object and this created object in itself is a nothingness unless the 'other' collaborates. The spectator too is a creator, though his creation is a directed creation — directed by the artist. Left to themselves all art-works are dead signs, it is the spectator, (as directed by the artist) that gives them their meaning. Thus the art-work lives only in its communicability. The artist makes an appeal to the audience for the recognition of freedom. The work of art, therefore, exists only in so far the audience responds to it. It is a potentiality which is actualized by the imaginative collaboration of the artist and the audience.

However, this being-for-others is fundamentally a way of affirming one's freedom. For man attains his freedom only through others; to talk about the freedom of Robinson

19 "To write is to make an appeal to the reader that he lead into objective existence the revelation which I have undertaken by means of language.... As the sufficient reason for the appearance of the aesthetic object is never found either in the book (where we find merely solicitations to produce the object) or in the author's mind, and as his subjectivity, which he cannot get away from, cannot give a reason for the act of leading into objectivity, the appearance of a work of art is a new event which cannot be explained by anterior data.... Thus, the writer appeals to the reader's freedom to collaborate in the production of his work." Ibid., p. 32.
Cruse is meaningless. One cannot conceive of freedom in isolation from others, it is only the others that make one realize one's freedom. Freedom, according to Sartre, is a constant possibility to negate — to deny any external compulsion. Thus freedom is essentially related to choice and action. To be free does not guarantee the successful execution of all one's plans, sometimes it is difficult to control the external situations, but what can be controlled is the attitude towards these situations. Freedom on the one hand refers to an attitude of the conscious mind. It is on the other a commitment — it is to own the responsibility of one's choice, it is a perpetual transcendence towards a desired project. Thus man is free because he appears as a lack: always on the move to fulfill and actualize himself.

"Human-reality is free because it is not enough.... The being which is what it is cannot be free. Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made-to-be at the heart of man and which forces human-reality to make itself instead of to be... For human reality, to be is to choose oneself; nothing comes to it either from the outside or from within which it can receive or accept."20

This freedom which appears as the freedom to negate is the pre-requisite of all artistic creativity. Fundamentally the imaginative act is a denial of the being-in-the-midst-of-the-world. This characteristic freedom of man

results in the creation of an unreal object. The artist through his freedom transcends the reality and creates and lives in an unreal world. The word 'transcendence' does not have any metaphysical implications — it does not indicate a transcendental realm. For we have seen that without this peculiar denial of the real — of the here and now, there cannot be any imaginary creation possible.\textsuperscript{21} "... and this going-beyond is freedom itself since it could not happen if consciousness were not free."\textsuperscript{22}

Art activity, therefore, presupposes the negation of the real, yet at the same time for a consciousness to negate the real, it is essential for it to be in the midst of reality. For, this negation of the real is not arbitrary, it is an intentional negation — it has a certain viewpoint behind it. Further, an image depends on reality for the negation of reality itself, because unless there is real there is no unreal possible — no imagination can be possible without perception. This shows that there is a parallelism

\textsuperscript{21}... all creation of the imaginary would be completely impossible to a consciousness whose nature it would be precisely to be "in-the-midst-of-the-world".\textsuperscript{1}(p.266).

"To be able to imagine, it is enough that consciousness be able to surpass the real in constituting it as a world, since the negating of the real is implied by its constitution in the world." (p. 288).

See J-P. Sartre, \textit{The Psychology of Imagination}. \textsuperscript{22}

between the relation of artist and the world; and Being and Nothingness: the artist, being amidst a real world creates an unreal object; Nothingness, arising out of Being, yet at the same time negates Being. This negation of Being which is the peculiar contribution of the imaginative consciousness is possible only for a being who is inherently nothing — the perpetually evanescent for-itself.

"The unreal is produced outside of the world by a consciousness which stays in the world and it is because he is transcendently free that man can imagine." 23

And yet this transcendence of the real is precisely the means for involving oneself with the world. It is only through one's freedom that man involves himself with the others — it is a circular process, the others make me what 'I' am and vice versa.

This relation between the 'I' and the 'Other' in art-activity brings us to the analysis of aesthetic appreciation. The art-object being unreal, the attitude towards it is different from that towards the real. Art-object evokes imaginary feeling, 24 for the spectator is

23Ibid., p. 271.

24"One certainly creates the aesthetic object with feelings; if it is touching, it appears through our tears; if it is comic, it will be recognized by laughter. However, these feelings are of a particular kind. They have their origin in freedom; they are loaned. The belief which I accord the tale is freely assented to... the characteristic of aesthetic consciousness is to be a belief by means of..."
constantly aware that he is confronting an unreal landscape (in case of painting) or a set of unreal situations. Thus, the appreciation of art is born out of the mutual commitment between the artist and the audience. This intentional choice of an unreal object (for the purpose of convenience we will call it an object) is accompanied by a particular type of a pleasure. This pleasure, which Sartre calls the aesthetic joy, is not the pleasure that follows the fulfilment of desire, here again it is unreal. The artist and the spectator in their mutual commitment transcend all practical and pragmatic purpose which can be associated with the art object. Thus the art-work evokes a joy which has no ulterior purpose — it is an end in itself. The artist and the audience 'distance' themselves from their particular prejudices and therein lies their essential 'generosity'. Therefore, we find that the aesthetic response is a detached response — detached from any extra-aesthetic significance either of unreal and practical or of any private and personal kind. As compared to the responses towards every day life situations, it is a passive response. This passivity emanates from its essential unreality. Passivity does not imply that the spectator when confronted by the art-work is dead to it but unlike the events of every day life, events on the stage do not directly impel

commitment, by oath, a belief sustained by fidelity to one's self and to the author, a perpetually renewed choice to believe." J-P. Sartre, What is Literature? p. 35.
him to action.

The above analysis of the aesthetic response is not merely descriptive, it is also representative of an ideal norm: the attitude which ideally is said to accompany artistic creation and appreciation. It is analogous to human freedom — man is a free being and the right thing for him to do is to realize his freedom, thus the freedom to be realized becomes an imperative. This, however, does not imply that Sartre too, like Kant, is building up a priori and universal norms in ethics and aesthetics. He is primarily analysing the nature of human consciousness, its peculiar role of transcendence into the unreal which results into the creation and appreciation of art. Any imperative in order to be valuable must emanate from the freedom and consciousness of man. The aesthetic attitude is not conceived by Sartre like a goal which must be reached by practising artists and critics, but it is the result of man's consciousness transcending the real into the realm of unreality. The moment of artistic creation is marked by an enjoyment and visualization for the sake of the unreal itself. Thus it is free from any extra-aesthetic involvement. This shows that Sartre is only attempting to give a phenomenological explanation of the aesthetic consciousness, he is not aiming to construct any norms for aesthetic evaluation and appreciation.