Let us try to summarize briefly the main conclusions that emerge from the present study. Since the central concept of this study is aesthetic meaning, the principal conclusions centre around it. Recapitulating what has already been said in different parts of this dissertation, it will be clear that the present discussion involves two types of conclusions. The first set of conclusions stems out of the observations made on the history of aesthetics in the Introduction; and the exposition and comparative assessment of these four thinkers in Sections One and Two. These conclusions pave the way for a more direct discussion of aesthetic meaning in the opening chapter of Section Three. For the purpose of clarity, the conclusions of Section Three can be further subdivided in two. First are those conclusions which emerge from our discussion of aesthetic meaning in Chapter VIII and the second may be regarded as some further derivations from the first. These derivations have been formulated in Chapters IX and X.

We have all along regarded aesthetic meaning as the use of art-symbols; knowing the particular use would go hand in hand with knowing the art-symbol itself.¹ And this has

¹Once again I may refer to Wittgenstein in this context. Referring to the game of chess he says: "This is the king" (or "This is called the 'king'") are a definition only if the
been the objective of Sections One and Two. With the help of an exposition of these four theories, an attempt is made to reveal the nature of art-symbol from varied angles.

A glance at the history of aesthetics and these four theories has made it evident that an analysis of aesthetic meaning must be couched in the autonomy and uniqueness of art-symbols. The theories of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and other aestheticians before Burke and Kant in the history of aesthetics; and Freud and Spengler amongst these four thinkers, go to show what a denial of aesthetic autonomy is like. Freud never looked upon the aesthetic as independent — independent in spite of being related to other activities of the human mind. And thus he ignored the most essential feature of art works — their structural and formal character. That is why he read art-symbols only as ciphers, unfolding the enigmatic messages of the unconscious. That these 'ciphers' have any formal character which makes them what they are, was not recognised by Freud. The revelation of this wholly unexplored aspect of the human psyche does lend a new dimension to the decoding of art-symbols, but it certainly cannot be stressed at the expense of the formal

learner already 'knows what a piece in a game is'. That is, if he has already played other games, or has watched other people playing 'and understood' — and similar things.... We may say: only someone who already knows how to do some-thing with it can significantly ask a name. L. Wittgenstein, op. cit., No. 31, p. 15e.
structure of art works. It will be like ignoring the here and now in 'pursuit of an essence (be it in terms of psychological categories like the Death instinct and the Eros, or metaphysical constructs like the prime-symbol or the Absolute Idea, an essence is an essence), the existence of which can neither be completely denied nor verified. Thus we are left with a complete uncertainty.

Furthermore, communicating and manifesting the unconscious can be one "use" of art-symbols, but surely it is not the only one. This oversimplification cannot do justice to the multiple dimensions of art-symbols. Thus, Freud neither develops an objectively demonstrable theory of creativity, nor does he give any satisfactory analysis of the art object. He ignores the latter in quest of the former, but ultimately both the process and the product seem to slip out of his hands.

Similar has been the case with Spengler. He too, like Freud, reads into art-symbols, a meaning which is not directly given through their structural configurations themselves. Thus he looks upon art works not as art works but as manifestations of cultural prime-symbols. This is another attempt at creating a philosophical myth. Reading the history of aesthetics, it becomes quite evident that pinning down the aesthetic with some supersensible metaphysical substrate will not take us anywhere. Therefore, in any
systems like those of Spengler or Hegel, one ignores the evident for the unknowable. And consequently, the notion of aesthetic meaning developed by such thinkers is extremely one-sided. Thus it becomes clear that for any understanding of aesthetic meaning what we need first to do is to examine the nature of art work; specify as far as possible, the process of its coming into being; the determinable conditions of its communicability and lastly; the possible criterion of its evaluation.

Regarding the process of creativity, it becomes clear from the exposition of the views of these four thinkers that art is born out of the desire for symbolic transformation—to project a coherent 'world-image' in terms of a sensuous medium (be it a mentally conceived medium only, as Croce has held). The causes behind this desire for symbolic behaviour have been variedly analysed. Sometimes as a desire to conquer the world—fear; as a communication of inhibited desires; as a conscious commitment to fulfil oneself against the impending mortality; and lastly as a desire to liberate the human spirit from any extraneous compulsions.

The analysis of the creative process goes to show the importance of the imaginative activity and its irreconciliability with the cognitive and the moral domains. Thinking the formal aspect (the medium, its composition and design) of art works as the most important, since it is this which prima facie distinguishes art from non-artistic phenomena, I
have sided with the theories of Croce and Sartre in this context. Sartre has very ingeniously analysed the negation of the real and a sojourn into the unreal through the imaginative consciousness. Thus advocating the inherent freedom of the imaginative consciousness from the perceptual and the conceptual. Croce further affirms the autonomy of the human imagination in the creation of art by making the aesthetic independent of the intellectual, useful and the moral. In spite of being similar to the logical (as both follow the principle of consistency), it is the logical which follows the aesthetic and not the reverse which has all along been stressed in the history of aesthetics.

This supremacy of the imagination in the creation of art works, goes to show that in their appreciation, they elicit a specific type of a response from the spectator. This has been first marked by Kant as the so called detachment and disinterestedness of the aesthetic consciousness. Thus, no communication of art symbols is possible unless this disinterested enjoyment of art-symbols is practised. Since this detachment is necessary for the revival of the art work through the imaginative participation of the spectator, it is one of the necessary prerequisites of all aesthetic evaluation. Therefore, like the creative imagination which is marked by its freedom from the utilitarian, moral and the intellectual, the evaluation of art is also a free activity. It liberates the human mind from any extraneous compulsions.
Denying the possibility of any a priori norms of aesthetic evaluation, it has been marked that no universal criterion (or criteria) of aesthetic judgement can be evolved. All criteria are contextual — they stem out of the particular art work at hand. And since one art work can be compared with another only if the two involve a similar style and technique, we cannot build up any absolute norm for the comparative grading of art works. Thus, in this context the intuitive universals of Croce and the relatively absolute cultural norms of Spengler are both insufficient to account for the diversities of aesthetic evaluation. For both are unable to leave any scope for the multiple interpretations and evaluations of art works.

Supplementing the observations of these four thinkers with the aforementioned remarks on the creative act and aesthetic evaluation, the art object can be roughly said to be constitutive of the following characteristic features:

a) Symbolic character.
b) Sensuous structure or form — having no necessary connection with objects in the external world.
c) Organic unity of elements with grades of relevance.
d) Freedom from moral and intellectual norms.
e) Disposition of creating an emotive effect upon the spectator.
The above mentioned observations regarding the various facets of the art object have a direct bearing upon the subsequent analysis of art-symbols and the aesthetic meaning in Chapter VIII.

The supremacy of the creative imagination and its freedom from extra-aesthetic interests in the appreciation and enjoyment of art works, shows the irrelevance of the moral, pragmatic and cognitive interests in the decoding of art-symbols. Thus it makes art-symbols peculiarly different from prescriptions on the one hand, and propositions involving cognitive information on the other. Even the most representative art work cannot be treated on the level of statements describing reality. For, in spite of its attempted isomorphism with objects in the external world, an art work creates a total atmosphere of unreality and abstraction and thus the criteria of real existence do not apply to it.

Furthermore, the formal structure and its organic unity makes art-symbols different from propositions involving discursive knowledge in yet another way. The uniqueness of their form and their organic unity of elements make them recalcitrant to any translating and paraphrasing into statements with synonymous propositional content. For synonymity is difficult to conceive in all art-symbols, even in those of literature which otherwise share with ordinary language its syntax.
Another important factor besides the structural peculiarities of art-symbols, which makes them untranslatable is their emotive character. We have already seen that art objects evoke and express emotions. Thus, verbal and pictorial symbols are not used referentially but as dominantly emotive symbols — thriving upon the cultural or iconic symbols, they tend to evoke emotions in the beholder. Here again I have sided with the views of Croce and Sartre regarding the status of emotions in artistic communication. Unlike Freud who treats art as a mechanism for the surcharge of inhibited emotions, Sartre and Croce have aptly shown that emotions are expressed and embodied rather then vented through art works. Thus it follows that art-symbols cannot be treated as interjections and emotive exclamations. The evocation and expression of emotion is extremely sophisticated and subtle in the case of art-symbols. For, what they embody is only a semblance of the lived emotion and not the replica of life situations. This stems directly from the basic unreality of art works which has been highlighted by Schiller, Sartre and Langer. Referring to literary works, Sartre has very ingeniously shown how feelings embodied in art works are not the attributes of art objects themselves, but feelings "loaned" by the reader to the art work in the course of his confrontation with the art object. This supports Sartre's belief in the nothingness of an art work — emerging out of the negation of the real by the imaginative
consciousness, it manifests only a potentiality which has to be fulfilled by the spectator. Thus the emotions in art works are unreal and are animated only when the spectator participates.

Keeping in view the multiple usages of art-symbols which vary from referential to cultural, iconic and overall emotive usages, the need has been felt for an open notion of meaning: a notion of meaning such as would account for the diverse dimensions of art-symbols and thus, not look for an essential criterion of significance of art-symbols. Thus the present discussion has followed the lines of analysis provided by Wittgenstein. The slogan "Don't look for the meaning, look for the use", is a product of this desire to keep oneself open minded and not search for empty universals. Thus it has been contended that meaning of an art work is not an entity or an attribute of the art object but the use of art symbols. And since the use of the term "use" is highly varied, what binds these varied uses together is not any Platonic universal but only family resemblances.

This analysis of aesthetic meaning has given rise to two sets of problems, viz. the status of uniqueness of art symbols and the status of aesthetic concepts.

Speaking for the untranslatability of art symbols we have advocated their uniqueness. Thus, following Gellner's analysis we have denied the possibility of making any U-type
judgements in the domain of art. However, this uniqueness of art-symbols does not make them into windowless monads, privately and uniquely uncommunicable like the neurotic's phantasies. In spite of their formal uniqueness, all art-symbols have a dispositional universality. This dispositional universality implies a potentiality of art objects to evoke a uniform response from all spectators. To the extent that art-symbols are expressive of an intention, and are not the products of disjointed musings of a day-dreamer or a neurotic, they do unfold with themselves the conditions of their interpretation and communication. In other words, if the elements of an art work are not arbitrary and there are some rules behind this fabrication of symbols, then these rules would always have the potentiality to be universally understood and followed.

It has been maintained in the course of the present work that vagueness of the boundaries of art-symbols make it possible for them to be interpreted in multiple ways. The criterion of internal consistency of elements which marks a superior interpretation from an inferior one, does not limit the possibility of having alternative interpretations. I have argued in this context that in spite of the possibility of diverse interpretations, if the use of art-symbols in a given context be clarified, it will be possible to distinguish between one interpretation and another. And it will also be possible to communicate
universally the particular rules of interpretation. However, the evaluative terms employed in the interpretation of one art work cannot be applicable to others. This has been demonstrated with the help of two poems, Kilmer's "Trees" and Blake's "The Tyger". Thus, it is evident that all rules of interpretation of art have only a contextual significance. But once again it must be remembered that contextual does not mean arbitrary. In spite of being valid in a certain context, we can still universalize a given interpretation if we specify the particular usage of art-symbol in a certain context. Perhaps we can say that if a given context holds and the structure of an art-symbol being a certain specific form, then this would be its interpretation. A further confusion arises because even within the context of a single art work, the rules are not always spelled out very clearly either by the creative artist himself or the critic. This, together with the inherent ambiguity of art-symbols, is what causes multiple interpretations to come into being.

This peculiarity of art symbols has an import upon the nature of aesthetic concepts. Since all interpretation of art-symbols has only a paradigmatic significance, aesthetic concepts are not determinable by non-aesthetic ones. Furthermore, the vagueness of the evaluative concepts of aesthetics makes it impossible to define them univocally. Thus, it has been demonstrated that the term "art" has no
necessary and _sufficient_ properties which can determine its essence. What we find common in all these varied usages are only family resemblances. Thus, keeping in view what has been said about aesthetic concepts, it is evident that one important role of aesthetics is to show how the word "art" is used and to do this the family resemblances between the various arts must be analysed. This implies that in order to make criticism more systematic, the evaluative propositions in aesthetics must stem out of a close connection with elementary statements descriptive of the properties of the material artifact. However, it has been seen that the evaluative concepts in aesthetics cannot be defined in terms of empirical categories. Thus result the the multiple interpretations of a single art work. And here the intention of the artist seems relevant. But again it is difficult to decide as to where and when and to what degree the intention of the artist can help in evaluation and interpretation of art works. Here it seems that problems would be more clear if the status and usage of evaluative concepts in aesthetics is analysed in greater detail. Thus, in order to be more definite in its objectives, aesthetics must be more self conscious and aware of its own ambiguities and confusions.