CHAPTER III

GOD ( ISVAPA )

God as a Postulate.

We are in a world which is distinctly regulated and differentiated by names and forms. We observe in everyday experience that some persons perform ritual deeds with a view that their near and dear ones may enjoy their fruits; consequently some are enjoyers while others are agents. Some objects are created in different places at different times by different causes. Similarly people are differently circumstanced. Some are happy, others are miserable. Those who are happy do not always remain so. The rhythmic movements of heavenly bodies, the beauties of hill and dale, of birds and beasts testify to the fact that the universe is neither inert nor dead.

The nature of the design even of a single body cannot be conceived by a human mind, remote indeed is the possibility of conceiving the design of the entire universe. This arrangement of the world cannot be justified until and unless an omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent creator of it is assumed. So we have every reason to postulate a cause of this universe which (cause) being material as well as efficient may fit in with the nature of its effect i.e. the universe. The scripture declares that the cause of the world is omniscient and that is Iswara.
Now what is the characteristic nature of the supreme Lord, is a disputed question having a different answer in different schools of advaita. Before we deal with it, it is essential to give a brief account of Isvara which is acceptable almost to all the sections of advaita.

According to the advaita system of Indian philosophy the Upanisads teach that whatever is in reality one; there truly exists only one universal being called Brahman. This being is of an absolutely homogeneous nature. This pure Brahman becomes the cause of the origination, sustenance and dissolution of the phenomenal world when it is associated with a power named Maya. The empirical reality draws its existence from Brahman associated with Maya. The objects of empirical existence have Maya located in the highest self for their material cause. If we wish to call attention to the doctrine that Seiki (power) and Sekkimai (Possessor of power) are non-different or identical or Seiki belongs to Brahman, we may say that the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is associated with Maya. In this latter way Brahman is more properly called Isvara.

The majority of the advaitins are of the view that the Maya transforms itself into the form of the mundane world, so Maya is the source of the physical world. But this source being inert cannot act by itself. It depends upon intelligence for its very existence. In strictness, the two elements, pure intelligence and Maya should together be reckoned as giving rise to the world, in accordance with adhika-vajnyaya. Maya is the potency, Seiki, inherent in Isvara through which he manifests the objective world with all the diversity of names and forms.
He at the same time sees through the diversity. He never misses its underlying unity as we, the individual souls do. This universe emerging from Isvara is not outside Isvara but within him, nevertheless this potency Sakti (Maya) exerts its influence in such a way that the sense of 'the other' (Bheda) takes its place. It gives rise to a distinction where in reality there is none. This is the view of Vasempati who says that Maya is not the source of the Universe but is a mere accessory to Isvara in bringing it into existence out of himself. Vasempati is the founder of Advacheeda view; the conception of God according to this view has a unique position in advaita and we shall deal with it in detail under the head of 'God in Advacheeda view'. The function of the obscuring power of Avidya is to obscure the unity of Being; but this unity is never concealed from Isvara, so Maya in its Awareness aspect is stated to be powerless over him. Nature does not hide the spirit from him. Herein lies the difference between Isvara and Jiva. God identifies himself with the whole world. This identification is not based on the erroneous knowledge or confusion (Athyajnanamimitta) between the self and the not self as it is in the case of an individual soul, but is the out come of the continual realisation of the true nature of both, that is, matter and spirit.

This realisation of the two different entities in the system of Advaita is the ground which constitutes the nature of the Lord. The Brahman which is a homogeneous mass of object less thought transcending all the attributes becomes God only through its
association with the Anirvacaniya (undefinable) principle of Maya. Strictly speaking, we can say that God in this system is something unreal like an individual soul. This is why the Vedantic thinkers did not permit ‘One God’ to dominate the world and men’s affairs in the world. This fact has been amply evidenced by the supervised passages treating of the qualified Brahman, where in an individual soul is instructed to perform Samadhi or Advaita meditation. Thus both Isvara and Jiva are equally empirical.

Isvara is illusory, phenomenal and unreal and shares the nature of becoming only. In consequence of this Isvara is designated the lower (Apara) Brahman to distinguish him from the higher (Pra). Isvara is a combination or blend of Brahman and Maya which constitutes the source of the world and becomes what is known as qualified Brahman, comprehending all the diversity of experience, including the experience of selves. Thus Brahman mingled with Maya descends to the phenomenal level. The distinction between Jiva and Isvara is entirely one of adjuncts. The consequence of this distinction is that God remains untouched by any of the evil consequences of association with finite adjuncts, such as narrow love and hate. It is attachment which implies preferences and exclusions. But God is attached to all because he is detached from all. This is called detachment is attachment. Thus God is represented as the creator of this world and Maya is deemed to be his accessory. In this form, he becomes the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe, and is sometimes spoken of as the great magician who brings forth out of himself all the phenomena of this universe.

1. Fundamental Problems in Indian Philosophy, by C. Raman Raja, B.S. Lal Banaras Press, Delhi, 1960, P. 51.
2. Veda Sanyasali, P. 51.
The comparison with a magician is indicative of the fact that he is in no way deluded by this phenomenal world as others are, for there is in his case a constant realization of the real character of this universe. Thus the evil does not touch him, but the real is the Absolute not the qualified Brahma or Isvara. The conceptions of God are like stepping stones for weak persons to reach the ultimate reality in the system of advaita. Such a conception of God shows that changelessness and inactivity on the part of Isvara are impossible. It is because Isvara is a principle mediating between Brahma and the world. Being one with Brahma he is related to the world. Isvara has Maya or Prakriti as his body and this Maya has various modifications due to the activities of the living beings. Creation and dissolution of the universe indicate that God is subject to change, contraction, expansion and time. Isvara (imperishable) namely, undeveloped entity (Mayakta) which represents the animal potentiality of names and forms, contains the fine parts of material elements, abides in the Lord and forms his limiting adjuncts.

God thus is subject to limitation and is metaphysically identical with Brahma. He is still all powerfull, all pervading and all-knowing. He dwells within all the empirical objects, rules
the entire aggregate of the created beings inclusive of the gods and so on. These qualities can be reconciled with God, if the Lord be endowed with superior limiting adjuncts. So the Lord is assumed to have super-excellent limiting adjuncts and the individual souls have inferior adjuncts. The superiority and inferiority of adjuncts is attributed to the circumstance that God is an object of nescience while the individual souls are the loci of nescience. God being an object of ignorance cannot be engrossed by nescience, while individual souls being loci of ignorance are awayed by nescience. This is the view of those who are the adherents of Avaccheda doctrine. Ignorance is ever free from avidya and his limitation can not affect his knowledge. Maya is subject to God so it cannot veil his nature. According to the reflection theory the reflection of pure intelligence in Maya, where in pure Sattva dominates, is designated as the supreme Lord. So it can neither conceal the essential nature of the Lord nor can produce an internal organ. Being under the sway of the Lord Maya assists him in the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the universe.

From what precedes it is quite clear that God is in possession of an indefinable power, called Maya, which serves as an adjunct to Isvara and is a limitation to Him. In reflection theory that power is taken to be the material cause of the world and in limitation theory that power is merely an accessory to God.
The author of Tattvavadana is of the view that in the
Vivekana school of Advaita the material cause of this world is
only that form of Brahman which is designated as Lord, characterised
as omniscient and associated with Maya. The author of Vivekana
and his commentators take their stand on scriptural statement that
this entire universe comprising sentient and insentient beings,
has for its material cause the principle which knows things in
their generality as well as particularity. This type of omniscience
is possible if intelligence associated with Maya is assumed to be
the material cause of the world. Intelligence devoid of all
qualities cannot give rise to the multiplicity of phenomena.
Sankara commenting on V.S. asserts that God, being the material
cause of all can safely be the self of all. From this it is quite
clear that intelligence i.e. Atma cit, being the locus of
Maya, which is the material cause of the world is designated
as Abhinavamittapadana (the material as well as the efficient
cause) of the universe.

The characteristics of God as intimated in scripture and
established by Sankara and his commentators are that he knows
all, he is the self of all and he is the source of all actions,
desires, odours, flavours and the like. These characteristic marks
can in no way be reconciled with an individual soul, so it
appears that the individual soul is not desired to be the cause
of the world, then there is no need to assign those qualities to
God which the individual soul is devoid of, because intelligence,
It is to be noted in this connection that according to the followers of the Viverana school Bhimacaitanya (intelligence characterised as Bhima) called prototype intelligence is the Lord, and when we say that the Lord is the material cause of the world, it means that Maya (an upadi of God) does not act as a qualifying adjunct. This is the view of Viverana and Sankaspassesariraka according to Ajarya Dikshit in his Siddhantaleasesagaraha.

In Viverana we meet with three different views about the nature of the causality of Brahman associated with Maya who is designated as the Lord. (1) Brahman and Maya together constitute the world like to strings, which twisted together constitute a rope. In this view Brahman and Maya have equal importance (Sampradanya). The second view is that Brahman possessed of Maya is the cause. In this view Brahman is superior to Maya in the causation of the world. The third view is that Brahman, being the a eve of the world, Maya which transforms itself into the form of this universe, is the Vivera cause of the world. In this view Adhisthitisata is taken to be the Upadat. The majority believe the

3. Nyayainakaranda, p. 163.
the author of Vivarana himself holds the third view.\footnote{1}

God as material cause in the view of those who maintain the difference between Maya and Vidyā.\footnote{2}

Appayadiksaite mentions a school of advaita which asserts that there is difference between Maya and Vidyā. This school firmly opines that the Lord Simbescaitanya being the locus of Maya, which has transformed itself into the form of this universe is alone the material cause (Vivarta-upadana) of this universe comprising the earth, ether and the like, but as for the internal organs (Manas, Citta,shankara and Buddhi) which are composite of two elements, gross and subtle, the vivartopadana is not only the Lord but the individual soul also. This is because the subtle elements, wherefrom the internal organs spring up, are the transformations of nescience located in Jīva. Thus the jīva also can be formed as vivartopadana of the subtle bodies of the embodied selves. This view has the approval of scriptural passages, which declare that at the time of release, when the nescience ceases to be, the subtle elements are put to an end and the gross elements which along with the subtle elements constitute the internal organs are dissolved into Maya that rests on the Lord and cannot be removed by the dawn of true knowledge.

Thus this school of reflective theory opines that Maya residing in the Lord and modifying itself into the gross elements cannot be removed by the realization of the true nature of Brahman

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Vivarana, P.907.
\item[2.] S.L.S., P.81.
\item[3.] Pra. Up., VI-5, and see Mund, III-2-7.
\end{itemize}
but it is avidya that being the material of subtle bodies and residing in the jiva, draws to an end. In this way it is asserted that the individual souls and the Lord have an equal share in the production of the subtle bodies.

This view is a compromise between Sankhya and Advaita. Here Maya is given the position of Prakriti. The only distinction between Maya and Avidya, according to this school, is that the cessation of Maya depends on God, who at the time of Sarvanukti recollects that Maya with all its effects has nothing to do, and resolving thus, reabsorbs Maya in his own self for ever; Avidya residing in the individual souls disappears at the dawn of the true knowledge of Brahman.

1 Isvara is the material cause of the world exclusive of the inner organs.

In the previous view Maya was given the position of Prakriti and the distinction between Maya and Avidya was based upon the difference of their loci. This indicates that the Sankhyas and some of the advaitins tried to meet each other halfway. This was not to the liking of some other advaitins, as Appayya states. That is why they diverged from that view to some extent and held that God cannot be the material cause (Vivarta-upadana) of the internal organs, because the Lord is not the abode of nescience modifying itself into the form of internal organs. These advaitins maintain that nescience is located in the jiva so jiva alone is the Vivarta-upadana (the material cause) of the subtle body.

2 Isvara not cause of the inner organs.

Among those who maintain that there is no difference between Maya and Avidya, some say that though of the universe the Lord is the material cause, yet of the internal organ etc. the jiva alone is the material cause, because of the cognition of their identity
with the jiva; hence it is that in the Bhava Sankara himself has declared that the inner organs are superimposed upon jiva alone. Vivevana also supports this view with remarks that the cognition of identity is due to superimposition of one thing upon another (the base Adhisthana) so Adhisthana is the Vivarta-pedana of that which is superimposed upon it.

Criticism of this view:

This view does not stand to reason, because material causality of the jiva in respect of internal organs has not been defined logically. It is alleged in this view that the substratum (Adhisthana) is the material cause of that which is superimposed upon it (Adhisthana) on the ground that there is the cognition of the identity of the superimposed with the substratum. In this view Adhisthana means Upadesa. The critic, according to Appaya, urges against this view that intelligence cannot be an Adhisthana of superimposition unless it be the location of nescience which has to transform itself into the form of the superimposition. Thus Brahman alone is the material cause of the entire empirical world because it is the location of the nescience which modifies itself into this universe. Similarly the jiva is the material cause of the merely apparent dream world. It has been established as the final conclusion by the Bhavyakara.

2. Vivevana, P.975.
3. S.Ind., P.86.
4. Ind. I, P.865.
5. Bhattachari, P.475.
world consisting of the earth, water, light, air, ether, mind etc. The view is founded on a passage of \textit{Mund} and is supported by arguments in \textit{Sankara's commentary} upon \textit{V.S.} There is an objection raised against the material causality of Brahman in regard to the world. The world cannot be regarded as a modification of Brahman as curd is of milk because in that case there will be the occurrence of the entire Brahman's modification, which is contrary to the advaita, or else it would hurt the theory of Brahman's being not made up of parts, if partial modification of Brahman be assumed. Hence Brahman is deemed to be the \textit{Vivarte-upadana} of this world like the jiva who sees the world of dreams which he posited in himself without the distraction of his own nature.

The nature of God in Reflection theory:

\textit{Prajakartha-Vivekara} holds that \textit{Iswara} is a reflection of intelligence in \textit{Maya}. \textit{Maya} is beginningless, beyond description and the source of the inorganic world. \textit{Maya} is different from \textit{Prakriti} the fiction of the \textit{Sankhya}, because it cannot be regarded as either different from Brahman or non-different. It is neither existent, nor non-existent. It is neither with parts nor without parts, thus \textit{Maya} is undefinable.

\textit{Vidyaanya} too, like the author of \textit{Prakashartha}, regards God as a reflection of cit. But there are differences between the two, too. According to \textit{Vidyaanya Prakriti} has two aspects, \textit{Maya} and \textit{Avidya}. In \textit{Maya} it is 'Sativa' which predominates and the other two qualities of \textit{Prakriti}, namely \textit{rajas} and \textit{tasma} are

1. \textit{Mund. II:1-3}
2. \textit{B.:S.Bh. II:1-16.}
3. \textit{Ibid., IL:1-28}
4. \textit{Prakashartha, PP.3,4.}
subjugated thereby. God is the reflection of cit in this Maya whose projective energy holds down rajas and tamas. That is why the Lord is not subject to the obscurative power of tamas and the disturbing power of rajas.

Servajna also is a follower of the reflection theory but in his view there is no difference between Maya and Avidya. The reflection of cit in Maya is termed as God and the reflection of cit in the products of Maya, namely internal organs and the like is designated as an individual soul. God is not prototype intelligence, but a reflection. He distinguishes jiva from God by Krama-upadhi on the part of God and Krama-upadhi on the part of jiva.

We see in the sixth ch. of Pancaadashi a different definition of God. Vidyaranya distinctly declares that there is a difference between Rūpa and Pratibimba, and Pratibimba is illusory or false. Giving four aspects of cit in contact with the adjuncts he defines God as the reflection of intelligence in nescience located in pure intelligence and tinged with the gross inner organs i.e. Antahkarana in a state of waking and dream and the impressions of intellects of all beings i.e. Antahkarana in a state of deep sleep. He compares God to the reflection of ether in the particles of water that constitute the cloud. Maya is like a cloud and the impressions of intellects of all beings are like the particles of water present in the cloud, and the reflection of intelligence is like the reflection of the sky in the water particles.

2. S.Sherirska III.145.
This is the conception of Isvara, namely Isvara is the reflection of intelligence in the impressions of intellect of all beings.

Vidyaranya says that under the three cosmic forms the self is of three aspects, called Isvara, Hiranyagarbha and Virat. Intelligence, qualified by Maya is Isvara and is the material and efficient cause of the world. Isvara is compared to a bleached canvas stiffened with starch. He is the substratum of the world creation. The subtle cosmic form of the self is Atman or Hiranyagarbha. All the jivas put together constitute His nature, and He is conscious of the internal organs of all the jivas. The universe remains in Him in a subtle or dim form, just as in twilight the universe seems to be immersed. In this state the universe is indistinct. The form is compared to a canvas stiffened with starch and marked with lines. This form of Lord is conditioned with the subtle bodies, products of non-quintuplicated elements. Just as the grains shoot their sprouts so the Lord in the form of Hiranyagarbha attains the tender stage of the sprout, He is the seminal form of this universe. In the form of Virat we have the universe in the manifest stage. Like unto a canvas filled in with paint, or the seed-grains which have borne their fruits, Virat is the gross form of the universe. Purusa Sukta is descriptive of Virat as the cosmic form. The virat self, the form of Isvara is conditioned by the collective gross body, the product of the quintuplicated elements. Thus there are the four states even of the single supreme self.

1. Ibid., VII, 200-3. See also Ved. San., p.19.
These are the differences in the views of those advaitins who hold that the supreme Lord (Iswara) is the reflection of intelligence in Maya.

1. Iswara the prototype of reflection:

The adherents of the reflection theory (pratibimbavada) are divided into two camps. They differ from each other on the nature of reflection and subsequently on the nature of avidya, God and jiva. Prakatatthakarasa, Vidyaranya and Advaita Vidyasayya being the followers of reflection theory admit that the primal ignorance (prakriti) has two forms, Maya and Avidya. The reflection of cit in Maya is the Lord and that in Avidya— the different parts of Maya possessing numerous projective and obscurative powers—is the individual soul. The reflection of cit in Maya or Avidya, according to these is as illusory and false as necere-silver. As avidyas are many the reflections of cit in numerous avidyas, the media of reflection, are many. Thus there are numerous individual souls. The conception of God according to this section has been expounded in the previous section. Now we shall deal with the conception of God according to the other section of advaitins who have propounded the reflection theory and distinguish them from each other according to Appayadiksa.

Prakatatthakara and Prakatatman, the chief exponents of the reflection theory, assert that the supreme Lord is the prototype intelligence (Bhacacaiti) and not the reflected one. The school of reflection theory takes its stand on a concomitance of

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1. S.L.C., p.318 see also Kr.Va., pp.130-33.
2. Ibid., p.101
3. Ibid., p.486.
4. V.P.S., pp.95-98.
Visnupurana which means that when nescience, which is only one and is the bearer of the difference between jiva and Brahman, absolutely draws to an end at the dawn of true knowledge the difference between Brahman and jiva cannot emerge because its material cause (Avidya) has been destroyed absolutely. This destruction of ignorance takes place at the time of release and not in the state of jivanmukti. The author of Vivarana maintains that God can never be assumed to be the reflection of chit in Avidya or Maya because avidya being single cannot give rise to the different reflections of one and the same intelligence. If God be a reflection of cit in avidya, then there will not be any difference between God and jiva, because jiva too is a reflection of cit in avidya. Avidya according to Prakasatanman, cannot be regarded as having two different forms requisite for two types of reflection, so that there should be a difference between jiva and Isvara. It is contrary to the system of advaita to assume that Maya and avidya are essentially different. In sruti texts wherein Indra is said to take on many forms through Mayas, the plural form is intelligible either on the view of the diverse capacities present in Maya or on the view of the gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas present in the Maya.

The term 'Abhasa' used in scripture to denote the supreme Lord, indicates that the prototype intelligence (Sambasaitanya)

3. R.Veda VI.LXVII
5. Mr.Up., 9.
too is imaginary like the reflected one because it is character-
ised as prototype (Simba). This characterisation of the pure
intelligence is false and erroneous. The difference between
Simba and Pratibimba is that the reflection is affected by the
qualities of the medium of reflection, while the Simba is free
from them. Thus there is one nescience, which is the condition
of the difference between jiva and the Lord. The difference
between jiva and the Lord is through their being reflection and
the prototype respectively. Both of them cannot be reflections
in the absence of different adjuncts. Reducing Isvara too to a
reflection, as did trakarakthakara and Vidyaranya, would make
him as helpless as the jiva. In Isvara helpless like a jiva can-
not control the jives. One reflection cannot control the other.
Therefore, only when Isvara is considered to be the prototype
and jiva to be the reflection, the freedom of the Lord and
dependence of the jiva on Him stand to reason. In Kalpataru the
case has been illustrated by the analogy of reflection and
prototype in ordinary experience. Just as a person (the prototype)
plays with the changes, such as straight, crooked etc., occurring
in his own face reflected in the mirror while he himself is free
from all of them, in the same way the Lord plays with the changes
in the jiva. The analogy illustrates the freedom to be the proto-
type.

Moreover, Isvara's creative activity is mere sport because

1. Kalpa taru - P.482.
2. S.L.C., P.132
God has no unfulfilled desire left, so His activity has no reference to any extraneous purpose, but proceeds from mere sportfulness or we may say that the activity of the Lord proceeds from His own nature, that is *ātma* joined with time and *karma*.

The sportfulness and fulfillment of the desires of God shows that He is not helpless and affected by the qualities of *ātma*, the medium of reflection, as a jīva is in every day life. Thus the author of *Vivekāna* does not agree with the view that both God and jīva are reflections.

An individual soul according to *Vivekāna* school of reflection theory, is the reflection of cit in avidya, which is one and all-pervasive, and thus there is only one jīva. For the jīva that is a reflection in nescience and has avidya for his adjunct, the internal organ, which is a transformation of ignorance, is the place of distinctive manifestation as the different mirrors are for the light of the sun which is one and pervasive.

Isevra according to the doctrine of *Avacchada*:

According to this view the pure unlimited and all-pervasive intelligence is Brahman, intelligence defined or conditioned by different adjuncts are the jīvas. What then is the position of god? *Ananda* Bodha in his *Nyayamakaranda* states a view according to which Brahman is the locus of *ātma*. This school

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1. B.S.S. Bh. IL1-33.
recognises a single Maya or nescience which has numerous parts. Brahman as defined by Maya in its totality is termed as Isvara, as defined by many parts of Maya, it appears as Jives, as undefined it is Brahman. The problem of Isvara becomes more acute on this view. If we can solve the problem of God by assuming numerous parts of Maya, then we might as well assume a plurality of Mayas or nesciences. But according to this version of the Avaccheda view the conception of God is not adequate. Brahman is Isvara only when it is defined by Maya or the parts of Maya. Brahman when defined by the parts of Maya taken collectively is called Isvara. Then the same Brahman is defined by the parts of Maya taken individually it assumes the forms of so many jives. It does not mean that Brahman assumes now the form of Isvara and again that of jives. It is simply a change of viewpoint which turns Brahman now into jive and now into God. This means that Isvara is a name for jives taken collectively just as a forest is a name for trees taken collectively. Isvara will bear the same relation to the individual soul as society or humanity does to the individual man. Such a conception of God is not adequate. The serious defect of this type of Avaccheda doctrine is that Isvara thus conceived can hardly enjoy the same position as the God of religion. It is because the collective soul can, no doubt, command to some extent loyalty even as society and humanity do but it can command little of religious awe and adoration. If the collective soul, which is assumed to be God in this view is more than the individual soul then God has to be transcendent, and the transcendence lies in a marked difference of quality. The difference of quality or the superiority of God, namely the transcendence is not identical with the state of omnipresence but is something more which is
not possible in a collective soul.

There is another view of Advocated which gives Isvara a better position than that of a collective soul. The view that nescience are many and they are located in the jives, seems to be more suitable. Mandana is the originator of this view and Vasapati Mira followed him faithfully. Vasapati Mira established this view with strong arguments. The assertion of this school of Advocated is that nescience has Brahman for its object and jive as its loci. Isvara or Brahman cannot be treated as the locus of nescience since in that case their eternal perfection will be affected.

Then we say that ignorance is in Brahman it does not mean that ignorance belongs to Brahman. It belongs to jives, and since jives are many, so a plurality of nesciences also is assumed. The doctrine of a single avidya with many saktis may justify the plurality of jives, yet there is room for an objection namely that a sakti of avidya is destroyed when a particular jive is released; though this is not to say that avidya itself is destroyed (this implying the simultaneous release of all jives) it is yet difficult to see how a sakti can be destroyed without affecting the possessor of the sakti, namely avidya, for sakti and its possessor are fundamentally non-different. From this point of view it is simpler to assume a multiplicity of nesciences, one of these being destroyed on the release of each jive.

2. Dr.'Nidhi p.10, see also Shankha Pena's commentary upon it.
4. C. C. Subbaraya's Introduction to Siddhant
The object of all the nescience of jives is Isvara. It
means in other words that in the case of Brahman as pure
intelligence there is no question of attributes like omniscience,
 omnipresence being affected. It is the jiva who suffers from
his finitude and feels the lack of these perfections. These
perfections really belong to his essential nature, because
otherwise he would never know of their non-existence, since
non-existence of a thing is apprehended by the non-cognition
(Anapala-bddhi) of the thing. The non-cognition (Anupala-bddhi) must
be competent. The competency of the non-cognition is the like-
lihood of the existence of that thing whose non-existence is
apprehended by the non-cognition. Then an individual soul feels
the absence of those perfections, like omniscience etc. he
transcends his apparent finitude. His non-realization of the
perfections is due to his ignorance. This ignorance belongs to
him as jiva, it relates to the perfections which he lacks and
which he considers as embodied elsewhere. The embodiment of
these perfections is Isvara who is thus the content of the nescience
as contrasted with the jiva who is only the locus of it. The
loci of these nesciences are the different jives and the object
of nesciences in all cases is the same Isvara. Every nescience
has two poles (ends); at one end there is Isvara and at the other
there is a particular jiva. At the dawn of the true knowledge
of the self a jiva realises the perfection about which there
was ignorance. Then a jiva merges into Isvara. The Isvara-jiva
polarity persists as long as even a single nescience exists. The
jiva that has attained the status of Isvara is not identical

1. V.Pari. P.279.
2. S.K.jayasimha-gana Shastri's introduction its English
translalion of S.L.G. P.
with Brahman. The final merger with Brahman will take place
only when the Isvara-jiva polarity will disappear by the ultimate
destruction of all nesciences. The view that the release of the
individual soul prior to the release of all souls (Samavakati)
is to be defined as the attainment of the status of Isvara
accords with the Advaita theory of Vasaspati Misra.

God's immensity lies in his being the ruler within all the
beings. God is the inspirer of all the activities and knowledge
of embodied selves. The essential nature of a jiva is that his
energies are the fragments of the energies of God. But at the
same time Jiva is ignorant of the Lord. In this case the ruler
within and the Lord are deemed to be identical.

God is more than any jiva or all the jivas put together,
or all the nesciences taken together. He is the wielder, while the
jivas are not the controllers of the nesciences which are located
in them, but are under their sway.

Thus the doctrine of Advaita is more in conformity with
the essentials of our conceptions of God. The conception of God
in accordance with the doctrine of reflection is somewhat
defective and so carries little appeal. This view holds Isvara
to be a reflection of intelligence in Maya, while the jivas are
the reflections of Brahman in Avidya. In Maya pure Sattva is
predominant and in Avidya impure Sattva is dominant. Such an
account is defective in two ways. Isvara has been reduced to a
reflection, so He is not more than a jiva. Thus God will be as
helpless as a jiva. Such an Isvara can hardly control the jivas

2. Br. Up. III-7-1, 2.
for every day experience does not support the contention that reflection in the form of God can control another reflection in the form of jivas. God cannot sympathise with and help jivas. This theory may be popular but the assumption that Iswara too is a reflection is subject to criticism. Seeing this the author of Vivarana holds that Iswara is not reflection, but a Himasaitya (prototype-intelligence).

A variety of the reflection theory is Abhasevada. The Abhase is considered to be wholly illusory, while reflection according to some is real, being identical with the prototype. This is the distinction between the two theories.

In the commentary on Siddhanta in which it has been stated that a face when seen in a mirror is a reflected face, while the redness of a Japa flower in a crystal, when it is in justa position with the Japa flower is called Parisamabhasa. The adjunct, in the case of semblence theory (Abhasevada) gives an outward appearance of the qualities alone of a thing which is placed before it, while the adjunct in the case of reflection, manifests a substance, qualified by the attributes, within itself as if it were the other. According to the semblence view the reflection is similar to the disc but different from it and unreal in the sense that it has no existence of its own but only appears temporarily like a mirage on account of the justa position of another object with the substance.

In the view of Abhase the self conditioned by ignorance and hence identified with it, is because of non-discrimination from the appearance (Abhase) of the intelligence that is himself, called the internal ruler, the witness, as well as Iswara the

\[\text{1. } \text{Minäh } F. 46.\]
cause of the world. The same self when it is conditioned by the intellect, who has come to be identified with it, is because of non-discrimination of the appearance (Abhava) therein of the intelligence that is Himself, called the jiva the agent, the enjoyor and the cogniser. This is the view of the author of \textit{Vartika}.\footnote{\textit{Pitaka}, and \textit{Brahma-nanda's commentary}. P. 117.}

\textbf{Witness Self}

It has been stated again and again by the scriptures and established unanimously by the founders of the different schools of \textit{advaita}, that the jiva is a composite of subject and object, self and non-self, reality and appearance. It is a composite entity comprising two different elements, the pure self (Sakshin) and the active, enjoying individual (Kartr). So in each individual self there are two entities, viz. the cognitive, emotional and conative experience and the witness self or Sakshin. The internal consciousness, which is truth or reality and is self-luminous, is called Sakshin. The internal organ serves as its limiting adjunct. It illumines objects. Everything is illuminated by the Sakshin directly or indirectly i.e., through internal and external organs, while Sakshin itself is self-luminous. The self-luminosity constitutes its reality. It is never the object of a knowing act but is pure immediacy and is directly with us. Self luminosity of Sakshin thus means the capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness without in any way being an object of consciousness. All the objects of

\footnote{B. S. B. on \textit{Advaya}.}
\footnote{Dr. Up. \textit{III. IV. 1}.}
consciousness have a quality namely, knowability, which may or may not be present in them, or may be present at one time and absent at another. It means that an object is dependent on some other entity which produces it or manifests it. Difference of consciousness from an object lies in the fact that it does not depend on anything for its manifestation, but manifests all other things. If consciousness should require another consciousness to manifest it, then that might again require another, and that another, and so on ad infinitum.

The witness self is not an object of knowledge, because it cannot be grasped by any means of knowledge. It has been shown that the self is not an object of consciousness. It cannot, therefore, be made an object of perception. Perception has two types of objects, external and internal. The self is not an external object, so cannot come in contact with the internal sense organs. Nor it is an internal object because in that case it should not be different from cognition, will, feeling etc. which are mental states. These are objective to consciousness and are illuminated by it. So the self-evident self cannot be regarded as an object of perception. Again the self cannot be an object of inference. It cannot be said that cognition etc. presuppose an entity to which they belong and it is this inferred entity that is called self; for if that were the case then no one would be able to distinguish his own self from that of others. For if the self is only an entity which has to be presupposed as the possessor of cognition will etc. then how can one cognize one's own cognition of thing as differing from that of others? So the self is self-evident and endures through all the mental states like will, feeling, cognition etc. and witnesses the appearance

1. Dr. Vidy. P.33.
and disappearance of all these mental states. No one calls in
question the reality of his own self, because it is of itself
manifested along with all states of knowledge.\footnote{1}

From what precedes it is clear that the self is real and
is not dependent on anything else for its manifestation, and so
is self-luminous. This self assumes the form of Saksin when the
limiting adjuncts i.e. gross and subtle bodies are not related
to it, namely, the self qualified per accidents by the internal
organ is termed as witness self. Bharramaja distinguishing an
Upadhi (qualification) from a Visesana (qualifying entity)
defines Upadhi as a qualification which being present in a
substance distinguishes it, without being syntactically related
to it, so the relation of the internal organ to a witness self
is that of an upadhi to the Upahita. Thus a Saksin can be spoken
of as a jive viewed in its true character - not as one with or
even as related to any of its adjuncts, but as aloof from all
of them. It is thus pure consciousness, the seeing light
(Drik-prakasa) and is virtually the same as Brahman. He may des-
cribe it as the transcendental ego to distinguish it from the
jive or the empirical ego.

\section*{Saksin is different from jive and Isvara}

\section*{( The view of Vidyaranya)}

Now what is the relation between Saksin and the jive?
It is a question which has been answered variously in the later

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{1}{Ibid., P.34.}
\item \footnote{2}{Ved. Puri, P.88.}
\end{itemize}
In the Kitaabta Dipa the eighth chapter of Kancadesa the witness self has been defined as the immutable intelligence which is the substrate of two bodies, the gross and the subtle. In every day experience too, the character of being a witness is well known to consist in being indifferent and yet observant. According to Vidyaranya the existence of the Saksa is patent from the fact that with the suspension of the activity of the empirical self in the interval between two thoughts, it is the Saksa that illuminates the subtle and gross physical sheaths. In ordinary life it has been observed that when our internal organs and external sense organs are active we are conscious of these two bodies viz. we feel affected by the qualities like pleasure and pain belonging to subtle and gross bodies, and the like, but in the interval between two mental states we are likewise conscious of the two kinds of bodies which are present to us as our associates. This consciousness is due to the witness-self because in these intervals the enjoying ego ceases to function. It is due to the witness self alone that individuation etc. (Hankarasaadi) being always in conjunction with the manifestation are not the sphere of doubt. No body doubts about his own existence. The constant presence of the witness self helps to maintain the identity of the seer in a series of mental ideas with respect to things other than the ego.

1. S. Dashi. VIII.3.
3. Ibid., P.136.
4. Ibid., P.238.
From this it is quite clear that Vydeharmya is of the firm opinion that the witness self is quite other than the individual soul, because the individual soul participates in life and its affairs while the Saksin keeps aloof from them. How it can be urged against this view that the Saksin being different from the jiva, he cannot recollect the Saksin being different from the jiva, he cannot recollect and thus participate in the experience of pleasure and pain to which the jiva is subject but the witness self recollects them. How is it possible while the jiva is other than Saksin? The reply to this is that through their reciprocal superimposition they are identified with each other. Saksin is not external to the jiva as "caitra" and "maitra" are external to each other. This is the relation of jiva to Saksin. 1 Their difference lies in the fact that while the witness self is a Himbe (image) conditioned or limited by the adjuncts, the jiva is reflected form of that (Himbe) affected by the qualities which really belong to the adjuncts. This distinction between jiva and Saksin has been confirmed by experience as well as by scripture. 2 A person participating in life and affairs and enjoying the fruits of his actions cannot be said to be a mere spectator and to be aloof from worldly activities. The Upanisad says that the jiva and Saksin are like two birds seated on one tree subtle body. Of these the jiva tastes the bitter-sweet fruits of action while the Saksin looks on unMOVED. 4

In Nataka-Dipa the example of the lamp in the theatre has been used to illustrate the difference of the Saksin from the jiva

2. Ibid., p.236.
3. V. Up., VI.2.
4. Ibid., VI.6.
5. F. Tashi X.10,12 & 14.
just as a lamp in the theatre illumines without distinction the master, the audience, and the actress, and shines of itself even in their absence, so the Saksin illumines equally the Jiva, the inner organ and the objects and shines of its own accord in sound sleep where all these are absent. The witness self, thus distinguished from Jiva by means of its passivity is not one with Isvara because the Lord is active in creating and governing this empirical world, and because Isvara is beyond the range of perception (Vesoksa) while Saksin is always witnessing the intellect, mind etc. and thus is constantly in immediate contact with Jiva.

1. The view of Citakha:

Citakha, too, is of the opinion that the witness self is the interior self of all the creatures and is the substratum of all the individual souls, which have their essence in the reflection of pure intelligence in the internal organs, and which is devoid of the qualities of being a Jiva, Isvara and the like. This Brahman assumes the form of Saksin since it seems to be identical with the individual souls which have it (Brahman) for their base (Ardthensa) and hence are erroneously superimposed upon it. In consequence of this mutual superimposition it seems to be as many as the jives. In the state of Brahman's being a Saksin the internal organs serve the purpose of mere limiting conditions.

Thus Citakha and Vijayaraya are unanimous in this view, and both of them are the followers of reflection theory as propounded by Vijayara School of Advaita.

The view of Ramanuja:

(The witness self is a special form of Isvara)

Ramanuja Asvarya's view about Sakina is different from that of Vidyaranya and Citsukha. He taking his stand upon a scriptural passage, states in his Vedanta Ramundi that the witness self is a particular form of the supreme Lord. He knows continuously the activity and cessation from activity of the individual souls, and is not moved by them in any way. He (the supreme Lord) is proximate (Antaranga) and immediate (Aparoksha) to the individual soul, and manifests the internal organs with all its attributes such as pleasure, pain, ignorance and the like. In sound sleep when there is quiescence of the gross and subtle bodies with all their organs, it is he (Sakina) who manifests the ignorance present in the jiva and is called Sakina. Now there arises a question that witness, as the knower of jiva's ignorance etc. is proximate, while the Lord, the omniscient, omnipotent cause of the world, it remote from the jiva. How then can the Lord be the witness? The answer is that the witness is not the Lord, but a particular mode of the Lord, in which mode there are no such attributes as creating and sustaining the world. It has been ascertained in the section dealing with sound sleep (Samupati) and departure from this life (Utkranti) that he, who is different from the jiva in the state of deep sleep and departure, is the supreme Lord. Ramanuja confirms this view by adducing satisfactory evidence from scripture.

1. S.L. S., P.344.
4. B.S. S.Bh. L3.42.
The view of Tattvasuddhi:

Jnanagahanapada agrees with author of Kaumudi with respect to the above view and confirms it by the illustration of nacre-silver. He says that in the delusion 'This is silver' the 'this' though apparently identical with the illusory silver does not really belong to silver, because it is not sublated (Badihita) along with the illusory silver which is erroneously superimposed upon nacre. The 'this' does not belong to sakti either, because in that case it would follow that like sakti it too, should be unknown. Similarly the witness self though, in reality it is one with the supreme Lord, yet in appearance it seems to be non-different from jiva because jiva is superimposed upon it. Thus being an Adhisthana (locus) of the jiva it serves the empirical purpose of jiva's happiness and the like.

All the instances of delusion supply evidence for the fact that delusion necessarily presupposes the cognition of the general characteristic of the Adhisthana upon which the illusory thing is to be superimposed. It is the precise knowledge of the Adhisthana which dispels the illusory object, so in the form of the witness self we have an indistinct notion of the highest self, the Adhisthana of the empirical phenomena. Krmananda holds that what is meant by the author of Tattvasuddhi is that the witness self is not of the constitution of Brahma but is of the nature of Isvara, because in the stage of this jagat the Adhisthana is in an unprecisely known state.

These are the views of those advaitins who hold that there is a lot of difference between jiva and sakshi. They also maintain

that the jivas are numerous and the witness self is one within a second. According to their doctrine Saksin being one and the same assumes apparently different forms when it is conditioned by different individual souls.

Seksin is the nescience conditioned Jiva:

Now there is a section of Advaitins as stated by Appaya Nisita in his S.L. Sengraha, and Vidyaranya in the Vivaranam Pranaya Sengraha, who do not believe in the multiplicity of the individual souls and consequently do not distinguish jiva from Seksin. They opine that nescience conditioned (vidyopadhiaka) individual soul alone is Seksin, because of its being directly the spectator of the two bodies without being an agent. Their contention is that it is not proper to assume a Seksin to be different from the jiva, because the jiva characterised as a reflection of intelligence in nescience, can be termed as Seksin. The jiva in himself is indifferent and unattached although it is subject to the imposition of agency etc., through getting identified with the internal organ. Now this conception of the jiva is not in accordance with the passage of Svetas Upanishad (VI-II) which intimates that Isvara and Seksin are identical, so the exponents giving a different interpretation of the stanzas remark that the portion of the verse dealing with the Teksin intends to convey the information that Brahman which has been assigned the status of jiva through being reflected in ignorance, is designated as Seksin. Thus there is no difference between jiva and Seksin. Their resort to such a different interpretation is based upon the fact that if Isvara

2. V.P. Sengraha P.74.
is regarded as Sakain then like Sakain Jivara must be immediately approximate (Aparokaṣa) to jive. Otherwise it would be contrary to every day experience and create tradition which confirm the immediately (Aparokaṣa) of Sakain to the jive. But Jivara is as remote to jive as the other individual souls because Jivara is a Śimha caṭayya (prototype intelligence) while jive is the reflection of intelligence in naissance. Thus the followers of this school justify their stand. According to this view a jive has two aspects, one real and the other unreal, that of Sakain or passive spectator and that of active doer and enjoyer.

Sakain is internal organ conditioned jive.

This view too has been stated by Vidyaranya and Appaya Vikṣita and has been assigned to some later adwaitins by their followers. This school agrees with the previous one in so far as the identity of the jive and Sakain is concerned. But they differ from that in the conception of a jive. That jive and Sakain are identical, is agreeable to the both of them.

The identity of the individual soul with the Sakainian stand to reason if jive be assumed to have internal organ as a limiting condition or adjunct. If the all-pervading swidy is to be regarded as the condition of the witnessing jive, then the latter must be able to illumine not only one's own mind but the minds of other creatures also. But this is not confirmed by experience. Therefore, it is proper to hold that the jive with the inner organ, as its condition, is the witness-self and this is different in different individuals. The internal organ exists in the subtle form even in sleep, so the witness conditioned thereby certainly exists even then.

1. S.L., p. 250.
The difference between the empirical ego and the witness self is that, while the internal organ is an attribute or property of the former (jiva) it is only a condition of limitation of the latter (Seksin). According to this view the ultimate consciousness is called Seksin when it operates in an individual self. Tharva Paja maintains that the eternal consciousness is called Jiva-Seksin when it operates in the individual organism, and it is called Isvara-Seksin when it operates in the universe as a whole.

The distinction between a limiting condition (Upadhi) and an attribute or property (Vaisesana) is this: what persists in the effect is an attribute (Vaisesana) like the blueness of the lily, what does not persist is either an adjunct or limitation or condition (Upadhi) or qualification per accidents (Upalakasana). Of these the attribute (Vaisesana) lasts at least as long as the effect, nor so the Upalakasana, when we say 'bring the red crystal', the redness though not natural to the crystal lasts till the crystal is brought, but when Cintre's house is indicated as that which has a crow sitting on it the crow may not remain there till the house is reached.

Thus on the part of Seksin the inner organ is an Upadhi, and on the part of a Jiva that is an attribute.

manifestation of nascience by Saksha.

Now, it is to be observed that nascience, inner organ, empirical ego and the like are directly illuminated by the witness self without being assisted by psychological conditions. With regard to the external objects it is observed that the veil of mental ignorance muffling them is removed by mental states. The obscuration of the witness self by nascience cannot be assumed to be removed by the states, because a vritti dispels ignorance as long as it itself lasts. That ignorance veils the intelligence in its entirety, has been admitted by the system of Advaita. Saksha being itself obscured by nascience cannot manifest ignorance, empirical ego and the like. Empirical ego is constantly manifested and that is possible only if it be admitted to be in contact with a self-luminous entity, and that is Saksha. Then how the witness self being itself obscured by nascience can manifest the nascience is a problem. In this situation Nrisihshara in his Advaita Dipika remarks that like Rehu, nascience is manifested by the light of intelligence obscured by nascience itself. Just as Rehu is not seen except by the light of the luminary which it obscures in eclipse so nascience is not seen except by the light of intelligence which it obscures in empirical existence.

Saksha is not obscured by nascience.

The followers of Vivekara school of Advaita are not satisfied with the remark of the author of Advaita Dipika because

they assert that in the case of Bhuh it is experienced that the
moon being veiled by Bhuh manifests nothing else except the Bhuh
which obscures her, but the consciousness (Caitanya) or the
sakshin being obscured by nescience manifests nescience as well as
internal organ and the like too. So the two cases are not parallel.
Hence the adherents of Vivarana school, like the authors of
Tattvadipana and Pujivivarana, opine that our postulations with
regard to the objects of empirical existence ought to be in
conformity with experience as much as possible. It has been
evidenced by experience that ignorance obscures intelligence only
to the exclusion of the witness-intelligence, which is the
manifestor of nescience, the internal organ and its attributes.
Thus these nescience, internal organ etc. are always in conjunction
with the unobscured light of intelligence, so they are not the
sphere of ignorance, erroneous cognition and doubt. The objection,
that if the witness self is unobscured and manifests nescience etc.
then the bliss (maya) which constitutes the characteristic
nature of the witness self, must be manifested is wrong because
in respect of the self there is seen unconditioned love due to
the manifestation of the nature of bliss. Prakasatman is firmly
of the view that there is certainly manifested happiness
characterised by its being the abode of supreme love.

From these aforementioned views about sakshin, it appears
that all the exponents of these divergent views are unanimous in
the fact that the sakshin is the seer, independent of the

1. Tattva- Dipana, p.323.
2. P. Vivarana, p.324.
3. Vivarana, p.323, see also Br.Up.II.3-5.
instruments of valid knowledge. In sound sleep Saksin manifests
the nescience when all the instruments of knowledge are absent.
It manifests all the supersensuous objects such as pleasure, pain,
desire, and the like. All the things of apparent existence like
macro-silver etc. are manifested by it. Individualization (Anekara)
and its attributes (pleasure and pain) which have been regarded
as apparently existent (pratibhasika) by the authors of San-
capadika, and Vive rama are manifested by the witness self.
Anekara (egoity) and its attributes are not deemed to be
pratibhasika by Vaisnavaya, yet they are manifested by Saksin.
And Saksin does not depend upon mental states or Vrittis for their
manifesting them.

1 Individual Soul

According to the Advaita system of Indian philosophy the
Upanisats teach that whatever is, in reality, one. There exists
only one universal being, called Brahman or the highest self. It
is pure being or pure intelligence. Intelligence cannot be
predicated of Brahman, but constitutes its substance. Brahman is
not a thinking being but thought itself. It is absolutely desti-
ute of qualities. Whatever qualities or attributes are conceiv-
able can only be denied of it. But if nothing exists but one
absolutely simple being whence is the appearance of the world
which surrounds us and in which we ourselves exist as individual
beings? The answer to this question has been given by Sankara
that there is, in reality, no transmigrating soul different from

2. Sri Sa., p.488.
the Lord. Still Brahma's being associated with a power called Maya or Avyaya is the root cause of this empirical existence and the individual souls. This power is not definable either as 'tat' or 'Atat'. It is a principle of illusion owing to which there seems to exist a material world comprehending distinct individual existences. In his commentary upon Vedavyasa-utras Sankara says that in reality there is no difference between the highest reality and the transmigrating soul, still the relation of the highest self with limiting adjuncts, consisting of body and so on which are the transformations of the primal nescience, is erroneously assumed, just as we assume the ether, the universal space (Akasa) to enter into relations with diverse limiting adjuncts such as jars, pots, caves and the like. In consequence of this connection there prevails the false notion that there are different spaces such as the space confined by a jar and the universal space, although in reality there does not exist any difference. Similarly in the case of the self there prevails the false notion that the Lord and the individual soul are different; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the unreal connection of the soul with the limiting conditions consisting of the body and the like.\(^1\) Just as the cloudless sky covers itself with clouds and assumes different shapes, so the pure intelligence veils itself with the indefinable nescience and appears in different limited forms.

It is ordinarily observed that the individual soul is a system of memories, associations, desire, likes and dislikes. From

\(^1\) Ibid., I.1.5.
this it appears that though its structure and constituent elements, cannot be grasped instantly yet can be taken in through inspection. This system being subject to change is called as Vijnanaatman. It consists of the Atman limited or individualized by the object. It is Atman associated with Ajnana. Its connection with Buddhi or understanding, which constitutes its characteristic feature, draws to an end when the state of a Samsara is terminated by perfect knowledge. The soul's connection with Buddhi endures even after death. In deep sleep and death this connection is potential while it becomes active on waking and re-birth. We are forced to admit this potential continuance by the law of causality.¹

From this it is manifest that the individual soul has two different component parts,² viz. self and not self, subject and object, reality and appearance and this can be conceived only if an analysis and a psychological account of it be given. The psycho-physical organism consists of the gross-elements, the life organs and the subtle body made up of the subtle elements which constitute the seed of the body. The life organs are of two kinds: (1) those of the conscious life, and the five organs of sense (Buddhi-indranyani) five of actions (Karmendranyani) and mind which controls perception of action; (2) those of the unconscious life.³ The Sukhya Prana which is the chief breath of life is divided into five different Pranas (Pranopenodenayatmasmanenas).⁴

The subtle body which consists of seventeen elements and the vital

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¹ S.Pada Krishna Indian Philosophy V,II. P.596.
² Adhyasa-Sh.
⁴ Ibid., P.317.
forms persists as a permanent factor of the soul until liberation. The basis of individuality is to be found not in the Atman or Upadhis, but in moral determination, which is a complex of knowledge (Vidya), works (Karma) and experience (Vijna). The vital forms continue as long as Samsara endures, and accompany the soul even if it should enter a plant, in which case the internal organ and the senses cannot unfold themselves. The soul must have been equipped with this apparatus of vital form from eternity, because the Samsara is beginningless.

There is a third Karmasamra which has been identified with Avitya which is indeterminate and beginningless.

The five organs of action, the five of perception and senses are created objects. They are Anu and limited. They are not deemed to be of atomic size since their pervading the whole body would then be unintelligible. They are not seen passing away at death, so they are assumed to be subtle. They are not infinite, because in that case there can be no passing or going or returning for them.

The jiva is the ruler of the body and senses and is connected with the fruits of actions. It has been said to be Vrubhu or all pervading, because its essence is the Atman, it is not Anu of atomic size because then it could not experience the sensations extending over the whole body. The author of

1. Br. Up. II, IV, 4-2, see also Radha Krishnan Indian Philosophy V. II. P. 296.
5. S. Hirach, P. 83.
Prakasartha who is a follower of the Viverana\textsuperscript{1} school of advaita and has exerted a great influence upon the prominent writers of the post Sankara advaita like Ramanuja\textsuperscript{2} holds that the primal cause i.e. the original material cause of beings called Maya, the mother of the empirical world, has endless limited portions which have two kinds of powers - Averana (obscuring) and Vikesopa (projective) in different degrees. These limited endless portions have been designated as nescience (Avidyā). The reflection of pure intelligence, not intelligence as delimited or as reflection or as the prototype of reflection, in the so-called nescience (Avidyā) is termed as jīva. As the parts of Maya with these two types of powers are numerous, so the reflections of intelligence in them assume different forms. Just as a single face reflected in many mirrors simultaneously assumes numerous mirrored shapes, so one and the same cit being reflected assumes the different forms of individual souls. The different adjuncts cause difference even in a single entity which coming in contact with them is conditioned. It appears from the view of the author of Prakasartha as it has been expounded by Adbhuta in his S. I. S. that he was a follower of the doctrine of Neminjīvavada and to explain the plurality of the jīvas he assumed that Maya comprises different parts with Averana and Vikesope powers. It is the projective power of nescience which gives rise to different individual souls and the multiplicity of this empirical world. Without the assumption of this Vikesope Sakti, the multiplicity of the empirical objects and individual souls cannot be justified.

\textsuperscript{1} The Colophon of Prakasartha.

\textsuperscript{2} C.N. Basu Gupta H.I. Philosophy, V.II.P.196.

\textsuperscript{3} S.I.S., P.99.
In Tattva viveka a different view about jiva has been expounded, which is akin to the Sankhya system. According to Vyasa the primal cause has three qualities, called Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. These are not the properties of the primal cause, but they constitute the very nature of the primal nescience called Prakriti. Owing to the differences in degrees of these qualities the original matter is divided into two forms Maya and Avidya. When Sattva is predominant and Rajas and Tamas are overpowered by it the substance is termed as Maya and when Sattva is overpowered by Rajas and Tamas, Avidya takes its place. But it must be noted here in this context that Maya is always different from Avidya. It is not possible according to this doctrine that Maya and Avidya should exchange their respective places.

The view of Tattvadipitaka has been endorsed by scripture which expressly declares that this original matter assumes two forms Maya and Avidya and creates jiva and God by means of reflection.

That Maya and Avidya are two aspects of one and the same thing called Prakriti, is likewise maintained by some other exponents of Advaita but there is a slight difference between this view and the previous one. According to this view into nescience constitutes the adjuncts of individual souls, but nescience has its essence in avaranasakti (obscuring power) and is not dependent upon the preeminent position of Rajas and Tamas. This results from the fact that the individual souls are subject

3. Mr. U. Jpn. 9.
to ignorance which is the effect of this obscuring power of Prakṛti. The contact of ignorance with individual souls (as when I say 'I am ignorant') proves that obscuring power has a dominant position in nescience which is the adjunct of the individual souls. Now we give the view of Sarvajñatma, the author of Sākṣeṣeṇa. Sarvajñatma, taking his stand upon the scriptural passage, which expressly declares that the individual soul has effects i.e. internal organs for its adjuncts and God has the original cause for His adjunct, maintains that the reflection of intelligence in internal organs is designated as Jīva, while God is a reflection of intelligence in nescience.

According to Sarvajñatma the logical significance of both the terms, Maya and Avidya is the same, that is why the two terms Maya and Avidya are used by him as synonyms. Now an objection can be urged against this view that Maya and Avidya being identical cannot originate two different images, while the pure intelligence, which is the prototype (Simha) and is in contact with Maya and Avidya is one and the same. Difference in reflections of a single entity presupposes different adjuncts. In the view of Sarvajñatma Maya and Avidya being identical are one, and pure intelligence is also without a second. So plurality of jīva and multiplicity of the world is unintelligible.

This argument has been rebutted by his commentator with the remark that Maya stands to Avidya in the

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1. S.L., p.103.
2. S.Sarirëka III. 143,277 & 278.
3. Ibid., PP.308-9.
relation of a cause to its effect and though cause and effect are apparently different, yet in reality they are identical.

Accordingly eye and its effects (internal organs) in essence being identical and in action being different serve the purpose of Adjuncts to the individual souls and God as reflections.

In Citracipa Shartitirtha characterising an individual soul employed a system of arranging intelligence in four classes (i) Kutastha; (ii) Brahman; (iii) Jiva and (iv) Invaders. According to this view jiva is the reflection of intelligence in the internal organ like the reflection of the sky in the water of a jar. If we take a jar and fill it with water, we find two states of Akasa there in the jar; the real space limited by the jar and occupied by the water; secondly the space (Akasa) reflected in the water. The real space which is free from all qualities is not perceptible at all, although it constitutes the substratum of the jar, water and the like. But the reflected space, which is perceptible and seems to have all the properties of water and the jar is merely an illusion. In fact it does not exist. That which is in reality existent is not perceptible. Both of them are identical and mutually superimposed. The real appears in the form of that which is unreal. This is the knot of real and unreal i.e., cit intelligence and 'cit non-intelligence, which has been designated by a technical term 'cidadigrahtii'.

In the case of an individual soul the pure intelligence which is omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient and is free from all modifications and sensible qualities has been limited by the


gross and subtle bodies, viz. the self serves the purpose of a substratum for these two bodies. But there is a reflection of intelligence in the internal organ which is perceptible and has all the properties of the subtle and gross bodies. This reflection of intelligence having all the qualities of Antahkara, Manas, Citta, Manas and Buddhi is erroneously identified with the pure intelligence which is the substratum of gross and subtle bodies. On account of their mutual superimposition their respective attributes also are superimposed upon each other.

From what precedes it follows that the very circumstance of cit's being a substratum of the gross and subtle bodies which are superimposed upon it, makes it appear as if it has all the qualities which really belong to the subtle body. This coupling or mutual identification and superimposition of pure intelligence, which is the only reality and subtle and gross bodies which are a product of ignorance constitutes an empirical self or an individual soul, which lasts until the realisation of the fact that this self is one with Brahman.

This above defined jiva is subject to all the conditions such as dream, waking, sleep, birth, death etc. It is tossed from one existence to another like the shuttle of a weaver without cessation. By the force of its delusion it travels from death to death.

A more explicit and conclusive view about jiva according to Pancadasa and Pancpadika is that Braukti wherein impure Sattva

1. Adyasa Bhashya.
2. Ibid., and P.Padika P.487.
is predominant is called Avidya. Avidya is an adjunct of... and in a part of Siva which obscuring the purity and the real nature (self-luminosity) of Brahman stands as the painted canvas (citrabhitt) of Avidya, deeds and impressions of knowledge. Avidya undergoing its peculiar transformations with God as its support manifests itself as the poers of activity and knowledge and functions as the doer of all kavashehas and enjoyer of all experiences. In association with the unchangeable light of Brahman, it is the complex of these transformations which appears the immediate ego and the pure self is falsely regarded as the enjoyer of experiences. This transformation is called Manas, citta, buddhi and the ego or the ego-feeler (Ahampratayin). The association of the ego with the pure self (Atman) like the association of the redness of a sesame with a crystal is a complex which manifests the dual characteristics, the Avidya stuff and the consciousness of the pure self (Sambhinnobhayapata).

The Avidya stuff, so called part of this complex, which makes the pure self appear as having the qualities of the internal organ - a transformation of Avidya assumes three states, so the pure self being embodied in these states (bodies) has three forms - Prajna, Taijasa and Viyasa. Owing to these stages of Avidya the self has three bodies, causal, subtle and gross, then the causal (nascience) body is a qualifying adjunct of cit, the cit is called Prajna, causal body is so called because of its being a particular aspect of Prakriti which is the parent of subtle and gross bodies and by its being destroyed by true knowledge it is called Sarira.

Jiva is called Jiva when it has a concept of gross body. In causal body jiva is Prana, in subtle body jiva is Tajasa. There is another way in which jiva's three forms are characterised (i) the Paramarthika (absolute self), which is the substrate of the subtle and gross bodies; (ii) the Pratibhasika (apparent self) which is the subject of the dream world; and (iii) the Vyabhicara (empirical self which is the enjoyer of the waking experience). 1

All these views about jiva bear witness to the fact that their upholders were much influenced by the Perinama theory of Sankhya, because they firmly opined that Jiva undergoes a modification in the form of this empirical existence. They differed from the Sankhya in so far only as they do not admit Jiva as an independent real entity. 2 It is removable by perfect knowledge.

The Brahman through its own ignorance appears as jiva, is a doctrine expounded by Suresvara and established by sound arguments by Ananda Bodha 3. The adherents of this doctrine take their stand on the passage of Sankara's commentary on Brh. Upsa, which means that it is Brahman itself that through its own ignorance is subject to transmigration and through its own true knowledge is released. 4 The main objection urged against this view by the opponents is that Brahman being pure intelligence, whose characteristic nature is self-luminosity can never be a dwelling place of nescience. Ananda Bodha's reply to this objection is that ignorance cannot take its place even in a jiva because of its being one with Brahman, and also jiva which is a product of Avidya cannot be an abode of it (Avidya). So Brahman is the location of Avidya. The

2. S. Inda, P.316.
argument that light and darkness being opposed to each other cannot exist at one and the same place, does not hold good, since the term Avidya does not denote the non-existence of knowledge (Jnan-asbheva). It is neither existent nor non-existence but being beyond description it is an insentient principle. This type of Avidya can locate itself in Brahman, which is self-luminous because Brahman as the substratum of this entire empirical existence, is an established fact. In this case Avidya is not opposed to the light of intelligence, which is its characteristic nature. It is destroyed by another light viz. the light of intelligence qualified by vrtti, the modification of the mind. This vrtti is the result of contemplation which has reached its highest pitch. Just as darkness which can easily be removed by a lamp, cannot be removed by the light of intelligence, although it also is a light, so nescience which cannot be removed by the light of intelligence can be removed by it when it is assisted by a particular form of mental modification i.e. intuition. Or else it can be held that intelligence qualified by intellect which itself is jagapaksas (non-intelligent light) can root out the nescience. It is observed in every day experience that the rays of the sun cannot turn a thing, but being reflected in a particular glass they reduce a thing to ashes on which they are focussed.

1. N. Narakand, P.318.
2. Bhasati, Kalya, and Harinma P.63, see also N. Narakand, P.320.
From the foregoing discussion it can be concluded that ignorance can reside with Brahmen and Brahman through its ignorance being in the state of a jiva can assume this empirical world like a person in the state of dream. Supersens compares the jiva to a prince carried away by a cow herd and brought up in a rural environment. When he became acquainted with his royal descent he gave up his other occupations and realised his kindling nature. In the same way Brahman falls into the state of a jiva by its own ignorance existing from eternity is not more of its true nature of being omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient, and thus is deprived of its natural qualities such as eternal and unsurpassable bliss. In transmigratory existence it is tossed from death to death. When it gets free from its ignorance through the instruction of a preceptor who himself is a more assumption like that in the state of dream it resumes its true nature of being eternal and unsurpassable bliss.

According to this doctrine there is only one jiva animating one body alone. All the other bodies are unanimated like one seen in a dream. It is due to the nascence of that one jiva that this entire universe has its apparent existence. All empirical experiences are like dream cognitions. All worldly affairs will cease to be at the rise of true knowledge. There is no distinction between the bound and the released since the jiva is single. As the persons seen in a dream are assumptive, so the release of Sukadeva etc. is also assumptive. The world of living and not living is a fiction created by a single jiva animating one

1. Dr. Up. Sār+h.V., P.970-78.
body alone. All the objections urged against this view can easily be rebutted by virtue of the analogy of the empirical existences to the dream cognition.

Hrjivavada or the doctrine of one jive is an important Vedanta School. According to it there is only one real jive, just as in a dream there is one real jive while other jives are creatures of the dream. Similarly according to this theory the empirical world of daily experience too has only one real jive while all others are his creations. But this theory fails to answer the question as to who this real jive is.¹

According to this section the Hiranyagarbha which is a reflection of Brahman in Maya is the one principal jive and the other jives are the reflections of this principal jive, and they are similar to the apparent clothings put on the bodies of human beings sketched on on artistically worked cloth. Thus this section of Advaitins holds the view of a single jive with many distinctive bodies.

The stand taken by this section of Advaitins is also shaky on account of above arguments. It is contended that since Hiranyagarbhas vary in each asan, it is not possible to determine which Hiranyagarbha is the principal jive. Hence another section of Advaitins prefers the view of a single jive animating many bodies without distinction.²

The non-recollection of one's happiness etc. by another is explained as due to the difference of bodies. In these three

2. S. L. S., P.162.
3. Ibid., P.164.
varieties of the Brajyavada there is no distinction between the bound and the released since there is only a single jive. There are Advaïtins¹ who do not agree with the view set forth above, and therefore, resort to the view of many jives with different adjuncts. The jives are many because of the plurality of the adjuncts, and since the jives are many the distinction between bondage and release is recognised.

Relation of Jive to Brahman:
What is the nature of the relation between jive and Brahman? Are they different from or identical with each other? Or is there a relation of difference sum non-difference between them?

The jive cannot really be different from Brahman, since the difference between Jive and Brahman cannot be perceived by sense perception. It is because the perception of difference depends upon the perception of both the objects between which difference is affirmed. The jive and the highest self are supersensuous, so are beyond the region of perception. Perception presupposes sense-contact, and sense-contact is not possible either with Jive or the absolute divine essence - Brahman. Nor can mind apprehend the difference between jive and Brahman, because the mind cannot work without the help of sense-contact. Mandana undertakes to prove that difference (Iheda) whether as a quality or characteristic of things, or as an independent entity, is never experienced by perception. He starts by saying that perception either manifests a positive object, or it presents the difference between other objects, or it both manifests a positive

¹. Ibid., P.165-66, see also Bhâmati, Kalpa & Parâ, Pp.378-80.
². Nidaksûndra, P.38.
object and distinguishes it from other objects. In the third alternative there may again be three alternatives, viz. (i) simultaneous perception of a positive object and its difference from others; (ii) first the presentation of the positive object and then the presentation of the difference; (iii) first the presentation of the difference and then the presentation of the positive object.

Against this Mandana argues thus; perception does not merely reveal the difference, nor does it first reveal the difference and then the positive object, nor both of them simultaneously, for the positive object must first be revealed before any difference can be manifested. Difference must concern itself with relation between two positive objects; for example, the cow is different from the horse. If the category of difference distinguishes two objects from one another, the objects between which difference is manifested must first be known. Again, it cannot be held that perception, having revealed the positive object, reveals also its difference from other objects; for perception is the process of cognition and there are not two moments in it such that it should first reveal the object which is in contact with sense organ and then reveal the other objects which are not at that moment in contact with sense, as also the difference between the two. Thus difference is not the object of perception. Similarly inference cannot establish the difference of jiva from Brahman, for inference is based upon perception, so it cannot stand alone. There is no mea

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1. Dr. Siddhi, P.46.
2. Ibid., P.46 and Shekati, P.119.
of valid knowledge by which the difference between jiva and Brahman may be established.

1. The doctrine of identity in difference

From the extracts of Bhartṛprapacāsa's Āṣayya on Dr̥daharṣyaka Upaśya, as Ballāljī Bhāskara has given in his commentary on Sankara's commentary, it appears that Bhartṛprapacāsa's philosophy was in agreement with the view of difference cum non-difference. According to this doctrine the relation between Brahman and jiva, and that between Brahman and the world is one of identity in difference. An implication of this view is that the jiva and the physical world evolve out of Brahman, so that the doctrine may be called as Dr̥daharṣyaka. Sankara in his commentary on V.2 states that the adherents of Dr̥daharṣyaka hold that Brahman has in itself elements of manifoldness, as the tree has many branches, so Brahman possesses many powers and energies dependent on those powers. Unity and manifoldness, therefore, are both true. A tree considered in itself is one but it is manifold if viewed as a composite of branches, flowers, leaves, etc. So the sun in itself is one, but is manifold as a whole comprising waves and foam; so the clay in itself is one, but manifold if we take note of the pots and pans made of it.

2. Criticism of the view

The followers of Sankara like the author of Vīvarana and Tatadvipaṇa assert that the view does not stand to reason.

1. Brahma-sūtra, Bhāda.
2. V.P. Agnives, P.801.
3. B.C.S. Bh. IL1-14.
According to the view of bhedabheda difference between jiva and Brahman cannot be removed by the true knowledge of Brahman. So there would be no release. It is because on this view the difference even non-difference of jiva from Brahman is real, so the knowledge having that (Bhedabheda) for its content cannot remove it. If it be said that there is some other knowledge which has no difference for its content, removes difference, then what is the means of valid knowledge which originates the knowledge of non-difference? The sacred teaching cannot originate that knowledge because in the view of Bhedabheda scripture has for its content the doctrine of difference even non-difference. Even admitting that there is the rise of true knowledge of non-difference, there will be illusoriness for the difference, if it is removable by knowledge, there will be the contingency of the falsity of difference. Nor may it be said that while ignorance is removed by knowledge, difference perishes through ritual acts alone, for scripture declares that the removal of the difference is caused by knowledge. He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself. Nor on the view of difference even non-difference is it easy to set forth the meaning of the words 'That' (Tat) and 'Thou' (Tven) of the great sentence 'Tattvamasi' for the jiva denoted by the term 'thou' will be a whole constituted of the two elements difference and non-difference and thus jiva will be a composite of parts (Savayava).

1. Prof. Harryama in the proceedings of the third Oriental Conference in Madras 1924.


3. V.S. Varṇayeṣu, 3802.
A critical concept of difference and non-difference is not possible between the jiva and Brahman as there does not exist the relation of the general and the particular, the relation of the quality and the possessor of the quality, the relation of the effect and the cause, the relation of the qualified and the pure, or the relation of part and whole, since there is no evidence. Difference and non-difference cannot take place in absence of relation of one of the above. It may be said that there is the relation of part and whole because of the smriti "In the world of jives a part of me alone" and the scriptural texts "All beings are a quarter of him". But this is unacceptable because there will be a conflict with the smriti text 'without helms' which declares that the self is partless. The smriti and smrti texts quoted above assert the littleness of the jiva in order to declare the infinitude of Brahman. If Brahman on the other hand be deemed to be with parts, it would be unstable like a pot which is created by parts. If it be said that partlessness is its nature 'having parts' is due to adjunct like the intellect, hence the said defect does not obtain, even thus real difference would not be established, because partless other cannot be really cut into pieces by the edge of a sword. The internal organ, etc. are not capable of really differentiating Brahman from the jiva, for it is inconceivable how Brahman could create adjuncts for its own evil. Nor is that creation for the sake of the jiva, since prior to that creation the difference of jiva from Brahman is not established; Karma.

1. Ibid., P.791.
4. V. V. VI. 17.
5. V. Sangrah., P.791.
6. Ibid., P.792.
nescience and residual impressions are not the cause of differentiation, because they are not the adjuncts of the jiva. It is only the internal organ which is a substance that is an adjunct of the jiva. It is quite clear from the above discussion that the ground on which the exponent of difference can non-difference takes his stand is very slippery.

: Plurality and omnipresence of the individual soul criticised:

Sankaracharya in the commentary on B.G. has established that there is one single self and the empirical plurality of selves (selves) is due to the limiting adjuncts which are erroneously superimposed upon it. And this one and the same self being connected with different limiting adjuncts with which it identifies itself, assumes different empirical forms. To illustrate this view the sutrakara introduces a comparison "like light" etc. Just as the light of the sun or the moon which pervades the entire space becomes straight or bent as it were on account of the limiting adjuncts with which it is in contact, such as a finger, for instances, but does not really become so, and just as the other, although imagined to move as it were when jara, the limiting adjuncts, are being moved, does not really move, and as the sun does not tremble, although its images tremble when we shake the cups filled with water in which sun's light is reflected, similarly the Lord also is not affected by pain or pleasure although pain be felt by that part of him that is called the individual soul and, presented by nascence, is limited by the Buddhi and other adjuncts.

1. B. 3.11,12,16-17-18, see also Mahatma on these sutras.
From this account of the self and the individual souls it is manifest that according to the view of Sankara the individual souls, which assume different forms owing to their being enwrapped by nescience, can be affected by their respective pleasure and pain, because they are qualified by their different limiting adjuncts, although the self is one and the same. Thus a rule can safely be laid down in respect of the pleasure and pain of the individual souls. But according to the doctrine of the plurality and omnipresence of the selves, as Vaisesikas hold the theory of pleasure and pain, does not stand to reason, and so in unintelligible.

The Vaisesika infers the plurality of souls, from differences in status, and the variety of conditions, and admits that all selves are omnipresent (Vibhu) because in all the parts of the body pleasure or pain is perceived simultaneously, and if it were of atomic size then yogin could not enjoy pleasure and the like in many bodies at once and the same time; and it is eternal since it is all pervasive like ether.

The Vaisesika establishes the plurality and omnipresence of the soul on the basis of differences in status and varieties in conditions of the embodied selves but the very ground i.e., the difference and variety of conditions leads us to conclude that soul is one and the same, otherwise there will be no Vyavasana of pleasure and pain on the part of the embodied selves.

According to this view all selves are all pervasive and there is no difference among them as to the entry into one body. Consequently when a thorn runs into Caitra's foot, there is

1. B. uttes III.2-20.
originated pain for Cātṛa, why is then pain not generated for other selves too? So far as the entry of all pervasive selves into Cātṛa's body is concerned Cātṛa's body is not different from other bodies. Nor is there the distinction so that the pain should affect only the person whose body has been pierced by the thorn, for, it is not possible to regard the body as belonging to some one self alone and not to others, because the body is originated in the proximity of all the selves, so all the bodies belong to all selves. Nor is there the restriction that the body originated by some one's unseen potency (Adrāta) belongs to that one self alone, since even for unseen potency (Adrāta) restriction cannot be established, that is, we cannot say that this Adrāta belongs to this self alone, not to the others. It is because when in order to originate that Adrāta the mind unites with some one self, it certainly unites then with other selves too, when the cause is common, how can then unseen potency originate in some one self alone? then the union of all selves with a mind is common, all the resolves, volitions, instincts, emotions and the like, which presuppose the union of selves with mind, will not be distinct for the different selves. In consequence of this all the mental states are conditioned to be perceptible to all the embodied selves. It is an established fact that an omnipresent entity being in conjunction with different things can never be differentiated by those different things, unless all these things are superimposed upon that eternal all-pervasive entity. In Advaita system all these empirical objects being superimposed on Brahman, which is omniscient, omnipresent and
eternal, can differentiate Brahman. But in the opinion of Kena a
mind are not superimposed upon the selves. They are as independent
as the selves. According to this view all selves are equally
infinite and all pervasive, so we cannot place any restriction on
the conjunction of a particular body and a particular self to the
exclusion of others. Body and internal organs can define or limit
a part of the self, if we admit the singularity of self, but on
the view that selves are numerous, equally all pervading and
within all bodies, we cannot say that their conjunction with the
internal organ which is seated in the body must take place in
that part of each self which is limited by the body, and that thus
there may result from difference of locality a limitative distin-
ction of resolution (Abhisamahi) of pleasure, of pain and of un-
seen principle (Adrata). Moreover, it is impossible to limit a
body which originates in proximity to all omnipresent selves to
one particular self to the exclusion of all others. All this
establishes the conclusion that the doctrine not open to any
objections is the doctrine of the unity of the self.

1. The Identity of Individual soul and Brahman;

The individual soul and Brahman are identical and the
apparent difference is due to the primal ignorance. At the dawn
of true knowledge nescience disappears and reality i.e., identity
of the individual soul and the highest self is realised. The
cognition of this reality depends upon the means of knowledge.

1. S.L., p.596.
2. B.Bh. IL.4-53.
called Agama (verbal testimony) because Brahman is not an object of other means of knowledge. There are two kinds of Brahman, the first are those by which empirical reality is known and they are empirical means of knowledge and the second are those by which the absolute reality is known, that is Agama or verbal testimony. All the Upanisat texts have Brahman for their purport and intimate the identity of Brahman and the jivatman.

In scriptural passages it has been declared repeatedly that before the creation (Yati) only this being existed one without a second. All this was self. This is the Brahman without cause and without effect. It is anything inside or outside the self is Brahman perceiving everything. That immortal Brahman is at the beginning. Vasempatimara declares in his Bhaskari that these statements, which have the purport of teaching the identity of self and Brahman, through their introductory intermediate and concluding passages, and through purportful repetition cannot be made figurative even by akra. For, from repetition results the essence of the object, not figurativeness.

Thus this non-difference of the individual soul from the highest self has Vedanta passages for evidence. All the Vedantists, whatsoever, explained with the words of purport such as the unity of the initial and concluding passages harmoniously lead to the non-dual Brahman and its non-difference from the inner self.

2. V.Suri: Seventh Ch.
3. Ch.Up.VI.2.1, see also Br.Up.II.5.12, and Mund I.2.11.
The meaning of the great sentence - Tattvamasi:

On the basis of reasoning the identity of Jiva and Brahman is demonstrated. The sacred texts declare the same truth in sentences such as 'That thou art'. In these sentences the method of explaining the truth is through the elimination of incongruous attributes. In the text 'that thou art' Brahman is referred to as 'That'. Here the term 'Brahman' or 'That' means that aspect of intelligence which becomes the material and instrumental cause of the world when associated with those aspects of Maya in which there is predominance of 'Tamas' and 'Sattwa' respectively. The term 'Thou' in the text refers to that condition of intelligence which results from his superimposing on himself Avidya that is 'Sattwa' mixed with 'Tajas' and 'Tamas'. Thus desires and activities are created in him. It is to be noted in this context that material and instrumental causality, desires and activities are only created in Brahman phenomenally as the result of its association with Maya or Avidya and not really.

Maya itself is phenomenal and the bondage which it creates is not real. So when the mutually contradictory aspects of Maya are rejected, there remains the one indivisible Brahman whose nature is truth, awareness and bliss. So say for instance 'This man is that Devadatta', here we negate the attributes of time, place and circumstances, both present and past, and take into account only Devadatta himself. Similarly in the text 'That thou art'

2. C. Deshi., L43.46.
we negate the conflicting attributes such as the omniscience and
the limited knowledge which characterise Isvara and Jiva respect-
ively and take into account only the immutable consciousness. The
words in the text are not to be taken in terms of subject and
predicate or in terms of object and their attributes. What is meant
is the absolute identity of 'That' and 'Thou'.

1. The view of Suresvara:

The view of Suresvara and his pupil Sarvañnata is note-
worthy in this context. In Naïskaranya Siddhi Suresvara says that
in sentences like 'verily the ether in the pot is the ether in
the sky' we point not to a subject qualified by a predicate but
to a reality not directly expressed in the words of the sentence.
the ether unlimited by pot or sky. So in sentences like 'That
thou art' we immediately receive knowledge beyond the expressed
meaning of the sentence.

Jeanottama, the commentator, remarks that sentences contain
a plurality of words which refer to different entities standing
in certain relation to one another. But whenever in the Veda, such
an interpretation results in a logical impossibly, it is
legitimate to interpret the words in an implied sense. This implied
sense may take us beyond the realm of all possible direct meanings
of sentences, based as the latter are on the machinery of
differentiation into substances, qualities and relations.

1. P.Dasli. VI.76.
2. N.Siddhi. III.9.
Accordingly the great sentence 'That thou art' affirms 'That' of 'Thou' and 'Thou' of 'That'. Now by the law of contradiction nothing can at the same time both be and not be the same thing. Hence, even, if we take the sentence at its face value as affirming that 'Thou' is qualified by 'That' and 'That' by 'Thou', it still points to a meaning beyond that apparently expressed by these words. For if 'That' is in some sense 'Thou' then all that is not thou is negated of 'That' i.e. all that is not self is negated of Brahman, and likewise all that is not Brahman is negated of 'thou'. Hence the sentence 'Thou art that' is one which points straightway to a meaning beyond that directly expressed by the words just like the sentence 'The ether in the pot is the ether in the sky'. A plurality of words is necessary to express a single meaning that lies beyond them. It is because the ideas conveyed by the usual meaning of the words have to be excluded.  

Traditional View:  

The author of Vedanta, Haribhushan, gives the view of some advaitins who are adherents of tradition. According to this view the great sentence 'That thou art' lies in the domain of indication termed as 'exclusive non-exclusive' (Jahadajahalakana). This type of indication comes into use when a word expressive of something qualified abandons a part of its sense and denotes another part as 'This is that Devadatta'. Here since the qualified entities primarily meant by the two words 'This' and 'That' cannot be identical because 'this' refers to Devadatta as associated with

2. V.Pari., P.243.
the present time and 'that' to Devadatta as associated with p.
by means of exclusive and non-exclusive leksaṇa (Jahadajahellaleksaṇa) the words refer only to the substantive (Vīṣeṣa) i.e., the
person of Devadatta, unrelated to time past or present. Similarly
according to the traditional interpretation of Vedanta, in a
sentence like 'That thou art' since the entity meant by the word
'that' viz., God as possess of omniscience cannot be identical
with what is meant by the word 'Thou' viz., the individual self
endowed with a mind, therefore, in order to make their identity
possible the words refer by indication to their essential nature,
viz., the Brahma without attributes.

D. N. Dutt, in his book 'Six ways of Knowing' has treated
this topic in a similar way. He observes 'Similarly is to be
understood the Vedic Text, "Thou art That" (tat tva asmi) where
"Thou" means an individual consciousness while "that" means
universal consciousness, and where the identity meant is to be
found by deducting, as before, the two incompatible determinants
"individual" and "universal" from both sides, and retaining in
thought only the common factor, consciousness.

Thirumuruga, however, maintains that sentences like 'This is
that Devadatta' and 'Thou art that' are not in the sphere of
'indication' (leksaṇa); for not withstanding the fact that two

1. ChUp. VI
3. Dutt, 'Six ways of Knowing', P. 330.
qualified entities presented to the mind by significance of two words 'That' and 'This' in the first example and 'That' and 'Thou' in the second example, cannot be logically connected with each other to convey an identical meaning, there is no contradiction in connecting two substantives (Visesaya) also presented by significance, so as to yield an identity of meaning. For instance, in the sentence 'The jar is transitory', although it is because according to the logicians' standpoint jarhood (chatatta) being a generic attribute is eternal, it is inconsistent to connect with transitoriness only one part of what is meant by the word 'jar' viz. jarhood, yet it is all right with regard to an individual jar, which is capable of being so connected because individual jars are perishable. Only where one part of the meaning of a word is presented as a qualifying attribute (vissesana) implication (lakesana) is admitted in order that the meaning may be presented independently, that is, as a substantive (visesya).

As in the sentence 'The jar is eternal', since jarhood is not independently presented as the logician holds, by the significance of the word 'jar' the latter refers by implication to jarhood, in order to effect such cognition. Similarly, in sentences like 'That art thou' there is also no implication (lakesana) because the meanings of the words 'Thou' and 'That' are presented as two substantives (Visesayas) by significance of those words, and thus there is no obstacle to their being logically connected so as to mean an identical thing. If implication be admitted even with regard to words signifying independent substantives, then in sentences like 'There is a jar in the house' there is colour in
the jar and 'bring the jar' since jarhood and house-hood being presented as qualifying attributes are incapable of leading to the desired comprehension of the logical connection of the meanings of the words comprising those sentences, therefore, even in these cases words such as jar would convey mere substantives just by implication. From such a long discussion Dharmaraja concludes that the statement about implication by the traditional teachers in sentences like 'that thou art', should be understood as mere conformity.