CHAPTER II

THE ULTIMATE REALITY AS BRAHMAN

The unchanging basis of changing phenomena:

All the empirical objects are indefinite, that is, neither existent nor non-existent. Empirically existing, this world cannot be termed as existent since it does not continue to manifest itself at all times. It manifests itself until the dawn of the true knowledge of Brahman. The world-appearance is not non-existent like a castle in the air which is absolutely non-existent since having an appearance it serves all the empirical purposes of the living beings. Apart from this it does not last forever. It is illogical to assume that an existent entity exists at one time, while at another time it does not exist, or it exists at one place and at another place it does not exist. Sat and Asat are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are. That a real thing should cease to exist does not stand to reason, since sat can never be 'Asat' and Asat 'cannot be 'sat'. Just as darkness and light cannot rise simultaneously at one end and the same place, so existence and non-existence cannot both belong to the worldly objects. The objects of the world have empirical existence only since they are conditioned, i.e., limited in both space and time. The categories of time and space are inapplicable to Brahman although they apply to all objects of the empirical world. This variability of objects in different contexts of time and space is, according to author of Bhagat, a strange sort of juggler's feat. 2

Appearance and existence are not identical. If a thing appears, it does not mean that it has its own existence. A
really existent thing is never contradicted. It is not manifestation that constitutes reality. A crystal appears as endowed with red colour and a rope appears as a snake, but they do not really become those objects or endowed with those attributes. To manifestation is not real existence. But the waking experiences being similar to dream experience are equally false. Both types of experience involve the duality of subject and object, and are, therefore, fundamentally more or less the same. If one of them i.e. dream experience is false the other also is false. The Upanisads declare that this universe is indeed Brahman. What is intended here is not the non-difference of the two, but the sublation of the Universe, namely, this universe is not universe but Brahman. This is the falsity of the world that whatever appears in it is mutable, everything flows.

Whenever we deny something unreal, we do so with reference to something real. The unreal snake, e.g. is negatived with reference to the real rope. But this denial of something unreal with reference to something real is possible if the real has substantive existence. Adi vaita agrees with the view of
Buddhists that all things change, but still we demand a super-
sensible reality which is not within the world of change. The
changing appearances must have some unchanging basis on which they
are based or imposed. This basis is the self (Brahman) which is
the only thing that is permanent, unchanging and real. Brahman is
the being of pure intelligence which is one identical entity and
negates all differences and duality. Brahman is entirely free from
predications; it is self-luminous and self-manifesting, shining
independently by itself. Whatever reality this world manifests does
not belong to it, but it belongs to the ultimate basis of every-
thing, and the world derives from this basis. Hence in negating
the world, we only deny its existence apart from or independently
of Brahman. 1

Brahman is pure being or existence, so it does not derive
its existence from anything else, since the relation of cause and
effect cannot exist without a certain superiority on the part of
the cause. So Brahman which is mere being cannot spring from itself.
Nor can Brahman spring from any particular thing because particular
things are conditioned and cannot thus give birth to a Universal
principle. Brahman cannot spring from that which is non-existent,
because 'Asat' being 'nirvacaniya' cannot give birth to that
which is 'Sat' and 'Nirvacaniya'. 2
Brahman is pure intelligence. It should be noted here that existence (Sat) and intelligence (Cit) are identical and not two different entities. Existence is intelligence and intelligence is existence. The two do not exclude each other. Then the term 'non-being' is applied to Brahman prior to its origination of the world, it does not mean that Brahman, the cause of the world is absolutely non-existence, since the term 'being' (Sat) ordinarily denotes that which is differentiated by name and form, and the term 'non-being' (Asat) denotes the same substance prior to its differentiation. This world which is now differentiated by names and forms was not differentiated by names and forms before its origination, so it was 'Asat'. Now Brahman being cause of this world, which is identical with Brahman, is called non-being in a secondary sense. Intelligence or existence is not to be predicted of Brahman as its attributes, but constitutes its substance. The qualities like omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence, which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is related to a world, depend on the evolution of the germinal principles called name and form, whose essence is nescience. These qualities are attributed to the highest Brahman merely as means of fixing one's mind on it. They themselves are not the objects of contemplation.

2. B.C.W.Dh. II-1-14.
3. Ibid., II-1-14.
There are some other qualities such as pure existence, intelligence and bliss, which are attributed to Brahman for the purpose of communicating the true nature of Brahman. These qualities belong to the very nature of Brahman, just as liquidity and coolness belong to the very nature of water. This is understandable from the fact that the Brahman does not possess any differences depending on time or space or any thing else. The scriptural passages, which declare Brahman to be the cause of the origination, subsistence and dissolution of the world, aim at absolute denial of all difference. For the texts which by means of the simile of the lump of clay teach that only Brahman is true while everything effected is untrue, cannot aim at the real causality of Brahman with reference to the world. So Brahman is not a cause and is consequently free from time relations. We cannot say anything positive of it because in that case Brahman will be a particular thing. A particular thing is an object of either sense perception or mental perception or of the both. Sense-organs can perceives only those parts of matter which are made up of the same elements as themselves. Brahman is not made up of elements, so is not perceptible by senses. Again, the ego (Aham) cannot see the eternal self on account of its inferiority. Brahman is infinite, so a person being finite cannot
comprehend Brahman. Human knowledge has those things only for its objects which can be expressed in words. Brahman cannot be expressed in words as 'cat'; for every word employed to denote a thing denotes that thing - when heard by another - as associated with a certain genus, or a certain act, or a certain quality, or a certain mode of relation. But Brahman belongs to no genus, is devoid of attributes and is actionless, so words have no power to denote it. 1 It is without parts, actionless and tranquil. 2 The one and the only reality (Brahman) is free from all the three kinds of difference. 3 The scriptural text denotes the oneness of Brahman and rejects qualities. 4 Brahman has nothing similar to it, nothing different from it and no internal differentiation.

(b). Definition of Brahman

We have a rational definition of Brahman in V.Sutra which is based upon a scriptural passage. 5 It has been stated above that existence, intelligence and bliss constitute the very nature of Brahman and are not to be deemed as its qualities, because Brahman is devoid of qualities. This is the definition of the essential nature of Brahman (Swarupalaksana). Distinctive features of attributes constitute a definition, but Brahman being devoid attributes cannot be defined. This problem is raised in Panchapadika. Patna Patna remark against it is that 'men in its
pristine state is attributeless but in the empirical sphere attributes like existence, consciousness and bliss are spoken of as belonging to Atman. Thus those properties though identical with his nature can empirically constitute a definition of the essential nature of Brahman.

The more intelligible definition is termed as definition per accidentes. This type of definition serves to distinguish the object for a while, that is, the features on which the Tatsth definition is based do not endure through out the same time as the defined object endures. It is the Tatsth definition of Brahman which we find in the scriptural passage, Brahman is said to be the source of the world's origination, subsistence and destruction. The falsity of the world and imperishability and immutability of Brahman are safeguarded by this definition because it assigns to Brahman a peculiar causality. Brahman is not merely the material cause but also the efficient cause of the world. This causality of Brahman is not to be understood in the ordinary sense. Brahman is the basis of this world in the same way as a piece of nacre is of the silver erroneously superimposed upon it. Just as nacre-silver springs from nacre, exists in nacre and finally is reabsorbed in nacre, so the empirical world derives its existence from Brahman, subsists in Brahman and finally is reabsorbed into Brahman.

(c) The view of Ramayana:

Ramayana states in his Vedanta Karumti that there are three definitions of Brahman the causality of origination the causality of subsistence and the causality of destruction.
This view of Bhamdvora is based upon his argument that the causality even of each one does not attach to anything other than Brahman. Thus he holds that it is a three fold definition each of which is independent of the others. He draws this conclusion from the circumstance that in the sections (Adhikaronas) of V. dealing with the essential nature of God, the creation, subsistence and destruction of all are mentioned separately as characteristic marks of Brahman. Thus according to Bandavulya each characteristic mark constitutes a different definition of Brahman and these characteristic marks do not attach to anything other than Brahman.  

(d) : The view of Vatsapati : 

Vatsapati Misra and his followers like Amalanka are of a different view. The followers of V. Misra are of the view that this definition is single, namely the causality of origination, subsistence and dissolution constitutes a single definition of Brahman. The underlying idea of this tenet is that the Advaita system aiming at final beatitude purports to expound the non-duality of Brahman. That Brahman is one without a second and everything movable and immovable has Brahman for its self, is the fundamental belief of this system of Philosophy. The non-duality of Brahman presupposes the material causality of Brahman in respect of the universe comprising sentient and insentient beings. Sentient beings are also deemed to be effects on account of their erroneous identification with the two bodies, gross and subtle, which are themselves effects. An effect or product derives its
existence from its material cause. It has no existence apart from that of its cause. The material cause is real while the effect having its essence in name and form is merely phenomenal. Accordingly it is held that Brahman is the real essence of everything owing to its being the material of everything. Thus material causality of Brahman requires the three characteristics, and it is thus : since the causality of creation and causality of sustenance are common to the efficient cause too, so in order to make known the material causality of Brahman it is essential to show the dissolution of the world in Brahman. Merely material causality does not serve the purpose of the adwaita. It is the efficient as well as material causality of Brahman that is the basic approach of the adwaita. Let Brahman be the material cause of the world, even then it is not necessary that Brahman will certainly be the efficient cause of the world, since it is observed in every day experience that efficient and material causality is not assigned to one and the same thing in respect of a product. For instance, a pot has for its material cause the clay and the potter as its efficient cause. So in order to remove this doubt, the creation and sustenance of the world are both ascribed to Brahman alone, and thus the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world constitute a single definition of Brahman which qualifies per accidens the non-dual Brahman as that which is, without losing its integrity, the material and the efficient cause. The per accidens definition of Brahman is adopted because the non-dual
Brahman cannot have any qualities which are real as there would be loss of non-duality. Hence the causality of creation etc. is not real qualification (Visessana) but is only an accedens (Upadesana). It necessarily falls short of what it qualifies, but is nevertheless able to give us a glimpse of the nature of that subject (Brahman).

(e) Brahman as Vivarta-Upadana:

From what precedes it is clear that Brahman is the material and efficient cause of the world. But its causality should not be understood in the ordinary sense. If Brahman is an efficient cause, does it mean that there is something other than Brahman, which is to be moulded into the form of the world? If Brahman is a material cause does it mean that it undergoes transformation in order to become the world? That there is a second to Brahman is not acceptable to the advaitin. That Brahman is a material and undergoes transformation also disturbs the immutability of the highest self. Therefore, the Advaitin propounds the doctrine of Vivarta, that is, the causation without transformation. The Advaitin holds that the creation and dissolution of the world are like evolution and involution; this is the theory of illusory manifestation. In this case, there is no room for the atomic and the evolutionary theories. Theories of origination and transformation presuppose the existence of time and space, that is why they cannot have any reference to Brahman who is partless and Bliss absolute. Any material change in the material cause can only occur in a
pre-existing time and space. Brahman is beyond time and space. Moreover, Arambhe and Parinama theories are contradictory to each other, so it cannot be decided whether cause and its effect are really different or non-different. The objection of Patakarya-vadin against the position of Arambhavadin amounts to this: The non-existence of the effect in the cause is not tenable due to the following reasons:

"(i) The effect is but a name of those qualities of the cause which have become manifest. The 'Ghata' or fitcher' is a name applied to the qualities of thickness, hollowness etc. which inhere in the earth in an unmanifest condition but become perceptible due to the agency of the potter. Apart from the above qualities of the cause, there is no such thing as 'Ghata'.

(ii) If the pre-existence of the effect in the cause is denied, then we can press oil out of stones."

The logicians who admit the difference between cause and its effect opine that a thing cannot be both cause and effect simultaneously. And a productive cause, the clay, cannot serve the purpose of its own and that of the jar, its effect. The view that there is no difference between cause and its effect does not stand the test of logic, because if a jar is deemed to be existent previous to its appearance it is no use for the potter to work upon the clay. Viewing this Vidyaranya says: The pot is not different from the clay, as it has no existence apart from the clay, it is not identical with the clay, as in the unmoulded
or products of reality called unreal, whereas reality is predicated only of the productive material in which the power (Maya) inheres. In the simile of the pot the clay is said to be the real entity in which the pot inheres. For the proponent of Sarinama-vada the cause is real while the effect is a name and a form imposed on the cause. The pot is but a name and a form imposed on the cause, clay. Gold is the reality, while the bracelet is but a name and a form. But Vivarta-vada goes one further. For it the empirical cause is no more real than the empirical effect (pot, bracelet). Clay is no more real than the pot. It, too, is a name and a form superposed on the metaphysical cause - Brahman.

We have three definitions of Vivarta and Sarinama in Siddhant lessangreha. A change which is of the same grade of reality as the productive thing, is a transformation, that, which is not of the same grade of reality, is illusory manifestation; or the change which is of the same nature as the material cause, is modification and what is of a different nature from that is illusory manifestation; or the effect which is non-different from the cause is a transformation; the effect which even without
being non-different from the cause is yet difficult to state apart from the cause is an illusory manifestation. This distinction between Vivarta and Karinma has been drawn by Appaya Diksita. 1

(f): In what respect Brahman is the productive material of the Universe:

The post Shankar advaitins are not unanimous in explaining how the world has come out of Brahman, although they are at one in holding the view of Vivarta, as Brahman is one without a second so it itself must be the material of the universe. But if it is pure, how can it be the material?

The author of tanae pasariraka and his commentator Madhavadeva hold that the pure Brahman alone is the material cause. They take their stand upon the ground that in the aphorism about the origination of the world and in the Bhava whereon material causality is declared to be the definition of the Brahman that is to be known and constitutes the subject matter of the V. U. t. r. s. 2 Further they remark that the scriptural passages dealing with the causality of Brahman, are not expressive but indicative of the pure Brahman. It is because the terms omniscience etc., denote that aspect of Brahman which is associated with Maya. This aspect,

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however, is not here intended to be intimated as it does not constitute the subject matter of Advaita. To the question - how pure intelligence can be the material cause? - Sarvejnanath replies that in the case of the pure and immutable Brahman, independent causality is unintelligible, so Maya is considered to be the subsidiary cause; the subsidiary though not the material cause, is yet present in the effect.

(g) : Intelligence associated with Maya is the material.

The author of Vivrdhana and his commentators like Acharendanda and Vijnubhatta differ from the view of Sarvejnanath. They think that material cause is only that form of Brahman which is the Lord as qualified by nescience and associated with Maya. They cite a scriptural passage in support of their view. It has been expressly stated in that passage that the material causality is to be assigned to that aspect of Brahman only, which knows everything in principle as well as in detail and whose nature is compact of knowledge. From him all these empirical objects take their rise. Further they assert that the characteristic mark assigned to the material cause of the world is exclusive of the jiva. If however, intelligence common to jiva and Isvara were the material cause then there was no need to exclude the Jiva.
Hence it is clear from the Dhāraya that the pure intelligence is not desired to be the cause but it is intelligence associated with Maya that is the material cause of the world.

(h) : The view of the author of Pādrtha Tattva nirnaya:

Gangapuri Bhattachar holds that Brahman and Maya are to be regarded as the material cause of the world. All the phenomenal objects are existent. Their existence cannot be intelligible unless being is attributed to them. Being is the same whatever may be the nature of things that exist. Existence, therefore, has been derived from Brahman which is the changeless cause (Vivartakarana) of this world. But all the changing contents must be regarded as products of the modification of some substance, and that substance is Maya which is regarded to be the 'perinæal' cause of the world. Thus Brahman is the Vivarta Cause and Maya is the perinæal cause of the world. The world manifests both aspects, the aspects of changeless being, and that of a changing substance. According to Vasempati Jiva or the empirical individual is the locus of Avidya and Brahman, the self-revealed intelligence is its object. It obscures Brahman and through Brahman it makes its false appearance and gives it the semblance of reality. Brahman, owing to its being the object of the Jiva-located nescience, of itself illusory manifests itself in the form of the world. Hence Maya is merely an accessory, not a subsidiary cause persistent in the world.
According to the author of Vedanta sūtrās, Prakāśamandana, the attribution of causality to Brahman does not stand the test of logic. Causality means the dual relation of cause and effect. In Advaita there is nothing else but Brahman, so it cannot, under any circumstances, be called a cause. The characteristic nature of Brahman as given by the scripture is that it is neither a cause nor an effect and is devoid of both inside and outside. Again it has been declared in Śruti that there is no effect and no instrument known of him. In this case it is contrary to reason and the Śruti to assume Brahman to be the cause of the world. It is just figuratively that nescience is said to be the cause of the world; because nescience too cannot be the cause of the world owing to the circumstance that causality itself is based upon the false notion of duality, which is the offspring of nescience.

The theory of cause and effect, therefore, does not enter the sphere of Advaita. How can this nescience be regarded to be the cause of the world, when its own nature has not yet been proved by any means of knowledge. It is like darkness and Brahman is like light. And it is not possible to perceive darkness by the help of light.

It is evident from these above mentioned different views about the causality of Brahman and the nescience that the followers
of Sankara were divided into two different schools with regard to the problem of causality. The Viverasa School and its followers like Ramanuja, Gangesuri and Vidyaranya consider that Maya is regarded as positive and as the stuff of the transformations of world appearance. According to this class of advaitins it is not intelligible to say that this world has no kind of existence at all. At the hands of these Vedantists the doctrine of advaita began to concede that, since the variety and multiplicity of world appearance cannot be explained by the pure immutable Brahman, so an undefinable stuff, Maya has certainly to be admitted as the ground of the world.

There were some other advaitins like V.P. Madhav, Anand Bhaña and Prajnananda who tried to explain Vedanta from an idealistic viewpoint and denied the objective existence of any stuff.

1. Bliss:

It has been stated above that existence, intelligence and bliss are not the qualities of Brahman, but they constitute the very nature of Brahman. The followers of Sankara are not at one about the characteristic nature of bliss, and also there are divergent views as to whether in empirical ego the bliss is manifest or not.

Sarasvatimarutu maintains that what is meant by the statement that self is of the nature of bliss is that there is entire absence of sorrow or negation of bliss in the self. Thus according to Sarasvatimarutu bliss means the absence of negation of bliss.

According to Prekasatman-ananda or bliss is the substance which appears as blissful, since it is the object which we really desire. It is the self on which the character of blissfulness is imposed. The self is called blissful, because it is the ground of the appearance of blissfulness. Wordly people desire what is blissful not bliss itself.

Prekasatman does not agree with the Vivarana view. The fault which he finds with it is that the self appears not only as blissful, but also painful, if its designation is based upon its appearance. Thus it can safely be called painful. According to Prekasatman the term blissful is applied to that object only which is endowed with bliss, the object of blissfulness which in itself is dissociated from blissfulness is not logically called blissful. If blissfulness is not a natural character of the self it cannot be called blissful, because in that case that thing too could be called blissful on which blissfulness is illusorily imposed. The scriptural passages bear evidence to the fact that Bliss which has been characterised as release is identical with Brahman, the result of highest knowledge. When we say that it is the result of the realization of the true nature of the self, it means that release is as eternal as the self and does not undergo any change. Now Bliss which is identical with release and Brahman has been stated as merely the cessation of miseries, the offspring of the transmigratory existence. According to this view it is obvious that
Servajnatman and his followers like Madhavacarana, whose view has been briefly expounded above considered bliss as a form of non-existence or negation. Chitsukha’s criticism of this view as expounded by Appaya in Siddhanteesa Sangraha is that in the case of happiness or bliss superiority and inferiority are established in experience, and that can hold good only if bliss is considered to be of the nature of an existent. And it is observed that persons, desirous of some intense happiness, though for a moment, are inclined to experience misery for a long time. There can be no gradation of mere non-existence. It is the positive conception of bliss which distinguishes advaita from nihilistic Buddhism and Nyaya ....

A. No doubt, the word 'nihilistic,' however, is being used not in a pejorative but in a descriptive case. It is being used not give an estimate of Buddhism but the reason of its unacceptability to Vedic orthodoxy. It is true modern Buddhist scholarship has exposed the fallacious character of this orthodox interpretation but this interpretation stands there as a historical fact and the contexts in which I have used the word 'nihilism' in regard to Buddhism show that there was no call for me to rectify this misunderstanding. I have only acknowledged its historical factuality. To enter upon a discussion of the validity or otherwise of the concept of Buddhist nihilism would have been quite irrelevant and uncalled for digression. Otherwise, I agree with the following observations of Dr. Shri "To the Vedanta and Mahavada, the Madhyamika with his purely epistemological approach and basis of a doctrine of reality, cannot but appear as nihilistic. The 'no-doctrine' attitude of the Madhyamika is construed by Vedanta and Mahavada as a 'no-reality' doctrine; they accuse the Madhyamika unjustifiably, of denying the real altogether and as admitting a theory of appearance without any reality as its ground (nirukshana nirguna). In fact the Madhyamika does not deny the real; he only denies 'doctrines' about the real (The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.318).
Vaisheshika. Mandana Miśra's Brahmac Siddhi has a long and
decisive discussion about the matter. Mandana asserts that
absence of misery is not bliss, because the two misery and
happiness can be experienced simultaneously by a person
half immersed in a cool tank on a hot day. If an absence of
misery is deemed to be happiness, a man who is being tortured
in a Rumbhi-Paschall ought to be happy, because, for the time
being, he is spared other tortures in other hells. Again this
negative nature of bliss does not hold good because the
experience of grades of happiness derived from different objects
through different means is unintelligible. Non-existence
(Abhava) is free from the degrees of gradation. If all that is
sought be the cessation of a particular want namely, hunger,
why should there be the search for a tasty and rich food?
It may be said that it is the desired object that pleases,
not the other, so the objects please by putting an end to
desire. Desire is the cause of tension and misery; it is,
therefore, the extinction of desire and the consequent extinction
of misery that constitutes happiness. Seneca rejoinder is that
the enjoyment of the desired objects does not extinguish desire
in reality. But the case is reverse; enjoyment becomes a habit
and is sought after again and again. Desire on the other hand
may cease, not through enjoyment, but by the realisation of the
worthlessness of the objects of desire. Absence of desire
resulting from finding fault with enjoyment does not equate with
happiness springing forth from enjoyment. Nor can it be maintained
that in all cases happiness is in proportion to desire and
effort, because it is observed in everyday experience that which
is gained with less tension and effort gives us greater happiness;
and what is generally desired and gained with great efforts may
cause misery in the end. Attachment to happiness is no doubt,
condemned, but what is meant is the seeking after the lower
impermanent and impure forms of happiness; attachment to the
highest bliss is not Saga. It is because the highest self is
bliss and we are identical with the highest self that even in
bondage the self is an object of supreme love.

Bliss manifested by Saksin.

On the ground of observation it is decided in the section
dealing with witness intelligence that nescience obscures
intelligence to the exclusion of witness intelligence. It follows from this that the witness - bliss (Seksi-Amenda) too is evident in the state of transmigratory existence, because bliss and ever-abiding consciousness are identical. It is a highly controversial topic. The different sections of advaitins tried their utmost to expound their own views and refute those of the others.

The founder of Viverana School, Prakasatman, Advaita Vidyasarya and Vidyaranya hold that the blissful aspect of the self is certainly manifest. They base their view on the fact that the self is an object of unconditioned love and affection which presuppose the self's being of the nature of bliss. Its' being the object of greatest love is proof eloquent of its being of the nature of bliss. It is observed that more than the body, mind and life men loves his self, his being. The self, therefore, is bliss. Others are loved for the sake of the self, but the self is loved for its own sake and for that of none else. It is, therefore, clear that the self being an object of supreme love is of the nature of highest bliss. Prakasatman's statement in the Viverana that there is certainly manifested happiness, which is characterised as being the abode of supreme love also supports the view of Vidyaranya. Others raise the objection that if this be the case, there will be no distinction between the state of transmigration and release. The view that even in mundane life bliss is manifested has been criticised. Bliss being one and the same cannot assume two different forms. In that case one form must be real while the
other is unreal. The difference between bliss as Brahman and the 
bless of Sakra is in this that the former is the prototype while 
the latter is the reflection of the former in nonsense. The 
difference of the prototype from the reflection is quite clear. 
The critic points out that such a difference is a fiction or 
assumption and therefore does not count in the case of bliss 
which is real.

Nor can it be said that the light of the sun is one and the 
same, but its manifestation is observed in different degrees when 
it is conditioned by different manifestors, such as the palm of 
the hand, crystal, mirror and the like. Similarly it may be said 
that the bliss though one, can be superior or inferior according 
as it is manifested in different degrees when it is conditioned 
by different vrtis; for the case is not analogous. The view that 
the manifestation of the sun-light in various degrees is owing 
to the nature of manifestors is not tenable, since when the 
passage of the sun light, which spreads everywhere and shines 
but not clearly in the sky, is obstructed with hand etc. it is 
not the creation manifestation thereof but intensification and 
when the passage of it is obstructed by a crystal or mirror it 
is the addition of the brightness of the mirror or crystal, not 
manifestation. In brief it can be said that the light of the sun 
can be increased or decreased, but the pure intelligence or bliss 
is not a subject to decrease or increase. If on the other hand 
the illustration be taken to be apt then the state of transmigrat-
ion itself would turn out to be more desirable than release, since 
underlined bliss in release will not be clear like the light of 
sun spreading in the sky while the bliss defined by vrti in the 
state of Sensara will be clearly like the light of the sun 
conditioned by hand etc.
Brahman, of Ananda all compact, is manifested as a hierarchy of various degrees of Bliss according to the variations in adjuncts. His main assertion is that it is illogical to ignore what is observed in every day experience and is stated in scripture. Scriptural passage and experience bear out the fact that Bliss, though one in itself, is superior at one place while elsewhere at the same time it becomes inferior owing to its limiting adjuncts. Just as a single white light being reflected in the mirrors with different degrees of impurity takes on many inferior forms due to differences in the qualities of the reflecting media, mirrors, even so, on the bliss which is one alone and constitutes the essential nature of the self, and is unsurpassable, a hierarchy of pleasures and pains is superimposed in different degrees according to the quantity and quality of the impurity (dirt) or inertia (Tamas) resident in the inner organ. Hence in the bliss, though manifest in the state of transmigration, there is no satisfaction since, through the superimposed grades of intensity, it is unsurpassable. At the dawn of right knowledge a cessation is put to all kinds of super-imposition of grades and in consequence of this unsurpassable bliss is realised. This is the distinction between the bliss in bondage and the bliss in final release.

Bhiss is obscured in bondage but not wholly.

Bliss, though manifest, is certainly obscured. Its manifestation and obscuration are consistent with experience. There is no gain saying the fact that bliss is manifest, because
unsurpassable love and affection are experienced for the self which is termed as bliss. It is obscured because of experience. Bliss is not in me, it is not manifest'. In one and the same witness (Saksa) different aspects are posited by nescience. In so far as the intelligence aspect of Saksa is concerned it is not obscured, and it is obscured so far as the bliss aspect of it is concerned. Bliss being manifest is obscured, because apart from its being present, it is not recognised owing to certain obstructions. For example, a number of pupils sitting around their teacher are chanting the vedic verses in chorus. But if we want to hear the voice of a particular boy it is not easy to fix upon it as it forms part of the chorus and is indistinguishable from it. When the voices of the other boys are silenced, one by one, the voice of a particular boy can be recognised. Here the other voices are the obstruction. The obstruction that prevents the recognition of the bliss aspect of intelligence is the superimposition of what does not really exist and is not self-evident on the self luminous Atman. Owing to this superimposition its character as truth and bliss is obscured. In the illustration the voice of the particular boy was drowned by the chorus of the other boys. Similarly the supreme bliss of Brahma is obscured by the superimposition of Avidya, which is the main cause of illusion.

According to Vacaspati Misra the undefined bliss being the
true nature of inner self is eternally attained, but it ceases to be as it were, in the state of transmigration due to the operation of nescience, which exhibits objects of nature contrary thereto. Thus it appears as if it were unattained. On the removal of that nescience a man gets rid of all evil and the bliss is attained, as it were like the forgotten golden ornament round one's neck. Thus its attainment is figurative.

Bliss non-existent in bondage:

Appaya mentions a view of some advaitins which is opposite to that of Vascespati Misra. According to this view the attainment of bliss at the dawn of true knowledge is not figurative, but it is actual. It is because in the state of transmigration the notion that unexceellable bliss does not exist and is not manifest is prevalent and that must have the veil of nescience as its cause. The experience of the veil of unexceellable bliss is the result of the veil of Ajnana. From this it follows that obscuration by ignorance gives rise to a posited non-existence of the bliss of Brahman which persists as long as ignorance does. At the cessation of ignorance the bliss appears because its non-existence is based upon ignorance which ceases to be. Thus the attainment of bliss is not to be taken in the figurative but in the primary sense.

Conscience:

The View of BharatiTirtha:

Now there arises the problem of conscience of Brahman. Brahman's conscience does not accord with reason, since knowledge itself is impossible in case of Brahman owing to its being devoid of internal organ, the means of knowledge. A jiva on the
other hand can be knower on account of its being endowed with the means of knowledge. Then Brahman cannot be even a knower, how can it be of the nature of Omniscience?

1 In reply to this the view of the author of Pencadasi is that the omniscient aspect of Brahman is possessed of an adjunct called nescience. This nescience is the productive material of all the internal organs, so it is associated with the impressions of the intellects of all beings. Thus being the witness of all the impressions of all contents, Brahman can be termed as Omniscient. According to Vidyaranya the nescience, which is the material cause of all the individual intellects, is persistent in the impressions of intellects. Intelligence being conditioned by nescience can safely be said to be omniscient.

Criticism of the view:

Bhartitirtha's view that the reflection of intelligence qualified by the impressions of the intellects is an omniscient aspect of intelligence called Isvara has been criticised by Kramananda. What is the adjunct of Ishvara? Is it bare nescience or nesciences as associated with the impressions, or bare impression? If bare nescience be the adjunct of Isvara it would be contrary to the view that Isvara is the reflection of Cit in the nescience qualified by the impressions of intellect. Nor is the second alternative, that Isvara has nescience for His adjunct to be omniscient valid, for it is better to regard nescience alone as the adjunct than nescience associated with impressions. It is in accordance with the rule of parsimony. In
defence it may be said that if bare nescience be regarded as an adjunct it would be difficult to establish the omniscience for Isvara, so impressions of the intellects are said to be the qualifications of nescience and thus omniscience is possible for Isvara. In reply to this Kramananda says that since omniscience can be established through the Setus- Virati of nescience, it is useless to admit the impressions of intellect as the qualification of nescience. Further, he says, omniscience cannot be established through the impressions of the intellects, because each impression cannot apprehend all things. Hence we must regard all impressions as the qualification of nescience, if omniscience is to be established. But all the impressions can exist together only at the time of Pralaya, not at the time of subsistence of the world. So omniscience is not established through impressions. The third alternative, that the bare impressions are the adjuncts of Isvara is also inadmissible, because if in each of the impressions the reflection of Cit is Isvara, then there will be many Isvaras. If Isvara be the one reflection present in all the impressions omniscience cannot be established because except in Pralaya all the impressions cannot exist at one and the same time and there cannot be a single reflection in many impressions. Hence the commentator concludes that omniscient God cannot be established according as it has been expounded by Vidyaranya.

1. The view of Prekârtha

The author of Prekârtha asserts that the jiva is admitted to be a cognizer because of its association with the adjunct - the internal organ - which transforms itself into the form of...
objects with which it comes into contact through channels of the senses or impressions, and the transformations of which take on the reflections of intelligence. Similarly for Brahman there are transformations of its adjunct - Maya - which take on the reflections of intelligence, there is omniscience. The universe exists either in a gross form or in a subtle form, or in the form of impressions, and is immediately known through the flashes of intelligence reflected in Maya. The main idea of this view is that just as internal organ (Antahkarana) serves the purpose of an adjunct essential to cognition so Maya on the part of the Lord serves the purpose of an adjunct requisite for a cognising principle. In this view God has always an immediate knowledge of this universe as it was in the past, as it is at present and as it will be in future.

The view of the author of Tattva Suddhi:

Jnanaghnagapada establishes omniscience thus: in the manner mentioned above perception of the entire existing world is possible for Brahman, and since it possesses impressions produced by perception, remembrance also is intelligible. Prior to creation, Maya - the adjunct of Brahman - transforms itself into the form of cognition of all objects in accordance with the unseen potencies of the Jivas (Jiva-adstremanodhena) Brahman which has that (Maya) as adjunct, becomes the witness by being reflected in Maya and thus is an agent in respect of the Maya's different transformations. In this way the cognition relating to the future things is intelligible on the part of Brahman. The main feature of this view is that perception (Pratyaksa) has those things only
for its objects that are existing, and it does not stand to reason to assume that Brahman's perceptive knowledge is of a different nature because the scriptural passages dealing with the omniscience of Brahman are silent about its (Jnana's) Proksata and Aparoksata. Viewing this it is proper to assume that Brahman like a jiva, has a Proksa Jnana of the past object.

The view of the author of Vedanta Koswadi:

According to the previous views the omniscience of Brahman was declared to be based upon cognitions through vivid, but Panchadnya maintains that Brahman's omniscience means that Brahman manifests everything which is in contact with the pure intelligence upon which the entire empirical existence is superimposed. Brahman's omniscience does not depend upon the cognitions through vivid, because in that case there would be a conflict with the scriptural passage which expressly declare that Brahman alone without a second is shining and all else shines after it. If on the other hand, Brahman's omniscience depends on vivid the modification of nescience - then at the time of dissolution of the world and prior to the creation of the world when Maya exists in the form of impressions omniscience will cease to be. So it is proper to hold that Brahman's omniscience is due to Svayamajnana not to Vrtti-jnana. His knowledge is not due to Vrtti-jnana because, thus his knowledge will be non-permanent and he would know sometimes and sometimes he would not know it will follow indeed that he is not all knowing. Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition as the
sun's nature is eternal luminousness, can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of knowledge such as vrtti and the like. Thus Brahman is not a knower but knowledge illuminating all objects: no idea of agency is involved here.  

1 The view of Vasapatinircara:

The author of Bhavati opines that knowerhood (jnairtva) cannot reasonably be assigned to maya or its products like external and internal organs because of their being inert nor can it be ascribed to pure intelligence because it hurts its immutability. Knowerhood is the property of a composite of matter and spirit. From this it is quite clear that cognition though apparently associated with the products of maya in reality it belongs to Brahman. Inert nature cannot engage itself in any type of activity. Thus Brahman is omniscient owing to its being manifestor of all things superimposed upon it. It illumines them in their presence and when they are absent and when Brahman stands in no relation to any object of knowledge, then too, it is shining just as the sun shines and illumines the objects of the world. It is clear from what precedes that omniscience means the light of intelligence upon which everything else is based and is existent. All knowingness, hence, is eternal knowledge independent of objects, and constitutes the nature of Brahman.