Chapter III

THE TRANSVALUATION OF VALUES

We have so far elucidated Nietzsche's most basic assumption -- his philosophical groundwork. In Nietzsche's projected "life-task", the "Transvaluation of all Values" 1 this groundwork plays a critical role. On the grounds of power, health and decadence Nietzsche identifies two basic types of evaluations: the master moralities and the slave moralities. While he tries to formulate a critique of the latter, the former serves as his cue to a new mode of evaluation. While the inner dialectic of the Transvaluation may be seen to work in the critiques that Nietzsche is trying to formulate, its outer dialectic may be seen in the new possibilities that the inner dialectic throws up.

A one line aphorism could well be called the axiom upon which the whole Transvaluation rests: "There are no moral phenomena at all, only a moral interpretation of phenomena ..." 2 The philosophical significance of such an assertion is the denial of any metaphysical ground, or criterion for moral judgments. His attention is focused primarily on religious moralities which assume a complex "moral world-order". Such a world order is one in which good and evil, for example, are taken as concepts denoting antithetical ontological realities. The bifurcation of reality includes the belief that there are, for example, the God, God, a "beyond"

(80)
or a "higher" metaphysical realm, and correspondingly, an antithetical world of evil, Satan or a depreciated and devalued world of phenomena. Parallel to an ontological bifurcation of reality there is a bifurcation in man — there is a part of him which is "good", for example the soul, faith, piety, selflessness, or the ability to keep to the law, and another part of him which is "evil" for example the desires, passions, and an individualistic instinctual life generally.

Since there are no moral "phenomena" nor any moral "facts", Nietzsche denies that there can be any axiological bifurcation of the world or man. Such bifurcations only create false worlds and false psychologies. They are at best, reflections of a will-to-nothingness, a "nihilistic" will to power. They cannot have any (objective) grounds. What is called "good" or "evil" remains, under his monistic principle, the same throughout. At most there could be a difference of manifestation, of degree and not of kind:

...between good and evil actions there is no difference in kind, but at the most one of degree. Good actions are sublimated evil ones; evil actions are coarsened, brutalized good ones.

Nietzsche goes to the extent of asserting that those instincts called "evil" have been necessary conditions for the creation of a "gentler civilization"; they are "the cyclopean architects and road-makers of humanity".
Nietzsche asserts that human actions are themselves morally ambiguous. This is revealed, he says, in the fact that in history the perspectives of moral evaluations have constantly shifted. Thus approval or disapproval have been directed towards the consequences of actions, or to the actions themselves, or to the motives of action (the deed becoming morally ambiguous), or the whole nature of man is itself brought into question. However, Nietzsche holds that these could only be motivated interpretations. The thrust of Nietzsche’s arguments are that man cannot be either judged or held responsible for his actions. His nature is one of "necessary consequence"; therefore responsibility is an error that rests on the further "error" of free will.

Nietzsche himself opts for a position of moral equanimity. Though his ground work may be said to constitute the metanormative elements of a value theory, he himself does not intend to work out any universal or a priori principles of conduct. Unlike Kant and Moore he does not assert any autonomy for the ethical object, i.e., the "Good", nor is he interested in looking to either social relations or reason as a source of moral evaluations. His position may be said to be one of individualism or egoism, but which too has to be drastically qualified.
Interestingly it may be observed thatjust as in the face of a philosophical nihilism Nietzsche also claims, paradoxically, to be a passionate searcher for truth so in the face of a moral skepticism Nietzsche still claims to be deeply concerned about being moral. So claims in a letter to have "a more severe morality than anybody..." Having said this much we had best attempt a fuller elucidation of the Transvaluation.

The master-slave morality: Man qua man is free, that characterizes him is the "instinct of freedom". By this Nietzsche merely means to imply that pristine man lives in the total freedom of the instincts without any social norms or rules to impede their normal course.

Nietzsche begins with the primacy of man's instinctual life. In their most primitive form the instincts are directed outside their source towards, for example, other men or objects of the world. What causes a problem in this "natural" course of things is the introduction of a norm or rule which denies the instinct its object, and as such, denies its "freedom".

However, rather than expand itself, the instinct turns inwards, upon the source of the instinct itself:

All instincts which do not find a vent without turn inwards — this is what I call the internalization of man.
The internalization of the instincts Nietzsche treats as a "serious illness" which has plagued men's entire history, (shown for example in customary moralities). Nietzsche calls this "illness" the "bad conscience", i.e., a form of self-inflicted pain.

Furnish, cruelty, the delight in persecution, in surprises, change, destruction—the turning of these instincts against their own possessions; this is the origin of the bad conscience.

But this self-inflicted suffering also, says Nietzsche, had the "purpose" of developing the "sovereign individual" who has a "conscience".

Nietzsche describes the "sovereign individual" as one in whom the "instinct of freedom" reasserts itself over and above the mass of men. This really means that such an individual is free from the moral constraints of society and as such is autonomous. Nietzsche asserts that since morality is more or less identifiable as a denial of the "instinct of freedom", it follows that "autonomous" and "moral" are mutually exclusive terms. Therefore, when Nietzsche says that the "sovereign individual" is "autonomous" he merely means autonomous of social morality.

Further, Nietzsche's intention in asserting that the "sovereign individual" is autonomous of morality is that it clears the way for the development of the individual conscience. Such an individual finds in himself "his standard of value". The awareness of his autonomy from social morality and thence of his own necessity,
sinks into his "innermost depths", it becomes a "dominating instinct"; "the sovereign man calls this his conscience." 12

Though Nietzsche does not explicitly argue as such, it may be inferred from his usage of the conscience that the conscience is the "link" between unconscious necessity and conscious awareness. It creates the awareness of that unconditional evaluation that "this and nothing else is necessary now", which we saw was one of the features of a "free will".

We shall take up the conscience again later. Here we may note that the conscience becomes Nietzsche's ground for identifying what he calls master moralities.

In especially the early works his paradigms for such moralities are taken from the ancient Jews, the Persians, the Greeks, and the pre-Christian Teutonic race. These cultures he also calls "physical cultures". They are evidence of "aristocratic modes of being" and "aristocratic modes of evaluation." He cites individuals from the cultures as examples of those in whom there exists a harmonious equilibrium of the instinctual forces and who are capable of creatively using their dominant instinct to perfect themselves in various activities. 13 We may briefly list some of the features of the modes of evaluation of these cultures.

1) An intense propensity for egoism. Each individual maintains a "pathos of distance" from the other in order that he be able to
develop his own predominant instinct, free from the constraints of the others' evaluation. There exists between these individuals, a healthy and severe competition, which, Nietzsche says, is necessary to generate creativity.

ii) The ability to requite, measure for measure. He prefers an open, fair and severe competition with his equals. He respects his opponent and forgives easily. Most important for Nietzsche, he harbours no resentment or malvolence towards the other in his heart.

iii) The ability to keep to one's word. Once the conscience is aware of the unconditional necessity of the moment, then what remains is the ability or the power to maintain a continence between the dictates of one's conscience and one's action. This essentially being what Nietzsche means by keeping a 'promise'.

iv) Finally, the evaluations of master moralities are suggested by the use of such concepts as "good" and "bad". The concept of "evil" does not exist in master moralities. The sovereign individual does not condemn the "other" who is his inferior; he does not pass judgment. He merely maintains a perfect equality and expresses his "disapproval", if it all, by saying "bad".

It should be emphasised that Nietzsche's use of the term master has the essential sense of a self-overcoming i.e. an ascetic of the instincts. In other words mastery would imply the ability to perceive not only the command of the conscience, but also the ability
to overcome resistance and obey and command.

Nietzsche may have developed his ideas through a Greek notion. The Greeks had a varied sense of mastery-slavery, from the submission to "fate" for the tragedians, to the common sense of meaning economic and communal relationships between a master and a slave. But more important, and Nietzsche may have been aware of this, the Greeks used mastery to mean the ability to control one's physical and emotional forces, and slavery to mean the submission to these forces.16 That marks out his notion of asceticism is the emphasis on the power and creative ability that arises out of asceticism. Nietzsche often uses the examples of Indian ascetics and Brahmin priests in whom there is great enhancing of power. Similarly artists, saints and philosophers are claimed to be high forms of the will to power's ascetics.

At this point it may be useful to offer certain clarifications. For Nietzsche the will to power is characterized by the instinct of freedom. Logically, both are identical.

Everything is will to power. There is nothing which is not will to power, and wherever we find the will to power there we will also find the instinct of freedom.

Nietzsche then, leads us to the thesis that the same will to power manifests itself in varying degrees. In a manner typical to his use of antinomies he uses two basic categories to describe this manifestation. Thus the will to power or the instinct of freedom
manifests itself in (a) health or decadence (b) the conscience or the bad conscience, (c) a decadent, nihilistic will to power or a healthy, affirmative form of the will to power; (d) in forms of morality that use concepts like "Good and Evil" or in forms of morality that use "Good and Bad", (i.e. in slave moralities or in master moralities). In each set of categories it is the "ideal instinct of freedom (to use my own language the will to power)".17

In both cases, asceticism would imply the formulation of a practice, values, goals, ends and purposes. These however would not imply a total negation or a total efflorescence of the will to power qua the instinct of freedom. Rather they would imply limited curtailment, "self-constraint" and channelization. It would be a matter of prescription and direction not negation. It was precisely for the identification and evaluation of these kinds of channelizations that Nietzsche develops the above categories. That he develops them in the way that he does is a peculiarity of his philosophy.

We have attempted to give an account of how Nietzsche conceptualizes the sovereign individual who is the paradigm of master moralities. As a contrast to the above Nietzsche conceptualizes the priest-types -- the paradigm of slave moralities.

Though Nietzsche works out extensive historical exegesis to show the origins and the mutual relation between the two, we shall avoid discussing these since it is not of philosophical interest.
We may observe that historically Nietzsche identifies, mutatis mutandis, slave moralities with religious moralities.

What may be significant for our understanding is his assertion that a master or slave could occur in all classes, and in every age and culture. He is cautious that the distinction is not easy to perceive; economic, social, or political classes are no indication of it. He goes to the extent of saying that under certain conditions a sophisticated degree of "mediation" may exist between them and that they could even be observed "within the same man, within one soul." Nietzsche sees the advent of the priests' evaluations as a "dangerous sharpening and intensification of opposed values". The priest always proclaims himself by a psychological superiority. He makes axiological bifurcations into the very nature of men. There is a part of man that is "evil" and is to be condemned, and there is a part of him that is "good" and is to be recommended. Here says Nietzsche "good" and "evil", "clean" and "unclean" confront each other as criteria for distinction.

Whereas the master moralities and the individualistic nature glorify and exult in their instinctual life, the priest type introduces a moral gradation into the instincts.

Nietzsche's argues that the fact that a part of men is being condemned as "evil" and "unclean" means that there must be something psychologically wrong with such an evaluation. His analysis takes him into a discussion of the psychology of the priest types, Nietzsche
typically describes the conditions under which these values arise as pathological. The "habits" of these "sacerdotal aristocracies" that arise are "mordid" and "neurasthenic". 21

To be brief, the priest-type arises under conditions of decadence, that is, under conditions of pain and suffering. Such conditions create, in the heart of the priest-type, a profound ill-will and resentment against all that the sovereign individual holds valuable.

Nietzsche holds that the origin of the evaluatory term "evil" arises from the heart of the resentful man; he holds that resentment is one of the primary conditions which gives birth to a peculiar set of values.

"The revolt of the slaves in morals begins in the very principle of resentment becoming creative and giving birth to values." 22

Decadence and resentment, therefore, may be identified as two essential elements which characterize slave moralities. This leads us to the third concept which plays much importance in Nietzsche's analysis, namely the way in which the slave or the priest-type perceives "actuality".

Nietzsche says that "actuality" is related under conditions of decadence. It is only those who suffer, in whom pain predominates, who feel the need to draw away from actuality.

Who alone has reason to lie himself out of actuality? He who suffers from it. But to suffer from actuality means to be an abortive actuality ... . The preponderance of feelings of displeasure over feelings of pleasure is the cause of a fictitious morality and religion; such a preponderance however, provides the formula for decadence..... 23
This need to draw away from actuality Nietzsche squarely calls "the theologian's instinct", it is a resentment directed against actuality, including themselves, and especially against any strong individualistic natures. The pathos that develops in the theologian is "faith" which Nietzsche sees as an elaborate process of self-deception, a lie: "closing one's eyes with respect to oneself for good and all so as not to suffer from the sight of incurable falsity." One wishes not to look: "Faith" means not wanting to know what is true.

All this eventually leads to the total inversion of actuality: there emerge the postulations of a (metaphysical) beyond, a "moral world order". A complicated "false psychology" is invented to give credence to the lie. Nietzsche's frequent use for this creation of a new order of things is the term the "holy lie". His critique of religious moralities is, therefore, a critique of this "holy lie", of which he offers an elaborate exposition.

For Nietzsche the inversion of actuality is the "most mendacious interpretation" that there can be. It denies the individual. It creates an immense amount of fear of one's own instinctual life, one's "evil" nature, and creates neurosis and guilt — the "bad conscience". It brings about the denaturalisation of natural values, "the falsification of all nature, all naturalness, all reality, the entire inner world as well as the outer". In short, such a "falsification" of actuality is part of the "slave revolt in morals".
Throughout this process Nietzsche emphasises that the motive of the priests in creating this order is always power. The will to power is operative even in the invention of a falsifying set of categories: "Let us be in no doubt what at bottom is taking place every time; the will to the end, the nihilistic will wants power..." The priest is the paradigm par excellence of the will to nothingness. By negating the world, negating even itself, the nihilistic will, we are told, gets a greater feeling of power.

The Anti-Christ! Since Nietzsche is well known for his anti-Christian stance we shall briefly take up his discussion on the subject. We have been developing Nietzsche's thesis on the slave and master moralities. Nietzsche identifies slave moralities with religious moralities. He offers elaborate historical exegesis about the origin and development of the Judeo-Christian religion, which, again, we shall avoid discussing.

He begins by separating Jesus the person from Christ who is the person "fabricated" by the first Christians of the Gospels. The conception of Christ is merely a reflection of those who wrote the Gospels.

It is absolutely crucial to understand this distinction. Nietzsche's attitude towards Christianity is well known. This may lead us to overlook the fact that Nietzsche attempts a rather profound interpretation of Jesus; he is not criticising the life of Jesus.
the person, but only the teachings of those whom he calls the "Christians". In fact his famous work *The Anti-Christ* is not so much anti-Jesus as it is anti-Gospels, anti-Paul, anti-Luther and generally, anti-Christian. The greatest irony of this work is that Jesus looks almost like a paradigm of Nietzsche's own attitude towards the world.

Nietzsche's concern is the "problem of the *psychology of the redeemer*." He states clearly that he is not interested in the "fact" of Christ as a historical person. He is interested in the "psychological type" of Jesus. It may be observed that Nietzsche is not using "psychological type" as a derogatory or evaluative categorization; his intention is to offer a descriptive categorization.

Nietzsche isolates two features of the type he wishes to put Jesus in; firstly there is an "instinctive aversion" for reality, which arises out of an extreme sensitivity to any kind of contact with either other men or with the world. It arises out of an acute sensitivity to suffering and pain, so much so that it "feels every contact too deeply".

Secondly there is an instinctive *apathetic*. Sensitive to all contact, it feels the total *uselessness* of resistance and combat both "evil" and "evil-doer" with "love".

Jesus himself, as a person extremely sensitive to pain, is a case of such intense internalization that his language becomes essentially a symbolism, "an occasion for metaphors". As such Jesus could be called a "free-spirit" in the sense that "he cares nothing
for what is fixed". His faith "resists formulation" for "the word killeth, everything fixed killeth." 34

The experience out of which this symbolism arises can only be put in such metaphors as "life" or "truth" or "light". These are used to speak of what lies "inmost", in the "inner life". 35

As a "symbolist par excellence", Jesus stands outside the powers of interpretation, outside any intellectual endeavour be it religion or science or philosophy, or even history or politics: "his knowledge is precisely the mere folly of the fact that anything of this kind exists". 36 Jesus could not be interpreted as the negation of anything of the world e.g. culture or class or caste, for the concept of "world" is itself lacking in Jesus' symbolism. He is certainly not open to ecclesiastical interpretation.

Where his type does encounter an opposing point of view it will

with the most heartfelt sympathy, lament the 'blindness'—for it sees the 'light' — but it will make no objection... 37

Jesus' faith therefore does not struggle to defend itself and maintains its typical equanimity in the face of resistance and opposition. It does not try to prove itself "either by miracles or by rewards and promises", and certainly not "by the Scriptures". 38

Let us see how Nietzsche interprets the symbolism of Jesus. This is significant because Nietzsche's own axiological categories --
"perfection" and "eternity" — are read into the interpretation.

Jesus often refers to his 'Father' in Heaven. Himself he calls, the "Son of Man". Saying that Jesus' reference to himself as the "Son of Man" is an "eternal" fact, a psychological symbol freed from the time concept, Nietzsche interprets the "symbols" of Father and Son as follows:

....in the word "Son" is expressed the entry into the collective feeling of the transformation of all things (blessedness), in the word "Father" this feeling itself, the feeling of perfection and eternity. 40

The "Kingdom of God", Nietzsche further asserts, does not lie in a beyond, it lies in the heart. This is crucial. The Kingdom of God lies in the heart. "Blessedness" does not lie in a beyond; "Blessedness is not promised, it is the only reality." 41

Rather than teach about the Kingdom of Heaven in a beyond that is to come after death, Jesus teaches the Kingdom of God as a way of the heart:

The Kingdom of God is not something one waits for, it has no yesterday or tomorrow, it does not come 'in a thousand years' — it is an experience within a heart, it is everywhere, it is nowhere. 42

Thus Nietzsche says that the "glad tidings", Jesus' actual gospel, is a practice rather than a belief or a metaphysical doctrine of redemption. Jesus abjures the Judaic concepts of sin, forgiveness
of sin, faith, redemption by faith, rewards and punishment. No formulas, rites or prayer as a means to communicate with God; "evangelic practice alone leads to God, it is God".43

There is a phenomenological ground for such a practice. It is a practice at the core of which lies the "experience within a heart". If we relate this to the Father-Son symbolism then this experience is the transfiguration of the here and now into the symbolism of perfection and eternity. This is achieved precisely because the heart is atemporal ("it has no yesterday or tomorrow"), and aspatial ("it is everywhere it is nowhere"). Thus one may interpret Nietzsche as follows: the heart is the ground for the transfiguration of the present into the symbolism of eternity and perfection. Rather than using intellectual or rational categories to describe a metaphysical world, Nietzsche uses a symbolism to describe an emotive experience.

But there is a methodological problem involved. If the entire Gospels are a fabrication, as Nietzsche asserts, then what are the grounds for his interpretation. One cannot refer anywhere if we were to counter Nietzsche with assertions like, "But Jesus does/does not say or do this..." simply because Nietzsche denies the possibility of referring to the New Testament at all. He does assert that he is not interested in the historical fact; but in a psychological type. How far, and by what means, Nietzsche would relate this type to the historical person of Jesus therefore, remains ambiguous and, in fact, impossible to gauge.
Inspite of methodological problems, in this writer's opinion, the value of Nietzsche's interpretation lies in inducing at least a skepticism regarding the compilation of the texts regarding Jesus' life and teachings. Undoubtedly the texts have gone through many compilations and a little "interpretation" creeping in cannot be ruled out. In fact it has been remarked that Christ's terminology was reminiscent of "Hellenic pantheistic ideology" ("I and the Father are one") which was successively sought to be eradicated, notably by St. Augustine and the scholastic tradition, and was sought to be put onto a firm basis of dualistic monotheism. 44

Moreover, Christ, like all religious preceptors, hardly used the language of complicated theologies that later grew around him. Thus Nietzsche's skepticism may not be entirely misplaced. His peculiar criticism is based, however, not on purely hermeneutical grounds but has its grounding in his psychological "observations". What is noteworthy is Nietzsche's use of the terms "heart", "transfiguration", "perfection" and "eternity" all of which play an important role in Nietzsche's aesthetics.

We must briefly turn to Nietzsche's critique of Christianity. He says "there has been only one Christian, and he died on the cross." 45 Those who later came by the name of Christians have not been really so, primarily because they interpreted Christianity to mean a "belief" in the "truth" of Christ. Instead of taking him as the example for a practice they believed that Christ was a redeemer,
that Christ would redeem them. This for Nietzsche could only be asserted by those who, unable to be masters, used Christ as a crutch to escape their own selves. "Belief" and "truth", says Nietzsche, negate the very essence of Jesus' teachings of the heart. The first Christians were merely "slaves" revolting against a social hierarchy. There followed the gradual destruction of Jesus' teachings and their replacement by a more or less Judaic slave-morality with its teachings of redemption and salvation and a beyond. A transfiguration of the here and now remains unperceived.

Nietzsche's general critique of Christianity is crystallized in specific treatments of Paul and Luther, both are seen as weak, resentful men responsible for formulating much of Christian doctrine. whereas Paul's weakness consists in his inability to keep to the Judaic law, Luther's consisted in his inability to keep to the strict ascetic rules required by a monastic life. One can only refer the reader to Nietzsche's works, especially the Anti-Christ, to gauge the extent of Nietzsche's vituperative polemic against Christianity. The above account of slave moralities could merely act as the broad framework within which he launches his attack.

Socrates: We have been trying to identify certain features of what Nietzsche calls master moralities and slave moralities. We discussed his analysis of Jesus which is, at least on the face of it, a case apart.
It may prove interesting now to expose Nietzsche's understanding of Socrates and the Platonic tradition since it too takes its pathos from an analysis of slave moralities in terms of decadence, resentment and actuality.

The Greeks, Nietzsche says, had turned decadent by the time Socrates arrives upon the scene. Socrates himself was a "man of the rabble". A physically deformed and ugly man, he was resentful towards healthy, exuberant master-types. He admitted the "dissoluteness and anarchy of his instincts". In other words, he was decadent.

But Socrates also had a tremendous drive for power in the sense that he did want to have some power over his instincts. Therefore, he invented the dialectic and reason as a cover for something "hidden, reserved, subterranean". He perfected his own art of self-preservation.

But, and this seems to be Nietzsche's fait accompli; Socrates, the Greeks, and much of subsequent philosophy, have been absolutely deluded about the efficacy of reason in overcoming decadence. Decadence has no cure. Philosophers, in any case, cannot overcome its

This is beyond their powers; what they select as an expedient, as a deliverance, is itself only another expression of decadence— they alter its expression, they do not abolish the thing itself.
This entire "optimism" in reason, that through it man would "progress" Nietzsche rejects as an illness. This radical assertion makes a clean sweep of almost the entire philosophical attitude.

The entire morality of improvement, the Christian included, has been a misunderstanding. The harshest daylight, rationality at any cost, life upright, cold, circumspect, conscious, without instinct, in opposition to the instincts, has itself been no more than a form of sickness, another form of sickness. So

Socrates initiates two mistakes: firstly, he gave undue authority to Reason. Secondly, and this is the crux of Nietzsche's critique of Socrates, the latter devalues the senses and the phenomenal world as well. Human sensuousness and the phenomenal world are only obstacles in the way of the world of forms or Ideas. There occurs, for the first time in the history of philosophy, the bifurcation of man and reality into the "apparent - real", "truth-illusion", "reason-sense", "Being-Becoming" dichotomies. Nietzsche asserts that this bifurcation could have occurred only because its creators were decadents, they felt pain at their own sensuous natures and at the phenomenal world and therefore had to negate them. As such this world lost significance.

For Nietzsche, this is of immense existential importance. He focuses on Socrates' dying declaration in which the latter is
reputed to have told Crito: "Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius, will you remember to pay the debt?" It was a Greek tradition that one offered a cock to Asclepius on recovering from an illness. Socrates thereby compares his life to an illness.

Thus Nietzsche concludes that Socrates was a decadent and therefore longed for a "beyond".

This then is the framework in which Nietzsche asserts that there is a flaw or prejudice in Socrates which is reflected throughout the history of philosophy. He saw himself as a destined historical agent in whom this prejudice is exposed. This line of thinking forms the background to his philosophical nihilism. Philosophy itself is abjured for a concern with the passions, the instincts and with individual praxis.

Egoism and the conscience: In his search for the paradigm of a new type of man, what strikes one is Nietzsche's repeated emphasis on egoism. We may, therefore, question whether Nietzsche's position may be called one of ethical egoism.

One reason why Nietzsche recommends egoism is that slave moralities always deny the individual and create obstacles to his acting out of his own interests and his own necessity.

However, we may ask, is this necessity of the individual unique or could there be parallels and continuities between the necessities of many individuals? It is only if the latter were possible that it would make sense to talk of common interests.
aims, goals and so on. The question however is not easy to answer on Nietzsche's behalf.

Nietzsche does imply that the necessity of the will to power would, in a sense, be the same for all individuals.

However, though the necessity of the will to power is common to all individuals, in Nietzsche's scheme, it is not necessary that the necessities of all individuals would be identical.

The will to power is such that by its very nature it always institutes a structure of hierarchy, based on the "relations of dominance" under which all life manifests itself. He says:

... all willing is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying, on the basis of a social structure of many souls; on which account a philosopher should claim the right to include willing as such within the field of morality; that is of morality understood as the theory of relations of dominance under which the phenomenon of 'life' arises. 82

Because the will to power always institutes a hierarchy, the necessity of one unit in this hierarchy would be different from the necessity of the other units. We may say that the one basic necessity of the will to power manifests itself in many different ways and these ways always reveal a hierarchy.

As far as ethical philosophy is concerned this has the important implication that there is no equality amongst men. Nietzsche
never fails to emphasize this. He says that slave moralities tend to obliterate the inequalities inherent in the very nature of human beings — and that one of the most vocal demands of slave moralities is equality. This demand, however, only inhibits the individual from acting out of his own necessity.

Thus one of the demands for egoism seems to follow from Nietzsche's assumption of the natural inequality amongst men.

Interestingly, in an early work Nietzsche remarks that even those values that are apparently altruistic, have the underlying motive of ego-gratification. Therefore, he says, altruistic moralities only create schisms in an individual's personality. He apparently values the "other", but really values only himself. In altruistic moralities man treats himself as "not an individuum but as a dividuum." 53 He argues that all altruistic moralities are essentially self-contradictory. Assuming that egoism is fundamental to human nature, he says: "the motives for this morality stand in antithesis to its principles." 54

Nietzsche's refutation of altruistic moralities goes to the extent of indiscriminately lumping together, and grossly at that,
Christianity, Democracy and Socialism. All are seen as directed against individualistic natures, tending to obliterate the "chasm between man and man" and, because man is essentially egoistic, they are deemed self-contradictory.

But we still have not answered our query whether Nietzsche's position warrants the appellation of ethical egoism.

It is common in contemporary philosophy to distinguish between psychological egoism and ethical egoism. While the former states that human nature being such, it is a fact that all men seek their own interest, the latter, takes the former's assertion as a premise and goes on to say that all men ought to seek their own interest. It has been argued that stated as such, ethical egoism is a self-contradictory position to hold. 55

As against such arguments it has been pointed out that ethical egoism can only be said to contain a contradiction if we understand it as propounding a normative principle. Rightly understood, however, ethical egoism does not propound a normative principle, and regards the promotion of one's own interest neither a "duty" nor the dictate of an "ought". 56 Kant saw this. The fact that men universally desire their own happiness is a fact that belongs to
every rational but finite being. It is a part of his nature. Therefore, to try to elicit from it an ought or a duty or a command becomes quite superfluous.

Nietzsche's position may well be called one of psychological egoism. It cannot, at least overtly, convey any sense of a duty or an ought or any normative principle. Though we find much in Nietzsche that has the form of recommendation, persuasion and even exhortation, strictly speaking Nietzsche always tries to work out paradigms of necessity itself. He does not, for instance, leave the individual much choice over being decadent or healthy, or derivatively, between being a slave or a master. One must be what one is. Therefore it seems futile to offer any prescription in the strict sense of an "ought". As such, one would have to be cautious in calling Nietzsche's position ethical egoism. That one could call it so will become apparent later.

To identify Nietzsche's position briefly: each "will-point" or "power-quantum" is in a state of constant tension with other power-quantums. Each seeks to preserve and accumulate its own power. In doing so it may be said to be acting in accordance with its own necessity. As such, his position is one of psychological egoism.

Though Nietzsche is clear about the question of egoism this has to be qualified. Firstly, he juxtaposes it with the "bestowing
virtue. The latter indicates that egoism is merely a precondition for being able to "bestow" all that one appropriates. A fuller exposition of this is best left for later.

Secondly, we saw that one of Nietzsche's reasons in asserting that a "sovereign individual" becomes autonomous of "herd-moralities" was that only thus is the individual able to develop his conscience. Hence the need for egoism. Thus Nietzsche's "psychological egoism", if at all we are to use such a label, has to be further qualified: egoism is only a precondition for the conscience, just as much as it is a precondition for a "bestowing virtue".

Besides egoism, Nietzsche places much emphasis on the "conscience". This has strangely been hardly emphasized by his commentators. Kaufmann and Denton virtually ignore it. Eric Heller has mentioned its significance for Nietzsche. Since we have seen that Nietzsche gives the conscience a crucial role to play in master moralities we had best attempt a fuller understanding of it.

By giving much importance to the conscience Nietzsche may well be sailing on rough waters. It has a history of controversy behind it. Its nature has been expressed in paradoxical form—as a "sentiment of the understanding" or a "perception of the heart".
It has been attributed both a reflective, cognitive role as well as one of providing intuitive insights into the moral worth of action. More recently it has been argued that the conscience can have no epistemic content, that "whatever else the conscience may be, it is not a faculty or source of moral knowledge." The charge that the conscience is relative and variable is avoided by simply denying that it can deliver any substantive moral dictates or norms at all.

Indeed, the main problem with introducing the conscience into moral philosophy is that it introduces far too much of relativity. Conflicting consciences could be found amongst individuals or groups of people and they could at best reveal contrary or contradictory possibilities. Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish, ordinarily at least, whether one's "inner sensation" or "awareness" is one of the conscience, or of some other feelings e.g. imagination or fear or shame. Further there is no objective ground or criterion or supreme authority which could be used to evaluate the "dictates" of the conscience. The criterion must be this conscience itself, or it may be outside the conscience. If it be outside the conscience...
then the conscience can hardly be the criterion for moral judgements.

Nietzsche, however, gives immense epistemic or cognitive significance to the conscience. It not only tends to become a criterion of "morality" but also of "truth" (Nietzsche subsumes both under the concept of "value"). Nietzsche progressively moves towards an unconscious or subliminal theory of values. The ground of values lies within the person himself. Values emerge in the conscience in the form of an "inner voice". He talks about the "inner voice of our taste, which is also a form of conscience ...." 60

He claims to have reached a "spiritual subtlety" essentially through conscience-vivisection. 62 It is the inner certainty which asserts unconditionally "this and nothing else is necessary now". 63

Nietzsche's frequent way of putting this is that a person with a conscience is able to put the indubitable label of "Yes" or "No" onto anything. By these terms he means validation, acceptance, affirmation as opposed to falsification, rejection, negation. The command of the conscience carries with it such conviction and certainty that the conscience tends to become Nietzsche's criterion for truth. Not belief, nor utility, nor pleasure, nor pain can be criteria but perhaps conscience is:
Truth has to be fought for every step of the way, almost everything...has to be sacrificed to it. 

Greatness of soul is needed for it...For what does it mean to be honest in intellectual things? That one is stern towards one's heart, that one despises 'fine-feelings', that one makes every 

Yes and No a question of conscience. 54

We earlier described Nietzsche's use of the term self-overcoming as a kind of asceticism of the will to power. The above passage seems to reinforce the kind of meaning which Nietzsche wishes to give to asceticism. The latter involves putting constraint on one's instincts, probing one's own consciousness and seeking one's own goals, aims and convictions. This involves putting a kind of discipline on oneself -- even restraining a crude "instinct of freedom". Nietzsche emphasises the well-disciplined conscience and denounces the uninhibited instincts of a crude, unshaped man.

It is in such a sense that asceticism as a form of discipline becomes all important for the development of a conscience. A conscience is the ascetic product of one's own necessity, and hence of one's true freedom.

The conscience, therefore, is a matter of cultivation. It is not there in fact in every individual, it has to be elicited, such as subtle energies are elicited by yogic exercises or meditation.
Nietzsche says that only those with a strong will can develop it. A person with such a will would embark upon the pursuit of knowledge with an immense amount of self-constraint.

The most spiritual human beings, as the strongest, find their happiness where others would find their destruction: in the labyrinth, in adversity towards themselves and others. In attempting, their joy lies in self-constraints with them; asceticism becomes nature's need, instinct... knowledge — a form of asceticism.

It is indeed the "ascetic of the heart" who is master, and one incapable of this asceticism, the slave. In the latter, morality becomes a curse. Because the instincts are in turmoil, are decadent, such a man can have no overriding authority over them. Morality only succeeds in repressing them, and consequently, creating guilt and neurosis — the bad conscience.

The conscience therefore plays a very important role in Nietzsche's ideas. It may be noted that he is not concerned with objective criteria, universal principles, nor is he even wanting to prescribe norms for action. Therefore, to object that the conscience would make universality and objectivity in ethics impossible is overridden simply by Nietzsche's disregard for these. We have this strange paradoxical situation where though Nietzsche is, we are convinced, profoundly concerned with values and morals, it is doubtful...
if Nietzsche could be called an ethical philosopher in the strict sense which demands universality and objectivity as conditions for normative ethics.

Some high points of the Transvaluation: (1) Placing all that we have said in the context of the Transvaluation of all Values, it may be said that Nietzsche's sense of "Transvaluation" is cognate with the sense of "Beyond Good and Evil".

The evaluation of the master-type is to affirm that which his conscience dictates. He merely adopts an attitude of moral equanimity and a distance towards one who is decadent and weak, a slave.

On the other hand the evaluation of the slave-type is one which is motivated by resentment, and, rather than maintain equanimity and his distance from a superior will, a slave condemns the master-type on grounds of illusory psychologies and illusory worlds. In this context then, Nietzsche's intention of the Transvaluation, of going "Beyond Good and Evil", is essentially the attempt to look into, and stand outside, so to speak, all slave moralities. Since he saw the slave moralities as having dominated western philosophy and Christianity, his projected Transvaluation is, therefore, the attempt to offer a critique of those values that have been generated by western philosophy and Christianity. Here lies the inner dialectic.
of the Transvaluation.

(ii) The crux of Nietzsche's criticisms against all forms of ascetic ideals, pessimism (weak), nihilism (weak) and slave moralities is that, arising out of conditions of decadence, they pass value judgement on life in general and individuals in particular.

A part of the inner dialectic of the Transvaluation shows how such judgements can only be puerile:

Judgements, value judgements concerning life, for or against, can in the last resort never be true; they possess value only as symptoms. One must reach out and try to grasp this astonishing fitness, that the value of life cannot be estimated.

If, Nietzsche's argument runs, values are products of the life process, how then could one turn on this process itself to evaluate it? In order to evaluate life "objectively" one would need a perspective that is outside life, and that is an absurd demand.

As Nietzsche says, the negation of actuality is itself a part of this actuality. Therefore, it is logically impossible to negate actuality:

To appraise being itself! But this a praised itself is still this being! — and if we say no, we still do what we are.

One must comprehend the absurdity of this posture of judging existence, and then try to understand what is really involved in it. It is symptomatic.

Socrates and Schopenhauer are examples of those pessimists who condemn existence. Christianity and Buddhism, as well as
Platonic metaphysics are purportedly examples of these pessimistic systems of thought which pass judgment on existence in order to condemn it. The judgment however could only be symptomatic of existence itself, namely, symptomatic of decadence, weakness, resentment and so on.

Thus is one sense, "Beyond Good and Evil" enjoins one to forsake any moral evaluation of life: "the value of life cannot be estimated".

As regards judgments and evaluations concerning individuals, Nietzsche asserts that because necessity rules the world, it is impossible to hold any person responsible for his actions or for having the kind of qualities that he does have:

No one is accountable for existing at all... the fatality of his nature cannot be disentangled from the fatality of all that which has been and will be.... One is necessary, one is a piece of fate, one belongs to the whole, one is in the whole.

The terms "good" and "evil" have had their origin in religious moralities. They presuppose that man has a "free-will" which Nietzsche asserts to be an invention of the theologian. Man is thus made accountable, responsible, for all his actions. What he denies is that responsibility could arise from a "free-will" and choice in one's actions. At best responsibility would mean maintaining a
continence between one's conscience and one's actions.

Because a person cannot be held responsible for his actions it is absurd to judge him and to condemn him as an "evil" man. At most one could distance oneself from him and, "Beyond Good and Evil", adopt an attitude of moral squamity.

Nietzsche's intention in taking all responsibility from the individual and placing him in the realm of necessity was to rid man of his "illness", namely guilt or the "bad conscience". In his fear stimulated by ethical and moral "laws", man has only succeeded in suppressing and distorting his instinctive nature. Nietzsche's aim in highlighting the instinctive nature of man is to encourage a spontaneity that emerges from necessity itself.

(iii) Though Nietzsche wishes to "transvalue" religion and morality, this must be qualified by the utilitarian and pragmatic perspective that he adopts on religion and morality. Both Nietzsche sees as being instrumental in self-diagnosis, self-therapy and in developing the ability to overcome some kind of a "sickness".

The individual is himself to be the perceiver of which norm would be most necessary for him. Such a "morality" purportedly like "Beyond Good and Evil", Nietzsche is quite tolerant of what is to be the content of a norm or role. Thus he even recommends that which
tradition or society condemn as "evil" precisely in order that the individual himself becomes capable of judging what is most conducive or harmful for him.

Morality for Nietzsche is not something intrinsically worthy in the sense that one must be moral for the sake of being moral. Nietzsche's conception always has the teleological end of "health" in view. Only that is to constitute a rule or a norm which would be most conducive to greater health. As such Nietzsche always looks on morality as being instrumental in asceticism and in the spiritual growth of an individual. Because its role is an instrumental one, we may infer that Nietzsche is most concerned with the causal efficacy of morality and as such treats the whole problem as a clinical problem. Whereas religious moralities evoke guilt and the bad conscience, Nietzsche wishes to look for that kind of morality which would enhance health and an exuberant affirmation of existence.

Interestingly, Nietzsche, Spinoza and Freud dispense with a priori moral distinctions and represent moral problems as essentially clinical problems, which can only be confused by the use of epithets of praise and blame, and by emotional attitudes of approval and disapproval. What is important for all three, it may be inferred, is the therapeutic project of harmoniously adjusting one's desires, needs and wants and their objects with one's happiness, pleasure or
pain. Moral evaluations of these are quite superfluous. Being a clinical problem one cannot prescribe any "ought" which is a priori, or universal or categorical. The adjustments must ultimately depend on the individual's own physiological and psychological predispositions.

It is in the above sense that Nietzsche looks on morality as having a kind of a utilitarian or pragmatic role to play in the total project of an ascetic of the will to power.

Religion also may have a similar role to play. Nietzsche suggests that religion could be used as a cohesive force in social relations, or as a guide for aristocratic teachers and spiritual leaders towards a more "withdrawn and meditative life".

Nietzsche envisions secular advantages of asceticism. Religion, as a gymnasium where individuals may practice the skill of self-mastery, could test one's feelings of great self-overcoming, of silence and solitude.

Further, an unsavoury aspect of Nietzsche's extremist views, religion could be used to concretise the relations between the ruler and the ruled by sanctifying them. It could help to delude the masses into a kind of somnambulant contentment by some transfiguration of the whole everydayness, the whole loadings, the whole half-beastial poverty of their souls.
Whereas Marx had offered a critique of religion because it acts as the "opium of the masses", Nietzsche recommends it for precisely such a reason. He went so far as to suggest the breeding of a spiritual elite.

Nietzsche also imputes an existential justification for religion and having a God. In a people it may be a reflection of its own self, its "perfection of its own self, its own "perfection". Such a people "venerated its own overcomings, and in its feelings of joy and power it wishes to "bestow" its gratitude onto some being. "He who is rich wants to bestow... religion (as) a form of gratitude". 74

To conclude this elucidation of the Transvaluation of all Values we may observe some limitations that are inherent to it. Firstly, Nietzsche always goes into history or psychology to justify or give evidence for his assertions. However, his excursions into history seem largely speculative, and he does not refer to concrete historical evidence. He does not, for example, provide references to specific individuals or events but tends to move in abstract generalisations.

Thus his assertions about the Aryans, the Greeks, the Persians, the Indians (especially Buddhism), the Jews, the early Christians and the Teutonic people seem left hanging in the air. He provides no references to source material. The historical backgrounds of his analysis of, for example, master-slave moralities becomes quite problematic.
Therefore, were we to question Nietzsche's methodological tools in approaching history and look for empirical verification of some of his assertions we may reach such insurmountable dead ends as to make us suspect the Transvaluation itself.

Secondly, much of the Transvaluation is heavily dependent on Nietzsche's power and health-decadence criteria. If these are found to be weak grounds, or even refuted, the whole Transvaluation would quite collapse.

Thirdly, both the notion of ascetic and the conscience are very important to Nietzsche. Both however are notoriously vague and not given to easy formulation (at least in the history of western philosophy). Though Nietzsche does try to form a clear picture of these, they nonetheless remain characteristically weak grounds for any ethical system. Both have an aura of privacy and the esoteric about them and this makes them at least philosophically suspect.

But they are also characteristic of the direction in which Nietzsche wishes to take us. Rather than be concerned with what lies outside us or "beyond" us, what is important is a kind of praxis. Both asceticism and the conscience have their significance in the context of an individual "becoming". It is in such a sense that Nietzsche wishes to shift the emphasis from Being, or Truth or rational thought to the individual himself.
But between the inner and the outer dialectic of the Transvaluation, between the "critiques" and the "new" possibilities, stands the problem of the age. Nietzsche was convinced that we are at such a historical juncture that we are neither here nor there. We have lost faith in religion and metaphysics. Science provides no better alternative. Even if the individual reasserts himself Nietzsche sees that the present historical and "psychological" conditions are such that to suggest any new grounds is almost a futile exercise. Therefore, let us turn to how he perceives this problem.