Chapter II

THE WILL TO POWER

PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL MONISM

Nietzsche's principle of the will to power may imply a monism. The latter is a term applied to any theory that seeks to reduce all of reality to a single principle. It seeks to stress the oneness of reality.

However, there are many difficulties in studying Nietzsche's monism. These arise because he is not always consistent in what he intends doing, and what he ends up doing. His intention is to develop a hypothesis on purely factual observations, but whether he strictly keeps to his intentions is disputable. He begins by trying to formulate a causal hypothesis, or a method with which to investigate phenomena, especially human psychology. His language, however, takes him into the metaphysical domain. There is thus an ambiguity whether Nietzsche's "will to power" is an ontological, monistic principle, or an empirical, experimental hypothesis.

Unity: In the early works Nietzsche refers to Being, the One Truly Existent, Primal Unity. Thales is the first philosopher precisely because he was the first to intuite the principle "All is One". In the later works there is a thematic development of "unity". We shall have to see how this can warrant us the right to call Nietzsche a monist. 1

Monism implies a philosophical system, or the attempt to subsume reality under an ontological principle. Nietzsche did not want to be metaphysical neither did he wish to build a system.

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For him, as we saw earlier, the attempt to work out a system always implies an over simplistic mind.2

Despite of such assertions, Nietzsche paradoxically does work out a system. The conviction about the unity of all existence leads to the attempt to capture this unity under a heuristic principle. Nietzsche came to declare his principle the "will to power".

It is first affirmed through the words of Zarathustra.

Test in earnest whether I have crept into the heart of life itself and down to the roots of its heart. Where I found a living creative, there I found will to power, and even in the will of the servant I found the will to be master.3

However, the idea can be seen to germinate in Nietzsche's earlier works in which power is invariably discussed in the context of psychology or culture.4 As such the will to power is not an intuitive, or axiomatic, metaphysical principle but is arrived at through a series of penetrating analyses. His fundamental category is already "life", and Nietzsche claims that he distils the essence of life, so to speak, in the will to power.

Undoubtedly Nietzsche's study of the Greeks influenced his conception of the will to power.

Context: To expose how Nietzsche arrived at the concept of power we may briefly refer to an early essay, Homer's Contest, in which he identifies contest as the key to an understanding of Greek culture. Man is seen as a part of nature and therefore there must be, Nietzsche assumes, something common between those qualities
we call "human" and those we call "animal". The following passage is crucial to understand both how Nietzsche arrives at a kind of psychological monism as well as his belief that culture arises out of a sublimation of our "animal" passions.

"Then one speaks of humanity, the idea is fundamental that this is something which separates and distinguishes man from nature. In reality, however, there is no such separation: "natural" qualities and those called truly "human" are inseparably grown together. Man, in his highest and noblest capacities, is wholly nature and embodies its uncanny dual character. Those of his abilities which are terrifying and considered inhuman may even be the fertile soil out of which alone all humanity can grow in impulse, deed and work."

The pre-Homeric Greek is brutally barbarian: "Combat is salvation; the cruelty of victory is the pinnacle of life's jubilation." However, the Greeks were able to control, channelize, sublimate their brutal instincts into creativity. What remained in the Homeric Greeks was the spirit of contest. Nietzsche sees Greek culture as arising out of this spirit of contest. The Greeks created tragedy and poetry "in order to conquer; their whole art cannot be thought of apart from contest". The philosophers too created "truth" and "knowledge" — their contest.

These philosophers possessed a firm belief in themselves and their 'truth' and with it they overthrew all their contemporaries and predecessors. Each of them was a war-like brutal tyrant.
As the idea of contest is developed through *The Dawn* and *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche begins to identify power as that which accompanies contest. The "feeling of power" is counterposed to fear and impotence, or is said to accompany the "striving for distinction". It is the motive behind people like Danto, Paul and Calvin. Power is the basis of moral evaluations. Nietzsche almost conclusively asserts in *The Dawn* that power has become man's "strongest propensity" and that "the means discovered for creating this feeling almost constitute the history of culture".

The bio-anthropological perspective: Besides developing the idea of contest and power in the early works, Nietzsche also begins to hold on to a bio-anthropological perspective in which the instincts are used as the fundamental substratum. All social, political, aesthetic and intellectual activities are explained on the basis of the fact that some instinct has to be expended in some manner. He uses such concepts as drives, passions, the instinctual needs of man, the instincts of health and decadence, the instinct of freedom, the philosophical instinct and the priest's and the theologian's instincts. The "sovereign individu", the "aristocrat" and the "slave" each have their peculiar kinds of instincts.

The instincts are notoriously vague and essentially ill-defined. Both Darwin and Freud are cautious about their use of the term "instincts". Nietzsche too admits that there is nothing more
incomplete than the knowledge that one can have about one's instincts. Yet he gives them all importance in his ideas and leaves his readers to guess what he actually means by the use of the terms.

In the context of our discussion it will also be useful to note that Nietzsche places much importance on unconscious processes. Here again it is difficult to offer proof, data or empirical evidence for the nature of unconscious processes. True there is a sense in saying that much of our biological functions are unconscious, implying thereby that we are simply not aware of them in our day-to-day life. However, problems arise when we understand the unconscious as being part of our mental make-up, our psyche, or as having certain psychological functions to fulfill. It is used in such a sense by the psychoanalytic school which infers the unconscious and its functions through the analysis of certain kinds of behaviour which seem to be symptomatic of it. It would take us far afield to discuss the merits of the psychoanalytic school vis-a-vis their analysis of the unconscious. Let us be content with saying that they face problems regarding the evidence and proofs of their hypothetical inferences about the unconscious.

In Nietzsche's context, he places the significance of our consciousness on unconscious processes. The latter are largely unknown. Therefore, he is speculative without being argumentative. Our conscious activities are inherently limited by their unconscious
ramifications, he wishes to say. Peculiar to his bio-anthropological perspective, he says:

...... we perceive that a purposiveness rules over the smallest events that is beyond our understanding: planning, selectivity, co-ordination, separation etc. In short we discover an activity that would have to be ascribed to a far higher and more comprehensive intellect than we know of. We learn to think less highly of all that is conscious, we learn responsibility for ourselves, since we - as conscious, purposive creatures - are only the smallest part of us. Of the numerous influences operating at every moment ...... we sense almost nothing......

We are in the phase of the modesty of consciousness. Ultimately we understand the conscious ego itself only as a tool in the service of a higher, comprehensive intellect; and then we are able to ask whether all conscious willing, all conscious purposes, all evaluations are not perhaps only means through which something essentially different from what appears in consciousness is to be achieved..... Are there really will, purposes, thoughts, values? Is the whole of conscious life perhaps only a reflected image? And even when evaluation seems to determine the nature of man, fundamentally something different is happening! .......

This is perhaps the most precise statement of Nietzsche's position. Consciousness is a part of a vast experimental laboratory in the general process of evolution, rather than being a static "entity", it is constantly getting refined. The products of consciousness - ideas and values for example - are merely reflected images - idolons - of vast processes. Nietzsche denies these any autonomy and cannot see, or rather does not wish to see them in terms of their proofs, validity, objectivity or degree of rationality. That is for him a superfluous concern, what is important is that
they are conditions posited by life in its growth.

In the context of values specifically the instincts, and not the rational intellect, are seen as determining factors. Values are perspectives peculiar to the instincts. That we are conscious of them is unimportant. What Nietzsche has in mind is that when, for example, I say "Honesty is a desirable value" this implies that it has been dictated by some instinct, perhaps of gregariousness, or precaution or survival in the more general game of the enhancement of life. Similarly if I say "This is great art" what is happening is that some instinct in me has been aroused or expended, nourished or satisfied. One could argue that these evaluations can be examined independently of their instinctual or unconscious ramifications, that is, in terms of their objectivity or degree of rationality. Nietzsche, however, does not consider such possibilities.

In such a light one could make the inference that Nietzsche arrived at the notion of the will to power on the basis of an analysis of culture and human psychology in which his attention is always focussed on the instinctive life of man. But he does not confine his theory of human nature to psychology but extends the idea of the instincts to cover all phenomena. He turns overtly metaphysical. The following passage indicates how Nietzsche begins from the ground of the instincts and progressively extends his "hypothesis" to cover all phenomena.
Granting that nothing is given as real except our world of desires and passions, that we can rise or sink to no other 'reality' than the reality of our drives — for thinking is only the relationship of these drives to one another — is it not permitted to make the experiment and ask the question whether this which is given does not suffice for an understanding even of the so-called mechanical (or 'material') world? I do not mean as a deception, an 'appearance', an 'idea' (in the Berkeleyan and Schopenhaurian sense), but as possessing the same degree of reality as our emotions themselves — as a more primitive form of the world of emotions in which everything still lies locked in mighty unity and then branches out and develops in the organic process (also, as is only fair, is made weaker and more sensitive), as a kind of instinctual life in which all organic functions, together with self-regulation, assimilation, nourishment, excretion, metabolism, are still synthetically bound together — as an antecedent form of life.

But this passage is merely "experimental". And his use of the instincts is, for our present purposes, only incidental. We must be aware that primarily Nietzsche wished to describe the world in terms of a dynamism and he faced the problem of how to go about describing this dynamism.

The metaphysical perspective: But in Nietzsche the bioanthropological perspective is overshadowed by a metaphysical perspective. Nietzsche perhaps used the former because Darwin had already sent shock-waves through the European intellectual climate. Darwin's theories became paradigm models within which human beings could be discussed.

Nietzsche however, more influenced by the Greek concept of becoming and the Schopenhaurian 'will', sought to identify the dynamic nature of change, evolution and history. He found the
closest analogy for such an identification in the concept of the will.

**Will and willing.** Before we go on to discuss the will to power it may be useful to make a clarification in Nietzsche's use of the concept of "willing."

It is interesting that the Greeks did not operate with the concept of will or willing. It was apparently introduced into philosophical language by theocentric philosophy of the medieval period. It was used so as to make the concepts of freedom, choice, good and evil meaningful. Only if we have a free will does it make sense to talk of choosing between good and evil.

In the post-scholastic period the will came to have both psychological and metaphysical connotations. The former connected a special mental faculty. It expressed a wish or a desire and was, in effect, a causal factor involved in all action. Some philosophers, not satisfied with confining the will to psychological functions, extended it, by analogy, to describe the world in terms of it. Thus the world came to have a dynamic, volitional nature, or in other words: the world came to be described in terms of an activity, a *conatus*. Let us be a little more explicit.

The classical model of a psychological will was provided by Descartes. For him the will was a mental faculty that implied a consciousness or a thinking process. It was attributed causal efficiency in so far as it was the agent of all human action,
including the body's activity.

Schopenhauer, however, refuted the Cartesian notion of the will. He extended the notion of willing to all activity. Thus bodily action is not something different from willing, as Descartes had thought, but is a part of the process of volitional activity itself. He extracted the will from being a merely mental faculty and broadened it to include all activity, and finally, using it, through a method of analogy, to understand all phenomena. As such, Schopenhauer's conception is a clear example of a metaphysical concept of will. Describing the world as conatus, he called it the One Will.

Wittgenstein's few remarks on the nature of the will show that he too rejects Cartesian dualism. He calls all human activity a form of "willing." Thus he says:

Willing if it is not to be a sort of wishing, must be the action itself. It cannot be allowed to stop short of the action. If it is the action then it is so in the ordinary sense of the word: so it is speaking, writing, walking, lifting a thing, imagining something, but it is also trying, attempting, making an effort — to speak, to write, to lift a thing, to imagine something etc. 18

Thus Wittgenstein held onto a very general conception of willing, which included several kinds of human activity.

Both Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein reject the Cartesian will. Where Wittgenstein parts ways from Schopenhauer is in the latter's attempt to extend the analogy of willing from human
activity to the *phenomenal world*, and to see it in terms of a perpetual activity, or *conatus*. It has been remarked that Wittgenstein was impressed by Schopenhauer's conception of the "world as Idea" but not by the "world as Will". 19

Nietzsche's conception of willing is closer to Schopenhauer's since he too extends the notion of willing to the world as *conatus*. Schopenhauer had likened his "One Will" as a primeval, blind, incessant impulse, an endless striving and becoming. 20 This conception probably influenced Nietzsche and he grants credit to Schopenhauer for breaking new grounds and forcing "our sensations back into older, mightier modes of contemplating the world and man." 21

Nietzsche no doubt objects to Schopenhauer's leap beyond the phenomenal world into the Kantian thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer called this in-itself the will. This will is primal, it is one and knows no multiplicity. Unlike Kant, Schopenhauer had opened the possibility of "knowing" the in-itself, it was not inferred but was "fully and immediately comprehended" by inner consciousness. 22

Nietzsche objects that the One Will is an oversimplification and a prejudice. We come to believe in it simply because it is a unitary word and our subject-predicate grammar facilitates the impression that the will is some "thing".

Philosophers are given to speaking of the will as if it were the best-known thing in the world. Schopenhauer, indeed, would have us understand that the will alone is truly known to us, known completely, known without deduction or addition.
It seems to me that in this case too Schopenhauer has only done what philosophers in general are given to doing: that he has taken up a popular maxim and exaggerated it. Willing seems to me to be above all something complicated, something that is a unity only as a word....

We must now expose Nietzsche's paradigm of willing from which he initially made the analogy for the will to power. Willing, rather than being associated with a psychological faculty or a Schopenhauerian will, is for Nietzsche "above all something complicated". His analysis is primarily a phenomenological reduction of the experience of willing. The end or the purpose of the analysis is to provide, by analogy, the inner dynamism of life itself. The analysis he schematized as follows:

I. SERVES FIRSTLY A plurality of sensations, i.e.,
sensations of some kind of movement.
   i) of the "condition we leave;"
   ii) of the "condition towards which we go;"
   iii) of this "leaving" and "going" itself,
   iv) muscular sensations which almost habitually arise
      as soon as we "will;"
   v) various other "feelings."

II. There is also in the act of willing a "thinking";
in every act of will there is a commanding thought — and do not
imagine that this thought can be separated from the 'willing' as
though will would then remain over”. 26

III  Finally, willing is not only a complex of feeling and thinking but “above all an emotion and in fact the emotion of command”. It is the “unconditional evaluation” that “this and nothing else is necessary now”. Nietzsche considers the essential nature of life as evaluation. The evaluation arises in the form of a command: “This and nothing else is necessary now.”

Nietzsche now describes what he means by “freedom of will”. It is no doubt being used in a special sense since there is really no “will”. He means by it merely the ability to will. The unique characterization of the ability to will is the characteristic of command. It may take the form “I am free, he must obey”. Here the use of a third person pronoun may indicate that this commanding-obeying is going on between two persons. The “other” however is the least important for Nietzsche. What is important is that the commanding and obeying is carried on within a person: “A man who wills – commands something in himself which obeys or which he believes obeys”. 26

This brings Nietzsche to the “strangest thing of all about the will”

we at the same time command and obey, and as the side which obey know the sensations of constraint, compulsion, pressure, resistance, motion which begin immediately after the act of will.
What Nietzsche's wishes to emphasize is that there are schisms in every act of will, that is, one in which the "other" is not involved. The schisms are in me since I command and obey and resist. We tend to gloss over these schisms in willing with the "synthetic concept 'I'". 27

The crux, therefore, of Nietzsche's paradigm of willing is the idea of command:

"Willing" is not "desiring", striving, demanding; it is distinguished from these by the effect of commanding. 28 It is a part of willing that something is commanded.

The will to power: Finally, Nietzsche says, it is the will to power which "persuades the living creatures to obey and to command and to practice obedience even in commanding". 29 The crucial point in the above lines is that the will to power is that which "persuades" one to "practice obedience even in commanding" 30

For Nietzsche there are many stages in the commanding-obeying process. Once the command ("this and nothing else is necessary now") has been obeyed a level of constancy is reached. The will is still. It revels in the fact that all resistance has been overcome. But the will is not satisfied at the level of constancy forever. It seeks something more: "And life told me this secret 'I am that which must overcome itself again and again'". 31

It seeks to overcome the stage of constancy. Nietzsche's study of Greek culture and his analysis of the nature of the tensions that
accrue in the commanding-obeying process lead him to say that willing is always a will to power.

This conception is telescoped into that Nietzsche means by "Self-Overcoming"; it is essentially the kind of willing that is the internal dynamism of the will to power. What is abjured radically is the traditional metaphysical notion, one adopted by scholastic theology and by the mechanistic world-view that, firstly, matter and motion (or force) are separate, and, secondly, that there is a First Cause (e.g., God) which set the whole universe into motion. As such both motion and the cause of motion are separate from that which moves i.e., matter. For Nietzsche there is only one being and that is life; its nature is such that it has an internal dynamism, hence will itself. It is within this nondualistic process that schisms appear.

Nietzsche, it is clear, was not satisfied with confining the conception of willing to human activity. As we saw, he wished to extend the dynamism of the instincts to all phenomena. Similarly, he wished to extend the idea of the will to power to all phenomena. Hence his criticism of Schopenhauer may seem unjustified since he himself went to the extreme of advocating an oversimplified, monistic conception -- a metaphysical system. Nietzsche's writings and notes reveal positivist intentions, but his language is metaphysical. The argument by analogy is carried to an extreme. Nietzsche justified this by saying that the step is not arbitrary but it is "commanded by the conscience of method."
Not to assume several kinds of causality so long as the experiment of getting along with one has not been taken to its ultimate limits (— to the point of nonsense, if I may say so); that is a morality of method. It follows 'from its definition' in the end the question is whether we really recognize will as efficient, whether we believe in the causality of will if we do — and fundamentally belief in this is precisely our belief in causality itself — then we have to make the experiment of positing causality of will hypothetically as the only one.

Carrying the hypothesis to its extreme, we would have to admit, says Nietzsche, that everything is will — it is not that will is acting in matter or through matter or on matter everything is will and therefore will can only act on will and not on matter. As an experimental hypothesis the will to power therefore creates the possibility for a monistic principle:

'Will' can of course operate only on 'will' — and not on 'matter' (not on 'nerves' for example); enough, one must venture the hypothesis that wherever 'effects' are recognized will is operating upon will — and that all mechanical occurrences, in so far as a force is active in them, are force of will, effects of will — Granted finally that one succeeded in explaining our entire instinctual life as the development and ramification of one basic form of will — as will to power, as is my theory — granted that one could trace all organic functions back to this will to power and could also find it in the solution to the problem — one would have acquired the right to define all efficient force unequivocally as will to power. The world seen from within, the world described and defined according to its 'intelligible character' — it would be 'will to power' and nothing else.

This passage could pose the problem: is the will to power an empirical hypothesis or a metaphysical doctrine? Kaufman, primarily on the basis of the early works, argues that Nietzsche's will to...
power is an "empirical concept" or a "psychological hypothesis." This may be justified in the extended sense in which "empirical" would include historical, anthropological, psychological, and cultural observations. Indeed there are a wide range of phenomena that could be empirically shown to exhibit a will to power. Wherever we notice competition, struggle, conflict, the clash of opposites, one could identify power as a motivating force behind such processes. Russell, interested in the notion of power, regarded it as the most fundamental principal in social dynamics and human relationships, just as energy is the most fundamental notion in physics.

In fact the idea of power has been explored in various dimensions in almost the entire history of thought since the eighteenth century. What is significant is that power is invariably discussed in the context of society or social relations. Social scientists or social philosophers have been trying to establish theoretical systems with the aim of studying power as it is manifested in actual, institutional structures in society.

Nietzsche's use of the will to power differs from a sociological concept of power in being primarily a psychological, and perhaps later a metaphysical, concept. In the early works the experimenting is with the sense of the "feeling" of power. Once matured into the will to power it comes essentially to have the meaning of the ability to command and self-mastery. Nietzsche's most significant use of the will to power is primarily in the
context of an acedia - a Self-Overcoming. It is from this primary use that Nietzsche extends the will to power to all phenomena.

The above passages indicate that Nietzsche's orientation is on scientific, positivist lines. However the will to power does not, by Popperian demands, leave open the possibility for its falsifiability, for, Nietzsche says, there is nothing which is not will be power. In fact, as in any metaphysical monism, it is impossible to adhere to Popperian criteria for scientificity. Since for Nietzsche everything is instinct, life, or the will to power it is quite absurd to ask for its verifiability or falsifiability.

Kaufmann's interpretation would have to face this charge.

Moreover, notice the last few lines of the passage quoted above. The language reveals a sudden shift from his positivist orientation towards a metaphysical conception. The will to power is the "world seen from within" - , described and defined according to its "intelligible character". Noticeably "intelligible character" occurs within inverted commas since the term is one commonly used by, for example, Kant and Schopenhauer to describe "reality", and which Nietzsche debunks as nonsense. Why then does he use this phrase? He certainly is wary of using it, hence the inverted commas. Yet he does. Did he realize that if we assumed one kind of causality, even if as a hypothesis, it would, if pushed to its extremes, inevitably lead to a metaphysical principle?
Though Nietzsche is arguing by analogy with the psychological notion of willing, his end-conception is one that stands in the tradition of metaphysics. Heidegger has clearly seen this. As C.J. Richardson puts it for Heidegger:

... Once Leibniz expanded the notion of subject so that it embraced not only the human ego (Descartes) but all beings, insofar as they are dynamic, or have an appetitus ("will") for further dynamism, the entire drift of modern thought was to conceive Being as the dynamism of dynamic beings, in one way or another as will. It is only normal, then, that Nietzsche should mediate Being as universal Becoming (life-force) and conceive it as will! 37

Nietzsche's use of "willing," therefore, does not have the merely psychological sense of "striving after what is not yet possessed, born out of a feeling of want," 38 it is rather an interpretation of the Being of beings, whose internal dynamism, however, is of such a sort that it can be expressed best in terms of what human experience calls "willing." 39

To describe the Being of beings is to describe the essence of reality. It is, in fact, an exercise in ontology. Thus Heidegger sees as essentially metaphysical what Kaufmann sees as empirical.

Nietzsche did try to get loose from the confines of the grammar and language of traditional metaphysics. He says in the spirit of his Dionysian, nihilist intentions, that if we eliminate identifying, labeling concepts then no "things" remain but only dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other quanta, their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, in their "effect" upon the same. The will to power not a being, not a becoming, but a motion. 40
But what does pathos mean? In Nietzsche's context it is difficult to go beyond saying that it is a propensity of life—a peculiar kind of dynamism of life. It is a propensity which determines, bears along, moves life.

Even so, can Nietzsche escape the charge that by calling the will to power a pathos he is still defining a quality of life and in fact the essential quality of life? Is it not open to the charge that it is an ontological assertion? Nietzsche rejects metaphysics but he does not hesitate to indulge in metaphysics himself.

There are also a few other difficulties in Nietzsche's general formulation of the will to power. Nietzsche's hypothesis states that it is possible to imagine a primeval state of unity which "branches out and develops in the organic process," and "also, as is only fair, is made weaker and more sensitive." This reveals a contradiction: if the will to power is indeed the will to power, then how could it propel itself towards a weaker...
state? Would it not, should it not, propel itself towards an even mightier unity? If the will to power is moving towards organic, hence weaker, forms, is it not involved in a self-denial? Then one may ask: Why and how does unity branch out into weaker forms? Nietzsche poses the question of how the One becomes the many to some pre-Socratic philosophers and discusses some of the answers they gave. He does not seem to be aware that the same question could be asked of the will to power.

Further, the will to power comes as a total negation of his position of philosophical nihilism. The latter would deny the possibility of saying anything about the world, while the will to power describes the world in its essential nature.

The most consistent ambiguity in Nietzsche arises in conceiving the world as chaos, without causal relations, without laws, but one in which necessity reigns. The idea of necessity is very important to Nietzsche. He attributes all evolution and history to some necessity taking place. Yet he would not like to formalise this — no cause and effect, no laws, no teleology, only chaos. He says: "The total character of the world ... is in all eternity chaos — in the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, arrangement, form".

It seems that there is something discrepant in saying that everything is chaos but yet necessary. For the latter term does seem to convey the sense of some regularity, or law, or a system.
Nietzsche's whole attempt at a monism with implied necessities seems to say that the world is in fact not chaotic but coherent. Nietzsche's use of the concept "chaos" therefore seems quite unwarranted. It could become somewhat meaningful only if we try to see that Nietzsche uses the concept merely to attack mechanical and teleological interpretations of the world.

There are certain other difficulties in Nietzsche which we may briefly point to. Nietzsche denies causality, laws and teleology. He says that these are creations peculiar to our logical-syntactical and psychological make-up. Yet, firstly, he postulates the will to power as the most fundamental of all antecedent causes. Secondly, Nietzsche denies that laws of nature exist. Yet his formulation of the will to power is such that it is possible to elicit certain laws from it. For example "A force will tend to move outward forever until some external force impedes its dilation." Or, depending upon the nature of the tension inherent in their relations, power quantes either increase or decrease their power.

Thirdly, Nietzsche denies teleology. Though his intention may be to refute a theologian's teleology, that a Grand Plan of God is being fulfilled in nature, he nonetheless, as we saw, imputes teleology even to the "smallest event" of nature.
Evaluations: We should now examine Nietzsche's thesis that the will to power is evaluative. Evaluations are perspectives which the will to power poses as conditions for its ascendancy through a series of overcomings. The trend of Nietzsche's style of thinking should be clear from our earlier discussion of "perspectivism".

The products of evaluations, for example values, aims, purposes, goals and meanings, are only

modes of expression and metamorphoses of one will that is inherent in all events; the will to power.

willing in general, is the same thing as willing to be stronger, willing to row — and, in addition, willing the means to this.

All valuations are only consequences and narrow perspectives in the service of this one will; valuation itself is only this will to power.

Nietzsche describes truth and art as the "highest" values that the will to power poses. Truth is that aspect or perspective which the will to power poses in its moments of constancy — when further growth is either not possible or not necessary. The will to power poses truth in order to consolidate and stabilize that to which it has already attained.

On the other hand, the will to power seeks to go beyond that to which it has already attained. It seeks conditions for its growth. To that end it seeks new perspectives, new evaluations.

In these moments, Nietzsche calls the will to power most creative.
Its activity, being creative activity, is aesthetic activity. Therefore, Nietzsche chooses to call art more fundamental than truth. The latter must give way to new possibilities. The "giving way" is such that it is aesthetic activity.

To conclude then, Nietzsche may be called a descriptivist in his theory of values. The will to power is a metaphysical or natural ground for all values. All values originate in it, form an essential part of it and cannot be abstracted from it. In normative theory, power is the criterion and measure of values: "What is the objective measure of value? Solely the quantum of enhanced and organized power." However, the problem remains in Nietzsche as to what would be the objective, scalar, the measurement of power? How can we decide that "this" has a higher quantum of power than something else?

( The answer to the question what is it that has power and how are we to distinguish power from non-power becomes superficial since for Nietzsche everything is the will to power. There is nothing which is not the will to power. )

It can be argued that as far as the measurement of value is concerned Nietzsche resorts to an emotive experience of value. Only through emotive experience could we judge what has greater or lesser power. Whether there would be something as an objective (common to all men) experience of power or a subjective, unique
experience of power is not answered by Nietzsche. He would probably hold the latter position. Thus he says:

What is good? — All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man.
What is bad? — All that proceeds from weakness.
What is happiness? — The feeling that power increases — that a resistance has been overcome.

There is only one sole good: power, and that is the Summum Bonnum — the highest good.

**Health and decadence:** Nietzsche further develops the concept of the will to power by saying that it manifests itself in two basic directions. In order to conceptualize these basic directions Nietzsche takes recourse to the biological and medical sciences. Thus he distinguishes between a healthy or strong will to power and a decadent or weak will to power.

Nietzsche claims to have gained insight into these concepts through personal experience. He claims that he was a decadent, but through a process of self-diagnosis and self-therapy he was also the "very reverse of it".

What is curious in Nietzsche's use of medical terms is that they are applied not only to physiology and psychology, which ought to be their proper domain, but also to ideas and culture. Thus he talks of "diets" (both literal and intellectual) the climate and
environment (both literal and intellectual) and the ability for recuperation (both physical and spiritual). 55

Malcolm Perley has shown in an excellent essay with keen textual awareness how these medical terms serve Nietzsche initially as metaphors with which to describe ideas, the mind, society and culture, but which increasingly become such formal analogies that the distinction between the metaphorical and the literal uses of these terms becomes extremely ambiguous. 55 Thus, for example, not only individuals but society also is looked upon as an organism. Culture provides the stimulants, climatic atmosphere and environment to the organism.

An analogy is drawn between the mind and the stomach and their functions are treated in an almost identical language. 57 Like the stomach the mind has its "food" (ideas, values, beliefs, etc.) and it assimilates, incorporates, rejects, seeks nourishment, recuperates from ailments much in the same way. Nietzsche carries poetic devices of metaphor into straight analogies, and thence into one of identity. It is thus not easy to discern, in Nietzsche, where concepts are being used literally from the biological and medical sciences, and where they are being used in a metaphorical sense.

However, in spite of the fact that Nietzsche sets up his "philosophical dispensary" on the "border line between metaphorical and literal statements", 58 and the fact that it generates linguistic
ambiguities, it may be observed that with Nietzsche it is not merely a case of carrying the analogy to an extreme. At the crux of Nietzsche's biological-anthropological perspective lies the attempt at a monism in which the macrocosm and microcosm would have to have some structural and functional analogies. Though Nietzsche is aware that analogy is a weak argument form, and believes that philosophers are inveterate analogizers, he himself, paradoxically, analogizes. He oscillates between the bio-anthropological and cosmological perspectives, using one as an analogy for the other. What is common to both is a wider assumption of the inter-relatedness and the unity of all existence. Indeed, the formulation of an ontological principle could not have arisen but for such an assumption.

Having said this much and without wanting to justify the peculiar perspectives that Nietzsche adopts we may briefly explicate what Nietzsche means by decadence and health.

Presley strongly, says almost nothing about decadence. It is a term with a physiological connotation, which Nietzsche does not use metaphorically. He offers explicit definitions, meant quite literally.

The very nature of the will to power or life is such that it is always "ascending". It is the characteristic movements of life. Now as long as life qua the will to power is ascending "happiness and instinct are one". For what is happiness? "The feeling that power increases— that a resistance has been overcome."
However, says Nietzsche, under certain physiological and historical conditions, the will to power begins to decline and turn degenerate. The exact causes of degeneration are never stated in Nietzsche. He only says, in abstract generalization, that life is such that it requires degeneration at certain points of its progress. He does not go beyond saying that the will to power declines and "whenever the will to power declines in any form there is every time also a physiological regression, a decadence." 61

Rather than state its causes Nietzsche is primarily interested in the symptoms of decadence. The foremost symptom of decadence is that the feelings of displeasure, pain, suffering begin to predominate over the feelings of pleasure or happiness.

There is, he seems to say, a disturbance that causes an upsetting of the equilibrium of the instinctive functions. He says that it is really a question of having a will which is strong enough to be able to control or coordinate the instincts. Note that "freedom of will" is to have the feeling of total command over the situation and by implication, over one's own instincts.

Nietzsche makes it quite clear that he is not using the terms "weak" and "strong" in the sense of advocating an ontological dualism. They are to be understood as metaphors used for purposes of designation: "weakness of will" is a metaphor that can prove misleading. For there is no will consequently neither a strong
nor a weak will". He says that it is a matter of organic complexity and coordination:

The multitude and disaggregation of impulses and the lack of any systematic order among them result in a "weak will"; their coordination under a single predominant impulse results in a "strong will".

Similarly "health" and "decadence" are not opposites but differences in degree:

there are only differences in degree between these two kinds of existence: the exaggeration, the disproportion, the disharmony of the normal phenomena constitute the pathological state... Within such a framework then, Nietzsche works out a classification of those ideas, beliefs, values, and cultures which either have their origin in decadence or which contribute towards decadence. The latter, note, can only contribute; they cannot be the cause of decadence.

Not only are the causes of decadence unknown, cures themselves are "mere palliatives" against some of the symptoms of decadence, they are merely other forms of sickness. In spite of the fact that Nietzsche claims that being a decadent he was also "the very reverse of it," decadence as such, is beyond all cures.

Nor is Nietzsche asserting that decadence ought to be cured or even fought against. Diagnosis, prescription, and cure are beyond our reach; "decadence is nothing to be fought; it is absolutely necessary and belongs to every age and every people." Nietzsche believed
it to be the necessary ground upon which any healthy creativity could take places. "The phenomenon of decadence is as necessary as any increase and advance of life." 66

Though Nietzsche is quite clear about the meaning of decadence, he does not offer such precise statements about what he means by "healthy". Though it could mean a "strong will" or a "free will" in the sense indicated, Nietzsche really oscillates between health conceived of as the ability to overcome sickness, and health as a kind of pristine pro-sickness health, between the conviction that each man is "in practice his own best doctor" and a generally valid definition of what true health is. 67 What we wish to highlight in this work is Nietzsche's conviction that in order to act like a "physician" of either others, society or culture, one must first heal oneself. Health achieved through a series of progressive self-therapies becomes Nietzsche's precondition for any activity whatsoever. Like Christ's advice that one ought to remove the log in one's own eye before one points out the mote in another's eye, Nietzsche says: "Physician, heal yourself: thus you will heal your patient too." 68

Nietzsche emphasizes the point that what one feels instinctively as good for oneself will be the clue to one's own health.

For there is no health as such, and all attempts to define (it)... have been wretched failures. Even the determination of what is healthy for your body depends on your goal, your horizon, your
energies, your impulses, your errors, and above all the ideals and phantasms of your soul. Thus there are innumerable healths of the body....69

Having stated Nietzsche's monistic, experimental, principle as the will to power and its relation to willing, the instincts, values and health and decadence, we must now turn to seeing how these assumptions work as touchstones, so to speak, in his Transvaluation of all Values. As a last word we may say that though the will to power acts as both the origin as well as the criterion of all values, it retains a certain ambiguity because it is stated in a variety of perspectives from the cosmological to the bio-anthropological.