REFERENCES

INTRODUCTION

3. Nietzsche talks about the "petty people" who preach "the long shriek of petty virtues".

What is womanish, what stems from slavishness and especially from the mob hotch-potch: that now wants to become master of mankind's destiny... (I., Pt IV, "Of the Higher Man", 3.)

4. Examples of descriptivists or cognitivists who also uphold a metaphysical theory of values are the Neo-Platonists and the Hegelians, including Bradley and certain theologians. The naturalists, besides Aristotle, include writers like R.B. Perry (See his General Theory of Value, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1931), and C.S. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, La Salle, Illinois, 1946) and N. Hartmann (Ethics, 3 Vols., trans. Stanton Coit, London, 1932). The third variety of descriptivists or cognitivists, that is, the non-naturalists or the intuitionists, includes Plato, Sidgwick, G.E. Moore (See his Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, 1903.) and W.D. Ross (See his The Foundation of Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1930).
5. As held, for example, by G.E. Moore and the intuitionists.
6. Other examples of the non-cognitivists or the antidescriptivists, are A.J. Ayer (See his Language, Truth and Logic, Gollan, London, 1966. See ch. 6, "Critique of Ethics and Theology"), Bertrand Russell and

These writers expound an emotive theory of values. Values are related to specifically emotive experiences expressed in terms of desires, wants, needs, interests and their satisfaction.

7. The prescriptive theory of value has been upheld by, for example, R.M. Hare (see his The Language of Morals, Oxford University Press, 1952.), P.H. Naylor (See his Normative Discourse, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1961.), P.H. Nowell-Smith (see his Ethics, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1964.) and J.C. Urmson (See his "On Grading" in Mind, Vol LIX, 1950, p 148.)

8. Besides translating several of Nietzsche's works (listed in our bibliography) his best-known work on Nietzsche is Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ, Princeton, 1974.


Chapter I: Nihilism and Art

1. First published in 1876, and for which he wrote a Preface in 1886.
3. BT 7
4. Ibid., 10
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 7
7. Ibid., BT 1
8. Ibid., 2
9. Ibid., 12
11. Ibid., 16
12. Ibid.
14. TM, ‘How the Real World at Last Became a Myth’
15. Peter Putsis: ‘Art and Intellectual Inquiry’
17. Ibid., Vol II, Pt II, 11
20. Ibid., 11
21. Ibid.
22. See, for example, EH 14 (‘... the unity of the word is no security for the unity of the Thing’), BGE 19, WP II
23. ‘The Wanderer and his Shadow’, 11
25. Ibid., p 43.
27. Ibid. See 119, 48 e
28. WP 522. Kaufman translates as "limitation" what Danto and Mary Warnock translate as "boundary".
29. 1886 Preface to Dawn, 5.
30. WP 522
32. WP 604.
33. GM 24.
34. WP 600.
35. OS 374.
36. WP 666.
37. OS 257. See also HH 2, 16, 10.
38. WP 481.
40. Ibid., p 72. See also p 79.
41. See HH 2, 16, 24–27, 63, 220, 251, 256 278.
42. This method is developed right through Human, All to Human: Dawn and Gay Science. He resorts to a form of historicism, which he calls a "scientific method". He says:

...there are no eternal facts, as there are likewise no eternal truths. Therefore historical philosophising is henceforth necessary, and with it the virtue of diffidence. HH 2.

See also HH 10 and 15.
43. A 59.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
Danto, of course, argues that Nietzsche was a strict nihilist.
49. GM III 24.
51. This is evident, for example, in WP 329.
52. See also Danto’s excellent argument proving this, op. cit., pp.80.
54. OS 110.
56. Ibid.
57. 1886 Preface to Dawn, 3.
58. WP 473. See also OS 374 ‘...the human intellect cannot avoid viewing itself in its perspectival forms and only in them.....’ See also A 55 where the “limits” and perspectival nature of reason are indicated.
59. OS 344.
60. W. Kaufmann, op.cit., p360.
61. Ibid., 361.
62. OS 344.
63. A 47.
64. Nietzsche accuses Kant of denying the possibility of knowing the “thing-in-itself”, the noumenal world, _existent_ in the realm of _morality_. Freedom, which belongs to the noumenal world, says Kant, can be known. Nietzsche says:

Kant believed in morality not because it was demonstrated through nature and history but despite its being contradicted by them. (1886 Preface to Dawn, 3)

65. In one of his rare references to Hegel he says:

........we Germans of the present catch the scent of truth ... at the back of the famous fundamental principle of dialectics with which Hegel secured the victory of the German spirit over Europe — “contradiction moves the world; all things contradict themselves.” We are pessimists — even in logic. (1886 Preface to Dawn, 4)
67. GM III 20. The whole of the Third Book of the
Genealogy of Morals is concerned with the ascetic ideals.
68. WP 473. See also WP 532
70. Nietzsche quoted from M. Heidegger, op. cit., p 74.
71. WP 724.
72. WP 885, II
73. WP 682.
74. BT 5.
75. WP 736.
77. Ibid., p 72.
78. TWL quoted for translation advantages from J. P. Stern,
79. See also S. Morris Engel 'An Early Nietzsche Fragment on Language' in Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol 24, 1963, p 27. In this remarkable essay Engel shows how Nietzsche tried to relate reality, music and language through a conception of "middle spheres." (Engel refers to a fragment by Nietzsche Uber Musik und Werke, an English translation of which can be found in the Oscar Levy edition, Vol II, pp 27-47.)
79. BT 24.
80. WP 882, IV.
82. TWL, 'Expeditions of an Untimely Man', 8.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.,
86. Ibid., 10.
87. Ibid., 8.
88. Ibid., 9.
89. Ibid.
Chapter II: Philosophical and Psychological Meaning

2. See my Introduction.
3. Z 'Of Self Overcoming'
6. Ibid., p 53.
7. HH 170.
8. HH 261.
11. Ibid.
12. GS 12.
14. Darwin used the concept of the instincts to account for behaviour which was complex, adaptive and often finely attuned to particular environmental conditions. He thought it expedient to use the concept only until we developed a clear picture of biological mechanisms and physico-chemical events.

Darwin's caution is best expressed in his use of the phrase "struggle for existence". Darwin says that he used the term metaphorically to cover a wide range of meanings: he envisaged a kind of ecological balance in which the struggle was not in terms of mere existence but in terms of how best to adapt and propagate in a particular environment. He says that the Law of Natural Selection is a cautious hypothesis:

.... but probably in no one case could we say why a species has been victorious over another in the great battle of life (Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, Collier Books, New York, 1966, p 77).

As against Darwin, Nietzsche argues that though the former had universalized struggle in nature, the struggle is not in terms of self-preservation or constancy or integration or mere existence, it is rather a struggle for more power. The struggle for survival or existence are consequences of the will to power. "The living creature values many things higher than life itself, yet out of this evaluation itself speaks—the will to power" (Z, 'Of Self-overcoming').

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However, it can be argued that Nietzsche misunderstood Darwin's use of the term "existence". Danto has offered devastating criticism against Nietzsche's understanding of Darwin. He accuses Nietzsche of having twisted the use of "existence" from its common philosophical sense to an economical sense of living "well" or living "poorly": "Striving for existence does not imply striving for marginal existence. At least Darwin did not imply so" (A Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, Macmillan, London, p.623-624). Seeing that Darwin himself is cautious and claims to be metaphorical in the use of "struggle for existence", Danto's criticism is quite justified.

Nietzsche's main criticism against Darwin, however, is that the latter was an optimist. The latter had, through his law of Natural Selection, assumed that species develop from "lower" to "higher" and more complex forms, and that this was a sign of the "progress" of the species. As against this Nietzsche assumes that the "whole animal kingdom does not evolve from the lower to the higher but all at the same time, in utter disorder, ever against the other" (p 624).

The crux of Nietzsche's shadow-boxing with Darwin is that it is the individuals who represent the high points of evolution and not a species. The latter generally represent the decadent and the weak. However, though the individuals are the "lucky strokes" of nature, they have a comparatively less chance of surviving because, having a "greater sum of coordinated elements ... disintegration is also incomparably more likely." and Nietzsche remarks with some irony that Nature is most cruel with her more fortunate children. She spares and protects and loves "les humbles" (p 665). In a subtle argument Nietzsche dispels the category of "species as itself an abstraction. He says that the distinction between an ego and a species is a false one, the latter being a defied class with no real reference:

The ego is a hundred times more than merely a unit in the chain of members; it is this chain itself, entirely, and the species is a mere abstraction from the multiplicity of these chains and their partial similarity. (p 662. Italics mine).
Such an assertion becomes important, as we shall see, for the kind of individualism that Nietzsche propounds.


Moreover, Freud's uncertainty about the instincts is reflected in the fact that he was always unsure about how to go about classifying them. For example, he first classified all instincts into two groups: ego instincts and sexual instincts, but after 1920 he preferred classifying them into groups called the life instincts and the death instincts (Nero and Thanatos).

15. D 115.
16. W 676.
17. BGE 36.
22. A. Schopenhauer, op. cit., p 144-145.
23. BGE 19.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid. Italics mine.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
29. "Of Self Overcoming", See the whole section, which is important in that it shows that self-overcoming is the essential nature of the will to power.
30. Ibid.
32. BGE 36.
33. Ibid.
34. W. Kaufmann, op. cit., p 204.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. WP 635.

41. Kaufmann translates pathos as having a variety of senses. "Occasion, event, passion, suffering, destiny are among the meanings of this Greek word." Kaufmann would prefer, in Nietzsche's context, to use the sense of event, or occasion for he adds that a "comparison . . . with Whitehead's philosophy of occasions and events would be fruitful." See WP p 338 n.

42. Nietzsche, as we said earlier, says that power is life's strongest propensity. See D 53.

43. 102 36.

44. Ibid.


46. GS 109. Italics mine.

47. See TW, 'The Four Great Fears', 3. See also GS 112, WP 635 and 636.


49. WP 676.

50. Ibid.

51. WP 674.

52. A 26.

53. EH, 'Why I am So Wise', 1.

54. Ibid., 2.

55. EH, 'Why I am So Clever', The whole section.


57. Ibid., pp 142-145.


60. A 2.


62. WP 46.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. WP 46.

66. Ibid.


68. Z, 'Of the bestowing Virtue', E.

69. GS 120.
Chapter III: The Transvaluation of Values

1. Preface 1, and WW, II.
2. EM 108.
3. WM 107.
4. WW 245.
6. GM II, 18. 7. GM II, 16.
7. It would be interesting to compare what follows with Freud's ideas. Nietzsche's account of the development of the "bad conscience" bears remarkable similarity to Freud's account of the development of the superego. Freud read Nietzsche quite late in life but acknowledged the latter's acute sense of psychological observation (See W. Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ, Princeton, 1947, pp182-183).
8. Ibid. Nietzsche's argument in the Genealogy asserts that memory was a precondition of being able to "premise". Since, says Nietzsche, pain is the most effective system of amnesias, customary morality had essentially the aim of inculcating in man a memory. A questionable assumption since customary morality must already presuppose a certain minimum development of memory. See GM II, the whole essay, but especially sections 1-3.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid. Nietzsche's use of the term "master" and "slave" as was done, for example, by Hegel and Marx, Hegel had used these terms to describe an initial stage in the ever-increasing consciousness of the Self, or in the process of the spirit or Mind becoming self-conscious (See O. F. Heggel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1966, pp 228-240). When it enters into the social-spiritual sphere it goes through a master-slave relationship.

It remained to Marx, initially of the Left Hegelian tradition, to put Hegel "upside down" and see the concrete economic and political ramifications of primitive master-slave relationships.

As for example of Judaism, here the "moral world-order" meant that "there exists once and for all a will of God as to what man is to do and what he is not to do" (A 26). The law that governs the universe is the "will of God." This false metaphysics included the invention of antithetical values associated with "piety" and "sin". In order that these become meaningful, there must be a "free-will". Nietzsche lays the origins of the concept of a free-will squarely on the shoulders of the theologian. (It is interesting that the Greeks did not operate with a notion of "will" and it seems to have been introduced into Western philosophy by Christian theocentric philosophy). Further, Nietzsche asserts, sin and piety are not taught merely as means to spirituality and power but are created in an almost utilitarian perspective of reward and punishment. Thus, for example, heaven and hell, salvation and damnation. See also in this context 'Nietzsche Contra Wagner' in W. Kaufmann, *The Portable Nietzsche*, Viking Press, New York, 1973, pp 642 ff.

But Nietzsche may also argue: pleasure is desired only because it increases feelings of power.
31. See especially A 24 - 32. Nietzsche, when he refers to himself as a decadent (see Chapter II above), could well be seen to be describing a psychological type. Moreover, he says that evaluations of life, either for or against, ought not to be taken seriously (this will be become clearer a little later below) and, in the light of his own statements, Nietzsche would like "psychological type" to be used in an objective, descriptive manner. A careful study of the language used in sections A 24, 31, 32 etc., together with our earlier discussion on health and decadence, seem to bear testimony to such an assertion.

Nietzsche's wish to delineate a psychological type may have been influenced by Dostoyevsky whom he read late in life but admired (See F. Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, The Anti-Christ, translated, with an introduction and commentary, by R.J. Hollingdale, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1977, p 202, and W. Kaufmann, Nietzsche : Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ, Princeton, 1974, p 340 n.). Indeed Nietzsche's remark that the world of the Gospels introduces us to a world similar to that portrayed in a Russian novel "in which the refuse of society, neurosis and 'childlike' idiocy seem to make a rendezvous" (A 31) could well be seen to bear an influence of Dostoyevsky's The Idiot (See also A 29).

32. A 30. See also A 29.
33. A 30. Probably referring to Jesus' refusal to defend himself against Pontius Pilate, Nietzsche asserts that Jesus was of such a nature that what he taught excluded all possibility of dialectics, the possibility of offering contrary reasons, opinions and views. This is significant if we remember that Nietzsche accuses Socrates of destroying tragedy precisely with his dialectic.
34. A 32.
35. Ibid., and A 34.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. A 34.
40. Ibid.
41. A 33.
42. A 34.
43. A 33.
This is argued, for example, by W. P. Glasgow, 'The Contradiction in Ethical Egoism', *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 17, 1969, pp. 81-85, and by Roger Donway, 'Can Egoists be Consistent?'. *Ethics*, Vol. 80, 1969, p. 50. The contradiction, as Roger Donway puts it, emerges as follows:

(i) I approve of each person acting to his own best interest.

(ii) My not approving of Tom's doing x is to my own best interest.

(iii) Tom's doing x is to Tom's own best interest.

(iv) I approve of Tom's acting to his own best interest (follows from 1)

(v) I approve of my acting to my own best interest (follows from 1)

(vi) I approve of Tom's doing x (follows from 3 and 4)

(vii) I approve of my not approving of Tom's doing x (follows from 2 and 5).

(viii) "If I approve of my doing an act, then I do it.' We therefore get a proposition as a contradiction of 6, namely: "I do not approve of Tom's doing x (follows from 7 and 8).

(ix) I do not approve of Tom's doing x (from 7 and 8).


Ibid.

We have already noted Nietzsche's vituperative attacks against Christianity. As regards Buddhism Nietzsche is quite ambivalent. He claims that compared to Christianity, it is more objective, has a background of philosophical development and has already abolished the concept of 'God'. He had some affinity for the Buddhist metaphysics of impermanence and becoming and asserts that it has advanced forms of a strict phenomenalism. Besides, it has advanced forms of praxis for the individual. See A 20, 23 and WP 155, 179, 136, 204, 342 and 530.

However, more often than not, Nietzsche looks on Buddhism within the paradigm of weak, pessimistic (or slave) moralities and ultimately in the context of the will to nothingness and nihilism. See, for example, WP 1, 17, 23, 64, 82, 145 and 220.

There is a striking resemblance between Spinoza and Freud in the treatment of one's instinctual life, or the passions. Stuart Hampshire has made an interesting comparison between Spinoza and Freud. This comparison could be extended to a comparison with Nietzsche as well, keeping in mind Nietzsche's fundamental notion of the will to power which would manifest itself either as the bad conscience or in health spontaneity. As Stuart Hampshire puts it:

There is an evident parallel between Freud's conception of libido and Spinoza's conatus .... both philosophers conceive emotional life as based on a universal unconscious drive or tendency to self-preservation; both maintain that any frustration of this drive must manifest itself in our conscious life as some painful disturbance. Every person is held to dispose of a
certain quantity of psychical energy, a counterpart (for
Spinoza at least) of his physical energy, and conscious pleasures
and pains are the frustrations of this energy. Consequently......
.....moral praise and blame of the objects of our particular
desires, and of the source of our pleasure, are irrelevant
superstitions; we can free ourselves only by an understanding
of the true cause of our desires. (Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza.
Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1965, pp 141-142)

71. B03 61.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. A 16.

Chapter IV: Nihilism Revisited

1. WP 2.
2. "Why I am a Fatality," 1-3 etc. Nietzsche likened himself
to a historical "destiny" in whom "The Transvaluation of all
Values is brought about".
4. Ibid., 2.
5. WP 5.
6. WP 3.
7. WP 4.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. WP 55.
11. Ibid.
12. WP 12.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. WP 30.


28. J.P. Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, *op. cit.*, in the essay Sartre says that the individual's choice "involves mankind in its entirety" (p. 49). Man is "responsible for all men" (p. 29)

29. Sartre says that existence cannot be explained, it is "complete gratuity... All is gratuitous... when one happens to realize it, then it turns one's heart, all begins to float... that's the nausea" (quoted from Wilfred Desan, *op. cit.*, p. 182).


33. In Nietzsche, according to Heidegger, culminates Descartes' subjectivity of the subject, which moves from the latter's certitude of consciousness, to Nietzsche's self-assertion of the subject. The latter according to Heidegger, is conceived of by Nietzsche as "will for the sake of will" (1913).
37. Ibid.
38. Ernst Junger was an intriguing personality whose thought seems to have been a keen development of Nietzschean ideas. He sought to explore the ways in which the will to power has manifested itself in modern times and the birth of new technological and industrial values. Except for J. P. Stern's Junger: A Man of Our Times, Bowes and Bowes, Cambridge, 1963, material on Junger eluded this writer, so also works by Junger.
42. Ibid., p 186.
46. Ibid., Anscombe's remarks are almost a strange reminder of Nietzsche's position.
49. Ibid., p 176.
50. GS 125.

Chapter V: Time and Value

1. EM 21.
2. GS 341.
4. By for example, Henri Poincare. However, he assumed certain principles of mechanism in his argument which have since become outdated. See Milic Capek, 'The Theory of the Eternal Recurrence in Modern Philosophy of Science with Special Reference to C.S. Pierce', *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol 57, No 9.

5. Nietzsche says: "At least the Stoics who derived nearly all their fundamental ideas from Heraclitus show traces of it." (G. E. Moore).


9. WP 1062.

10. WP 1066.

11. Magnus extracts three basic assumptions Nietzsche makes:

   (i) Time is finite.

   (ii) Energy is finite.

   (iii) Space is infinite.

   From these the fourth follows:


12. Danto reduces the premises to three:

   (i) The total energy in the universe is finite.

   (ii) The number of states of energy is finite.

   (iii) Energy is conserved.

   He adds four additional assumptions which Nietzsche must assume in order to argue in the way in which he does. Thus:

   (iv) Time is infinite.

   (v) Energy has infinite duration.

   (vi) Change is eternal.

   (vii) Principle of Sufficient Reason.


15. Ibid. Italic mine.


18. To be sure Nietzsche did make an outline for a projected book, "The Eternal Recurrence" (WP 1057 n). The project of course was never accomplished but indicates that Nietzsche did feel a cosmological proof of the doctrine possible.


20. Ibid.


22. See ibid., p 136.

23. Z., Pt II, 'Of Redemption'.

24. Ibid.


26. WP 617.

27. WP 85.


30. Of Heraclitus he says:

The yeasaying to the flux and destruction of all things, the decisive element in any Dionysian philosophy, the yeasaying to contradiction and strife, the idea of Becoming, together with the radical rejection even of the concept Being - these things, at all events, force me to recognise him who has hitherto had the closest affinity to my thought (WP 39).

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. EH, 'Why I am so Clever', 10.

34. BO: 56.

35. Nietzsche does consider a position of pantheism made possible by affirmation but questions how far pantheism can be possible without morality. He says it would be possible to affirm a process without assuming a moral, teleological world order only if "something were attained at every moment within this process - and always the same." (WP 83). He claims that Spinoza, whom he admired and felt an affinity
with (See his letter to his friend Franz Overbeck dated July 30, 1881, in W. Kaufmann, *The Portable Nietzsche*, The Viking Press, New York, 1973, p 92), had reached such an affirmative position. Nietzsche's pantheism is infused with an almost mystical notion of a unified plenum or "universal existence," thus he envisions a world in which one's "basic character trait" is identified with the "basic character trait of every event" and adds that a person who experiences this unity would "welcome every moment of universal existence with a sense of triumph" (p 55).

Elsewhere he describes the meaning of "Dionysian as

"...an urge to unity...an ecstatic affirmation...the great pantheistic sharing of joy and sorrow that sanctifies...the feeling of the necessary unity of creation and destruction" (p 1080).

37. Go, 54.
38. Go, 23.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Jung says:

The unconscious is the matrix of all metaphysical statements, of all mythology, of all philosophy (so far as this is not merely critical) and of all experiences of life that are based on psychological premises (C. G. Jung, *The Collected Works*, trans. R. F. C. Hull, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1959, Vol 11, p 362).

43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p 470.
45. Ibid., 3.
46. Ibid., 1.
47. Besides Jung and Driscoll, this writer is only aware that Mircea Eliade has extensively treated the myth of the Eternal Recurrence as it occurs in almost all mythologies. Since his interpretation is also based on psychological and ontological grounds, he probably has many interesting things to say. Unfortunately, except through secondary sources, Eliade's relevant works consistently eluded this writer.
Do you know that at this very moment you are surrounded by eternity? *Do you know that one moment can be eternity? This is not a riddle; it is a fact, but only if you want that moment and use it to take the totality of yourself forever in any direction (Carlos Castaneda, *Tales of Power*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1976, p 15).

61. MT 22c.
63. Gs 370c.
64. Ibid.
67. Ibid., 11.
68. SEG 66.
70. A 36.
71. This has been observed by Giles Driscoll, op. cit., p 479. He remarks that Nietzsche's mental breakdown (in 1888) could have resulted from a failure to effectively respond to this problem.

Chapter VI: Preconditions and Authenticity

Mainly by the anti-Semitic who flourished in Germany in Nietzsche's own times and whose ideas flourished till the rise (and fall) of the Nazi movement. (Nietzsche's own sister and brother-in-law, his publisher, E. Schmitzmer, his friend, F. Overbeck, and Wagner who among his contemporaries who liked to give an anti-Semitic and pro-Aryan slant to his writings.)

Nietzsche did think of recommending the "breeding of an elite or a "master race", but one which did not have specific racial denotations. He wished to propose a race of masters who would be the very embodiment of asceticism, self-overcoming, self-control and who would have the ability to "command" (i.e., give a "direction" to men, especially in the context of values, aims and goals.)

However, Nietzsche's many references to, and comparative studies of, races, cultures and peoples generate controversies that go beyond the sense he gives to "mastership." Besides being historical, they are difficult to analyse and evaluate. Most recent scholars have been content with trying to undo the anti-Semitic and pro-Aryan images which grew around him (See W. Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ, Princeton, 1974, especially chapter 10, for a good background to this aspect of Nietzsche's thought).

3. GS 125.
4. GS 140.
5. "Pt II ('The Wanderer and His Shadow') 37.
6. Ibid.
7. See TW, 'The Four Great Errors', 7 and 8, for a comprehensive discussion on the subject.
9. BGR 200.
10. GS 240.
23. *‘Whv. I Am So Clever’, p. 45,
24. Ibid
25. Nietzsche says:

All the practices of the order, the solitary philosophers, the fakirs are inspired by the right standard that a certain kind of man cannot benefit himself more than by preventing himself as much as possible from acting (Ibid).

Such lines of thinking seem to take Nietzsche into mystical realms, as much as do his skepticism of the intellect’s creations, his ideas on unity and pantheistic affirmation.

A.K. Coomaraswamy brings out the nature of the spontaneity which characterizes a mystic through reference to the Indian cult of Sahaj. A comparison between Nietzsche’s idea of suspending willing is worth comparing with the notion of Sahaj.

The tradition of Sahaj moves with the conviction that the highest level of romantic or spiritual love is achieved only with the cessation of desire. As other mystical traditions, it advocates a state of repose which is free from desire, longing and willing. As Coomaraswamy puts it,

Sahaj has nothing to do with the cult of pleasure. It is a doctrine of the Tao, and a path of non-pursuit. All that is best for us comes of itself into our hands — but if we strive to overtake it, it perpetually eludes us (A.K. Coomaraswamy, *The Dance of Shiva*, Sagar Publications, Delhi, 1971, p 135).

And Coomaraswamy gives instances of how Sahaj has been reflected in Indian literature (See, for example, p 132).
26. As Bernd Magnus puts its

Since the categorical mode of thinking has become inadequate to retrieve the lost sense of Being .... Heidegger's latest reflections .... get caught up in a vision in which he strives for a thinking which, in awaiting Being, is a non-willing and non-representing (Bernd Magnus, op. cit., p 140.)

27. BR 107. Italics mine.
31. 0 5 270.
32. We saw (in Chapter 1) how Nietzsche looks on art as arising from "a feeling of plenitude and increased energy" -- the "essence of intoxication". But "out of this feeling one gives to things, one compels them to take ....." (TWL, Expeditions of an Untimely Man, 8.) An understanding of such a bestowal is all-important for Nietzsche.
33. 2, Pt I, 'Of the Bestowing Virtue', 1.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.

CONCLUSION

3. Just to cite two examples: The Upanishads say:

When the mind is silent ....... it can enter into a world which is far beyond the mind: the highest End.

The mind should be kept in the heart as long as it has not reached the highest End. This is wisdom, and this is liberation. Everything else is only words (The 'Maitri Upanishad', 6.24, in The Upanishads, trans Juan Mascaro, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1977, p 103.).

And Carlos Castaneda reports Don Juan as having said that there were innumerable paths from which we could choose one to follow. For him the heart alone can tell us which path to choose. Don Juan asks us to ask ourselves: "Does this path have a heart? If it does it is good; if it doesn't it is of no use" (Carlos Castaneda, The Teachings of Don Juan, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974, p 106). Further he says: "It is the consistent choice of the path with heart which makes a warrior different from the average man". (Carlos Castaneda, A Separate Reality, Penguin, Harmondsworth 1974, p 224) In everyday life, he adds, one can see if a path has a heart "when he is one with it, when he experiences a great peace and pleasure traversing its length" (Ibid).


5. Ibid. p 597.
6. Ibid. p 600.
7. Ibid. p 336.
8. Ibid. p 236.
9. A 34
10. Ibid.