CONCLUSION

In the course of writing this work it is possible that we have missed out on many of Nietzsche's ideas which have some bearing on his conception of values. For instance, we have not dwelt at length on some of his historical and cultural observations which either form the (empirical) ground for some of his more interesting assertions or which, alternatively, substantiate such assertions. Further, it has been impractical to point out the extent and rich nuances of his psychological observations, some of which are not only startling but reveal a keen, penetrating insight.

There are a few ideas which we have tried to bring into perspective because, if not virtually ignored, they have not been sufficiently dealt with by Nietzsche scholars. Perhaps these scholars felt, and justifiably so, that being abstruse they were likely to raise complications and controversies which were best left aside.

However, we thought it necessary to point to them because Nietzsche did give them importance in varying axiological perspectives and because an awareness of them may prove useful in future Nietzsche studies.
The ideas which we have in mind revolve around the
notions of the conscience, eternity, non-willing and the Bestowing
Virtue.

To give a general perspective on this work, we have tried
to bring into relief how Nietzsche, with an obsessive commitment,
tries to remove all transcendental grounds which have served to
give values a meaning. As such, his critiques are directed towards
metaphysical and religious beliefs and how these are related to
a devaluation of the phenomenal world, the instincts, the passions
and so on.

With an equal obsession he tries to show that life (or the
will to power), the instincts and the passions are adequate to
make values meaningful and must be affirmed as such.

One must, of course, be cautious in observing how the
rejection of transcendentalism and the affirmation of instinctual
life are brought about. Nietzsche purportedly argues on the basis
of empirical and historical observations. But, in the last
resort, is the assertion that instinctual life provides a ground
for values an a priori assertion? Or does it rely solely on
empirical evidence? Further, is the assertion that life manifests
itself in health and decadence an a priori assertion or an
empirical one?
The problem becomes more acute when Nietzsche asserts that the world is the will to power and nothing else. Such an assertion seems to be an a priori one. It is not an empirical one in so far as it does not leave open the possibility for its falsifiability.

But if Nietzsche resorts to the a priori and the metaphysical one could well argue that he is not able to provide a ground for values which is not transcendental. His rejection of all forms of transcendentalism is, therefore, beset with numerous ambiguities and inconsistencies.

Assuming that life and the instincts can provide a ground for values, there are two "sets" of values that Nietzsche works on:

The first set deals with those values which arise from decadence, sickness, weakness, resentment and so forth. It encompasses all "ascetic ideals", including the search for truth and the creation of "true worlds". It also encompasses what Nietzsche calls "slave moralities" or those moralities which uphold the distinction between "good" and "evil".

The second set deals with values which arise from health, strength and exuberance. Besides "master moralities", it encompasses such values as art, including perfection and eternity,

A few points may be emphasised here. First, both sets of values are eidolons or symptomatic of the life process itself.

Life manifests itself in health or decadence. As such, health and decadence serve him as criteria for the classification of the different kinds of values which life throws into relief.

Second, Nietzsche does not rule out the possibility that the same value could occur in both sets. Thus, for example, power could be the goal of both a healthy will and a decadent will. This for Nietzsche would be all-important for an evaluation of the nature of the value.

Third, Nietzsche would not fail to emphasise that our values both sets of values are indeed valuable in the sense that life has a use for them in its own enhancement — as aids in the "transfiguration of the physis." Both sets are interdependent and Nietzsche often tries to show how each finds the other necessary and hence valuable, for its own propagation and perpetuation.

Fourth, in the context of the will to power, we may note, whatever different values we may have, they can ultimately be seen
to be related to one sole value — power.

Nietzsche of course, is neither always explicit nor clear about the exact nature of the multifarious relations that could so result.

The ambiguous relations between eternity and power and the Bestowing Virtue and power are glaring examples of the case in point.

However so, here too the values that emerge from the will to power are classifiable according to the health-decadence criteria.

Two interesting features of Nietzsche's rejection of all forms of transcendentalism may be pointed out. The first is his antipathy towards the intellect, reason and logic. He believed that art and myth, qua spontaneous creations in which the creator has only a marginal role of mediator to play, are capable of embodying far greater "truth" than discursive or scientific thought. He believed in an organic, largely emotive, liaison between the origins of an image or an idea and its "message". Such a belief often leads him to commit the genetic fallacy.
The second point is that in moving away from all forms of transcendentalism Nietzsche's attention focuses on the individual, or, to be more precise, on oneself.

This most immediate and apparent embodiment of life and the instincts is emphasised right through the conceptions of "master moralities" (especially the stress on egoism), self-overcoming and self-knowledge.

The primacy given to the individual is evident both in Nietzsche's philosophical ideas and in his habit of injecting autobiographical and biographical elements into his writings. The charge of *argumentum ad hominem*, a form of the genetic fallacy, can be levelled against him at so many points that we thought it superfluous to mention it in the course of this work.

Giving primacy to the individual, however, raises fundamental problems in Nietzsche. He also tries to work out a holistic, monistic cosmology in which every process is marked by a necessity – either the necessity of instinctual life or the necessity of the will to power.

The individual himself is only a part of this holistic conception. As such, the individual has no choice or alternative but must succumb to that necessity of which he is a part.
Yet Nietzsche wants to give primacy to the individual.

There are moments of ambiguity or even inconsistency when Nietzsche says that values are the necessary products of life and the individual is merely a mediator and when he says that the individual is the creator and bestower of value. It is a problem that brings into relief a fundamental cleavage between Nietzsche's conception of life and his normative intentions. It is the kind of problem faced by any holistic, deterministic system which still wants to retain freedom and the possibility of ethics for the individual.

At a general level we may say that the import of Nietzsche's philosophical nihilism is that truth does not lie "out there", waiting to be grasped by the intellect. At least that is not important, he even admits its possibility. What is important is knowledge of oneself - of one's own truth. As M. Furusho puts it, what Nietzsche seeks is not the "'objective perspective' - independent truth" but the "'existential truth' - the truth in the sense of being 'true to oneself' ".

Finally, we cannot resist pointing out that in moving towards the individual Nietzsche reveals a predilection, which too seems to have gone unnoticed by Nietzsche scholars. We shall call
this predilection a predilection for the heart. It seems to have been a consequence of both his antipathy towards the intellect as well as his search for the "truth" of the individual in subliminal realms.

By introducing the heart into philosophical writings one may well be thought to be moving towards mystical or esoteric forms of thought for it is primarily in literature of such kinds that the heart has been treated. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger seem to have tried to dispel such thoughts.

Let us briefly see how the "heart" is used by Heidegger.

For him authenticity demands that, by non-willing, one waits for thought. This is so because for Heidegger it is ultimately Being which bestows "thought" on a thinker. This comes in the form of a "gift", and we are told that the "gift" that Being bestows "is nothing less than itself". This "gift" says Heidegger, constitutes the essence of the thinker.

Such a bestowment of Being reposes in what Heidegger calls the "heart" of man. It is only when man, a thinker, is so empowered that there arises in him a "wanting". To want to think and to have the power to think are "profoundly related."
It is in such contexts that Heidegger asserts that there are many "sides" to Being which are not accessible to representative thought but only to the "interior world of the heart." 7

Nietzsche envisages a rather mysterious liaison between life and the heart and the conscience. What he seems to want to say is that the heart, as the very core of man's being, harbours life in its most immediate manifestation. It is not a "mirror" of life for that may imply a kind of dualism to which he would have been averse. Rather he wishes to say that the heart is the embodiment of life in its most immediate form.

To be sure, Nietzsche's references to the heart are rare. We shall point to two instances where he uses the heart in contexts which in themselves are quite significant.

In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche describes Dionysus as one who possesses the "genius of the heart". He says:

The genius of the heart as it is possessed by that great hidden one, the tempter god and born pied piper of consciences, whose voice knows how to descend into the underworld of every soul.... 8
There are two points to note here. One, Dionysus is described as the "genius of the heart", and two, Dionysus is almost simultaneously described as the "pied piper of consciences."

Nietzsche seems to want to say that Dionysus, sensitive to every impulse of life, ignoring "no signal from the emotions", is so closely attuned to life that he experiences life in its most immediate spontaneity, its most immediate necessity. Such an experience is not one of the objective or external world. It is an experience of one's innermost being. It is in such a context that Nietzsche wishes to call Dionysus "the genius of the heart".

At a phenomenological or epistemological level, Nietzsche's introduction of the conscience in the lines quoted above may be significant. The conscience, as we saw, is Nietzsche's infallible faculty which commands "this and nothing else is necessary now". But it is not easy to see how Nietzsche in the same breath calls Dionysus both "genius of the heart" and the "pied piper of consciences".

He says the "tempter god" is one who irresistibly compels one to "follow him more inwardly more thoroughly."

Two meanings could be elicited from Nietzsche's words. One, that qua "genius of the heart" Dionysus helps others to
bring their consciences to the forefront — makes them probe into
themselves to enable them to recognize their conscience. Two, that
he compels already developed consciences to follow him. He gives
them direction. Perhaps he is able to do this because he has a
peculiar allure which stems from his attunement to the very pulse
of life. He does not offer rational grounds for the direction he
gives; he tempts, he entices. Being the embodiment of spontaneity,
he induces it in others and, as if by magic, a direction is created.

However so, it is clear that, through the individual, Nietzsche
does seem to have wanted to work out a relation between life, the
heart and the conscience. He would almost certainly have said that
the commands of the conscience are a clue to the world of the heart,
and hence a clue of the nature of life itself.

The second instance in which Nietzsche uses the heart in a
significant manner is found in the Anti-Christ. Here he describes the
"Kingdom of Heaven" not as something which comes after death but
as a "condition of the heart." If in the earlier work Nietzsche
described Dionysus as the "genius of the heart" here we are given
a hint about the experience of the heart.

Nietzsche's last word is enigmatic, paradoxical and
borders on the esoteric. The condition of the heart reaches beyond
time and space. It does not, however, lie in a transcendental realm, in a beyond. It lies within the individual and is accessible only to the individual. Yet, for all its immediateness and particularity, it is, paradoxically, profoundly universal.

Nietzsche says that the "Kingdom of God" as an "experience within a heart" has "no yesterday no tomorrow ... it is everywhere, it is nowhere...."