The second chapter of the thesis is an attempt to analyze and explicate the problem of Subjectivity-consciousness-viewed from a different aspect viz. that of a concrete human person. This chapter especially underlines an important question. How to relate the fundamental concept of subjectivity or consciousness to the real complex ordinarily referred to as person, (denoted in another way as ego) for, Subjectivity is intelligible only in the context of a human subject or person. Accordingly, following Merleau-Ponty, we argue that it is not possible to describe the human world fully without referring back to the human body. That is why the concept of body has such a central place in the existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. It is not the thing body, but rather the immediately experienced and experiencing, lived and living body of everyday life that Merleau-Ponty gave emphasis. I do experience my body as the means, the instrument by means of which consciousness is situated in the world. Thus for Merleau-Ponty, the study of consciousness in the world is a study of consciousness as embodied, and hence a study of the body as experienced or what Merleau-Ponty sometimes calls the lived body or body proper. It is only through existing in bodily form that I can be in the world. Through the body I am able to act upon the things and persons and conversely they are able to act.
on me.

i) Paradoxicality in man's knowledge of himself

From the point of view of both the inner structure and the outer expression there is nothing more enigmatic in the world than man. No theory about the nature of man has ever claimed to be complete. There is something basically paradoxical regarding man's knowledge of himself: he finds himself to be there as a knowing consciousness and at the same time discovers, while he is in the knowledge situation, that there is an expanse of the unknown spread around what is known. Man's knowledge of himself, and of the world, is shrouded in an ocean of ignorance. Our pursuit of self-knowledge is a sort of dog-running-to-catch-its-own-tail game. Man as a being escapes from his own act of knowing, we know a thing and yet do not know enough what we know of it, somewhere our knowledge retains an eternal lack. Whether it is directed outward or inward, the knowing mind makes certain things stand out under its flash light as it were, but an infinite number of other things linger as unclear along the borders of the known, waiting to enter the zone of knowledge. These latter things, however, may never enter the region of clarity but may fleetingly disappear into total obscurity into some unfathomable primordial darkness.

ii) Human Subject: The Manifold Phases

Man is a marvellous and many sided creature. In common
with all the beings of nature, he has a physical body composed of the basic elements, which grows, decays, and interacts with other processes\(^1\). In common with plants, this body is animated by a moving principle that nourishes and reproduces itself. With the other animals, it is capable of locomotion, and is endowed with sensory organs which enable him to direct his acts by an awareness of external things and his own pleasures and pains. In addition to these he possesses freedom which makes him the master of his own life by deliberation and choice. Finally he is, as Proclus said, a praying animal, who is able to enter into communion with a being higher than himself.

It is possible to single out each of these phases, and to regard the whole of human nature from certain points of view. Thus we have an astronomical view of man which looks at him as a tiny physical process lost in the vast encompassing spaces of galactic universe. There is the biological view of man which focuses him as a living being and regards him as the last stage of a protracted planetary evolution. There is again the animalistic view of man which concentrates upon his awareness of pleasure and pain and his elementary appetites. Sharply set off from these are the libertarian view of man which focuses his freedom of choice, and sees him as the master of his history. Finally there is

the religious, view of man which interprets his whole being in terms of his relation to an eternal spirit.

In the earliest pre-Socratic phase of the Greek thought, the concept of man was not sharply focused. Noteworthy remarks were made about man. But the chief object of speculative interest was the order of nature as a whole. Man was simply a part of the cosmos, and attention was never concentrated on his peculiar nature as an object of special concern.

Of all visible beings, man alone possesses the faculty of rational insight, weak though it is. Hence Socrates was led to a new conception of soul, and a radically novel theory of human nature as a whole. Man is not a cosmic accident, but a culminating phase of the whole natural order with a peculiar and important function to perform. He alone can bring nature into the light of understanding, and consciously direct his life and activities into voluntary harmony with this order. This explains the intense passion with which Socrates urged upon himself and his contemporaries, wherever he met them and at every situation, even as an old man at the time of his trial, the supreme importance of not sinking down to the level of dumb creatures, but of tending those precious souls which they


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alone possess, in order to perform the unique and essential function for which they were brought into existence. He differed sharply with the sophistic view that men once lived dispersed without the bonds of society. This is sheer fantasy, for the human subject is too weak, especially in infancy, to live alone by himself. He needs a family for mere survival and the family is a society, indeed the root of all society. Hence man is understood as a social animal by nature. He needs society not only to survive, but also to satisfy many other basic needs of his nature. The Socratic ideal is not the rule of one man, one class, or the people as a whole, but rather the rule of reason and the law of nature for the common good of all.

The pre-Socratic philosophers had made no sharp distinction between soul and body. Life and consciousness were thought to be active manifestations of physical parts. The atomists held that soul consisted of finer material atoms, and Heraclitus had identified soul with fire. Anaxagoras had boldly asserted that mind was something unmixed with matter and capable of independent purposive action. But he failed to sustain this position, and finally identified the causes of human action with air, ether and water', leaving no real place for mind.

iii) Socrates : A Novel Conception of Man

Socrates introduced a novel conception of the soul quite distinct from all the preceding theories, which has
exercised an important influence on the western view of man ever since. The soul is neither an arrangement of atoms nor a superpersonal agency endowed with super-human knowledge and capacities. It is rather the primary guiding part of the human subject, by which he understands and consciously directs his life. Like God himself, the human subject is immaterial, invisible and known only through his effects. This part of man can oppose and govern the body. It retains its identity throughout physical change, and even survives the complete disintegration of the body at death. Hence as Socrates constantly asserted, the chief obligation of every man is first of all to tend his own soul, and then so far as this is possible, to help others in tending theirs. This new view of the human soul gave rise to two results which have played an important role in western thought as a problem and as a cultural attitude. The human individual as such is more than an organized body, extended in space. He is compound of such a body, together with a knowing, planning agency. This agency can unite with the stable forms of things as they really are, and can direct its activities in the light of such knowledge, which no physical thing can do. Hence man is a union of physical body with non-physical soul. How can two such diverse elements be united in one single being? This has given rise to look at the problem of human body and soul

4. Xenophon, Mem., PP.4,3,14.
in a different way and has played an important role in western thought from the time of Socrates.

iv) The Ontological Structure of Man: Two Approaches

To understand man is to be able to encompass through thought and words the entire field of his consciousness. As Prof. Ramakant Sinari\(^5\) opines there can be, and indeed are, two distinct approaches to the understanding of human reality: one outside-in and the other inside-out. Although ultimately the answer to the question what is man? Will have to comprehend explanations of all the factors that go to constitute the entire human reality, the outside-in approach is the basis of all empirical studies and rational analyses and the inside-out approach is crystallized in ontologies. The empirical studies of human phenomena begin with the consideration of man as an object, an incarnate and observable thing, i.e., one that can be dissected, experimented on, manipulated with instruments, measured and X-rayed. The empirical view of man, therefore, tries to avoid every reference to his inside, his feeling self. It is the basic requirement of this view to objectify man, to investigate him by divorcing him from his inwardness to attempt not to state the unstateable existential meaning of "being human". For this view man must be explained outside in, i.e., he must be regarded as a specimen of the

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behavioural set and brought under scientific laws. Man, as a biological, physiological, Psychological, chemical and social entity, according to the outside -in approach, is a fully analysable system.

The outside - in explanation for the phenomenon of man, so far as their logical character is concerned, are invariably flawless because they make it a point not to construct unwarranted or trans-empirical hypotheses. They try to strictly adhere to the principle of stating only what is observed or observable, of establishing the truth of every proposition strictly empirically. So, in many of the scientific philosophers today, where solutions to problems seek to be outside - in, every statement referring to man's inside is translated into the statement of behaviour. Statements about mental acts, about consciousness or ego, existential experiences, statements of private meanings, are all reached through the behavioural and physical formulations. In the process, man's subjectivity-his "inner space" - one of the eternal mysteries into which our inward-seeking sensibility continually runs, -is lost.

v) Gilbert Ryle and The Behaviouristic Approach

One of the most eminent scientific philosophers in which this has happened is Gilbert Ryle's theory of the human mind. Ryle's method of accounting for the nature of

mind is behaviouristic. By approaching the "mental", outside-in, he discards the classical notions regarding the inside of man-notions like non-materiality, self-luminosity, intentionality, introspection and self-consciousness. Statements about them, he hold, can be explicated by means of their equivalents in the category of physical behaviour. Thus, for instance, statements such as 'I am thinking what I am doing", "I must heed what the others say or do" were usually taken as referring to particular frames of mind.

vi) The Inside-out Approach and The Structure of Consciousness

The design of the inside-out study of man centres around man's consciousness and hence to bring out the ontological structure of man. In fact this study is more than scientific, for, it proceeds from the "roots" of consciousness's very act of experiencing. To the inside-out view, man's experience of the world manifests his intensionality. Man sees his own life and his presence in the world as significant realities. His sense of being in the world, of having a body extended in space and "open" toward various impressions about the physical world, his awareness of occupying a certain locus amidst things and along flow of time, his being conscious and alive, are fundamental to his ontological being. Man is directed toward some meaning or other, some impression or other - he not only perceives himself as experiencing but also registers
vii) The Intentionality Thesis and The Inside-Out Approach

The thesis that human consciousness is intentional-originally put forward by Edmund Husserl and now unhesitatingly accepted by phenomenologists and existentialists - suggests perhaps the most primordial quality of man's existence. Consciousness is always the "consciousness- of". The awareness I have of the physical world and of myself as an embodied mind cannot be separated from my being. To be conscious as man is to be worldly, i.e., to have a psychic structure directed towards objects, to contain and know that the world is there. Thus 'being intentional' is 'being directed towards the world' : both the expressions point out what can be termed the arrow-head character of man's entire psycho-physical existence.

One of the most puzzling constituents of our inside is that our sense of being conscious is uninterruptedly fastened, so to say, to the process of our meaning-intuiting. Existence itself is a meaning. That I am here and now, that the world is there as a sort of abode of mine, that the objects and persons around me engage my senses and attentions, are all expressions of certain basic meaning-experiences. How these meaning-experiences or meaning-intuitions arise in consciousness is one of the perennial problems in metaphysics. We know, for instance, that our awareness of existing in the world is the residual meaning
behind all meanings as such, that even if we succeed in annulling all other meaning, the "meaningfulness" of our being worldly cannot be annulled.

In a sense nominalists are right when they say that the ultimate constituents of the universe are names. However, the word 'name' must be understood in a broad sense - it must refer to that fundamental import which consciousness runs into by its position in the world. The very bodily being of mine, the fact of my living in space and time, objects around me - the books, pencils, the walls, the trees and roads and houses outside my window - are all meanings in the sense that they are intuited by me as definite "spots" through which my awareness journeys. There is no experience which is totally devoid of meaning.

The intentionality of consciousness and the emergence of meaning are thus strangely inter-connected. Both display a kind of inside-out directedness of the human self: they point at something and leave the consciousness as its experiencer, its "meaner". Just as every meaning situation implies the presence of a mind, a cognitive being, it also shows itself as a meeting-point of the latter with something. It is impossible to conceive of a context where an absolutely meaningless experience prevails. In this sense, to be is to be meant for someone-to a ego that posits itself as an I-locus. This chair, for instance, is "caught" by my consciousness as a meant thing; it is, so to say, a
"prey" to my meaning consciousness. Indeed, the world that is perceived as a meaning or assembly of meanings can be analysed into simple individual nuances, somewhat like noesis-noema structures; but even when so analysed, meanings still remain the basic constituents of our existence in the world. One is then, inclined to say that man is the origin of all meanings.

Since all meanings are intended, so to say, apprehended by consciousness, and since there is no possibility of their being self-subsistent, it is the intentional character of consciousness that seems to generate them. To say that man is the creator of the world, that the world comprises a pattern of meanings secreted by the I-loci, contains, therefore, greater truth than might appear. Ontologically i.e., looking at the inside-out direction of it, human consciousness is both worldly and non-worldly. The worldliness is not something extraneous to us - it is a natural habitat of our existence. As Heidegger says, temporality or being-in-the-world belongs to the very structure of man. It is by being-in-the-world, or rather because of it, that our sense of existence becomes a reality, an impregnable truth. Unless therefore a special endeavor is made to disconnect our inside from its environing outside, i.e. the world of psychic impressions as such, we necessarily remain world-conscious, world oriented, world based. But while living as world based we do not
succumb to the world. Nothing that is given to consciousness is such that it holds on to it rigidly. Different horizons of meaning arise in consciousness as clear, semi-clear and unclear nuances in the back group of what stands out as prominent. The self escaping disposition seems to be innate to the very essence of man.

viii) The Phenomenological Method and The Primordial State of Consciousness

In fact Husserl's famous phenomenological method, which is a self-explorative technique in modern existentialist philosophers, has for its aim the withdrawal of consciousness from its world-experience. Husserl's plan, like that of the yoga philosophy and Samkars Vedanta, was to "catch" the primordial state of consciousness - i.e., the state at which consciousness is pure and immune from all presuppositions. While, therefore, phenomenologistis, following Husserl, support the possibility of consciousness's attaining what have been called the "essential" or "eidetic" meanings, the existentialists at no stage alienate the phenomenon of being - conscious from that of being-in-the-world. "Worldliness" belongs to the very structure of consciousness. It is the expression of its basic disposition. All meaning - intuitions or meanings-experiences form the very way consciousness is or lives in the world. Had there been a region in which consciousness could realise total absence of the world impressions, the
whole outside could be regarded as a superimposition, an accident in relation to consciousness. But the very fact that we do not perceive the world as "unnatural" do not want to vanish from it (by dying, for example), shows that being-in-the-world defines the fundamental structure of the human subject.

However, our inside has dimensions that cannot be exhaustively fathomed. We reach them by an act of transcendence. In its inward journeys so to say; consciousness can see itself running into a volley of meanings, nuances, perspectives, each of which appears like a creation, an occurrence from nowhere. Actually the unfolding of the archaeology of these meanings is one of the most interesting - although most difficult - tasks in the ontological studies of consciousness. Creativity is the very core of our inner life, it is the very spirit of man.

Self transcendence is the essence of human consciousness. In every experience or act of his, man surpasses himself-as-given, figures as something more than his cognitive self. Human consciousness does not contain itself like an object. Being a ceaseless flux, its inward movement, is without any boundaries. This is why its precise characterisation is not possible. It constantly creates its views toward the given, generates and re-constructs meanings and throws them on to the given. There is thus no preconceived rational scheme which our inside adheres to. It
is a passion, an urge, a pure spontaneity, freedom.

Unless our view of the inside of man is complete, we cannot claim to know human life and human behaviour fully. The elementary pre-conscious sphere which borders on a void or nothing impinges on our notion of the empirical reality and becomes the subjectivity-stuff that we basically are. It is the sphere of freedom, creativity and Being of which we are ordinarily unaware, or only intermittently aware.

Consciousness, as it is directed toward something or other, figures as a kind of gleam discovering whatever it falls upon. It is a capacity to radiate meanings, to present itself to itself. It is this activity of discovering by radiation concerning man's inside that was most perspicuously suggested by Samkara - one of the most wonderful inside-out theoreticians in the world by characterising the self as light. It is the very nature of human reality to discover itself by discovering the world, to find itself to be there as a watchful witness of itself, to reveal itself by revealing itself-in-the-world. If we are able to define the exact nexus between consciousness's act of experiencing and that toward which this act is directed the noesis and the noema, we will have found an answer to the question why the world is there as it is. Indeed, the noesis-noema structure is epistemically positive; it has an experimental purview, a colligation of meanings grasped as present in time, a solid nucleus around which the meaning-
consciousness keeps on hovering. This meaning-consciousness need not express itself in a linguistic behaviour, its manifestation in language is something contingent, and very often directed toward a social purpose.

ix) **Man and His Primordial Nature**

Understanding Man, then, is understanding man in his primordial nature. This may be one of the reasons why Merleau Ponty speaks of the three strata of human behaviour as consisting of a) the physical b) the organic or the vital or the physiological and c) the symbolic. These are not three aspects of human existence, but only three attitudes with which we approach the study of man from the phenomenological point of view, they are in a sense only paradigms. The investigations by phenomenologists have shown that man's nature cannot be exhausted by the first two. They take the study of man into the realm of creativity. Phenomenology then must probe into the inner life of man, in the sense that it is concerned with the modes of his inner life; perceiving, imagining, feeling, willing, thinking, striving etc. It is these inner modes of human consciousness that give meaning and value to experience. This is the significance of the phenomenologists interest in subjectivity, though metaphysically, the phenomenologists steer clear of the subjective and objective distinctions in reality, as they are not ontologically committed. The phenomenologist is also interested in things in which the
scientist (Scientifically oriented positivist) are not interested in questions of value and meaning.

On the basis of this characterization of consciousness as intentionality, it is now possible to recharacterize the sense in which consciousness is self-knowing, is Being-for-itself. Consciousness is essentially aware of itself, but not as an ego. Consciousness is necessarily conscious of itself as consciousness (of) an object. According to Sartre, this is even a necessary feature of consciousness. It is not to be confused with the reflexivity of the Cartesian cogito. There is no self in this consciousness (of) an object, and all of this is still pre-reflective. The cogito is based on this 'second-order' consciousness (the term comes from Merleau-Ponty) but it is only a "necessary possibility". Consciousness can then be characterized as "Being-for-itself" because its existence consists in its dependency on objects, its knowledge of its own dependency on objects, and the possibility of explicit recognition of itself in the Cartesian cogito.

x) Merleau-Ponty: His Concept of Consciousness

Merleau-Ponty's view on the concept of 'consciousness' are much more difficult to summarize, largely because he

avoids the term as much as possible, usually using "conscious" as an equivalent of 'knowing' or 'reflective'. He rejects the traditional Cartesian definition of consciousness as immediate self knowledge. In "Phenomenology of Perception", the discussion of consciousness is central around the problem of perception.

From the foregoing discussions, some central features of consciousness, as analyzed by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have become evident. Consciousness is necessarily consciousness (of) objects, consciousness is dependent on its objects; there is a pre-reflective consciousness which is not 'inhabited' by an ego; yet consciousness is necessarily self-conscious, it is consciousness (of) being conscious (of) objects, pre-reflective consciousness is not primarily a knowing consciousness but a 'living' experiencing consciousness.

xi) The Body Image

One of the distinct features of the philosophy of Merleau Ponty is his emphasis on the analysis of the human body. From our discussion, so far, it should be evident why they think such an investigation is necessary. Traditional philosophers, Descartes for example, had simply distinguished material objects from consciousness; my body was one among other material objects. My body according to the traditional thesis, was no different philosophically than the chair in which I sit. We ought to ask, "who is this
body?" and as soon as we do, we see that there is something very peculiar about thinking of my body as a physical object. The peculiarity is initiated because I think "myself manifested to the other and the other manifested for me as a body". We then tend to think of the body as, a certain thing having its own laws and capable of being defined from outside.

Once we think of the body as an object, as an object of physiology, there are "insurmountable difficulties" in trying to 'reunite' consciousness with this physiological system. According to Sartre, I never "apprehend the contingency of my body as body for me". My body is not an object in the world. My body, however, is primarily me, not an object of mine. My body is an instrumental center of instrumental complexes, a point of view and a point of departure. My body is "lived and not known". For Merleau Ponty, habit is a matter of 'enlarging' our body; habit expresses our power of dilating our being into the world, or changing our existence by appropriately fresh, instruments. To get used to a hat, a car, or a stick is to be transplanted into them or conversely to incorporate them into the bulk of our own body. It is literally true that the subject who learns to type incorporates the key-blank space into his bodily space.

xii) Body Image and The Theory of Perception

Body is not simply another object in the world to which
I am mysteriously attached; my body and I are indistinguishable; my body is an object which does not leave me. The theory of the body is already a theory of perception. One could not grasp the object without the mediation of bodily experience. External perception and the preception of one's own body vary in conjunction because they are two facets of one and the same act.

This theory of bodily perception will allow an answer to a most puzzling question in Husserl. When we speak of "looking at an object in its different aspects" and from different viewpoints, how are we to make sense of the notion of 'different aspects' and 'different viewpoints' after bracketing the world, including my own body? If my body is bracketed, what sense does it make to say that I 'walk around the object'? Merleau-Ponty has dispensed both with this problematic 'bracketing' of existence and rejected the claim that my own body is just another object. Thus he is able to assert that it is by conceiving my body itself as a mobile object that I am able to interpret perceptual appearance and construct the cube [I am walking around] as it truly is. It is worth commenting that Merleau-Ponty has turned these insights concerning the peculiar place of my body in the world into a basis for a theory of perception.

In so far as the body comes into the reality of the world, the subjective venture is a situation defined by the objectivity of the body. The essential presence of the subject in the world is 'one' with his body as lived; and, the object which his body is in the world exists as that same essential presence. In this sense, "philosophy is indeed and always a break with objectivism and a return from construct to lived experience, from the world to ourselves". This is to say, "the lived experience can no longer recognize itself in the idealizations we draw from it". In short, the lived body experience is the spontaneous and primordial presence at the world which is the phenomenal body.

Merleau-Ponty's concept of the lived body is the notion that existence is the perception of essences in their primordial or immanent structure. It is this immanences that is taken up in the act of transcendence to become the "presence" that is existence. In short, the essential spontaneity is the material of existential analysis through a phenomenological method. "To experience a structure is not to receive it into oneself passively, it is to live it, to take it, assume it and discover its immanent meaning". The phenomenal body which is the lived experience is primordial structure that is itself temporality. This is to suggest that the existential presence of the body is the common
structure that is manifest in the on-going immanence and transcendence that is spatiality in genesis. It is only through this structure that the lived experience is manifest. The flesh is the visible - seer, the audible hearer, the tangible touch - the sensitive - sensible. The lived body experience can be illustrated in the grasp of your right hand with the left. For each instant of time that this union of hands creates, one hand is object and one hand is subject. Yet, they are reversibly subject and object only with the union to each other. This is the immanence and transcendence that is the phenomenal presence. Each such presence creates the limits of its own spatiality and the movements of the phenomenal presence within those limits is their time. It is obvious that the clasped hands do not remain static in their roles as subject and object, each hand is first subject, then object, then subject, and so on. In any event, the felt or lived phenomena is known and expressed through the agency of the body. In addition, the perception or expression that takes place is an intentional act. The elements of experience that become relational through a dialectic of immanence and transcendence constitute a presence only when the intent of the body-subject directs the composition of that structure. "In order to perceive things, we need to live them".

To have a body is to possess a universal setting, a schema of all types of perceptual unfolding and of all those

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inter-sensory correspondences which lie beyond the segment of the world which we are actually perceiving. A thing is, therefore, not actually given in perception, it is internally taken up by us in so far as it is bound up with a world, the basic structures of which we carry with us, and of which it is merely one of many possible concrete forms. Although a part of our living experience, it is nevertheless transcendent to our life because the human body, with its habits weaving a human environment, has running through it a movement towards the world itself. There is no ideal or arbitrary limitation that exists to guide the dialectic of perception in the lived body experience; it is present with the individual himself. At times the "lived distance" between the person and the world fluctuates so as to allow the body subject to exist in a realm of absolute freedom which has the negative effect of a forced choice of continuing to be. On the other hand, the lived distance may become so great or so small that events cease to have significance with those closest to one-self, thus becoming obsessional. "They enshroud me like night and rob me of my individuality and freedom. I can literally no longer breathe; I am possessed". It is in this structure of perception that the lived body becomes totally subject, object, or other.

The lived-body experience is fundamentally the recognition by the person that his body is the agency of his
psyche so that one is a body subject in the phenomena of living.

xiv) Lived Body as a Unitary Agent

Lived body is the unitary agent through which the reception of the world and others, as well as oneself, is accomplished. And, through it one is known to others as "at the world" and known to oneself in expression.

There is no doubt that the lived body is the semiotic agency of perception and expression alike. We are not, then reducing the significance of the word, or even of the percept, to a collection of 'bodily sensations' but we are saying that the body, in so far as it has 'behaviour patterns', is that strange object which uses its own parts as a general system of symbols for the world, and through which we can consequently 'be at home in' that world, 'understand' it and find significance in it.

Thus, the body-subject in the lived body experience is the semiotic of being and existence that is manifest, and thus known, through the essential agencies of perception and expression. In the first reflection of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological method there is indeed a primacy of Perception that is the lived body experience.

Our bodily existence and the things it experiences constitute, according to Merleau Ponty the entire bulk of what is called our 'being-in-the-world'. Man is a 'body subject', an 'ego-body', a 'body image', a body itself. What
he suggests by the pre-eminence of the reality of our body is that no consciousness deprived of the consciousness of being a body would have access to the world. And therefore, whatever meaning we attach to our encounter with the world, we can account for this meaning by first apprehending the configurational power of the body.

Merleau-Ponty neither separates man's body from his mind nor looks upon the former as a mechanical sequence of actions and reactions. For him one of the clearest evidences of the primary of the body, is that when we are in the course of experiencing something—its direction, magnitude, location etc. we are as if spread over the parts of that thing and collide with it every instant.

The body is not an object, for its presence to one's consciousness results from the mysterious union of one's inner life and one's communication with the world. I can move away from the bookshelf, but I cannot move away from my bodily being. My life is so united with it that I cannot refer to myself without referring to 'I' as a body; and whenever I hear and give others an impression that I am a referent with continuity I posit myself in my thought and language as a body. He says that without the sense of permanence of one's own body one would not be able to comprehend the permanence of objects and persons around oneself.
It is through our body that our consciousness of living amidst things in the world emerges. On account of its solidity and position, the body subject plays the role not only of an environed creature but also of a project making and volitional planner. Merleau-Ponty stresses what he terms as the 'Manipulatability' of objects and says that this quality presupposes a kind of dynamism and motility in our own body. When I look at an object, I know that I am unable to have more than one view of it at a time, and that I can walk, if I want, around it in order to have all of its possible facets. Dynamism and movability of man's physical being is at the very basis of what most of the phenomenologists call the consciousness's potentiality to 'Suspend' the entire range of its psychic and epistemic experience. According to Merleau Ponty the most immediate impression a person gets of his bodily existence is when he adopts an attitude towards certain activity. I may stand, for instance, with an erect pose, or stoop down to pick up a coin, and thereby feel that I am an existence moving with a certain psycho-physical purpose. It need not be imagined, however, that this purpose is an extorganic factor, nor need it be considered to be a characteristic, imposed on the natural 'schema' of the body. What he points out is that although we are not at all times aware of different parts of our body, we carry a pre-conscious apperceptive 'sense' that
we are postures eternally subject to change. This is why a twinkle of eyes may be performed to convey a whole meaning or attitude. Of course, this attitude need not be interpreted as strictly physical or strictly mental. Merleau Ponty speaks of postures as essentially resulting from a total psycho-physical motivation directed towards the world. The body is the manifest representation of this motivation. Merleau Ponty suggests that human body learns a movement only when the whole of it displays an understanding attitude towards it and incorporates it. A movement is an active functioning of the body medium in contact with the world. The body must become the movement in order to learn and adopt it. On the other hand, if by some inner attention I isolate myself as moving from the world I would never learn the movement. My having a body implies that when I act in the world, in space and time, I belong to them and thereby enjoy a limitless number of relationships synthesized into a whole by my consciousness. Merleau-Ponty writes 'I am not in space and time, nor do I conceive space and time, I belong to them, my body combines with them and includes them. My body has its world, or understands its world, without having to make use of my 'Symbolic' or 'objectifying function'.

It is never our objective body that we move, but our phenomenal body, and there is no mystery in that, since our body, as the potentiality of this or that part of the world, surges towards objects to be grasped and perceives them. "My
body is that meaningful core which behaves like a general function, and which nevertheless exists, and is susceptible to disease", Merleau Ponty has compared body with the work of art. "I am not in front of my body, I am in it, or rather I am it". "The body is to be compared, not to a physical object, but rather to a work of art. In a picture the idea is incommunicable by means other than the display of colours and sounds.

According to him, "The theory of the Body image is implicitly, a theory of perception". The phenomenal body is the matrix of human existence. It is the center around which the world is given as a correlate of its activities. Through the phenomenal body we are open to a world of objects as polarities of bodily action. The phenomenal body is the archimedean point of action and neither a passive agency of sensory perception nor an obstacle to idealist knowledge".

The status of my body is privileged. I can never be detached from it, nor even in the attitude of objectivity. "To say that it is never really in front of me, that I can't array it before my eyes, that it remain marginal to all my perceptions, that it is with me". My body is the vantage point from which I perceive all possible objects. It is the

body which is the vehicle of my perception and movement in the world.

xvi) Conclusion

Merleau-Ponty has pointed out that "genuine philosophy is a relearning to see the world"\textsuperscript{11} and he claims to do just that in his two major works, \textit{The structure of Behaviour} and \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}. His aim is to make a phenomenological study of man, of the world, and man-in-the-world. This seems, at first, to present no particular problem, for, our experience is precisely of the world and we find ourselves in the world. However, since description is so basic to phenomenological reflection, we are bound to encounter some difficulties when we come to man who is at once subject and object of this phenomenological analysis. Man is in the world, part of the world, yet he is also the one who experiences this same world and describes it in all its multiform manifestations. Alquié compares the analysis of Sartre to that of Merleau Ponty that the world of the latter is far more cheerful and simple than that of Sartre\textsuperscript{12}, wherein struggle between the ego and the other largely prevails. In Merleau-Ponty one can enjoy the simple beauty of the child's world wherein there are no problems; this vision should make the philosopher aware of reality as


\textsuperscript{12} Alquie, \textit{The Philosophy}, P.59.
it is in its primordial manifestation, it should lead him to
the root of his thoughts - a root which goes back to
childhood. However, one must not think that Merleau Ponty's
approach is merely a confusion of the orders of reason and
of emotion, on the contrary, while he admits the relation of
the two in the ambiguity of the body, he is very much
concerned with the basic problems of philosophy i.e., the
true foundations of knowledge and of values. His
phenomenological investigation is not aiming at a pure and
simple description of the given, without qualifications or
without further reflection, but at discovering in the
immediate, such as it offers to consciousness, "the reason
of all that which will follow. His return to the immediately
given is always accompanied by the cares of problem
solving".13

It must not be thought, however, that for Merleau Ponty
reflection be defined as an activity of the intellect, as a
pure "Cogito". Nothing would be further from his thought.
Reflection comprises life, because it is contained in it.
Merleau Ponty refuses all idealistic construction and
maintains that my experience involves my body as well as my
spirit, and therefore no reflection is divorced from the
materiality of the world, or from the existential condition

of man. Hence, to understand the philosophy of Merleau Ponty, we must first of all grasp the meaning he gives to the body as body - subject and to the world as horizon of our perception, and primordial data of phenomenological reflection. The body plays an important role in the dialectical relation between the self and the world, and between the ego-subject and the other. In order to clarify this unique role of the body in behaviour, Merleau Ponty studies in detail the phenomena which disclose a body to another; he investigates the findings of psychology. In the introduction to "The structure of Behaviour", he indicates his aim, he wants to show the relation of nature to consciousness, by investigating structure or form.

At the level of irreflexive experience it is impossible to separate definitively consciousness from the lived body and from the lived world, for none of these elements of man's experience exists in isolation; the very diversity of the senses and their unity of operation suggests an interrelation between them and the living body in the world. But even at the reflexive intellectual level one cannot separate the consciousness from the body, first of all because the reflexive is resting on the irreflexive; secondly, because the subject is never perfectly transparent

to itself; lived experience is not without ambiguity.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, intellectualism - as seen by Merleau Ponty implies the hypothesis of a transcendent subject which is incompatible with the finiteness and passivity of knowledge and makes it necessary to identify man with God. It would also make it impossible for many "Selves" to exist as independent and autonomous, hence the danger of Solipsism would appear.\textsuperscript{17} Actually, if there are empirical subjects, then the transcendent is a useless duplication - because, according to Merleau Ponty it is this empirical subject which knows, and, loves, and is known.\textsuperscript{18}

In short, intellectualism forgets the interrelatedness of consciousness with the body, of the body with the world, of reflexion with the irreflexive in a temporality which is ambiguous because it is multiform and always new - always in process and in a dialectical relation - without transcendence. Needless to say, for different reasons, empiricism falls into the same contradictory position, equally unjustifiable, according to Merleau-Ponty.\textsuperscript{19}

Merleau-Ponty introduces consciousness not as a psychic reality, not as a cause, but as a structure - which is given

\textsuperscript{16} Cf. P.P., Part III, Chapter I, PP.424-468.


\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, P.150.

\textsuperscript{19} Cf Ibid, PP.IV,VI,35,43-77,150,231,247,274,423-468.
in its appearence - and inquires into the mode of existence of such a structure. This is the burden of the structure of Behaviour, in the words of Merleau-Ponty himself. His notion of human freedom in *phenomenology of perception* is somewhat different from that of Sartre. Merleau-Ponty admits that man, being in a situation, is never totally free; he is already committed to the human involvement in the world, hence his choice is within a milieu over which he has no power or control, further, man's choice is not totally conscious; it is rather pre-conscious. Because of our interdependence with the worlds, it is never easy to distinguish that which is choice from that which is situation. However, it is quite true that I have always the freedom to stop one project and begin another, but I always choose from what is available so to speak. But one must choose, or rather he chooses even when he refuses to choose - in the sense that one always expresses something, since one cannot remain in the void - the choice, however, is not always an act: to remain what one is to continue in a previous choice. It is not necessary that if I do not refuse I thereby choose incessatnly. This is the notion of Sartre for whom without a continual choosing of oneself one is not existence before essence.

22. Ibid, PP.515-516.
Moreover, the importance of his writings, according to Prof. Lauer is the introduction of dialectic into transcendental phenomenology. Like Husserl, the experience he chooses to describe is primarily perception, but the mutual conditioning of world and perceptive consciousness is a far cry from Husserl's purely constitutive phenomenology. The advantage of this is that it enables Merleau Ponty to describe man's body not as an object but as a condition for objectivity, as the point of contact between consciousness and the world. Meanings are contributed by consciousness, it is true, but these are based on the pre-given world, whose givenness is mediated by the body. If man is radically contingent, if he is immersed in materiality, if his consciousness is utterly dependent on his relation to others, and if his condition in the world is determined by the very structuration of his being, it is no wonder that man cannot ultimately be defined with any semblance of finality - and therefore no abstract and general notion can be applied to him absolutely and without qualifications. Notwithstanding the fact that Merleau Ponty does not consider man as a pure possibility - as is the contention of other existentialists - and therefore recognizes in him a basic "essence", still this "essence" is not to be taken abstractly, nor as co-extensive with "man". Hence man can

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never be defined except in his milieu, that is to say, concretely, at a given moment of time, in a given spatial configuration, and in a concrete relational existence with other men. An examination of the phenomenology of perception shows how Merleau-Ponty situates man through his body in the maze of intentions and relations which make up this universe. Body is a phenomenon of special importance. That is the reason why he investigates the body so thoroughly: we could almost say that his whole study is directed to clarify the significance of the body in relation to self, to the world, and to others. There is, in short, no relation and no aspect of his phenomenology which does not imply the body.

For Merleau-Ponty, as we have said, the body itself is a subject. To justify this thesis, he has to begin by changing the accepted meaning of "Subject". This term has a long and involved history. In Greek and medieval philosophy it possessed a dual meaning, one logical and the other ontological. It had, first of all a logical meaning, for it was used to indicate the subject of proposition expressing a judgement and as such functioned in both the linguistic and philosophical analysis of the judgement. Any such proposition consists of two essential components, for through it, we say something about something. That "about" which the statement is made is the "subject" and "that which" is stated is the predicate. Alongside this logical
meaning, however, we find also an ontological meaning.

Subject as Person - The term "Subject" came to mean personal being in-so-far as it is distinct from purely thing-like being. It is in this sense that the term is used today in philosophy. When we speak of "Subjectivity" we intend to express that our mode of being transcends the purely thing-like character. He does not quite deny consciousness to human subjectivity. He says e.g., that, if consciousness is not co-original with subjectivity, it would be impossible to understand how the subject could ever become conscious but, at the same time he says that consciousness in its deepest level is so obscure that it cannot be verified, even though human existence is always, even on its deepest level, already of a subjective nature. In other words, consciousness is no longer the central characteristic of subjectivity and becomes more or less marginal. The question which arises here is, of course: If according to Merleau Ponty consciousness is more or less marginal to subjectivity, what then is the fundamental characteristic of this subjectivity?

Dialectic Relationship to Surroundings - Something has a subjective character by virtue of the fact that it has a dialect relationship to the reality around it, changing it into its own "environment" and giving it a meaning for

itself. Dialectic relationship alone does not suffice to constitute subjectivity. For the gestalt also which exists for a subject is characterized by the dialectic relationship, by "circular casualty", as Merleau Ponty often expresses it when he speaks of this dialectic relationship. Subject at the same time is both a part of the whole of the dialectic relationship and its center. It belongs to the whole of the reciprocal relationships and simultaneously is the center of all these relations.

The most important thing is to know that the world and the view of the world are inseparable: If we understand this we can understand subjectivity as inherent in the world.