CHAPTER II

UNITED NATIONS AND MAJOR PEACE INITIATIVES

All over the world, October 24, is known as United Nations' Day, but at the lofty streamlined headquarters in New York there are no celebrate birthday celebrations, for the Organizations is growing up the hard way, surrounded by countless difficulties and dangers and always short of money. The original charter was drawn up with the advice and consent of fifty-one nations. It was designed to promote but, above all, to keep the world at peace.

The United Nations is not the first attempt in history to outlaw war by international agreement. In the grim aftermath of farmer battles victorious rulers have tried to lay the foundations of permanent peace. After the 1st World War, in 1919 the leaders of the great powers gathered in the famous Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles to draw up Peace Treaties. During the Conference, President Wilson of the United States produced his draft for a League of Nations to till the urgent need of peace. He proposed that all the victorious nations should unite against aggression, and that disputes should be settled by peaceful means, by discussion instead of by violence or force. A council of nations, it was decided, would sit in Geneva and dispense universal justice and every one would disarm since there would be no need of guns.

The League of Nations never fulfilled its early promise and its influence declined steadily. In 1931, the Japanese seized the Chinese province of Manchuria, 1935 the Italians added Ethiopia to their North African empire and in 1936 the German dictator, Adolf Hitler, defied the ruling of the Treaty of Versailles and marched and led the army into the Rhineland, on the French border. Mussolini, the Fascist dictator of Italy, joined forces with Hitler, and at the other side of the world the Japanese fought for the mastery of the Far East.
The conflict spread to every continent, and people of many nations were dragged unwillingly into war. Everywhere, all over the world, people were praying for peace and security.

While the heavy responsibilities of war still rested on their shoulders, the two great leaders, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, had turned their minds to the problems of peace.

Thus the United Nations Organization was born in the tragedy of the Second World War. While the framers of the charter were meeting in San Francisco, Allied forces were fighting beyond the German frontier and the assault on Japan could begin. The charter begins by stating that the people of the world are combining their efforts to accomplish certain objective. Understandably, the 1st objective was, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life time has brought untold sorrow to mankind......."

The main purpose, then, of the United Nations, is the maintenance of peace. The overall method by which it is to be accomplished is the development of a dynamic international society in which nations are held together by many visible and intangible bonds of civilized adjustments and developments. The Charter suggests that the nations first of all attempt to settle disputes directly. It suggests a variety of means for dealing with them. Article 33 of the Charter states: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies of arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice".

The United Nations, the world's most comprehensive and modern organization for preservation of world Peace, grew from a wartime alliance. The basic motivation for establishing the UNO while its predecessor, the League of Nations, was languishing at Geneva, was to try once again to avoid the catastrophe of war. Among the Allied Powers, the US under President
Franklin D. Roosevelt was strongly in favour of a global peace-keeping agency. He was one who coined the name United Nations. Even when the World War-II was raging, the need for such an organization was proclaimed in the famous Atlantic Charter signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill as early as 1941. The Anglo-American initiative gained further momentum at the Moscow (1943 October) and Yalta Conference (February 1945) where consent of Soviet Union and the Republic of China was obtained.

The Moscow Communiqué released in November 1943 envisaged "a general international organization based on the principle of sovereign equality of all peace loving states...... large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security". At Yalta Conference of February 1945, the decision making procedure for the UN was agreed upon, whence arose the Veto power of the big five. Also introduced was the notion of the trusteeship system.

The next major initiative was taken at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of foreign officials (August – October 1944), where the first blueprint of UN emerged. At Dumbarton Oaks the question was raised whether economic and social matters should come within the scope of the proposed organization. The Soviet position had been that it should be devoted exclusively to security matters. However, the Anglo-American viewpoint in favor of entrusting the organization with security as well as non-security tasks ultimately prevailed.

The next and the largest Conference for framing the Charter of the new organization was held at San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945. Attended by about 280 delegates from 50 invitee nations, the Conference looked like a World Constitutional Convention. At San Francisco the medium and small powers took considerable initiative to scrutinize the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and suggest important changes. The San Francisco Conference ended with the signing of the charter on June 26, 1945. It took another four months to get the charter ratified so that the UN of today was officially launched on October 24, 1945.
The UN was conceived as a general international organization, not only world-wide in membership but comprehensive in its tasks as well. Hence the purposes of the organization stated in Article 1 of the Charter, refer to a great variety of political, social, economic, cultural and humanitarian objectives. The foremost objective is "to maintain international peace and security and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats of peace...... and to bring about by peaceful means...... adjustments or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace".

The second purpose was to "develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" and to take "other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace". A third purpose was "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character and in promoting respect for human rights" without any invidious distinction. Finally, the UN was intended to be" a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends".

UN PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS

As mentioned above the primary purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security, as such it is required "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats, to the peace and for suppression of acts of aggression." The measures to be taken have been set out in Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter, with the Security Council taking the primary responsibility. While under Chapter VI, the Security Council calls on the parties to settle their disputes either voluntarily or agreeing to the Council's directives, Chapter VII addresses more serious breaches of peace and requires the Council to take all sorts of peace enforcement measures including armed action. Remarkably, the UN-so far has not engaged in a full scale collective security action, although the Korean Operation (1950s) and the Gulf expedition (1991-92) came closer to the idea. By and large conflicts and
breaches of peace have been contained and controlled by an alternative method called Peace Keeping Operation.

Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) are never partly military. They have been commonly employed to supervise and maintain ceasefire; to provide a buffer between opposing forces; to assist withdrawal of contending forces and, sometimes to help national reconciliation in civil war situations- Evidently the PKOs are flexible instruments of policy and can be undertaken either at the initiative of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. In most cases PKO has avoided the crippling effects of the veto system. In short, the PKO stands between text-book enforcement measures and mild diplomatic means for settlement of conflicts. Aptly did Dag Hanunarskjold put it, PKO might be put in a new "Chapter VI and a half.

The PKOs are mostly initiated following agreements between the UN and the countries affected. They are intended to be provisional and involve temporary measures. Their task is essentially to stop or contain hostilities and thus create conditions in which peace making can start. The Secretary General has all along taken the lead in organizing the PKO. United Nations peacekeeping operations can be divided into two broad categories. Observer mission which consists largely of officers who are almost invariably unarmed; and peace keeping forces which consist of lightly armed infantry units with the necessary logistic support elements- These categories are not, however, watertight. Observer missions are some times reinforced by infantry and/or logistic units, usually for a specific purpose and a brief period of time. Peace-keeping forces are often assisted in their work by unarmed military observers.

The first use of military personnel by the United Nations was in 1947 through two United Nations bodies; the Consular Commission in Indonesia and the Special Committee on the Balkans.

The first peace-keeping operation established by the United Nations was an observer mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

There have been, in all, eight peace-keeping forces. The first was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) which was in operation in the Egypt-Israel sector from November 1956 until May 1967. The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was deployed in the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire) from July 1960 until June 1964. The United Nations Security Force in West Israel (UNSF) was in operation from its establishment in September 1962 until April 1963. The second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) functioned between Egypt and Israel from October 1973 until July 1979. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was deployed in Namibia from March 1989 until March 1990. The other forces, which are still in operation, are the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in March 1964; the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) established in Syrian Golan Heights in May 1974; the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established in March 1978. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia; and United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) the last two continuing since 1992.
A United Nations peace-keeping operation is considered a subsidiary organ of the UN, established by a resolution of the Security Council, or occasionally of the General Assembly. Its military component consists of a Force Commander (sometimes called Chief of Staff) and a number of contingents provided by selected member states of the UN who have been so requested by the Secretary General. Since 1973 selection of the contingents is being made in consultation with the Security Council and, of course, in consultation with the parties concerned. During the period of their assignment to UNPKF, the military personnel, while remaining in their national service, are treated as international personnel. As such they are to be totally under the UN authority and have to regulate their conduct with only the best interests of the UN in view.

It may be mentioned here that the UNPKF has also a civilian component. A civilian administrative staff is formed by the Secretary General from among existing staff of the UN Secretariat. In addition some local hands may be recruited temporarily to facilitate logistics and communications. Where the UNPKF is required to perform tasks of a non-military nature, the civilian contingents constitutes the bulk of the personnel (e.g. policemen, election monitors) Overall command in such cases rests with the Special Representative of the Secretary General.

Some of the major initiatives taken by United Nations for maintaining and establishing peace in the different parts of the world.

The Korean Experience (1950-53)

To learn about the Korean war from a historical perspective, one can start early in this century with the victory of the Japanese over Russia in the Russo-Japanese war that ended in 1905 and their domination of Manchuria and Port Arthur followed by the Japan's annexation of the Korean peninsula in
1910. The Japanese occupation of Korea lasted for 35 years until Japan's defeat and surrender on 25 August 1945.¹

In 1947, the UN declared that elections should be held throughout the entire country to choose one government to unify the country. The south rejected the proposal and held its own election and established an independent Republic of Korea in August 1947 with Syngman Rhee as its leader.

Then on 9 September 1947, the Russians proposed a mutual withdrawal of USSR and US troops from the peninsula. While making such a peaceful gesture, flows of USSR military equipment began to enter the north bolstered by 25,000 vet Chinese troops from the Manchurian campaign to replace the withdrawal of USSR troops.

For American leaders who were tired of their troops in Asia, and did not want another conflict oil tile mainland, this offer of withdrawal came as an opportunity to extract themselves from a potentially costly and strategically unimportant situation which they considered Korea to be. Withdrawal could go ahead. This American policy toward Korea, following World War II and the occupation of Japan by the US are linked.² The adding of troops, equipment and money to Korea with tile occupation of Japan and the rebuilding of its economy was financially too much for Washington to handle. Therefore, it was rationalized that Korea was outside of the US line of defense in Asia. In Sept 1948, with the support of the USSR, Kim II Sung was elected prime minister of the new People's Republic of North Korea and the withdrawal of Russian troops began.

Such a policy made the 'Korea problem' convenient to hand over to the newly formed UN in May 1948. The UN goal was to unify the country, and if that failed, support for an independent government in the south was to proceed and the US could withdraw its 30,000 troops while providing limited economic

aid to the newly formed Republic of Korea government. As US forces withdrew, however, a US military advisory group of 500 officers and men remained to train and equip the small ROK army. It was called the Korean Military Assistance Group, or KMAG, a well-trained and equipped ROK army of 100,000 troops was KMAG’s goal. Once trained, 4 ROK divisions were stationed along the 38th parallel to defend against a North Korean People’s Army - the NKPA intrusion.

The reaction to the Communist attack called for immediate US action through the newly-established UN. Cognizant of the charge that he was ‘soft on Communism,’ President Truman had to act decisively and strongly. However, he acted cautiously and in proportion to NKPA aggression because of the possible involvement of the USSR, chief supplier and supporter to the North Koreans, that could lead to an expanded war, even a possible World War II. He set limited objectives for US intervention, that is, to drive the NKPA back beyond the 38th parallel. Carefully, he even down-played the gravity of America and UN Involvement by agreeing to the term ‘police action’ rather than war.

As a first test of the Cold War, the Communist invasion of the South had been turned around. Exacting revenge on the North by an invasion and takeover of their country remained unanswered. Underlying all planning was the question of the Chinese and their participation and what the USSR intended to do in the changing balance of military power. Would they possibly assist the NKPA and, if so, at what point?

Within America, those opposed to further involvement were branded as being 'soft on Communism' and failure to check such aggression would encourage similar acts in other Asian countries. With consideration of the difficulties of winter warfare in the north on the minds of allied military planners, the question of continuing north became more complex. Syngman

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Rhee had his own reason for complete defeat of the north which was the possibility that the whole country would become his to lead.4

UN forces continued to drive north toward the Yalu which was reached in late Oct. The successes of Inchon, the recapture of Seoul and winning of Pyongyang gave military planners like MacArthur a sense of overconfidence and arrogance. As oil previous occasions, MacArthur's estimations of NKPA strength were much lower than reality. Based on such information, he assured the president that the Chinese would not enter the war, that NKPA resistance would end by thanksgiving and that his troops would be home by Christinas, a promise he would live to regret. While making, such promises to Truman at a meeting held on Midway Island and assuring him that 'victory was won in Korea,' 300,000 Chinese Communist forces - CCF, were pouring over the Yalu river into North Korea without the knowledge of the Allies.5

Phase three thus began, with UN forces unprepared to face the onslaught and bloodshed that was about to overwhelm them. With the entry of the Chinese, the political equation and military scope of the war changed and expanded greatly. US policy makers at the highest levels were forced to re-think America's role and the domestic and international repercussions of the developments. The support of the Chinese by the USSR added a far deeper dimension to the role of the UN.6

MacArthur was shocked and astounded by Truman's order and reacted by saying that 'thousands of America lives' would be lost with the bridges left intact. One of his famous statements was uttered: 'in war, there is no substitute for victory. We cannot fight with one hand tied behind our back.' So great was his insult that he threatened to resign but his feelings of self-importance and vanity and the belief that tile Army couldn't do without him overcame such thinking. Challenging the authority of the JCS and taking his case directly to

4 Ibid., p. 122.
5 Ibid., p. 150.
the America people, MacArthur believed that UN forces were in 'grave danger' without the bombing. His strategy was successful and Truman had to yield under political pressure and authorized the bombing of the Yalu bridges.

However, to avoid a complete withdrawal from Korea, MacArthur recommended strategies designed to expand the scope of the war with provocative actions against Red China. Perhaps it was his way to retaliate against the Chinese or distract their attention away from Korea. The recommendations were for a naval blockade of the China coast; releasing the forces of Chaing Kai-shek on Taiwan to attack the Chinese in Korea and assisting anti-Communist guerillas on the Chinese mainland to fight the Communists. Such recommendations caused a greater loss of MacArthur's credibility among the JCS and the president and created more doubts about his ability to command and his mental state.

Phase four of the war began in January 1951, when the CCF re-occupied Seoul and drove the Allies south along with millions of half-frozen refugees who crossed the ice-covered Han River with the troops. Phase 4 turned out to be the longest phase of the war, lasting 18 months. Their retreat, however, ended about 25 miles south of the city due to UN superiority in tanks and heavy artillery. And, starting in late Feb, the Allies began to turn the tide in their favour.7

As Allied forces were fighting their way back to the 38th parallel, the debate about how far they should go and if the NKPA and CCF should be destroyed took place. MacArthur, on the other hand, continued to insist on inflicting heavy losses on the Chinese with massive infusions of men and equipment until (here was an all-out) victory over the enemy at no-matter what the cost. He felt humiliated by what his soldiers had endured ever since the CCF forces crossed the border and aggressively pushed south. No doubt, his ability as a leader could have been called into question with such attitudes.

Ibid., p. 240.

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7 Ibid., p. 240.
MacArthur's supporters blamed Truman for the frustrating status of the war while forgiving the general for defying the Constitution, which he clearly did. Ultimately, in the next Presidential election, Truman's was bypassed as the nominee for the Democrats in favor of Adlai Stevenson who lost to Dwight Eisenhower, the hero of World War II. In a campaign promise, the former general said that he would go to Korea and bring the war to a conclusion.

From late June 1951, a UN strategy of a 'limited offensive' was to be followed, that is, defense lines were to be held without the taking of a additional enemy-held territory. Despite it, Americans advanced to an area called the Iron Triangle, located just north of the 38th parallel. There they engaged in savage fighting in which 60 Marines were killed in one week alone. Unlike previous battles, very little news coverage was given this event and subsequent fights, indicating the indifference which most Americans had toward the war.

However, later the same month, Jacob Malik, USSR Ambassador to the UN, called for a cease-fire and peace negotiations on the Korean War. Such news was welcomed by Americans and provided hope that the US could leave Korea under honorable circumstances. By July, US casualties had mounted to 69,000 troops.8

The back and forth course of the war had shown very little positive results because the stalemate in which both sides were at approx the same point where they started. Without reports of newsworthy fighting for the newspapers in America, Korea began to drop off the pages and historians in later years began to call it 'the forgotten war' and the term is still used today.

Soon after Malik's proposal, peace talks began on 10 July 1951, in Kaesong and lasted until July 1953. The warring armies continued to fight while peace talks were in progress. The violence, however, did not lessen as the casualty count continued to build and, at the war's end, was greater during the

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two years of the talks than during the one year before they began.

As the negotiations began, no agreement was reached on an immediate cease-fire despite the static battle lines. The fighting continued as it would for almost two years. The 1st Communist demand was the insistence that the UN pull back to the 38th parallel from their positions north of it. Had the UN done so, there would have been absolutely no net gain. In reality, all sides - the Russians, Chinese and Americans wanted to end the conflict but the hostility was too great to reach an agreement.⁹

After nearly two months of negotiations and bickering over petty issues, the talks were suspended for two months. Talks resumed after the two-month delay. A new site, Panmunjomori was chosen because Kaesong was no longer acceptable to General Ridgway, the head of the UN delegation. The Communists seemed to offer an end to the fighting at the existing battle line and not at the 38th parallel. Ridgway was a hard liner who personally distrusted the enemy and insisted on the existing battle line. Even though the talks resumed, the fighting continued, much of it instigated by the Chinese in a failed effort to influence America voters with a military victory and thereby turn more public opinion against the war. Their efforts, however, turned into failure at the battle of White Horse Hill when more than 10,000 Chinese soldiers were killed.

The US was charged with engaging in bacterial warfare by dropping disease carrying insects over North Korean cities resulting in thousands of deaths. Though denounced by the US as propaganda, 39 America POWs who were pilots or flight crews 'confessed' to the charges after being tortured and brainwashed. The charge was never proven by an independent organization such as the Red Cross.

Finally, in the spring of 1953, after the death of Joseph Stalin, there were signs of hope as the Communists became more flexible. Whether Stalin's death and the influence of the USSR was directly related to the change in

⁹ Ibid., p. 55.
attitude is not fully known. However, in Apr, both sides agreed to Operation Little Switch which was the exchange of wounded and sick POWs on both sides, 6,670 Communists and 684 UN prisoners including 149 Americans.

Despite the opposition of Syngman Rhee who resisted peace of any kind with the Communists and tried to undermine the process, Operation Little Switch went ahead, followed by Operation Big Switch, the major exchange of all POWs on both sides.10

After months of negotiation, it was agreed that repatriated prisoners held by the UN were free to choose to return to Communism or be turned over to a commission composed of neutral nations. After further questioning by Communist officers to try to persuade them to remain, they were free to go to a non Communist country.

In the Big Switch exchange, which proceeded after the signing of the cease-fire, 12,773 UN POWs including 3,597 Americans and 7,862 ROK, 945 British, 229 Turks and 140 others were returned. For the Communists, 75,823 POWs were returned, including 70,183 NKPA and only 5,640 Chinese. Even up to the last days of the war with the final agreement near, a major Communist offensive against ROK positions was undertaken, only to be driven back by a massive artillery response. Although 27 July 53 was agreed upon for the signing of the cease fire, fighting continued during the final hours before 10:00 am, the hour of signing.

There is much that can be said about the war. The casualty figures are enormous and very tragic: at least 2 million Korean civilians and 2.4 military casualties on both sides, which shows that 4.2 million men, women and children were killed or wounded with lives and families destroyed. The country, north and south was almost completely devastated.

Differing political systems, which the fighting was all about, remain essentially the same on the Korean peninsula which remains divided in two

10 Ibid., p. 122.
almost along the same line as it was before the war, a 151 mile long Demilitarized Line. Only a small gain of about 1,500 square miles above the 38th parallel is now in the south's hands that wasn't theirs before the war. The added territory is hardly worth what it cost.\textsuperscript{11}

Direct enforcement action with organized combat units against an alleged aggressor has been few and far between in the history of the UN so far. The first and perhaps the only instance when it took classic proportions was during the Korean crisis. Four distinct phases can be identified in the UN collective security action in Korea.

(a) Fixation of responsibility for breach of the peace-The Security Council, taking advantage of the absence of the Soviet delegate on 25 and 27 June 1950, held North Korea responsible for an armed intrusion into the territory of South Korea. It determined that this was a breach of the peace and decided to take enforcement action against North Korea if it did not withdraw its troops to the norm of the 38th parallel. Non-compliance by North Korea was taken as the basis for a punitive action which the US and its western allies were only too eager to carry through. Considering the fact that North Korea enjoyed Soviet support, the Security Council had to choose between passive acquiescence and endorsing US action that was likely to produce a major confrontation with the Soviet Union. There being no option for a negotiation with North Korea, a firm action seemed to be unavoidable, particularly to avoid the stigma of being ineffective like the League of Nations.

(b) Dispatch of UN forces under US command—Following the 27\textsuperscript{th} June resolution a combined armed force drawn from UK, US, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand was placed under the unified command of the American General Mac Arthur with Headquarters at Tokyo. A few other pro-western, members agreed to make only some token

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 209.
contribution while many Afro-Asian members maintained a position of detachment. The actual authorization to use UN force however came by way of a maneuver called Uniting for Peace Resolution in the General Assembly (November 3, 1950).

(c) Chinese intervention—while the UN military action dragged on in the face of fierce North Korean resistance, entry of China into the fray was precipitated by Mac Arthur's decision to enlarge the theatre of war. A security council attempt to condemn China was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Many at this stage had the apprehension that instead of managing the original, limited crisis the UN was getting embroiled in a major war. Moreover, the military reverses suffered by the UN forces in the bands of the North Koreans and the Chinese undermined the prospect of an early settlement.

(d) Move towards armistic—With the ground realities showing some stability, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in February 1951 to explore the possibilities of a peaceful settlement, followed by a contrary resolution in May imposing embargo on shipment of war materials likely to reach the North Koreans and stepping up UN combat operations, soon, an exasperated UN decided to negotiate an armistic, primarily with a view to arranging repatriation of thousands of western soldiers held captive in the Chinese and the North Korean camps. Certain neutral nations were assigned the role of running an armistic supervision commission with India at its head. Finally, in July 1953 the armistic was signed with armed forces of the two Koreas receding to their pre-war positions and prisoners of war released in several batches.

Thus, the first test case of collective Security seemed to end in too much ado about too little achieved. The territorial integrity of South Korea was preserved no doubt but the characterization of an alleged aggression from the North remained ambiguous. Neither was the ability of the UN to take a concerted and effective action clearly established. Going far beyond his
mandate, the American General turned a police action into a military expedition. There was indeed little justification to provoke a Chinese retaliation. A virtually one-nation enterprise, the UN operation did not reveal "independent statesmanship in making the most critical policy decision."\textsuperscript{12} It had all the smell of a cold war fought in disguise of collective security. National interests got mixed up with community concerns. Above all, the whole enterprise was undertaken without developing a proper military-diplomatic apparatus to give it a sense of direction. In any case, the preponderance of forces was definitely not on the side of the UNO.\textsuperscript{13} Finally, the only abiding legacy of the Korean operation was the Uniting for Peace Resolution which redefined the institutional balance between the Security Council and the General Assembly.

**Indonesia**

After the liberation of Indonesia from Japanese troops, the Indonesian nationalists set-up a republic and declared independence. So the Dutch government launched military attack on Indonesia. The matter was brought before the Security Council by the Indian representative and a ceasefire was arranged. Both the Dutch government and Indonesia accepted goods offices of the committee of Australia and Belgium. Australia on behalf of Indonesia and Belgium on behalf of the Dutch carried on negotiations for peace. In January 1948 an eighteen point settlement programme was accepted but this agreement was violated by the parties and there was further clash. The Security Council called for cease-fire and established UN committee to settle the issue. The


\textsuperscript{13} Goodrich, Leland, M., Korea: Collective Measures against Aggression." International Conciliation No. 495, October 1953, p. 146.
Dutch government was asked by the Security Council to recognise the Independence of Indonesia which she did on 27th December 1949.\textsuperscript{14}

**Greece**

British troops were in Greece at the end of the Second World War and were supporting the conservative provisional government. The Soviet Union challenged the presence of British forces and contended that Britain was interfering in the internal affairs of Greece and the military presence of Britain was threat to peace. The matter was referred to the Security Council, which simply took notice of the views expressed. The Greek question became serious when the neighbouring countries helped the guerillas against the Greek government. The Security Council appointed a commission of investigation. On the Greek question the UK and the United States were on one side where as the Soviet Union was on the other side. It was observed that the Security Council could be paralyzed in the exercise of security functions by the veto. However the Greek case could not be regarded as a triumph for the UNO but it set a precedent for increased reliance on the General Assembly in future disputes in case Security Council is paralysed by exercise of veto power.\textsuperscript{15}

**Issue of Merger of Trieste**

According to the Italian peace treaty after the end of the Second World War, Trieste was internationalised and the Security Council accepted responsibility for its government. In the meanwhile Trieste was occupied by joint Anglo-American and French troops in Zone A where as the forces of Yugoslavia had occupied the Zone B of Trieste. In 1948 the USA and the UK expressed their desire to revise the treaty and handover the territory to Italy. In 1953 an Anglo-American plan to handover Zone A to Italy, was announced. Marshall Tito the head of Yugoslavia government threatened to march into Trieste. In the meanwhile Italy and Yugoslavia reached an amicable solution by

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which Italy, occupied Zone 'A' and Yugoslavia occupied Zone 'B' of the disputed territory.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Cuban Missile Crisis}

The Cuban missile crisis and its aftermath was the most serious U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War although the crisis itself was short, it was so intense that it absorbed the entire attention of President Kennedy and his closest advisers. The Cuban missile crisis, the "sixteen days in October," ending with the Kennedy-Khrushchev "agreement" of October 28, 1962, has been studied extensively by scholars and has been described in a variety of published works.

According to Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, in May 1962 conceived the idea of placing intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba as a means of countering all emerging lead of the United States in developing and deploying strategic missiles. He also presented the scheme as a means of protecting Cuba from another United States-sponsored invasion, such as the failed attempt at the Bay of Pigs in 1961.\textsuperscript{17}

After obtaining Fidel Castro's approval, the Soviet Union worked quickly and secretly to build missile installations in Cuba. On October 16, President John F. Kennedy was shown reconnaissance photographs of Soviet missile installations under construction in Cuba. After seven days of guarded and intense debate in the United States administration, during which Soviet diplomats denied that installations for offensive missiles were being built in Cuba, President Kennedy, in a televised address on October 22, announced the discovery of the installations and proclaimed that any nuclear missile attack from Cuba would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union and would be responded to accordingly. He also imposed a naval quarantine on Cuba to prevent further Soviet shipments of offensive military weapons from arriving

\textsuperscript{16} Keshwani, Khemchand B., International Relations in Modern World (1900-1995), op. cit., p. 365.

\textsuperscript{17} Deustch Merton, The Analysis of International Relations, op. cit., p. 154.
there. In response to the threat the US military began a rapid mobilization for possible use against Cuba. The 1st Armored Division was ordered to Fort Stewart. In the short span of two weeks the population of the post rose from 3,500 personnel to over 30,000.

During the crisis, the two sides exchanged many letters and other communications, both formal and "back channel." Khrushchev sent letters to Kennedy on October 23 and 24 indicating the deterrent nature of the missiles in Cuba and the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. On October 26, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a long rambling letter seemingly proposing that the missile installations would be dismantled and personnel removed in exchange for United States assurances that it or its proxies would not invade Cuba. On October 27, another letter to Kennedy arrived from Khrushchev, suggesting that missile installations in Cuba would be dismantled if the United States dismantled its missile installations in Turkey. The American administration decided to ignore this second letter and to accept the offer outlined in the letter of October 26. Khrushchev then announced on October 28 that he would dismantle the installations and return them to the Soviet Union, expressing his trust that the United States would not invade Cuba.

Further negotiations were held to implement the October 28 agreement, including a United States demand that Soviet light bombers also be removed from Cuba, and to specify the exact form and conditions of United States assurances not to invade Cuba. A second dangerous crisis emerged over the removal of Soviet IL-28 bombers from Cuba, which the United States insisted were "offensive weapons" and thus subject to the October 28 agreement. By January 1963 it was clear that no formal agreement would result.¹⁸

Suez Crisis and the UNEF (1956)

With Korean experience still fresh in memory, the UN was soon confronted with unprecedented crisis. On October 29, 1956 two permanent

members of the Security Council, (Britain and France) and Israel combined to forcefully oust Egypt from the Suez canal area over which the latter had asserted its sovereignty but the aggressors wanted to get back control over the canal. In response to Egypt's petition, the General Assembly in its emergency "special session of November 1956 sent out an appeal for ceasefire and created the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to resolve the crisis in the Middle East. It was a unique peace effort in which the Secretary General played the central role. The force was not intended so much for combat operation as for truce supervision and to prevent the redemption of hostilities. This was particularly necessary in view of the fragile character of the Arab-Israeli truce since the 1948 flare up in the middle-East. To ensure that the Force was unquestionably impartial, its contingents were to be drawn from states other than the permanent members of the Security Council.\textsuperscript{19} It was made accountable direct to the Secretary General and its terms of reference were fixed by the General Assembly. The force was essentially meant for emergency operation and had nothing to do with the military balance in the conflict. Moreover, all operations of the force including its stationing and duration of stay, were subject to the consent of the host country i.e. Egypt. Finally, the force was to be financed by the nations who contributed troops and logistics. However, the cost of their transportation, maintenance and administration were to be met out of a special fund to which all member states must make contributions in proportion to their share of the regular UN budget. At no point of time the UNEF included more than 6000 men.

Once in the field the UNEF formed a buffer zone between the Anglo-French-Israeli forces and the Egyptian army. Following withdrawal of the invading forces UNEF restored the lost patch of territory to Egypt. In the Sinai Peninsula, it took prolonged diplomatic pressures to make Israel evacuate. The 273 kilometer long border between Israel and Egypt had to be patrolled by

\textsuperscript{19} The ten contributory states were: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia
UNEF till May 1967 - a period marked by occasional breach of truce, UNEF was withdrawn at a time when Egypt no longer wanted it in view of the offensive it was planning against Israel.

In May and June 1967 the ONEF withdrew, leaving the Truce Supervision group to witness the 1967 flare up. Later, the October, 1973 war between Israel and Egypt aided by other Arab nations led to the formation of UNEF II to serve more or less the same purpose as its predecessor. It was kept alive for about six years and was not extended after 1979.

**West New Guinea (West Irian)**

The territory of West New Guinea (West Irian) had been in the possession of the Netherlands since 1828. When the Netherlands formally recognized the sovereign independence of Indonesia in 1949, the status of West Irian remained unresolved. It was agreed in the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty C concluded between the Netherlands and Indonesia at The Hague, Netherlands, in November 1949 C that the issue would be postponed for a year, and that "the status quo of the presidency of New Guinea" would be "maintained under the Government of the Netherlands" in the mean time. The ambiguity of the language, however, led the Netherlands to consider itself the sovereign Power in West New Guinea, since this would be a continuation of the "status quo". Indonesia, on the other hand, interpreted the Dutch role there to be strictly administrative, with the implication that West Irian would be incorporated into Indonesia after a year.

The status of the territory was still being disputed when Indonesia brought the matter before the United Nations in 1954. Indonesia claimed that the territory rightfully belonged to it and should be freed from Dutch colonial rule. The Netherlands maintained that the Papuans of West New Guinea were not Indonesians and therefore should be allowed to decide their own future when they were ready to do so. The future of the territory was discussed at the
General Assembly’s regular sessions from 1954 to 1957 and at the 1961 session, but no resolutions on it were adopted.

In December 1961, when increasing rancour between the Indonesian and Dutch Governments made the prospect of a negotiated settlement even more elusive, Secretary-General U Thant, who had been appointed Acting Secretary-General following the death of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, undertook to resolve the dispute through his good offices. Consulting with the Indonesian and Dutch Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, he suggested that informal talks take place between the parties in the presence of former United States Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who would act as the Secretary-General's representative. The parties agreed, and talks were begun in early 1962.

A sharpening of tension between the two Governments occurred shortly thereafter, however, when Indonesia landed paratroops in West New Guinea. The Netherlands charged that the landings constituted an act of aggression, but Indonesia refuted this on the grounds that "Indonesians who have entered and who in future will continue to enter West Irian are Indonesian nationals who move into Indonesia's own territory now dominated by the Dutch by force". Secretary-General U Thant urged restraint by both parties but declined a Dutch request to send United Nations observers to the scene, noting that such action could only be considered if both Governments made the request. Further incidents were reported by the Netherlands during the first months of 1962, and there were intermittent lulls in the progress of Ambassador Bunker's talks.

The Acting Secretary-General was at last able to announce, on 31 July 1962, that a preliminary agreement had been reached, and that official negotiations were to take place under his auspices. The final negotiations were held at United Nations Headquarters under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, with Ambassador Bunker continuing to act as mediator. An agreement was signed at New York by Indonesia and the Netherlands on 15 August 1962. Ratification instruments were exchanged between the two countries on 20
September 1962 and, the next day, the General Assembly took note of the agreement in resolution 1752 (XVII) of the same date, authorizing the Secretary-General to carry out the tasks entrusted to him therein.

The agreement provided for the administration of West New Guinea (West Irian) to be transferred by the Netherlands to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), to be headed by a United Nations Administrator who would be acceptable to both parties and who would be appointed by the Secretary-General. Under the Secretary-General's jurisdiction, UNTEA would have full authority after 1 October 1962 to administer the territory, to maintain law and order, to protect the rights of the inhabitants and to ensure uninterrupted, normal services until 1 May 1963, when the administration of the territory was to be transferred to Indonesia.

The agreement also stipulated that the Secretary-General would provide a United Nations Security Force (UNSF) to assist UNTEA with as many troops as the United Nations Administrator deemed necessary. In "related understandings" to the main agreement, it was established that United Nations personnel would observe the implementation of the ceasefire that was to become effective before UNTEA assumed authority. The United Nations was therefore entrusted with a dual peacekeeping role in addition to its administrative responsibilities as the executive authority.

Establishment of UNSF

With the cessation of hostilities, the next step was to ensure the maintenance of law and order in the territory. In addition to supervising the observer team, General Rikhye had been charged with making preliminary arrangements for the arrival of UNSF.

Article VIII of the Indonesian-Netherlands agreement stipulated the role and purpose of such a force:

The Secretary-General would provide the UNTEA with such security forces as the United Nations Administrator deems necessary; such forces would
primarily supplement existing Papuan (West Irianese) police in the task of maintaining law and order. The Papuan Volunteer Corps, which on the arrival of the United Nations Administrator would cease being part of the Netherlands armed forces, and the Indonesian armed forces in the territory, would be under the authority of, and at the disposal of, the Secretary-General for the same purpose. The United Nations Administrator would, to the extent feasible, use the Papuan (West Irianese) police as a United Nations security force to maintain law and order and, at his discretion, use Indonesian armed forces. The Netherlands armed forces would be repatriated as rapidly as possible and while still in the territory will be under the authority of the UNTEA.

UNSF was thus essentially an internal law and security force — the "police arm" — of UNTEA whose responsibilities would range from ensuring the smooth implementation of UNTEA's administrative mandate to supervising the buildup of a viable, local police force.

In the memorandum of understanding on the cessation of hostilities, it was provided that UNSF would commence its duties as soon as possible after the General Assembly adopted an enabling resolution, but no later than 1 October 1962. In fact, the UNSF Commander arrived in West Irian weeks before the Assembly resolution was passed.

Major-General Said Uddin Khan (Pakistan), appointed by the Secretary-General as Commander of UNSF, arrived in Hollandia on 4 September for preliminary discussions with Netherlands authorities and for a survey of future requirements. Similar efforts had already been exerted to some extent by General Rikhye, who had been charged earlier with making preliminary arrangements for the arrival of UNSF. The two men cooperated closely before and after the establishment of UNSF in West Irian.

UNSF comprised 1,500 Pakistan troops, made available at the request of the Secretary-General, as were the support units of Canadian and United States aircraft and crews.
By 3 October, an advance party of 340 men of UNSF had arrived in the territory. On 5 October, the balance of the Pakistan contingent took up its positions. Also included in UNSF were some 16 officers and men of the Royal Canadian Air Force, with two aircraft, and a detachment of approximately 60 United States Air Force personnel with an average of three aircraft. These provided troop transport and communications. The Administrator also had under his authority the Papuan Volunteer Corps, the civil police, the Netherlands forces until their repatriation, and Indonesian troops, totalling approximately 1,500.

Establishment of UNTEA

UNSF was created to uphold the authority of UNTEA. Whereas groundwork for the arrival of UNSF troops had been laid in West Irian prior to the General Assembly’s recognition of the agreement, it was not until Assembly resolution 1752 (XVII) was adopted that personnel associated with UNTEA were dispatched. This resolution, which would make the United Nations directly responsible for the administration of the western half of New Guinea, was approved by a vote of 89 to none, with 14 abstentions.

In the resolution, the Assembly took note of the agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), acknowledged the role conferred by it upon the Secretary-General, and authorized him to carry out the tasks entrusted to him in the agreement.

Upon adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General noted that for the first time in its history the United Nations would have temporary executive authority established by and under the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General over a vast territory. He dispatched his Deputy Chef de Cabinet, Mr. José Rolz-Bennett, as his Representative in West New Guinea (West Irian), where he would make preliminary arrangements for the transfer of administration to UNTEA. Mr. Rolz-Bennett arrived in the territory on 21 September 1962, the date the enabling resolution was passed.
Under the agreement, neither Dutch nor Indonesian officials were to hold any of the top administrative positions during the seven-month transition period. In addition, three quarters of the Dutch civil servants of lesser rank had decided to leave the territory before 1 October, thereby creating a vacuum that would have to be filled to prevent a disruption of essential functions and services. In some instances, this was accomplished by promoting Papuan officials to the vacant posts. There was, however, a great shortage of adequately trained Papuans.

Mr. Rolz-Bennett immediately set about assembling an emergency task force to be deployed in key areas of the administration, recruiting international as well as Dutch and Indonesian personnel. The Netherlands Governor of the territory and his senior officials assisted in this effort; measures were also taken by the Netherlands Government to encourage Dutch officials to remain and serve the Temporary Executive Authority. In addition, the Indonesian Government was requested to provide urgently a group of civil servants to fill certain high-priority posts. This request was made with a view to the gradual phasing in of Indonesian officials, whose presence thus facilitated the subsequent transfer of administrative responsibilities to Indonesia. In all, 32 nationalities were represented in UNTEA, among them both Dutch and Indonesian personnel.

The transfer of the administration from the Netherlands to UNTEA took place on 1 October 1962 and, in conformity with article VI of the agreement and its related aide-mémoire, the United Nations flag was raised and flown side by side with the Netherlands flag.

Before his departure from the territory on 28 September, the Netherlands Governor, Mr. Peter Johannis Plateel, appealed to the population to give its support to the United Nations administration. In messages from the Secretary-General and from Mr. Rolz-Bennett (who was designated as Temporary Administrator for approximately six weeks), the population was informed that UNTEA would endeavour to ensure the welfare of the inhabitants. The
Temporary Administrator signed an order effective 15 October granting amnesty to all political prisoners sentenced prior to 1 October 1962.

On 1 October, Indonesia and the Netherlands established liaison missions to UNTEA in Hollandia/Kotabaru. An Australian liaison mission replaced one which had formerly served in Hollandia/Kotabaru as an administrative liaison between the authorities of the territory of Papua/New Guinea and West New Guinea, and now provided effective liaison with UNTEA on matters of mutual interest.

The United Nations Administrator, Mr. Djalal Abdoh (Iran), was appointed by the Secretary-General on 22 October 1962, under article IV of the agreement. On 15 November, he arrived in the territory to take up his assignment and Mr. Rolz-Bennett returned to Headquarters the following day.

UN in Kashmir: The UNCIP (1948) the UNIPOM (1965)

Regular raids by Pakistan-sponsored marauders into the princely state of Kashmir which had acceded to join the Indian Union led to an Indian complaint in the Security Council in January 1948. Without specifically branding Pakistan an aggressor, the Council sent a UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and report 'on the situation as well as assist mediation efforts. By mutual consent, a ceasefire was effected to assist truce supervision. A group of military observers became operational. They were known as UNMOGIP. Since Indo-Pak relations frequently led to crises and hostilities with Kashmir remaining the bone of contention, the presence of the UN troops has at least marginally assisted in keeping the conflict localized and practically freezing the line of actual control (LAQ).

Again when war broke out between Pakistan and India in 1965 the Security Council was apprised of the matter. It imposed a ceasefire and ordered immediate withdrawal of forces by both sides. The UNMOGIP was upgraded to UN India-Pak Observation Mission to patrol the borders.
UN in Lebanon: UNOGIL (1958)

In May 1958, armed rebellion broke out in Lebanon when President Camille Chamoun (a Maronite Christian) made known his intention to seek an amendment to the Constitution which would enable him to be re-elected for a second term. The disturbances, which started in the predominantly Moslem city of Tripoli, soon spread to Beirut and the northern and north-eastern areas near the Syrian border, and assumed the proportions of a civil war.

On 22 May, the Lebanese Government requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider its complaint “in respect of a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security”. It charged that the United Arab Republic was encouraging and supporting the rebellion by the supply of large quantities of arms to subversive elements in Lebanon, by the infiltration of armed personnel from Syria into Lebanon, and by conducting a violent press and radio campaign against the Lebanese Government.

On 27 May, the Security Council decided to include the Lebanese complaint on its agenda but, at the request of Iraq, agreed to postpone the debate to permit the League of Arab States to try to find a settlement of the dispute. After the League had met for six days without reaching agreement, the Council took up the case and, on 11 June, adopted resolution 128 (1958), by which it decided to dispatch urgently to Lebanon an observation group “so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other matériel across the Lebanese borders”. The Secretary-General was authorized to take the necessary steps to dispatch the observation group, which was asked to keep the Council informed through him.

Resolution 128 (1958), supported by both Lebanon and the United Arab Republic, formed the basis for the establishment of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL).
Creation of UNOGIL

Following adoption of the Security Council's resolution 128 (1958). Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld told the Council that the necessary preparatory steps had already been taken. The Observation Group proper would be made up of highly qualified and experienced men from various regions of the world. They would be assisted by military observers, some of whom would be drawn from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and could be in Beirut on the very next day. The Secretary-General stressed that the Group would not be a police force like the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed in Sinai and the Gaza Strip.

Following the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Galo Plaza Lasso of Ecuador, Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal of India and Major-General Odd Bull of Norway as members of UNOGIL. Mr. Plaza acted as Chairman.

In order to start the operation without delay, 10 observers were immediately detached from UNTSO for assignment with UNOGIL. Five of them arrived in Beirut on 12 June and began active reconnaissance the following morning. The plan was to cover as many areas as possible and to probe further each day in the direction of the Syrian border so as to observe any illegal infiltration of personnel and supply of arms across the border. The number of observers was rapidly increased with new arrivals and reached 100 by 16 June. Two helicopters were placed at the disposal of the Group on 23 June, and they were supplemented shortly thereafter by four light observation aircraft.

Method of operation

The three members of UNOGIL assembled in Beirut on 19 June under the personal chairmanship of Dag Hammarskjöld, who had arrived in the area the day before. As outlined by the Secretary-General, the role of UNOGIL was strictly limited to observation, to ascertain whether illegal infiltration of
personnel or supply of arms or other matériel across the Lebanese borders was occurring. It was not UNOGIL’s task to mediate, arbitrate or forcefully to prohibit illegal infiltration, although it was hoped that its very presence on the borders would deter any such traffic. The borders meant those between Lebanon and Syria, since the Armistice Demarcation Line between Israel and Lebanon was covered by UNTSO and not involved in the present case.

It was decided that the Group should discharge its duties by the following methods:

(a) The UNOGIL military observers would conduct regular and frequent patrols of all accessible roads from dawn to dusk, primarily in border districts and the areas adjacent to the zones held by the opposition forces.

(b) A system of permanent observation posts was to be established and manned by military observers. There were initially 10 such stations. The observers at these stations attempted to check all reported infiltration in their areas and to observe any suspicious development.

(c) An emergency reserve of military observers was to be stationed at headquarters and main observation posts for the purpose of making inquiries at short notice or investigating alleged instances of smuggling.

(d) An evaluation team was to be set up at headquarters to analyse, evaluate and coordinate all information received from observers and other sources.

(e) Aerial reconnaissance was to be conducted by light aeroplanes and helicopters, the former being equipped for aerial photography.

(f) The Lebanese Government would provide the Observation Group with all available information about suspected infiltration. The Group would also request the military observers to make specific inquiries into alleged activities as occasion required.
In a letter dated 1 October, the United Kingdom informed the Secretary-General that it had agreed with the Jordanian Government that the withdrawal of British troops should begin on 20 October. On 8 October, the United States announced that, by agreement with the Lebanese Government, it had been decided to complete the withdrawal of United States forces by the end of October. The withdrawal of United States troops was completed by 25 October, and of the British troops by 2 November.

**Operations in the Congo: ONUC (1960-64)**

Although post-Westphalian enforcement is often regarded as a phenomenon that started in the 1990s UN peacekeepers used significant amounts of force in the Congo in the early 1960s. The crisis in the Congo demonstrates how a combination of hasty (Belgian) decolonization, state fragility, weakness of central government authority, and ethnic and regional fragmentation drew the UN into using force against a secessionist movement and foreign mercenaries, and covertly supporting the overthrow of the elected Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba.\(^\text{20}\)

On 30 June 1960 the Congo gained its independence from Belgium. Only five days later, however, the Congolese army mutinied, causing extensive civil unrest, which included a number of attacks against Belgian citizens. In response to these attacks, on 11 July Belgium deployed paratroopers without the consent of the Congolese government. To make matters more complicated, on the very same day, local politician Moïse Tshombé declared Katanga, Congo’s most mineral-rich province, to be independent, and the following month South Kasai also attempted to secede. It soon became apparent that Tshombé had considerable support from both the Belgian government and the

vast industrial mining complex Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, headquartered in Brussels.  

In response to Belgium’s intervention, both President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba called upon the UN to send military assistance, declaring that Belgium had committed an act of aggression against the Congo. Invoking Article 99 of the Charter, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld called an urgent meeting of the Security Council. The Security Council agreed with the Congolese government and in Resolution 143 of 14 July 1960 called for Belgium to withdraw its troops. The Council authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force, ONUC, which included troops from 30 states and at its peak, in July 1961, comprised 19,828 soldiers and some 2,000 civilian experts and technicians. ONUC personnel were initially intended to act as peacekeepers to oversee the withdrawal of Belgian troops and to help the Congolese government restore law and order; they were not supposed to get involved with Congolese politics in general and the Katangan secession in particular. But this is precisely what happened. Arguably, this was because ONUC’s underlying goal was to restore an acceptable degree of Westphalian order by maintaining Congo’s territorial integrity, peacefully if possible but by force if necessary.  

Although Belgian troops quickly withdrew from the majority of Congolese territory, they did not withdraw from Katanga. This prompted the Security Council to call for their immediate withdrawal from the province (Resolution 146, 9 August 1960). This was duly done within six weeks. ONUC was left to support the Congolese government restore law and order in the country. The problem was that the issue of Katanga’s secession

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22 James, A., Peacekeeping in International Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan with the IISS), 1990, p. 296.
remained unresolved and approximately 510 Belgian officers and foreign mercenaries remained within Katanga to support Tshombé.  

In retrospect, it is clear that the UN actively took sides within Congolese politics in two senses. Covertly, the Secretary-General and the United States employed strategies designed to weaken Lumumba’s position, especially after August 1960 when he had requested and received military assistance from the Soviet Union to suppress the regional rebellions in Katanga and South Kasai.  

Lumumba was subsequently abducted and later murdered by opposition politicians in January 1961. The UN also authorized ONUC to use force, ostensibly to prevent civil war in the Congo (Resolution 161, 21 February 1961). UN peacekeepers used force shortly afterwards against Tshombé’s gendarmes and various mercenary and ‘foreign’ (mainly Belgian) elements in Katanga (although ONUC troops were also killed by rogue and undisciplined factions of the Congolese army in several incidents during 1961). The use of force to remove all mercenaries from Katanga was reiterated in November 1961 (Resolution 169). ONUC was eventually terminated in stages after February 1963 when Katanga was re-integrated into the national territory of the Congo. The last ONUC troops were withdrawn by 30 June 1964, although the country continued to receive civilian aid. 

ONUC’s use of force had important repercussions for UN peacekeeping more generally. As Alan James has suggested, the mission was widely perceived as a tool of US foreign policy. It also generated a financial crisis which has plagued UN operations ever since: ONUC’s annual cost was $66 million at a time when the UN’s overall budget was only $70 million and

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26 James, A., Peacekeeping in International Politics, op. cit., p. 299.
France and the Soviet Union refused to pay. The operation also encouraged the UN to ensure that henceforth the role of the Secretary-General would be far more circumscribed. Finally, all subsequent UN forces were given six month long mandates in order to allow the Security Council to periodically review ongoing operations. ONUC’s role in the Congo thus highlights two important points. First, given the opportunity, the UN was willing and able to engage in intra-state conflicts well before the 1990s. Second, even when dealing with problems exacerbated by Westphalian systems of governance, in this case the retention of state borders imposed during colonialism, the UN refused to countenance political solutions that were not based on the territorial integrity of the state in question.

The Congo Crisis confronted the world community with all possible complexities — internal instability, intrusion of external forces, deliberate subversion, secession, tie-up of local and foreign economic interests and above all obstructive cold war politics. All these arose from the chaos that followed Congo’s independence from a reluctant Belgium in July 1960. As the national army mutinied and the uranium rich Katanga province seceded due to foreign instigations, the central government requested UN intervention. Urgent action was recommended by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold for the first time in a civil war situation which required a new form of peacekeeping. The Security Council authorized the UN Congo Operation (ONUC). A large contingent with civilian and military personnel was sent to the Congo as per host-country agreement with the immediate objective of ending Belgian intervention and restoring law and order. But the UNEF with its pure and simple posture of self-defense and non-interference could not cope with a fast deteriorating situation. Consequently the principles of non-interference had to

be 'stretched, modified and at times, by passed' to flush out the obstinate foreign mercenaries and to strengthen Central Government grip on the seceding Katanga Province. For about four long years, the UN went on helping the Congolese Government to maintain the country's political independence and territorial integrity as well as maintain law and order. After the assassination of the Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, the ONUC mandate had to be more assertive. The parliament was reconvened under its protection (August 1961) and regular forces were dispatched to chase away the mercenaries employed by the Tshombe Government in Katanga (December 1962). The initiative for expanded ONUC now came from Mr. U Thant who succeeded Dag after the latter died in a plane crash. In February 1963 Katanga came to be reintegrated into the Congo State. At the peak, part of its operation, ONUC forces consisted of a total strength of 20,000 personnel. Before it was finally with drawn by June 30, 1964, a nation wide political reconciliation had been effected.

It was stated that "when ONUC ended its mandate, the Congo was a united country in name only; One-fifth of its territory was under Leftist rebels ...what the UN intervention in the Congo accomplished was the restoration of status quo ante. There was a central government friendly to the western Countries". No wonder, therefore, US diplomatic and financial support was readily available throughout the UN operations while the Soviets were thoroughly opposed to the expansion of UN mandate and refused to share the burden of peacekeeping expenses.

UN Peacekeeping in Cyprus: (UNFICYP 1964-87)

UN role in ethnic strife in a newly independent small state was illustrated for the first time in the Cyprus crisis. With Greek and Turkish Cypriots seriously defending their interests under the new Constitution of 1960, the island state was in acute tension. On receiving Cyprus governments' charge

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of Turkish intervention in its internal affairs, the Security Council recommended the sending an UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) intended to prevent recurrence of communal fighting and restore law and order. The mandate was initially for six months at a time but has been continuously renewed to date. Apart from peace restoration, the UN also undertook the task of helping a settlement of the Cyprus problems, for which a UN mediator was appointed by the Secretary-General. With the communities finally persuaded to come to the negotiating table, stability gradually returned to the island. Ten years later, the General Assembly passed a resolution urging end of outside interference, safe return of all refugees and continuation of in Ere-communal dialogue assisted by UN mediator. Since a mutually acceptable solution was hard to arrive at, UNFICYP took care that the cease fire was not violated. The operation lasting for more than two decades and involving a force level of 2,328 with expenses running into a huge deficit. The multinational force also included a large contingent from a permanent Security Council member i.e., UK.

**Vietnam War**

US involvement in Vietnam began during the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961), which sent US military to South Vietnam. Their numbers increased as the military position the Saigon government became weaker. In 1957 Communist rebels -- Viet Cong -- began a campaign of terrorism in South Vietnam. They were supported by the government of North Vietnam and later by North Vietnamese troops. Their goal was to overthrow the anti-communist government in the South.

John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) decided to commit American support troops to South Vietnam. Four thousand troops were sent in 1962. After John Kennedy was murdered, Vice President Lyndon Johnson served the last fourteen months of Kennedy's term. He then was elected to his own full term. It began in January 1965. Much of his time and energy would be taken up by the war in Vietnam. By early nineteen-sixty-four. America had about
seventeen-thousand troops in Vietnam. The troops were there to advise and train the South Vietnamese military.

Under President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1968), US intervention mushroomed both militarily and politically. Johnson asked for a resolution expressing U.S. determination to support freedom and protect peace in Southeast Asia. Congress responded with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, expressing support for "all necessary measures" the President might take to repel armed attacks against US forces and prevent further aggression.\footnote{Frankel, Joseph, International Relations in Changing World Allison, op. cit., p. 41.}

Under the strategy developed by General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, American divisions would seek out and destroy North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (South Vietnamese Communist) formations, while air power carried the war to the North, attacking both the will of Hanoi's leaders to continue the fight and, to an increasing extent, their ability to do so. The list of targets expanded to include transportation, oil storage, and the nation's few industries. In theory, Westmoreland's strategy of search and destroy would force the Communists to expend supplies and thus make the logistics establishment in North Vietnam all the more vulnerable to bombing.\footnote{Russett, Bruce and Haivey Stars, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, op. cit., p. 135.}

In 1966, more than 200,000 troops were committed to Vietnam. The United States escalated its participation in the war to a peak of 543,000 troops in April 1969. American forces in Southeast Asia operated under some stringent restrictions, including being forbidden to invade enemy territory in North Vietnam and, for many years, likewise being barred from ground operations against enemy sanctuaries in bordering Laos and Cambodia. The "body count" of Vietcong killed was the centerpiece of the American approach to waging the war, conducted through search and-destroy operations in remote jungle regions. By 1966 it became increasingly clear that this strategy of attrition was not working and could not work because of the enemy's capacity
to replace losses far higher than those the allies were able to inflict.

The political challenge of the war stemmed from the belief of the rural Vietnamese that the Government of Vietnam will not stay long when it comes into an area, that the Government was indifferent to the people's welfare, that the low-level officials were tools of the local rich; and that the Government was excessively corrupt from top to bottom. The American search and-destroy military operations didn't solve these problems, and were at best irrelevant to security in rural Vietnamese villages. At worst, indiscriminate aerial attacks and artillery fire exacted a toll on village allegiance to the Saigon government.34

Concern that China might react as it had fifteen years earlier in Korea argued powerfully for relying on air power rather than invasion to convince Hanoi to call off the war in the South. Having turned to air power, the Johnson administration chose to apply it in a gradually escalating fashion. President John F. Kennedy's recent success in compelling the Soviet Union to with draw bombers and ballistic missiles from Cuba bred confidence in the gradual application of force.

The individual services, for the most part, controlled their own air arms. The Army maintained control of its large helicopter fleet as organic air assets. Marines followed their traditional organizational path of assigning an Air Wing to each Marine division. The Navy maintained complete control of its air assets and Admiral Sharp, as Commander in Chief of Pacific Command (CINCPAC), implemented the Route Pack system for all air operations over North Vietnam. General Clay, the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) commander, was assigned coordinating authority for de-conflicting air operations, but he felt that the existing command arrangements (route packaging and assigning the air component only coordinating authority) did not provide a sound means to control the overall air effort.

34 Vasquez, John, A., Classics of International Relations, op. cit., p. 320.
The Route Pack system divided responsibility within North Vietnam into seven different geographic areas, with the Air Force and the Navy each receiving responsibility for portions of the route packs. Commander in Chief of Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), the naval component of Pacific Command (PACOM), maintained control of carrier air assets. Even within the Air Force there was no single air commander. Seventh Air Force was responsible for Air Force air operations in Vietnam, while Thirteenth Air Force was responsible for Thailand, and Strategic Air Command (SAC) never relinquished command or control of its B-52 bombers.

The targeting process further complicated this patchwork of responsibility. Targets were selected in Washington by a small team on the joint staff and approved only at the presidential level. The result was a major misuse of air power. Air power application came to be simply the servicing of targets, with little regard for whether or not they were the "right" targets, and without an air campaign plan. Service parochialism dominated the air effort. Lacking a single responsible air commander, a clear set of objectives, and a common concept of operations, even the most skilled operations of the separate components tended to work at cross-purposes and give respite to the enemy.

Initially, most Americans backed Washington's Vietnam policy. A dangerous situation seemed to be developing, one which the US government referred to as the "domino theory" -- if South Vietnam were allowed to fall to communism, so eventually would the rest of Southeast Asia. But as the war dragged on and a military victory appeared more and more elusive, public opposition became more vocal.

President Johnson believed that the United States had to support South Vietnam. Many other Americans agreed. They believed that without American help, South Vietnam would become communist. Then, all of Southeast Asia would become Communist, too. As Johnson's term began, his military advisers

told him the Communists were losing the war. They told him that North Vietnamese troops and Viet cong forces would soon stop fighting. On February sixth, however, the Viet Cong attacked American camps at Pleiku and Qui Nhon. The Johnson administration immediately ordered air attacks against military targets in the north.

In March 1965 the first American ground troops arrived in South Vietnam. Congress supported the president's actions at that time. However, the number of Americans who opposed the war began to grow. These people said the war was a civil war. They said the United States had no right, or reason, to intervene. For six days in May, the United States halted air attacks on North Vietnam. The administration hoped this would help get the North Vietnamese government to begin negotiations. The North refused. And the United States began to build up its forces in the South. By July, one-hundred twenty-five thousand Americans were fighting in Vietnam.

In December 1965 the United States again halted air attacks against North Vietnam. Again, it invited the North Vietnamese government to negotiate an end to the fighting. And again, the North refused. Ho Chi Minh's conditions for peace were firm. He demanded an end to the bombing and a complete American withdrawal. Withdrawal would mean defeat for the South. It would mean that all of Vietnam would become Communist. President Johnson would not accept these terms. So he offered his own proposals. The most important was an immediate cease-fire. Neither side would compromise, however. And the fighting went on.

Johnson strongly defended the use of American soldiers in Vietnam. In a speech to a group of lawmakers he said: "Since world war two, this nation has met and has mastered many challenges - challenges in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin, in Korea in Cuba. We met them because brave men were willing to risk their lives for their nation's security. And braver men have never lived than
those who carry our colors in Vietnam this very hour.”

On 31 January 1968 combat erupted throughout the entire country in the Tet [new year] Offensive. Thirty-six of 44 provincial capitals and 64 of 242 district towns were attacked. They even struck at the American embassy in the capital, Saigon. Once the shock and confusion wore off, most attacks were crushed in a few days. During those few days, however, the fighting was some of the most violent ever seen in South Vietnam. Fifty-thousand Communist soldiers were killed during the tet offensive. Fourteen-thousand South Vietnamese soldiers were killed. And two-thousand American soldiers were killed. Thousands of Vietnamese civilians were killed, too.

On 31 March 1968 the President spoke to the American people on television. He told of his proposal to end American bombing of North Vietnam. He told of the appointment of a special ambassador to start peace negotiations. And he told of his decision about his own future: “I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awesome duties of this office -- the presidency of your country. Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your president.”

Hanoi had suffered a military defeat in the Tet Offensive, but had won a political and diplomatic victory by shifting American policy toward disengagement.

By 1969 the unsatisfactory results in Vietnam compelled U.S. leaders to reconsider their approach to the Cold War. Consequently, assumptions regarding Cold War adversaries were revised. In their own strategic innovation, Nixon and Kissinger transformed the nature of superpower relations, inaugurating detente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. Recognizing the United States altered economic and strategic position, Kissinger introduced the concept of "interdependence"
to explain significant changes in American relations with the less-powerful countries of the world. Such developments led many observers to conclude that the Cold War had ended. Others believed that the change was one of form rather than substance. Some Cold War assumptions and appearances had changed, in their view, but superpower confrontation remained the basis of international affairs.

By the spring of 1972 the Vietnam War was at a low ebb. The 1968 Communist Tet Offensive had given way to a gradual winding down by mid-1969, and after the invasion of Cambodia in May 1970, there was little fighting in South Vietnam. Yet, while the United States was in the process of withdrawing its forces from a war that was becoming increasingly unpopular with its citizens, the North Vietnamese were rebuilding their forces in preparation for another massive offensive in hopes of overrunning the southern half of the divided country. In April 1972, heavily armed North Vietnamese divisions crossed into the South at several points, including from out of Cambodia.

Beginning in late 1972, National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger's negotiations with North Vietnam began to move seriously towards a settlement. To build up the military of South Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird initiated "Project Enhance Plus" on 20 October 1972. The Pentagon ordered rush deliveries of some $2 billion worth of military equipment including over 600 aircraft. The program gave South Vietnam the fourth largest air force in the world, with over 2,000 aircraft. Only the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China maintained larger air forces. By this time South Vietnam also floated the fifth largest navy in the world (with 1,500 ships) and fielded the fourth largest army in the world (with 1.1 million troops).

Nixon resumed bombing of North Vietnam in response to the North Vietnamese 1972 Easter offensive, and mined North Vietnamese ports and bombed Hanoi and Haiphong in late 1972. Such pressure was intended, at least
in part, to force North Vietnam to sign an armistice. In early 1973 the United States, North and South Vietnam, and the Viet Cong signed an armistice. American military activities in Cambodia and Laos, which had continued after the cease-fire in South Vietnam went into effect, ended in 1973 when Congress cut off funds.

South Vietnam's military defeat tended to obscure the crucial inability of this massive military enterprise to compensate for Saigon's political shortcomings. Over a span of nearly two decades, a series of regimes failed to mobilize fully and effectively their nation's political, social, and economic resources to foster a popular base of support. North Vietnamese main force units ended the war, but local insurgency among the people of the South made that outcome possible and perhaps inevitable.

The setback suffered by the United States in the Vietnam War was rooted in a failure of strategy. Indeed, perhaps no war in American history shows more clearly both the difficulties of making sound strategic judgments and the dire consequences of a lack of clear strategic vision.

The Vietnam War thus provides a cautionary tale for American political and military decision-makers about the crucial importance of thinking clearly about strategy. By incorrectly relating military strategy to national policy and by improperly understanding the nature of the conflict, the United States exhausted itself against a secondary enemy in South Vietnam. The American failure in Vietnam also stemmed from trying to fight a traditional conventional war when the conflict's nature demanded a counterinsurgency effort. Top military commanders, unable to fathom the problem, refused to implement such a strategy despite evidence of its effectiveness.

Problem of Racial Discrimination in South Africa

In the first session of the General Assembly India complained that the government of the Union of South Africa had enacted certain discriminatory

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laws to the disadvantage of the people of Indian origin there. For example
Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation Act of 1946 placed the people of
Indian origin in a disadvantageous position. India requested the General
Assembly to recommend that the government of South Africa should abandon
the policy of apartheid and enact legislation in conformity with the principles
of UN Charter. South Africa contended that the matter lay within her domestic
jurisdiction. This view was rejected by the Assembly which called upon the
parties to settle the matter peacefully. But the disputants failed to reach an
agreement. On May 14, 1949 the General Assembly asked India, Pakistan and
the Union of South Africa to hold a round table conference and explore the
ways and means to settle the issue. But the differences continued to persist. The
parliament of South Africa passed yet another stringent measure known as
Group Areas Act. The sixth session of the General Assembly provided for the
establishment of commission to help the disputants in solving the long standing
controversy. The Assembly also called on the South African government to
suspend the implementation of the Group Areas Act since it was based on the
doctrine of racial discrimination. The seventh session of the UN General
Assembly commenced in 1952 and it set up UN Good Offices Commission to
arrange negotiations between India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa but
the commission did not succeed in its mission because the South African
government insisted that the commission had no jurisdiction in the matter. In
June 1955 the UN Secretary General designated ambassador Louis de Faro of
Brazil to assist the parties. India and Pakistan agreed to cooperate but the
South African Government declined to collaborate. In December 1955 and
again in November 1956 the General Assembly appealed to the parties to
negotiate but the Union of South Africa refused to respond to the appeal. The
Assembly recommended later the economic and trade boycott of South Africa.
Unfortunately Britain and the United States had adopted partisan approach to
question of imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions on the racist
white regime of South Africa which had audacity to flout the world public
opinion. However, the UNO had also failed to force South Africa to dismantle the edifice of apartheid because of continued support of the Western Powers to the White regime there.\textsuperscript{39}

**Civil War in Cyprus**

Cyprus is an Island republic in eastern Mediterranean with a population of about 6 lakhs including 77% Greeks and 18% Turks. The trouble started in Cyprus with the demand raised by Greek Cypriots for union with Greece. The Arab nationals were opposed to this plan and so both the communities clashed in 1965. The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon all the states to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus. The situation in Cyprus deteriorated again in November 1967. Ultimately three peace makers representing the USA, the UNO and NATO brought about an agreement in Cyprus. This agreement provided for withdrawal of Greek and Turkish expeditionary force from Cyprus, UN guarantee of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus and disarmament of all armed forces in Cyprus except for a 5000 strong police force. On July 16, 1974 President Makarios of Cyprus fled when a coup was staged against him. Turkey now intervened in favour of the Turkish Cypriots and landed her troops in Cyprus. The UN General Assembly adopted resolution asking for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. UN emergency force was stationed in Cyprus and Indian military officers participated in peace keeping operations there. President Makarios was able to regain his authority and refugees returned to their homes. In 1977 the Greeks and Turkish Cypriots had agreed to set up a federation in Cyprus.\textsuperscript{40}

**Arab-Israel Wars**

During the First Arab-Israeli War (1948-49), an Egyptian invasion force of 7,000 men crossed the Palestinian border at Rafah on the Mediterranean coast and at Al Awja (Nizzana) farther inland. They soon reached Ashdod, less

\textsuperscript{39} Deustch Merton, The Analysis of International Relations, op. cit., p. 78.
\textsuperscript{40} Keswani, Khemchand B., International Relations in Modern World (1900-1995), op. cit., p. 55.
than thirty-five kilometers from Tel Aviv. But by the time the first truce ended in mid-July, the Israelis had reinforced their positions, beating off Egyptian attacks and recovering territory to protect Jewish settlements in the Negev. By the fall of 1948, the Israelis put Egypt's 18,000 troops deployed in Palestine on the defensive and penetrated the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt and Israel concluded an armistice under United Nations (UN) auspices at the end of 1948 and later agreed on a cease-fire line that generally followed the prewar boundary between Palestine and Sinai.41

After President Gamal Abdul Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal in July 1956, the British, French, and Israelis began coordinating an invasion which triggered the Second Arab-Israel War. On October 29, 1956, the Israelis struck across Sinai toward the canal and southward toward Sharm ash Shaykh to relieve the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. At the crossroads of Abu Uwayqilah, thirty kilometers from the Israeli border, and at the Mitla Pass, Egyptian troops resisted fiercely, repelling several attacks by larger Israeli forces. British and French forces bombed Egyptian air bases, causing Nasser to withdraw Egyptian troops from Sinai to protect the canal. At the heavily fortified complex of Rafah in the northwestern corner of Sinai and at other points, the Egyptians carried out effective delaying actions before retreating. Egypt vigorously defended Sharm-al-Shaykh in the extreme south until two advancing Israeli columns took control of the area. At Port Said (Bur Said), at the north end of the canal, Egyptian soldiers battled the initial British and French airborne assault, but resistance quickly collapsed when allied forces landed on the beach with support from heavy naval gunfire.42

In the eleven years leading up to the Third Arab-Israel War in June 1967 (also seen as the the Six-Day War), the military had been intensively trained for combat and outfitted with new Soviet weapons and equipment. Despite these preparations, the war proved to be a debacle for Egypt.

42 Ibid.
On February 4, 1971, Sadat announced a new peace initiative that contained a significant concession: he was willing to accept an interim agreement with Israel in return for a partial Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. A timetable would then be set for Israel's withdrawal from the rest of the occupied territories in accordance with UN Resolution 242. Egypt would reopen the canal, restore diplomatic relations with the United States, which had been broken after the June 1967 War, and sign a peace agreement with Israel through Jarring. Sadat's initiative fell on deaf ears in Tel Aviv and in Washington, which was not disposed to assisting the Soviet Union's major client in the region. Disillusioned by Israel's failure to respond to his initiative, Sadat rejected the Rogers Plan and the cease-fire.

In May 1972, President Nixon met Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev, and Sadat was convinced that the two superpowers would try to prevent a new war in the Middle East and that a position of stalemate—no peace, no war—had been reached. For Sadat this position was intolerable. The June 1967 War had been a humiliating defeat for the Arabs. Without a military victory, any Arab leader who agreed to negotiate directly with Israel would do so from a position of extreme weakness. At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union were urging restraint and caution. However, the United States refused to put pressure on Israel to make concessions, and the Soviet Union, which had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel as a result of the June 1967 War, had no influence over Israel.43

On October 17 the Arab oil producers announced a program of reprisals against the Western backers of Israel: a 5 percent cutback in output, followed by further such reductions every month until Israel had withdrawn from all the occupied territories and the rights of the Palestinians had been restored. The next day, President Nixon formally asked Congress for US $ 2.2 billion in emergency funds to finance the massive airlift of arms to Israel that was already under way. The following day, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia decreed an

immediate 10 percent cutback in Saudi oil and, five days after that, the complete suspension of oil shipments to the United States.

Israel was shocked and unprepared for the war. After the initial confusion and near panic in Israel followed by the infusion of United States weaponry, Israel was able to counterattack and succeeded in crossing to the west bank of the canal and surrounding the Egyptian Third Army. With the Third Army surrounded, Sadat appealed to the Soviet Union for help. Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin believed he had obtained the American acceptance of a cease-fire through Henry Kissinger, (United States secretary of state). On October 22, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, calling for a cease-fire by all parties within twelve hours in the positions they occupied. Egypt accepted the cease-fire, but Israel, alleging Egyptian violations of cease-fire, completed the encirclement of the Third Army to the east of the canal. By nightfall on October 23, the road to Suez, the Third Army’s only supply line, was in Israeli hands, cutting off two divisions and 45,000 men.\footnote{Sondhi, Sunil, International Relations: A Framework for Analysis, op. cit., p. 102.}

The Soviet Union was furious, believing it had been double crossed by the United States. On October 24, the Soviet ambassador handed Kissinger a note from Brezhnev threatening that if the United States was not prepared to join in sending forces to impose the cease-fire, the Soviet Union would act alone. The United States took the threat very seriously and responded by ordering a grade-three nuclear alert, the first of its kind since President John F. Kennedy’s order during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The threat came to naught, however, because a UN emergency force arrived in the battle zone to police the cease-fire.

Meanwhile, Syria felt betrayed by Egypt because Sadat did not inform his ally of his decision to accept the cease-fire. Two days after Sadat had accepted the cease-fire, President Hafiz al Assad of Syria also accepted the cease-fire.
Neither side had, won a clear-cut victory, but for the Egyptians, it was a victory nonetheless. The Arabs had taken the initiative in attacking the Israelis and had shown that Israel was not, invincible. The stinging defeats, of 1948, 1956, and 1967 seemed to be avenged.

In Egypt the casualties included about 8,000 killed. The effect of the war on the morale of the Egyptian population, however, was immense. Sadat's prestige grew tremendously. The war, along with the political moves Sadat had made previously, meant that he was totally in control and able to implement the programs he wanted. He was the hero of the day.

Negotiations toward a permanent cease-fire began in December 1973. In January 1974, Kissinger began his shuttle diplomacy between Egypt and Israel. On January 18, the first disengagement agreement was signed separately by Sadat and Golda Meir. A second disengagement agreement was signed on September 1, 1975. The agreement provided for a partial Israeli withdrawal in Sinai and limited the number of troops and kinds of weapons Egypt could have on the eastern side of the canal. Israel agreed to withdraw from the Abu Rudays oil fields in Western Sinai, which produced small but important revenue for Egypt. Egypt also agreed not to use force to achieve its aims, a concession that in effect made Egypt a non-belligerent in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As the price for its agreement, Israel extracted important concessions from the United States. Kissinger's secret promises to Israel included meeting Israel's military needs in any emergency, preserving Israel's arms superiority by providing the most advanced and sophisticated weaponry, and pledging not to recognize or to negotiate with the PLO.  

On June 5, 1975, the Suez Canal was reopened. This was a great moment for Sadat, not only politically but economically, because the canal provided Egypt with considerable revenues.

The stark defeat of the Arab states in the 1967 war gave new

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popularity to Palestinian resistance groups organised among the Palestinian refugee community. These groups took control of the Palestine Liberation Organization, formed in 1964 by the Arab states. Yasser Arafat, head of the Fateh group, became the Chairman of the PLO. The PLO became the institutional vehicle for attracting and directing the national aspirations of the Palestinians, and quickly established itself as the central force in the Palestinian Diaspora. The Summit of Arab Heads of State in Rabat in October 1974 recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This United Nations General Assembly bolstered this status by inviting Arafat to give a speech before it on 13 November 1974; the same General Assembly session admitted the PLO as an observer at the UN and its specialised agencies.

Until the outbreak of the Gulf crisis in 1990, Arab, European and American leaders introduced various initiatives for a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although none of these achieved a breakthrough, many of their suggestions served as the basis for the Middle East Peace Conference that convened on 30 October 1991 in Madrid.

At the end of the Madrid Peace Conference the delegations from Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and the joint Palestinian Jordanian delegation agreed to hold rounds of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, which began in late November and December 1991. Secret Palestinian-Israeli talks also commenced on 20 January 1993 in Norway. On 9-10 September, Chairman Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin exchanged letters of mutual recognition, and on 13 September, the two leaders signed the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles of Interim Self-Government Arrangements in Washington, D.C. The Declaration of Principles introduced significant changes in the governance of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Under that agreement, the parties agreed to Israeli military withdrawal from portions of Palestine, where control was to be assumed by the Palestinian Authority (an entity distinct from the PLO). These arrangements were to endure for a
five-year interim period, during which the parties were to negotiate and implement a permanent status agreement. Issues deferred to the permanent status negotiations are borders, security arrangements, water, Jerusalem, refugees, relations and cooperation with neighbors and settlements.46

Israel's first military withdrawal, beginning in April 1994, ceded control over the West Bank town of Jericho and approximately two-thirds of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority. Under the Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995 the Israeli army re-deployed from all the large Palestinian towns in the West Bank (except Hebron) as well as from other smaller towns and villages. The Interim Agreement created three categories of areas in the West Bank: Area A, where the Palestinian Authority had authority for public order and internal security; Area B, where the Palestinian Authority assumed responsibility for public order for Palestinians while Israel ensured internal security; and Areas C, where Israel maintained exclusive control. Israel also maintained exclusive control over borders, external security, Jerusalem and settlements.

Under the Interim Agreement, Israeli military forces were to carry out three further redeployments from all areas of the West Bank other than specified military locations, Jerusalem and settlements. These were to be completed by July 1997, although by January 2000 Israel had not completed its second redeployment.

On January 20, 1996, Palestinians of the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip elected an 88-member Palestinian Legislative Council as well as the President of its Executive Authority. Following Israel's opening of a tunnel under the Haram al Sharif, the holiest Islamic site in Palestine, demonstrations and armed clashes broke out over a four-day period leaving 62 Palestinians and 14 Israelis dead and 1,600 Palestinians and 50 Israelis wounded. Despite the tense relations that prevailed during the

46 Russett, Bruce and Haivey Stars, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, op. cit., p. 171.
government of Birlyamin Netanyahu, the two sides initialed the Hebron Protocol of January 15, 1997 which provided for Israeli redeployment from 80% of Hebron, while Israel maintained control over the portions of the city in which Jewish settlers lived.

Palestinian-Israeli relations were also negatively affected by Israel's rapid expansion of illegal Israeli settlements in Palestinian occupied territories, which occurred in the face of Palestinian and international condemnation. In February 1997, the government of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu announced its intention to construct a Jewish settlement on Jabal Abu Ghneim south of Jerusalem. This settlement, which reinforced the ring of Jewish settlements around East Jerusalem, prompted fierce confrontations between protesters and Israeli troops in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, an angry reaction from the Palestinian Authority and a several months-long breakdown in peace negotiations. This hiatus ended with the signing of the Wye River Memorandum on 23 Oct. 1998, which provided for the implementation of the second phase of further redeployment from the West Bank and for heightened security-related obligations on the part of the Palestinian Authority.47

The Netanyahu government, which signed the Wye River Memorandum with great reluctance, quickly bowed to internal political pressures and declared Israel's refusal to implement the Wye River Memorandum, plunging Palestinian-Israeli relations into a new state of crisis. Netanyahu's defeat by Ehud Barak in Israel's May 1999 elections led to improve relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel signed the Sharm El-Sheik Memorandum oil September 4, 1999 which established a timeline for the implementation of outstanding commitments of existing Palestinian-Israeli agreements, including further redeployments, prisoner releases, the construction of the Gaza Sea Port and the opening of West Bank-Gaza Strip safe passage corridors. Israel conducted two phases of further redeployments from 7% and 3% of the West Bank in September 1999

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and January 2000, respectively, in accordance with the obligations of the Sharm El-Sheik Memorandum. At the end of the latter redeployment, 11.3% of the total area of the West Bank was comprised of Area A and 25.6% of the West Bank comprised Area B, while the rest (63.1%) remained under exclusive Israeli control.

The permanent status negotiations formally started in May 1996, although serious discussions only commenced in earnest in November 1999. As of January 2003, no concrete progress had been made in the negotiations. Meanwhile, several issues still plague relations between Palestine and Israel, including continued Israeli settlement activity, the presence of hundreds of Palestinians in Israeli jails and Israel's Judaization policy in Jerusalem.

**Afghanistan War**

More than two decades after its commencement and over a decade after its cessation, the Soviet-Afghan War remains an enigma in the West. Earlier successful Soviet military interventions in the Ukraine (1945-1951), East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968) and intermittent Soviet military pressure on Poland demonstrated that the stark military power of the Soviet state was an irresistible tool of Soviet political power. The West was thankful that nuclear deterrence maintained the Cold War balance and reluctantly accepted Soviet intervention within its socialist commonwealth and in the Soviet border regions as one cost of that balance.48

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a repeat of their invasion of Czechoslovakia. For months after the invasion, hardly a political or military expert in the world doubted that Afghanistan was now forever incorporated as a part of the Soviet Empire and that nothing short of a large-scale global war could alter the status quo.

And global war was most unlikely as both super powers intended to avoid it. Some Westerners recalled the British experiences in Afghanistan and

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waited for a Soviet "Vietnam" to emerge, but most Westerners believed that the Soviets would ultimately prevail. Some even projected their European fears to southern Asia and envisioned a bold Soviet strategic thrust from southern Afghanistan to the shores of the Persian Gulf, to challenge Western strategic interests and disrupt Western access to critical Middle Eastern oil.

The initial active resistance by the Afghan military was confined to a short battle against the Soviet Spetsnaz unit storming the Presidential Palace. However, the stunned citizens of this geographically isolated land immediately rose to defend their land. In defiance of the wisdom of conventional warfare, the citizens armed themselves, gathered into loose formations and began to attack and sabotage the superior occupying force's personnel, installations, depots and transport with any available weapons (to include flintlock muskets).

Open resistance flared so quickly that only two months after the invasion, (on the night of 23 February 1980) almost the entire population of Kabul climbed on their rooftops and chanted with one voice "God is Great". This open defiance of the Russian generals who could physically destroy their city was matched throughout the countryside. The Afghan warrior society sent thousands of warriors against their northern invader.

Communist power was established in Afghanistan on 27 April 1978 through a bloody military coup. President Nur M. Taraki, the new president, announced sweeping programs of land distribution, emancipation of women and the destruction of the old Afghanistan social structure. The new government enjoyed little popular support. The wobbly new government was immediately challenged by Armed resistance fighters. The Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan began to disintegrate as bloody purges swept the officer ranks. In March 1979, the city of Herat rose in open revolt. Most of the Afghan 17th Infantry Division mutinied and joined the rebellion. Forces loyal to Taraki advanced and occupied the city while the Afghan Air Force bombed the city and the 17th Division. Over 5,000 people died in the fighting, including some 100 Soviet citizens. This event may have lead the
Soviet General Staff to start intervention planning. Soldiers, units and entire
brigades deserted to the resistance and by the end of 1979, the Afghan Army
had fallen from about 90,000 to about 40,000. Over half the officer corps were
purged, executed or had deserted. In September 1979, Taraki’s Prime Minister,
Hafizullah Amin, seized power and executed Taraki. Amin’s rule was no better
and the Soviet Union watched this new communist state spin out of control and
out of Moscow’s orbit. The Soviet Politburo moved to stabilize the situation.

The Soviet Union had significant experience with stability operations to
maintain its socialist empire. Their experiences in subjugating the Hungarian
revolution of 1956 (where they suffered 669 killed, 51 missing and 1540
wounded) led to improved methods and techniques. In the 1968 invasion of
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Army lost a total of 96 killed. The elements of their
invasion plan included the establishment of an in-country Soviet military and
KGB element to assist the invasion force and the production of a cover or
deception operation to divert attention away from the future invasion. A
General Staff group would tour the country in advance of the invasion, under
some pretense, in order to assess and fine-tune invasion plans.49

When the invasion began, the in-country Soviet military and KGB
element would disarm or disable the national military forces. Airborne add
Spetsnaz forces would spearhead the invasion and seize major airfields,
transportation choke points the capital city, key government buildings, and
Communications facilities. They would seize or execute the key government
leaders. Soviet ground forces would cross into the country, seize the major
cities and road networks, suppress any local military resistance, and occupy the
key population centers. A new government would then be installed, supported
by the armed might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

This invasion plan was also used in Afghanistan. Soviet military and
KGB advisers permeated the structure of the Afghanistan Armed Forces. In

49 Ibid.
April 1979, General of the Army Aleksly A. Yepishev, the head of the Main Political Directorate, led a delegation of several generals in a visit to Afghanistan to assess the situation. General Yepishev made a similar visit to Czechoslovakia prior to the 1968 invasion. In August 1979, General of the Army Ivan G. Pavlovski, CINC Soviet Ground Forces, led a group of some 60 officers on a several weeks long reconnaissance tour of Afghanistan. General Pavlovski commanded the invasion force in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The invasion of Afghanistan was launched on Christmas eve, not a major Muslim holiday, but a time when the Western governments were not prepared to react. Soviet advisers disabled equipment, blocked arms rooms and prevented a coordinated Afghan military response. Soviet airborne and Spetsnaz forces seized the Salang tunnel, key airfields, and key government and communications sites in Kabul. Soviet Spetsnaz soldiers killed President Amin. The Soviet ground invasion force crossed into the country, fought with a few pockets of Afghan military resistance and occupied the main cities while the Soviet government installed their Afghan puppet regime.

The Soviets expected the resistance to end here, but it had only begun. The ability to rationalize an intolerable situation that pervades the West did not hold in the mountains of Afghanistan. The Afghans' values, faith and love of freedom enabled them to hold out against a superpower, even though they suffered tremendous casualties in doing so.

The Afghan war was fought under four General Secretaries Brezhnev, Chernenko, Andropov and Gorbachev. Many senior Soviet military officers want to blame the Afghanistan debacle solely on the Soviet political leadership, yet, there were high ranking military accomplices who carried out Politburo directives without protest. And, although many in the West view Gorbachev as a liberal democrat and point out that he ordered the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the bloodiest years of fighting in Afghanistan (1985-1986) were under his leadership.
Ideologically, the Soviet leadership was unable to come to grips with war in Afghanistan. Marxist-Leninist dogma did not allow for a "war of national liberation" where people would fight against a Marxist regime. So, initially the press carried pictures of happy Soviet soldiers building orphanages—and did not mention that they were also engaged in combat and filling those very orphanages. By the end of 1983, the Soviet press had only reported six dead and wounded soldiers, although by that time, the 40th Army had suffered 6,262 dead and 9,880 combat wounded. Soviet solutions for Afghanistan were postponed, as one general secretary after another weakened and died and the military waited for a healthy general secretary who could make a decision. It was only during the last three years of the war, under Gorbachev's, glasnost policy, that the press began to report more accurately on the Afghanistan war.

The Afghanistan War forced the 40th Army to change tactics, equipment, training and force structure. However, despite these changes, the Soviet Army never had enough forces in Afghanistan to win. Initially, the Soviets had underestimated the strength of their enemy. Logistically, they were hard-pressed to maintain a larger force and, even if they could have tripled the size of their force, they probably would still have been unable to win. Often, they could not assemble an entire regiment for combat and had to cobble together forces from various units to create a make-shift regiment. Base-camp, airfield, city and lines of communication (LOC) security tied up most of the motorized rifle forces, but still, the mujahideen constantly interdicted the road and pipelines supplying the Soviet and Afghan forces. The Soviets were never able to completely control their LOCs, although their forces were performing an important international mission. Consequently, they were never able to consistently transport sufficient supplies into the country to support a larger force.50

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Gulf Adventure (1990-91)

The occasion for UN action in the Persian Gulf region arose by early 90s, following a sudden Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, which met with practically no local resistance and led to temporary annexation of the oil-rich kingdom by Baghdad. As usual, such a shocking turn of events stirred world conscience and the UN as the conscience-keeper was immediately activated. The Security Council in a 14 to 1 vote (Yemen against) branded Iraq an aggressor (resolution 660 of August 1990) and imposed all out economic sanctions (Res 661 of 6 August) against it.

Initial reaction of President Saddam Hussain was one of intransigence as he laboured under a misguided impression regarding possible US moves. These were revealed one after another in subsequent sessions of the Security Council. To implement UN measures of sanction, exclusive authority was given to "member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait", in other words US and other western powers who had already got their forces deployed in adjacent areas, earlier in the context of tensions arising from Iran-Iraq and Arab-Israeli confrontations (Res. 665 of 25 August).

The decision finally to use force against a recalcitrant Iraq came with the adoption of Resolution 678 (29 November) authorising the use of "all necessary means" to uphold and implement Security Council resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions." This time as many as 12 members supported the US drafted resolution. Soviet Union included, with China abstaining and only Cuba and Yemen opposing it. This meant two things viz. (a) the UN enforcement action was to be applied through a chosen group of states with special interests in the gulf region and (b) there would be no restraints on the kind of measures these states would themselves like to decide upon.

Action followed with amazing speed. About a dozen resolutions were carried in record time by a highly energized Security Council, between 29th
November '90 and 15th January '91. A massive multinational 'armada' was dispatched by air and sea to roll back the invading Iraqi troops. The mode of operation was also unprecedented. UN combat forces were placed under the command and control of US General Schwarzkopf and Mr. Colin Powell. Armed with teary; artillery and latest missiles and anti-missile devices they not only pushed the Iraqi forces back but entered deep into the sovereign territory of Iraq with round the clock air attacks against Iraqi military installation. No serious attempt was made to take a second chance at peaceful resolution for which signals did come from President Hussain when he was met by the French President and an ex-British Prime Minister and later also by President Gorbachev. Neither was any mid-operation review allowed regarding the admissibility of the punitive actions taken in the name of the UN but actually conducted in accordance with the war plans of the Pentagon codenamed operation "Desert Storm'. There was no questioning if the UN mandate was being exceeded, which indeed it was. After all, the proclaimed US objectives were to shatter Iraq's defense capability, eliminate Saddam from the seat of power and cripple Iraqi economy by choking the commercial outlet of its oil resources. Added to this was the unrelated dimension of Kurd revolt for which again, a strictly monitored "no fly zone" was imposed inside Iraqi territory. Patently, the US has been using the UN mandate to fulfill its own game-plan of power politics in the region where its primary interest has always been to control the vital supply line of oil.

So far as international intervention at the behest of the US is concerned, the UN was virtually 'hijacked'. Although the Security Council legitimized the actions and was still not ready to relent so far as economic sanctions against Iraq were concerned, it was definitely against the true spirit of the UN to make a rather vindictive use of the enforcement measures. It is one thing to punish and undo aggression but it is altogether different to engage in unrestrained violence totally out of proportion with the original offence. Once Iraq agreed to honor all UN resolutions, it was unduly harsh to prolong the economic
sanctions. The use of deadly weapons not only caused untold damages but severely affected the ecological conditions around the Gulf.

The Gulf operations, the latest in UN collective Security activities, have thus unleashed certain forces and given rise to certain tendencies that may not augur well for the world organization. They amounted to recognition of US hegemony and paved the way for what subsequently came to be called a unipolar world. To use the UN in the partisan interest of a big power and its allies without due regard to the limits and legitimacy of the actions taken by them is clearly doing a disservice to its ideals. It would have been defensible if the actions did not go beyond liberation of Kuwait imposition of financial and other penalties on Iraq to compensate for its illegal occupation of Kuwait and general restoration of the regional order.

**UNIKOM: UN Iraq Kuwait Observation Mission 1991 (Continuing)**

Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait on 2nd August '90 attracted immediate UN attention. The Security Council condemned the invasion and demanded unconditional withdrawal. This was followed by imposition of economic sanctions against Iraq with a deadline of 15th January, '91 within which Iraq must comply with all the resolutions of the Security Council. Otherwise member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait were authorized to use "all necessary means" to uphold the Council's resolution and restore international peace and security in the area.

As the deadline passed, armed forces of several states led by USA began air attacks against Iraq and a severe ground offensive. Hostilities were suspended on 27th February, '91 as Iraqi forces had by then, been rolled back. On 3rd April, '91, the Security Council, while still maintaining economic sanctions against Iraq, adopted resolution 687 (1991) which set detailed conditions for a cease-fire and established a machinery for securing implementation of those conditions. Following Iraq's acceptance of the provisions of the resolution, the ceasefire came formally into force.
By the same resolution (687/91) the Council established a demilitarized zone along Iraq-Kuwaiti boundary. A UN Observer Unit (UNIKOM) was posted to monitor the situation on the basis of the plan submitted by the Secretary General and approved by the Security Council (Res. 689/91).

The mandate of the mission was:

(1) to monitor the 40 km. Khawr-Abd Alien Waterway dividing Iraq and Kuwait.
(2) to deter violations of the boundary by constant surveillance of the 200 km DMZ, running 10 km, inside Iraqi territory.

By 6th May, 91, the mission was fully deployed and is still continuing from its HO at Umm Qasr. Initially to provide essential security UNIKOM included five infantry companies. The military observers initially remained unarmed. They would simply engage in ground and air patrol and maintain liaison with the parties. They are to verify that no military personnel and equipments move through the Zone and no fortification or bases are maintained there. UNIKOM is also providing technical support to (i) the Iraq Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission, (ii) transfer of property from Iraq to Kuwait and (iii) relocation of Iraqi citizens on the Kuwaiti side of the border.

Following some reported intrusions in 1993, the UNIKOM was reinforced. An infantry strength of 3 battalion was sanctioned and they were to use force in self defense (S.C. Res. 806 of 5 Feb. 93), two fixed wing aircrafts and some helicopters are at the disposal of the UNIKOM. Participating countries include among others India, China, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

The annual cost of the UNIKOM is approximately S 70 million. Two-thirds of the amount is being paid by Kuwait Government. The remainder comes from assessed contributions of UN members.
Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Harzegovina (March 1992 Continuing)

Reports of serious fighting after Croatia and Slovenia declared themselves independent from Yugoslavia while Serbs living in Croatia opposed this move. Efforts of the European Community to stop the hostilities proved unsuccessful. UN got involved in September 1991 when the Security Council unanimously adopted its resolution 713/91 calling all States to implement a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipments to Yugoslavia."

Cyrus Vance, then US Security of Stale, was appointed by Secretary General Perez de Cuellar as his personal envoy. Lord Carrington, then chairman of the European Community Conferences on Yugoslavia also offered his good offices. The initial purpose was to discuss the feasibility of deploying a UN Peacekeeping Operation. Despite an agreement reached by the Yugoslav parties at a meeting in Geneva, the temporary truce was broken soon after.

On 27th November Security Council resolution 721(91) endorsed the deployment of a UN PKO in Yugoslavia. With a small group of military officers, civilian police and UN Secretariat staff moved to Yugoslavia for maintaining ceasefire. Following a second agreement at Sarajevo between Die UN" Special envoy and the warning factions the new Secretary-General B.B. Ghali sent a group of 50 military liaison officers to promote the conditions of ceasefire. On 25th February, '92, the Security Council by resolution 743/(92) approved the setting up of the UNPROFOR initially for one year and on 7th April authorized full deployment of force (res 749/92).

The operational mandate of UNPROFOR extends to 5 Republics of former Yugoslavia—Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. In Croatia the task was to secure withdrawal of fighters from all Croatia and demilitarization of UN protected areas. By later resolutions of the Security Council, UNPROFOR was also authorized to undertake monitoring functions in the 'pink zones', and control entry of civilians into UN protected areas and
perform immigration and custom functions. On January 25, 1993 a semblance of peace was restored as the Croatian Government and Serb local authorities informed the UNPROFOR that they would withdraw forces.

Then came the turn of Herzegovina and Bosnia. About 100 observers were redeployed, there from Croatia. But by May 92 the situation went almost beyond control as Bosnian Serbs and Muslims intensified their conflict threatening even the lives of the UNPROPOR personnel.

A series of appeals from the Security Council to all countries for a ceasefire proved ineffective. On 30th May, 1992, acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council imposed wide-ranging sanctions on Yugoslavian federal authorities (then located in Serbia and Montenegro) in its resolution 757(92). It demanded cooperation for unimpeded delivery of all humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR also tried to stop fighting around the airport of Sarajevo. Necessary military personnel were also sent by UN to supervise the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons. By early July, UNPROFOR was partly able to achieve its objectives around Sarajevo. Hence by resolution 776(92) the Council called on states to take "necessary measures" to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNPROFOR mandate was, accordingly, expanded to support efforts of the UNHCR to ensure relief supplies and protect convoys of civilian detainees. A no-fly zone was declared in October 92 to ban all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and for strict monitoring of all other flights. Next month, by resolution 787, the Council demanded that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina must stop immediately - evidently in view of the adverse reaction of some Muslim states outside the region. To achieve this Secretary General wanted a larger mandate for UNPROFOR to include the right not only to search but to turn back all provocative military elements as well as confiscate all contraband goods. He wanted some 10,000 additional troops to carry on operations at 123 crossing points on the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
However, the operation to protect humanitarian convoys throughout the territory had been persistently thwarted by obstruction, mines, artillery fire, and total non-cooperation of the Serbs. Violations of no-fly zone were also frequent, although no combat air-mission was detected by NATO AWAC-s until March 1993. Air support coming from NATO members from April 1993 onward with France, UK, USA, Turkey and Netherlands providing aircrafts for the operation somewhat stemmed the deteriorating situation. Simultaneously, Srebrenica, and me area around was declared a 'safe zone' wherefrom the Serb forces had to withdraw their paramilitary forces. Systematic searches were carried on to collect and seize unauthorized weapons and ammunitions.

In his 20th September, 1993 report, the Secretary General admitted that the task was becoming extremely difficult and short of a political solution, the UN mandate was not possible to implement. Air strikes around Sarajevo were also deemed necessary. NATO did the job with amazing enthusiasm. Russia, however, registered its objections to the veiled ultimatum of NATO against Serbs. Ultimately the threat of bombing had some effect. By February 1994, informal consultations resumed, largely due to Russian initiative and the warring sides, particularly the Serbs, agreed to observe cease-fire and comply with the UN directive to withdraw their troops from Bosnia.

Commenting on the overall experience of the UNPROFOR Stanley Meisler, a leading American journalist wrote:

"The UN mission to Bosnia was hapless and star-crossed but not wholly a failure. In 1994, 2,740,000 Bosnians received relief aid. Many lives were saved, and the war did not spread. As the fiftieth anniversary of the UN approached, however, aggression remained unpunished, and peace elusive. The mission and the war had also frayed relations between NATO and the UN, the United States and Europe, the Clinton administration and UN bureaucrats. The gravest error made by Boutros-Ghali was to accept the veto on bombing. That made it difficult for the UN to rationalize its two roles as peace keeper and peace enforcer.... Yet given the nervousness of troop suppliers, France and
Britain and the refusal of the United States to commit soldiers on the grounds, the UN accomplished as much as it could of a confused and limited mandate.\footnote{Meisler Stanley, UN the First Fifty Years (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press), 1995, p.329.}

**UN in Somalian Civil Strife (UNOSOM 1992)**

The power struggle following the ouster of President Siad Barre in January 1991 led to severe clan clashes in different parts of Somalia. Mogadishu, the capital witnessed intense fighting between one faction supporting the interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other supporting General Mohamed Farah Aidid. Infiltration of numerous bandit groups aggravated the situation. The hostilities resulted in widespread casualties, destruction, homelessness, malnutrition and pestilence—killing about 300 thousand people up to 1994.

As political chaos mounted, the UN continued its humanitarian assistance and was later fully engaged in finding out a peaceful solution of the civil strife. The then Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuillar sent visiting team under a senior UN official, Mr James O.C- Jonah in January 1992. Then on the advice of the next Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali the Security Council by resolution 733 of January 23, 1992 urged all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities and imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipments to Somalia. To assist the process of political settlement, the Secretary General convened a meeting of the representatives of LAS, OAU, OIC as well as the contesting factions. The talks succeeded in getting the factions accept a cease fire agreement (3rd March, 1992). It also instituted UN convoys of humanitarian assistance and approved deployment of a few military observers on both sides of Mogadishu. The Security Council also authorized the dispatch of a technical team for monitoring ceasefire (res. 746 of 1992) and set up a UN operation in Somalia (res. 751 of 1992) to run emergency humanitarian assistance. About 500
security personnel were drawn from ten third world countries and placed under Pakistani Brigadier General Imuaz Shaheen. But the UN troops could not tackle the widespread lawlessness and looting of supplies by armed gangs. The UN convoys themselves now required protection. For safe deliveries of relief airlift was also necessary. Hence an enhanced UNOSOM with some 4219 personnel was authorized and a 100-day action programme for accelerated humanitarian assistance was launched to prevent famine, death and deprivation. About S 82 million was requested for implementation of the programme. But the urgent need of the hour was to stop the unabated violence against international relief effort. Hence on 3rd December 1992, the Security Council adopted, unanimously, resolution No. 794 authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment". A 3500-su-ong Task Force was engaged and it successfully secured major population centers. At the same time a national reconciliation meeting was held at Addis Ababa in January and March 1993. Simultaneously, in view of mounting attacks on UN personnel and reported casualties, UNOSOM was endorsed with enforcement powers to monitor cessation of hostilities, prevent resumption of violence, disarm the factions and transfer the weapons to a newly constituted national army (Security Council res. 814 of 1993). End to the hostilities was in sight by middle of the year allowing a two-year transition period to set up a viable structure of civilian administration. In the meantime an operation carried by US Rangers on 3 October 1993 in South Mogadishu tried to capture the Key areas held by General Aidid for his alleged complicity in the June attack on UN personnel. During the course of the operation two US helicopters were shot down by Somalia militiamen and about 18 US soldier had died in the cross fire. This led to the retaliatory attack by US Quick Reaction Force by air, navy and artillery. Finally the forces were withdrawn in March 1994 but Mogadishu remained tense and many African states were unhappy over the bitter end of the conflict.
UN in Cambodian Turmoil (UNTAC)

Cambodia which has gone through bouts of civil war and prolonged instability received UN attention only towards the final phase of its crisis. Ouster of the charismatic left-oriented Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970 by a US-backed military coup led by Loh Not whose dictatorship was replaced by a more ruthless government of the Khmer Rouge, a pro-Chinese guerilla band led by Pol Pot in 1975. Deep scaled public discontent against the terrorist regime occasioned intervention of Vietnamese forces with full Soviet backing, leading to the installation of a moderate communist government headed by Heng Samrin in January 1979. But the die-hard Khmer Rouge elements did not allow peace and stability to return to the country until the legendary prince in self-exile in Beijing agreed to lead a national coalition government which was facilitated by an international initiative under the UN auspices. The Paris Agreement of October 1991 laid the ground work for restoration of peace.

On 28th February, 1992, the Security Council authorised by a unanimous resolution for the establishment of a UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and adoption of necessary measures by the Secretary General for rapid deployment of the forces. A tentative plan for a 15-month long action involving an estimated cost of $2 billion was also approved so that conditions could be created for holding a nationwide election in which parties to the civil war were free to participate once they abjured violence and made complete demobilization as well as surrender of arms.

Evidently it was politically a rather delicate task to try to restore public confidence after about two decades of sporadic warfare and widespread destruction. However, UNTAC with more than 22000 personnel having expertise in human rights, civil and military administration as well as constitutional matters successfully completed its mission under the competent command of the UN Special Representative from Japan. Free and fair elections took place under UNTAC auspices in Spring 1993, law and order was restored, refugees were rehabilitated and displaced persons repatriated. Of course, the
UNTAC failed to achieve complete demobilization due to non-cooperation of the Khmer Rouge on the pretext that all Vietnamese forces had not left Cambodia. Actually the UN needed more time to reach out to the key areas of the Cambodian administration. Nevertheless it successfully repatriated about 3.6 lakh refugees and held a free and fair election in May 1993, although the Khmer Rouge boycotted the election. After the election, the Constituent Assembly proclaimed Sihanouk as Head of the State, with Prince Norodom Ranaridh of FUNCINPEC and Hun Sen of CPP as Co-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers. The Constituent Assembly was also helped by UN experts in drafting the Constitution, especially its human rights provisions. Thus the travails of a small Asian Country were mitigated, thanks to a rather extraordinary intervention by the UN.

The UN Role in Darfur

As a response to the escalating crisis in Darfur, the Security Council, on 30th July 2004, assigned additional tasks to UNAMIS by its resolution 1556 (2004).

Darfur had long experienced localized violence exacerbated by ethnic, economic and political tensions and competition over scarce resources. Beginning in February 2003, attacks on government targets by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and the Government's decision to respond by deploying its national armed forces and mobilizing local militia, took the violence to unprecedented levels. Indiscriminate air bombardment carried out by Sudan's armed forces, accompanied by attacks by the Janjaweed and other militias, left villages across the region razed to the ground. Often during these attacks civilians were murdered, women and girls raped, children abducted and food and water sources destroyed. The cycle of terror inside Darfur also threatened regional peace and security.
At the same time, the United Nations and a collection of non-governmental organizations launched a massive humanitarian operation in Darfur, constantly expanding activities to respond to the needs of an increasing number of people displaced by violence.

In its resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004, the UN Security Council, among other things, reiterated its grave concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis and widespread human rights violations, including continued attacks on civilians. In addition to requesting a monthly report on the Government's implementation of commitments vis-a-vis the Janjaweed militias and their leaders, the Council also requested the Secretary-General to incorporate into the mission contingency planning for the Darfur region, including by assisting the African Union with planning and assessments for its mission in Darfur and by preparing to support the implementation of a future agreement in Darfur in close cooperation with the African Union. Accordingly, the mission initiated such contingency planning.

**Comprehensive Peace Agreement:** On 9th January 2005, in an event that marked a turning point in the history of the Sudan, the Government of the Sudan, represented by Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), represented by Chairman John Garang, signed in Nairobi, Kenya, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA included agreements on outstanding issues remaining after the Machakos Protocol and had provisions on security arrangements, power-sharing in the capital of Khartoum, some autonomy for the south, and more equitable distribution of economic resources, including oil.

Though, the United Nation's initiatives in direction of World Peace has not achieved its goal, but this does not mean that UN is a total failure in this direction. Right from its inception, UN did a commendable job in various conflicts such as Korean crisis, Congo and Lebanon crisis, etc. As per its commitment towards the World Peace, UN has established and running peace-
keeping operations around the world. The United Nations is carrying out more than 60 peace-keeping operations around the world till date.

If we took the positive meaning of peace which include social and economic justice, basic human needs such as food, shelter health and education, United Nations is doing a good job in this direction. The UN charter states that one of the organization's central purpose is to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character. Through a series of high profile international conferences over the last few decades, the UN has shown the spotlight on emerging issues of global concern and helped to propel action to address them globally and nationally. New understandings on the range of issues addressed by global conference ultimately found expression in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted unanimously at the 2000 UN Millenium Assembly. And the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable development in Johannesburg, Sought Africa, brought renewed political attention to sustainable development challenges, including the adoption or reaffirmation by government of a broad range of targets related to water, energy, health, agriculture and biological diversity. The UN is currently finding a growing role for itself in encouraging governments to implement the policy reforms needed to achieve these goals and targets and in tracking their progress along the way.

The UN system has also proved adoptable in the face of new challenges. For instance, as the seriousness of problems such as rapid population growth and environmental degradation become apparent, new institutions like the UN fund for population and the UN Environment Programme were organized. Today the UN is being called on to play a growing role in combating the spread of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

In sum, it is hard to accept the idea that the conventional power political model merely represents the past, the remnants of which linger in the present, whereas the alternative approaches represent the future. We cannot foresee how
much of these new perspectives will materialize, although it would be foolish
to deny that some of them are already making an impact on the operation of the
international system; it is possible that this impact may greatly increase,
although, as has been argued, scarcely leading to an international government.
Consequently only a vague and impressionistic prediction is possible about the
shape of things to come at the end of the century: it seems likely that the
international system will remain pluralistic and untidy, with states continuing
to play a leading though probably increasingly more circumscribed role.