CHAPTER - IV

MEANING OF ARTHA (पर्यायन)

The Indian philosophical systems survey the manifold aspects of language behaviour by which the meaning of names (रूपम्) is understood. To begin with, पञ्चिन, रतन्जलि and कान्तायणम study the nature of रूपम् by means of the correct usages of words (नामम्) which require the etymological study of language. The निमांसा endorses the grammarian viewpoint by saying that the individual words convey no meaning except in the context of syntax. On the other hand, the भायिक्यिकत्वas argue that the isolated word-meanings are very important in understanding the cognitive aspect of language, and even the emotive element (व्याख्यानम्) that possesses socio-cultural import is suitably taken into account.

1. Meaning of Meaning (रूपम्):

The investigation into रूपम् (meaning) presents the way by which words acquire new signification in the light of history. As निमांसा: जालकिर्तर records, the word रूपम् may be used in various senses which comprise the (a) ordinary, (b) religious, (c) ontological and (d) empirical aspects. According to ordinary (लालकित) usage, the word रूपम् means wealth which is based on day to day transactions. The निमांसा stresses the religious (धार्मिक) aspect of रूपम् that facilitates the performance of rites and rituals in accordance with the religious code. The बाल्यिकास like कान्तादि consider that the word रूपम् has its ontological significance.
in that it stands for the pādaarthas (word-meanings) like dravya (substance), lāna (quality), karma (action) etc. In contrast to the Vaiśeṣikas, the Maitreyaṇikas hold that the word ārtīa only denotes the a posteriori aspect which represents the qualities like rasa (water), rūpa (colour), śanda (small), sārpa (touch) and sābda (word) that are apprehended through the sense organs. All these definitions suggest that the variety of usages of ārtīa seem irrelevant to the science of semantics in the strict sense of the term, although these definitions have a profound significance for the philosophy of meaning.

The word ārtīa occupies a very important place in the philosophy of language since meaning is the expression of reality. It gives us only the meanings of elementary units together with the rules that help to construct the sentential forms from them. The elementary unit consist of autonomous words that are definable in terms of semantic concepts which presuppose some factual elements: (a) a pada (word) possesses sākta (function), (b) only a pada has meaning, (c) a śakta pada (a word that has a function) precedes ārtīa, and (d) it points to the referent. Ārtīa can never be equated with word, because a word has linguistic existence whereas meaning has real existence. Nor can it be identified with sākta because if meaning is considered as a function, then word can never be meaningful for sākta is regarded as relation (saṃbandha) in Indian philosophical system, and hence the problem of relating
a rāda with a rūpā that is a relation, remains inexplicable. And
if meaning is different from sākti, then how to relate artha,
sākti, and rāda as distinct relata also is inexplicable. Even
artha is distinct from concrete objects because the object possesses
material existence, but artha has a separate existence. Object
maintains its existential character even if it comes to be the
aim of linguistic knowledge.

The uniqueness of artha consists in the functioning of words
in a language situation which may be called functional. The language
situation contains three factors: (a) sākti (function), (b) sambandha
(relation) and (c) a nāma (referent), that facilitate the phenomenon
of meaning. The words that are devoid of meaning become symbols
of objects signified by them since meaning is a fact in reality,
that possesses psychological, physical and configurative elements.
The elements of individuality (vyaktitva), class-essence (jāti), and
a particular shape (āṣṭi) are present in artha, for, in a given
context, the preponderance of one over the other determines its
factuality. The asāṃyānakas hold that artha is a definite individual
(vyakti) that is characterized by class-essence and a collocation
of configurative elements. Viśvanātha, Dinakari and Dāmarudra define
that the factuality of artha consists only in vyakti which is
characterized by jāti, but its generic shape constitutes only a
part of it, that is not felt separately. Even artha may be the
percept of a particular (vyakti) if its suffix denotes a case-relation
(kāraka), gender (linga) and number (vācana), and so the percept
of *grānti* must be a *vyakti* because only *vyakti* is capable of being qualified by gender and number.

Pancharātri considers that *artem* is *sanāta* (an indivisible linguistic symbol) that signifies a metaphysical element revealed in the form of intuition. The division of words (*pādas*) into nouns, verbs and roots, suffixes and particles are only phenomenal since their class-essence refers to the real element and the individual to the unreal. The absolute meaning of *artem* is real, permanent, omnipotent, and omnipresent which is called *śāśvāt brāhmaṇa*. The Naiyāyikas repudiate the grammarian's thesis by saying that the notion of *saṃta* is a mere metaphysical abstraction which is nothing but a sort of postulation of sounds and a grammatical fiction it must presuppose a cognition of letters and words in a prearranged manner, so that the intellect can interpret a series of sense-elements as a realized product. Unless a *pada* is defined as a linguistic utterance that is a collection of sounds produced by the movements of the speaker's vocal organs, the notion of *artem* remains inexplicable.

Instead, the Naiyāyikas postulate the reality of letters that compose a *pada*, and the reality of *pādas* that make a syntax for the explanation of *artem*. To begin with, the meaning situation may be presented in a rectangle:

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involves the direct relations between A and B, C and D, and B and A which may be called constitutive, conventional, and expressive respectively, whereas that between A and B, C and D, and A and D are always indirect and imputed. The linguistic meaning (artha) is the most fundamental fact of reality in which the ultimate constituents of objects exist and interact with one another. The absolute reality is the ultimate ground of unity that is consistent with the pluriplactic constitution of objects of which existence (satya) and artha are inseparable elements. Artha is the self-expression of reality which is manifested in the specific form of syntax through the word meaning (sabd-artha) relation, since the reality is the grand combination of meanings.

3. Function of Word (saka-Sakti):

The essential nature of sādha (word) lies in possessing sāti (function) by which meaning is communicable to the hearer. The word sāti is defined in terms of sādhabodhi (relation) that exists between a sādha and its artha. The recollection of meaning is necessary only to presuppose the relational function of a word without which the knowledge of sādhabodhi (cognitive meaning) would be impossible. If sāti or the relational function is discarded, then the word sāta (pot) may awaken the recollection of other (ākāśa) through inherence (samavaya). As a consequence, ākāśa becomes the object of verbal comprehension because the recollection of meaning may not be possible by its sakti which is contrary to our experience, for ākāśa cannot be known through linguistic cognition.
It is said that the significance of śabda (relation) consists in its being conditional to both the relata, and if one relatum happens to signify the other in a relational situation, the relation between śabda and artha is to be called vācyā-vācyas-śabda (denoter-denoted relation). It may be described as dharmajñāna śabda (known-known relation) because the knowledge of word is contingent upon the knowledge of its sakti. Even, it may be known as bhayan-bodhāna śabda (combiner-combined relation) since without the knower the thing to be known cannot be discerned. Thus, the saṅgīyikas postulate that the relational function acts as the originator (abhatā) of meanings that are recollected. As Cādiśākha writes, sakti is a kind of vyāpāra (operation) by which artha is directly presented so as to generate words.° Though the knowledge of sakti is an aid in producing the knowledge of word, it acts merely as a vyāpāra that helps the recollection of meaning. But the use of the word vyāpāra in the definition of sakti is not proper, for it undermines the essential nature, and perhaps, Cādiśākha intends to emphasize the functional role that can generate cognitive meaning (abhatābodhā). According to Viśvanātha and Rāmarudra, the relational character of sakti issues from a fundamental maxim that the knowledge of one relatum awakens the knowledge of the other relatum which immediately follows the former. On seeing an elephant-rider, the elephant is immediately recollected because sakti relates the elephant to its rider, and thus, pada-sakti is not abstract but a definite relation that travels from a word to its referent.
The grammarians admit that there are many saktis: (a) 
kr̥-sakti (primary function), (b) tadinīt-śakti (secondary function),
(c) saṃsāra-śakti (function of compound), (d) ekasāra-śakti (residual
function), and saṃsāra-śakti (function of a word that ends in
saṁ-suffix), by which they explain the problem of šabda-arta
relation. The Saṅgyāikas reject the grammarian view by stating
that it is not necessary for šabda, tadinīt, saṃsāra or saṃsāra
words to have separate functions since they come under gartname-
śabdav, and only words can possess śabda, tadinīt or any other suffix.
So t.e.n, roots, suffixes and particles are all meaningful words only
if a meaning element is assigned to them. The Khetoricians, the
mādāsakas, the vedaśins an. the Saṅgyāikas admit that there are
specific saktis in language that are known as : (a) abhidhā-śakti
(primary function), and (b) laṅkā-śakti (implicative function)12
and they even include (c) vaśijñā-śakti (suggestive function) in
its fold. A careful inquiry would reveal that the notion of śakti
plays most profound role in the embodiment of philosophy through
meaningful language units.

3. Primary function of word (Abhidhā-śakti):

According to the Saṅgyāikas, abhidhā-śakti is a direct
relationship that exists between śabda and its arta.13 A śabda
is a collection of sounds which is uttered in actual speech with
a definite phonological pattern, but the notion of arta, being an
objective fact, is an actual entity denoted by it. Abhidhā-śakti
is described in terms of synonyms like mukhya-śakti (principal
function), वैच्छेदक-सक्ति (denotative function) and अभिधेय-सक्ति (significative function) which talk about सक्ति of which the words अभिभ्य, वैच्छेद, and अभिधेय are prefix words. अभिधेय-सक्ति relates सब्द to अर्थ that is directly expressed by सब्द, and it is this सक्ति that is said to exist in word (सब्द) so assemble it for denoting meaning.

The नायायाङ्कन hold that अभिधेय-सक्ति is of three varieties: (a) रुद्र-सक्ति (conventional function), (b) वैध-सक्ति (derivative function), and (c) वैधिक-सक्ति (derivatively conventional function). The (a) रुद्र-सक्ति is defined as that which exists in a word that does not directly relate a word with the etymological meaning (वैधिक), and it means साध्व-सक्ति (collective function) which is independent of वैध-सक्ति. The word अनुष्ठान (cov) possesses conventional function that connects itself to a meaning without recourse to the constitutive notions of देव and मुरिन. People traditionally employ the word अनुष्ठान by relating it to the meaning अनुष्ठान (cov) on the basis, that the custom prevails over precept. To support their contention, the नायायाङ्कन refer to the फांसीन rule that the मति suffix does not possess function, because there is no proof to hold the contrary, and thus, only a single विद्यात्स अभिधेय-सक्ति (qualified primary function) is enough for explaining meaning which is limited by a certain act.

The नाय्याङ्ककान like Jagadisa hold that रुद्र-सक्ति may be of various kinds: (a) नामित्तिक-सक्ति (occasional function),
(b) pārībhāṣaṇa-sakti (technical function), and (c) māndūkikī-sakti (conditional function). 16 Yoge-sakti is that sakti which exists in an occasional name in order to relate itself to the meaning which is limited to the class. Again, when a function, residing in a technical name, connects itself with the meaning by avyaktadharma (non-functional character) which does not exist in the mind, it is known as pārībhāṣaṇa-sakti. In, a function which exists in a conditional name relating itself to the meaning through uḍāṇa (divisible property), is also called as supārībhāṣaṇa-sakti.

According to the saiyāyikā, (c) yoge-sakti (derivative function) is defined as that which directly refers to the constitutive elements of a word although it does not refer to rūḍhi-sakti (conventional function) in any way. The word pācake (cook) is said to possess yoge-sakti in the sense that it is that sakti which relates the word pāca to the meaning 'to cook', and the word pāca to the meaning 'the agent of cooking'. The saiyāyikās also recognize a variety of yoge-sakti as many derivative names as there are. 17 If a verbal root gives rise to the cognitive meaning by means of art (primary) suffix that the root possesses, this kind of function may be known as art-sakti (primary function). Again, when a tadbhāta (secondary) name is formed out of another name by means of secondary suffix that the word possesses, this function would be called tadbhāta-sakti (secondary function).
Lastly, (a) the śāyāyikas think that if a sākti which is determined by the full word taken together is in agreement with the already determined functions, this function may be known as yogikā-rūdhya-sākti (derivatively conventional function). Sometimes, both the functions are present in a certain context in which the conventional one seems to obstruct the constitutive, and in that case, the conventional function may be known as the obstructing function which sublates the latter.

Some śāyāyikas hold that there is yogikā-rūdhya-sākti (derivative-conventional function) in which both sūtra and rūdhya independently work together. The conventional function neither entails, nor obstructs the constitutive function, but the whole word becomes related to the meaning through either constitutive or conventional function whichever is convenient. It is found that the conventional function is entirely dependent on the acceptance of the function of a full word over a long period of time, while the constitutive function resorts to the constitutive functions of root, suffix and particle etc. Thus, yogikā-rūdhya-sākti is partly constitutive and partly conventional where the latter is important although the former acts as an adjective, and hence yogikā-rūdhya-sākti is of a peculiar kind where both the functions can have the independent employment in language.

Philosophers say that sakti is a sambandha (relation) that is distinct from both word and meaning, though sakti occupies an intermediate position between them. Word and meanings are not the
objects of will (icona), but of cognition since icchā cannot be their locus. Some grammarians write,  sakti is a qualification that appears in the denoter-denoted form. The Saṃkhyāins say that this qualified form cannot explain the exact nature of  sakti because when  sakti produces an effect, it becomes itself determined if  sakti is present in one relation so as to manifest the other relatum, and if the manifested is not connected to the manifest, then that relatum will never be manifested in spite of the presence of  sakti. Even, there is no proof to hold that the manifestor possesses  sakti for manifesting an object through its connection with the latter. Shāntipariṇī tries to equate the essential character of a word with its  sakti i.e., can be found in upādhyāya-vasādakabhāva (assister-assisted relation). It amounts to saying that  sakti is identical with gāmbhandha which, as Nāgāraja describes, is a relation that exists between the denoter and denoted (vācya-vācaka).

The rhetorician hold that  sakti is sākṣeta for it has the capacity of upakara (assistance). Though a word is different from meaning, they appear to be abheda (identical) by means of sākṣeta since sākṣeta is mutual imposition of word over meaning, having a relative difference. As Mādhava writes, abheda-sāmbhandha may be known as yogyata because yogyata that is found in sāmbandha is nothing but yogyata towards yogyata. For the grammarians, abheda-sāmbhandha (or adhyāsa) can associate a word with a meaning since a word is invariably connected with quality and action. Since every object of cognition is apprehended along with the concomitant
vori, the latter is regarded as its element. The brahmatises
constitute a metaphysical superstructure that an erases their
mutual merger because the word-essence (vākśe) is the ultimate
cause of nomenclature. As a consequence, the merger of two distinct
entities becomes unreal due to the illusion, imposition of sabda
over artha, because the potency of words conjures the fictitious
objects without any external reality.

The Naiṣadic point out that the external world is as much
real as the word-essence it, and even the dream is also objectively
valid.23 There cannot be any adhyāsa or ēropā (imposition) if
sabda and artha are dissimilar in kind and quality. Even, their
placement is not logically warranted, because it cannot be cognized by
identical sense organs. Further, there is no proof to hold that
there is any similarity or any transfer of one's attribute to the
other, since if one is removed from the other in space, the transfer
becomes impossible.

According to Kumārila, the cognition of the thing-in-itself
is undetermined for it is due to the nomenclature prior to any
knowledge of relation that exists between them.24 Moreover, the
word adhyāsa (imposition) presupposes a real difference between the
superimposed and the locus of superimposition since the word,
cognition, and its content are felt as entirely different. When
a sabda is felt as a cluster of sound-units, its meaning may be
cognized as an individual which possesses a definite arrangement of
of part, though their cognition becomes a flawless conscious unit which has an inherent illumination of its own.

The Vaisékiyas may point out that there is a vyáti (invariable concomitance) in the form that, wherever there is sābda there is artha, by which the problem can be explained. For to them, the idea conveyed by a sābda is a class which gives rise to the cognition of universal meaning, the śāntika and śvyā do not admit this view by stating that it does not escape the fallacy of petitio principii, i.e., if the word s (cow) becomes a sābda (subject) as well as nitya (cause) of inference where the meaning is sādhyā (probandum), then the sādhyā involves s (cow) as a part of the premise.

The Śākhāyikas might say that the relation sāvyāya (conjunction) cannot explain the nature of sākṣi, as it does not specify what could be the relation between pāka and sāṃkṣa. It is not even sāmyāya (inherence) because they are not of the nature of whole and part, dāti and vyākṛti. Either abhidhiyāsa (conventionality) can explain it, since it presupposes the very thing to be inferred; and it is not even daśika (spatial) and sālikā (temporal) relations because they cannot associate a sābda with artha for the spatio-temporal concomitance is not possible between them without the presence of artha. The sābda-artha relation is purely linguistic since it can never be explained by any extra-linguistic device.

Therefore, abhidhiśākṛti (primary function) is only the auxiliary cause of sādhibodha because it helps to give rise a knowledge. Some Sākhāyikas define that abhidhiśākṛti is a relation which exists
between a word and a meaning. Anahāra chātra seek to carry further the definition of Visvānātha by emphasizing that it is the anabhāvikā sakti (comprehensial function) which induces a particular sābda in order to produce sāddabodha.27 The word smṛtyānuśāla (favourable for recollection) has a profound significance in the definition of anabhāvikā sakti since it stands for pravajakātya (stimulator) which acts as a sābda-artha relation.

4. Ontological Significance of Function of Words:

The problem of the ontological import of sakti is bound up with the problem whether sakti is nītya (eternal), apaurneṣa (impersonal) or śāyika (conventional). To begin with, the school of Bhasha propounds a naturalistic theory that sakti exists in vācyā (denotational) so as to produce the notion of a thing, and it becomes a factor in knowledge that stands in need of intellection. As nātyānyāna holds, the sābda-artha relation is nītya understood from popular usage (vācyā-nātyā) which makes the cognition possible by presupposing sakti.28 According to Guḍatōji and Kāśhana sakti is a natural form of bodhisattvā or vācyā-vācana (denotational) relation which resides both the relate respectively.29 For the grammarians, a sābda possesses a natural sakti for conveying a meaning, which is nothing but nītya abheda sambandha (eternal relation of identity) that is definable in terms of innate capacity.

The Pīnācāra does not take interest in seeking its ultimate origin since the history of language traces back to a period in human
society at which time society without language is inconceivable.

So then, sakti is pramordial, self-existent and original which exists in each sākṣī as a natural potency. As Ārkaśāratī Viśra observes, sakti is intrinsic in causality itself, not given from outside, and not shaken by any external force. For Gābrih, sakti is a noner-named relation, nītya and aparama because word and what is denoted by it are nītya. The Ārkaśāratī school seems to maintain the same view by saying that sakti is an inherent significative function which explains all phenomena of verbal expression.

According to Gābrih, sakti is an eternal primary relation since it is a corollary of what is denoted by words i.e., a class-character. He questions the bonafide of convention that, if sakti is a conventional relation then it must fulfill three conditions: 31 (a) Convention for the benefit of each man, (b) the setting of convention at each time of pronunciation, and (c) the setting of convention by god for all times. None of these conditions sakti can fulfill because it is not artificial since its idea of being different is contrary to our experience. Further, a single pronunciation can never fix for all time the convention of word and meaning for there is no beginning, on creation of the world, and no god who could set up convention. All these prove that sakti has a separate categorial existence because sakti is not a dravya for guṇa do not inher in it, and sakti is also not
a *guna* and *sāyāna* which exist in a class and other *catālokā*. The *vaiśeṣika* view by holding that *sakti* is a word-meaning relation for in the final view of the *vaiśeṣika*, whatever the natural expressive relation (*sakti*) may exist in causes, it must occasion the effect.

The *sāyānikas* do not accept the naturalistic theory by saying that it is only use (*pravṛtti*), that determines the ultimate origin of *sakti*. They approve the view of the *vimśita* and *vaiśeṣika* in order to maintain the sanctity of the Vedic language and culture, but they differ from them by admitting a realistic approach towards language and philosophy. It is an undeniable fact that *sāda* is produced by a little human effort in breathing out air through larynx, which can sufficiently prove that *sakti* is *anitya* (non-eternal) relation. As Gautama writes, the relation of *sāda* and *artha* is understood only by conventional significance i.e., *gāndharva* (time bound). Accordingly *Śridhara* also explains that if *sakti* resides in *vācya* (denoted) in accordance with the nature of a thing, the inexperienced man may understand *artha* just as the experienced understands, because there are *pada*, *artha* and their relation.

*Udājotara* attacks the eternalistic theory by stating that if *sakti* is *svabhāvika* (natural) and *nitya* (eternal), then the simple utterance of the word *purāṇa* (fill) would fill our mouth, and if it possesses a *svabhāvika* relation with *artha* then the same
word should relate the same artha everywhere, but it is not the case. Sivaditya also rejects the categorial treatment of sakti on the ground that sakti only reveals the nature of a referent. Even, to accept sakti as a category necessitates each artha as its object so that lotus, lily, tree, cistema etc., may enjoy independent existences which might involve the multiplicity of sakta.

The sahyayikas expound the conventional theory that words have fixed association in language admitting no interference, though association is subject to gradual recognition. The vaises-gikas also consider that intellection is the objective fundament of denotation since it is brought about by grown-up people as proficiency in language. Proficiency in language produces artha by the intermediate impression so that padatva (wordness) can act as the innate fitness, whereas the adventitious fitness constitutes its convention.

According to the sahyayikas, a particular sabda as connected to a definite artha is contingent upon external factors that are responsible for the starting of association. Association traces back the time when the first men communicated artha and embodied the entire fact of knowledge through language. The nyaya holds that association is purely sahyayika (conventional) being established by God, and that this conventional relation is dependent on isvara (will of Lord) such that so and so sabda should signify so and soarthas. However, the association is the eternal expression of his is Bair and isparya, and each sabda becomes
efficacious for conveying a distinct artha because of his bestowal of sakti. That is eternally associated with sabda is artha since it depends upon the eternal will of god, and it implies that language too is creation which is given to man for exploring his will.

According to the savya vaiyayikas, the notion of sakti suggests a fundamental metaphysical position with regard to the nature of causation. Being an eternal agent, god associates sabda with artha by his will i.e., sakti is neither inherent in sabda nor in artha; but being external to both sakti can unite them through temporal relations, which reflected in supreme causation. The later vaiyayikas contend that the god-made convention may be questionable because many words and languages are uncreated that do not depend on isvareccha before their addition to language. It is not that sakti is isvareccha, since it isvareccha does not exist in artha, then why should it reside in sabda at all? Though isvareccha is the cause of sabda as well as artha, yet none of them can be the object of isvareccha because the object of isvareccha is their cognition. There may be non-eternal relation between them, which is the effect of manugreccha i.e., man-made convention in course of time which may be known as paribhasa. The notion of paribhasa can be found even in Bhartihari when he says that sakti is of two kinds: (a) ajaniaka (eternal) and (b) adhunikas (modern of which the former refers to the nitya (eternal) relation whereas the latter to the saitya (non-eternal) and paribhasika relation.
Some haivyayin deny this paribhāṣāka relation because though two kinds of words may be named separately, yet no difference can be found in their sakti for denoting particular meanings, for one word is of human while the other of divine origin. As Nīmaśārya Shālikar records, when the father names his child in accordance with the scripture, the divine will dictate the father's will so as to maintain the divine supremacy which certifies the paribhāṣāka relation as a form of divine convention. But the acceptance of icchā alone seems to be the answer to the problem since icchā is the cause of sakti whether it is of human or divine.

According to Jagadīśa, samayika usage is the starting point of language and sābda-artha relation. The elders use sābda in association with artha in the presence of youngsters so that the latter understands sakti as set by convention, which comes through associations. The whole setup of wont involves some psychological factors so much so that the namer's icchā directs a sābda for denoting a particular artha. Āśvavajña seems to emphasize the temporal element of icchā, that exerts force to the conventional aspect of sakti. Though icchā is wrongly identified with samaya, (convention), it may not imply samaya although the latter implies the former. So will or intention is interlaced with convention only as a stimulating factor when convention becomes the instrument for carrying out the command of icchā. The psychological factors like the necessity of communication, choice and deliberation etc.,
may fall in the domain of the namers' icchā which plays a dominant role through convention by relating sabda with artha. Thus, the language conditions:

(a) icchā (samaya)
(b) icchā (~ samaya)
(c) samaya (~ icchā)
(d) (~ samaya) (~ icchā)

can determine the justification of the language game. It may exhibit that the conditions (a) and (c) validate the eternal and permanent starting of language, whereas the condition (b) supplies the basis of the man-made technical relation, and the condition (d) implicitly justifies the divine starting of language by negative human origin.

5. Knowing of Meaning (Sāntipraha):

The Savaya Saivayikas like Laksmīdevī, Kṛṣṇakānta, Śaṅbhaḍa, Viśvaṅgha and Vinayakari maintain that vyakarana (grammar), upamāna (analogy), kosa (dictionary), aptavāya (trustworthy sentence), vyavahāra (usage), vākyasāsa (supplementative), vivṛti (interpretation) and siddhapada (famous word) constitute the means of knowing artha and its relation to sabda. To begin with, some say that vyakarana or the grammatical study of language is the most effective means of knowing artha. To them, the significance of grammar can be derived from two facts: (a) without grammar the elders cannot employ meaningful words in language, and (b) the different ways of knowing presuppose grammar in one form or other,
and so grammar occupies a significant place in the field of semantics.

In contrast to this, Sañgëśa Bhatta, Kātyāyana, Jagadīśa and Kanahādira consider that vyavāhāra (popular usage) is the most effective way of knowing artña. They think that the learner may not understand the niceties of prakṛti, prayyāya and nipāta etc., and thus, the problem whether vyākaraṇa or vyavāhāra is the most effective means of knowing is to be solved only by practical consideration. It is true that the learner may not follow the ways of upanāna, vivṛti, kosa and siddhyapadānānādhyā because they presuppose the knowledge of sakti, and therefore they do not rouse any practical interest in him.

According to the Sañjñayikas, (4) vyavāhāra (usage) is defined as a natural method that one cannot guess how a word functions, but one has to look at its use in language.* When an elder commands

* The similar conception of use of words in language can be found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Opening section, p. 2: "When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. This intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movements of the other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified, and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires."
vamanaya (bring a cow) to another who in turn acts likewise, the onlooker looks at the use and reflects that the cow-bringing-act is the result of prayika (effort) which is denoted by words.*

For the śrabākaṇas, vyavahāra is understood only from a syntax which occurs in imperative mood since the vidhālinī (imperative) suffix directly expressed the commendatory activity. 44 The onlooker understands that kārya-depth (knowledge of activity) of the cow-bringing-act is extraordinary in character, so that the knowledge of activity as a function is correlated with the same which exists in the causal substrate, being itself correlated with activity. As Kāmārīya observes, vyavahāra means three things: (a) a perception of a śabda along with the material object that is experienced by the person, (b) the deduction of artha and its relation to words from the listerner's activity, and (c) the postulation of sakti. 45 In order to refute the Pīmāṇa view, the Naiyāyikas deny sakti as connected to kriya (action) because there is no uniform presence of kārya in all cases, and the derivability of sakti which is connected to kārya may imply the dissociation of kārya itself. 46 Even some grammarians hold that the linguistic usage may produce certain behaviour by which śabda-artha relation is understood, which supports the viewpoint of the Naiyāyikas.

According to the Naiyāyikas, (B) upamāna (analogy) is only complimentary to vyavahāra since upamāna is defined as the

* This is exactly the elementary process involved in uttering simple speech forms with strikingly apparent and much repeated practical emphasis upon the relevant features of a situation, what Leonard Bloomfield calls 'demonstration' - Linguistic Aspects of Science, International Encyclopedia of unified Science, Vol.1, Nos.1-5, n. 257.
consequence of *vyāhāra* (operation) that helps to recollect the meaning of sentence. What is known by *upāśma* is *upaśāti* which consists of identifying an unknown concept with an actual object.

One can analyze the process as follows: (a) the listener hears a sentence that a *kṛṣṇa* (wild ox) resembles *ga* (go), (b) he accepts the authority of the speaker, and (c) understands its *sakti* when he says that *kṛṣṇa* is similar to *ga*. After perceiving *kṛṣṇa*, the listener ascertains its resemblance to *ga*, which acts as *kṛṣṇa* (instrument), and (d) it works as an aid to *vyāpāra* which recalls the meaning of sentence already known. Lastly, (e) all these prove that the listener ascribes *kṛṣṇa* as the meaning of the word *kṛṣṇa*, because it is similar to *ga*, that is limited by *kṛṣṇatva* (wild oxness).

The *kṛṣṭiyākṣas* hold that (g) *vyākaraṇa* is an effective mean of knowing *ārtha* since it lays down rules for determining *ārtha* of roots, suffixes and particles etc. Since *ārtha* can be obtained from the functions of root and suffix, the root *bhū* means 'to be' in present tense and *lāt-vibhāgti*, whereas the word *pācaka* (cook) means one who cooks. As *Pāli* says, the *tīna-vibhāgti* denotes the *karta* (agent) by the relation of identity, but not by *kṛti* (effort), because if it means *kṛti* then the agent may not be expressible. But it is not the case, for no name can be used without any *kāraka* (case) which must be expressed by a *vibhāgti*. If it is not signified by *ti*, then the case of the agent must be instrumental; and it implies a virtual contradiction of the earlier rule,
and if it be a case, then the apprenclusion of vacane (number) also becomes impossible.

The Saävyayikas do not admit the grammarian view by admitting that karī is the special feature of karta and as karī differs from agent to agent, so it only multiplies the number. To remove the multiplicity, Visvanāth holds that karī should be the meaning of the ten-fold suffixes so that a particular karī can participate in ārtī (effortness) which is its class.48 Further, the instrumental case might occur only if the agent's number does not find a place in it, and not otherwise.49 For Visvanāth, karī as the meaning of the suffix is multifarious like kala and vacane because only the things that are circumscribed by the number of agent's can admit the instrumental case. Here Visvanāth states two rules: (a) karmatvavyayantaruddhy (non-obstruction of object-relation) and (b) pratamantapadopaddhy (the presence of a word that has first case-ending) which can express number as well as agent.50

The phrase karmatvyayanantaravīsagata (that are not circumscribed by bīma objects) is said to determine the thing in question which does not refer to any description (vīsagata). The thing in question only characterises karta by pratamaśabkati that determines the number of agent and so the meaning of the first rule is not an extra-description besides the meaning of a verbal root. The sentence caitra eva maitra gacchati (Maitra goes like Caitra) shows that the word caitra cannot have agnostic connection with the number of vibhakti, for the meaning of caitra is not expressed by a verbal root as the description of something else.
The Śāṅkaraśāstra may argue that ārti is only a viṣṇāra for the meaning of ten-fold suffix is not ārti, since it cannot be found in inanimate objects. The Śāṅkaraśāstra say that, that which is a viṣṇāra is only ārti connected to ārtitvā.\(^{51}\) It may imply ārāya (substratumness) of the operational activity whereas the verbal suffix can denote only ārāya by laksana. \(^{52}\) The Śāṅkaraśāstra mean to say is that the usage of words in language conforms to the grammar of that language, since grammar controls the use of meaningful language.

For the Śāṅkaraśāstra and the grammarians, \(^{53}\) a kosas (dictionary) tell us that the word āvāṣa (white) is with regard to white colour in accordance with masculine gender, since āvāṣa points to what is denoted by white colour.\(^{54}\) As Viśvanāth observes, for the sake of simplicity, ādti is with regard to white colour alone, while it refers to what is possessed by āvāṣa through laksana, only if these are sanctioned by popular usage.\(^{55}\)

According to the Śāṅkaraśāstra, \(^{56}\) a āvyārti (interpretation) is distinct from description and naturalistic explanation that may involve the notion of synonymity. The process of interpretation requires four things: (a) two bodies of discourses, (b) a person who understands only one discourse, (c) a person who understands both discourses, and (d) the interpretation. Āvyārti can point to meaning as understood from a commentary which gives the synonyms of word by describing meaning in doubtful cases. As Viśvanāth
writes, the verb pacati (is cooking) can be better understood only if a syntax pūkam saroti (is doing cooking) is supplied instead of pacati, because the suffix ti is with regard to ātī of the agent, which is connected to meaning by interpretation. 

According to the Māyāyikas, (a) siddhasāndhādhiya (meaning of famous words) is also a means of knowing of arthā for an already known sādha in syntactic li, related to famous words by sāndhāya (continuity). As Śāṅkara Śaṅkikār records, though the meaning of pīkā (cuckoo) is absent earlier, yet it is apprehended as kākāla (cuckoo) because the sweet-sāngīnā, sentiment is correlated to other words by the relation of continuity.

Sautaka holds that (c) arthā is also understood from meaningful words which are employed in sentence by authoritative persons, which means āptavāsa (trustworthy statements). It involves a conscious deliberation, facial expression, play of eye, bodily movement and the tone of voice that can explain the states of mind in seeking or rejecting something.

Lastly, the Māyāyikas admit that (a) vābyāṣeṣa (supplementation) can also explain arthā only in doubtful cases where the remnant (sāṣa) should be taken as a clue. When two groups of people use yava (barley) (a) as dirphasūka (a longawn seed) and (b) kauṣu (a panic seed), it is this supplementary statement which can explain that yava flourishes when all grains loose their leaves in spring.
Thus, it may be said that the contextual factors like upādeśa (purpose), viśaya (subject), līṅga (mark), adhikārya (propriety) and kāla (time) can also determine artha. Even, the method of saṃyoga (conjunction), viprayoga (disjunction), saṃcāraya (coexistence), virodha (contradiction), a kāna (place), saṃbhāraya (nearness of other words), saṃpratya (capacity) deśa (space), grammatical vyakti (gender) and anuvāra (accent) should be given due importance. All these factors may suggest that artha is understood in three broadways: (a) grammatical context, (b) verbal context, and (c) situational context which decide the use of word or sentence in direct or implicative senses.

5. Global Aspect of Language:

The sāṃkhyakāvat attempt to explain the factuality of artha which can be better understood by contrasting their views with that of the Jainas, īmāsakas and grammarians. To begin with, the Jainas believe that the conjunction of akṛti (shapes or forms) can differentiate one artha from another since what is denoted by a sabda is a definite akṛti of a vyakti (individual). They hold that akṛti is of two kinds: (a) tiryag (vertical) and (b) ardha (horizontal) which are universals. The former consists in uniformity of content that exists in vyakti, but the latter in the uniformity of pattern. Though akṛtis are present in all vyaktis, they are perishable at their destruction since they do not exist without any content.
The Nyāyaśāṅkya do not accept the viewpoint of the Jains because, as Vaiśeṣika says, a word is qualified by jāti (class) only if it is related to jāti. Yet the disposition of jāti does not relate to jāti at all for it only multiplies the unnecessary assumptions. A figure being made up of jāti may differ in each case, and even jāti by itself is not sufficient to produce sakti since though a model has a sakti, yet it cannot be regarded as a vyakti. 57

According to the Saṅghaśāṅkyaśāstra, the factuality of sakti consists only in vyakti, but not in jāti. 56 They argue that a jāti refers to vyakti because the import of gatī declares vyakti in its entirety, and the syntactic construction with case and verbal root is understood only with reference to a vyakti. The Saṅghaśāṅkyaśāstra derive the notion of vyakti from the principle of individuation that the material content along with a vyakti manifests an object only when a vyakti is made up of limited dimensions. The reference of the vyakti-theory can be found in the works of Vaiśeṣika when he asserts that, if jāti occurs in infinite vyaktis, then it cannot signify any singular object. It implies that if jāti is shown in one vyakti, it would certainly involve the cognition of infinite vyaktis which is against our experience. 59 Vaiśeṣika refers to the Paninian rule that, when a word recalls a single vyakti by the natural law, the repetition of phonetically self-same word does not necessarily denote the plurality of vyaktis. Even jāti is not directly connected to vocana (number) and līṅga (gender) which
invariably correspond to archa, since the attributes car, jati, \( \text{ṣakti} \), \( \text{vyakti} \), and \( \text{vilā} \) are inherent in the locus by means of co-existence.

Some later \( \text{śāyānas} \) support the views of \( \text{vyādi} \) and the \( \text{Śrāvyās} \) by saying that the percept of a \( \text{vyakti} \) is artha.

Where a nominal suffix is given, regard to number and gender, there case and verbal root signify \( \text{vyakti} \) as meaning, for it is qualified by number and gender. As \( \text{Śrāvyāna} \) holds, if the cognition of plurality is simply due to the extension of \( \text{vyakti} \), then arthas may cover the entire \( \text{vyakti} \). Some of the \( \text{Śrāvyānas} \) agree with the \( \text{Śrāvyānas} \) and the \( \text{Advaitins} \) in that, though they recognize the element of \( \text{vyakti} \) in artha, yet \( \text{vyakti} \) is not the whole of meaning. As \( \text{Pāṇḍaracārya} \) observes, if a word means only a single individual, there occurs the fault of wandering away from the proper subject, in equally expressing others which it should not include.\(^6\)

If it means the infinite individuals, then it would bring the endless variety of meaning, and so it becomes indefinite which goes against our experience.

According to the \( \text{Śaṅkara school} \), the view does not hold good because either all individuals or the entire aggregate or a single individual should be conveyed by words.\(^6\) All independent \( \text{vyaktis} \) are not arthas since they are transient that may have manifold functions. Even it is very difficult to perform any sacrificial rite with all the individuals, for it is not possible to use the
singular and dual numbers. Furthermore, if it necessitates an aggregate apart from them without dual or plural numbers, then the aggregate of all individuals would be impracticable. Even more, if one individual is signified by a word, it cannot be the sole meaning because the notion of common character, plural or dual number, this or that individual would not be possible.

According to Kumāraśīla, what is signified by a word is only a jāti that exists in many vyakti because it is recognized before vyākhyāta is known. As the cognition of a word implies the cognition of jāti, the meaning of vyākhyāta (verbal suffix) relates to prakṛti (root) by means of evātā (substratum). For the Kumāraśīlaite, visyata (objectness) that exists in jāti is invariably related to vyākhyāta that exists in vyayati. If jāti occupies an adjectival position in cognition, it need not be further conditioned since jāti is an adjunct which is due to visyata. Even the apperceptive cognition of aśaḥ gotväna jātāmi (I know cow by cowness) shows that there is no jāti as avacchinna (limited), and if it requires a condition by avacchinna (noninherence) relations then it might lead to infinite regress. The syntax kalo saha (time is cow) can also prove that gotya (cowness) is subsidiary by inherence relation without any gotvatva (cownessness), and if gotya is limited by gotvatva through kalika (temporal) relations, there does not arise any cognition at all. Otherwise, the cognition
According to the philosophers, the word यथा (verbal cognition) in which यथा means जैत्य because यथा can be understood by लक्षणो में नाम विशेषता (universal characteristics). However, the kindred do not regard it as absolute reality. To distinguish यथा from जैत्य, they contend that जैत्य is a shifting factor. Therefore the kindred do not regard it as absolute reality.  

It is possible to signify यथा by लक्षण (universal characteristics) only in a sense that since यथा are many, it is necessary to mark them by लक्षण (universal characteristics). If यथा are many, it is necessary to mark them by लक्षण (universal characteristics). If यथा are many, it is necessary to mark them by लक्षण (universal characteristics). If यथा are many, it is necessary to mark them by लक्षण (universal characteristics). If यथा are many, it is necessary to mark them by लक्षण (universal characteristics). If यथा are many, it is necessary to mark them by लक्षण (universal characteristics). If यथा are many, it is necessary to mark them by लक्षण (universal characteristics).
(cow individual) is the main and gōtva (cowness) is the subsidiary since the cow gō is known to have gōtva as jāti. Jāti (individual) occurs in cognition only by virtue of its being an object of some knowledge where jāti is also an object. Since the Brāhmaṇas do not advocate any visiṣṭaśakti (qualified function) in knowledge, they seek to define upadānśaktiyatyaḥ (being the function of the "one", gō) in such a way that the co-Individual cannot enjoy the same position of being an object as jāti enjoys. They apply the law of parsimony that the cognition of jātisākti is the cause of gāthāphala, and not the cognition of vyākti, though the individual possesses a jāti. And in this, ātma (self) is not an object of upadānśakti (word-function), and therefore it does not occur in the order of causality (āranyakapāṭhavacchedada).³⁹

It may be said that just as in verbal cognition, the knowledge of ṣaeva (wild ox) may be possible by means of gōtva since ṣaeva is an individual instantiation of the class gō. Similarly, in verbal cognition the knowledge of gō may also be possible by means of ṣaeva (substance) because gō is regarded as a substance. This view is not acceptable to the Brāhmaṇas because, in verbal cognition, the adjunct gōtva is connected to the qualificand gō by means of samavēya (inherence). And this samavēyasāmbandha, according to them, stands for vīṣeṣyatāvacchedakasāmbandha (the relation of qualificandness) by which a prakara (an adjunct) is
related to a *visé{sya* (qualificand). It means that when a word gives rise to a *sâdhabodha*, in which *ot\(\)va* is a *prakāra* and *\(\)o* is a *visé{sya*, there occur two kinds of *kāryakārmanabhṅva* (causality): (a) one where verbal cognition includes corness as an adjunct and corn as a qualificand (*\(\)otvapra*kāraka*\|*visé{sya*\(yaka*\(\)sâdhabodha*); and (b) the other where verbal cognition includes the cow as a qualificand and corness as an adjunct (*\(\)ovisé{sya*\(yaka*\)\|*otvapra*kāraka\|sâdhabodha*). To the *Ara*\(\)bhākāras, since there is no rigid rule for preferring either, so towards *ot\(\)vásâbdu\(\)tvā* *acchinama* (the delimited cognition of corness) both *ot\(\)va* and *ot\(\)vat\(\)ikt\(\)i\(\)kāna* (the cognition of corness as a function) are to be accepted as independent causes of verbal cognition.70

*Strictly speaking*, *sâdhabodha* or *\(\)o* cannot preclude the experience of *govi\(\)nāti* that are already perished, and that are yet to be born, though the *jātī* (corness) cannot exist in them, hence the *Ara*\(\)bhākāras apply a rule, that a *vyakti* becomes an object of knowledge only when both *jātī* and *vyakti* are the objects of one and the same knowledge (*tuly'\(\)vyaktibodhyanīyama*). So towards the *sâdhabodha* of *ot\(\)va*, the knowledge of *ot\(\)vâ\(\)k\(\)t\(\)i\(\)k\(\)i\(\)kā* alone would be the cause, and not *ot\(\)va*. However, in this cognition of *ot\(\)va*, *gavāya* (wild-ox) does not come in as a qualificand since there is no evidence like perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*) that might bring *gavāya* in *sâdhabodha*.71 In the perceptual cognition like *avyakṣa*
(this is a cow) the pure cowness (suddhagotva) is felt as subsidiary and unlimited (niravacchhinna), and so is the case of cow-sensation (1 know cow by cowness). Thus, there is every possibility of violating the rule: the subsidiary and unlimited objectness of cowness is limited by the main objectness of the cow-individual which possesses cowness by the relation of inherence (niravacchinnaparakārataya samavayaḥ antivisesyataṁ ātāya tvaṇyaṁ). The Prabhākaraśātras obviate this difficulty by saying that the cognition of cow-sensation does not occur in verbal cognition, but only in perception. And even, it is not possible to cognize the pure cowness (suddhagotva) as an object without cow because cow is the qualification which is to be understood only by means of laksāna (implication).

Thus, when there is no sādabodha of pure gotva which is subsidiary without any cow-sensation in the main, there we have to admit a rule: when the objectness of gotva is a subsidiary, towards sādabodha which has no limiting adjunct, there the subsidiary objectness of gotva becomes conditioned by the main objectness of cow-sensation. On this view, the cognition of cow-sensation which is understood as a cow-variety does not violate the rule, since there is no such knowledge like illusion (bhrama).?2 Therefore, for the Prabhākaraśātras, the rule includes three things: (a) that the vissayata (qualification) should be in the form of a prakārā (adjunct), (b) the prakārata must be a niravacchhinna (unlimited), and (c) that the cognition must be a verbal one.
The *jayya-naiyayikas* like *Jagadisa* criticize the *jāti* theory by stating that the act of *vyakti* has inextricably bound up with *jāti*, and even to imagine a syntactic act like *pratijāti* (is seeing) which is connected to *adhyātma* it to posit an absurdity. Moreover, *jāti* cannot possess an act of *vyakti* since *jātāvaya* (connessness) is absent, and that which relates to *jāti* (conness) by inference may not relate a *vyakti* at all. If *vyakti* as an act is related to the probandum (conness) sometimes by (a) *svārayavrtti* (the relation of self-substratum), and sometimes by (b) *bālayāvrtti* (inherence), then it submits to inferential fallacy.

According to the *naiyāyikas*, *Bīkara's* resort to *arthā-pāṭti* (extension) is not at all plausible because verbal knowledge is opposed to *arthā-pāṭti*, since it is not possible to recognize an individual. The viewpoint of *Andana* (division) is also not acceptable because there is no usage where a *jāti* is regarded as meaning without any *vyakti*, and hence it is impossible to admit *laksāna* in order to signify a *vyakti* in which *jāti* exists as a *prakāra*. Further, the usage *gorayamabha* (a cow is different from a buffalo) shows that *vyakti* as well as *jāti* are directly related to a certain *avadhātva* (boundary), and therefore, he seems to admit (a) *sakti*, and (b) *laksāna* simultaneously that may go against the thesis itself.
As against the Prabhakaras, the Naiyayikas hold that if the word **_Gotvā_** (cowness with a _jāti_) is taken as _gotvā-samārthyanātva_ (the possibility of being cowness), then it would not be possible to know _jāti_ before the cognition arises, since _jāti_ is established afterward. Again, _gotvā-samārthyanātva_ cannot be accepted as a separate category like _abhidāna_ because there is no authority to admit such _abhidāna_ at all. Further, _gotvā-samārthyanātva_ also cannot mean _gotvā-nubhavajanaśāntvānātva_ (being a cause by which cowness is experienced), for the word _pāta_ (cloth) may also become a cause towards _sāmūhī-jana_ (a cognition of a group of independent objects as its content) in which _pāta_ is also an object, but it is not the case. Nor _gotvā-samārthyanātva_ can stand for _gotvā-nubhavajana-nātyānātva_ (an eternal convention in which the causality of apprehending cowness is an adjunct) because there may be possibility of knowing _gotvā-samārthya_ and to have verbal cognition of a co-individual may mean co-individual that possesses _gotvā_ also. It appears that _gotvā-samārthyanātva_ has also a _sāṅketa_ (convention) in order to specify _pāta_ towards the cognition of _gotvā_ that has _pāta-jāti_. Therefore, _gotvā_ that has _pāta_ is to be accepted as the meaning of the word _pāta_ and not _pāta_ alone, since _gotvā_ is an adjunct of the cause of cognition in which _pāta_ occupies a subsidiary place.

Though the Nyāya Naiyāyikas agree with the Mīmāṁsāśātras and the Advaitins by holding that the manifestation of _jāti_ is
dependent on the knowledge of *vyakti*, they differ from them by emphasizing *vyakti* in cognition. The *vimśeśakas* advocate that the knowledge of a *viséṣṭa* (adjective) precedes the knowledge of a *viseṣya* (substantive) only in a *viséṣṭa-jñāna* (qualified cognition) because the cognition of a *vyakti* cannot be prior to the cognition of a *jāti*. Here the *nāyāyikas* point out that *vyakti* is the chief qualificand in meaning in which *jāti* acts as a limitor because, unless the qualificand, in which a *viséṣṭa* exists is accepted, there the cognition of a *viséṣṭa* cannot be justified. Thus, they hold that *vyakti* which is characterized by *jāti* alone is the sole meaning, whereas the *ākṛti* (shape) constitutes only a part of it.  

The problem whether verbal cognition might include *jāti*, *ākṛti* and *vyakti* or not is the problem whether they would be regarded as *sakti* at all or not. Bhartrhari answers by saying that a word has two *sākṣetras* (*saktis*): (a) *adhanikā* (modern) and (b) *ajanika* (eternal) of which the former is *vyakti* that admits all dynamism while the latter is *jāti*.68 As against Bhartrhari, the *nāyāyikas* contend that there is no authority to prove that *saktis* of *caitra*, *yava* etc., are eternal. 69 And some grammarians seem to substantiate the view that a *jāti* along with a *vyakti* is the sole meaning of a word, which is the thesis of the *nāyāyikas*. For the *nāyāyikas*, *sakti* is also connected to *ākṛti* just as it is with *jāti* and *vyakti*, since there is a rule: the meaning of a word is *jatyaṅkrityvyāktayāḥ* (class and shape characterized individual).
Therefore jati, akṛti and vyakti come under one sakti, otherwise languages (implication) would be impossible in the cases like saṃśārṇa (cow is eternal) etc.

The Sānyā Naiyāyikas interpret the Gautamīde aphorism by saying that jati and vyakti are meant by one sakti which is indicated by singular use, but akṛti stands for a separate category (sakti), though they are denoted by a single word and relate each other by differential relation i.e. vyutpattivaicitra (the peculiarity of etymology). It is tantamount to saying that, in absence of akṛtisakti, it is possible to have vyaktisakti which has jati alone as an adjunct. But it does not mean that vyakti and akṛti are meant for one sakti, whereas jati is a different sakti which is conveyed not by any word but only by a sentence. For it is laborious to admit vyakti as understood by sakti which has a configuration (saṃśāna) by means of reciprocal relation. Moreover, it is not possible for the Naiyāyikas to admit that jati alone, without any limiting property, might come under the object o. sakti. Strictly speaking, if both jati and saṃśāna can limit the object of sakti, there does not arise any difficulty; and so, the word saṃśāna is regarded not as supādhi (conditional), but as naimittiki (occasional) name, since here the object of sakti is an indivisible property of an occasional character.

According to Bhāvananda Siddhānta Vagīśa, the word akṛti in the Gautamīde sūtra does not mean saṃśāna, rather saṃsārṇa
(syntactic construction). It is this समारा by which vyakti can be related to जाति through inheritance so as to become an instrument that necessitates a condition for the respective cognition. It follows that जाति, अकृति and vyakti must occur in verbal cognition so that the real essence of meaning is to be understood in a broad perspective.

According to the Naiyāyikas, a word consists of (a) name and (b) a suffix, nominal or verbal whatever might be. They do not accept the views of Saṅkara iera that phala (result) is the meaning of a dhatu (verbal root) since the cognition of phala associated with a vyāpāra is denoted by a verbal root, by saying that when dhatu signifies an individual action (vyāpāra), it is always qualified by either phala or both phala and vyāpāra.

The Naiyāyikas agree with the Prabhākara when they say that dravya or vyāpāra (action) is the meaning of dhatu, but they differ from them by holding that the individual action, not the universal one, is the meaning of dhatu. The Prabhākara might accept kāryatva as the meaning of dhatu which is not a jāti, but akhandopādhi and it is not even a dravya that can be understood by ākṛti since it relates to the attributes of the immediate spatial contact. The Naiyāyikas point out that the Prabhākara contention seems to involve a contradiction when they hold that both jāti as well as akhandopādhi are the meaning of dhatu. If akhandopādhi of actionness is not a jāti in Prabhākara’s view, then it must be
an avacchedaka (a characteristic property) of vyakti, which substantiates the viewpoint of the baijayikas.

According to the Mimamsakas, the import of akhyata (verbal suffix) is bhavana (meaning of root) on the part of the agent, though Sarthasarathi Mira holds that a particular kind of vyapara (operation) is the meaning of akhyata. If all words of a syntax relate to bhavana as agents, objects or instruments in order to satisfy akanksa, then bhavana alone must be the meaning of akhyata.

The grammarian differ from the Mimamsakas by stating that both kara and karya or vyapara constitute the meaning of akhyata which qualifies the meaning of dhatu. The root pac denotes phala as well as karya whereas the suffix ti signifies karta so as to qualify the meaning of pac. It is equivalent to saying that vibhaddacha is a vyapara which consists of an agent qualified by both result and action.

Neither the views of the Mimamsakas nor the views of the grammarians are acceptable to the baijayikas. The baijayikas agree with the grammarians to the extent that they admit phala and vyapara as the meaning of dhatu, but they differ from them in that that which is qualified by vamanatva (krti) is alone the meaning of akhyata. When it connects itself with other word through the relation of substratumness (sarayata), akhyata is said to be krti-lakara (nominative case). And when it is through the relation of objectness (visayata), it is considered to be krmatalakara (objective case) and the like. Akhyata also signifies the case-relation, number
and gender of the agent but it is this vyakti which is capable of being qualified by gender and number to which kartrtva, karanatva etc., are assigned. As there are infinite number of vyaktis, a definite vyakti should be restricted if it is to be signified by a particular word, and this restriction can only be achieved by means of jāti with its characters.

According to the Ājīvakkas, the absolute notion of jāti baffles our attempts to understand the specific meaning of words. To determine vyakti we must take note of a specific akāra in which vyakti is instantiated. The instantiation requires a restriction to the exclusion of others, that can creat a ground for the universalization of vyakti which it achieved by means of jāti. For them, a word denotes a vyakti, cannot a jāti, and it stands for susthāna in order to distinguish the dissimilar kinds; and which of the factors would be dominant in meaning demands a practical consideration of the context. Thus, the Ājīvakkas seem to hold the global character of meaning, the content of which is identical with conceptual thought. The content of śabdajñāna and pratyajñāna would be the same if their specific aspects are ignored. They are alike constituent of vyakti, jāti and karmas but their difference lies more in emphasis upon one or other of the particular elements.

The grammarians too have similar inclinations when they hold that the tva, ta suffixes signify punas, karmas and jātis
only if they relate to the names. For the grammarians, the idea of gender, number and cases are to be included in meaning whereas the suffixes that are indicative of masculine, feminine and neuter gender suggest only meaning and nothing more. Even Patanjali seems to hold the same view that the utterance of ला० तृतीय gives rise to the cognition of der-lap, tail, lump, hoofs and horns all taken together. It is nothing more explicit than the observation of Patanjali that the word denotes the global characters of meaning, which is the thesis of the नियायिकास.

As regards the content of व्यक्ति and its global character, it might be said that व्यक्ति is not of this or that kind, but it includes the variety of behaviours. Any substance can be called कर्ता that gets अर्थि and becomes the locus of the distinctive qualities. The qualities like odour, taste, touch, gravity, solidity, fluidity and the non-pervasive dimensions are said to inhere in व्यक्ति. Even it might comprise the specific चुनास, रूपाः and रावणा in its domain so as to come under a पदार्थ that may be meant by any word. व्यक्ति is manifested, rendered perceptible by external organs of sense, and thus अर्था consists in signifying a definite global व्यक्ति which is characterized by जाति, अर्थि, कर्मस, प्रयाणाः, कर्तिः and व्यापराः, and it is this व्यक्ति of which the case relations like कर्तिलकः, कर्मलकः, करणलकः, and सामप्रदानö etc., the modes of कला are significantly ascribed, and which can embrace all the possible qualities in its sweep.