JAYANTA AND HIS NYĀYA MAṆJARI (10th century A.D)

Jayanta's Nyayamaṇjari is an independent commentary on Nyāya Sutra. Jayanta was a Brāhmaṇa logician who fought hard against the Buddhist. His age is considered to be between the 9th century A.D. and 11th century A.D. According to Satiṣ Chandra Vidyābhuṣaṇa the date of Jayanta is about 10th century A.D. In the opinion of DāśGupta the date of Jayanta is 8th century A.D. Karl H. Potter in his encyclopedia of Indian philosophies says that Jayanta belonged to the close of the 9th century A.D. Jayanta had wrote a play named Agamaḍambara.

In his Nyayamajari Jayanta examine the sphaṭa-vāda and opposes this theory by saying that it is a most cumbrous one. He criticises the doctrines of Buddhists viz. Kalyaṇarakṣita and Dharmottara. He opposes the Buddhist doctrines Apoha,
Kṣaṇa-Bhanga, Īśvara Bhanga etc. Apoha means the knowledge of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites. Kṣaṇabhanga means the momentary existence of things. Srutypraṇāṇya - denial of the authority of the veda. Īśvara-bhanga - the non-existence of God. These doctrines are propounded by Kalyāṇarakṣita.

Jayanta was clearly a sincere believer in the authority of the Vedas. He says that God teaches according to the taste and capacity of the pupil. Jayanta was not only a scholar of philosophy but also a dramatist and a keen student of grammatical theory. Jayantās great triumph is his Nyāyamañjari. He has also written a summary for his Nyāyamañjari called Nyāyakalika.

**NYĀYAMAÑJARI**

The work Nyāyamañjari is a commentary on the Nyāya Sutras of Gautama. It treats the Nyaya topics under two sects ie. Pramāṇa and Prameyas- Prameyas that is listed in the Nyāyasūtra.
Jayanta starts his work with the salutation of Śiva and others. He wrote sixteen verses as Mangala. Jayanta treats of the sixteen categories of the Nyāya. He defines Pramāṇas or instruments of knowledge as the collection of all the conditions of true judgment. He also accepts the four instruments of valid knowledge. ie Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, and Śabda. He establishes the extrinsic validity of knowledge. He treats of asatkhyāti, Ātmakhyāti and Anyathākhyāti. The validity of verbal authority is extrinsic.

Jayanta firmly says that God exists. He says that, if the Vedas do have an author, the author must be God. In his Nyāyamañjari Jayanta first sets forth the arguments propounded by the opponents and finally refutes all these and states that God is existent. The opponents' arguments are as follows:

1. God is not perceived, 2 And therefore He cannot be inferred 3. Gods' works' - "Creations" eg: hills, are not products, since they are unlike pots etc, which are the products of man's handiwork 4. In any case, not all products
are products of man's handiwork, and therefore not all products are products of God's handiwork. 5. If God were inferred by analogy, then he would be like a potter. But a potter has a body moves his limbs, and is not omniscient etc. while God is held to have the opposite qualities. 6. If God has a body who creates it? not himself, obviously, and to postulate another God to create the first Gods' body is to generate infinite regress. 7. Does He create by bodily movement or by mere willing not by bodily movements, since it would take too long. Not by mere willing, as how can willing affect the courses of atoms? 8. Does God act from motive or not? If so, God is not perfectly blissful. If not, then he behaves like an insane person. Or perhaps He creates out of compassion? But then why did He create so much sorrow? 9. Since merit and demerit is sufficient to guide destiny, God is not needed to command them. 10. And if He is brought in to guide merit and demerit He becomes dependent on them. 11. If it is held that God creates for sport (līla) then it must be pointed out that in between cycles there is no sport and thus no reason for creation, nor should a good God be
edified by this tawdry spectacle of a world. If God is made absolutely responsible for the state of the world then (a) God's goodness must be rejected (b) the Vedic injunctions become pointless (c) the hypothesis of liberation must be abandoned. Jayanta opposes all these arguments and states that God can be inferred. He considers that the world is an effect. The inference is that God exists, because He produces an effect of a type whose existence presupposes the existence of someone who knows the process and motive of its production, like a jar. He (Jayanta) objects the Čārvāka view that the Vedas are produced by men, Mīmāmsa point that the mountains are effects but they are destructible and the Buddhist view of the everything is transitory "Being an effect' according to Jayanta means, 'having parts". Jayanta denies the 'apōha' ie a thing means the absence of absence, of the Buddhist. In Nyāyamañjari there is a brief discussion of other proposed proofs for God's existence. The eternality of God's attributes is proved. The will of God is eternal, it produces temporary effects by its connection with non eternal objects, and he holds that God is incorporeal. God
can will physical results just as we will our bodies to move. In answer to the objection of God’s motive, that God should not produce sorrow if he is compassionate, Jayanta says that God must provide a place (Hell) for people whose Karma is bad, to correct their ways and seek salvation anew. The time between cycles, that is produced by God to give the selves periodic rest from their labour.

Jayanta also refutes the Kumārila’s view that God is unnecessary and the merit and demerit of the selves produces all effects. Jayanta says that the world needs a master builder. That master builder is only one God.

Jayanta objecting the Mīmāṃsaka viewpoint, states that sound is non eternal. The objections are as follows 1. A sound is an effect because it is regularly preceded by effort 2. A sound is destructible because it is not heard always. 3. We use expressions like producing sounds etc. which show it is an effect. 4. Sounds evolve from other sounds 5. Variations in the cause of a sound produce variations in the sound, which shows it is an effect.
The Mīmāṁsakās say that the Vedas are not man made. Jayanta opposes this opinion and states that Vedas are written by individual and that individual is God. Jayanta says that no one has seen the Vedas being composed, so perception is not a proper instrument. Inference also cannot prove that Vedas have no author.

In the Vedas it actually says that Prajāpati created the Vedas. The epic says Vyāsa wrote Mahābhārata. It is an acceptable fact, likewise, the inference in the case of the Vedas is sufficient to show that they were created by God. God, who created the Vedas created the world also. The words and its means are also established by God. According to Jayanta God created the Vedas to convey meanings already established by God.

The validity of the Vedas is due to their being spoken by trustworthy people, and not because of their eternity. In the second part of Nyāyamañjari, Jayanta states that the self is perceptible, and inferrable as well. And proves the existence of adṛṣṭa. He describes at the time of discussing the topic
rebirth, the process of construction of human body, which is the same from atoms with the assistance of God. That is the agency behind creation.

**VARADARĀJA AND HIS TĀRKIKARAKṢA (10th - 11th AD)**

Varadarāja, the author of the Tārkikarakṣa belonged to the 11th century. He deals with all the sixteen categories of the Nyāya. In the prameya he includes all the twelve objects of Nyāya beginning from Ātman and the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika beginning from dravya etc. The literary meaning of the word Tārkikarakṣa is protection of logicians. Tārkikarakṣa is devided into three chapters the first chapter deals with the first fourteen categories of the Nyāya ie from Pramāṇa to Chala. The second chapter deals with the fifteenth category viz jāti and the third chapter deals with the sixteenth category viz. Nigrahaṣṭhāna.

In the Tārkikarakṣa, of Varadarāja there is no failure of the definition to apply to God ‘valid knowledge’ would be applicable to erroneous hetu proffered by selves other than God. There is no regular relation between selves and valid
knowledge. There are two kinds of valid knowledge eternal and non eternal. The locus of eternal knowledge viz God is one instrument and the other is the instrumental cause of valid knowledge. Varadarāja in his own commentary on Tārākārikaṇa viz sārasamgraha adds that according to Nyāya the knower (pramatṛ) experiences validity through its invariable concomitance with God's knowledge. In this work perception and inference are the valid instruments of knowledge Varadarāga says perception is also an attribute of God—he remarks 'Siva is my valid instrument of knowledge'.

GANGESA UPĀDHYĀYA AND TATTVA CINTĀMAṆI

Gangesa belonged to the 12th century A.D. Tattva cintāmaṇi is his famous work. This work is considered as a milestone in the whole history of systems of philosophy, especially in Nyāya. He is considered as the propounder of the Navya-Nyāya system of logic. It was Udayana who first introduced the Navya Nyāya style. But it is Gangesa who first composed a full treatise in the Navya Nyāya style. Tattvacintāmaṇi is an important and immortal work of
Gangesa. Gangesa gives considerable contribution to the doctrine of God in Indian philosophy and Nyāya system.

There is a legend about Gangesa that, while he was young, was altogether illiterate. He propitiated the goddess Kāli, and acquired a boon to have deep erudition in the science of Logic. Gangesa developed a highly technical and sophisticated vocabulary, which unequalled in its power of clarity. Gangesa divides his Tattva- Cintāmaṇī in to four parts dealing with perception (pratyakṣa) Inference (anumāna) comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (sābda) respectively. The first part treats of perception. It opens with stanzas saluting God Siva. The salutation is offered to Śiva to invoke blessings. In the first part Gangesa explains the usefulness of invocation of blessings- Mangala vāda. The theory of valid knowledge and invalid knowledge are discussed. The intercourse between senses and their objects (sannikarṣā) are discussed. The classification of perception into two, Laukika pratyakṣa and Alaukika pratyakṣa are also discussed. There are the descriptions of
Inherence (samavāya - vāda) the invalidity of non-perception (anupalabdhyapramāṇya vāda) the existence and characteristics of non-existence, (abhāva vāda) causes of perception (pratyakṣa kāraṇa vāda), The atomic nature of the mind (manoṣutva vāda) immediate perception (Nirvikalpa vāda), the doctrine of self consciousness (anu-vyavasāya vāda) and mediate perception (Savikalpaka vāda). In the second chapter- Anumānakhanda the determination of inferential knowledge (Anumitinirupaṇa), the distinction of inference from perception, five provisional definitions of invariable concomitance (Vyāpti pancakam) etc are included. In this Khanda Gangesa explains the inference of God (Īśvarānumāna) Gangesa says that by inference we can prove the existence of God. He opines God as the maker of the universe. The inference that Gangesa employed for the existence is that - The universe has a maker, because it is a product, as a pot. i.e., in making a product like pot, there is an agent - the potter. Similarly, in the case of the production of binary atomic compound (dvyaṇuka), there must be perception by an agent of the atoms which
constitute the compound, a desire in him to make it, and his actual making of it. The atoms are supersensious, So they can not be perceived by ordinary human being. Hence the producer of the binary atomic compound is an agent who is not human being but God. So God is accepted as the maker of this universe. Gangesa discusses the pakṣa, Sādhya, and hetu of possible inferences to establish the existence of God. The supreme being, who is the creator of the universe is proved by the inference of the nature of having an agent, for the earth and so on, considering their nature of being an effect as a jar.

The Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gangesa has a section on establishing God through inference, from this it is clear that God-concept and theism are vital to the Nyāya darśana. According to Nyāya darśana, whereas it is possible for yōgins to have ‘alaukika pratyakṣa’ of Īśvara, there can not be laukikapratyakṣa of Īśvara at all. The only way of achieving God cognition is then through Anumāna which is the powerful means of infallible knowledge. The scriptures strengthen the God knowledge so derived.
KEŚAVA MISRA AND TARKABHĀṢA (Mid 13th century A.D.)

Tarkabhāṣa is the only work under the authorship of Keśava Miśra. His age is considered as the middle part of the 13th century. The work Tarkabhāṣa is divided into two main portions. Pramāṇa portion (Purvabhāga) and Prameya portion (Uttarabhāga).

The first portion deals with the four Pramāṇas, hetvabhasas etc. The prameya portion deals with the twelve prameyas that mentioned in the Nyāya Sutra. In the order the first Prameya is soul or 'Atman'. Keśava Miśra defines ātman as- 'Ātma - possess of the generality namely Ātmatva'. It is different from the body and sense organs. It is different in every body, eternal and all pervading. It is perceptible by mind. If it is not acceptable, ātman is also inferreble from hetus -Buddhi etc. Buddhi etc are special qualities, but they are not the qualities of earth etc because they are perceptible by the sense organs, Buddhi etc are only perceptible by mind. Not the quality of space, time and mind because their qualities are not special qualities. Their
qualities are all common qualities, ie Buddhi etc are special qualities. Not the quality of space because it is having quality and perceptible by a only one sense organ, so the dwelling place of the qualities ie. buddhi etc are different from all other substances wanted, and that substance is Ātman. This ātman is because of Vibhutva itself, ātman is eternal like the ether. This ātman is different in everybody, because happiness sorrow etc. are different in each body. He mentions sixteen categories of Nyāya. Under Prameya twelve Prameyas beginning from ātman are explained. He agrees four means of valid knowledge that were accepted by the Naiyāyikas- ie., Perception, Inference, Comparison and Verbal testimony.

The soul is that which possess the generality soul-ness. It is eternal and omnipresent, different in each body and also distinct from the body and sense organs. Even if it is perceptable by mind it can be inferred from the presence of special qualities like knowledge etc. It can be inferred by the reasons of both positive and negative\textsuperscript{11}. In Tarkabhaṣa it is said knowledge etc. occupies in a substance other than the
eight because they are the qualities which do not belong to these eight\textsuperscript{12}. The negative pervasion is a quality that is not one which does not belong to these eight substances is not one which subsists in a substance other than the eight eg. colour etc.

The positive pervasion for the the existence of Ātman is that quality which does not subsist in one substance must subsist in any other different from the former, for example sound which does not belong to earth\textsuperscript{*}etc. So it is stated that Ātman is a substance that is different from other eight substances. This ātman is omnipresent omnipotent and is different in each body.

NYĀYALĪLĀVATI OF VALLABHĀCĀRYA (12th century A.D.)

Nyāyalīlāvati is a small work done by the famous Vallabha\c{c}arya. It is an expository treatise on Vaiśeṣika philosophy Vallbhācārya opens his work with a salutation to Puru\ṣottama. It deals with six categories of the Vaiśeṣika system. Intellect or buddhi comes under the category of quality or guṇa. This intellect is of two kinds viz Vidya-right
knowledge and avidya-wrong knowledge. The means of knowledge to acquire right knowledge are fourfold. They are perception- Pratyakṣa, inference-anumāna, comparison-upamāna, and verbal testimony- śābda. This is equalent to Nyāya system Vallabhācārya did not accept presumption - arthāpathi, probability -sambhava, tradition- aithihya etc as separate means of knowledge.

In Nyāyaśāstra Vallabhā discusses his philosophy of God. His inference to establish the existence of God is same as the earlier Nyāya authors. Vallabhā establishes God as the agent of creation of this universe. That which is the object of discussion has an agent because it is an effect like a jar. Being an agent means, to have direct knowledge of the material cause as well as desire and effort. Individual souls do not have direct knowledge of the material cause of earth and so on, and so the individual souls can not be the makers. Therefore there is no faults of establishing God as the agent of creation. Individual souls cannot be the agent of the earth and so on, because they possess limited knowledge through their merit and demerit. They can't have the knowledge of
material cause and so on. With limited knowledge individual souls can’t became the agent of the universe. One who have the direct knowledge of the material cause of the earth and so on only can be the agent. That agent, having direct knowledge of material cause of earth and so on is considered as God. This agent is not embodied. The external sense organs are not capable of cognizing the knowledge of material cause of earth etc. So they are not able to cognize an agent with that knowledge. The mind is also able to cognise only the knowledge of the particular individual soul to which it belongs. No individual can cognize the knowledge of God who is the agent of the universe. God and his knowledge are not objects of the sensible perception of any individual soul. There is no agent with a body. As in the case of a jar an agent with body is established likewise an agent without body is established in the case of earth and so on. Vallabhaścārya states that ‘being an effect’ there must be ‘having an- agent’. The universe being an effect is also having an agent, that agent is the supreme -soul -Īśvara.
TARKASAMGRAHA OF ANNAMBHATTA (1623 A.D.)

Tarkasamgraha is an excellent work on Nyāya Vaisesika system. Annambhatta is the author of this work. Annambhatta has also written a commentary on Tarkasamgraha named Dīpika. These works Tarkasamgraha and Dīpika are known together as Annambhattīyam. The name Tarkasamgraha is interpreted by Annambhatta himself as a compendious elucidation of the nature of substance, qualities and such other ontological categories of the Vaiśeṣika system, which are accepted by the Nyāya. Thus the Tarkasamgraha with Dīpika fulfills the object mentioned in the concluding verse.13.

Annambhatta begins his Tarkasamgraha with the benedictory verse to Lord Śiva and to the preceptor. ’Placing the Lord of the universe in my heart and making obeisance to my preceptor, I compile this Tarkasamgraha to enable beginners to understand the dialectical philosophy easily”14. This work deals with the seven categories of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika school viz. substance (dravya), quality (guṇa),
action (karma), generality (samānyya), particularity (viśeṣa), inherence (Samavāya) and non-existence (abhāva). Dravyas are of nine kinds viz. earth, (prdvi), water (ap), light (teja), air (vāyu), ether (ākaśa), time (kāla), space (dike), Soul (ātma) and mind (manas). Quality are of twenty four kinds. Action (karma) are five kinds-upward motion, downward motion, contraction expansion and motion from one place to another. Generality (Samānya) are two types - the more comprehensive (param) and the less comprehensive (aparam). Particularities abiding in eternal substances are innumerable indeed. Inherence (samavāya) is only one Negation (abhāva) is fourfold antecedent negation (prāgabhāva) destructive negation (pradavamsābhāva), absolute negation (atyantābhāva) and mutual negation (anyonyābhāva). After mentioning the categories Annambhatta explains the characteristics of each of them and their divisions, beginning from the substances. The soul (ātma) comes as the eightth substance. Annambhatta defines soul (ātma) as the substratum of knowledge. It is of two kinds viz the supreme soul and the individual soul. Of these,
the supreme soul\textsuperscript{7} is omnipotent and omniscient and one only. The individual soul\textsuperscript{8} is different in each body, is all pervading, and eternal.

The characteristic mark of the supreme soul is said as Lordliness consists in being the substratum of eternal knowledge. Here is a doubt about the proof for the existence of \textit{Īśvara}. If perceptible, is it external perception-ie perceivable by the external sense-organ, like eye. Or is it internal perception ie perceived by the mind? External perception can not be possible because it is not having shape or colour. Not by internal perception because He is free from the feelings of pain pleasure etc. felt by the individual soul. The supreme soul can not be inferred, because of the lack of similar instances to support the inference. Nor verbal testimony can prove His existence, because of the lack of vedic texts establishing His existence. In reply to these objection, Annambatta says in his \textit{Dīpika} that, it is not so, because earth, sprouts etc are caused by some agent since they are products like a jar. Thus, the existence of \textit{Īśvara} is proved by inference. Agent is one who possesses an
immediate knowledge of the inherent causal apparatus, a will to act and an effort. Inherent cause is the material cause. Omniscience consists in possessing a direct knowledge of all subtle substances like atoms etc. Vedic sentences like, 'He who is the omniscient is also the immediate knower of everything'\textsuperscript{16} etc. are the proofs for the establishment of the existence of \( \text{Isvāra} \).

\( \text{Jīvatma} \) or individual soul consists in its being the abode of pleasure, pain etc. Here is an objection that this body itself is the soul. When one say "I am a man', 'I am a brāhmin' etc. here the word 'I' denotes the body. Annambhatta says that it is not so, because if body were the soul, then the inevitable destruction of the soul has to be accepted. When the body is destroyed the soul is also destroyed. The sense organs also cannot be the soul, because in that case there can not occur the recollection. The act of seeing is done by eyes, the act of touching is done by organ of touch and act of hearing is done by ears and so on. In one case of accepting sense organs as the 'agent', there will be five agents. It is the general rule that one who experiences is only liable to
remembrance. We are all having the feeling that 'I who saw the thing now touch' In the absence of identity of the knower, this kind of knowledge never occur. So there is a 'thing' other than the sense organs as the knower. That 'thing' is the soul. Thus we have to accept that soul is quite different from the body and the sense organs. The individual soul is different in different bodies. Otherwise there must be common experience of pleasure and pain to all individuals.

The soul is not of atomic magnitude because the experience of pleasure and pain etc are felt all over the body. Nor is it of any intermediate magnitude. If it is so, the soul must under go destruction. Then we will have to assume that every action that the soul performs during its existence on earth will perish without yielding its fruits and that everybody will be enjoying the fruits of actions which are not performed by him. Therefore it is necessary to accept that the individual soul is eternal and all pervading.

The inference in the case of God is as follows:- Every effect is produced by a causal agent eg: a pot: A dyad which
is the least component of the element. Earth is an effect. Therefore it is produced by a causal agent. This causal agent can be only God. No human being can possibly be an agent in the production of a dyad which is formed of two atoms. The atoms are not perceived by any human or sub-human agent. Thus the existence of a super-human agent has to be postulated to explain the creation of the world and that is the proof for the existence of God. This is the view that Annambhatta stated in his Tarkasamgraha Dipika as the proofs for the existence of God.

**VIŚVANĀTHA NYĀYA PANCĀNANA AND SIDDHĀNTHA MUKTĀVALI (1634 AD)**

Viśvanātha Nyāya Pancānana is the author of the famous work on Vaisesika called BhāṣaParicceda. The author, also known by the name Pancānana Viśvanātha, himself has written commentary on his Bhāṣāparicceda named Siddhānta Muktāvali. The word Siddhāntha Muktāvali literally means that rows of pearls of logical truths.
Viśvanātha opens his Bhāṣāparicceda with a saluting verse to Sri Krishṇa. In Siddhānta Muktāvali Viśvanātha salutes Śīva and invokes Śivas' blessing.

Bhāṣāpariccheda deals with seven categories of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system viz. substance (dravya) quality (guṇa) action (karma) generality (sāmānyā) particularity (višeṣa) and non-existence (abhāva). The substance is again divided into nine viz. earth, (kṣiti) water (ap), light (teja), air (marut), ether (vyoma) time (kāla) space (dik) soul (ātma) and mind (manas). The substance soul (ātman) is the abode of intellect (buddhi) and several other qualities. Visvanātha defines soul also as the inspirer of the organs etc. An instrument requires an agent soul is the agent and the organs are instruments. The generic attribute of soul is inferred as the determinant of the inherent causality of pleasure, pain etc. The generic attribute does not exist in God. There is no proof for God having these qualities. The sentiency is primarily in the soul. This is said as the presider of the instruments - 'Indriyādyadhiṣṭāta'. The sentiency is manifested through the organs in the body. The soul does not acquire the knowledge
directly. It acquires knowledge through the organs in the body. The soul is the agent of the knowledge. In perceptions like 'I know' and 'I am happy' etc. the 'I' denotes soul. Viśvanātha states that the soul is distinct from the sense organs. The instruments can operate only with the help of an agent- ‘Sakartṛkam Karaṇam.’ It is observed that cutting instruments such as axe, can not produce any result without an agent, similarly the eyes and other instruments of knowledge can not produce any result without an agent. Hence an agent over and above all these instruments is inferred. And that agent is soul. Viśvanātha explains in his Siddhānta Muktāvali that the body has no sentiency, for it is not found in dead bodies. If the sense organs possess sentiency, how can recollection take place even after the loss of any organ. If the body has sentiency, one can not account for the recollection in old age, of things that had seen in the childhood. Because bodies on account of the accession and decay of their parts are continually subject to birth and death. When the body losses any of its component parts, it is destroyed. When it has an additional part it is produced as a
new. So the body of an old man is entirely different from the one he had in childhood. We can not urge that the impressions produced in the previous body generate impressions in the next body. It is not comfortable to presume an infinite number of impressions. If the body has sentiency, a new born baby will not have the inclination to suck. But an infant does so due to the conduciveness to what is desirable, which was experienced in a previous birth. That the impression of the soul continues from birth to birth. It has no beginning. So the soul is without a beginning and also can not be destroyed. That is, the soul is eternal. The instruments of knowledge like eye an other organs cannot be the agents of knowledge. If they are accepted as the agents, there will be no recollection on the loss of these instruments. One sees an object with his eyes and later, even though he losses his eyes, he identifies the same object with touch (skin). If eye was the agent of perception, then the recollection by the help of touch will not be possible. It is impossible for one person to recollect a thing which was experienced by another person. It is clear that experience and recollection stand to
each other as cause and effect through having a common substratum. This common substratum is soul. The mind is not such a sentient being. If mind is accepted as the sentient being, there would be no perception of knowledge\textsuperscript{21}, since the mind is atomic and medium dimension is a necessary factor for perception. When knowledge pleasure etc, arise it will be impossible to perceive them. Soul is accepted as the agent of knowledge.

**JAGADĪŚA TARKĀLANKĀRA AND HIS TARKĀMṚTA**

Jagadīśa Tarkālankāra, the author of Tarkāmṛta is about 1635 A.D. Tarkāmṛta is an important work on vaiśeṣika philosophy. Tarkāmṛta begins with a salutation to Lord Viṣṇu. Jagadīśa in his Tarkāmṛta says that a man who desired to attain emancipation should possess a true knowledge of the soul. He divides his Tarkāmṛta into two parts- Viṣayakānda and Jñānakānda. The first i.e. theViṣayakānda deals with categories of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and the second part deals with the four means of valid knowledge. He divides the categories in to two main heads positive and
negative. The first six categories include in the positive and non existence include in the negative. This Abhāva is devided into two relative non existence (samsargābhāva) and reciprocal non existence (anyonyābhāva). The relative non existence is again devided into three one antecedent non existence (prāgabhāva) subsequent non- existence (pradvamsābhāva) and absolute non existence (atyantābhāva) The second section Jñānakānda, treats of right knowledge and the four means perception inference comparison and verbal testimony. The amalgamation of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika categories is shown in this work.

Reference

1. H.I.L Pg. 146
2. En. I.P. Vol. IInd Pg. 342
3. अन्वयभिचारणीयसन्दिग्धामर्यादेः विद्यक्ति बोधाबोधस्वभावा सामग्री प्रमाणम् । N.N.J. Pg. 12
4. N.N.J. Pg. 194
5. N.N.J. Pg. 202
6. N.N.J. Pg. 200
7. N.N.J. Pg. 240
8. H.I.L Pg. 406
9. स च मानसप्रत्यक्षः T.Bh. Pg. 53
10. विप्रतिपत्ती तु बुध्यादि गुणलितः T.Bh. Pg. 53
11. अन्ययेन व्यतिरेकः च व्यासः वा तु शक्यते।
12. बुध्यादि: पृथिव्याद्य इव व्यासिकर्तुः पृथिव्याद्य इव गुणानस्य तत्त्वोत्सति गुणत्वात् T.Bh.
13. काणादन्यायमतः: बहुव्युत्पत्ति सिद्धे।
   अन्तःभङ्गेन विदुषा रचितस्त्रस्क सग्रहः।
14. निवधायहि विषवेशं विधाय गुणवन्दनम्।
   बालानम् सुखबोध्यतमा क्रियते तर्कसंग्रहः।। T.S.-1
15. ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्रं। सत्वविधं: परमात्मा जीवात्माच। तत्रेतरं: सर्वज्ञः।
   परमात्मैक एव। जीवात्मा प्रतिशारीयं भित्रो विधुरित्यस्य। T.S.
16. व: सर्वज्ञ: स सर्वबित् इत्यायामोऽधि तेन प्रमाणम्। T.S.
17. न मध्यमपरिमाणवानू: तथा सति अनित्यत्व प्रसंजेन कृ तहानात्कृत्यायाम्
   प्रस्तात।। T.S.
18. चूँक गणीकृत विधुर्वलयीकृत वासुकिः।
   भवो भवतु: भवायाम लीलातां¦ वपण्डि तः।। N.S. M.
19. आत्मेनिम्नायाधिष्ठता करणं हि सकर्त्त्रकम्। N.S.M 47
20. शरीरस्यन चैवतन्य मृतेषु व्यविधारतः।
   तथात्तवं चेतिनिम्नायामुपपाते कर्म स्मृति:। N.S.M
21. मनोपिनतथा ज्ञानाध्ययन्त्या तथा भवेत्। N.S.M.
CHAPTER-VI