Udayanacārīya of the 10th century wrote a profound work to establish the existence of God. There is a legend about Udayanacārya, that he usually participated in debates and defeated the Buddhists in religious discussion, but later on his victory was not admitted. One day there was a hot contest between Udayana and the Buddhists on the existence of God. Udayana tried his level best to make them believe in God by arguments. Then Udayana ascended the top of a hill taking a Brāhmaṇa who believes in the existence of God, and a Buddhist who does not believe in God. Reaching the top of the hill Udayana pushed both of them down. When falling down, the Brāhmaṇa-believer of God, cried aloud “there is God” and he come to the Ground without any hurt. While the Buddhist who exclaimed that “there is no God,” died of
the fall. This fact was considered as the proof for the existence of God. Thus Udayana proved the existence of God. But for this sin he was blamed as murderer. In penitentiary of this he conducted ‘thuṣānalā’ and committed suicide in that thuṣānalā. At that time he addressed Jagannātha of purī by a well known verse. Meaning that ‘proud of our powers, you dispisest me up on whom your existence depended when the Buddhist reigned supreme’.

Udayana is undoubtedly a logician and redoubtable philosopher of the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy. Udayana’s Nyāya Kusumāṇḍjali is a critical and constructive, polemical and philosophical treatise. It deals with the proofs for the existence of God. It is a great work both in dialectics as well as in style, so it occupies the formost place among the Indian philosophical classics. Udayana is the first Indian theologian who attempt to establish the existence of God with the help of logic.

It was Udayana who made theism one of the chief doctrines of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system. He established God,
opposing the opinion of Buddhists and other Nihilists. Gautama- the author of Nyāya Sutra has given only a casual reference to God. At that time theism was not an original tenet of the Nyāya System. There are seven well known works attributed to the authorship of Udayana. They are Nyāya Vārtika-tātparya-tīka pariśuddhi, Nyāyapariśiṣṭa, Kiraṇāvali, Lakṣaṇāvali Lakṣaṇamāla, Ātmatattva-Viveka and Nyāya Kusumāñjali. Among these Nyāya Vārtika tātparya tīka pariśuddhi and Nyāya pariśiṣṭa belong to the Nyāye school. Kiraṇāvali, Lakṣaṇāvali, and Lakṣaṇaṃmāla belong to Vaiśeṣika school. Ātmatattva-Viveka and Nyāya Kusumāñjali are belonging to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika syncretic system and they are independent treatises.

Udayana is considered as the pioneer of the modern school - Navya Nyāya. In his Lakṣaṇāvali Udayana mentions Īśvara while explaining the soul as the paramātma.
Kusumāñjali which means a handful of flowers is written by Udayanācārya. He has written this book to establish the existence of God or Supreme Soul. From the time immemorial the existence of God is a disputed subject. In ancient India, there are both who accept God and who do not accept Him. Nyāya philosophy accept God as an existing substance. They establish the existence of God by using several arguments.

If we examine the history of Indian logic we can see that Indian logic came to this stage of development by writing volumes of books to refute the arguments of Baudhās. Through a war of arguments, the Nyāya and Baudhā logicians established a rich empire of logic. The Nyāya logicians are Āstikas and Baudhā logicians are Nāstikas.

From the History of early Indian Logic. We can understand the war of debate that took place in India between Hindu and Baudhā Logicians. Udayanācārya was one of our Hindu Logicians who fought against the heretic Baudhās in order to establish the existence of God.
In his reputed work Kusumāñjali, he establishes God’s existence with the help of arguments, by asserting that there is a thing desert or adrsta which we acquire by our several deeds. The ‘adrśta’ is a combined name for dharma, or puṇya and adharma or pāpa.

In each birth we acquire this adrśta on account of which we get the next birth. Here somebody must be there as the agent to determine each living being’s birth etc. God is this agent. Further every product is having a producer. Earth is a product so it should also have a producer. The human being etc. or those who live in this world are not the producers of earth. God is that producer. So we can assert the existence of God as the producer of this earth.

The Brāhmānas maintain that their religion is eternal. It is based on scriptures or vedas. The Jñānakānda represented by the Āranyakas is concerned mainly with the nature of soul.

We can see the development of the concept of Soul through the different stages of Vedic literature. Firstly
Upaniṣads were called Ātmavidya which dealt with the Soul. At a later stage Ānvīkṣiki was called Ātmavidya. Ānvīkṣiki treated of two subjects the soul and the theory of reasons. This Ānvīkṣiti was developed into philosophy or darśana.

The study of Indian philosophy is necessary to understand the early Indian culture and heritage. So in that sense the study of Kusumāṇjali is important.

It was already indicated that Nyāyakusumāṇjali is a profound work which mainly deals with the existence of God. Udayana proves the existence of God, refuting the objections forwarded by Cārvāka, Baudhā, Sānkhya and Mīmāmsa. The work is divided into five clusters or chapters called stabakas. In the first chapter Udayana establishes the existence of “an alaukika reason” as the controller of Adṛṣṭa.

Udayanācārya opens his Nyāya Kusumāṇjali with a saluting verse to Lord. This Kārika has two fold interpretation. One from the point of view of flower and the other Nyāya. This verse signifies the purpose (prayojana) of writing this work, the subject (viṣaya), the relation
(sambandha) and aspirant (adhikāri). Here the word 'bhramaccetome' points the aspirant. The word 'Īsasya' denotes subject, 'niveśitaḥ' denotes relation and 'amṛtarasaprasyandamādḥvikabhūḥ' denotes the purpose. The word 'Nyāyaprasūnañjali' stands for handful of inferential arguments establishing marks (liṅga-s) which are free from all defects. Here the faultless inferential arguments are called flowers. They are collected within the fold of hand and it is offered at the feet of the Lord.

By the word 'Īśasyaivaniveśitaḥpadayugē' Udayana denotes that pramāṇas and tarkas are used in support of the Nyāyas by which the establishment of God is done, compared with honey ie. immortality. Faultless inferential arguments in support of the existence of God dispel contrary thoughts about God’s existence and thus generates intense longing for mokṣa.

In this word 'padayuge' pada means feet. There is a question if god possesses a body? God does not need a body to create, yet He assumes a temporary body inorder to set up
a tradition or 'padayuga' may refer to feet meditatively visualised as belonging to images that represent God.

In connection with the ascertainment of the existence of God, Udayana sets forth five objections negating the existence of God. Each of them is rejected in the five stabakas each and states the existence of God.

**GOD - THE CONTROLLER OF ADRSTĀ**

It is first chapter of Nyāya Kusumānjali Udayana sets forth five objection which will result in the negation of the existence of God. These objections are as follows

1. There is no adṛṣṭa which is considered as the means of the attainment of the other world³.

2. Even in the absence of God the performance of sacrifices etc. Which is the means of attaining the other world, is possible⁴.

3. There are Pramāṇas which prove the non existence of God⁵
4. Even if God exists, there is no pramāṇa to prove His existence.

5. There is no Sādhakapramāṇa or supporting argument to prove the existence of God.

The first objection ie. there is no adṛśta entails five more sub-arguments. They are 1. An effect is not dependent on a cause, as the relation of causality is invalid, 2. Even if in some cases an effect depends on a cause, the relation of causality is invalid 3. Provided causality is accepted as a universal law, an effect will be produced from the same cause always. 4. Provided on effect is produced from different causes, there is no necessity of admitting a cause for the attainment of the other world. 5. Even if there is a cause for the attainment of the other world, performance of sacrifices etc. can be that cause and there is no Pramāṇa for proving adṛśta inherent in the soul as the cause of the other world.

In the first chapter of Kusumāṇjali Udayana establishes God as the controller of Adṛśta. Udayana states this following a critical and dielectical method of refutation of
the opponents view points. Udayana establishes theism with reasons and arguments. In his refutation of the arguments of the opponents, Udayana examines the Carvaka view first. Carvaka denies all the extra empirical concepts viz. God, soul, merit, demerit (adrsta) etc. To the Carvaka only matter and motion are real. Everything other than the two things are unreal Udayana establishes the existence and reality of trans empirical values. He is convinced of the law of Karma. The acts of the individual are short lived. These acts produce adrsta (dharma and adharma) that inheres in the soul. The soul by itself is inert. Human beings can not perceive it. The establishment of God is accounted for the functioning of adrsta in accordance to its rewards to the agents (soul). God is omnipotent and He is the guiding principle of adrsta. He is the agent who provides the fruits of adrsta. This is the moral argument that Udayana forwarded for the existence of God.

Udayana states that there is no need of establishing or proofing His existence. He is accepted by the wise as the path way of heaven and liberation. Here in Kusumanyjali he is only
doing 'upāsana' of the Supreme Being. Upāsana' is the next phase coming after 'Śravaṇa or hearing. The logical enquiry into the existence of God is admitted as the way to liberation. The arguments setforth by Udayana, in support of the existence of God lead to the attainment of liberation. When the Ātman is known in its real nature, Jīvātman, attain liberation. Bondage of individual Soul continues till it gets the real knowledge of Ātman. In the scriptural authorities, worship of God is regarded as the cause of Puruṣārthas viz. dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. One has to attain the knowledge of God inorder to worship Him. From the worship of God, one gets His grace and it causes self realization. It is the grace of God that helps to attain the knowledge of Ātman. The knowledge of God proceeds the worship of God. For His worship existence of God must be considered.

There does not exist any doubt about the existence of God, because all worship the Supreme Being in different names. The followers of Upaniṣads accept the Being as pure consciousness, Sāṅkhya consider Him as the first knower.
The followers of Patañjali worship the being as one who is unaffected by any afflictions etc. The Pāśupatas worship the Supreme Being as the creator of the world, who is untainted even by such actions which are opposed to secular and Vedic laws. The Śaivas call him Śiva and Vaiṣṇavas call Him Puruṣotama. The Paurāṇikas call the Supreme Being as Pitamaha (Brahma) the ritualists- Yajñikas call the Supreme Being as the Yajñarupi Yajñārādhya Puruṣa. Baudhahas accept Him as Omniscient Being - Sarvajña. Jainas accept the Supreme Being as immaculate selves free from Karmic veil (Nirvārana). Mīmāmsakas as the accept God who is to be worshipped by sacrifice and chanting (homa and Japa). The Cārvākas worship him as the ruler of the world or in the form of images etc. The Naiyāyikas accept Him as one who is endowed with what is rationally attributed to Him. The artisans call Him as viśvakarma- architect of the universe. So as long as the world exists the world with its castes (jāti) family (gotra) etc there does not arise any doubt about in the existence of God. There is no need of establishing his existence. So Udayana says that this logical enquiry into the
existence of God may be called reflection (manana). He is doing only the worship that followed after hearing.

Even though there is no doubt about the existence of God. Here is the logical reflection of His existence. The Vedas speaks of God but not have established His existence with logical reasoning. The Nyāya Kusumāñjali is a treatise on the existence of God based on logical arguments and reasons. Udayana says that those who have set forth objections against God’s existence, also have some kind of knowledge about Him. The author also have the scriptural knowledge of God. Udayana follows the scriptural injunction that reflection should be done on that which has been heard from the scripture. Udayana is reflecting on God, who is heard from scripture. That reflection is done in his Nyāya Kusumāñjali. Udayana sets forth objections not because of His non existence, but to show the opinion of the opponents and to state the existence of God, rejecting these objections.

Udayana, in the first chapter of Nyāyakusumāñjali established that there is a supernatural cause viz. adṛṣṭa
which is the cause of birth of every beings. For this Udayana rejects cārvāka point that there is no supernatural cause. Udayana opines that when adṛṣṭa is established, the postulation of God as the controller of adṛṣṭa follows logically. In this treatise Udayana establishes that the supernatural cause is in the form of merit and demerit. For this Udayana advances the reasons that 'on account of dependence'. The meaning of dependence here is that the effect as occasional (kādācītka). Everything in this world is occasional ie. Subject to birth and death. It is not right to say an occasional thing is not perishable. So the world is not accidental or uncaused. It is clear that the postulation of Adṛṣṭa is based on the principle of causality. Activity is the cause of adṛṣṭa and adṛṣṭa gives rise to happiness and misery.

Udayana says the expression uncaused 'akasmāt bhavati' is riddled with inconsistencies. By the word 'akasmāt bhavati' did not mean the deniel of the cause or production. Nor it means that the effect itself or an absolute nothing is the cause. It can not be said that the
effect is produced by its own nature. The effect invariably possess limits\textsuperscript{11}.

If the meaning of ‘akasmāt bhavati’- is the denial of the origination of the object itself, the object world not originate at all as it was before creation. An effect comes into existence from itself is also not acceptable. If it happens so creation is not existent. According Nyāya School being non - existent it cannot become the cause of its origination. An object does not exist prior to its appearance. ie. an object cannot be the producer or cause of itself (svabhāvavāda). Again if the word ‘akasmāt bhavati’ mean that an effect comes into existence from absolute nothing is also defective. It is because that the effect which is said to come into existence from an absolute nothing at a given time, could have came into existence even earlier as there is no factor which could prevent it rising my from an absolute nothing earlier. The result of this argument is that the effect should have to be treated as eternal. A particular event happens at a particular moment of time, neither earlier nor later. naiyāyikas accept the causality of non -existence.
Udayana says that nobody could deny that non existence is an effect. The non existence is the destruction of a thing previously existing. This destruction take place due to some cause. The anvaya- vyatireka relation that determines the causality of a positive thing, determines the causality of the non-existent thing too. Non existence is not mere nothing. Through this Udayana proves the causality of non-existence. How existing things are causes nonexistence is also like this (śvarūpeṇa hetutvam) non-existence is of four kind- prāgabhāva, pradvamsābhāva, atyantābhāva and anyonyābhāva. Here in these anyonyābhāva had no causality. The causality of prāgabhāva, pradvamsābhāva and atyantābhāva are rejected and they have causality only in the form of samsargābhāva. Udayana also refutes the śakti doctrine propounded by Mīmāṁsakas, inherent śakti and infused śākti.

Udayana says in the case of fire, gem, chanting the mantra etc. are pradibandha and the person who make use of them is pratibandhaka. The theory of śakti can do
nothing in this case. The purificatory actions like sprinkling in grain etc. cause some kind of adṛśta in the person who does it and not in the grains. It is mentioned in the following karika of Nyāya Kusumāñjali.

संस्कारः पुंस एवेष्टः प्रोक्षणाद्वृक्षणादिभि:
स्वगुणः परमाणूः विशेषः पाकजातयः || N.K.I.11

From the actions of men dharma and adharma (adṛśta) are formed. It is in the Puruṣa (soul) and not in the physical body. The final attribute of the final atoms are produced by the contact of fire. The paramāṇu (atoms) can produce things that come under the same jāti. We worship the images of dieties because the consecration ceremony creates a self sense in the devatas “this is ‘I’ (ahaṅkāra) and ‘this is mine’(mamakāra) in the images and they lent merit to the person who worship on it and demerit to the person who haress (ninda) on it. Adṛśta resides in the soul and not in the elements.

Sāṅkhya says that Puruṣa is immutable and eternal Adṛśta is a product of buddhi and not of the Puruṣa. But according
to Nyāya Philosophy adṛśta is produced by God. It is said in Kārīka that

कर्तृधर्मा नियन्तरः चेतिता च स एव नः ||
अन्यधातुन्यपरः स्त्यादसंसारोद्धवा धृवः || N.K. I. 14

The agent of action is the substratum of virtue, vice, pleasure, pain etc. sentience is the attribute of the agent but not of buddhi. This agent must be a sentient being. Sāṅkhya says that Puruṣa is not a qualified entity कूट स्थचैतन्यस्वरूपः पुष्करपलाशबतू निर्लेपः स्वतन्त्रस्वः। If the agent is not the sentient being there will be no liberation otherwise the world will certainly not originate. A sentient person who has desire, aversion etc. can not take birth. Otherwise no birth will occur. Udayana here quotes a Nyāya Sutra वीतरागजन्मावर्त्तनात्। Like the Sāṅkhyas, Naiyāyikas don’t accept buddhi as the sentient being. It is the soul that is sentient. If sentience is attributed to buddhi and not to Puruṣa, then bondage and liberation become an impossibility. If buddhi is eternal it will always be related to Puruṣa and Puruṣa can never attain liberation. If it is non-eternal, when it perishes its attributes
(body sense organs) also will perish. If the Buddhi has no origination body, sense organs etc. also remain unproduced. By this there arise the problem of non-origination of the world.

There is no problem of the soul becoming non-eternal being the substratum of volition (kṛti) which is non eternal because there is absolute difference between attributes and the substratum. Soul exists even after its attributes are destroyed. Thus soul is established as the eternal agent, enjoyer and the substratum of adṛṣṭa.

If body were the soul, one can remember what was experienced, by another. It does not happen so. From this we can infer that there is something other than body which recollect the previous experiences. Transformation of one's knowledge into another is also impossible Buddhist doctrine of momentariness is also rejected here. Udayana says that without difference in the form of causal efficiency (kurvadṛupatva)there cannot be momentariness. But by no means we can establish the difference in the form of causal
efficiency. Actually there is no difference in the seeds which are in granary or in the farm. It is with the help of soil, water, etc the seed down in the field sprouts. So inference is not valid to establish the difference in the form of causal efficiency. Without inference that momentariness cannot be established Without the definite knowledge in the form of Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa we cannot assume a nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.

Here Udayana refutes the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. Causal efficiency in the previous moment is inferred from the perception of the effect in the next moment. Momentariness cannot be established without assuming causal efficiency that distinguishes one individual from another. Without causal efficiency a product does not come into existence. Seed in the field sprouts but not in the granary. It is because the help of other factors the seed in the field sprouts. In the absence of those factors seed in the granary does not sprout.
The refutation of casualties is rejected by Udayana. Cārvāka says that causality is neither natural nor adjunctive attribute. And causality is not even an entity at all. In objection to this point Udayana says that if causality is not admitted even the ‘blue colour’ the example cited by the opponent, in order to refute the causality will not have actual existence. Because they do not admit eternal things. So blue colour cannot be eternal. But in the absence of a cause it cannot be non-eternal also. So cause-effect relation must be admitted. It is a universally accepted fact that there is a relation between cause and effect. Fire will produce smoke in association with wet fuel, seed produce sprout in association with water air etc.

The causality of eternal and all pervading soul is established here. In Nyāya soul is admitted as the material cause of adrsta. Cārvāka says that eternal and all pervading soul is devoid of Vyatireka relation, such soul cannot be proved as the generator of the adjunct. Udayana in reply to this argument says that ‘invariable antecedence of the effect is cause’(kāryāṇiyatapurvabhāvah) and not anvaya-vyatireka relation
Earth, water, fire, air and ether (bhūtāḥ) cannot be the material cause of cognition etc. Cognition etc are not the qualities of time space, and mind, because only general qualities inhere in them cognition etc. are specified qualities. So the ninth substance the soul is established as the dwelling place of cognition etc. and this soul is accepted as the material cause of cognition etc. Here causality is proved by evidence that establish the substratism of the attributes and not by any Vyatireka relation. Adṛśṭa also inheres in the soul. that which is not soul has no adṛśṭa inherent in it. absence of adṛśṭa is int he absence of the soul. Here in this chapter Udayana establishes God as the controller of adṛśṭa. He concludes the first chapter with the Kārika:

इत्येषा सहकारिशाक्ति रसमा माया दुरुभाषितः
मूलत्वात्रकृतः प्रबोधयतोजविद्यति यस्योदिता ।
देवोऽस्य विरतप्रमधरचनाक छोपलकोलाहलः
साक्षात्साक्षितया मनस्यभिरति बध्नातुः शान्तो मम ॥ N.K. 1. 20
menaing that may that God who has given up, for the time being the creation of the world, who is the direct perceiver on whose is devoid of desire and hatered and on whose control is the adṛśta, the unseen which is fit to be called the co-causal efficiency on account of its un equalness, which is also called as māya on account of its indescribability which is called the prakṛti due to its being the root cause, and as avidya owing to its being destroyed by right knowledge, bring pleasure to me. Here God is established as the controller of adṛśta.

GOD AS THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD

In the second chapter of Nyāyakusumāñjali, Udayana establishes God as the author of the Vedas. First he refutes the Mīmāṁsa point of view of apauruṣeyatva of the vedas. The Mīmāṁsakas accept the authority of the Vedas. But they strongly argues that they are not the words or sayings of a person (God). But Udayana refutes this point and states that Vedas are done by a single person - and that person is God. God, the creator of the Vedas is sarvajña. It is said in this Kārika
It means that ‘as validity of the knowledge is extrinsic, as there is possibility of creation and dissolution, and as there can be no reliance on anybody other than Him, there is no other cause left open’.

The validity of knowledge depends on excellence. The knowledge produced by the Vedas also depends for its validity on excellence. And this excellence consists in the validity of the authors knowledge of the meaning of the Vedas. One can compose something after understanding what he is composing and the validity of the Vedas depends on the validity of the authors knowledge of the Vedas. The Vedas must have an author and that author is God. Human beings cannot be the author of these Vedas. They are not efficient enough to create the Vedas. So we have to accept God as the creator of the Vedas.

Udayana setsforth an inference for the proving god’s authorship of the Vedas.” the valid knowledge (pramā) is
produced by something more than the general causal aggregate which gives rise to knowledge in general because it is an effect as well as a particular knowledge". That means the valid knowledge is produced by excellence which is an extraordinary cause other than the general causal aggregate of knowledge is general. Excellence in the case of the verbal knowledge produced by the Vedas stands for the author’s possessing the valid knowledge, and God is established as the substratum of this knowledge.

In this chapter Udayana upholds the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge. For this purpose Udayana cites the following syllogism: validity is extrinsically known, since doubt is arising at the non-repeated stage of a cognition like invalidity. Here, anabhyāsadaśā means the stage of non-repetition (avṛttī). If a person perceives water in a lake from a distance in which lake he has taken bath the other day. The knowledge of water which is produced at that time is a knowledge that arises at the stage of repetition. For, this knowledge is similar to what he had the other day. Here, doubt does not arise about the validity of this knowledge.
But if a person perceives water in a lake for the first time from a distance, a doubt may arise on the validity of the knowledge of water. So we are having definite experiences of having the origination of doubt at that stage of non repeated cognition. If validity is to be known extrinsically, such doubt must not arise. Validity is inferred from the successful activity. The inference is thus "The knowledge which occurred to me is valid, because it led to successful activity. Hence, validity is not apprehended by the causal aggregate that apprehends the knowledge is general. It is inferred by a different hetu, viz. successful activity. This is meant by extrinsic validity of knowledge and Udayana supports the extrinsic validity of knowledge. Mīmāsāsaka says that validity is apprehended along with knowledge in respect of valid knowledge. This view is not acceptable to the Naiyāyikas and say that validity of an object can be determined even without the knowledge of validity. An effect cannot originate without a cause. Instantaneous pravṛtti too not being reasonable without the instantaneous accompaniment of its cause calls for that and not for the
knowledge of intrinsic validity. It is clear that the cause of pravṛtī is desire, the cause of desire is the knowledge of Iśtasādhanaṭā. The cause of Iśtasādhanaṭā consists in the knowledge that something belongs to the same category that was previously experienced as a mean a to a desired end. It is proved that validity is not apprehended at the time of the generation of knowledge. It is apprehended later on through inference. Therefore the validity of knowledge is known extrinsically.

The opponent (Mīmāṃsaka) argues that the validity of knowledge may be extrinsic, but they say that the validity of the Vedas is not extrinsic. They say that the validity of the Vedas is established through acknowledgment of the great people. So there is no need to postulate God to ascertain the invalidity of the Vedas. The seers acknowledge the validity of the eternal Vedas. So God is not established either as the author of the Vedas or as the cause of the validity of the Vedas. This view is not acceptable to the Naiyāyikas. They say Vedas consists of letters and letters are not eternal. They are subject are to production and destruction. So the Vedas
are not eternal. According to Naiyāyikas letter sound both are non- eternal. The sound once uttered and was heard before is no more. The hearing organ is not defective, and it is in perfect condition. But the sound is not heard. It is understand that the sound is destroyed and that is why it is not apprehended now. So we that the sound is non eternal.

For those who do not accept destruction of sound as perceptual an inferential argument is offered to prove the perceptability of the destruction of sound. The inference is "The destruction of sound is known by the sense organ, because it is the non-existence of the counter- correlate of what is within the scope of sense organ, like the non existence of a jar". The sense organs that knows an object knows the non existence of that object also. Eg. the eyes which perceives a jar, perceives the non-existence of that jar also. Like this the ear that knows the sound can also know the non-existence of the sound. From this it is proved that the destruction of sound can be known by the sense-organ. The knowledge of non-existence arises even without the perception of the substratum. Hence, non existence of sound,
that is the destruction of the sound, can be perceived even though it exists in super sensuous ether. The non-existence of sound can be known without perceiving the ether, its substrate. The sound that uttered or heard before does not exist after hearing. This proves the non-eternity of sound ie. perception is the proof for the non-eternity of sound. Non-eternity of sound can also be proved by inference also. The inference is that 'sound is non-eternal, because it is produced, like a jar. It may be argued that when a sound is heard, there arises a pratyabhijña in the form 'this is the sound which was heard before and thus there arise an identity between the sound heard on that moment and the sound heard before. But here pratyabhijña does not mean identity it means only the similarity. This pratyabhijña of similarity means that the sound heard before is destroyed and a new sound is produced ie. the sound undergo production and destruction. So the sound is non-eternal. The word sound does not be postulated as eternal.

The word once heard does not exist now. Letter - sound is also non-eternal because it undergo destructions. So the
words and sentences being the assemblage of letters are also non-eternal. So the Vedas are also non-eternal and they are destroyed during dissolution of the world and are created again during the creation of the world. The person who created the Vedas is God. Every thing that are products undergo destruction during dissolution. As the Vedas are also products they undergo destruction at that period. When creation takes place there arises the necessity of creating the Vedas again. Then God creates the Vedas. The study of the Vedas through the teacher disciple tradition is existing eternally. So the Vedas are not composed as new at any time.

The arguments to disprove dissolution are examined and rejected. The opponent says there is no dissolution. Dissolution means every thing simultaneously comes to an end. For this they set forth a ‘vyāpti’ that is the present day and night are preceded by the previous day and night, and the previous day and night are preceded by still another previous day and night, and so on. So the day and night existing in the beginning of creation also must be preceded by the previous day and night. If there is dissolution the first
day and night existing in the beginning of creation would not be preceded by the previous day and night. Such day and night would be absent owing to dissolution. So dissolution cannot be accepted. At the time of creation there is caste and religion, like Brāhmaṇa and Kṣatriya Udayana rejects this argument by saying that

वर्षादिवद्व महोपाधि: बृत्तिरोधः सुपुष्पितः
उद्धृतबृत्तिशिकवद्वर्णः मायावत्समयादवः || N.K. II. 2

As in the case of the days of the rainy season the existence of the universe is the condition, there is suppression of action as in deep sleep, (origination of) the caste is as in the case of herbs, scorpions, signification (of words etc) are like jugglary.

It is stated that there is a vyāpti that days and nights are preceded by the previous day and night. Even if dissolution is accepted this Vyāpti can be maintained. The last day and night existing prior to the dissolution may precede the first day and night existing in the beginning of creation. It is like the first day of a rainy season is preceded by the last day of
the rainy season of the previous year and not by a day of the rainy season existing immediately before it. Like this the first day and light at the beginning of creation proceeded by the last day and night existing prior to the dissolution and not by the day and night existing immediately before the first day and night at the beginning of creation. The argument that during dissolution fruitification of all human virtuous and sinful actions can not be suppressed can also be not accepted. According to Nyāya during deep sleep fruition of action does not take place. Like this during dissolution actions are not fruitified.

Caste system cannot be violated even if dissolution is admitted. It is clear that scorpions in general are born out of scorpions, but the first scorpion is born out of cowdung. Like this the first Brāhmaṇa at the beginning of creation are not born out of Brāhmaṇa parents but they are born out of five elements in accordance with in their respective adṛṣṭa. The postulation if dissolution is not riddled with any contradiction. It cannot be said that at the beginning of creation the significations of the words are not ascertained,
because there is absence of the previous usage of words like jar etc. At the beginning of creation, after creating human beings, God uttered the word like jar etc. and asked them to bring it and thus teaches them the signification of the words.

To prove creation and dissolution Udayana cites some arguments. 'The series of effects constituting the world is produced by the material causes that are devoid of any visible causal series, because it is a causal series, like the series of fire generated by the arani-wood. Here production by material causes proves creation and devoid of any visible causal series proves dissolution. The ultimate fire, atoms inherent in the arani wood exist without producing effects before, but give rise to a series fire when wood are put in to friction. Like this during dissolution ultimate atoms without producing the series of effect in the form of binary compound, etc. but later at the will of God they produce the series of binary compound. It is clear that the branches of the Vedas that are the authority of the observance of Vaidika dharma gradually get destroyed. Therefore the Vedas are non eternal, for this Udayana says.
The deterioration of the tradition (of the Vedas) may be inferred from the observation of the deterioration of birth, ceremonial purification, learning etc of the capacity of study and observance of the Vedas.

The Vedas are destroyed not only during dissolution, even at the cycle of creation also a deteriorating tendency marks the capacity of the study and the observance of the Vedas in different era, and there is break in the tradition of the study of some of the Vedas. From this it is clear that during creation also some of the branches of the Vedas gradually get destroyed. In the state of dissolution fructification of all actions is arrested, nothing is destroyed. The universe stands like an empty space, where only ultimate atoms exist. The actions of living being performed before dissolution exist during dissolution, and the time is delimited by such actions marks the beginning of the cycle of creation again. Then the question arises that if at the time of dissolution all the Vedas
are destroyed, neither the Vedas nor the wise people who accept the validity of the Vedas exist. Then how at the beginning of the creation the validity of the Vedas can be ascertained. Udayana says that the validity of Vedas at the beginning of creation must be ascertained on the ground that the Vedas are uttered by a reliable person, and that reliable person at that time can only be God. Therefore, God is established as the author of the Vedas.

The Sāṅkhya asks that the seers like Kapila and others who have realized the dharma and adharma and possessers of eight aiśvaryās, may be author of the Vedas.

Udayana answers that it is not good. The seers like Kapila and others cannot be the author of the Vedas. For one cannot repose confidence in any being other than God. The Vedas are concerned with many supra sensible things. One who has the direct knowledge of such upra-sensible things cannot only be the author of the Vedas. There is no proof to ascertain that Kapila and other had the direct knowledge of such things.
Meditation also did not help the seers to get the direct knowledge of supra sensible things, because meditation is not possible on things that are not known before. And Kapila and others (seers) have not the knowledge of the caste system exited in the other universe. So it is not possible for them to migrate from one part of this world to another part. Kapila and others can not establish the caste system in this universe by following the caste system in that universe. So we have to accept the opinion of Udayana that it is the omniscient trustworthy God who has composed the Vedas at the beginning of creation. This omniscient Lord has set up all the Vedic traditions in the beginning of creation. It is said the verse

कारं कारमलौकिकासदुतमयं मायावशातू संहरनू
हारं हारमपीन्द्रजालमिव यः कुर्वनू जगत्क्रीड ति ।
तं देवं निरवग्रहस्तु रदभिध्यानानुभारं भवं
विशवासैक भुवं शिवं प्रति नमनु भूयासमत्येष्वष्पि ॥ N.K. I. 4

It means that “May I remain worshipful unto my and to that God Śiva, ‘the Bhava’, the sole ground of confidence,
whose splendour of eternal knowledge shines forth unhindered, who as if in a magic creates this world of supernatural and wonderful nature out of his māya and then destroys it, and having destroyed recreates it.

REJECTION OF PROOFS FOR THE NON-EXISTENCE OF GOD

In the third stabaka of Nyāyakusumānjali the objections of Mīmāṃsaka and Carvāka are refuted and proofs for the non-existence are rejected and states that none of this proofs can establish the non-existence of God.

योग्यावृहिः कुतोऽयोग्ये प्रतिबन्धिः कु तस्ततराम्।
कायोगवं बुध्वते शृङ्गा कानुमानमनाश्यम्॥

There can be no proof for the non-cognition of God who is not fit to be perceived. The objection pointed out by the opponent, also cannot be established, because the siddhanties doesnot negate horn which is not fit to be perceived, inference also is not possible without the subject.
It cannot be said that the non-cognition proves the non-existence of God. Because the examination of the nature of non-cognition shows that it is capable of proving the nonexistence of God neither independently nor with the help of sense organs. The arguments cited by the opponents for the non-existence of God are 1. That which exists is perceived, God is not perceived, therefore God does not exist 2. Sentience in general is perceived as delimited by body which is fit to be perceived. God who is also a sentient being must possess a body. God is not having such a body so God does not exist. 3. An agent takes to work either for his own sake or for the sake of others, none does anything irrespective of his own interest or that of others. God is the creator of this world, so he must have some purpose behind this creation.

But all these objections cannot prove the non-existence of God. The first objections is the non-cognition cannot prove that God is inexistent, because non-cognition can prove the non-existence of a thing only when that thing is fit to be perceived. When it is said that "there is no jar on
the floor', then the absence of the jar on floor is ascertained and not the non existence of jar. Here the non-existence of the jar on the floor is ascertained because the jar is perceptible. But this is not applicable in the case of God, because God is not fit to be perceived; hence His non existence can never be proved by non-cognition. The second objection that God is non-existent because he is not having a body is also incapable of proving His nonexistent. It is not right to state that “there is no God, because it is not perceived”. When one say 'I am happy', I am miserable' here the ‘I’ means soul. That soul is not fit to be perceived. But this absence of perception cannot prove the existence of his soul. Similar is in the case of the supreme soul also. It is not perceptible but is not non existent. During deep sleep soul is not perceived because of the absence of the causal aggregate necessary to perceive the soul. In the absence of jñāna, kṛti etc. which are the qualities of the soul, soul can not be cognised.

During deep sleep soul is not perceived. But this does not negate the existence of the soul. The Supreme soul is not fit
to be perceived. But this non perception did not prove His non existence. One can perceive his own soul, but he can’t perceive other’s soul, hence one can’t say that others have no soul. It is the adṛṣṭa that determines the perception of the soul. It is due to the intervention of adṛṣṭa the mind perceives only one’s own soul and not others. The mind which is in contact with the individual soul lacks capacity to perceive the supreme soul. As the supreme soul is not fit to be perceived, He cannot be the subject of legitimate non-cognition; hence His existence cannot be denied on the basis of non cognition. The non perception of hare’s horn is not fit to be compared to the non-perception of God. There is no positive proof for the existence of hare’s horn, so it can bot be established. But in the case of God there are active and positive proofs for His existence.

‘The argument that the hare possesses horn because it has animality’ may be offered as a proof for the existence of hare’s horn. But this argument is not against the existence of God. A similar argument is in support of God’s existence ie. “the earth etc. must have a creator, because they are
effects one do not have the perception of others soul as he has of his own soul. Other soul is inferred on the basis of the Vyāpāra of body that belongs to that soul”.

The opponent objects that Vyāpāra, of the body cannot be considered as cause for the inference of soul. They says that during deep sleep there is no Vyāpāra of the body, but still the soul exists. So the vyāpāra of the vital force must be the pramāṇa for infering the other soul, since this vyāpāra is absent in God. So the absence of God may be inferred from the absence of the vyāpāra of the vital force. This cannot hold good, because during prānāyāma there is no Vyāpāra of the vital force, then the absence of the soul must be considered. It does not happen so. So soul cannot be inferred from the Vyāpāra of the vital force. At the time of Prānāyāma a particular form of the body exists, that form of the body is also not the cuase for the inference of the soul. The body heat present in the faint body is also not the pramāṇa for the soul. It is stated the particular sentient soul is inferred from the observation of the Vyāpāra belonging to particular as body in the same way the supreme soul or God is inferred from the Vyāpāra or the creation of the world.
The mind is considered as a karaṇa. But the soul is not considered so, because the soul being knower is supposed to be an agent and is devoid of the nature of the karaṇa. The soul cannot be perceived during deep sleep, but this cannot prove the non existence of the soul. The supreme soul is not fit to be perceived. One perceives his own soul, but does not perceive the soul belongs to others. It is adṛṣṭa that determines the perception of the soul. Due to the intervention of adṛṣṭa the mind perceives only onesown soul and not others soul. Due to adṛṣṭa particular soul comes in contact with particular mind, body and sense-organs, and the mind perceives only that soul with which adṛṣṭa brings its contact and not any other soul. So the sense - organs and mind generates knowledge inherent in that soul only and not in any other soul.

The opponent argues that there is a relation between the agency and motive (Vyāpyavyāpaka Bhāvah) If God were the agent of the world, He must have a motive. Since God does not have any motive behind the creation, He doesnot exist. The absence of God's agency is inferred from the
absence of motive. Here the opponent attempts to negate the existence of God by inference. The inference is that "God is not the agent, because there is absence of motive in Him". This inference is not valid, because here the pakṣa(āsraya) is not yet established and so it is having the doṣa-hetvābhāsa of Āsrayāsiddha.

God is not sought to be established through erroneous reason. Udayana says, if the existence of God is pseudo and not real, such God cannot be the subject of any inference. Inference arises only when there is doubt about the existence of something in the substratum. In the inference "there is fire in the hill, because there is smoke" the hill is the pakṣa, where the presence of fire is to be established by ascertaining that where there is absence of fire there is absence of smoke. Here only the real object can be the substratum and not an unreal object. If the opponents doesnot admit the reality of God, God cannot be the subjects of inference. Like this, an unreal objects cannot be the counter correlate (pratiyogi) also. This is established in the following Kārika:
mere non cognition cannot negate the existence of anything. If it is so the existence of all super senscious things would remain unestablished. Only legitimate cognition can negate the existence of anything. Something which is not established cannot be the subject of any inference. So God who is not established also cannot be the subject of any inference

But individual souls are subject to perception and there is no doubt in it, but they are devoid of omniscience and an agency of the earth etc.

The opponent tries to prove the absence omniscience and agency in God. They say the soulness (ātmatva-jāti) has no relation with the person who is omniscient and agent of everything. They say that cowness is a jāti, but it doesnot inhere in a individual who is omniscient and agent of everything. Like this ātmatva jāti also does not inhere in the omniscient agent. By this argument they try to state that there doesnot exist a soul as omniscient agent.
Udayana in response to this, says that this inference is having the fallacy of Saḍhyāprasiddi. That is Saḍhya in this inference i.e. a person who is omniscient and agent of everything is unestablished. So a fallacious inference cannot prove the absence of omniscence and agency in God. Udayana says if the validity of the Vedas is admitted, then the existence of God, cannot be disproved by inference. If however, the Vedas are admitted as invalid, then the fallacy of unestablished substratum cannot be avoided.

आगमादे: प्रमाणत्वे बाधननिषेधनम्।
आभासत्वे तु सैव स्यादाश्रयायासिद्धिशुद्धता। ।N.K. III. 5

Here the cārvāka view of non-cognition proving non-existence of God refuted. Non-cognition of something cannot prove its non-existence. If it is so no inference can exist. Even though, as far as cārvāka is concerned, there is not the function of inference, there are persons in his world who take it as a means of valid knowledge. If it is told that the very expectation or sambhāvana will do, then that also is not correct. Rejecting the ‘Sambhāvana’, Udayana says in Nyāya Kusumāṇjali-
The meaning is that if there is perception, then there will be no doubt. If there is no perception then also there is no doubt, because there is the definiteness of existing and non existing. If something is established as non-existent on mere non-perception, then even the perception cannot be considered as the means of knowledge. Because we are not seeing the sense organ eye etc.

Analogy is not accepted as a proof for non existence of God. It is already established that perception and inference cannot be bādhaka-pramāṇa for the existence of God.

According to Vaiśeṣika Upamāna is not much different from perception so it is not considered as a separate Pramana. Therefore Upamana cannot be a bādhaka pramāṇa for God’s existence. According to Prabhākara Mīmāṁsaka upamana is similarity and it is a separate category But Nyāya doesnot accept it as a separate category . Similarity inorder to be a category must be either a bhāva or an abhāva. Other than bhāva and abhāva there isn’t a third category.
According to Naiyāyika Upamāna is a distinct means of knowledge and the knowledge produced by Upamāna cannot be produced by any other means of knowledge. The Naiyāyika gives upamana the separate status of pramāṇa. But it cannot preclude the existence of God.

According to Vaiśeṣika, Sabda cannot disprove the existence of God, because it is not a separate pramāṇa. It comes under inference. But the Naiyāyikas do not agree with this point Sābda does not include in inference. It is a separate pramāṇa. The opponent asks that if śabda is a separate means of knowledge, then there are words in Gita, that the soul is not an agent. The Naiyāyika admits God, the supreme soul as the agent of the world. So according to śabda pramāṇa the soul is devoid of agency, then the agency is God who is the supreme soul is also nullified.

Udayana gives reply to this in the following verse

न प्रमाणमनासोक्ति नांवृष्टे कविदान्तात।
अगृहवृष्टे सर्वज्ञो न च नित्यागम क्षमः।।N.K. III. 16
If the reasons cited - for establishing absence of agency in God is the testimony of an unreliable person, it is benefit of authority. If it is the testimony of a reliable person, he must possess the knowledge of such supersensible fact conveyed by the couplet otherwise he will not be admitted as a reliable person and such a person must be the omniscient God; the Vedas cannot be eternal (hence must have an author viz. God).

If it is the testimony of a reliable person, then he must possess the knowledge of such transcendental fact conveyed by the couplet, otherwise he cannot give such testimony. And such a person must be the omniscient God. Thus God is established as an omniscient of Bhagavad- Gita and the Vedas.

नचासी कथितेकान्तं सत्त्वस्यापि प्रवेदनात् ।
निर्मितानावधोधारो न प्रांत्यो तत्त्वः ॥II.N.K. III. 17

The scriptural statement referring to the non-existence of God is not the determinanat, because the scriptures do state about the existence of God. It does not purport to
establish the non-existence of God. Sabda establishes the existence of God. The Vedas also mention the existence of God.

After establishing that Sabda cannot preclude the existence of God, Udayana examines Arthāpatti and states that arthāpatti also cannot prove the non-existence of God. According to the opponent, arthāpatti explains the non-existence of God on the ground that if there is God, he would not give the Vedic instructions, because he being all powerful knows how to make active everybody. As there is Vedic instructions, we can presume God to be non-existent. Udayana says that, on the contrary the instructions can be explained only when God is admitted as their instructor. As the instructions cannot be explained without presuming the existence of God. God cannot be disproved by arthāpatti Nyaya holds that the knowledge of the Vedas is the cause of pravṛtti towards dharma, and that knowledge arises from the Vedic instructions, and God is the instructor. More over it is not a separate Pramāṇa, it is included in the inference itself.
Abhāva - non-cognition also cannot prove the non-existence of God, non-cognition is not accepted as a distinct pramāṇa by the Naiyāyikas. It includes in perception.

The third chapter of Kusumāṇjali concludes with the following Kārika

प्रत्यक्षाविद्येऽवयं दूरे विरोधोद्वयः ।
प्रयोगनुभववीश्वरावलोकितमांसेष्य नासादते ।
तं सर्वाः विसंबरक्कमसमस्ववच्छ न्तलीलोतस्वः ।
देवानामपि देवमुद्भवदतिश्रद्धा: प्रपद्यामहे० N.K. III. 23

Without dependence on God even perception etc. Cannot establish their own nature, (only when God is established as the subject, then only) there is possibility of the rise of any contradiction; with the greatest faith aroused we take resort to that Lord of the Lords, who cannot be invalidated by any means of knowledge, who is one without a second, who delights in the sportive exercise (of the creation of the world etc.) unparallel, independent.
In the third chapter of *Nyāyakusumāñjali* Udayana establishes God as the substratum of valid knowledge. In this chapter he deals with the Mīmāṃsā point of view that even if God does exist, his knowledge is not valid. The definition of Pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge) is that which makes the knowledge of the thing unknown. The knowledge of God being eternal and reflecting each and every thing it cannot be the knowledge of the thing unknown. Hence the criterion of valid knowledge does not apply in the case of God’s knowledge. Udayana refutes this Mīmāṃsā position and states that God is the substratum of valid knowledge.

The validity of memory is rejected in this chapter. Udayana states that apprehending an object apprehended before is not a characteristic mark of valid knowledge as it fails to apply in such an affirmative instance as continuous stream of cognition. Udayana defines valid knowledge as ‘yathārthānubhava’ or true experience. And this true
experience did not depend on any prior experience. It is said in the kārika that:

अभ्यासपरिधिक अभ्यासरलक्षणमपर्यंतः
यथार्थानुभवो मानमनन्दक्षत्येष्यते ||N.K. IV. 1

Knowing an object unapprehended before is not the characteristic mark of valid knowledge, because it involves the fallacy of less pervasiveness and of over pervasiveness valid knowledge is true experience which is independent that it does not depend on any prior experience. Memory depends on prior experience. So it is not a valid knowledge.

The theory of cognizedness is refuted in this chapter. It is said that Jñatata (cognizedness) is produced by the cognition of the object, which resides in the cognized. It is refuted by Udayana. He says that it is a jar is not distinguished as a jar unless cognizedness is produced in the jar then before the production of Jñatata, the jar being not distinguished as jar, it will not be understandable. How cognition can produce Jñatata in the jar? We have to say that Jñatata is produced in the Jati not a particular that is said in the Kārika that
The nature of cognition is to distinguish itself from other objects. If the nature is not accepted, then the acceptance of cognizedness also will not help in this matter. Even if it is granted that cognizedness is produced in an existing object, it cannot be produced in a non-existing object. Thus Udayana refutes the Jñātata Vāda also.

The supersensuousness of knowledge also is rejected in this chapter. The mīmāṁsakas are of opinion that knowledge is supersensuous (atīndriya) because it is not perceived by the sense-organs (indriyeṣā anupalabhyamānatvāt) Here the reason non-perception for proving supersensuousness ie. knowledge being super-sensuous can be perceived by non cognition (anupalabdhi) as super-sensuousness implies absence of sense-perception. This Anumāna is untenable because here the sādhyā (super-sensuousness) and hetu, non-perception (Anupalabhyamānatva) are same. Only a legitimate (yogyā) non-cognition can perceive absence (abhāvas)
non-cognition can perceive the absence of a thing only when its counter-correlate, viz. the thing is fit to be perceived. Super-sensuousness of knowledge can be perceived by non-cognition only when knowledge is fit to be perceived if knowledge is fit to be perceived, it can never be super-sensuous. So knowledge cannot be proved as super-sensuous on the ground that the substratum of Jñātata is not perceived.

After rejecting the validity of memory, the doctrine of cognizedness and supersenseousness of knowledge are also thus rejected. Udayana states God as the substratum of valid knowledge. Here the opponent says that valid knowledge being a Kriya is always produced by pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge). God's knowledge being eternal is not produced by any of the means of valid knowledge. Therefore God's knowledge can not be considered as a 'prama' or pramākaraṇa. Hence God cannot be established as the pramāta. (substratum of valid knowledge). The Naiyāyika here says that pramā is yathārthānubhava and pramātṛtva (right knowing) is the possession. According to Gautama
authoritativeness (prāmāṇya) means being separated from all absence of knowledge. That is being always possessed of knowledge. Pramā is defined as Yathārthānubhava and it is not inconsistent with God’s knowledge. His knowledge is eternal and not produced. Being a right knower (pramāta), means being connected with Prama by intimate relation, ie the relation of inherence which connects a substance and its qualities. This can be established in the case of God also. God is pramāta (agent of prama) but his agency consists in His being āsraya or substratum of prama and His agency is eternal. Being separated by all absence, being ever connected with prama, God is an authority. Pramātva in respect of God cannot be defined as ‘anityatve sati yathārthānubhavatva’. Gods knowledge is not non eternal. His knowledge is prama. He is always connected with knowledge, the anityatva is futile. God’s knowledge cannot be considered as aprama because it is not produced knowledge. The same reason that establishes God, establishes His possession of valid knowledge too. The yathārthānubhava, tallies with Gods knowledge about the erroneous knowledge possessed by
human beings. It is therefore established that God possesses valid knowledge and He is pramāta as well as Pramāṇa. Udayana declares it in the following kārika:

साक्षात्कारणि नित्ययोगिनि परद्वारानेवक्षस्थितोऽः
भूतार्थानुभवे निविष्ट निखिलप्रस्तारिवस्तुकः॥
लेशादृष्टि निमित्तदृष्टि निगमप्रभावे शश्कृतुषः।
शश्कृौन्येषक्तलमिति भि: किंपरैरस्तम्ये प्रमाण शिवः॥ N.K. IV. 6

"He whose direct and eternally related true knowledge which is independent of other means of knowledge consists of the proper succession of all the various objects and which is free from least doubt owing to the absence of any incidental defects arising out of the slightest ignorance. He the Śiva is my authority, why should I care for other authority tainted as it be with rising doubt"?

PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

In the fifth chapter of Nyāya Kusumāṇjali Udayana explains inferential proof for the existence of God. In all the four chapters he gives some arguments for the existence of
God. In the first stābaka he explains fruits of the sacrifices. He says adṛṣṭa is the fruit of sacrifice and this adṛṣṭa is as directed by God. In the second chapter Udayana explains that Vedas, which enjoin sacrificial rites are valid. This validity of the Vedas are because they are done by God. In the third chapter Udayana explains that there is no evidence for the non-existence of God. None of the pramāṇas can prove the non-existence of God. In the fourth chapter Udayana gives us a clearcut idea that God, being the author of the vedas possess valid knowledge. From this we can understand that these four chapters are for the establishment of God. In the fifth and the last chapter Udayana proves the existence of God on the basis of inference; It is stated in the following Kārīka:

कार्याःश्रोतवृतीपादेः पदात्रूपत्यः श्रुते: ||
वाक्यात् संख्याविशेषचाच साध्यो विविद्ययः || N.K. V. 1

An eternal omniscient Being as established on the grounds of products, concretive activity, sustaining effort etc. destruction, introduction of empirical usages, infallibility,
sruti, sentences thereof, and particular number. Udayana proves God by the above given reasons (hetus) Here the Kārya the earth and such products that constitute the world must be created by a conscious agent who possess full and definite knowledge of all the details relating to the required causal apparatus. An individual soul or Jīva can not be the agent who creates the whole world. Its creator is the supreme soul or God.

At the beginning of creation two atoms contact together through activity or (āyojana). This activity in the atoms is due to will of God and not by Jīva.

The various planets are sustained in their position and do not collide each other. This must be due to the sustaining effort of some conscious being. This conscious being is Isvara. The destruction of the brahmanda upto dyads are due to the volitional effort of a conscious being and this conscious being is Ṣvāra.

The intelligent who originally introduced ‘pada’ into the world for empirical usages must be no one other than Ṣvāra.
The infalliability of the Vedas depends on the validity of the knowledge derived from them. And the knowledge from the Vedas are all valid because of the eternal purity of the source from which they have originated. This source is definitely the omniscient God. The Vedas are composed by an omniscient being. Vedas are empirical and its composing is not able by an ordinary man. So we have to accept God as the composer of the Vedas. The Vedic texts consisting of sentences must be composed by some intelligent author, and that author is the omniscient God. At the beginning of creation the cause of the diad (dvyaṇuka) is the number ‘two’ belonging to two atoms. It is the omniscient God to whom such enumerative cognition can be attributed and not to the individual self. Here the inference is that the world and so on are kāryas - ie products like the pot. It means that the pot is a product and it is produced by the potter likewise the world and so on are products and they need a producer. The individual souls can bot be producer of the world. So we infer God as the creator of the world.
According to the Nyāya philosophy, creation is as follows: during the period of cosmic rest, by the will of God atoms undergo certain motion and two atoms join together, produced the dyād and three dyāds joinning together makes the triyaṇuka. And four triyanukas joining together make the caturaṇuka. In the order the huge earth water etc. are produced. The atoms are insentient. They want an intelligent agent for motion. According to the Nyāya philosophy this intelligent agent who makes motion in the atoms is God. And when God takes to creation, He is assisted by adṛṣṭa of Individual beings. This individual adṛṣṭa is the necessary condition for all products. But it cannot be said that adṛṣṭa alone is the cause of creation. The efficient causes are also taken into consideration. Supervision by an intelligent agent is one of the causes for the production of the insentient objects.

Udayana cites some sruti and smṛti in support of the proof for the existence of God. He says all actions are dependent on God’s volition and His volition is the auxiliary cause for action and inaction is due to the absence of that auxiliary
cause. Udayana says that individual souls are guided by God, because they are ignorant and devoid of eternal volition (nirapekṣa prayatna). The action of the atoms are guided by God. The actions of all the sentient and insentient are guided by God.

Further Udayana states that dhṛti (support) is also a proof for the existence of God. The sustaining agent of the entire universe postulated to be God. The inferene based on dhṛti is as follows. The whole universe, including the earth and other planets is sustained, either directly or indirectly by the volition of God, because having possessed of weight it doesnot drop down, like the body of the flying birds and like the substance in conjunction with the bird. Udayana says that, the vedic scriptures informs that Indra, Yama, and others sustain their respective world. From this it should be understood that God being immanent in them sustains the world. This identity of God with other things is referred to by such sruti text as (ātmaivēdaṁ sarvam, sarvam khalvidam brahma etc) . Otherwise God and the world being different, there cannot be identity between them. God
enters into the person of Indra and other like a magician projects himself as horse, bear, etc. And it cannot be agreed that, adṛṣṭa itself sustain the universe and there is no need of postulating God’s volition for the sustentation of the universe, because volitions is ascertained as the sustaining cause of the universe on the basis of anvaya vyatireka relation\textsuperscript{15}. Volition must be considered as the cause towards the sustentation of the universe eventhough adṛṣṭa is present. Udayana cites the words from sruti and smṛti texts in support of this argument.

एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गिन ब्राह्म -
पृथिवियो विपृते तिष्ठौ।। (Brhadaranyak Up. 3-8-9)

Udayama says that it mens that ‘Oh’ Gargi! the heaven and the earth are sustained by the volition of the Supreme Being.

Verse from Gita is also cited by Udayana in support of the volition of God

उत्तमः पुरुषस्वत्वः परमात्मेतेतुदाहतः ||
यो लोकद्रामाविषय विभागत्वाय ईशवः || Gita 15-17
Udayana means by this that - God who is not worldly and is omniscient, who is worshipped by all, who possesses eternal qualities and eternal will, sustains all the worlds which are in conjunction with his knowledge, desire and volition.

The Vedas scriptural text which states that God in the form of tortoise etc. sustains the earth is also explained by this. Destruction also is a cause for the existence of God. God is not only the creator, but also is the destroyer of the universe. The entire universe ie. beginning with 'brahmanda' and ending with 'dyads' undergoes destruction, and destruction must be due to the volitional effort of a conscious being. That conscious being must be God.

Udayana presents the following sruti and smṛti texts in support of this argument.

एव सर्वाणिभूतानि समभिल्वाय्य मूर्तिभि:
जनमबृहिक्षैर्नित्यं सम्प्राप्यति चक्रक्रवत् ॥

God pervades the entire universe and makes it revolve as it were by causing creation, and destruction of them Udayana cites the lines of Bhagavat Gīta again

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These lines means that “O Arjuna all beings pass into ‘my nature’ at the end of unit of cosmic duration and at the beginning of the same unit ‘I’ emanate them”. Here the word ‘mynature’ means all products pass into atoms.

It is clear that kāryatva, Āyojana, dhṛti and samhāra etc. are the causes for proving the existence of God. Kāryatva is free from any upādhi (condition). Āyojana, dhṛtih and samhāra are also kārya, hence they are also free from any upādhi. God is the cause of creation, sustentation, and destruction. Thus there is cause effect relation between God and creation, sustentation and destruction of the universe or beings.

The fourth reason set forth by Udayana for proving the existence of God is ‘padāt’. It means that God is the agent for introducing empirical usage. According to Nyāya, like other things empirical usages are also destroyed at the end of the cycle. They are again created at the beginning of the
next cycle. Therefore there must be one person responsible for introducing these usages in the beginning of a cycle and that person is God. For at the beginning of the cycle no human being exist. Therefore it must be God himself who introduced all the empirical usages at the beginning of a cycle. He sets up example regarding all the empirical usages in the beginning of creation and makes people follow them. Eventhough He has no physical body, He is competent to assume physical form from time to time and impart instruction to human beings. In occasion He exhibits His supreme power.

The next hetu cited by Udayana for existence of God is Pratyayā (authoritativeness) According to Nyāya the authority of the Vedas depends on its propounder and that person is God. For this Udayana gives an inference as follows ‘the validity of knowledge of the Vedas depends on the infallibility of the speaker, because it is valid knowledge, like perceptual valid knowledge’. The validity of precipitin depends on contact. Like this verbal testimony depends on the authoritativeness of the speaker. And the authoritative-
ness of the speaker consists in his having the exact knowledge of the word - meaning. The valid knowledge depends on the purity of the person who uttered them. So the validity of the vedas is due to its being pronounced by the omniscient God.

The next hetu that cited by Udayana, for the existence of God is 'sruteḥ' Udayana says the vedas are composed by an omniscient being it is because they are the vedas. And that which is not composed by an omniscient being, is not the Vedas as in the case of empirical sentence.

Udayana defines vedas as consisting of sentences, the cause of which is not perceived and the validity of which is accepted by the seers. The non-perception of the cause, implies that the vedas are not composed by human beings (Anupalabhyamāna-mutāntaratva, and jīvājanyatva) . The Vedas are the composition of an intelligent being, because they consist of sentences. ie. Vākyatva. This is the seventh argument put for ward by Udayana for proving the existence of God.
The Mīmāṃsaka says that the authorship of the Vedas is not known, so the above said inference is not capable to establish the existence of God (asmaryamāṇakartṛkatvāt). In reply to this objection, Udayana says that in every new cycle, God composes new Vedas, and as the Vedas differ from cycle to cycle. It is not possible to know their authorship in the same way as the authorship of other works is known. So the hetu said by Mīmāṃsaka-‘Asmaryamāṇakartṛkatvāt’) is not good. So it is not applicable in respect of the Vedas. In support of the above argument (vākyatva) Udayana cites the Gita verse- ‘Vedāntakṛtvedavideva cāham’.

The opponent says that the smṛti and sruti which cited by Udayana to prove the existence are not valid because they are not vidhi, they are only arthavādas - ie only recommendatory passages. In reply to this Udayana says that if it is so Kartṛsmaraṇa (knowing of the author) also does not come under vidhi-vākya. So on this ground Kālidasa cannot be established as the author of Kumārasambhava etc.
The argument that the Vedas are not composed by an intelligent, because they are not known by any other means of knowledge is also invalid. For God composes the Vedas after having the direct perception of the Vedas.

The opponent advances some reasons to reject this view. The objections are as follows - the Vedas are not composed by an intelligent being, because there is absence of the causal aggregate for the knowledge of the Vedas. God being sentient being like us he cannot possess the knowledge of the Vedas. His knowledge does not consists of the Vedas, because He possesses knowledge like us. He is having the sense organs like us. So He cannot perceive the Vedas God cannot have the mental perception of the Vedas. Because mental perception is possible only with regard to the qualities of the
soul. These are the reasons that the opponent set forth to state that God is not the composer of the Vedas.

Udayana reject all these objections. These reasons cannot have the capacity to prove that Vedas are not the composition of God. He says God is not in need of the causal aggregate for having the knowledge of the Vedas. His knowledge is eternal. Causal aggregate is needed only for non-eternal knowledge. So God does not need at causal aggregate for perception. If it is meant as human being human beings cannot have the perception of the atoms. The Siddhāntin set forth the reason that Vedas consists of senses to prove that the Vedas are composed by an intelligent being cannot prove that Vedas are not composed by an intelligent being. (प्रमाणान्तरागोचरार्थत्व) It cannot be a condition of Vedāpauruṣeyatva. God the author of the Vedas possesses eternal knowledge. So His knowledge of the Vedas is also eternal

The next reason set forth by Udayana to prove God’s existence is ‘sānkhyā viseṣa i.e. particular number. By this
Udayana says that His enumerative cognition gives rise to the notion of duality which is the cause of the magnitude of dyad. Atoms are the ultimate constituent elements of gross bodies. It is through the combination of two atoms the dyad is formed and it is through the will of God that combination takes place. The tryad is formed through the combination of three dyads. In this order the elements earth, water, fire and air are formed.

The magnitude of dyad and tryad depends on the number of atoms and not independently without depending on the number of atoms. Here the number of atoms is the cause for dyad, tryad. This number is advanced as the ground for God's existence. The atomic magnitude is devoid of all causal efficiency. Atomic magnitude is not the cause for manifested magnitude but its number is the cause for manifested magnitude. There must be some intelligent being whose enumerative cognition creates the motion of two and three. This being must be God who is possessed of unimpeded cognition.
This is the last proof that Udayana advances to establish the existence of God. Udayana says it is the omniscient God whose ' apekṣābuddhi ' produces the notion of duality which is the cause of the magnitude of dyad.

Udayana says God's will is the purport of the Vedas. Interpretation of the Vedas by an omniscient being is valid. The Words of Īśvara etc must have meanings as in secular usages. It is said in the following kārika:

उद्देश एवं तात्पर्यं व्याख्या विशवदृशः सति ।

इंश्वरीदिपं सार्थं लोकवृत्तानुसारत: ॥ N.K. V. 6

Udayana explains all the above mentioned reasons which are the proves for the existence of God. All these explanations are based on the different aspects of the Vedas. Here the first reasons viz. 'Kāryatvat' is mentioned as tātparyāt. It is explained that the words are authoritative only when they are having tātparya. So the Vedas being words, must have tatparya inorder to be authoritative. And one whose tātparya is declared in the Vedas is God. The word 'kārya' in the Kārika means pravṛtti nivṛtti-tātparya and
these pravṛtti and nivṛtti are the tātparyas of God, the author of the Vedas. Nyāya believes that language is the creation of God, and each word is capable of conveying a particular sense. God has willed particular meaning to words. God is established from the fact that His will invests the word with their meanings. The second reason for the existence of God said by Udayana is ‘Āyojanāt’. ‘Āyojanāt’ here means interpretation. The proper understanding of the Vedas is possible through correct interpretation. This is not possible by a person who know the Vedas partially. The proper interpretation of the Vedas is possible only by a sarvajñā. And that sarvajñā that omniscient interpreter is God. The fact of God’s having the knowledge of the import of all the vedas is called ‘dhṛti’. This is the third reason for the existence of God. Human beings with their limited knowledge can not master or teach the Vedas. A person other than God can never master the Vedas. It is inferred that the Vedas are interpreted by an omniscient being ie God. Here the word Kāryatvāt is interpreted tātparya, partipādyatva, prayojana and abhiprāya.
Padāt is the fourth reason for the existence of God. Udayana says the words like Om, Īśvara, Īśana etc used in the Vedas prove God’s existence. The words are meaningful only because they are used in the Vedas.

Pratyayāt is the next reason that explained by Udayana for the existence of God. This refers to vidhi-pratyaya suffixed to verbal roots expressing command etc. These commands (vidhi pratyaya) is conveyed by the Supreme person and that person is God. So God is inferred from the vidhi-pratyaya. When a trust worthy person utter some words, his intention is that the hearer should either do something or desist from doing something. So is in the case of Vedas also. The trust worthy person, as there author convey the vidhi pratyaya that conveyer of the vidhi pratyaya is inferred as God.

Here the suffixes like ;liṅ' etc. activates the people. Udayayana holds that the meaning of vidhi-pratyaya is 'abhiprāya' of God. That aphiprāya is the cause of the knowledge of that object. The abhiprāya here means -
whether liṅ-artha is the kartṛdharma or karaṇadharma or karmadharma, or niyokṛdharma. Liṅ artha cannot be kartṛdharma, because it is spanda. If spanda were liṅ artha, there arises istahāni and anistāpati. Kṛiti or prayatna is also not liṅ artha. Iccha also cannot be the meaning of liṅ artha. If it is so there occur mutual interdependence.

Vākyāt is the next reason that Udayana setsforth for the existence of God. Udayana says a sentence is an expression of a particular relation between words. The person who composed the vedas possesses the knowledge of the meaning of the words before composition. The sentences in the Vedas also express particular relation between words. So there must be an author who know the particular relation of words and there meaning. That person who know this relation independently is God. He must have the valid knowledge of Vedas before composition.

Saṅkhya-viśeṣāt is the last reason expounded by Udayana to establish the existence of God. The word sankhyā express two meanings that are saṅkhyā number and samākhyā name.
Here number means the verbal form in first person. It refers to the speaker. And the mention of first person singular is to the speaker. The original speaker of the Vedas is God. The second meaning samkhya also stands for the different names accepted by God. The names like Kaṭha, kalāpaka etc are different recension of the Vedas. To teach these recensions first time to Rṣis, God embodied himself as Kaṭha, Kalāpa etc. Here it means that at the beginning of all circle of creation God assumed certain names (samākhya) Kaṭha, Kalāpa etc. He assumed particular body to teach the recensions.

All the five stabakas of Nyāyakusumāñjali expresses some evidence for the existence of God. The fifth one gives eight reasons for the inferential knowledge of God. The existence of God is referred in sruti, smṛti and epics. It is said that God is perceptible to yogins. God is perceptible through mental perception, as in dream. So in the case of God also the mind gives rise to the perception of God. Sruti speaks about paramātma who possess eternal knowledge, all pervading,
named as Viṣṇu. He possess infinite knowledge, and eternal direct perceptual knowledge of everything Supra - sensuous. Smṛti speaks of Vāsudeva and all actions should be undertaken for the sake of Vāsudeva only without desiring for fruits of actions. Actions other than for the sake of Viṣṇu cause bondage and action for the sake of Him destroy bondage.

Patañjali says karmayoga with a purified mind can enjoin meditation. Meditation of God includes intuitive worship of God. The seers proclaimed God by performing 'jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice,' building temples etc. Sruti says when God is known everything is known, one should devote himself to Lord. Gita words like 'fill thy mind with me,' 'be my devotee,' 'sacrifice unto me,' 'taking me as the supreme goal' etc.. All these establishes the existence of God.

After presenting all these evidences he prays to God to remove the doubt about His existence, for those who did not agree with all these proofs it is said in this kārika:
meaning that. In spite of having stated the existence of God by various scriptures and logical arguments, those who do not agree or believe in the existence of God are certainly stone-hearted persons, when fall in deep sorrow and escape from that sorrow with the mercy of God, will slowly believe in God. Then they remove their doubts about His existence.

Udayana concludes his Nyāyakusumāṇjali with the saying that:

अस्माकन्तु निर्गमसुन्दर, विराज्जेतो निम्म्रं त्वनी-
त्वद्वासनन्दनिधे, तथापि तरलं नाधापि सन्नुप्तेत
तत्राथ, त्वरितं विपद्हिं कर्णं येन त्वदेकाग्रतां
याते चेतति नामुवाम शतशो बाम्यः पुनर्यातना: || N.K. V. 16
Here Udayana prays that ‘O God, the naturally beautiful our minds absorbed in You, then ocean of joy, being restless are yet to be satisfied. Therefore bestow mercy upon our mind to remain fixed in You and will not be subjected to the continual afflictions of Yama.

Reference

1. ऐश्वर्यमदमतः सन्त्वात्मानसंभवन्यसे।
   पुनर्बोधे मसायाते मदधीना-तवस्थिति॥

2. सत्यक्षप्रसरस्सतां परिमल्प्रोद्धोधब्धोत्सवो
   विम्लानो न विमर्दनेमृत्तरस प्रस्यन्द्वाध्वीकमुः॥
   ईशास्थैष्ठ निवेषितः पदयुः भृजायमाणं भ्रमतः
   चेतो मे रमयत्वविन्ध्यमनघो न्यायप्रसूतान्वजलि: | N. K. I.1

3. अलौकिकस्य परलोकसाध्यतस्य भावात्।

4. अन्यथापि परलोकसाध्यनुष्ट नस्माबवात्।

5. तद्भवानस्वेदकप्रमाणा सःभावात्।

6. स्त्वेदपि तस्यप्रमाणात्वात्।

7. तत्साधकप्रमाणाभावाच्येति।

8. N.K. Pg. 4
9. N.K. I.3

10. श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः

11. N.K. I.5

12. N.K. I.16

13. N.K. I.18

14. इत्येषा सहकारिरिकिसरसमा माया दुर्स्नीतिति:
   मूतत्वात्प्रकृति: प्रबोधभवतो सिद्धिति यस्योदिता ।
   देवोत्सै विरतप्रपर्यङ्गनक्षोलकोलाहलः
   साध्यात्साधित्वा मनस्यभिरति बध्यतु शान्तो मम । N.K. I.20

15. It is established by anvaya vyatireka relation that whatever there is sustentation, there is volition as a sustaining cause, and wherever there is absence of volition, there is absence of sustentation.

16. कारणमहत्वं वा कारणबहुत्वं वा कार्यमहत्वमुत्पादयति

17. एताबानेवायमामनाय N.K. V.

18. वेदः कदाचितू सर्ववेदार्थविद्वार्तायात् अनुष्ठातृतृमंतितिचलनेपि
   निर्निर्णायात्नुष्ठानवातः
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