DEVELOPMENT OF
NYĀYA VAIŚEṢIKA THEISM

Traditional Indian philosophy is based on spiritualism. Along with spiritualism, materialism also has a prominent role in philosophy. Indian philosophy gradually developed due to the conflict between the materialism and the spiritualism. Spiritualists believe that materialistic objects are derived from consciousness. At the same time materialists believe that the consciousness and thought are derived from materialistic objects. Both spiritualism and materialism are intermingled in Indian philosophical systems.

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika uphold common sense and science. They are known together as Nyāya Vaiśeṣika. The application of methods is different in these systems. Naiyāyika is willing to accept things, whatever are established through right reasons. If the Nyāya philosophy
dealt only with the nature of the soul and its released condition, there would not be much difference between Nyāya and the Upaniṣads which also treats of these problems. The thing that which distinguishes Nyāya from Upaniṣads is its critical treatment of metaphysical problems. The purpose of Nyāya, in the words of Vācaspati Miśra, is the critical examination of the objects of knowledge by means of the canons of logical proof.

Nyāya is one of the various names of Ānvikṣiki. It deals with the logical aspects of things. In the first stage of development logic was known as Ānvikṣiki, Hetu-Śāstra or Tark-Vidya. In the second stage it got the name Nyāya Śāstra. The word Nyāya means 'right' or 'justice'. So Nyāya Śāstra means the science of right judgment or true reasoning. The word Nyāya technically means syllogism (Pancāvayavavākayam). The Nyāya operate not in things that are determined, not in things that which are not known, but only in thing that are doubted.
It is the examination of objects by evidences. It only accepts things that are known through means of valid knowledge. Naiyāyikas accept four means of valid knowledge. They are Perception, (Pratyakṣa) Inference (Anumāna), Comparison (Upamāna) and Verbal testimony (Śabda). Nyāya is theistic and supports the existence of God. It aims at liberation or otherwise called apavarga as the ultimate end of human life. To attain this, one has to acquire the right knowledge of categories. Naiyāyikas accept sixteen categories.

NYĀYA SŪTRA OF GAUTAMA

The first systematic work on Nyāya Śāstra is the Nyāya Sūtra of Gauthama. According to some, he is also known as Akṣapāda. There is a legend that once Goutama, while walking fell unwillingly into a well, and was rescued with great difficulty. God felt mercy on him and provided him a pair of eyes in his feet. So the name Akṣapāda is given to him in the sense that one who have eyes in feet. At the same time there is an opinion that Gautama and Akṣapāda are
different persons. The proof is that one lived in Mithila and
other in Kathiawar. Gautama is said to be the founder of
Ānvīkṣikī-vidya and Akṣapāda the founder of NyāyaVidya.

Nyāya is a system of atomic pluralism and logical realism.
Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are allied systems and is known as
'Samāñatantra'or similar philosophy. Both of them agree that
earthly life is suffering and bondage of the soul. Both regard
the cessation of suffering as the supreme end of life.
Bondage is due to ignorance of reality and liberation is due
to right knowledge of reality. Nyāya aims at the exposition
of right knowledge of reality and Vaiśeṣika also aims at the
same. Though being Samāñatantras there are some
differences also in this two systems.

Gautama opens his Nyāya Sūtra with sixteen categories
and says the right knowledge of these categories leads to
liberation (Niḥśreyasa).

Among the sixteen categories the first is Pramāṇa. That
is of four kinds. The work includes five chapters and each
chapter is having two daily potions. The work is in the
order of Uddēśa, Lakṣṇa and Parīkṣa.
In the Nyāya Sūtra, Gautama mentions twelve Prameyas. They are Ātma, Śarīra, Indriya, Artha, Buddhī, Mana, Pravṛti, Dōsa, Prētyabhāva, Phala, Dukha and Apavarga. The first Prameya is Ātman or soul.

Soul is the perceiver of all that brings about pain and pleasure, Soul is the experiencer of all pain and pleasure. He is the knower of all, and it is he who gets at all things. The point in which the soul differs from the other objects is that it is only as the experiencer of pleasure and pains. It is never 'hēya', it is always 'upādeya' to be acquired and treasured, while all the rest except release are always only fit to be got rid of. And release is always to be acquired and treasured. Soul, the first prameya is not apprehended by perception. The soul is cognized by means of inference. This soul is of two kinds Jīvātma-individual soul and Paramātma-spiritual soul. The Jīvātma is many and Paramātma is only one. This Paramātma is called God (Īśvara). He is the knower of all things, omniscient and omnipotent.
The Naiyāyikas are of the view that Ṭīśvāra has fashioned this universe by his will out of the ever existing atoms. The atoms are the Primary cause for every effect. Every effect must have its cause. So the world with all its arrangement and order is an effect, and it needs the agency of some cause and this cause is Ṭīśvāra. According to Nyāya this world is not momentary. It is a collection of atoms and is made up of parts like all effects. This world being an effect like any other effect, must have a cause like any other effect, must be preceded by a cause, and this cause is Ṭīśvāra. We can not see Ṭīśvāra because, He has no visible body and not because He does not exist. If there is any doubt look at the shoots which come out of seeds they are not produced by any agent like selves. The Nyāya opinion is that, they are created by God, because they are also effects. We do not see any one to fashion them. It is not because there is no maker of them, but because the creator can not be seen. Thus it is not improper for us to infer that since all effects have a cause, the shoots as well as the manifest world being effects must have a cause. This cause is Ṭīśvāra. He has infinite knowledge and is all
merciful. At the beginning of creation He created the Vedas. He is like our father who is always engaged in doing us good.

In the Nyāya Sūtra, Gautama defines Śabda as the utterance of trustworthy person⁷. It is of two kinds - that of perceivable objects and non-perceivable objects⁸. Here the trustworthy person is considered to be God. Human beings can be a trustworthy person, only in the case of worldly objects. In the case of non-perceivable things like heaven, hell etc human beings can not be the trustworthy person. The words like 'Svargakāmōyajēta' are seen in the Vedas. Here heaven is not a worldly object. Human beings are unable to speak of a thing that is not existing in this world. From this we have to infer that the speaker of the Vedas is somebody other than human beings. And that person is God. Goutama mentions soul as the first object of knowledge⁹ in his Nyāya Sūtra.

There may be an objection like what is the necessity of accepting a soul. The sense organs themselves will do. But that objection has no logical existences. We can’t say that the self is identical with the sense organs, because we can
grasp one object by more than one sense. We identify a thing which is known before by the eyes, by the organ of touch also\textsuperscript{10}. Here in this case if the sense is accepted as the soul then there will be no recognizion. One can have remembrance only if he had experienced before. It will not occur that one is experiencing and another is remembering. But we can't perceive soul. It is only inferrable through reasons. The reasons for the inference of soul are Desire, Aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition\textsuperscript{11}. The way how Desire becomes a proof for the existence of the soul is thus. If one comes into contact with an object and experience pleasure and at a later time he sees that object, he wishes to acquire that things. This wish is possible in one, who is remaining the same. In the same way aversion is also a reason for the existence of soul. If one had a painful experience from one thing and he sees that thing again aversion comes to him. Like desire, aversion also can exists in a thing which is remaining same. Effort is also a reason for establishing the existence of soul. Effort would not be possible if there is no agent perceiving things in present and
recollecting his past perceptions. The effort of one body on
the basis of experience of the another body is not possible.
One who recollects should necessarily be the one who has
experienced. We all have recollections about our child-hood
experiences. The body of child-hood has changed in the stage
of youth and old age. So the body cannot be the Soul. Effort
is possible only on the basis of perception cognition and
recognition of the same subject and that subject is Ātman-
Soul. Previous experience of the pleasure and pain are also
reasons for the soul. When a man gets a thing cherished by
him, he is pleased and when he get a thing hated by him he
feels unhappy. That is the object of the experience of
previous pleasure and pain cause the present pleasure and
pain. Here the experience of the pleasure and pain of both
previous and present should be the same. That cannot be the
body. It is the soul. When a man is desirous of understanding
one thing, he ponders over it, and finally comes to know it in
the form. The person who desires to know, who ponder over
it and finally knows it are the same. So cognition becomes a
reason for the inference of soul.
The soul is distinct from the body. If the body were the soul then, there would be no sin from the burning of a living body\(^\text{12}\). Here the word 'living body' indicate 'living creature'. Actully when the body of a living creature is burned by a man, he must be punished with sin of killing a living creature. But if the body is accepted as the soul, it undergoes change in every moment and so the body of the killer at the time of killing, and at the time of punishment are different. So the killer will not be touched with sin.

Here the Cārvāka objects that if the soul is eternal there will also be no sin, because in killing a body with ātman, ātman being eternal it can not be destroyed. In reply to this Gautama says that, it is not so because the killing effected not to the body but the subject of the effect or body\(^\text{13}\). Soul is something different from body, the mind can also not be treated as the soul, because mind is an instrument while the Soul is the agent. A person who has tasted a sour fruit, finds that its taste is connected with certain colour and smell. At a later time when he happen to perceive the colour or smell of the fruit, he starts to discrete saliva. From this we can
infer that there is someone common to all senses other than the external organs and mind. The instruments of cognition belong to the congniser. The mind also is only an instrument of knowledge. There is a soul different from the sense organs and mind, because the new born infant experience joy, fear and sorrow. This is followed only from the continuity of remembrance of what has been repeatedly gone through before\textsuperscript{14}. It means that something is followed from he previous life to this birth. That which followed from birth to birth is that eternal soul.

Gautama in his Nyāya-Sūtra gives casual mention of Ṫśvāra. He devotes three sutras to view that God is the cause of the world. These sutras were the starting point of theism in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system. In the first Sutra, Gauthama established God as the giver of the fruits of activities done by men\textsuperscript{15}. The good actions of men produce good results and bad actions produce bad results. These results or fruits of actions are given by Ṫśvāra only. It does not mean that the actions of men are not the cause of fruit\textsuperscript{16}. It is not denied that human actions are required, and that no effects would
take place without the working of human agents. But we require another power, to account for what would otherwise be irrational results of human action. Self alone is capable of perceiving pain or joy in any state of existence. This unseen power is İśvara.

The next aphorism means that the above said reason (Puruṣakarmābhāve Phalāniṣpatteh) is not correct, since the actions of men is influenced by Him ie. by God. Besides these there is no elaborate discussion, about God in the Nyāya Sutra. Gautama treats with soul in its every aspects. ie its eternity, difference from body, sense organs, mind, omniscience and its liberation. He says liberation of soul is the ultimate end of human life. It includes in the four human values viz dharma, artha, kāma and mōkṣa. He calls liberation or mōkṣa as apavarga’. It is the state of cessation of sorrow (duḥghābhāvaḥ) Gautama has not speak much about God or not presented any proof to establish His existence. That is not because of His non-existence or unimportance. It must be because of the absence of the opponents who reject God’s existence. We have to assume
that there is no need of establishing a thing that is existing. Isvara is existing and there is no need to prove his existence with the assistance of evidences. That is why Gautama had not spoken much of God and not because of His non-existence.

**NYĀYA BHĀṢYA OF VĀTSYĀYANA**

The Nyāya Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana is the earliest commentary on Nyāya Sūtra. Vātsyāyana is also called as Pakṣilaswaṁin. This work is divided into five chapters and each chapter is again divided into two Ahnikas or daily portion, as in the Nyāya Sūtra. There are different views about Nyāya Bhāṣya Dr. Satis Candra Vidyabhuṣana says. Vātsyāyan was a native of Southern India. His age is assigned to the middle of the 5th century A.D. In Stcherbatskoi’s opinion Vātsyāyana lived long after 500 AD. That it contains references of Viññāna Vāda, so it must be after the date of the origin of Viññānavāda, i.e. in the 5th centruy. The Sutras and Bhāṣya are not yet seem to be studied with the minuteness and thoroughliness which their
nature demands. The Nyāya Sūtra now available are not all original. We can assume that they underwent certain interpolations. It may be admitted that there are many interpolations in the Nyāya Sūtra and in Nyāya Bhāṣya.

Vātsyāyana opens his Nyāya Bhāṣya with the discussion of the instruments of Right knowledge. With out the means of valid knowledge, no real knowledge occurs. With out real knowledge there is no activity. After knowing the right knowledge of a thing, one will desire to get or avoid a thing. Desire is the thing that activates men. The objects are that brings sorrow, and its reasons or happiness and its reasons to men. He defines - the knower - Pramāta, means of knowledge-pramāṇa and the objects of knowledge- pramēya. He says about the Padārthatattva - He defines ‘tattva’ as ‘the reality of the real and unreality of the unreal.

The real knowledge of the sixteen categories of the Nyāya Sūtra leads to liberation. Tattvajñāna is the knowledge derived by the means of valid knowledge. Vātsyāyana admit the four means of valid knowledge that is ascribed in the
Nyāya Sūtra. They are Perception inference, similarity and verbal testimony. Through these means the cogniser get cognition of the cognised object cognised is the person one who is stimulated to exertion by the desire to acquire or discard the object.

The means by which the person obtains the right cognition of the thing is called the instrument of cognition. That thing which is rightly known is called the cognised object. The comprehension of the thing is called right cognision. The right knowledge or the ‘tattvajñana’ of the sixteen categories mentioned in the Nyāya Sūtra leads to the Niḥśreyasa. Mostly in all systems of orthodox Indian philosophy true knowledge of the objects accepted by system is said to be cause of liberation. The objects of knowledge vary in each system.

Although the real knowledge of sixteen categories are told by Gautama as the cause of emancipation, Vātsyāyana makes it clear that it is the real knowledge of soul etc. is the direct cause of emancipation. Being the science of logic, Nyāya
Darsana has to deal with doubt etc. Otherwise this science will have no difference from Upanisads.

The second Sutra of Nyaya Darsana says about the process of the attainment of 'apavarga'. Vatsyayana explains this as that the 'removal of wrong notion' is the first requirement for release. It is possible only through acquiring right knowledge. There are twelve kinds of prameyas beginning from Atman and ending with apavarga.

Wrong notions may be in many ways. It may be like 'there is no soul' or, a non-soul may be apprehended as Soul. Like wise pain is regarded as pleasure, non eternal is regarded eternal etc. These wrong notions lead men to action. By these actions men acquire merit and demerit and these leads to the continuation of birth and death. When true knowledge is attained, wrong notion is destructed. By the destruction of wrong notions defects in the form of desire aversion etc. By the destruction of desire, aversion etc. the activity is perished. By the destruction of activity, there will be no merit or demerit and by the absence of merits and demerits On
the cessation of birth, there will be no pain. The cessation of pain is the real end of life-called liberation - Apavarga.

In the Bhāsyā also there is the acceptance of four means of valid knowledge. perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. The real knowledge derived from these means of knowledge are Pratyakṣa, Anumiti, Upamiti and Sābda respectively. In the explanatory portion of the third Sūtra Vātsyāyana makes it clear, that there is no hard and fast rules regarding the object and means of valid knowledge. Certain things are known by all the means of valid knowledge while certain things are known only by certain means of valid knowledge. The knowledge of soul may be by inference, verbal testimony or self revelation\textsuperscript{23}. But the knowledge of heaven etc. will be only by verbal testimony. Verbal testimony is the word of a reliable person. A reliable person is defined as who possesses right knowledge of things\textsuperscript{24}. He is moved by a desire to make known to others the thing as he knows it. He is fully capable of speaking of it. Vātsyāyana explains the word ‘Āpta’ as one who acts through the direct right knowledge of things
(apti). This definition is equally applicable to the sages as well as Āryas and mleccas. He says about the validity of both vedic and worldly sounds and the validity of the knowledge of things that are visual and invisible. Word is of two kinds Drṣṭārtha and Adṛṣṭārtha. The first is the meaning of which can be perceived, and the other is that the meaning of which cannot be perceived Drṣṭārtha are the words denoting things and Adṛṣṭārtha are words denoting things that are believed to exist. From this explanation we can infer that Vātsyāyana strongly believed in the existence of the other world.

In the Pramāṇa Sutra Soul comes first. Vātsyāyana in his Bhāṣya brings forth the idea that, the soul is the perceiver of all that brings about pain and pleasure, experiencer of all pain and pleasures, the knower of all pains, pleasures and their causes- who gets at all things. The soul is inferred from these reasons- Desire, Aversion, effort, pleasure, Pain and cognition- If one man once experience pleasure by coming into contact with a certain kind of thing, in the future when he sees a thing of that kind, he wishes to acquire that thing.
This wish to acquire is possible only in one who remains one and the same. The wish to acquire was generated by the remembrance. So remembrance of the previous experience is an indicative of Soul. Aversion is also an indicator of the existence of Soul. When one sees a thing that previously caused him pain, he comes to have Aversion to the thing. Effort also becomes an indicative for the existence of soul. If one had experienced pain or pleasure from on object. Who he sees that kind of thing again, an effort arises in him to avoid or acquire that object. The remembrance of the previous pain and pleasure causes the present pain and pleasure. When one gets a thing which brought him pleasure in the past, he will be pleased. When one gets a thing which kind of a thing brought him pain in the past, he feels unhappy. This proves that there is some one common to all these experience that is the Soul. Cognision is another reason for the existence of Soul ie. the desire to know a thing, pondering to know that object, and the knowledge of that thing are existing in the common agent, that agent is the Soul.
There is diversity of knowledge as regard to the diversity of the body. One agent does not recognise what has been perceived by another; So it is clear that there is such a thing as Soul.

In the third chapter Vātsyāyana examines the nature of the self. Is it an aggregate of the Body, the sense organs, the mind, the intellect and sensation etc?

The Soul is different from body. If the body were the soul, there should be release from since as the body were destroyed. But in reality a person is not freed from sins although his body is destroyed, in as much as the sins pursue him in his subsequent lives. Hence the body is not soul.

The soul is different from the sense organs because we can identify an object through both sight and touch. The identity of a thing through touch (skin) that has been previously seen by eye is possible. It is possible only if we accept soul as the knower different from the sense organs. There is an objection that soul is not different from the senses
organs. There is a fixed relation between sense organs and its objects, ie. eye and colour, skin and touch, noses and smell. It means that the objects are apprehended by their sense organs. So there is no need of posting a soul distinct from the sense organs. It is not acceptable. Vātsyāyana asserts that the soul is certainly different from the sense organs. It is correct that there is a fixed relation between a sense and its object. But the sense can not apprehend more than one object whereas the soul can apprehend many objects ie. Soul can see colour, hear sound, and feel touch, etc. So the Soul confers unity on the various kinds of apprehension. So the soul is different from the sense organs.

The soul is different from mind. In some systems soul is not different from mind. According to them the agent which sees the object and touches it is different from the eye and skin. They consider the mind as agent. Vātsyāyana opposes this point and states his own view that mind can not be considered as the agent of cognition, because it is only an instrument of cognition like eye skin etc.. It is stated that the agent sees by the eye, touches by the skin, hear by the ear,
and think by the mind, so mind is also an instrument and not the agent. We must admit the agent other than mind. Moreover, the mind cannot be the agent because it is atomic in size. Being atomic, it cannot perform diverse acts like seeing, hearing, knowing, feeling etc. simultaneously. From this it is clear that mind is only an agent which is entirely different from the soul.

The problem of the eternity of the soul is also proved by Vātsyāyana, in his NyāyaBhāṣya. Vātsyāyana proves the eternity of the soul by stating that a new born infant, expresses joy, fear and sorrow, but in the present life, he has not perceived anything that give rise to joy, fear or sorrow. From this it is inferred that there is something in which the continuity of remembrance exists. That element is the eternal soul which continues from previous life. After perishing the previous body, the soul continue to exist in the present body. Joy and sorrow cannot appear without a cause; The reason for these feeling cannot be attributed to such other causes like Heat, cold etc. The cause here can only be the continuity of remembrance. The desire of breast feeding
in the infant is also due to the continuity of remembrance. To establish the eternity of the soul Vātsyāyana again says that persons without attachments are not born. Only persons beset with longings are born. These attachments or longings are only due to recalling to mind of things previously experienced. This recalling of previous experience is possible only when there is a continuing eternal Soul. If we do not admit the eternity of the Soul, then occurs the 'loss of the result of action done' (Kṛtahāni) and 'gain of the result of action undone' (Akṛtābhyaṭāgama).

In the fourth chapter of Nyāya Bhāṣya Vātsyāyana states God as the giver of fruits of actions done by men. The person who acts does not get the desired fruit of his action from this we can infer that there is someone behind the actions of men, as the giver of the fruits of his action. That one who is the giver of the fruit of the actions of men is Īśvara. To God is the giver of the fruits of action of men\(^2\).

Vātsyāyana also states that Īśvara qualified Soul. God is devoid of demerit and false knowledge and possesses
eternal knowledge and bliss. He is a special kind of Soul who is having the eight qualities. His dharma is in accordance with his will.

**NYĀYAVĀRTTIKA**

Uddyotakara is the author of Nyāya Vārttika. He is believed to have flourished during the first half of the 7th century. Nyāya Vārttika in an extended commentary on Vātsyāyana's Nyāya Bhāṣya. In this work the author develops many new arguments and sometimes presents new or alternative explanations for some of the Sūtras. Like is, the Nyāya Sūtra of Gautama, Udyotakara divides his work into five chapters and each chapter is further divided into two portions. Uddyotakara says there are four sciences viz Three kinds of Vedas agriculture, politics and the science of reasoning. The Nyaya includes in the science of self, It aims at release through knowledge of the sixteen categories mentioned in Gautama Sūtra.

The early Naiyāyikas are of opinion that there should be an intelligent supervision of adṛṣṭa. Uddyotakara establishes
God on the strength of that intelligent supervisor. The word intelligent is only a synonymous word for divine will. There is no difficulty in proving the existence of God, because adṛśta needs the aid of time for its final fructuation. So also it depends upon the divine will. Divine will alone is not capable of inducing creative power in adṛśta. The volitional urge of the individual conditions the physical action. The volitional action of particular adṛśta is limited in particular body. It can not produce volitional urge in another body. The uncaused deserts of individual actions are supervised by a conscious agent and that conscious agent is God. The individual Soul can not be the controller of adṛśta, because individual souls have no knowledge of objects before coming into contact with the body. God require no body for his knowledge. His knowledge is eternal and ubiquitous and as such there is no anomaly involved in the view of the theists that God is the dispensing agent of adṛśta. In the Nyāya point of view the world is an effect; being an effect it is created, and individual (human beings) are not able to create it. We assert God as the creator of the universe. Every
creative urge is motivated. Our creative urge is always for the attainment of something or to avoid something. But God has no such desire; either to achieve or to avoid. He is not having any unmerited desire. He is self-satisfied and self-sufficient. He has nothing to gain and nothing to lose (Na ca Sakalaprāptavyasyāsati Prāpaniyam Kincid Iswarasya). God is absolutely free from any kind of misery and affliction, so it is not acceptable that God created the world out of his sportive mood. According to Uddyōtakara, sportive mood takes place only when an individual is afflicted with pain and try to overcome it. God having no pain or misery have no sportive mood.

Uddyōtakara opines that creation is innate to divine nature. There may be an objection that if God is by nature, creative, creation will go on and there will be no stop for creation. There will be no one against his activity. But it is not right. If the omniscient and omnipotent agent is there, there will be no recess in the creation of the world process. Uddyōtakara points out that such a position would ultimately lead to simultaneous creation of all objects.
God's creative urge is not independent. It depends on individual deserts viz. dharma and adharma to came out to frustration\(^3\). Like other ancient Naiyāyikas, Uddyōtakara says that God possesses direct knowledge and will\((\text{aparākṣajñānacikīrṣāvatva})\). It explains the origin of the phenomenal world. God posses direct intution and desire to create. So Naiyāyikas accept Him as the author of the universe.

Uddyōtakara opine that God has unimpeded and unbounded desire \((\text{Ākliśtaicca})\). His will is free from error \((\text{Rāgadvēśamāhārahitaḥ})\). Uddyotakara does not assert volitional effort in God because of the difference of agent hood in God and in the individual soul\(^3\). The creation of individual soul (embodied) springs from his volition but God's creative nature is not springing on volition. Atoms are considered as the ultimate units of creation. When Gods' creation begins two atoms join and forms dyād \((\text{dvāṇuka})\) and three dyāds join together forms tryād \((\text{tryāṇuka})\) and goes on this order and forms ultimate substance. At the time of pralaya, the atoms separate from each other. There is no
physical organism of God. To contend the opinion of the opponent, Udayana says atoms are the body of God. But Uddyōtakara is not in support of this position. Uddyōtakara does not admit atoms as the divine body of God. And opines that God is not embodied.

Uddyōtakara states that God is the cause of the world and he is accepted as the creator of the world. From this it is clear that God existed at the beginning of the world. Then doubt arises whether He exists after the creation of the world. In reply to this Uddyotakara says that God is the cause at present also. The dharma and adharma of the individual must be activated by an intelligent agent. That agent is God. This agent must exist as far as the dharma and adharma of individuals exist. It is clear that God is the cause not only at the beginning of the universe but also at present. God creates the objects of the material universe and helps the objects to do their specific function. Uddyotakara not only established proofs for the existence of God, but also has discussed the nature and activity of God. Vātsyāyana says
that God is a special kind of Soul (Gūṇaviśiṣṭam Ātmāntaram Īsvarah). But Uddyotakara opines that God is a special kind of substance. The soul possesses knowledge so it must be a substance. God can not be another soul because the qualities which are attributed to God are different from that of ordinary Soul. So God is different from Soul. The difference is that there is no dharma and adharma in God. He is free from the law of Karma. The another difference is that the qualities in God are eternal (Nītyajñānāsrayatvam). God possesses eternal knowledge. But the knowledge of the individual Soul are lost when they are liberated. God’s knowledge is always direct and it includes all things in the universe. There is no inference or Upamāna or Šabda to God. Some say that Īśvara, the all knowing cause of the whole world is only another soul, which has special characteristics. Others, however, consider that He is another substance which is different from soul since it has knowledge which is eternal and which has everything as object40. God is not bound or liberated. He has neither happiness nor sorrow, which are the fruits of Karma. Uddyotakara denies body for God.
According to Uddyotakara individual Souls possess body because of their dharma and adharma. God does not have dharma and adharma. So He did not have any body. There is not desire in Him God possesses the five common qualities viz. number, extension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction. These qualities exist in individual souls also. Uddyotakara states God as the efficient cause, (Nimitta Kāraṇa) of the world, He produces the world, by making use of the adṛṣṭa of individual souls. God create the universe depending on the adṛṣṭa of individual soul. There is difference in happiness and sorrow of individuals and reason for that is dharma and adharma of individual Souls. In accordance with the merit and demerit of the respective souls, God brings about their rebirth in appropriate bodies. Thus it is clear that there is connection with individual soul and God.

The activity of God is neither for the sake of play (Kriḍārthan) nor for the sake of proclaiming his glory (vibhutikhyāpanārtham) According to Uddyotakara somebody will play inorder to remove his sorrow or to have
joy. But God has no sorrow or happiness. God has nothing to gain or nothing to lose. Uddyotakara establishes his own theory that God acts because of His nature (Tatsvābhāvyāt) itself. There may be doubt that if God acts by His own nature, then there will be no stop for activity and creation will go on successively. Uddyotakara clears it by saying that God has knowledge and He acts only when the other auxiliary causes like merit and demerit are present. He does not act without taking into consideration of dharma and adharma. Uddyotakara is the first who works out in detail about the qualities of God using Vaiśeṣika categories. One of the most important contribution of Uddyotakara is to consider God as the efficicent cause of the world. His teaching of God as the special kind of substance is different from that of the Nyāya Bhāṣya.

VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY

The Vaiśeṣika philosophy is one of the orthodox systems that accepts the validity of the Vedas and which allows place for God. All the commentaries on the sūtra of Kaṇāda and
almost all the later works of Vaiśeṣika, give special attention to this topic. In the Vaiśeṣika Sutra of Kaṇāda, there is no open reference to God. It is true that there is no reference of God as a cosmic Soul in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra. But Kaṇāda does not deny the existence of God. All the commentators on the Sutra have accepted the existence of God. It is true that the commentators have not introduced God, in a way to make it a theistic philosophy. the mere absence of an open reference to God does not prove the non existence. In the Praśastapādabhāṣya, there is a full chapter which explains how God creates and destroys the Universe. Vyomaśiva also have proved the existence of God with elaborate argument.

Vaiśeṣika Sutra is the only work attributed to Kaṇāda. The study of the Vaiśeṣika Sutra makes us aware that Kaṇāda must have recognized God. Kaṇāda deals with the supersensious perception of mystics and seers and recognises such a perception as a valid means of knowledge. This proves that Kaṇāda recognised God. The perception of seers is said to be due to their power of Mantras by which they extol
evoke different Devatas. It shows that Kaṇāda recognises supernatural souls as Devatas. Such a recognition presupposes a recognition of supernatural agency. In the second discourse of the sixth chapter, Kaṇāda deals with duties of man regulated in the Vedas. It is said in the Vedas that by performing religious rites one gains access into Svarga. By this it is clear that Kaṇāda has accepted Svarga and such imperceptible and divine worlds which are recognized as the abodes of Gods.

Kaṇāda opened his Vaiśeṣika Sutra with the promise of explanation of dharma. He says that the dharma is that by the possession of which Niḥśreyasa is obtained. Vaiśeṣika Sutra expounds the basic tenets of the Vaisesika system. It is difficult to find in what order the Sutras are arranged. This work consists of ten chapters, the first seven are each divided into two sections (āṅhika).

The theory of atoms is one of the most important theories propounded by the Vaiśeṣikas. The atoms consist of no parts. It always remains independent. In the midest of
the atoms of other substance, the atoms maintain their
particularity. To produce things of larger magnitude, an
atom is empowered to combine itself with other atoms. There
is no beginning or end to the atoms. It partakes the quality
of eternity with God. The atoms are motionless and inactive.
It is God who puts it in motion so as to effect successive
combinations to form various things. The atoms maintain
their original stage and continue to exist, at the time
destruction of the universe.

Kaṇāda accepts six categories. Kaṇāda mentions abhava
but did not give it the states of a category. Later Vaiśeṣikas
accepts non-existence. They divide all existent categories
into two main title Bhāva and Abhāva.

In the six categories, substance comes first. It is of nine
kinds viz earth (pṛthivi), water (ap), fire (tegas), air (vāyu),
ether (ākāśa), time (kāla), space (dik), spirit (ātman) and
mind (manas). Mind is the internal organ. Spirit or ātman is
the eightth category. They accept plurality of Soul. Each Soul
is independent, individual, eternal and all pervading
spiritual substance. Consciousness is not an inseparable quality of the self or not the essence of the self. Consciousness is considered as an adventitious attribute of the self, because the self does not possess this quality during deep sleep. Consciousness is a quality, it must reside somewhere, but it is not the quality of the body or the senses or the mind. It resides in the self. Besides consciousness, the soul possesses some other important qualities viz. desire (iccha) volition (yatna) etc. also.

The theory of atomism is a fundamental principle of Vaiśeṣika system. The Vaiśeṣika hold the theory of atoms and say that the world is produced out of atoms. It is said that the atoms are developing themselves in a variety of forms. It would be something like the materialists. They hold that the world itself is the outcome of the atoms and that there is no God. But Vaiśeṣikas accept the existence of God who has put the atoms in a peculiar shape and this shows that he has some will and design. Educing order out of the chaos of the atoms is the function of God. Kaṇāda might have
deliberately excluded God from the system, not as being non-existent, but as being beyond and above the phenomenal world with which the system was chiefly concerned. In fact Kaṇḍāda does not mention God in his Sutras. He traces the primal activities of atoms and Soul to principle of adṛṣṭa. An atom is having no parts and it is independent. They opine that atoms are perceived by God. But barring the reference to God and individual soul there is nothing in the system so elaborate in its contents to make it spiritual. Kaṇḍāda accepts the authority of the Vedas. Even though he does not teach that God has revealed Vedas, it does not mean that he refute this fact. As far as the knowledge required to compose the Vedas in concerned Kaṇḍāda says human beings don’t consist such a knowledge. So some one superior to men must be the author of the Veda. Kaṇḍāda in the aphorism - ‘tad-vacanad-āmnāysya-prāmṇyam- makes it clear that the authority comes to Veda because it is told by Him. Here the ‘tat’ means the teller of dharma. Kaṇḍāda has said this sutra and the interpreters like Prāstapada and Vyomasiva have treated the ‘tadvacana’ as
the sayings of God. And they introduced God in this system by name. They state that creation and destruction are due to the desire of God. The right knowledge of the similarities and dissimilarities of the six categories are conducive to liberation. Supreme good results from particular dharma (merit). This dharma is aided by the desire of the supreme God. The authority of the Veda is accepted but it is not accepted as eternal or authorless. It is the word of God and this makes it authoritative. He is guided by the law of Karma representing the merits and demerits. These merits and demerits are unintelligent and needs some one intelligent to supervise and control it. He is established as the efficient cause of the world. The atoms are the material cause. God can not directly operate or create the world. He only gives notion to the atoms.

According to Vaiśeṣika bondage is due to ignorance and liberation is due to right knowledge. Here the knowledge means the right knowledge of the similarity and dissimilarity of the six categories. Due to ignorance the individual souls
perform actions. Actions are the cause of merit and
demerit. The actions are in the things which are supposed to
be the giver of pleasure or the avoider of sorrow. Actually
the wrong knowledge finds its place here. Men know a thing
as the giver of pleasure which is actually not.

The merit and demerit of the individual souls are called
as Adṛṣṭa. Adṛṣṭa is in accordance to the good and bad deeds
(karma) of the individual souls. This adṛṣṭa guided by God,
imparts motion in the atoms. This motion in the atoms leads
to the creation. Creation is for the sake of enjoyment or
suffering of the individual souls. As long as this creation
continues, the soul will be bound and with the stop of
creation the soul is liberated. This is due to the knowledge of
the right discrimination of the categories. The liberated souls
have the knowledge of nothing, no feeling, no action. The
soul is absolutely free at the stage of liberation.

PADĀRTHA DARMA SAMGRAHA

The earliest works on Vaisesika system are Vaiṣeṣika
Sutras of Kaṇāda The Daśpadārthaśāstra of Candramati

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and the Padārtha Darma Samgraha of Praśastapāda. Padārtha Darma Samgraha is also known as Praśastapāda Bhāṣya. Praśastapāda was the first who allotted a place for Īśvara in Vaiśeṣika system. Praśastapāda dealt with the existence and attributes of Īśvara. The later Vaiśeṣikas accepted the doctrine of Īśvara set forth by Praśastapāda and further elaborated and discussed. Praśastapāda has devoted a full chapter to describe the cosmic acts of God. He say the creation and dissolution of the universe is due to the will of God. He has not classed God along with the human soul. The other commentators followed Praśastapāda and they have discussed the existence of God elaborately.

Praśastapāda defines soul or atman as the substance which belongs to the class Ātmatva. The effect of soul is cognition. Soul is inferred from cognition. Soul is subtle and imperceptible Jñāna can not in the body (sārīra) sense organs (indriya) or in mind (manaḥ) because, all these are unintelligent. So it is clear that Jñāna is a characteristic or attribute of the intelligent soul only. The soul is also inferred from other reasons like actions of vital air (prāṇa) etc. The
attributes of the soul are cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit demerit, faculty, number, dimension, severality, conjunction and disjunction. According to Praśastapāda right knowledge is of four kinds. viz, Pratyakṣa anumāna, smṛti and ārṣajñāna. To attain emancipation one has to acquire the right knowledge of the similarity and dissimilarity of the six categories prescribed in the Vaiśeṣika Sutra*. By the real knowledge false knowledge, is got rid of and man experiences a passive mood. So desire and aversion perishes and will be free from dharma and adharma. The union of soul and body are destroyed. Then occurs final emancipation or mākṣa

Praśastapāda divided his text into six portions viz. Dravyagrantha, Guṇagrantha, Karmagrantha, Samanyagrantha, Visesagrantha and Samavayagrantha respectively. Each grantha is again divided into prakaraṇās such as dravyaprakaraṇa, Sādharmyaprakaraṇa etc. Praśastapāda opens his work with a benedicatory verse paying homage to kaṇāda the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system.
Praśastapāda accepts the six categories that presented by Kaṇḍāda. They are dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Samānya Viśeṣa and Samavāya. The early vaiśeṣikas donot enumerate negation as a separate category, though thus accept the concept of negation. Later Vaiśeṣikas began to consider negation as a separate category. The concept of particularity (Viśeṣa) is the peculiar doctrine of Vaiśeṣika-s. It is the ultimate specializing factor inhering in eternal substances. Praśastapāda deals with the characteristics of all the six categories. According to his Bhāṣya, beingness (astitva) nameability (abhidheyatva) and knowability (jñeyatva) are common characteristics of all the six categories. Astitva is the capability of an object to exist in a particular form. It means that the categories are characterized by their positive nature. Abhidheyatva is the potentiality of being described by words. Jñeyatva is the characteristic of being known. The object which are not subject to the cognition of ordinary people can be conceived as object of cognition to ascetics (yogin)-s and God (Īśvara).
The mention of soul found as a substance. Here soul stands only for the individual soul. Praśastapāda has not distinguished the soul as Jīvātma (individual soul) or Paramātma (Supreme Soul). The soul being subtle in nature, can not be perceived by the sense organs. It is only inferred, like the sense organs from the perception of sound etc. The sense organs being instruments (karaṇa) can not operate itself. They need an intelligent agent to operate them. That intelligent agent by whom the instruments of organs are operated is Soul (Ātma). It is in the soul that the cognitions inheres. The body and sense organs does not possess cognition. As the body, sense organs and the mind are not the intimate cause of cognition. Consciousness does not belong to them. They are all unintelligent. The next argument setforth by Praśastapāda for the existence of Soul is that, we infer the charioter from the movement of chariot. We can infer an intelligent agent from the movement of body. The activity of the body inorder to avoid undesirable things and attain desirable things is also cause for the inference of the soul. Praśastapāda explains the Vaiśeṣika Sutra⁴⁴,
proving the existence of the soul. Thus differentiated actions of the vital air in the body, is like those of the blower of a wind pipe. The opening and closing of the eyelids is like those of a puppet which is controlled by somebody. The growth and healing up of wounds and fractures in the body are like the repairing of house by its owner. The contact of the sense organs for perceiving desired objects, is like the moving of a ball by a boy in a corner of the house. After the perception of an object by the eyes, if there is the remembrance of taste, we find the tongue being salivaised. From all these reasons, it is possible to infer a single cogniser, who has cognised both the cognitions and who is similar to a spectator looking through two windows. The abode for the attributes viz pleasure pain desire, aversion and volision is inferred as Soul⁴⁵. These are not the attributes of the body or the sense organs- because they co-exist with notion 'I". They exist only in a portion of the object to which they belong. They do not exist till the destruction of their substratum. They are imperceptible by the external sense
organs. Like this the existence of the Soul is proved from the word 'I' which is distinct from the word 'earth' etc\textsuperscript{46}. There are merit and demerit in the Soul as they are said as not being the cause of the attributes of another soul\textsuperscript{47}. Faculty existing in the soul is the reason for remembrance. The plurality of the Soul is indicated by the restriction\textsuperscript{48} (Vyavasta) The highest magnitude (paramamahatva) in the Soul is indicated in the Sutra*. When Soul comes in contact with the body, pleasure, pain etc. take place. Praśastapāda establishes arguments to prove the existence of the Soul by inference. Consciousness is stated as the inferential reason of the Soul. The body, the sense-organs, the mind and other substances can not be the substratum of consciousness. Soul is considered as the substratum of consciousness.

**VYOMAVATI**

Vyomaśivācārya in his Vyomavati takes up the general argument for the existence of God, based on the cosmic process of creation and annihilation of the universe. He says that creation and annihilation of the universe are done by an
intelligent agent and this agent is God. For this purpose he first proves that the universe is created. The argument is that 'the universe is created and destroyed because it has a physical structure'. Whatever has a physical structure, is a product and all the products are created and are bound to be destroyed. So the universe is created and destroyed as it is also a product having physical structure. It means that all things having a structure are products. That is wherever a physical structure is found there is impermanence, but the reverse does not hold good. The universe has a physical structure and so it is a product. So the universe is created and as a product it is destroyed also. The universe having produced and destroyed, must have a producer and destroyer. This producer and destroyer must be an intelligent and sentient being. He puts forward a syllogism ie. 'the earth and the like have an intelligent cause, because they are products'. Whatever is produced is having a sentient cause, for example, a pot, these are such products'. So these have such a cause.'
Here the example is a pot and its creator is a potter, an empirical Soul with limited knowledge and power. Then one may doubt that, how can this prove the existence of a cosmic soul with unlimited powers. Then the answer is that, what is inferred in the above given syllogism is only the agency of a sentient Being without reference to its powers. But the power of this Being will be in accordance with the product. That is in the case of a pot, the Being proved is only a potter, as a potter creates a pot. Similarly in the case of the creation of earth, a being which is capable of creating the earth only is proved. So the above instance prove that a pot points to a sentient being capable of producing it while the earth and the like presuppose only such a being as is capable of producing them. Such a Being should have the knowledge of all the causes including the infinitesimal atoms which are the material causes of the globular products. So the sentient being who has a knowledge of atoms and such suprasensible beings must be omniscient Being. Here is an objection that the Being that established by the above argument is only a sentient Being- producing an
effect and not an omniscient being here the general concept is based on general concomitance. For this objection Vyomaśiva argues that laws about the particulars are carved out of general laws a common rule applies to all the particulars. So in the argument for the existence of God, the particular producer i.e. the omniscient Being is proved by the general law that the product points to a sentient being. There is an objection that the inference in the case of fire from smoke is not similar to the inference of the Supreme-Soul, because fire is perceptible and the Supreme-Soul is beyond perception. In the instance of fire, fire can be actually seen, but the Supreme Soul cannot be seen at all. For this Vyomaśiva says that in establishing the existence of God, the concomitance between the producer and a sentient being is universally established but the powers of these beings may vary. In the instance of the inference of fire, that is from the particular to general. But in the case of the Supreme Soul it is from the general to the particular. The non perceptibility of the Supreme Soul does not make the argument weak, because there are many valid types of
inferences which establish the existence of the supersencious objects. It is absurd that the potter should be fully similar to the cosmic creator. In the argument for the existence of God, God is inferred as an agent at least and not as God. And the agent or creator of the cosmos should have a complete knowledge of the instruments and the process of the creation of cosmos as every producer should necessarily have a knowledge of the components of the product. This make the cosmic creator omniscient.

Vyomaśiva opines that God is not embodied. Those who accept an anthropomorphous God, conceive God to be embodied, because they think that all the sentient creators are always found to have a body and God also as a sentient creator should have a body. But Naiyāyikas can’t accept this view. If God is having a body, his knowledge and power also should be limited as in the case of all other sentient creators and such a person having limited knowledge and power can’t create this universe. Moreover there is no evidence of His being a body. God is an agent, He cannot be said to have a body. If He is having a body. He can not be the cosmic
creator. With a body similar to that of an empirical creator, God can not be accepted to be the creator of the universe. And there is a vast difference between God as the cosmic agent and the ordinary Soul the empirical agent. Both the ordinary soul and the cosmic Soul are similar as agents, but the magnitude of power and function of the cosmic agent makes Him the highest while that of the empirical agent makes Him the lowest. So it can not be said that God should have a body just as the empirical soul has. If God is having a body He will be having limited knowledge and power so His field of activity also would be limited. So the simultaneous effects in the vast area of space can not be accounted for.

If God is having a body, it is clear that it is the creation of Himslef. Then the question arises whether He created that body with or without a body. If he created it with a body, then that body must be non-eternal and must have been created by Him with another body which again must have been created by Him with yet another body. And this process of creation goes on. Thus the supreme Being should
be always busy with the creation of the series of His own bodies and no other work would be done. If it is accepted that God creates His first body without being a body, then He can create this universe also without a body. So there would be no necessity for a body at all. Accepting an embodied God is logically defective and self destructive. Recognition of God means recognition of a supreme agent with powers. These powers are not similar to that of the power of the empirical embodied agent. Thus the subject of inference shows that recognition of God is dissimilar to the empirical agent. If the subject is the body then it may be argued that the possession of body makes God similar to the empirical agent. Hence it can not be proved that God has a body. It is clear that it is not the body that makes one creator. If it is the body that makes one creator, then he would be a creator even in the state of sleep and absent mindedness as the body exists even in such states. It is the power to make use of the material causes that characterises a creator. It is the will of God that plays an important role in the cosmic acts of creation and dissolution of the universe. It means that God exercises His will to create and destroy.
The will of God is entirely different from that of the will of ordinary man. It is without selfish motives. God acts for others. He has nothing to gain for Himself through His creation and He creates for the sake of empirical souls. The will of God is eternal and it acts when the auxiliary factor, ie, adrṣṭa appears. It is the cause of beginningless creation. This unbroken continuity is a fact. The cosmic will appears and works as and when the adṛṣṭa of the empirical souls makes it appearance. This will plays an important role in the cosmic acts of creation and destruction.

So Vyomaśīva has discussed and established the existence of God, the will of God and has proved that God is not embodied. From this we can see that the early Vaiśeṣikas have the theistic tendency. It is clear that the vaiśeṣika system has been a theistic system right from the early stages.
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