4.1: A Perspective on Contemporary International Relations and Nation's Behaviour

The nationalism, that the French, in the wake of their victories under Napoleon, carried deep into the Eastern Europe, awoke a popular awareness of the political power implicit in large numbers of people living together within a state. Until this time, by and large on the continent of Europe, the people as a whole had little interest and no real share in the process of government. A fundamental revolution in their ideas and a new political awareness of nationalism were the first fruits of the French revolution.

After the French Revolution, the feudal idea that, people, like cattle, were the property of king - could never be effectively revived. It was rapidly replaced into the minds of those who had come into contact with the contagious French ideas by the new "national" principles.

In the course of the 19th century, this objective of liberal nationalism triumphed in most of Europe and in the Americas. In the course of the 20th century, it has increasingly spread to the other areas of the world - particularly to the formerly colonial Asia, Africa and Latin America and most recently to the earstwhile Soviet Union's satellite States in the Eastern Europe as well as to its own former constituent republics.
The basic result of nationalism is that each state has increasingly become the centre of its own universe. It is itself more and more its own first concern and pre-occupation. It fabricates and elaborates a national way of looking at the world - what the philosophers call its own "Universe of discourse." Words and terms lose their objectivity, since they take on meanings given to them by nationalistic aspirations and national interests.

The consequence of separate universe of discourse is that, international morality becomes an extension of national morality. Each national group jealously guards its national values, emphasising the superior level of perfection attained in their own nation-state, but simultaneously believing that most other nation states share the same values in less well realized forms. The net effect is that the particular values become universal values, indeed. Thus, the national values are projected on to the international scene, and the state sees reflected back its own value image and labels it "universal". This process eliminates the logical incompatibility between what a nation wishes to do and what the world might deem right and just.

Thus, the viewpoint of any given sovereign nation-state is rooted in its own interpretation of the universal value at stake. It does not reject the value, but rather interprets its own conduct favourably in the light of, and on the basis of that value. This process need not even be a conscious one. In this way, two states may follow mutually contrasting policies, or a given state may at times behave in a manner contradictory to its earlier behaviour over the same issue and yet justify their action. This is what a state's foreign policy constitutes in essence.
4.2 : Exploring the contours of an Analytical Framework

One of the most difficult problems in the study of international relations is to explain why nations behave as they do.

Much of what we want to know about international relations can be grouped under the headings of twelve fundamental questions (Deutsch 1989). In one form or another, these questions have been asked for many centuries by political scientists, as well as by political leaders. It is difficult to get precise answers to these questions, and even more difficult to acquire a knowledge about them that can be impersonally tested, reproduced, and verified, or else disproved, to be called in some sense scientific. Yet we must explore such knowledge, and in exploring the contours of such knowledge, our twelve fundamental questions may help us to keep our search relevant to what we need to know by integrating varied concepts of such knowledge into an analytical framework.

These twelve fundamental questions are as follows:

1. **Nation and world**

What are the relations of a nation to the world around it? How do they relate to the international political system?

2. **Transnational Processes and International Interdependence**

To what extent can the governments and peoples of any nation-state decide their own future, and to what extent does the outcome of their actions depend on conditions and events outside their national boundaries?
3. War and peace

What are the determinants of war and peace among nations?

4. Power and Weakness

What is the nature of the power and weakness of a nation in international politics? What are the sources and conditions of such power? What are its limits? When, how, and why does power change?

5. International Politics and International Society

What is the relation of international politics to the society of nation-states?

6. World Resources

Is world population growing faster than world supplies of food, energy, and other resources, and faster than the "carrying capacity" of our environment with regard to clean air, water and unpolluted living space? What would be, in either case, their consequence for international relations, and what, if anything, could be done about them?

7. Prosperity and Poverty

How great is the inequality in the distribution of wealth and income among nations? What determines the nature of these distributions and the size and direction of changes in them?
8. Freedom and Oppression

How much do people care about independence from other peoples or countries, and how much do they care about freedom within their own country and nation? What conditions influence or change their perceptions and choices?

9. Perception and Illusion

How do leaders and members of nations perceive their own nations and their actions?

10. Activity and Apathy

What part and what groups, of the population take an active interest in politics? What part and what group do so with regard to international politics?

11. Upheaval and Stability

Under what conditions does stability prevail in a state? When and how does the upheaval take place? How does the stability or upheaval affect a nation-states' course of international politics?

12. Identity and Transformation

How, throughout all changes, do individuals, groups, peoples and nations preserve their identity? To what extent can peoples, states, and social groups change their behaviour, their goals, their inner structure, and to what extent can they still, throughout these changes, preserve their own identity? What are the effect of international changes on national transformation and identity, and con-
versely, what are the effects of transformation of one nation, or some social groups within it, upon other nations and upon the international system?

Clearly, it is easier to ask such questions than to answer them. Some aspects of international politics and nation’s external behaviour, such as general foreign policy orientations and latitude of choice, can be accounted for by reference to systemic conditions, capability analysis or strategy. But political units do not just react to limitations imposed by the external environment. Nor do we understand a state’s international relationships and foreign policy behaviour with reference to strategy. In fact, it is too simplistic, and sometimes misleading to assume that a state’s behaviour in foreign affairs is governed by its foreign policy strategy. To understand state’s behaviour adequately, we must, in addition to systemic conditions, capability and strategy, discuss objectives which are the basis of a state’s foreign policy action; and it is the objectives which in the final analysis control and determine a state’s international behaviour.

Some students of international politics maintain that all human behaviour, including therefore behaviour in the international realm is characterized by a “power drive”. Bertrand Russell, for example wrote that “of the infinite desires of man, the chief are the desires for power and glory” and added that some human desires unlike those of animals, “are essentially boundless and incapable of complete satisfaction” (Russell 1938). Other scholars agree. And although some of them might not classify the power drive as either unlimited or omnipresent, they feel that the concept of power provides the best organizing focus for the study of relations among individuals and groups, including the massive and complex groups whose interactions is the subject-matter of the study of international relations (Morgenthau 1985).
Yet, in our judgement there is reason for caution in accepting this or any other single-motive explanation of nation's behaviour and applying it to the infinite variety of patterns found in international relations. Certainly, considerations of power are important. They are seldom, if ever, completely absent from the minds of the statesmen. But this is not the same as claiming for them a first priority in each situation. Much will depend upon how power is defined - and anyone who has ever attempted such a definition will know that he is dealing with a slippery concept. If it is equated with physical force alone, one finds that many contemporary international relationships can not be explained by sole reference to relative possession of physical strength. May be it was so in an earlier day, when Thucydides could write that, "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must"; but we live in a different world in which the weak can afford to be rash, but the powerful have to be restrained.

If power includes, as it must, not only physical but also psychological, economic, and even moral ingredients, then one may wonder whether the concept has not become too broad to be useful for the purpose of analysis.

It might seem that the mere existence of a multitude of nation-states, each capable of independent decision and action, would suffice to explain the peaceless state of the world affairs and the power struggle that fill the international arena. Undoubtedly, the anarchical condition inherent in any system of multiple sovereignty constitutes one of the pre-requisites of international conflict; without it, there could be no international relations peaceful or non-peaceful. Yet, in the final analysis, it is the goals pursued by the actors and the way they go about pursuing them thorugh strategy - both of which are determined by a variety of factors - determine foreign policy and external behaviour of the states.
The following chart presents an integrated framework constituting a coordinated and typolozied scheme of relationships between various conceptual variables identified in the twelve fundamental questions that we framed and a discussion which followed them. The framework presented here is comparative in nature which will be used in the following chapter to understand the relational pattern between India and the United States.

Diagram 2: Determinants of Foreign Policy - an Integrated Conceptual Framework
4.3: Understanding Nation's Relational Patterns: A Framework for Analysis

The Framework, as developed for the present study, constitutes five basic determinants of a given nation's international relational patterns. They are:

(1) International Systemic Environment

(2) Domestic Environment

(3) Total National Capability

(4) National objectives, and

(5) Nation's strategies

Each of these determinants has a number of constituent influential factors in constant interaction. Thus, International systemic environment is typologized into four broad states as that of conflict, competition, co-existence and cooperation. The assumption is that, at any given period of time the international systemic environment can be understood as being in either one of these four states or as being in a state of a complex composition of all the four states, each constituting itself in varied degree.

The second important determinant of a nation's external behaviour is its domestic environment which itself is determined by a combined effect of four factors, viz. nation's socio-political-economic value system, human resource composition, idiosyncratic factors in leadership and internal lobbying by interest and pressure groups. Total National capability, as generated by a complimentary and
cumulative effect of geo-political location, state of economic development, socio-political-economic stability and military strength, is the third determinant of a nation's external relational pattern.

International politics arise when states seek to change or sustain the behaviour of other political units in the system in order to achieve, defend or extend their own interests, values, and objectives. We have identified here certain basic objectives which are common to every nation’s scheme of interests. They are: national security, economic development, international prestige, and influencing and maneuvering national and international environment favourably. In addition to these basic national objectives, every nation conceives its own special interest(s) unique to its own national existence, and thus they constitute an important determinant of its international relational pattern.

Finally, in view and with assessment of the above determinants a nation-state formulates and implements its strategies, which too in ultimate analysis becomes a determinant of a nation's overall foreign relations.

There is a constant interaction and interinfluence between the constituent factors of each determinant and among the determinants themselves. Thus, any foreign policy formulation is essentially a product of simultaneous influence of a number of varied determinants through a highly complex process of interaction and interinfluence.

This interinfluence is indicated in the framework's diagram by the dotted boundaries which characterize the non-rigid compartmentalization of various determining variable and point their compositeness of them.
It should be recognized that the term 'system of states' has a long history, and embodied some rather different meanings, before it came to have its present one wherein we know system (or international system) to form when two or more states have sufficient contact between them and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave - at least in some measure - as parts of a whole.

It appears to have begun with Pufendorf, whose tract *De Systematibus civitatum* was punished in 1675 (Bull 1977). Pufendorf, however, was referring not to the European state system as a whole, but to particular groups of States within that system, which were sovereign, yet at the same time connected so as to form one body - like the German states after the peace of Westphalia. While the term 'system' was applied to European states as a whole by eighteenth-century writers such as Rousseau and Nettlebladt, it was writers of the Napoleonic period, such as Gentz, Ancillon and Heeren who were chiefly responsible for giving the term currency. At a time when the French power threatened to destroy the international system and transform it into universal empire, these writers sought to draw attention to the existence of the system, and also to show why it was worth preserving; they were not merely the analysts of the international system, but were also its apologists or protagonists. Of their works, the most important one was A.H.L. Heeren's *Handbuch der Geschichte des Europaischean Staatesnsystems und seiner kolonien* published in 1809 (Bull 1977). The term 'state system' first appeared in English in the translation of this work that was published in 1834 (Heeren 1834).
For Heeren the state system was not simply a constellation of states having a certain degree of contact and interaction. It involved much more than simply the causal connection of certain sets of variables to each other, which Kaplan takes to define a ‘system of action’ (Kaplan 1957). Kaplan defines a system of action as a set of variables so related in contradistinction to its environment, that describable behavioural regularities characterise the internal relationships of the variables to each other, and the external relationships of the set of individual variables to combination of external variables. On the other hand, a state system for Heeren was the union of several contiguous states, resembling each other in their manners, religion and degree of social improvement, and cemented together by a reciprocity of interests (Heeren 1834). In other words, he saw a state system as involving common interests and common values and as resting upon a common culture or civilization. Moreover, Heeren has a sense of the fragility of the states system, the freedom of its members to act so as to maintain the system or allow it to be destroyed, as the Greek city-state system had been destroyed by Macedon, and as later the system of Hellenistic states that succeeded Alexander’s empire had in turn been destroyed by Rome. Such a conception of states system differs basically from what is called an international system in the present study, and is closer to what Bull calls an international society (Bull 1977).

After the Renaissance and the religious wars, the beginnings of bourgeois commercialism, and the centralization of monarchical bureaucratic control, feudalism gave way to the nation-state system, which enjoyed its classical period from 1648 until 1914. This system began to undergo a fundamental transformation with World War I, and that has continued through several clearly identifiable phases to the present day of the post-cold war era. George Pettee (1966)
has referred to the transformations of the western state system since ancient times as "systemic revolutions'. Even within the period from 1740 to 1960, Richard N. Rosencrance (1963) discerns nine "system-periods' in which the modes, objectives and techniques of diplomacy were perceptibly different in each.

Virtually all analysts of the international system begin by pointing to the standard sets of variable - actors, structure, processes, and environment (Young 1968, Romani 1972). The term 'actor' means a fairly significant organized entity capable of carrying on more or less independent activity in the international arena. The structure of an international system is defined by the number of major actors in the system and the distribution of power among them. The term "process" refers to various kinds of operational activities such as diplomacy, for instance, in order to conduct a state's external affairs. "Environment" refers to the state of affairs in the international system resulting from interaction of actors. In the present study we have typologized the international systemic environment broadly into conflictual, collaborative, competitive and accommodative. At a given period of time the international environment can be understood as being in a state of a complex combination of these broadly conceptualized typologies.

4.3.2 : Domestic Environment

Governments invariably have to operate under restraints and with resources which are basically derivatives of domestic environment. The framework in the present study considers four variables of the domestic environment for analysis. They are: socio-political-economic value system, nature of human resource, idiosyncrasies of leaders, and interest and pressure groups.
The norms and traditions that underlie the relationships among a society's members, their interpretations of their common heritage, and all the other means by which they sustain the ties of community are important cluster of socio-political-economic value system. Values and memories can be shared widely or they can be divisive forces among segments of the society, and, plainly, the effects of societal unity can range from guiding to hindering the formulation of the society's foreign policy plans and the conduct of its external affairs.

Effectiveness in foreign affairs depends on a multitude of variables, but one of them is the nature and composition of human resource and the extent of its support to government is significantly affected by the degree to which basic values are shared in the society.

Influence of domestic environment is not limited to the impact of societal unity upon the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Equally important are the processes through which the contents of the shared norms and practices of the society, as distinguished from the degree of unity that supports them, shape the plans that are made and the activities that are undertaken with respect to the external world.

Similarly, a leader's beliefs about the nature of international arena and the goals that ought to be pursued therein, his or her peculiar intellectual traits for analyzing information and making decisions, his or her past background and the extent of its relevance to the requirements of the role, his or her emotional needs and a host of other personality traits - these are but a few idiosyncratic factors that can influence the planning and execution of external relations.

(Appendix C) At several levels, ranging from the day to day deci-
sions of foreign policy officials to the more long range processes whereby new ideas surface through the society's communication system, its major value orientations serve as foundations for the external goals that are framed and the means that are selected to reach them. A business oriented society, for example, is more likely to rely on foreign economic policies to achieve its objectives than one in which the dominant value orientations are religious or military in nature. This translation of underlying cultural values into foreign policy plans and activities occurs in a variety of ways, ranging from the impact of public opinion on policy making to the more subtle effect of lobbying by interest and pressure groups.

4.3.3 : Total National Capability

One of the most important and yet one of the most difficult task for the student and practitioner of international relations deals with the analysis of the capability of states to formulate and implement their foreign policy objectives.

The variety of foreign policy instruments available to a nation for influencing others is partly a function of the quantity and quality of capabilities. What a government seek to do, the type of objectives it formulates, and how it attempts to do it will depend at least partially on the resources it finds available, feasible, and employable.

The task of such an analysis is important, because this analysis may help to comprehend facets of relations among states which might otherwise remain incomprehensible. By comprehension we mean either an explanation, usually after the fact, or a prediction. Harold and Margaret Sprout (1962) put the matter this way:
"With reference to historical cases, the analysis is designed to answer the question: How was it possible for a given state to exert an influence or to play a role which it did in fact, exert or play? With reference to the future, capability analysis is designed to yield a predictive estimate as to the influence which a state could exert or the international role that it could play, either in a specific postulated contingency or in a postulated overall configuration of political relationships in the society of nations."

For the purpose of the present study our framework constitutes four elements of national capability, viz; geo-political location, economic development, socio-political-economic stability and military strength.

Much can be said about geographic factors as sources of foreign policy decisions and behaviour. The configuration of the land, its fertility and climate, and its location relative to other land masses and to waterways - to mention but a few of the more important geographic factors - all contribute to the psychological environment through which statesmen and peoples define their links to the external world - and the operational environment out of which their dependence on other countries is fashioned.

Among deterministic theories of national power few have exercised a more seductive and persistent appeal than geography. Until half a century ago, the relationship of geographical position appeared to be one of the most stable and predictable factors in international politics. Europe, in particular, was endowed with such a favourable combination of climate, population, and resources that its economic, technological and social organization appeared destined to give it unlimited supremacy over the rest of the world."
The degree to which the economy of a state has moved from an agriculture to an industrial structure has also been subjected to intensive investigation as a source of foreign policy plans and behaviour. The more a country is industrialized, the more likely it is to experience division of labour and the emergence of organized groups around the subdivided tasks that proliferate as industrialization unfolds. Thus, the level of modernization contributes importantly to the variety and intensity of non-governmental links between people and their counterparts abroad as well as of the internal demands for governmental officials to formulate external policies that reflect and serve the diversity of interests that economic development produces.

It would be difficult and beyond the purview of this study, to list in detail all the aspects of a country's economic situation which contribute to or detract from its capacity in international relations. Entire courses in Economics are focused on such a task. It would also be difficult to separate many of economic ingredients of state capacity from other aspects of a society, such as geography, resources, population, and scientific and technological development. These are all intertwined and interdependent. Nevertheless, in attempting to identify specific economic factors one would have to take into account a country's industrial capacity, capital formation and gross national product.

For example, certain production is entirely oriented toward national security purposes and thus directly contributes to a state's ability to achieve its objectives in relations with others. Other aspects of production may have an indirect relationship, and still others may either have no relationship at all or perhaps the most tangential one. In fact, the diversion of resources to some kind of production may even detract from the possibility of attaining maximum strength in a society's international relationships.
The privileges and opportunities available to a nation's various groups constitute a cluster of societal factors that can undergo slow change and in so doing serve as important foreign policy inputs. The socio-political-economic stability sustained through the social structure of a society and the changes that it undergoes are crucial determinants of the degree of internal conflict and harmony within society, of the groups from which political leaders are recruited, of the extent to which the human resources of the society are developed, of its capability to adjust to change - all factors that can in turn change and shape the contents and effectiveness of the state's action abroad.

The basic arrangements that organize the structure of authority among the agencies and personnel of government constitute still another set of governmental variables susceptible to change that fall between the short and the long run. A government can be highly centralized and democratic or of course, can lie at any point between these two extremes. The greater the concentration of authority in a single individual or small group, the greater is the likelihood that subordinate policy-makers will withhold criticism and seek to provide information and recommendations that they perceive their superior wants. In more decentralized and democratic government, on the other hand, there is likely to be a greater flow of critical and detached information and advice through policy-making process. Moreover, the stability and coherence (or the lack of it) of any political structure also significantly influence a country's foreign affairs.

The contemporary students of politics wonders whether Clausewitz's (1966) famous aphorism that "war is nothing but the continuation of political relations by other means" retains its original meaning. Clausewitz wrote in an age when the concept of limited war was rooted in the temper and technology of the times. And now, man has added nuclear weapons to his arsenal, whose destructive po-
tential raise serious doubts as to whether all-out war can still be contemplated as a viable alternative in the pursuit of political objectives.

Nevertheless, one is still compelled to examine international relations in the light of war-making capacity in terms of military strength because of what the sociologists call a cultural lag - man's inability to adjust on short notice to drastically changed circumstances. No single weapon - however revolutionary - suffices to change human nature; political trends depend on man and societies as much as on weapons (Aron 1959).

Because nuclear weapons happened to be developed at a moment in history when the two states were overwhelmingly powerful than all others, the anarchy of the international system was reduced for a time to a precarious bipolar balance of nuclear terror. Since then, other powers have entered the nuclear club or are on the verge of entering, so that one of the characteristics of the modern age is that peace itself seems to rest upon the mutual fear inspired by the magnitude of nuclear destructiveness. States have arrived at such a deadlock in their search for security that peace seems to depend on the degree to which rival states can maintain the balance of power. On the other hand, nuclear weapons in the hands of many and unscrupulous can only add to the insecurity of the entire international system.

While analyzing a state's total national capability, it is useful to caution against the temptation to think in deterministic categories. A country's geographic position, its economic potential, its socio-political-economic stability and its military strength will undoubtedly affect its external policies, but, the relationship is not usually a direct, automatic and causal one. The sprouts (1962) emphasise the
point by advocating the use of the term "political potential" instead of the term "power". This is sound advice; not only because of the coercive connotation of the term "power" but also because the term "potential" draws attention to the fact that men in positions of influence and control can choose whether or not, and if so in what ways, and to what extent, to transform potentialities into actualities.

4.3.4 : National Objectives

In the ultimate analysis, it is the goals pursued by the actors and the way they go about pursuing them that determine whether and to what extent the potentialities are translated into actualities. This can be understood by imagining two extreme sets of conditions, both theoretically compatible with a multi-state system, in which, as a consequence of wide differences in the objectives pursued by the states in question as well as in the means they are willing to employ, the chances of peace would stand at opposite poles.

Starting at one pole, one can postulate a situation in which all actors are entirely satisfied with the established state of international affairs, and are content, therefore, to concern themselves exclusively with domestic matters. In this case, they would have no incentive to make or press demand on others. As a consequence, there would be no rationale for conflict or for disturbance of the peace. Needless to say, this is a utopia.

The other pole postulates that nations are engaged in making exacting demands on one another and are prepared to fight rather than give in. Actually, to be able to predict very serious threat to the peace, one need only to assume that a single powerful actor within a multi-state system is bent on attaining goals of territorial expansion or dominion over others. Because resistance toward acquisitive goals of this nature is certain to materialize, the stage is thus set for clashes that justify a high expectation of violence.
4.3.5 : National Strategy

Strategy is generally understood to be concerned with only the darker side of the human nature, in that it examines the way in which military power is used by the governments in pursuit of their interest. Now, because military power refers to the capacity to kill, to maim, to coerce and destroy, it follows that it is a crude instrument. Its use determines not who is right in any dispute, but whose word is going to prevail, and its utility arises, fundamentally, out of the depressing fact that, human beings, their property, and society in which they live are destroyed.

Thus, for the man in the street, strategy is intimately connected with planning wars and fighting them. This popular impression is reinforced by Clausewitz's (1966) definition of strategy as "the employment of battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of war". But in a very important sense, the man in the street has got it wrong. Although the term "strategy" has been used primarily in reference to the design of military operation, it has a much broader applicability. It can be used to refer to any predesigned set of moves or series of decisions in a competitive environment where the consequences are not governed by chance. It is the practical adaptation of the means placed at disposal to the attainment of the object in view (Lidd'elHart 1967). Thus a proper understanding can have the advantage of releasing strategy from its traditional straight jacket—war.

4.4 : In Summary

Out of a complex interaction of the determinants profiled here before, emerges a continuous series of decisions, plans, and activities shaping external relational pattern of a nation. These output
variety of forms, ranging from the broad announcement of the very concrete act, from the plan designed to serve as a guide to action in any situation in any part of the world for number of years to the specific behaviour designed to cope with a particular problem in a particular country at a particular time.

The framework as developed here can provide an effective analytical tool to select, classify and organize relevant information out an infinite pool of data. Using this framework through a discretionary, empirical analysis of concrete behaviour, the analyst can discern the patterns of relations and explain their causal dynamics. It is to such an discerning and discretionary analysis of Indo-U.S. relations that we shall turn to in the following chapter.

References


