NOTE ON APPENDICES

The following appendices constitute such information as to profile the changing Indian domestic economic scenario and American perception and policy objectives vis-a-vis changing international scenario. It is recognized and acknowledged that these appendices do not present an all comprehensive information on the topic of the present research and that more of such appendices constituting other relevant documents would have enriched the empirical gamut of the present study.

Nevertheless, we understand that these appendices do provide a critical insight into the governmental thinking and concrete policy measures that they envisage or have already taken with regard to the changing global scenario. However, two points may be considered in defence of limited scope of empirical data in appendices.

One, this study's basic thrust is theoretical rather than empirical. Therefore, inclusion of relevant empirical data in its body is deliberately selective rather than compulsively comprehensive. Yet, the empirical data selected, as we understand, is sufficient to corroborate the study's theoretical perspective. Secondly, so far as comprehensiveness of empirical data in the form of appendices is concerned, the major handicap has been difficulties in our access to the primary sources, chiefly government documents. We understand that a more open and possible access to these sources especially in the U.S. would have certainly enriched the argument and analysis of this study.

Nevertheless, a postdoctoral study, as now being envisaged by this scholar, aims to explore the capability of the theoretical frameworks developed in this study in the context of more vital and comprehensive empirical data-base.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to report on recent events in the Soviet Union and the American response. I have organized my statement to cover four topics:

1. Key Tenets of US policy toward the Soviet Union, 1989-90;
2. Analysis of recent events; Outlook; and Implications for US policy.

Key Tenets of US policy Towards the Soviet Union, 1989-90

In analyzing our future course, it is useful to review the key elements of our present policy. It establishes a baseline and explains the reasoning behind our current path.

The President stated in May 1989 that it was time for us to move "beyond containment." Given the break in traditional patterns of Soviet behavior, we felt it was important to seize the possibility to achieve long-term Western goals while also opening the way for the
Secretary Baker explained our approach towards the Soviet Union in speeches he gave in April and October 1989; he then reviewed our progress and explained our ongoing strategy in a third speech in October of 1990.

In brief, our strategy has been to explore and develop possible points of mutual advantage for both the United States and the Soviet Union. Our logic has been to probe the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy, seeking to shape and, where possible, to alter Soviet policy calculations so that the Soviet might face up to the contradictions between the new thinking and old habits. We sought to formulate proposals in ways that emphasized benefits to both parties. In doing so, we strove to escape from the old East-West, zero-sum logic that a gain for one was a loss for the other.

Our strategy required us to broaden and deepen our agenda with the Soviets. We added new items. We proposed new approaches.

**Our first objective** was to work with the Soviets to overcome the division of Europe, the original cause of the Cold War. After many decades, Western resolve and NATO's protections had led to free and prosperous countries next door to dictatorship. When the people behind the Iron Curtain - confronted with such disparity - chose freedom, we sought to persuade the Soviets that the peaceful emergence of democratic governments and market economies throughout Central and Eastern Europe would benefit all of us - East and West. The old illegitimate regimes were decaying because they did not reflect the consent of the governed and could not tap the free will of freeman; their perpetuation would be costly both in economic terms and in preventing the Soviet Union from achieving the opening to the West that it sought. Our approach - an effort not to singu-
larize or isolate any party in Europe that respected the moves toward freedom - was important in bringing about German unification peacefully and democratically.

Second, we stressed our common interest in resolving regional conflicts peacefully, often seeking to rely on elections as a means of establishing legitimacy and the local popular will. To create an appropriate context for elections, we sought to use our respective influence to persuade conflicting parties that the use of arms would not produce an enduring solution. This has been the approximate formula for our cooperative efforts in Nicaragua, Cambodia, Angola, and Afghanistan. The experience provided the basis for the immediate joint US-Soviet denunciation of Iraq's attack on Kuwait - the joint statement of Secretary Baker and Minister Shevardnadze on August 3 which in turn provided the basis for unprecedented UN and multinational action.

Third, we sought to demonstrate our support for perestroika in practical ways. We expanded our human rights agenda with the Soviets through an effort to institutionalize these rights by building the rule of law. We started a program of technical economic cooperation to encourage the development of market reforms. We explored our common interest in addressing transnational challengers, such as narcotics, terrorism, and the environment.

Fourth, we expanded the arms control agenda with two efforts: we pressed to address the imbalance in conventional weapons in Europe, and we explored our mutual interest in halting and reversing the build-up of new weapons of mass destruction. These efforts produced the CFE [conventional armed forces in Europe] and chemical weapons destruction agreements.
A Successful Record

I think this strategy has built a successful record, although there is no doubt that our work is far from finished. The Red Army is departing Central and Eastern Europe. The nations behind the old Iron Curtain now have an opportunity to chart a new course of democracy and market economies. We have taken significant steps toward constrainig and channeling the Soviet military threat through arms control. We have seen the Soviet impulse toward adventurism diminish, and we have also helped to foster Soviet cooperation on regional conflicts around the globe. And we demonstrated our good faith commitment to support political and economic reform in the Soviet Union if that is a course to which the Soviet leadership remains committed. The increased uncertainty about the future course of the Soviet Union has three major implications for this strategy.

One, we should seek to secure those benefits that we have achieved over recent years.

Two, we should continue to explore the possibility of finding new points of mutual advantage between the Soviet Union and the United States, but do so in a way that recognizes the changed context.

Three, we should try to manage uncertainty by multiplying our channels of information and increasing our points of access with a rapidly changing Soviet society.

Analysis of Recent Events

The Soviet Union is a vast country. The motivations, fears, and interests of its diverse peoples are enormously complex. The Kremlin is certainly not the sole locus of influence, but the political scene has been dominated by the interplay of many forces in Soviet society.
with the actions of a particular leader. Therefore, I wanted to offer you one possible analysis of how recent changes may have affected President Gorbachev’s perspective and the path of Soviet policy.

In October 1989, Secretary Baker made an observation on the Soviet reform effort that is a useful point of departure for reviewing the course of recent events there. He said:

"President Gorbachev wants to remake the Soviet Union. That’s what perestroika and glasnost are all about. That may not have been his aim in 1985, but the failures of the early reform efforts convinced him and his colleagues that change must dig deeper into Soviet society. These are utilitarian, purposeful, and determined men - we should recognize that they are not pursuing freedom for freedom’s sake. Their aim is to modernize the Soviet Union, but their frame of reference is not the Age of Reason or the spirit of the Enlightenment. They are the descendants of other great Russian modernizers - like Peter the Great and Alexander II - fundamentally rooted in the unique Russian experience.

As a modernizer and as a balancer of political forces, President Gorbachev faced success, deterioration, and dilemmas in the late summer of 1990.

By unleashing the truth, he had begun to expose the terrible record of communism. The old system was discredited. Indeed, in July, Gorbachev rallied popular resentment to inflict a stunning defeat of the old guard at the communist party congress.

Yet he had nothing to substitute for the party’s control of State and society, and problems pressed in from all sides. The new openness seemed to be dismantling institutional capabilities and societal norms.
at a rapid pace. State institutions - executive and legislative - appeared unable to step into the breach. There was an erosion of executive power at all levels. Legislatures could debate, but seemed unable to act coherently; their passage of laws did not translate into action.

The economic situation continued to worsen. Movements calling for increased autonomy, or even secession, complicated the difficult tasks of creating a new civil society and new economic relationship. All this disorder, however explicable and perhaps unavoidable, tapped deep seated Russian fears. The society and economy seemed to be disintegrating, and yet no one seemed to be able to do anything about it.

Despite the hopes and excitement the reformers generated, they seemed unable to serve as an effective counter weight; they could not yet help balance those forces in society that were frightened and threatened by the changes. That is why [Foreign Minister] Shevardnadze thought to give them a “wake-up call,” warning of the need for reformers to pull themselves together.

**Solutions From the Right**

In contrast, the institutions on the right may have seemed to Gorbachev to offer straightforward, understandable solutions to these problems - even though they are not real answers. Moreover, the army, the KGB, the defense industrial complex, and the Communist Party all remain powerful constituencies. All felt threatened by recent events. Just as important, these are all national institutions. tools that the Soviet leadership might use to counter the forces that it probably perceived as undermining its modernization of the Soviet Union.
In sum, President Gorbachev may have perceived internal economic and political problems that gave him less freedom to maneuver, lack of support (or even a threat) from radical reformers wanting to move quickly toward real democracy, capitalism, and republic independence; and forces on the right that offered apparent solutions and familiar tools to deal with their own anxieties and those of the society at large.

So Gorbachev turned to the right, in his view, to preserve his credibility as a leader and to preserve the union. In September [1990], Gorbachev rejected Shatalin's "500 Day Plan" and spurned the reformers. He retained Ryzhkov as his prime minister, affirming his intention not to abandon the existing governmental structure. In October, Gorbachev secured adoption of a more vaguely worded compromise economic reform program. In December, he got vast new presidential powers to implement this program also in December, Gorbachev made key personal changes at the interior and justice ministries and secured stronger enforcement powers for the KGB and military to act internally. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze resigned warning of dictatorship. By the end of the year, almost all of Gorbachev's perestroika team had departed. Finally, in January, the Soviet leadership opted for intimidation in the Baltics, which became a show of force and then violence.

Gorbachev may well believe that, given the pressures he faces, he must act forcefully to restore order so as to "save" reform. But it is important to underscore that this is his conception of reform - of modernization of Soviet society - not the conception of the radical reformers whom he freed to think for themselves. Indeed, President Gorbachev has probably been honestly surprised by the negative reaction in the Soviet Union and in the West to these moves; he may
have expected that people would trust him, would give him leeway. In the face of a strong negative reaction from the West, President Gorbachev appears to have taken steps to limit his responsibility for some of the particularly objectionable characteristics of the rightward turn, most notably in the Baltics. He probably recognizes that his long-range hopes for modernization of the Soviet Union require maintaining an opening to the West. But modernization and the West are not more important than survival.

Still, it is important not to lose sight of some fundamental changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union over the course of the past 6 years. Some reforms have planted roots, although it is hard to tell how deep they run. People no longer fear challenging the government and the old ways. Demonstrations of over 200,000 people in the streets of Moscow cannot be dismissed lightly. The cooperative movement facing incredible adversity, continues to grow. (Over 6% of the Soviet labor force now works in cooperatives or is self-employed.) There are reports that the Soviet military is troubled by the prospect of being employed against its own people in the event of civil unrest. And the new leaders of the republics although not operating from a common agenda, do seem to share a mutual interest in establishing a more pluralistic system between the center and the republics. These are changes we need to encourage; they offer some chance of a different future for the Soviet Union.

Outlook

*Perestroika* has been a program of political and economic liberalization that was supposed to modernize the Soviet Union. President Gorbachev wanted to end stagnation. He wanted to lift restraints on information to encourage the development of science and technology.
He thought that if he gave the Soviet people an increased role on setting policy, increased freedom to speak and act, that he would generate more energy and commitment to strengthen the Soviet state.

It appears that the Soviet leadership never recognized that increased freedom would enable people to choose how they would focus their energies. Those freed forces moved Soviet society in unforeseen directions. The leadership did not appreciate the longsmoldering embers of nationalism that were ready to flare once the empire loosened its grip of fear. They did not know that, once allowed to express their disdain for the Communist Party, the people would not devote their energies to invigorating State institutions created by the whole system through which they had risen and which they had mastered.

The Soviet leadership is trying to cope with this crisis of legitimacy by restoring "order." For them, order depends on authority.

So I suspect that the Soviet Union is now in a period of what I would label "authoritarian reform." The state will be willing to use heavy-handed measures to restore what it considers to be the necessary prerequisites for a continued program of economic and social modernization. That program is likely to be marked by a series of incremental changes and a pattern of fits and starts. The greatest danger is that the "authoritarian" elements could overwhelm the reform impulse.

The major issues that President Gorbachev now faces are, first, to work out effective center-republic relations, and second, to improve economic performance.
As the Soviet leadership focuses its attention on these two key problems, it will certainly be willing to tamper with and limit the new political and social freedom. For no, political groups continue to operate within and outside the legislative process. There is still an exchange of ideas that would have been inconceivable 6 years ago. President Gorbachev may seek to avoid significant limits on this exchange of ideas, because he still believes it is essential for the modernization of the economy and technological growth. But openness is a means to an end in the Soviet Union; it could be curtailed significantly if it impedes the center's ability to cope with those two overriding problems.

The problem of center-republic relations is fundamentally one of negotiating arrangements that achieve satisfactory political legitimacy between different levels of government and the people. It is clear that the old authority of empire operates no longer, so the center is beginning a halting process of determining the degree of autonomy necessary to achieve legitimacy.

Nationalism in the USSR

As outsiders viewing this process, we need to be careful not to examine it solely through the lens of our Western conceptions of the nation-state. Nationalism, one of the momentous movements of the 19th and 20th centuries in much of the rest of the world, has followed a somewhat different course in the Soviet Union. Russian nationalism has existed for some time, but it has been harnessed to serve the ends of Soviet communism. Russian chauvinism has antagonized many other peoples in the USSR. But the national movements in the borderland republics have only recently been freed to define their own national characters and their origins in culture, literature, language, territory, and history; they are still evolving
and still exploring how they relate to one another. The relation be-
tween nationalism and the state is frequently not yet well defined. 
Moreover, the national movements do not fit neatly within republic 
boundaries. One in five Soviet citizens lives outside his ethnic re-
public or area. So there is substantial potential for friction and con-
flict among the central government, republic governments, and na-
tional movements.

The search for political legitimacy, the balance between central au-
thority and autonomy, and the accommodation of nationalism are all 
questions for the Soviet people to determine. They are not, of course, 
something that we are in a position to decide.

It may be the case that the new pattern of relations worked out within 
the Soviet Union may not be easily described in terms of traditional 
nation-state sovereignty. President Gorbachev has said that the cen-
ter may need to develop a different treaty relationship with each 
republic, and that the transitions to these new relationships might 
differ. It is clear, however, that the Soviet Union has not progressed 
far in defining appropriate concepts of power-sharing, federalism, 
or individual rights.

On the economic front, as in the case of centre-republic relations, I 
expect the primary objective will be to reestablish order. Some may 
believe that order is a prerequisite for moving the system toward 
market relations. The currency confiscation and the attacks on the 
shadow economy are designed to foster order. The price increases 
and compensation proposals are designed to reorder price and wage 
relationships. Commands to fill State orders are designed to ensure 
that basic supplier relationships remain in place.
These moves will be complemented with other incremental actions, such as destatization, designed to restructure the industrial organization of the economy to operate more effectively in some type of competitive market format.

**Worsening Economic Outlook**

This economic program will almost certainly fail. The decline in production will likely accelerate. So will inflation. Large industrial enterprises are likely to move increasingly to barter relationships, unless halted by an extensive discipline campaign. Firms that produce products that can be bartered for food or other suppliers will do so, passing the benefits through to their workforce. Enterprises that produce large, non-tradeable goods will be in trouble. Labor that controls sensitive sectors, such as energy and transport may use its power to secure special benefits. If the agricultural sector cannot get the necessary inputs and machinery, this year's harvest could slip. The Soviet Union has a large amount of debt coming due this year, which it cannot pay, adding to the burden. The men and women at the end of the chain—the consumers—are likely to suffer even more.

One of the greatest dangers of the emphasis on the economic order is that it will be particularly damaging to the nascent market sector. Despite incredible obstacles, cooperatives have continued to grow and employ more workers. But they are vulnerable because they operate outside the understood rules of the command economy. Similarly, black markets have arisen to supply goods and services to people at market prices. But the association of some of these activities with the criminal sector either as victims of it or supplied by it—leave them vulnerable to a discipline campaign. The drive for order may also inhibit some of the barter arrangements that are develop-
ing among enterprises. This proto-market system is inefficient, handicapped by lack of competition and established rules, but it is seeking to pick up where the broken-down command economy left off.

In the economic area, too, the Soviet Union needs to establish a basic set of rules governing property rights, contracts, and competition. This is a matter of creating legitimacy and confidence in economic relations, roughly analogous to the task ahead in the political realm. Of course the ability to establish such economic rules of the game is fundamentally tied up with establishing the respective authorities of political units. At present, there is a "war of laws" that leaves producers, investors, workers, and consumers befuddled. Furthermore, there could be a clash between the need to establish efficient market ties over large areas and the devolution of political authority. So these two questions - of political and economic rules - will have to be resolved together.

The present course appears to be one of seeking to reestablish the power of the center. This is the power system that the Soviet leadership knows, and with which the national institutions like the army, the KGB, and the communist Party are comfortable. But President Gorbachev may sincerely believe he is using this reassertion of central authority to return to course of *perestroika*.

In part, the conflict is that President Gorbachev, who rose to the top of the old Soviet system, cannot fully understand an irony: that by initiating a new system he did not automatically ensure his legitimate leadership within the new system. The Soviet leadership's concept of legitimacy is limited by their own experience. They may want to reach an end result for the Soviet Union that both they and we can see would be in our mutual interest, but they believe they can-
not reach that result unless they are permitted to operate with the
power derived from the old system. The forces they must unleash to
modernize the Soviet Union challenge their authority. Since they
must unleash to modernization, the leadership moves to restore the
old order. This could explain the increasing references by some
Soviet to models of development like the Republic of Korea or Chile.

We should try to persuade Soviet leaders that a reliance on the
method of the old power system will create unintended conseque-
ces that move them away from the very objectives they seek. Both
efficient market economies and stable democratic politics depend
on public confidence that government and the public will operate
according to a set of generally understood rules. Arbitrary asser-
tions of government power threaten such a rule-based system. It is
in our interest to urge all parties in the Soviet Union to create and
abide by such rules. Their own processes, operating within those
rules, will have to establish the legitimacy of relations between the
center and the republics, and between government and the people.

Implications for US Policy

Perhaps for some time, we will need to maintain a flexible approach
that can adjust to important problems raised by a major nation in
great flux. The Soviet Union remains a military superpower with the
capability to destroy the United States and, for that matter, the world
as we know it. It still has approximately 30,000 nuclear warheads.
Within the past two centuries, its armies have marched from the
shores of the Pacific to Paris and Berlin. It has 46 nuclear power
reactors of questionable construction that could erupt into an
environmental and human catastrophe. Its borders mark an arc of
other lands in transition: from the struggling democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe, through the Islamic lands of the Mideast, on to
South Asian countries struggling with their own religious and national conflicts, and extending to the communists of Eastern and Northern Asia who are trying to bolster bankrupt regimes.

As I noted above, conditions in the Soviet Union are likely to worsen, but the specific course of the future is highly uncertain. Therefore, we need to secure the benefits we have achieved, continue to probe for other points of mutual advantages while recognizing the changed context, and seek to manage the uncertainty by multiplying our points of access with a society that is transforming itself.

We need to continue to stress through both our diplomacy and our foreign economic policy, the importance for East-West stability of the success of the fragile democratic market economies of Central and Eastern Europe. Economic decline and upheaval in the Soviet Union add one more pressure on these countries. Our policies should both help these nations achieve stable democracies and sound market economies and also facilitate their connections with the stabilizing network of Western political and economic institutions. We must do so in a way that encourages the Soviet Union to recognize that it is to its benefit to have successful example of democratic and market transformations on its borders.

In regional conflicts, it remains in our interest to work constructively with the Soviet Union to resist a reversal of "new thinking" that was designed to define and shape Soviet security differently. That thinking makes it possible to develop cooperative approaches to resolve conflicts peacefully and democratically. Some of the fundamental internal circumstances that produced a Soviet willingness to engage with us on regional issues remain. Soviet involvement in these conflicts was expensive in terms of economic and military resources and in terms of President Gorbachev's desire to improve relations with the West.
We need to recognize, however, that the leadership's preoccupa-
tion with internal troubles might lead to a lack of high-level focus on
some of these problems around the globe. Moreover, given the stra-
tegic readjustment that the Soviet Union has made, powerful groups
are likely to be increasingly sensitive about conflicts in religions in
bordering areas. It is a geopolitical reality that some in the Soviet
Union will perceive that regional problems closer to home involve
greater political and security interests than those at issue in Africa,
Central America, or Southern Asia.

The Arms Control Agenda

In arms control, it continues to make sense to reduce and constrain
the Soviet military threat by negotiating effectively verifiable agree-
ments. Of course the specific terms of any negotiations must serve
our own national interest. We need to send a strong signal that we
will not accept the rewriting of agreements already entered into and
that faithful implementation will be required.

We also should test whether the Soviet Union is interested in coop-
erating with us and others on the proliferation agenda - an arms
control subject that is likely to be even more important in the future
than traditional East-West discussions. The Soviet Union should have
a strong interest in stopping and reversing the spread of weapons of
mass destruction and missile technology, because a number of those
seeking to develop these destabilizing weapons are on its own bor-
ders. In any case, as the Gulf crisis highlights, we have a strong
interest in vigorously pursuing the proliferation challenge.

Our policy toward the Baltics should focus on two tracks. First, we
need to continue to demonstrate our unequivocal support for their
aspirations of independence. Of course, we never have accepted
their illegal incorporation into the Soviet Union. We have demonstrated this support through words and deeds. We have met at the highest political levels with officials and representatives of the democratically elected governments of the Baltics. The President has met with all of the four top Baltic officials who have visited Washington since last May. We are maintaining a virtually continuous diplomatic presence in all three Baltic capitals. Our consul general in Leningrad supplements this presence with periodic trips to meet top Baltic leaders. We welcome the visits of these leaders to the United States. We are sending humanitarian medical supplies directly to the Baltics. And we work with the other nations of the West, through CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] and other multilateral bodies, to demonstrate cohesive international support.

But these steps alone will not be sufficient unless we are able to persuade the Soviet leadership to engage in peaceful negotiations to resolve those issues that stand in the way of the Baltics' goal. So our second track is to persuade Soviet leaders that such a course is in their interest. At a minimum, this course involves sending a strong, united Western signal that the use of intimidation and force is unacceptable. It also needs to involve frequent contact with Soviet leaders so we can urge them to establish mechanisms that could achieve, step by step, a result that satisfies the Baltic people. We have pointed out that the Baltics involve special circumstances because of their illegal annexation following the Nazi-Soviet pact that commission of the Supreme Soviet itself denounced. In addition to our contracts with the center, we have sought out officials of the Soviet republics to explore their perspective on events in the Baltics. A peaceful, democratic result in the Baltics might establish a method that could help the center develop legitimate, consensual ties with the republics.
Finally, it remains in our interest as well as that of the Soviet leaders, to create a pluralistic society within the Soviet Union. This is a vital step toward the democracy and market economy that we hope will eventually result. We need to honestly recognize that our influence in this historical process will be marginal. But given the importance of the Soviet Union to the world, we should look for ways that might help the process of transformation.

Given the devolution that has already taken place in Soviet society, it is in our interest to have an expanded range of contacts. Of course, these should be with republic and local leaders as well as the center. We have looked for ways to support democrats, free trade unions, and market reformers. These are courageous and admirable pioneers, people who reflect the universal human spirit of freedom and dignity. We hope they can play a greater role in their country’s future.

Perhaps less obvious to some, we should also expand our range of contacts with other important groups in the Soviet Union, including the military and the defense industrial sector. These are powerful groups, and we know they have been associated with the rightward swing in Soviet policy-making. But these group or institutions also reflect the anxiety that has troubled much of Soviet society. No Soviet leader will be able to ignore the military’s concern about housing and jobs for the troops withdrawn from Central and Eastern Europe. No economic reform programs will be politically successful if it does not address the fears of the skilled and influential workers in the defense industrial sector. Perhaps contacts with us and others in the West can help lead some of those not traditionally associated with the reform movement to recognize the potential benefits of reform and the dim prospects for a programs based on old thinking.
We need to face the fact, however, that while it is useful to maintain and expand these contacts, at times it will be exceedingly difficult to do so. Given the turmoil in the Soviet Union, we should expect actions, some accidental some intentional, that offend and outrage us. When those events occur, as they already have and probably will again, we will need to send a strong message to the people involved. We need to point out that internal conditions will affect the willingness and capability of western democracies to ease the Soviet Union's self-imposed political and economic isolation. In doing so, we need to make hard-nosed calculations about maintaining relation that are in our own national interest and could be in the long-term interest of the reformed Soviet Union.

We need to have the types of dialogue with the highest levels of Soviet and republic governments that enable us to point out the unintended negative consequences that may flow from certain actions. These unintended consequences could block Soviet leaders' abilities to achieve their own positive objectives. President Gorbachev has achieved a significant legacy, but we need to explain that he risks that legacy by his own actions.

The Soviet Union is in the midst of a political, economic, and social crisis. But the Soviet Union cannot solve its problems through rigid adherence to an old constitutional and political system that never achieved political legitimacy. The old system of central controls will not establish a basis of legitimacy for the future; nor will use of intimidation and force. The Soviet Union needs to establish new relations between the government and the people. It will have to device the institutions and degrees of autonomy that appropriately reflect the consent of the governed.