Chapter 5

U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR

There is a story about how American Congressman Dan Burton became an India-bater and made the issue of human rights in his country a part of his political constituency. Burton's advisers one day decided that the Congressman's image in Washington needed some improvement and one of them hit upon the idea that taking up human rights issues in the House of Representatives may be a good way of doing so.

Coincidentally, around the same time, the Congressman ran into someone who was lobbying in Washington on behalf of secessionist groups in Punjab and Kashmir and made up his mind that he would adopt human rights in India as his cause celebre (Nayar 1991).

The story may well be apocryphal, but offers an insight into how public opinion on foreign policy issues is often shaped in open societies. Indo-U.S. relations have reached a crossroads where New Delhi can benefit from the Burton story even if it is the product of someone's fertile imagination. During the last two years, an identity of interest, shared goals and changing geopolitical considerations have forced sharp changes in attitudes - both in New Delhi and in Washington towards each other.

These changes are highly significant for India, for, the South Asian region has always received a low priority in the U.S. foreign policy formulations in the post-world War II period, compared to other re-
regions of the world, especially Europe, West Asia, Southeast Asia and the Far East (Barnds 1977). This is because, according to Robert L. Hardgrave, South Asia has not been a strategically vital area for the United States and the latter's involvement in this region has been "episodic and derivative" of other interest, such as containment of Communism, protection of oil in the Persian Gulf and access through the lanes of the Indian Ocean (Hardgrave 1984).

However, there exists another shade of opinion in the United States which challenges the view that South Asia is an area of low priority for the United States. Arising out of new apprehensions about "India's potential nuisance value to the world" in the post-Pokharan period and in the wake of India's growing military capabilities in the second half of the 1970s, such opinions merely sought to draw the attention of the U.S. policy makers to emerging realities in South Asia (Mahapatra 1992).

Myron Weiner, a political scientist and South Asia specialist at the MIT, for instance, in his catalogue of potential mischiefs that might come out of South Asia included the possibility of India exporting nuclear technology and undermining Pakistan's stability. Stephen Cohen and Richard Park pointed out that the long-term U.S. strategic interest in South Asia "would expand were India to develop an interventionist capacity in the gulf, or enhance its ties with important gulf states, or perhaps if India were to engage its Navy in threatening superpower strategies in the Indian Ocean" (Congressional Research Service 1978).

On October 1, 1991, the U.S. state Department opened a new special wing, the Bureau of South Asian Affairs, to deal with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and other countries of the region perhaps with a little more attention and care. According to representative Stephen
J. Solarz, who was instrumental in leading the fight for the creation of this bureau, the aim of this move was to "ensure that this important part of the world receives the high level attention it deserves".

5.1: The Past as Prologue

The forces of the Cold War had an impact on South Asia only in sporadic and fitful fashion. In the early 1950s, Cold War considerations led the United States to support both India and Pakistan, albeit in different ways. Pakistan after 1954 became one of the principle recipients of U.S. economic and military assistance. India, despite its nonaligned status, became one of the larger claimants of U.S. economic assistance in the Third World. The other superpower, the Soviet Union, evinced no great interest in the region until after Stalin's death. The Soviets then made only marginal inroads in the region for two important reasons: they were willing to support India on the Kashmir issue and they were ready to assist India's efforts toward planned industrialization.

U.S. interest in South Asia reached its apogee during the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962. This convergence of interest proved to be quite short-lived. Subsequent U.S. unwillingness to provide India with the technological know-how to develop its military aircraft industry quickly dissipated this goodwill. The Soviets eagerly stepped in to fill the breach.

After the second Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, the United States disengaged itself from South Asia. Disenchanted with the failure of various efforts to bring the two antagonists to settle their central dispute, the United States diverted its efforts to the prosecution of the war in Southeast Asia. Apart from brief involvement in the affairs of the region during the East Pakistan/Bangladesh crisis of 1971, the United States largely ignored South Asia in pursuit of its global
strategic interests. U.S. disengagement from the region, coupled with the hostility New Delhi and Moscow shared toward China, cemented the Indo-Soviet relationship. Arms transfer arrangements and critical Soviet assistance in building-up Indian domestic infrastructure further strengthened this bond.

During the Cold War years, certain shibboleths had come to dominate Indian foreign policy. On the multilateral level they included the principle of nonalignment. Yet at a bilateral level, they also included a relatively passive alliance with the Soviet Union to meet a number of tactical ends. Other long held tenants were opposition to great power prerogatives enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, consistent support for the less developed countries in various multilateral fora, and a grudging acceptance of the Brettonwoods economic order. Some of these foreign policy positions had important domestic components. The unease with the liberal international economic order sponsored by Brettonwoods, for example, was paralleled in the doubts about market oriented economic development strategies in the domestic sphere.

U.S.-Soviet strategic rivalry reasserted itself in South Asia in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan as the State bordering on Afghanistan, quickly became the major conduit of U.S. weaponry to the Afghan resistance. To enlist Pakistan's cooperation, the United States provided Pakistan with substantial economic and military assistance, thus steadily building and modernizing Islamabad's armed forces.

Indian unhappiness over U.S. military assistance to Pakistan did not this time prevent a modicum of pragmatism from emerging in New Delhi. In the early 1980s, New Delhi made halting efforts at economic liberalization that received encouragement from Washing-
ton. Simultaneously, Washington demonstrated a willingness to provide much-sought-after dual use technology to New Delhi (Thomas 1990). As long as the Indo-Soviet military ties remained intact, however, there were structural limits to the Indo-U.S. relationship. Only the disintegration of the Soviet Union could make it qualitatively different, to which we shall now turn our focus of study, using the analytical framework developed and described in chapter four of this study.

5.2 : Impact of International Systemic environment on U.S.- Indian Relations.

What kind of an international systemic environment does the United States and India face after the end of the Cold war?

With the removal of the imperatives of the Cold War the realities of the international systemic environment, as described in chapter 3 can be conceptualized as follows:

1.
The global order is characterized by a number of regional and ethnic conflict and cooperation systems, most of which have deep cultural and historical roots. These systems function amidst global depolarization of power configuration.

2.
The spread of advanced military technology from middle level suppliers adds an inter-regional dimension to regional conflict (Bailey 1991). In some cases, the technology being transferred from one region to another has loaded implications for third region (e.g., the implications for India of the deployment of Chinese M 11 missiles by Saudi Arabia, or Pakistan).
3. There is a perplexing and sometimes perturbing revival of older ideologies and beliefs. These include militant Islam, sub-nationalism, and ethnic separatist movements. This trend is especially virulent not only in the countries which never had a serious democratic movement, but also in those who have well established values and structure for democratic and secular way of political life.

4. Unprecedented scale of global ecological disequilibrium concerns cut across traditional territorial fortresses. These concerns challenge the way all states conduct their internal as well as international affairs.

5. New actors and new regions are emerging and the borders of old ones are shifting. we will have to junk obsolete geo-psychological constructs with strictly territorial myopia of sovereignty and come to terms with new trans-territorial and trans-regional economic, strategic, and cultural interactions that will, loosely, be called regions. And, as states such as India acquire enhanced power projection capabilities, and their economies expand beyond their immediate boundaries, they become multi-regional power.

The new international systemic environment is an unnerving era of hot peace (Soni 1993), where the notion of balancing power configuration through vital strategic alliance is replaced by a flexible and shifting series of strategic links association, and arrangement patched together interest-by-interest. These links and associations and arrangements become stronger between states that share something else besides politico-economic expediency.
An entire complex of concerns arise from the problems associated with present manifestations of what seems a persistent long-range source of disturbance in the international systemic environment: problems associated with what may for convenience be designated as international societal socialization. What is the degree to which states claiming rights and privileges of membership of a universally extended Westphalia (Miller 1990) - the truly physically universalized sovereign state system of our times - are prepared to abide by its norms, rules, laws, conventions and practices, especially when legal or judicial equality does not translate axiomatically into substantive equality? When one speaks of the latter, the reference is not only to economic asymmetries and changing pattern of global resource distribution. The reference is also to the felt need of states with strong, varying and conflicting cultural orientations to projects, through their participation in the extended westphalia, their religious, cultural, and various configured forms of ethnic and such other identifications, and claim their place in the sun, so to speak their substantive, self-evident and not merely nominal equality, in the system.

The post-Cold War international systemic environment, conceivably through the rest of the present decade, devoid of such a universal framework of control as the Cold War provided, will be politically articulated in much more agitated and disturbed forms by the thrusts of large parts of the world to "assimilate" substantively into membership of the universally extended international society of our times. Disturbance, disorder, disruptive violence and loss of control and direction seem likely to characterise the systemic order of the future (Rosenau 1991; Buzan 1991).

How, then, is the problem of international societal socialization within a universally extended international society to be tackled? The
Americans will have to confront varied manifestations of this vexatious problem, because the United States has high future stakes in the disturbances it can cause. If, for example, she has to deal credibly with what appears to be a major foreign policy concern, the issue of stability in the international system, it will implicate differing varieties of intervention which her existing set of constraints preempt. But not these alone. Intervention on a global scale, consonant with her strengths and interests, needs to be suitably legitimized in the absence of any imminent strategic or political or ideological or any other compelling threat, such as international communism which was projected during the period of the Cold War. Thus, the United States cannot proclaim that her overt policy strategy henceforth is likely to be one of global intervention, to ensure international stability. Her constraints of varied nature restrict her in doing so, and so also is the lack of any very convincing set of legitimations (Rana 1991).

Ironically, it would appear that potentialities for large-scale disturbance within international system helps to organize, even catalyze, several of India's subsisting strengths into sources of influence, in international relations. The peculiarity of the turbulence, which we referred earlier, and the tenuousness of economic and other compatible forms of power are likely to enhance the importance, for the United States, of any major country in the world which has a positive stake in maintaining its original status quo, and on inherently substantive interest in stability.

India's national interests are tied to the South Asian regional status quo. India comprises a huge area of South Asia, and her status quo interests in the region is a force for stability in a major political th-
ater of the world. So is the pronounced interests of all segments of
political leadership of the country to keep it united, considering that
India embraces a landscape teeming with myriad plural sub-regional
identities, which have more often than not in history been subject to
forces of disintegration. Despite depredations on the political sys-
tem India has continued to represent, for over four decades the
most notable example of a functioning constitutional liberal democ-

dacy in the wide arc of the developing world, and in the hugely popu-
lated and differentiated geographical region with regular elections
of fairly free and genuine nature, a largely independent judiciary, an
articulate, vigilant and vociferous opposition, a vigorous and exten-
sive multi-lingual free press and an administrative cadre very much
in place.

The country can boast of many other such attributes in numerous
spheres of national life. Today they seem so pertinent, so much so
as to bring around a virtual turnabout in the United State's South
Asia policy, towards the region's overwhelmingly powerful country,
points to the cogency of America's international systemic stability
problematic and the extent to which it catalyzes India's inheriting
strengths into influences in the international domain after the Cold
War.

5.3 : Domestic Environment and National Capabilities of India and
the U.S.

Accumulating changes over the past ten years have brought about
a general change in the conditions of domestic environment in both
the countries and in their national capability perceptions. These
changes have raised critical issues, many of which interact in ways
that increase their impact. Some of them have been visible for a
considerable time. But the general intensification of their influence has accelerated over the past four or five years. As a result, U.S.-Indian relations have entered into an era with unprecedented potentiality for unprecedented partnership.

While India is passing through a period of volatile political change, its constitutional structure is resilient enough to absorb the shock of this transition. Compared with more homogenous Societies, or societies at a later stage of national consolidation and development, India often appears turbulent as it experiences intermittent social and political instability. But such instability is endemic to the development process.

Soon after India won its independence, Eugene Staley warned that the "most dangerous decades" for traditional societies embarking on the process of economic modernization would come immediately after the take-off stage of development. Economic progress, he pointed out, would generate ever-intensifying social and political conflict over limited spoils that would never be enough to go around as population growth escalated (Staley 1954).

This somber projection was unusually relevant for India with its 882 million people, its stratified society and its linguistic diversity (Harrison 1960). India is now facing its most serious trials since independence, precisely because it has laid the foundations for its economic development during the past four decades more successfully than is generally realized. The burgeoning growth of industry in recent years and the first signs of participation in expanding private financial markets by affluent rural elites constitute the most striking symbols of economic vitality. At the same time, economic growth accompanied by inequities in income distribution have produced the "million mutinies now" described by V.S. Naipaul (1991).
India's vigorous embrace of market reforms after three decades of stifling bureaucratic socialism is an overwhelming irony (Bhagwati 1994). The government of Prime Minister Narsimha Rao and his remarkable finance minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh (a Cambridge-trained economist whose Oxford dissertation in the 1960s had argued against the pessimistic view that India's export markets were limited and for a new outward orientation), chose the option of initiating reform. And they have been making history.

India undertook a cascading set of reforms beginning in June 1991. Industrial controls over most investments and over diversification and expansion were removed almost at once. Import controls (except for most consumer goods) were dismantled, with current account convertibility introduced by 1993. The removal of restrictions on the import of consumer goods has begun as well. All these and other such reforms have brought about a significant improvement in India's export growth and balance of trade position as shown in the following tables. (Also refer Appendices C and D).

India's export growth (US $ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Products</th>
<th>Apr-Jul 1993</th>
<th>Apr-Jul 1994</th>
<th>Percent Growth</th>
<th>Percent Weight*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineering goods</td>
<td>807.26</td>
<td>841.23</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile &amp; Handicrafts</td>
<td>1673.89</td>
<td>1861.85</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals and related products</td>
<td>725.69</td>
<td>933.67</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Products</td>
<td>190.68</td>
<td>285.41</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural and Allied products</td>
<td>800.10</td>
<td>693.34</td>
<td>-13.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Weight of these items in India's current export basket. Total Source: The Economic Times, Ahmedabad, 19 Nov. 1994. 46%
India's Foreign Trade Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports (Apr-Sept)</th>
<th>Exports (Apr to Sept)</th>
<th>Trade Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. $ m</td>
<td>%growth</td>
<td>U.S.$ m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>1170.71</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>8548.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>10791.59</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>10351.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Foreign investment restrictions have also been ended. Almost every fortnight the figure of direct foreign investment is reported to have reached higher levels. Coca Cola and IBM, both virtually forced to leave India earlier, are now back. Pepsi has signed a major agreement with the government; and General Electric and others are actively investing or exploring investments. New investment in 1993-94 exceeded $1 billion, a substantial increase over the $100 million annual inflow in 1990-91 prior to reforms (Bhagwati 1994). The inflow is accelerating.

Financial sector reforms are scheduled, and privatization is commencing. Since the objective of private ownership is greater management efficiency, the government has also sought better management by introducing competition to areas of public sector monopoly by allowing the entry of new private sector firms. New private airlines have been started to complete with the state-owned Indian Airlines, and services have improved.

The macro-economic balance has also been steadily restored, with the budget deficit reduced on schedule. Inflation is now in single digits, a very different situation than prevails in South America, where high inflations into four digits have flourished with the surreal extravagance found in the novels of Gabriel Garcia Marques.
India has demonstrated its capacity for political renewal and stability in its response to the 1984 and 1991 assassination tragedies as well as in the aftermath of the Ayodhya crisis. Predictions of political paralysis proved unfounded during the first eighteen months after a minority congress (I) government assumed power in June-1991. Parliament overwhelmingly approved the 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94 budgets with their bold and controversial economic reform measures.

True, media reports out of India often suggest growing political chaos. But this is not so. These erroneous reports come from a humorless acceptance of the hyperbole common to Indians and from an inability to see that the exaggerated self-criticism is simply a cry for the correction that often follows. Thus, when recent riots in Bombay, where some Hindus and many Muslims were killed, were being condemned, many in India and abroad compared them to programs and fascism: the comparison is absurd but the anguish behind it is real.

Similarly, while the riots after the destruction of the controversial structure in Ayodhya in December 1992 were thought to be a sign of India's growing disorder and terminal cancer in the body politic, exactly the opposite inference can be drawn. We should not judge a society's strength by whether it can fine-tune politics so as to avoid tragedies, but rather by how it handles them once they occur.

After the riots, Indians throughout the nation wrote to the papers and magazines, marched into the streets and organized meetings for awareness; they did not rush to the streets to loot and massacre on a massive scale. Similarly, the social stratification process which has been acutely accelerated by ever-increasing quota of reservation in government jobs and admission to educational institutes for various social groups is also now being taken by most Indians as an issue due to collapse under its own monumental disproportion or by
the sweeping privatization and exacting merit demands of the em-
ployers from their employees.

The political, economic and social challenges ahead, India's inter-
nal problems are not likely to stop the development of its power
projection capabilities. Budget stringency and the disruption of former
soviet military procurement may significantly slow down military ex-
pansion, but New Delhi will nonetheless seek to increase its military
reach over time and to play a global as well as a regional foreign
policy role that will compel American attention in the decades ahead.

The Indian security perspective is dominated by the perceived threat
of Chinese power, both conventional and nuclear, including alleged
Chinese intermediate-range missile emplacements in Tibet and
Sinkiang, and by a desire to maintain what New Delhi considers an
acceptably safe margin of military superiority over Pakistan. How-
ever, India is also motivated by a determination to avoid being con-
signed to second-class status in a depolarized world. In this self-
image, India is entitled to recognition as a leading global power and
to a regional sphere of influence centered on, but not necessasity
restricted to, South Asia and the Western Indian Ocean and its is-
land states. The psychological compulsion to demonstrate a mili-
tary reach consistent with this self-image has contributed to the ex-
pansion of Indian naval power, the development of the indigenously
produced intermediate-range ballistic missile Agni in May 1994 and
successful launch of the polar satellite launch Vehicle-D2 in Octo-

India's 1992-93 defense budget totaled $ 6.75 billion. This consti-
tuted 15 percent of her overall budget and three percent of her gross
national product; by comparison, Pakistan's defense budget is 38
percent of its total budget and six percent of its GNP (Harrison &
kemp 1993). To put the issue of Indian spending in perspective, it
should be noted that when inflation and rising manpower costs are taken into account, real defense spending levels have actually declined.

The most sensitive emerging problem in Indo-American relations is likely to relate to India's potential to produce nuclear weapons. India is extremely unlikely to give up the option of developing nuclear weapons, if only for domestic political reasons. To do so would make any government vulnerable to charges that it has compromised national sovereignty and security under external pressure, especially in the light of actual Chinese nuclear capability and Pakistan's ambiguous nuclear strategy. We may now turn our attention to the American domestic scenario and her capability status after the end of the Cold War.

America remains by far the most technologically advanced military power in the world. Ideologically too she has assumed a position of leadership in large and important areas of the world with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the apparent emasculation of the Chinese challenges. Capitalism, or various reformist forms of capitalism, appear increasingly to girdle the globe, and yet no impressive challenge is in sight. Constitutional liberalism, political pluralism, political freedoms, and fundamental rights, appear to be creating political legitimation which few, if any, post-modernist celebrations of traditional diversities and cogencies, or even bed-rocked fundamentalism in large areas of the world, can match, if they can not, for an appreciable period of time ahead, or without much struggle and travail, supplant. The United States leads as an intellectual exemplar in the large areas of the world (Nye 1990). Politically, the United states stands strengthened by her close association with Japan and some of the more successful Pacific Rim States, and with the steadily strengthening and integrating Western
Europe. In eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics, all the political equations for the time being seem to have changed dramatically in favour of the United States; so have they in important parts of Latin America. And, of course, in the United Nations she has been able to chalk up an accrual of strength which, although the outcome of labored diplomatic cultivation, and despite much criticism appears more real than at any time in the past.

These are impressive advantages. Yet, it is conceivable that America finds it difficult to shape a recognizable overall foreign policy strategy because they in no way help to ignore or offset her constraints.

The compound growth rate of the U.S. economy in the four years ending in 1986 was about 4 percent, the highest such four-year figure since 1979. After 1986, however, the rank sank steadily, to about 1.7 percent in the four years ending in 1991, and 1.8 percent for the four years ending in 1992 (Sommers 1992).

The potential overall growth rate is a function of the growth rate of the labour force and the presumed improvement in the productivity. The civilian labour force, both male or female, has been falling for many years. In 1991, the actual labour force fell almost 6 million short of the level it would have reached had the 1970-1990 growth trend been maintained (Sommers 1992). Even more important than the crude supply of labour is the quality of workers. There is almost no disagreement that U.S. literacy and educational levels lag behind those of her major international competitors - and, in fact, most other developed economics. It is also generally accepted that new entrants into the U.S. labour force are poorly equipped for the increasingly technical jobs that are rapidly replacing lower level clerical and physical jobs. According to Bureau of Labour Statistics projections, there will be virtually no growth in unskilled job categories in the 1990s (Sommers 1992).
At the federal level, the immense budget deficit is likely to continue for several years. In the main, the deficit reflects an enormous and still-growing volume of transfers and insurance-type claims, which provide little economic stimulus but nevertheless absorb revenues and require financing. The federal government's expenditures on payroll and goods are dwarfed by these transfers, and real outlay is likely to shrink further in the course of a considerable decline in defense spending. Though it is true that defense spending is economically "wasteful", defense is a large industry and the armed forces are a larger employer. Though unequivocally beneficial in the long run, the cut in defense spending is bound to produce dislocations and adjustments throughout the economy for years.

The problems government faces in contributing to orderly growth and providing a suitable environment for private industry are not limited to budgetary constraints. All government units in the United States, but most particularly the federal government, are now subject to intense pressure from single-issue constituencies, and from more general constituencies seeking favorable treatment in tax and spending legislation. These pressures are familiar there and elsewhere, but their intensity has grown recently as the U.S. growth rate has subsided, aggravating a host of social and distributional problems that had been present to a lesser degree for decades in the U.S.

The economy bears an increasing burden of social costs. Many of these social costs are present in almost all developed democratic systems, but some are responses to visible social strains that are much more pronounced in the United States. The particular conditions of declining growth over the past several years have tended to amplify these abnormal costs and to establish connections among them. The burden of dealing with them continues to grow, but the public resources and the ethical commitment required to address them are heavily strained.
And yet, America is still a remarkable country. As Abraham Lincoln told Congress in December 1862, America is a nation that "cannot escape history" because we are "the last best hope of earth". The president said that his administration and congress held the "power and... responsibility" to ensure that the hope America promised would be fulfilled. Today, 133 years later, Lincoln's America is the sole "superpower" left on earth. America is still the last best hope of earth, and holds the power and bears the responsibility for its remaining so. This is an enormous power and a sobering responsibility, especially since America is no longer alone but is accompanied by a free world growing ever larger and more interconnected.

Today, two alternative force structures are the focus of attention in Washington: the Base Force proposed by Richard Cheney, and the alternative proposed by Les Aspin. In simple terms, at the end of fiscal year 1997, the Department of Defense (DoD) Base Force and Aspin plan calls for the levels indicated in the column 1 and 2 respectively of the following table.

### Potential U.S. Force Levels Under DoD and Aspin Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DOD</th>
<th>Aspin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active army divisions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine divisions</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active air force wings</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Ships</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear-fueled submarines</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast sealift ships</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepositioning Ships</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The DOD Base Force has incurred a number of criticisms. Among the most telling is that it was developed while the USSR still existed, and the disappearance of the Soviet Union in 1991 renders it out of date.

In contrast to the DOD approach to sizing the U.S. military forces that may be required, Congressman Les Aspin claims that the best way to proceed is with a more precise, bottom-up, review of U.S. military forces. Aspin's force would save some $64 billion more than the $50 billion reduction proposed by President George Bush in his 1993 budget request.

The revised and approved DOD document reportedly (Smith 1992) clarifies and softens the overall tone of earlier draft without abandoning the basic concepts it espoused. In addition, and separately, the DoD has attempted to answer the criticism that since the USSR no longer exists, the Base Force and the rationale supporting it are out of date. The department points out that great uncertainties still exist in the world: 'We do not yet fully know the outcome of events in the former Soviet Republics, but we do know that at a minimum there will be tension and turmoil in that region- which are already seeing'. Conceivably there could be, as has been the case before in Russian history, a conservative counter revolution after which Russia would revert to being a hostile and aggressive power. In light of these uncertainties, the DoD points, it is too early to make drastic changes to the carefully thought out Base Force, especially to the levels proposed by Congressman Aspin.

The building-block approach chosen by Aspin has some interesting characteristics. His focus seems entirely on the direct employment of military force; his analysis appears to be concerned solely with
military force rather than military power. There is a great difference between these concepts and each plays a vital and complimentary role.

With acknowledged and credible military power, the United States will be called upon less frequently, to employ military force, because would-be adversaries will be deterred by the knowledge that the United states has the means and the will to resist threats to its vital interests. Military power exceeds military force in that it carries with it an authority that helps stabilize situations so that combat use of force often becomes an unacceptable alternative.

5.4 : U.S. and Indian National Objectives and strategies vis-a-vis Bilateral Relations

U.S. and Indian foreign policy, as that of most countries around the world, is in a state of flux. We are moving into a period of such international complexity that it will be some time before even major centers of power and influence in international relations will be able to formulate their objectives and strategy more definitely. On the other hand, a physically rampant transnationalizing world will necessitate tighter forms of governance in what is likely to remain basically an anarchic arena of politics (Holsti 1992).

The effectiveness of any policy including foreign policy, hinges heavily upon its relevance to the total environment in which it is sought to be operationlized and its capability in actual and potential terms to accomplish the desired objectives. Thus the essential ingredients of any effective policy are three : objectives, capability and relevance. It must be emphasized here that there is a dynamic inter-influence between and amongst these three ingredients and the strength of an equilibrium achieved through such inter-influence makes a given policy successful.
What should India's objectives be in the post-Cold War era?

Apart from the inevitable objectives of comprehensive national security and national development, which are the bedrock of survival of any nation-state, India must seek to accomplish two objectives: One, promoting her global economic proliferation through increasing national internal and international competitiveness and technological upgradation; and two, promoting regional cooperation and stability as a benevolent dominion power by acquiring and demonstrating necessary capability. In essence, India must systematically exercise her total power apparatus to transform India into a lynchpin of global power dynamics. She must emancipate her national existence to such a level so as to make her an inevitable reference in any context of post-Cold war world politics.

This does not imply any notion of hegemony or singular dominance on the part of Indian Foreign policy. Such notions are indeed fast-out-dating in the world shrinking into a global village through increasing transnationalization and interdependence. What it implies is quite the opposite, albeit with subtleties. Borrowing a term from Bio-sciences this foreign policy may be referred to as **Strategic Symbiosis**.

In the life sciences the term symbiosis, means any of several close relational patterns between two different species. The word comes from the Greek word meaning "state of living together". A symbiotic relationship is classified into three main types: mutualism, wherein both partners benefit from the relationship; commensalism, in which one member benefits while the other is neither helped nor harmed; and lastly, parasitism, wherein one member of the relationship benefits while the other is harmed.
Clearly, given the world situation as it is and given the kind of political culture that India has so proudly nurtured through centuries, the second and the third types of symbiotic relationships can not be effectively pursued by India. Thus it is only the symbiosis of mutualism that seems to be a viable foreign policy option with regard to international relations in general and the United States in particular.

A policy of strategic symbiosis based on mutualism combines elements of containment, appeasement and alliance in a complex manner. It can be the most effective way to advance mutual interests of the U.S. and India over the next few years. It recognizes that both countries have shared interests and acknowledges that a formal alliance may be excessive and mutual containment destructive to the pursuit of vital interests.

The Reagan administration actually employed this kind of strategy, but was inherently flawed with the disproportionate presence of the element of American superiority in "weaning" India away from the Soviet embrace. Nevertheless, this strategy, incorporating an important change in American perception of Indian legitimate interests, did enable both the countries to talk about a whole range of issues including the more sensitive issue of the transfer of dual-use technology of Super Computer to India. It also led to changes in Indian policy under the government of Rajiv Gandhi as we learned more about American realities (Gould & Ganguly 1993). A policy of strategic symbiosis would include several elements.

5.4.1 : Structure

A policy of strategic symbiosis should construct necessary and useful relational stakes. These stakes may in part of be economic, ideological, diplomatic and strategic. To achieve this with sustained po-
itical relationship, there needs to be an increased number of formal and informal mechanisms that would allow Americans and Indians to effectively present their perception to each other.

5.4.2 : Targets

A policy of strategic symbiosis should set clear targets. Given the long-term operational span of this policy which may extend over more than one governmental term, it would be useful to be able to measure progress, or the lack of it. What issues are most demanding in the U.S.-Indian relations: Clearly, India can not make America behave against its own perception of national interest, nor can the United states rectify the basic causes of conflict in South Asia by mere pronouncements of irresponsible statements and wishful preaching.

5.4.3 : Diplomacy

A long-term policy of Strategic symbiosis will draw upon the resources of other states. In pursuit of mutual interests the U.S. and India can work with Russia, several European countries, Japan, China, and Pakistan. Indeed, in some cases, it will be other states who will be more effective partner. For instance, Japan has a long drawn interest in non-proliferation issues, has substantially high investments in India and Pakistan, it is an Asian economic giant with changing perception of her global role, and is vitally interested in the maintainance of sea lanes and a tranquil Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia.
5.4.4 : Military Implications

A key assumption of the policy of strategic symbiosis is that neither India nor the U.S. will pose any significant security threat to the current or future strategic interests of each other. Except in the very unlikely cases of an American intervention with implied or actual threat to Indian regional or global interest or vice versa, it is unlikely that Indian and American forces will stand against each other on a battle ground.

Therefore, U.S.-Indian military relations should be keyed towards three objectives: avoiding misunderstanding between the two countries, laying the ground work for possible strategic collaboration in future and providing warning time about changes in each other's policy and perspectives.

A policy of strategic symbiosis - a complex equilibrium of cooperation, pressure, persuasion and appeasement - recognizes the non-military component of mutual security interests of the U.S. and India. The real value of this policy lies in demonstrating to the larger political collectivities in both the countries that the United States and India do not fear each other and that they can cooperate not only for mutual interest but for the interest of the world at large. If they can do this, they should be able to discuss coordination of their policies on a broad range of political, economic, and regional issues that lack the immediate photogenic attraction of maneuvers at sea, but are far more central to the security concerns of a fifth of the human race.

If, as Lincoln called America to be "the last hope of the earth" that hope can not be realised, as Tagore and Sri Aurobindo sung; without India's partnership in the emergent new world of hope.
References

Bailey, Kathleen. 1991. *Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many* 
Urbana : University of Illinois Press.

ing Perceptions and policy choices". *Pacific Com 

Enterprise* March\April.

Problem in International Relations*. London : Har 
vester Wheatsheaf.

Congressional Research Service 1978. *The United States, India 
and South Asia : Interests, Trends and Issues for 
Congressional concern*, pp 9-10.

Gould, Harold, and sumit Ganguly. 1993 Editors. *The Hope and 
the Reality : U.S.-Indian Relations from Roosevelt 
to Reagan*. New Delhi : Oxford IBH.

American policy in South Asia". *Asian Affairs*. 
Vol.11.1.p.45

Harrison, Selig, S. and Geoffery Kemp.1993. *India and America after 
the Cold War*. Washington :The Carnegie Endow 
ment for International Peace.

order, 1648-1989*. Cambridge ; Cambridge Univer 
sity Press.

Nineteenth Century International Politics." in 
Rosenau and Czempiel. Editors. Governance with


