"British Empiricism" refers to the 18th century philosophical movement in Great Britain which maintained that all knowledge comes from experience. Continental Rationalists maintained that knowledge comes from foundational concepts known intuitively through reason, such as innate ideas. Other concepts are then deductively drawn from these. Empiricism was the 18th century philosophical movement in which the theory that all knowledge comes from experience. Empiricism relied upon observation and experiment, especially in the natural sciences. British empiricists, namely John Locke, did disallow or rejected innate ideas and the derivation of all the raw materials of knowledge from sensation or reflection. They however, did not reject the notion of instinct or innateness in general.

"Humans, who are servants and interpreters of nature, can act and understand no further than they have observed in either the operation or the contemplation of the method and order of nature. The contrast between mere ideas and their relations on the one hand and substantial matter of fact on the other is central to the common sense notion of a world we find and do not make, a world to which our ideas must conform if they are to be factually true and informational reliable."

Empiricism was almost wholly based on the process of experimentation through experience, observation and reflection. This process accordingly enabled any individual to construct in their minds a more coherent and intellectual world that surrounds them. Empiricism embraces Locke's theory "that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection" and therefore fulfills the observation that humans (according to Francis Bacon) can indeed act and understand no further than they have observed. The incorporation of Immanuel Kant's dictum that "concepts without precepts are empty, and precepts without concepts are blind, while the effective cooperation of precept and concept, observation and idea, constitutes empirical knowledge."
It essentially has been discovered that fetuses and newborn babies have no perception while the parent of the child would be an experienced observer of the human world surrounding the fetus or newborn. The perception of the surrounding world by the parent would be the empirical example that the operation of the mind does furnish with ideas through the examination of experience through observation. Empiricism therefore is, truly, a movement in which, the observation that experience comes from knowledge. Empiricists doubt wholly that individuals are born with "detailed, picture-like, concepts of God, causality, and even mathematics", Perception therefore comes from experience from aging, simply. The maturation of an individual allows ideas to form after it has begun to perceive. Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum* "I think therefore I am" somewhat supports the ideology behind complete empirical theory.

Empiricism was developed to question the nature of human understanding and development through life experiences and observations. Also, the existence of God was questioned (mainly by Hume). "If God can prevent evil, but doesn't, then He isn't all loving" was one of Hume's views that essentially the human mind cannot have experienced a relationship with God through experimentation or observation therefore the existence of God was highly questioned. This is where rationality becomes a question through empiricism questioning the absence of innate ideas. Later, scientific investigations of God's existence took place (after the turn of the 19th century a lot more) as empirical theory and canon began to fade out in Britain.

A philosophical doctrine which regards experience as the only source of knowledge. The empiricist draws his rules of practice not from theory but from close observation and experiment, emphasizing inductive rather than deductive processes of thought. In seventeenth- and eighteenth- century medicine, however, empiricism was synonymous with quackery, and in literary criticism the term is also generally employed to characterize an uninformed judgment. British Empiricists staunchly rejected the theory of innate ideas and argued that knowledge is based on both sense experience and internal mental experiences, such as emotions and self-reflection. 18th century British Empiricists
took their cue from Francis Bacon who, in the very first aphorism of his New Organon, hails the primacy of experience, particularly the observation of nature³:

"Humans, who are the servants and interpreters of nature, can act and understand no further than they have observed in either the operation or the contemplation of the method and order of nature".

Humans, who are the servants and interpreters of nature, can act and understand no further than they have observed in either the operation or the contemplation of the method and order of nature. Although British Empiricists disavowed innate ideas, in favor of ideas from experience, it is important to note that the Empiricists did not reject the notion of instinct or innateness in general. Indeed, we have inborn propensities which regulate our bodily functions, produce emotions, and even direct our thinking. What Empiricists deny, though, is that we are born with detailed, picture-like, concepts of God, causality, and even mathematics.

Modern philosophy in its beginning, breathes the spirit of modern times. Knowledge had grown much up to 14th century but it had not reached to its apex. Modern philosophers gave different theories of knowledge. Modern theory of knowledge that "knowledge is power" seems to be evident, since in this world of explosion, the knowledge having zero or near zero value cannot survive amidst the knowledge that has a lasting impact on human memory, and it is this impact that leads to generation and development of knowledge in all fields of human activities and makes its survival due to constant exertion of power to the sensitive brain of human beings. The emphasis on reason and on new method of discoveries led to inquiries into the limit, nature, and function of knowledge. This study of knowledge for ascertaining its nature and limit is called epistemology.

Men in the west have inherited the way of thinking from the Greeks. They have tended to emphasize the objective world of senses, which has led to modern science, and technology, in which the West excels. It has produced a philosophy of nature that
supports and branches out into various sciences. The resulting knowledge is
departmentalized, specialized and detached; and it tends to be empirical and descriptive.
Knowledge beyond immediate world of senses becomes theoretical and is expressed in
various verbal or mathematical symbols. For many eastern philosophers the world is
ephemeral and illusory. They are concerned with the personal and inner reality of the self
and a reality beyond this present empirical world. A person is more likely to stress
“Knowledge by acquaintance” and to gain acquaintance the mind must be cleared of the
obstacles of selfish desires and disturbing emotions. Discipline, which is intellectual,
moral, emotional as well as physical, and self-control are essential. According to Hindu
philosophers’ spiritual truth depends for its validity on the Scriptures, reason and
personal experience. When all the three factors jointly lead to the same conclusion, one
may be reasonably assured of having reached the truth (the liberation of Spirit)
Buddhists have relied on reason, experience and intuition. Gautam based his philosophy
on reason and the everyday experience of men. He advised his followers to adopt only
what agrees with their experience when it has been subjected to investigation and the test
of reason and when it contributes to the welfare of themselves and others. Thus a man
needs to base his beliefs on his own experience as interpreted by reason.

Empiricists consider experience the concrete realm of knowledge. According to
empiricism knowledge is received through sensation by sense organs. Empiricists are
against the theory of innate ideas. Empiricism considers mind a tabula rasa. All
knowledge is acquired through sense experiences only. Sensation and reflection, the
sense experience outer and the inner, are the only two windows through which the dark
chamber of mind comes to be filled with light. For example the elements of experience
such as light and heat, colour and smell are all unrelated and simple. An English
philosopher, John Locke was the founder of modern empiricism. He was not a
constructive metaphysician, like his contemporaries, Spinoza and Leibnitz. Locke worked
out an all embracing system to explain the nature of the universe. In his essay concerning
Human Understanding Locke tried to show that men’s power are too limited for such
total knowledge to be possible.
Empiricism considers empirical experience the sole source of knowledge. According to it we human beings attain knowledge through the sensations received by our sense organs. In a way rationalism and empiricism both are the opposing views to each other. Locke Berkeley and Hume—the trinity of British empiricism all start from the assumption that, real knowledge must be certain, mathematics is the model of knowledge and real knowledge must be certain. Locke tries to reconcile this view with what appears to be understandable facts of common sense; Berkeley combines it with a form of empiricism which leads to somewhat startling conclusions, about reality and Hume draws consequences from it which seems to indicate a distinctly ambivalent attitude. Three principal philosophers are associated with British Empiricism: John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume.

EMPIRICISM

JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704) 
GEORGE BERKELEY (1685-1753) 
DAVID HUME (1711-1776)

4.1 John Locke (1632-17104)

John Locke born at Winton near Bristol in 1632 is considered the father of empiricism, began by trying to remove the prevailing notion that men were born with a certain amount of knowledge in the form of innate ideas.” Locke maintained that we are born knowing nothing; the mind is a tabula rasa everything comes from sensory experience. Locke was an empiricist in the sense; he believed that all material of our knowledge is derived from sense perception and introspection. He was a rationalist in the sense that he believed in bringing all opinions and beliefs before the tribunal of reason and disliked the substitution of expression of emotion and feeling for rationally grounded
judgments. But he was not a rationalist in the sense of one who denies spiritual reality, while not contrary to reason or above reason, in the sense that they cannot be discovered by reason alone and may not be fully understandable, even when revealed.

4.1.1 Aim

Locke's empirical emphasis was partly, an inheritance from Bacon, but it was a partly deliberate answer to the Continental Rationalists. Locke aimed at a "common sense" philosophy, in contrast to "speculative theories" (terms of opprobrium among the Empiricists) in vogue on the Continent. Locke's theory was in fact the response of a temperament exactly the opposite of Spinoza's to the dilemma of Cartesians and to the problem of accommodating the new science and the traditional philosophy to each other. Whereas Spinoza preferred the indubitable and the rational and the ideal. Locke preferred the concrete and practical and was deeply suspicious of neat and tidy, but abstract, schemes. Locke's starting point was typical of this empirical disposition. Before men began to philosophize about ultimate realities, he said, they ought to find out what kind of instrument the human mind is and whether it is fitted for such metaphysical inquiries.

4.1.2 Works


The fundamental principles of Locke's philosophy are presented in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), the culmination of twenty years of reflection.
on the origins of human knowledge. According to Locke, what we know is always properly understood as the relation between ideas, and he devoted much of the *Essay* to an extended argument that all of our ideas—simple or complex—are ultimately derived from experience. The consequence of this empiricist approach is that the knowledge of which we are capable is severely limited in its scope and certainty. Our knowledge of material substances, for example, depends heavily on the secondary qualities by reference to which we name them, while their real inner natures derive from the primary qualities of their insensible parts.

As a philosopher Locke insisted on the primacy of experimental science and philosophy over the subtle quibbles of traditional Aristotelian modes of thought. His principal philosophical work was his "Essay Concerning Human Understanding", published in 1690, although it had taken him seventeen years to complete: it comprises an attempt to determine what aspects of his existence man's understanding was capable of comprehending and which exceeded his power. He believed, with Hobbes, that man had once existed in a state of nature, but that, as a creature created in God's image, man was possessed of reason, and therefore capable of rational behavior, which permitted him to cooperate with other men to form societies and to discern the laws of nature, the most important of which guaranteed him life, liberty, and property. Man acquired knowledge not by means of divine revelation or because he possessed innate ideas, but because his senses permitted him to learn from the external world, and put him in touch with reality. (Locke, like Newton, would be one of Blake's *bête noires*.). Though all men were born equal, Locke maintained, some, by dint of greater industry, could legitimately accumulate more property than others: the primary responsibilities of legitimate governments, therefore, were to protect life and liberty and to safeguard property.

4.1.3 Basic Assumptions

The men of 17th century were aware that most (some said "all") of what past ages had taken for knowledge was ignorance and superstition that had to be cleared away in order to provide a firm basis of progress. "Reason" was the name they used to describe
the new method that was to replace the dogmatism of the past. For the men of this age, "reason" had rich emotive conative overtones: It stood for "cool" objectivity (as opposed to "passion"), for impartiality (as opposed to prejudice), for intellection (as opposed to revelation). They held it to be a property with which all men were endowed, and the instrument by which they were to fashion for themselves a better life. In this sense Locke was as much rationalist as Descartes. They shared the enlightenment outlook that man is competent to cure all his ills, cognitive as well as moral, by the use of his natural powers. Descartes took as the prototype of reason that abstract *vis cognoscens* that seemed to him to be at work in mathematical reasoning, Locke took as the prototype of rational thought the kind of thinking. For Locke the real world was here-and-now the world of abdominal incisions, discharging abscesses, and emergency operations, not an ideal world of mathematically certain relations. Though reasoning about this world of concrete occurrences does not yield absolute certainty, Locke held we should not scorn it; it is the best we can accept in this life, and it is a great deal better than anything we would get by trying to apply the geometric method to concrete problems.

Locke held that.

"Our inquiries from the true and advantageous knowledge of things... He that in physics shall lay down fundamental maxims, and, from thence drawing consequences and raising disputes, shall reduce it into the regular form of science, has indeed something to enlarge the art of talking and perhaps lay a foundation for endless disputes; but if he hopes to bring men by such a system to the knowledge of... the constitution, nature, signs, changes, and history of diseases... (he) takes much (the same) course with him that should walk up and down in a thick wood, overgrown with briars and thorns, with a design to take a view and draw a map of the country." 5

Descartes and the Continental Rationalists had assumed that the a priori method of mathematics can be used satisfactorily in other fields, especially in most obscure of all fields, metaphysics. The result was a series of speculative fights into unknown. The contradiction into which the philosophers fell are therefore not in the least grounds for "suspecting either that there is no such thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it." Locke was convinced with reason.
itself. Providing we know how to employ it and do not demand to transcend truth from it, it is an entirely adequate instrument for ascertaining that we need to know. It is “the candle of the Lord set up by himself in men’s minds”, and without it we are plunged into “Egyptian darkness”. Truly, therefore, it “must be our last judge and guide in everything”.

Locke initially believed that clearing the ground of a proper use of the understanding would be easy. He unconsciously assumed metaphysical position that determined the course of his epistemological enquiry. This assumption was the familiar Cartesian belief that world consists of two different kinds of things, minds and bodies; that mind know only their own states (which like Descartes, Locke called “ideas”); and that ideas somehow “represent” the external world of bodies. Now, because he assumed that what the mind knows are its ideas, his proposal to study the extent of the human understanding seemed to Locke to mean investigating the nature and origin of ideas.

4.1.4 Innate Ideas

The Origin of Ideas are acquired, learned and obtained from our experience. In other words, in general there is no innate idea. Locke held that the claim for the universal validity of knowledge does not justify the existence of the innate ideas. Such ideas as logical principles (i.e., the principle of identity, that of contradiction and that of the excluded middle), moral laws, God, can be developed by gradual use of human reason, not innate ideas. The only exception to the rule is: the desire for happiness which is inborn to the human

Considerations concerning the nature of knowledge had always found an important place, in the comprehensive form of reflection which we designate philosophy but the treatment of knowledge was had always hitherto been dominated by ontological considerations. Either knowledge was regarded as something to be accounted for by reference to the general principals, or special features of knowledge were appealed to for the establishment of ontological conclusions. From the futility of a merely formal treatment of knowledge, Locke was saved by his keen interest in the varied contents of experience; while he was the first to regard the problems of knowledge as primary, and as
requiring to be dealt with from its own point of view. An investigation of knowledge as Locke presupposes, he maintains is a necessary preliminary to any attempt to determine the nature of real being.

Considerable divergence existed among philosophical writers of the 17th century as to the significance to be attached to the term idea. In a way by many it was employed, which limited its application to a medium of cognition involved in sense perception and imagination; even in this reference the term was ambiguous. For while it was sometimes applied to the contents of these mental functions themselves, it was also used to signify the physiological conditions upon which they were supposed to depend; whether these were still conceived as 'sensible species' or physical representation of material things, or according to more modern view, as consisting some form of motion in the brain. According to Descartes ideas are involved alike in sense-perception and in pure or imageless thought. It is in this comprehensive sense that the term is used by Locke. Adopting a distinction, which had been current among the Schoolmen, Descartes maintained that the idea may be regarded from two distinct points of view. It may be considered as a mode of the individual's consciousness, or as the representation of something other than itself. From one point of view, it may be said to possess 'formal reality'; from the other 'objective reality'.

Locke sought to derive the whole content of our knowledge from a series of physical facts devoid of objective reference. He repeatedly compares the function of idea with that of the word. Both were for him essentially representative. Indeed, a 'physical fact' sheer impossibility. To have admitted it would have been to run directly counter to the principal which was fundamental for his conception of mind, that 'to be in the understanding' is 'to be understood'. It is the objective reality of the idea which is brought forward in its definition, as 'whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks' and it is with ideas as 'objects' of thought. For Locke the term 'object' however a relation and dependence upon mind or subject.
4.14.1 Ideas from Experience

Locke's Most of Book I of the Essay is devoted to a detailed refutation of the belief that any of our knowledge is innate. Locke insisted that neither the speculative principles of logic and metaphysics nor the practical principles of morality are inscribed on our minds from birth. Such propositions do not in fact have the universal consent of all human beings, Locke argued, since children and the mentally defective do not assent to them. Moreover, even if everyone did accept these principles, their universality could be better explained in terms of self-evidence or shared experience than by reference to a presumed innate origin. Innatism is the refuge of lazy intellectual dictators who wish thereby to impose their provincial notions upon others. Besides, Locke held, our knowledge cannot be innate because none of the ideas of which it is composed are innate.

The correct answer proposed Locke is the fundamental principle of empiricism: all of our knowledge and ideas arise from experience. The initially empty room of the mind is furnished with ideas of two sorts: first, by sensation we obtain ideas of things we suppose to exist outside us in the physical world; second, by reflection we come to have ideas of our own mental operations. Thus, for example, "hard", "red", "loud", "cold", "sweet", and "aromatic" are all ideas of sensation, while "perceiving", "remembering", "abstracting", and "thinking" are all ideas of reflection. ("Pleasure", "unity", and "existence," Locke held, are ideas that come to us from both sensation and reflection.) Everything we know, everything we believe, every thought we can entertain is made up of ideas of sensation and reflection and nothing else.

Locke believed that everyone allows some ideas originate in experience; but the received opinion was that we start life with a certain number of "native ideas and original characters", and that "these ideas, being in our minds from their very beginnings, are antecedent of all experience and must have been implanted in them by God himself". Locke probably had in view, as the holders of the "received opinion", like teachers in the university-"Schoolmen", whether Catholic or Protestant in their theology, who used the doctrine of innate ideas to silence criticism. They argued 1) that innate ideas, because of
their allegedly divine origin, are sacrosanct and above the kind of scrutiny that Locke held to be an indispensable preliminary to philosophical speculation, and 2) again because of their living origin, these ideas have an transcendent importance that makes them particularly well suited to be the axiomatic starting points for metaphysical system-building. Against such obscurantism, Locke was very effective. He said, no one has yet discovered a new truth or advanced the sciences a jot by starting out from “What is”, is, or from “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be”.

Locke argued “innate” ideas are not self-evident maxims. The reason for this is that

1. Even if there were propositions which commanded universal assent, this would not prove them to be innate unless all other explanations of such uniformity of belief could be confidently ruled out. 

2. Even for the most promising candidates, universal assent does not exist. Children and idiots do not possess such propositional knowledge.

Locke holds that if we have an innate capacity to know, which if represented as a doctrine of innate knowledge is ‘a very improper way of speaking’, or alternately, they involve the supposition that children do possess this knowledge, but with the qualification it remains latent until a later date—for example, until they come to the age of reason. But this line of defence presupposes that it is possible for someone to know a proposition of which he has never been aware. Locke pronounces this to be ‘near a contradiction’.

Nearly all arguments which Locke deploys against the doctrine of innate ideas suggests that for the purpose of his attack he regarded it primarily a psycho-genetic account of how we come to possess certain items of knowledge. When Locke deals with the view that children become aware of their innate knowledge when they come to the age of reason, he points out that on one interpretation, this could mean that ‘reason assists them in the discovery of these principles’. But this can hardly count as a doctrine of innate knowledge any longer. Such an appeal to reason in order to account for
‘discovery’ of such principles makes the doctrine redundant, not only psychologically, but also, one might add epistemologically. Locke asks how ‘genuine innate principles may be distinguished from others, that so, amidst the great variety of pretenders, I may be kept from mistakes in so material point as this’. Locke’s own attitude towards the doctrine was prompted by the epistemological uses which were made of it, as is sufficiently revealed by a quotation

“We may rationally hope to see with other man’s eyes, as to know by other men’s understandings. So much as we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we possess of real and true knowledge. The floating of other men’s opinions in our brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. .. When men have found some general propositions that could not be doubted as soon as understood, it was, I know, a short and easy way to conclude them innate. This being once received, it eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopped the inquiry of doubtful concerning all that was once styled innate. And it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be masters and teachers, to make this the principle of principles,—that principles must not be questioned. For, having once established his tenet,—that there are innate principles, it put their followers upon a necessity of receiving some doctrines as such; which was to take them off from the use of their own reason and judgment, and put them on believing and taking them upon trust without further examination: in which posture of blind credulity, they might be more easily governed by, and made useful to some sort of men, who had the stall and office to principle and guide them”.

Locke clearly felt that the doctrine was being used as a pseudo-epistemological device to buttress obscurantism and as an instrument of intellectual oppression. Locke’s primary intent is to question its empirical foundation. Yolton quotes the relevant passage from Parker’s Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonic Philosophie (1666).

“But suppose that we were born with these congenite anticipations, and that they take Root in our very Faculties, yet how can I be certain of their Truth and Veracity? For it is not impossible but the seeds of Error might have been the natural Results of my Faculties, as Weeds are the first and the Natural Issues of the best Soyles, how then shall we be sure that these spontaneous Notions are not false and spurious”.

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This eminent sound criticism of dogmatism led Locke to adopt a very naïve conception of the relation of the mind to its experience. Locke shared with his opponents the view that if there were innate principles then they would be true. Locke argues against the view that there are any innate moral principles. He says: "Another reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles is that I think there cannot any one moral rule be presupposed whereof a man may not justly demand a reason: which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd if they were innate, or so much as self-evident, which every principle must needs be, and not need any proof to ascertain its truth, nor want any reason to gain it approbation." Even if side-step the problem of deciding what precisely Locke means by ‘self-evident’ and how self-evidence would make itself manifest in innate principles, it is clear that Locke commits himself to the view that if there were any innate principles they would be self-evident and therefore true. The question arises why was Locke committed to this view? The answer to this question is given in Locke’s Essay, I, Chapter ii. Locke says:

“For I imagine anyone will easily grant that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom God has given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes, from external objects; and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature and innate characters, when we may observe in ourselves faculties, fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them, as they were originally imprinted on the mind”.

Locke’s this statement applies that if there were any innate principles, these would also have been imprinted by God. But we do not have to rely on speculations about what Locke might or might not have implied by these remarks. In Chapter iv Locke is more explicit: “I grant that if there were any ideas to be found imprinted on the minds of men, we have reason to expect it should be the notion of his maker, as a mark God set on his own workmanship, to mind man of his dependence and duty”.

Finally, we conclude that if there were any innate principles Locke could only explain them by supposing that they were imprinted by God; and further, Locke could not even countenance a God-deceiver problem. For example, revelations, if they are genuine (i.e. if they come from God) are trustworthy because “we may as well doubt of our own
being as we can whether any revelation from God to be true". Therefore, if there were any innate principles imprinted on our minds by God, they would have to be taken as true. Hence, although it is Locke's theological convictions and his concern for religious toleration, which inspires his attack on the doctrine of innate knowledge, it is his, theological convictions which prevent him from using what would strike us as the most direct epistemological refutation of it.

When Leibnitz read Locke's attack on innate ideas, he concluded that this was directed against Descartes, and in his *New Essays* he refined the Cartesian to escape these criticisms. As might be expected, Leibnitz reformulation reflected his doctrine of a continuum of degrees of consciousness. Whereas Locke argued, "no proposition can be said to be in the mind which it was never yet conscious of". Leibnitz attributed that Descartes' own formula is ambiguous, for example the term "originate" can mean either (1) "is the occasion for our coming to know" or (2) "is the source of the truth of." Locke supposed him to mean the former and criticized him on that basis. Thus, when Descartes denied that mathematical ideas originate in perception, he meant that measuring the perceptual triangle is not a proof (or a disproof) of the theorem about interior angles equaling two right angles. But this is not to deny that the perceptual triangle suggests the theorem. The real question is not what everyone recognizes certain universal truths, but whether there are any universal truths. Locke did not want to deny the latter-in fact, he insisted on it; no one, Leibnitz thought wanted to hold the former. Therefore, there was no real dispute. There only appeared to be one because Locke had confused a psychological question with an epistemological question.

Leibnitz acknowledged as Locke maintained, all our knowledge "begins in particulars and spreads itself by degrees to generals." But this is merely a psychological order of coming to know; it in no way affects the fact that "the generals" must be true in order for the particulars to be recognized. Leibnitz pointed out, our knowledge does not indeed begin in experience; and there is nothing in our minds other than their several experiences- nothing, that is, except the mind itself. In this way, Leibnitz characteristically presented a compromise formula that, it might be thought, Locke could
accept. But about the nature of this mind that knows the experiences, the two thinkers were poles apart. Leibnitz assumed the real is rational, hence he believed that the mind must be the kind of thing that can know this universal rational order. On the other hand, Locke assumed that the real is actual, that the test of truth is experience, and that the mind accordingly, is simply a surface on which experience writes.

Locke's attack on innate principles (and innate ideas as well) is to-pronged; he attempts to show, that the theories of innatism of varying sophistication are either unintelligible, false, or, if modified, trivially true and that they are all irrelevant and unnecessary. But sometimes it seems that it is not the idea of non-conscious knowledge per se that Locke dislikes—he allows the unconscious propositional knowledge of memory—but that of a knowledge which is not only unconscious, but which has never at any time been conscious. No proposition can be said to to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. Locke expands this view in the Essay, later on, when he claims that if there are any innate ideas in the mind which the mind does not actually think on, they must be lodged in the memory. But the ideas stored in the memory are brought from there by remembrance and must be known when recalled to have been in the mind before, 'unless remembrance can be without remembrance'. But this is not possible for innate knowledge, that which by definition does not come from natural sources; hence innate knowledge cannot exist in memory; and so, according to what was premissed, it does not exist in the mind at all. This weak reasoning is soundly refuted by Leibnitz. The reason is that:

1. It is not true that all memories are known as such in the mind; we frequently recall things yet are unaware of doing so, like the man who 'believed he had composed a new verse, which is turned out he read word for word a long time previous in some ancient poet'.

ii. What is at issue is the intelligibility of the notion of non-conscious knowledge; but if Locke allows that there can be unconscious knowledge, that stored in the memory, this concedes the central point. If acquired knowledge can be stored
unconsciously in the mind, then why shouldn't there be a store of original or innate knowledge existing non-consciously? Why need all knowledge have been 'present to conscious' at some time?

Leibnitz has other reasons, drawn from the murkier depths of his metaphysics, for not rejecting notions of the unconscious. In particular he mentions the 'petites perceptions' which, taken singly, are below the sensory threshold and hence unnoticed by the conscious mind, but which rise above it when they are combined with others in a normal perceptual experience. In general Leibnitz thinks that *the insensible perceptions* are as eminently useful in Pneumatology as are the insensible corpuscles in Physics, and it is equally unreasonable to reject the one or the other under the pretext that they are out of reach of our senses. He even takes this admirable maxim to the doubtful extreme of claiming that 'we have an infinite account of knowledge of which we are not always conscious, not even when we need it.' But this seems to be a reference to the nature of monadic perception, rather than a claim about innateness in 'the common system'.

In his *Essay* Locke considers theories of innatism of varying sophistication, hence the criticism sometimes levelled against him that he chooses only the simples is unfair. One suggestion, he examines is that knowledge of certain maxims is innate in the sense that the mind has a natural capacity to assent to them when it has understood to them. Locke rejects this not because it is false, but because it is trivially true, and does not amount to a theory of innate knowledge. Thus if I understand or know any proposition then it follows that I must have had the capacity to do this, and so acceptance of their theory of innatism would mean that all the truths we come to know are innate, 'and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking, which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny innate principles.' The later persons, who include Locke, are quite willing to allow that there exists natural capacities to acquire knowledge and ideas which the mind has in the virtue of its natural endowment of faculties and powers; but these capacities are general in nature, and do not favour particular truths or concepts. Leibnitz denies that his theory, at least, states no more than that the mind has such natural general capacities for
acquiring knowledge; the mind, he thinks, is not only capable of knowing innate truths, but has the further power of finding them in itself. Here we can profitably recall the difference between Locke's comparison of the mind at birth to a blank sheet of paper, on which any truth can be written and which therefore favours none in particular, and Leibnitz's use of the model of a block of marble in which the figure of Hercules is marked out by veins, and only awaits uncovering. To sum up their differences on this point: Locke envisions the understanding acquiring all its knowledge and ideas by the exercise of its natural and unspecific faculties and powers, but Leibnitz sees it as possessing some knowledge and ideas which can be extracted ready formed. There seem to be two main causal factors involved: sense experience, which serves as the occasion or indirect cause of emergence of innate knowledge into consciousness, and which Leibnitz implies is a necessary condition of this process; and reflection and thought, 'attention to what is in us' as Leibnitz sometimes describes it, which is the direct cause and also necessary.

Descartes, in discussing the innate knowledge we have of God, claims that in its extraction from the mind both tradition (explicit teaching) and observation are remote or indirect causes, 'inviting us to bethink ourselves of the ideas which we may have of God, and to present it vividly to our thought' and hence are not alone sufficient to give us this idea. They must be backed up by a clear and perhaps prolonged reflection on the idea of God (like that of Descartes in the Meditations) and it is this which is mainly responsible for the emergence of the idea and the knowledge of God associated with it into the conscious mind. The distinction between the occasional and direct causes of an event seems to correspond roughly to the modern one between enabling conditions which provide a state of readiness for the occurrence of an event, and stimulus conditions which actually bring it about in those circumstances. The idea that some aspects of individual development may require both enabling conditions, which affect only the onset of the changes and possibly also their continuation, but not their form; and stimulus conditions which guide and control the development, is well established in modern biology and psychology.
We can imagine beings for which the existence of innate knowledge could be quite simply demonstrated: suppose we discover on another planet a race like humans in all but this respect, at a certain level of maturity the young display, either spontaneously or with some coaching, knowledge of certain facts of their planet's history—that a certain battle was fought on one date, or that a great leader died on another. For example in case of Socrates and the slave boy, we are inclined to say that the knowledge of geometry the boy acquires is not innate, but simply acquired because the truths are self-evident—given a little prodding, a directing of attention to relevant features. This is what Locke suggests; and we might also agree with his belief that in other cases a concept or a truth can be acquired from normal sense-experience, without postulating innateness. Leibnitz believes that both innate knowledge and ideas are extracted from the mind, and that therefore his position differs substantially from that of Locke, who holds that the mind has only general capacities to acquire all knowledge and ideas which do not favour any principles or concepts in particular.

"The general principles enter into our thoughts, of which they form the soul and the connection. They are as necessary thereto as the muscles and sinews are for walking, although we do not at all think of them. The mind leans upon these principles every moment, but it does not come so easily as distinguish them and represent them distinctly and separately, because that demands great attention to its acts; and the majority of people, little accustomed to think, has little of it."

Thus the basic question was not whether there are innate truths (whether there are canned goods in the closet), but what sort of thing the mind must be to know (as everyone, including Locke, acknowledged that it does know) universal truths. Put in this way, it is clear that, though both Locke and Leibnitz saw the mote in the other's eye, neither was aware of the beam in his own.

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Locke rejected universalism, because "All things that exist are only particulars", and so there are no universals, universalism is just false. Locke had no inhibitions about
trying to produce a rival theory which would succeed in universalism's impossible task. Locke insists that a 'general idea is a mental particular which is 'general' only in the sense that it is used in a certain way:

"Words are general when . . . when used for signs of general ideas, and so are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and the ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things. But universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas which in their signification are general . . . [General ideas] are only creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into, by understanding, of signifying or representing many particular. For the signification they have is nothing but a relation that, by the mind of man is added to them" 42

Locke presents ideas as 'standards' to be used in classifications of particulars, but ideas are themselves particulars and cannot serve as standards until they themselves have classified.

"The mind having got an idea which it thinks it may have use of either in contemplation or discourse, the first it does is to abstract it, and then get a name to it; and so lay it up in its storehouse, the memory, as containing the essence of a sort of thing, of which that name is always to be the mark."43 We have to abstract an idea in order to make it usable. The process is essentially one of neglecting, omitting, setting aside "The mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind . . . separate from all other existences, and the circumstance of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind."44 Abstraction, though, involves somehow stripping an idea not just of 'circumstances' in which its like originally came into one's mind, but also of some of its internal detail "When [children learn] that there are a great many other things in the world, that in some [respects] resemble their father and mother, and those persons they have been used to, they frame an idea, which they find those many particulars do partake in, and to that they give, with others, the name man, for example. And this they come to have a general name, and a general idea. Wherein they had nothing new; but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all." 45

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Locke takes all 'ideas' to be something in the nature of sense-data—either as acquired in ordinary perception, hallucinations etc., or as imaginatively conjured up at will. This fact—which now shifts towards the center of our concerns—shows in his saying, above, that the 'ideas' involved in meaning and classifying are developed by abstraction from 'particular ideas received from particular objects.' The later are certainly meant to be the sense-data acquired in ordinary perception, and the ideas which figure in meaning and classifying—the ones that may be abstract, and that can be called to mind at will and are 'excited' in us when we understand—are supposed to be copies of them. You have a copy-idea in your mind when, for example, you see a face in your mind's eye or have a tune running through your head. So an 'abstract' idea is a copy-idea, an idea such as one might have in imagining something, which is in some way sketchy or undetailed. How did in a nutshell, did Locke try to solve the 'problem' of explaining our ability to classify particulars?: 'By means of his theory about abstract ideas' This answer is misleading. The theory of abstractness is, at least prima facie, a solution of this 'problem.' We always classify things by comparing them with samples, while leaving shrouded in mystery the question of how we manage to select the relevant feature(s) of any given sample, then we should have a problem to which the theory of abstractness might be the solution. But in relation to the large 'problem' of how we are able to classify particulars, abstractness as such is peripheral.

4.1.6 Simple And Complex Ideas

There are no innate ideas "stamped upon the mind" from birth; and yet impressions of sense are not the only source of knowledge. "The mind furnishes the understanding with ideas." No distinction is implied here between "mind" and "understanding," so that the sentence might run, "the mind furnishes itself with ideas." As to what these ideas are, we are not left in doubt: they are "ideas of its own operations." When the mind acts, it has an idea of its action, that is, it is self-conscious, and, as such, is assumed to be an original source of our knowledge. Hume and Condillac both refused to admit reflection as an original source of ideas, and both, accordingly, found that they.
had to face the problem of tracing the growth of self-consciousness out of a succession of sensations. According to Locke, reflection is an original, rather than an independent, source of ideas. Without sensation mind would have nothing to operate upon, and therefore could have no ideas of its operations. It is "when he first has any sensation" that "a man begins to have any ideas". The operations of the mind are not themselves produced by sensation, but sensation is required to give the mind material for working on

4.1.6 1 Simple Ideas

Understanding is receptive (passive) in simple ideas. Understanding can be also active in combining several simple ideas, though understanding does not create ideas, but simply combine them. The ideas which sensation gives "enter by the senses simple and unmixed", they stand in need of the activity of mind to bind them into the complex unities required for knowledge. The complex ideas of substance, modes, and relations are all the product of the combining and abstracting activity of mind operating upon simple ideas, which have been given, without any connection, by sensation or reflection. Locke's account of knowledge thus has two sides. On the one side, all the material of knowledge is traced to the simple idea. On the other side, the processes that transform this crude material into knowledge are activities of mind which themselves cannot be reduced to ideas. Locke's metaphors of the tabula rasa, "white paper", and "dark room" misled his critics and suggested to some of his followers a theory very different from his own. The metaphors only illustrate what he had in hand at the moment. Without experience, no characters are written on the "tablets" of the mind; except through the "windows" of sensation and reflection, no light enters the understanding. No ideas are innate; and there is no source of new simple ideas other than those two. But knowledge involves relations, and relations are the work of the mind; it requires complex ideas, and complex ideas are mental formations. Simple ideas do not, of themselves, enter into relation and form complex ideas. Locke does not, like Hobbes before him and Hume and after him, look to some unexplained natural attraction of idea for idea as bringing about these formations. Indeed, his treatment of "the association of ideas" is an afterthought, and did not appear in the earlier editions of the Essay.
Simple ideas (of sensation) are exemplified by yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, and so forth. But, towards the end of the second book, a very different list is given: extension, solidity, and mobility (from sensation); perceptivity and motivity (from reflection); and existence, duration, and number (from both sensation and reflection). These are said to be "our original ideas", and the rest to be "derived" form or to "depend" on them. It is difficult to compare the two lists, instance by instance; but one example may be taken. According to the first list, hard is a simple idea, according to the second list, solidity is the original (and therefore simple) idea, and hard will be derived from it and depend on it. It is clear that, in making the former list, Locke was trying to get back to the primary data of our individual experience; whereas, in the second list, he is rather thinking of the objective reality on which our experience depends and which, he assumes, it reveals. But he does not observe the difference. He seems to forget his view that the original of all knowledge is to be found in the particular, in something "simple and unmixed". Thus he says without hesitation, "If any one asks me, what this solidity is, I send him to the senses to inform him. Let him put a flint of a football between his hands, and then endeavor to join them, and he will know". But he will not know without going a long way beyond the simple idea. The simple ideas in the case are certain muscular and tactual sensations; and he interprets these by other means (including knowledge of external objects and his own organism) when he says that the flint or the football is solid.

4.1.6 2 Complex Ideas

Even if the simple ideas of sensation provide us with ample material for thinking, what we make of them is largely up to us. In his survey of ideas of reflection, Locke listed a variety of mental operations that we perform upon our ideas. Locke, defined the relevant mental operations as we experience them in ourselves, but then went on to consider carefully the extent to which other animals seem capable of performing the same activities. This procedure has different results from Descartes's doctrinal rejection of animal thinking. According to Locke, only abstraction (the operation most crucial in forming the ideas of mixed modes, on which morality depends) is utterly beyond the capacity of any animal.
Perception of ideas through the senses and retention of ideas in memory, Locke held, are passive powers of the mind, beyond our direct voluntary control and heavily dependent on the material conditions of the human body. The active powers of the mind include distinguishing, comparing, compounding, and abstracting. It is by employing these powers, Locke supposed, that we manufacture new, complex ideas from the simple elements provided by experience. The resulting complex ideas are of three sorts: 55 Modes are complex ideas that combine simpler elements to form a new whole that is assumed to be incapable of existing except as a part or feature of something else. The ideas of "three," "seventy-five," and even "infinity," for example, are all modes derived from the simple idea of "unity." We can understand these ideas and know their mathematical functions, whether or not there actually exist numbers of things to which they would apply in reality. "Mixed modes" similarly combine simple components without any presumption about their conformity to existing patterns, yielding all of our complex ideas of human actions and their value.

Substances are the complex ideas of real particular things that are supposed to exist on their own and to account for the unity and persistence of the features they exhibit. The ideas of "my only son," "the largest planet in the solar system," and "tulips," for example, are compounded from simpler ideas of sensation and reflection. Each is the idea of a thing (or kind of thing) that could really exist on its own. Since we don't understand all of the inner workings of natural objects, Locke supposed, our complex ideas of substances usually rely heavily on their secondary qualities and powers—the effects they are observed to have on ourselves and other things.

4.1.6.2 1 Relations

Relations are complex ideas of the ways in which other ideas may be connected with each other, in fact or in thought. The ideas of "younger", "stronger", and "cause and effect", for example; all involve some reference to the comparison of two or more other idea. Locke obviously could not analyze the content of every particular idea that any individual has ever had. But his defence of the empiricist principle did require him to
show in principle that any complex idea can be derived from the simple ideas of sensation and reflection. The clarity, reality, adequacy, and truth of all of our ideas, Locke supposed, depend upon the success with which they fulfill their representative function.

4.17 Substance

Substance is an idea regarding which Locke was in earnest with his own fundamental theory (however, he was perplexed about the origin of the idea of "substance in general" as well as of the ideas of "particular sorts of substances"). He admits that substance is a complex idea; that is to say, it is formed by the mind's action out of simple ideas. Now, this idea of substance marks the difference between having sensations and perceiving things. Its importance, therefore, is clear; but there is no clearness in explaining it. We are told that there is a "supposed or confused idea of substance" to which are joined, for example, "the simple idea of a dull whitish colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility and fusibility", and, as a result, "we have the idea of lead".

A difficulty might have been avoided if substance could have been interpreted as simply the combination by the understanding of white, hard, etc., or some similar cluster of ideas of sensation. But it was not Locke's way thus to ignore facts. He sees that something more is needed than these ideas of sensation. They are only joined to "the supposed or confused idea of substance", which is there and "always the first and chief". He holds it to it that the idea is a complex idea and so made by the mind; but he is entirely at a loss to account for the materials out of which it is made. We cannot imagine how simple ideas can subsist by themselves, and so "we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist", and this we call substance. In one place, he even vacillates between the assertions that we have no clear idea of substance and that we have no idea of it at all. It is "a supposition of he knows not what". This uncertainty, as will appear presently, throws its shadow over our whole knowledge of nature.
4.1.7.1 Quality Of Substance

Locke began his survey of our mental contents with the simple ideas of sensation, including those of colors, sounds, tastes, smells, shapes, size, and solidity. With just a little thought about specific examples of such ideas, we notice a significant difference among them: the color of the wall in front of me seems to vary widely from time to time, depending on the light in the room and the condition of my eyes, while its solidity persists independently of such factors. Locke explained this difference in corpuscularian fashion, by reference to the different ways in which the qualities of things produce our ideas of them.

Locke's view is that the simple idea is the test and standard of reality. Whatever the mind contributes to our ideas removes them further from the reality of things; in becoming general, knowledge loses touch with things. But not all simple ideas carry with them the same significance for reality. Colours, smells, tastes, sounds, and the like are simple ideas, yet nothing resembles them in the bodies themselves; but, owing to a certain bulk, figure, and motion of their insensible parts, bodies have "a power to produce those sensations in us". These, therefore, as called "secondary qualities of bodies". On the other hand, "solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number" are also held by Locke to be simple ideas; and these are resemblances of qualities in body; "their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves"; accordingly, they are "primary qualities of bodies." In this way, by implication if not expressly, Locke severs, instead of establishing, the connection between simple ideas and reality. The only ideas which can make good their claim to be regarded as simple ideas have nothing resembling them in things. Other ideas, no doubt, are said to resemble bodily qualities (an assertion for which no proof is given and none is possible); but these ideas have only a doubtful claim to rank as simple ideas. Locke's prevailing tendency is to identify reality with the simple idea, but he sometimes comes close to the opposite view that the reference to reality is the work of thought.
4.1.7.2 The Primary Qualities

The primary qualities of an object are its intrinsic features, those it really has, including the "Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion" of its parts. Since these features are inseparable from the thing even when it is divided into parts too small for us to perceive, the primary qualities are independent of our perception of them. When we do perceive the primary qualities of larger objects, Locke believed, our ideas exactly resemble the qualities as they are in things. Thus, for example, the primary qualities of this rose include all of its quantifiable features, its mass and momentum, its chemical composition and microscopic structure; these are the features of the thing itself.

4.1.7.3 The secondary qualities

The secondary qualities of an object, on the other hand, are nothing in the thing itself but the power to produce in us the ideas of "Colors, Sounds, Smells, Tastes, etc." In these cases, our ideas do not resemble their causes, which are in fact nothing other than the primary qualities of the insensible parts of things. The powers, or tertiary qualities, of an object are just its capacities to cause perceptible changes in other things. For example, the secondary qualities of the rose, include the ideas it produces in me, its yellow color, its delicate fragrance; these are the merely the effects of the primary qualities of its corpuscles on my eyes and nose. Like the pain I feel when I stick my finger on a thorn, the color and smell are not features of the rose itself. Some distinction of this sort is important for any representative realist. Many instances of perceptual illusion can be explained by reference to the way secondary qualities depend upon our sensory organs, but the possibility of accurate information about the primary qualities is preserved, at least in principle. The botanical expert may be able to achieve detailed knowledge of the nature of roses, but that knowledge is not necessary for my appreciation of their beauty.

The ground having been cleared by the refutation of the theory of Innate Principles, which Locke regarded as the basis of the only theory of knowledge fundamentally opposed to his own, the way would seem to be open for a direct attack.
upon the main problem of the determination of the nature and extent of human knowledge or certainty. Instead of making such an attempt, Locke proceeds to discuss certain questions concerning our ideas, the consideration of which he regards as an essential preliminary to the solution of the problem of knowledge. Locke is properly aware that ideas themselves cannot constitute knowledge. According to him the unit of knowledge is the proposition or judgment, which is alone capable of being true or false. When. On the contrary to a strict propriety, ideas are spoken of as true or false, it is always in virtue of some secret or tacit proposition in which an affirmation or denial is made. But if the ideas taken as such, fall short of the requirements of knowledge it is also true that apart from ideas there can be no knowledge. Although certainty can be 'placed in any one single idea, simple or complex,' it must be 'grounded ideas.' According to Locke's account of the genetic order of acquisition of ideas, ideas first are had from sensation, and then as the individual grows in self-consciousness, 'the understanding turns inwards upon itself, reflects on its own operations, and makes them the object of its own contemplation'.

4.1.8 Ideas in General

All the objects of the understanding are described as ideas, and ideas are spoken of as being in the mind. Locke's first problem, therefore, is to trace the origin and history of ideas, and the ways in which the understanding operates upon them, in order that he may be able to see what knowledge is and how far it reaches. This wide use of the term "idea" is inherited from Descartes. The contemporary term which corresponds with it most nearly is "presentation". But presentation is, strictly, only one variety of Locke's idea, which includes also representation and image, perception, and concept or notion. His usage of the term thus differs so widely from the old Platonic meaning that the danger of confusion between them is not great. It suited the author's purpose also from being a familiar word in ordinary discourse as well as in the language of philosophers. Herein, however, lays danger from which he did not escape. In common usage "idea" carries with it a suggestion of contrast with reality; this is not supposed in Locke's use. In the first book of the Essay, on the subject of innate ideas, Locke points to the variety of
human experience, and to the difficulty of forming general and abstract ideas, and he ridicules the view that any such ideas can be antecedent to experience.

Locke wishes to avoid any presupposition about matter, or mind, or their relation. It is not difficult to see that the notions which he has expelled often re-enter. But the peculiar value of his approach consists in his attempt to keep clear of them. He begins neither with mind nor matter, but with ideas. Their existence needs no proof: "everyone is conscious of them in himself, and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others". His first inquiry is "how they come into the mind"; his next business is to show that they constitute the whole material of our knowledge. In his answer to the former question we discover the influence of traditional philosophy, or rather of ordinary common sense views of existence, upon his views. All our ideas, he says, come from experience. The mind has no innate ideas, but it has innate faculties. It perceives, remembers, and combines the ideas that come to it from without; it also desires, deliberates, and wills; and these mental activities are themselves the source of a new class of ideas. Experience is therefore twofold. Our observation may be employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds. The former is the source of most of the ideas which we have, and, as it depends "wholly upon our senses," is called "sensation". The latter is a source of ideas which "every man has wholly in himself," and it might be called "internal sense"; to it he gives the name "reflection".

Starting from the simple ideas which we get from sensation, or from observing mental operations as they take place, Locke has two things to explain: the universal element, that is, the general conceptions with which knowledge is concerned or which it implies; and the reference to reality which it claims. With the former problem Locke deals at great length; and the general method of his exposition is clear enough. Complex ideas arise from simple ideas by the processes of combination and abstraction carried out by the mind. It would be unfair to expect completeness from his enterprise: but it cannot be denied that his intricate and subtle discussions left many problems unsolved. He raised questions in such a way as to provoke further enquiry. Principles such as the causal relation, apart from which knowledge of nature would be impossible, are quietly taken.
for granted, often without any enquiry into the grounds for assuming them. Further, the difficulty of accounting for universals is unduly simplified by describing certain products as simple ideas, although thought has obviously been at work upon them. In this connection an important inconsistency becomes apparent in his account of the primary data of experience. It is, indeed, impossible even to name the mere particular - the "this, here, and now" of sense - without giving it a flavor of generality. But, at the outset, Locke tries to get as near it as possible.

His doctrine of modes is also affected by this same inattention of the fact that a simple idea must be really simple. Thus he holds that "space and extension" is a simple idea given both by sight and by touch. One would expect, therefore, that the original and simple idea of space would be the particular patch seen at any moment or the particular "feel" of the exploring limb. But we are told that "each idea of any different distance, or space, is a simple mode" or the idea of space. Here again the simple idea is generalized. He professes to begin with the mere particulars of external and internal sense, and to show how knowledge - which is necessarily general - is evolved from them. But, in doing so, he assumes a general or universal element as already given in the simple idea.

4.19 Modes

Modes are those ideas which cannot exist by themselves, but are represented by

- others.
- Simple modes = ideas combined of simple ideas of the same kind (space, time, unity and power)
- Modes of space (distance, shape, place, length, infinite extension)
- Modes of time (duration, instance, temporal unit, eternity)
- Modes of power (active & passive power)
  - Matter cannot produce power, but simply transmit it.
  - Spirit can initiate power, possesses active power = will (Locke used this to explain the freedom of will)
- Mixed modes = ideas combined of simple ideas of various kinds (running, strife, abstinence, printing, theft, murder of parent)
  - The customs of the people influence the formation of mixed modes (e.g. sacrilege, ostracism)
  - The concepts most frequently exploited for formation of mixed modes are those of thinking, motion and power.
The goal of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), is to establish epistemological foundations for the new science by examining the reliability, scope, and limitations of human knowledge in contrast with the pretensions of uncritical belief, borrowed opinion, and mere superstition. Since the sciences had already demonstrated their practical success, Locke tried to apply their Baconian methods to the pursuit of his own philosophical aims. In order to discover how the human understanding achieves knowledge, we must trace that knowledge to its origins in our experience.

The theory of tabula rasa. When we are born, our mind is blank. All the knowledge comes from experience and learning. All the experience is either external which is called sensation (external perception) or internal which is called reflection (inner perception). Therefore, the ideas are either ideas of sensation—which is given first early or ideas of reflection—which derived from the above secondarily. these dualistic understanding of the faculties of perception (sensation and reflection) derives from the Cartesian influences of the dualistic dichotomy of material and spiritual substance. While Descartes held that the inner knowledge (ideas of reflection) is immediately known, therefore, is "prior" known and the knowledge of the external world is vicarious, thus "less well Known", Locke maintained that the ideas of sensation is "prior" in the sense that the ideas of reflection depends upon the ideas of sensation. The significance and emphasis was reversed. Locke held that reflection (inner perception) is awaken by sensation, but did not maintain that reflection is produced from sensation.

When we relate an unreal idea or an inadequate idea to an object, we make an error. Truth or falsity consists in affirming and negating, i.e., in judgment. therefore, they are the agreement and disagreement between ideas Reality and Irreality (e.g triangular square) is the agreement and disagreement between ideas and their objects (things). The objects of knowledge is the relation of ideas neither that of ideas to their objects, nor that of among objects The Human Spirit by nature desires to know, the cognition of "things" but it can only know their ideas, not the objects themselves Locke, too, considered the mathematical knowledge as the paradigm for knowledge in general All perceptions
(sensations) have their "external causes" for i) various sensations mutually verify
ii) actual "pains" of senses iii) sensation is always distinguishable from memory. It is not
absolutely certain, but certain enough for our practical life! Locke's investigation into
human knowledge began by asking how we acquire the basic materials out of which that
knowledge is composed, our ideas. For Locke, an idea is whatever is directly before the
mind in an act of thinking. Ideas, then, are the immediate objects of all thought, the
meaning or signification of all words, and the mental representatives of all things.
Locke's question was, where do we get all of these ideas which are the content of our
knowledge?

All the parts of our knowledge, Locke insists, have the same rank and the same
history regarding their origin in experience. It is in its most extreme form that the
doctrine of innate ideas is attacked; but he cannot see any middle ground between that
extreme doctrine and his own view that all ideas have their origin in experience. Indeed,
it is difficult to determine against whom the argument is directed. But when we note
Locke's polemical interest in the question, and remember the significance for him of the
empirical origin of all the elements of human knowledge, we can be content to see in it an
earnest protest against the principle of authority, a vindication of our right to examine
critically all the so-called "principles" of human knowledge.

As ideas are the sole immediate objects of the mind, knowledge can be nothing
else than "the perception of the connection of and agreement, or disagreement and
repugnancy, or any of our ideas". This agreement or disagreement is said to be of four
sorts: identity or diversity; relation; co-existence or necessary connection; real existence.
Each of these kinds of knowledge raises its own questions; but, broadly speaking, one
distinction may be taken as fundamental. In the same paragraph in which he restricts
knowledge to the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, he admits one kind of
knowledge which goes beyond the ideas themselves to the significance which they have
for real existence. When the reference does not go beyond the ideas "in the mind", the
problems that arise are of one order; when there is a further reference to real things,
another problem arises.
Locke also distinguishes between two degrees of knowledge: intuition and demonstration. In the former case, the agreement or disagreement is immediately perceived; in the latter, it is perceived through the mediation of a third idea, but each step in the demonstration is itself an intuition, the agreement or disagreement between the two ideas compared being immediately perceived. He believes that mathematics and ethics are demonstrable. When ideas are together in the mind, we can discover their relation to one another; so long as they are not taken to represent archetypes outside the mind, there is no obstacle to certainty of knowledge. "All relation terminates in, and is ultimately founded on, those simple ideas we have got from sensation or reflection". But "general and certain truths, are only founded in the habitudes and relations of abstract ideas". In this way Locke vindicates the certainty of mathematics: although instructive, the science is merely idea, and its propositions do not hold of things outside the mind.

When it comes to knowledge of real existence, though, ultimately there are only two certainties the existence of ourselves (by intuition) and that of God (by demonstration) Concerning the self, Locke agrees with Descartes that the existence of the self is implied in every state of consciousness Every element of our experience, every idea of which we are conscious, is a certificate of our own existence, as the subject of that experience: As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence. I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident than my own existence? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that For if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as of the pain I feel: or if I know I doubt, I have ascertain perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt.

However; Locke fails to point out how the self can be an idea and thus belong to the material of knowledge. An idea of the self cannot come from sensation; and the simple ideas of reflection are all of mental operations, and not of the subject or agent of
these operations. On the other hand, when he had occasion to discuss personal identity, he followed his new way of idea, and made it depend on memory.

Concerning God's existence, his proof is a cosmological-type argument. From the certainty of our own existence that of the existence of God immediately follows. A person knows intuitively that he is "something that actually exists." Next a person knows with intuitive certainty, that "bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles" it is, therefore, "an evident demonstration", that from eternity there has been something. And since all the powers of all beings must be traced to this eternal Being, it follows that it is the most powerful, as well as the most knowing, that is, God. Eternal and alone can produce "thinking, perceiving beings, such as we find ourselves to be". Locke here assumes, without question, the validity of the causal principle even beyond the range of possible experience.

Sensitive Knowledge of the External World. Below the rank of knowledge proper (intuitive and demonstrative), Locke recognizes a third degree of knowledge, not strictly entitled to the name. This is our sensitive apprehension of external things, or of real objects other than ourselves and God: Does not the very definition of knowledge, as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas with one another, preclude the perception of the agreement of ideas with non-ideal reality?

Locke's argument for the objective validity of sensitive knowledge consists of several considerations. First, he urges, our ideas of sensation differ from those of memory and imagination, that is from mere ideas, in being produced in us without any action of our own, and therefore "must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind, in a natural way, and producing therein those perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to". They, carry with them all he conformity which is intended; or which our state requires: for they represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us: whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for our necessities, and apply them to our uses.
Secondly, pleasure or pain often accompanies the sensation, and is absent from the idea as it recurs in memory or imagination; and "this certainty is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be". Thirdly, our several senses assist one another's testimony, and thus enable us to predict our sensational experience. On these grounds Locke concludes that, the certainty of things existing *in rerum natura* when we have the testimony of our senses for it is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For, our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom they are; and accommodated to the use of life: they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us.

The certainty which Locke attributes to sensitive knowledge is seen to be practical, rather than theoretical, and it is impossible to distinguish this degree of knowledge from the belief or opinion which results from a balance of probabilities rather than from certain perception. But even granting that our sensitive apprehensions of external reality possesses the certainty which is the characteristic of knowledge, as distinguished from mere opinion, we must observe within how very narrow limits it is confined:

When our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea, we cannot but be satisfied that there doth something *at that time* really exist without us, which doth affect our senses, and by them give notice of itself to our apprehensive faculties, and actually produce that idea which we then perceive: and we cannot so far distrust their testimony, as to doubt that such *collections* of simple ideas as we have observed by our senses to be united together, do really exist together. But this knowledge extends as far as the present testimony of our senses, employed about particular objects that do then effect them, and no further.
We cannot demonstrate the necessity of the co-existence of those ideas, which constitute the modes or qualities of substances; we cannot perceive their "necessary connexion or repugnancy." The connection between the secondary and the primary qualities remains inexplicable. "And therefore there are very few general propositions to be made concerning substances, which carry with them undoubted certainty".76 "Our knowledge in all these inquires reaches very little further than our experience".77 Beyond the strict warrant of experience, or the testimony of our senses, we may venture upon "opinion" or "judgment" as to the co-existence of the qualities of substances, but we cannot strictly "know". "Possibly inquisitive and observing men may, by strength of judgment, penetrate further, and, on probabilities taken from wary observation, and hints well laid together, often guess right at what experience has not yet discovered to them. But this is but guessing still; it amounts only to opinion, and had not that certainty which is requisite to knowledge."78

Locke finds himself compelled, therefore, to conclude that the so-called "science" of which Bacon had talked so proudly, and of whose achievements he had himself spoken so respectfully in the opening pages of the Essay, is not, in the strict sense, science at all; that, in his own words, there can be "no science of bodies". It is vain to search for the "forms" of the various material substances, or to seek to verify "the corpuscularian hypothesis" as to the connection of the primary and the secondary qualities of things. "I am apt to doubt that, how far soever human industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things, scientifical will still be out of our reach.... Certainty and demonstration are things we must not, in these matters, pretend to"79. If we cannot attain to a science of bodies, still less can we expect "scientifical" understanding of spirits. Spiritual substance is, as we have seen, as unknown as material substance; and Locke finds additional reasons for limiting our knowledge in this sphere.80

Locke is at one with the rationalist theologians of his century in their antagonism to an "enthusiasm" which would substitute for the insight of reason and of rational faith, the so called "revelation" of private experience. Against such a view, he insists upon the necessity of judging revelation by reason "God when he makes the prophet does not
unmake the man. He leaves all his faculties in the natural state, to enable him to judge of his inspirations, whether they be of divine origin or no. *Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything*.  

Yet reason clearly limits the field of its own insight; it is only reasonable to believe where we cannot know and yet must act. However, as morality and religion cannot be compassed by reason, such knowledge must be supplemented by faith if we are to fulfill our divine destiny. The Limits of Knowledge of the world is distinguished from faith which is based on revelation (equally certain), while knowledge is opinion, belief, assertion (based on reason or logical ground), the latter of which alone are highly probable they have more reason to be true. Locke abandoned "empiricism" by recognizing the universally and objectively valid relations among ideas. Locke's epistemology is a combination of the psychological description of the origin of ideas the logical determination of the possibility and scope of knowledge (the validity of knowledge) The validity and limits of knowledge Locke admits can not be deducible from a posteriori origin of ideas.

4.1.11 Evaluation

According to Locke, man's mind is inactive in the beginning; it passively accepts all external influences to which it is subjected. Modern psychology disproves Locke's theory that the mind is inactive in the assimilation of sensations. On the other hand, it is now believed that the mind makes a selection in accepting sensations, the process of selection being determined by mind's attentiveness. On one hand Locke holds that experience is the source of knowledge on the other he indicates that universal and definite knowledge cannot be derived from experience. Naturally, how can the empirical standpoint provide philosophical knowledge? According to Locke there is nothing in the intelligence, which is not first in the senses, now if this is so why are ideas abstract? Why is the existence of matter accepted? Even the duality between primary and secondary qualities arises. By making distinction between the two Locke has concluded that our senses can comprehend only secondary qualities and not the primary ones. He thus,
creates a dichotomy between the primary and secondary qualities, although he never does prove it beyond doubt. It is for this reason, Berkeley took up Locke's theory and elaborated it further to prove it that it is incorrect to assume the existence of anything outside the mind. Berkeley proved that all knowledge is subjective but did not accept the principle of abstract ideas. Berkeley viewed that all ideas are particular, there is a general idea but not abstract general idea.

In order to be a pure empiricist Locke ought to have confined knowledge to experience alone but he denies the name, to sensitive knowledge based on pure sensations. Instead of basing knowledge on sensation he thinks the real knowledge is based on abstract ideas, derived from concrete setting. Locke's theory reflects many ideas that belong strictly to the domain of rationalism. Locke accepts the active nature and importance of mind; he admits that mind is responsible for changing simple ideas into complex ones. Even if experience suffices to provide us with the raw materials of knowledge but only the mind can convert it into knowledge. Where the question of those things is concerned which falls into the limits of man's knowledge in the sphere of religion and faith, Locke accepts that reason is supreme. The rationalist learning's in Locke's epistemology save him from making his empiricism too imbalanced and one sided.

We are aware of the existence of the universe, but such awareness is not acute as our knowledge of our own ideas. By accepting the existence of matter, Locke becomes a materialist. Precisely for this reason did Berkeley later on tried to disprove his materialism and the resultant atheism by basing his arguments on Locke's own epistemological theories. But far how did he succeed in this task? Berkeley remarks that although Locke set out on the right path. Berkeley apparently took up empirical thought where Locke had left.

42 George Berkeley (1685-1753)

George Berkeley born in Ireland was a sincerely religious man, deeply impressed by the conflict between the scientific and the religious views of life that, so he thought,
was revealed in the writings of Descartes, Locke and other modern philosophers. The root of trouble, he held, was the belief that object of scientific cognition is an independent and inert material substance. "All the monstrous systems of atheists" have relied on the alleged existence of material substance and the difficulty of understanding how it could be created out of nothing by God's fiat. The supposed independent existence of matter has made it easy for "impious and profane persons" to 'decide immaterial substance' to suppose the soul divisible and corruptible like the body, to deny providence, and to attribute "the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity." Therefore, if the concept of matter can only be eliminated, "the atheist will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety". But how is it possible to the existence of matter without denying the validity of the whole scientific enterprise as well? This was the problem of which Berkeley believed he had found a solution.

4.2.1 Works

George Berkeley developed a series of texts devoted to various aspects of a single central thesis: that matter does not exist. In An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709), for example, he argued that the phenomena of visual sensation can all be explained without presupposing the reality of external material substances; the objects we see are merely ideas in our minds and that of God. His later writings, include: criticisms of Newton's calculus and theory of space in De Motu (1721) and The Analyst (1734); a defence of traditional Christian doctrine in the Alciphron (1734); and, in the interminable Siris (1744), a lengthy disquisition on the presumed benefits to health of "tar-water"

It is the immaterialist philosophy, in which he employed strictly empiricist principles in defence of the view that only minds or spirits exist. He opened A Treatise concerning the Principles of Knowledge (1710) rather technically, with an extended attack on Locke's theory of abstract ideas. The book continues with arguments designed to show that sensible qualities—both secondary and primary—can exist only when perceived, as ideas in our minds. Since physical objects are, on Berkeley's view, nothing more than collections of such qualities, these sensible objects, too, are merely ideas. In what he believed to be his most devastating point, Berkeley argued that it is literally
inconceivable that anything like a material substance could exist independently of the spirits or active thinking substances that perceive it. In *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713) Berkeley spoke through Philonous ("Mind-lover"), who tries to convince his reluctant friend Hylas ("Woody") that it is only by rejecting the artificial philosophical concept of material substance that skepticism can be finally defeated and the truths of common-sense secured.

4.2.2 Aim

Locke maintained that our knowledge does not reach beyond our "ideas". Therefore, Truth is an agreement between ideas, and not between an idea and its object. Then, Locke recognized and talked about the qualities of things (primary qualities) the certainty of sensory knowledge about the external world. Locke is not consistent in his thinking, e.g., on the one hand, we are not able to know the object or material substance itself and yet contended as if he knew the existence of the external world and of its objects. Berkeley advanced a step further and radicalized Locke's empiricism by being more consistent in taking an idealistic position. Berkeley denied the distinction of the primary and the secondary qualities, denied the existence of the primary qualities independent of mind and considered the primary qualities as additional relations to the secondary qualities. Berkeley denied the existence of material substance and held that substance must be incorporeal, thus only spirit deserves the name of substance. Berkeley argued that the universal idea of substance is senseless and held that the particular idea of substance is no other than a combination of many ideas which are also particular. Berkeley contended that what we recognize is solely ideas. To Berkeley, therefore, Being or what really exists is either ideas (those which are perceived) or the spirit or mind (that which actively perceives).

Berkeley radicalized Locke's nominalism a step further and denied the existence of the universal ideas produced by understanding in stead Berkeley advanced the Representational Theory to explain the universals. According to Berkeley, Ideas are "sensible things", i.e., those which are perceived by our senses Berkeley's radical
empiricism resulted in the denial of the universal and came to maintain that the material world be obsolete. (To a great extent, this has something to do with his linguistic analysis of the meaning of such terms as "existence", "primary qualities", "objects", in relation to the so-called "external world". The ambiguous meaning of "being perceived" and "being known". To Berkeley, an "idea"= an "object" (Is this correct? No!) The linguistic analysis is to be evidenced, according to Berkeley by concrete psychological experience (a particular idea or image). Berkeley took the ideas of Locke a step further and founded the school of thought known as Immaterialism. He believed that Empiricism led to thoughts of atheism and skepticism of God. Berkeley said that nothing is real in that material objects do not exist at all in the world. All that exists is the perceptions of the individual and that is the basis of reality. He believed that to think the material world exists is absurd and following only Immaterialism can protect true reality Irish philosopher George Berkeley believed that Locke's Essay did not carry the principles of empiricism far enough. Philosophers like Descartes and Locke tried to forestall problems of perceptual illusion by distinguishing between material objects and the ideas by means of which we perceive them.

The representationalist approach can provide no reliable account of the connection between ideas and the objects they are supposed to represent. The results of this failure, Berkeley believed, are bound to be skepticism and atheism. There is, however, an obvious alternative. Common sense dictates that there are only two crucial elements involved in perception: the perceiver and what is perceived. All we need to do, Berkeley argued, is eliminate the absurd, philosophically-conceived third element in the picture: that is, we must acknowledge that there are no material objects. For Berkeley, only the ideas we directly perceive are real. Immaterialism is the only way to secure common sense, science, and religion against the perils of skepticism

4.2.3 Ideas and Meanings

Berkeley was led to use 'idea' to cover qualities by meaning and sensedata. Berkeley thought he could show that nothing exists independently of minds and that the
word “matter”, when used (as most of people use it) to designate such a supposedly independent existent, is merely a meaningless noise to which nothing in the real world corresponds. The chief argument of Berkeley is of primary and secondary qualities. “They who asserted that figure, motion, and the rest of primary or original qualities do exist without the mind, in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and such like secondary qualities, do not; which they tell us are sensations, existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned with different size, texture, and motion of minute particles of matter. . . . . Now, if be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect, and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must with all give it some colour or other sensible quality, which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore, the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to with, in the mind and nowhere else”.

This argument is extremely effective against Locke and Descartes, who held that colour, sound, and odor are mind-dependent and yet denied that size and shape are. Strictly speaking, the argument shows only that primary and secondary qualities are “inseparably united”. Hence, those who did not agree with Locke and Descartes that the known facts about physiology “conclusively demonstrated” the mind-dependence of sense qualities would not be touched by this argument as it stands. Berkeley is best known for espousing the "immaterialist hypothesis" in contrast to Locke’s "corpuscularian hypothesis" concerning the origin of our ideas from without. He claimed that the origin of these ideas is not mind-independent bodies, but a spirit (God). The doctrine of mind-independent bodies was subjected by Berkeley to a number of different arguments. Several important parts of his arguments relied on the rejection of what
Berkeley took to be Locke’s doctrine of abstract ideas, which was attacked by Berkeley in the Introduction to the *Principles of Human Knowledge*

### 4.2.4 Abstract Ideas

Developing the basis for an empiricist immaterialism requires unlearning significant portions of what Locke taught us. Berkeley devoted the lengthy "Introduction" of his *Principles of Human Knowledge* to a detailed refutation of what he supposed to be one of Locke's most harmful mistakes, the belief that general terms signify abstract ideas. As Berkeley correctly noticed, our experience is always of concrete particulars. When I contemplate the idea of "triangle", the image that comes to mind is that of some determinate shape; having the abstract image of a three-sided figure that is neither equilateral nor isosceles nor scalene is simply impossible. It is unnecessary, too: for purposes of geometrical reasoning, any particular image can be used as a representative for all. (It is not at all clear that even Locke would have disagreed with this position.) But the consequence of Berkeley's criticism is a theory of meaning entirely different from Locke's. General terms (or words of any sort) need not signify ideas of their own, on Berkeley's view. Instead, they acquire meaning by a process of association with particular experiences, which are in turn associated with each other. But of course mere association (as Locke himself had noted with respect to ideas) is not a reliable guide to reality.

Any general term which has meaning according to Locke's abstraction theory must stand for some aspect of experience-some feature which is abstracted from, and was therefore present in, unabstract ideas which were had in ordinary sense experience. Locke, countenances many terms which his meaning-empiricism does not permit him and says that there are abstract ideas corresponding to them. But in so doing he goes against both meaning-empiricism and the theory of abstract ideas, and so these lapses provide no backing for Berkeley’s implied claim that the abstraction theory encourages its adherents to adopt meaningless terminology. Some of Berkeley’s most causal jibes at abstractionism, in which abstract functions as little more than a substitute for ‘unintelligible’, may reflect a specific complaint which is certainly voiced by some.
commentators, namely that abstraction doctrine departs from meaning-empiricism and licenses the use of idle words which can't cash in experience. There is a different fault which Berkeley seems to find with the theory of abstract ideas, namely that it implies, or at least encourages, the view that 'sensible things' can exist at times when they are not being perceived.

The function of abstraction is to allow the use of general terms to apply to things of the same kind: "ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind, and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to those ideas." How this works, exactly, is a matter of contention. Consider Locke's example of the use of the general term 'white' to apply to chalk and snow (today) and milk (yesterday). The word is universal, applying to many objects, and corresponding to it is whiteness, a universal idea, a single color in all the complex ideas of white things. Locke called the universals "precise, naked appearances in the mind", and they are the result of the operation of abstraction (or at least so it seems). Berkeley, having allowed that there are 'general ideas' or 'universal notion', goes on to insist that these ideas are themselves mental particulars. "Universality", so far as I can comprehend not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it: by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature particular, are rendered universal. Here, Locke says, "Universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas which in their significance are general".

Berkeley's picture of Locke's account of the semantics of general terms proceeded along these lines. He advanced a battery of criticisms against this picture. First, he claimed that the operation of abstraction is psychologically impossible. That is, one is unable, by any effort, to separate (or "precind") the naked appearance whiteness from the other qualities making up the complex idea of a thing. Every color is the color of some expanse with a determinate figure. A follow-up criticism is that the result of such an operation is unintelligible. This can be stated in terms of a dilemma. Either the whiteness is a determinate whiteness or it is not. For whiteness to serve as a universal, it
must be the same for all shades of white. If it is a determinate shade of white, say the white of the milk I saw yesterday, then to represent the different shade of white in the chalk, it must also be that shade, and so both shades, which is impossible. On the other hand, if it is neither shade, then we do not have a definite idea. One cannot imagine a white which is no determinate shade of white. Here Berkeley reveals a key assumption, that the abstract ideas would have to be a sensible idea rather than some kind of idea comprehended by reason alone.

The final criticism is that the postulation of abstract ideas is not necessary to account for our use of general terms. In the first place, Locke had claimed that the production of abstract ideas is difficult, to which Berkeley replied that the use of general terms by small children could not be accounted for. But more importantly, there is a way of giving a semantics for general terms without appealing to intermediary ideas at all. When I use the term ‘white’, it can refer indifferently to any of the ideas of milk, chalk or snow. I need have only one of them in mind and let it do duty for other ideas. Adapting the example we can say that I may consider the chalk merely as white, without attending to the other qualities making up the complex idea of the chalk. Note that this nominalist solution requires that considering a thing as of a certain sort. But this raises a new Locke’s original question, namely, how we rank things into sorts

"The immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge is nothing but particulars. Every man’s reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own mind; which are truly, everyone of them, particular existences ... Universality is but accidental to [knowledge], and consists only in this, that the particular ideas about which [knowledge] is are such as more than one particular thing can correspond with and be represented by" 92 In insisting that ideas are ‘in their own nature particular’, and that an idea’s generality consists only in ‘the relation it bears to the particulars signified by it’, Berkeley is not disagreeing with Locke at all. Locke can easily allow that any given abstract idea is a mental particular which can occur only once in a single mind. As one piece of evidence Berkeley is involved in this mistake, consider his reference to the ‘incomprehensible idea of Man which shall have nothing particular in it’. If his concern here is with abstractness, the phrase could be rather ‘nothing specific in it’, and I conjecture that Berkeley used ‘particular’ because he was not clear in his mind.
about the distinction between abstract/specific on the one hand and universal/particular on the other. Also, he says this 'I do not deny absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there are abstract general ideas.' If 'abstract' is used properly, i.e. in Locke's sense, that remarks simply false: Berkeley denies not only there are any abstract general ideas, but also that there are ideas whose generality is somehow built into them, ideas which are general or universal in the sense that one of them could recur in different minds or at different times, ideas whose generality consists in something more than the use to which they are put. In suppressing this second I, Berkeley shows that he has not properly distinguished it from the first denial.

Berkeley remarked that in Locke's theory of classification the bit about abstractness bears only on the sub-'problem' about selecting the relevant features of the mental sample. Berkeley did not see this. He share Locke's picture of the abstraction doctrine as central to Locke's whole account of how we classify; and so of course he saw himself as rejecting Locke's theory, he and did not put any rival theory in its place. Berkeley had agreed with Locke that "it is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination-either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways". This provides a sure way of checking the aberrations of speculative philosophy. We have merely to look for the "original idea" that was the source of my speculative concept. If we find it, well and good; if we cannot, we must abandon the concept as fictitious "No sooner do we depart from sense and distinct to follow . . . reason . . . ., but . . . we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation; till at length, having wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we are, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Skepticism."

The trouble, Berkeley believed, stems from a tendency to think in words signify. "We need only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand". Hence, Berkeley therefore devoted the opening pages of the Principles to a study of the . . . nature and abuse of Language.
In the main, of course, this was intended by Berkeley as a criticism of the speculations of the Continental Rationalists, but it was also directed against Locke, who, as Berkeley rightly saw, had formulated his historical plain method ambiguously and had not pressed it to its logical conclusion. Hence, when Berkeley denied that men have the "faculty of abstracting their ideas", he was actually making two distinct assertions, though he had not distinguished them. He was asserting both a psychological thesis—that there are no generalized images, only specific ones- and epistemological thesis—that there are no universals, only particulars. As regards the former, Berkeley and Locke differed but as regards the latter both were in agreement: when I think "man", for instance, what I am thinking about is nothing but particular human beings.

Since all ideas are concrete particulars, and since there are no real universals, it follows that a general name simply refers to (is the sign of) several particular ideas, all of which it indifferently represents, and someone of which is always actually present to the mind is always a particular, how can we ever know general truths at all? Berkeley's answer was that we can be sure that what is true of the one is true of the other because the particular properties that differ in the two do not enter into the proof.

4.2.5 Berkeley's Attack On Material Substance

Berkeley attacked Locke's doctrine of material substance. But Locke had no doctrine of material substance: he was the victim of exegetical and philosophical mistakes initiated by Berkeley and inherited by many later writers. Locke did discuss the concept of substance, and he had a theory of reality. These two bits of work contributed to the hybrid which Berkeley called his theory of 'material substance'. Berkeley's attack on material substance was to show that the critique of abstract ideas applies to the notion of the "matter". Berkeley attacked Locke for his "materialism", and proposed an immaterialist hypothesis in its stead. It is important to recognize that Berkeley understood materialism, as the thesis that matter exists, not that the mind is material, which is its current meaning. Just as the word "man" either names nothing at all or is simply a way of referring indifferently to John, to Tom, to Mohan, to Shyam, to Ravi, so "matter" either
names nothing at all or is merely a way of referring indifferently to a great many particular qualities Berkeley, tried, urged, to find the "original" of the idea of matter. All one never finds is particular apples, tables, men. Analyze any one of these. Is it possible to find any matter? No; finds only such-and-such sensible qualities

"As several of these are observed to company each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collection of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things". But in none of these is matter to be found. The conclusion that follows, which Locke ought to have drawn from his historical plain method, is that terms like "matter", "body", "material substance", should be dropped from philosophical vocabulary. Let us say that an object is corporeal if it has all the qualities of body, extension, figure, motion and rest, solidity, and whatever other qualities a body has. A material thing is a corporeal thing which is mind-independent. Thus materialism is the thesis that there exist mind-independent corporeal things, and immaterialism is its denial.

Berkeley propounded a number of arguments against materialism in the opening sections of the Principles of Human Knowledge.

1. Objects Of Perception

1. The qualities of bodies are perceived by the senses.
2. What is perceived by the senses is ideas.
3. Therefore, the qualities of bodies are ideas.

This argument trades on an explicit equivocation made by Locke, who distinguished ideas in the immediate sense (the sensations in our minds) and in the mediate sense (the qualities in bodies which cause these sensations). Thus Locke could accept the conclusion so long as it is understood that 'ideas' is taken in the mediate sense.
II. Meaning Of 'Exist'\textsuperscript{102}

1. When we say a body exists we mean that we perceive or would perceive it.
2. What we perceive or would perceive are ideas.
3. Therefore, when we say a body exists we say something about ideas.

This argument's first premise is an instance of a broader verificationist notion of meaning. For Berkeley, a sentence referring to a sensible object is meaningful just so far as there are empirical conditions under which its truth can be confirmed. But once again, so long as 'ideas' is interpreted in the mediate sense, there is nothing opposed to Locke's view. On the other hand, if it is interpreted in the immediate sense, Locke would object. He believed that unperceivable corpuscles exist, for example abstraction.

III. Abstraction\textsuperscript{103}

1. It is impossible to separate in thought the things we see and feel from their perception.
2. Bodies are objects we see and feel.
3. Therefore, it is impossible to separate in thought bodies from their perception.

Here, Locke would say that it is possible to separate in thought the things we see and feel from their perception. This of course cannot be done for ideas in the immediate sense, but it can for ideas in the mediate sense.

IV. Likeness\textsuperscript{104}

1. Ideas can only be like other ideas.
2. Therefore, our ideas of bodies can only be like ideas.
3. Therefore, if bodies have qualities resembling our ideas, then those qualities are ideas.

Berkeley has given us no reason to accept the first premise. Later, he will try to show an essential respect in which ideas in the immediate sense cannot be like ideas in Locke's mediate sense.
V. Primary And Secondary Qualities

Locke had thought he had shown that the ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble their originals. Berkeley argued that the same arguments which purport to show this also apply to primary qualities. So ideas of primary qualities do not resemble their causes.

VI. Unknowability

It has already been shown that bodies are not known through the senses. They are not known through reason, either, since this would require the establishment of a necessary connection between ideas and their originals. But there is none to be found.

VII. No Explanatory Advantage

No one can explain how bodies can act on spirits so as to produce ideas in the mind, so there is no explanatory advantage to the materialist hypothesis over a hypothesis which posits another kind of cause.

VIII. "Master" Argument

Any attempt to conceive the unperceived existence of bodies must fail. Therefore, it is impossible to conceive of a body existing unperceived. This is called in the literature the "master" argument because Berkeley professed to stake his whole case on it alone.

4 2.5.1 Primary And Secondary Qualities

I want to return to the argument concerning primary and secondary qualities. It is one of the best-known and central arguments in the group. Berkeley concluded from it that if material things exist, we couldn't know that they do - a skeptical conclusion. He would still need a reason to rule out the existence of things independent of the mind. Recall that for Locke, a material substance is a group of primary qualities united by an unknown support. Locke had claimed that these qualities (most notably extension and solidity) are such that we are unable to conceive a body without them. He claimed further
that our ideas of these qualities resemble the qualities themselves. The primary qualities are the source of powers in bodies to change things and receive change. Most importantly for present purposes, they can cause sensible ideas which do not resemble them; these are the ideas of secondary qualities.

Another way to distinguish the two is that the primary qualities are absolute, while the secondary are relative to perceivers. The color of a thing may vary from perceiver to perceiver in a case where the object is the same. Berkeley noted that this phenomenon holds for primary qualities as well. My idea of an object and yours may vary with respect to the size they represent the object to be, say large and small. This variation in perceived size would not face Locke. He would claim that the idea of a body resembles the body respect of there being some extension. The exact extension is not found in the idea itself, but it need not be for the quality to be primary. The body simply has to have the quality in some degree no matter what state it is in.

Berkeley's response would be that to say that a thing has extension in general without assigning it a specific degree is to attempt to use an abstract idea. But in the Introduction, he had claimed that there are no abstract ideas of this sort. Even if there are not, it is still possible to claim that my idea of, say, a ball of a determinate size can resemble a ball of any size. Berkeley himself had claimed that the figure of a triangle of determinate size and shape can be used as representative of all others.

4.2.6 Existence Is Perception ("Esse est percipi")

This is the criterion for something (other than the Spiritual Substance) to be real. Let us consider that we are debating whether or not the ghost exists. What is our criterion for the existence of anything including the ghost? We normally say, "Oh, yes, once we see the ghost, we believe that the ghost exists". In other words, we take the perception of something for its necessary condition for the existence. If anything exists, then it must be perceived. Berkeley took this being perceived rather the sufficient
condition for its existence (being). In other words, if anything is perceiving, then it exists. Berkeley reinforced the reasoning of "Esse Est Percipi" as follows:

"... by the term exist when applied to sensible things [?] The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see I feel it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed; meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or at that some other spirit actually does perceive it. ... This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi; nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them." ¹⁰⁹

As the self-proclaimed defender of common sense, Berkeley held that what we perceive really is as we perceive it to be. But what we perceive are just sensible objects, collections of sensible qualities, which are themselves nothing other than ideas in the minds of their perceivers. Berkeley¹¹⁰ used Lockean arguments about the unreliability of secondary qualities in support of his own, more radical view. Take heat, for example: does it exist independently of our perception of it? When exposed to great heat I feel a pain that everyone acknowledges to be in me, not in the fire, Berkeley argued, so the warmth I feel when exposed to lesser heat must surely be the same. What is more, if dip both of my hands into a bowl of tepid water after chilling one and warming the other, the water will feel both warm and cold at the same time. Clearly, then, heat as I perceive it is nothing other than an idea in my mind.

Similar arguments and experiments establish that other sensible qualities—colors that vary with changes in ambient light, tastes and smells that change perceptibly when I have a cold, and sounds that depend for their quality on the position of my ears and conditions in the air—are, like heat, nothing but ideas in my mind. But the same considerations apply to primary qualities as well, Berkeley pointed out, since my perception of shape and size depend upon the position of my eyes, my experience of solidity depends upon my sense of touch, and my idea of motion is always relative to my own situation. Locke was correct in his view of primary qualities but mistaken about
primary qualities; all sensible qualities are just ideas. But sensible objects are nothing more than collections of sensible qualities, so they are merely complex ideas in the minds of those who perceive them. For such ideas, Berkeley held, to be just is to be perceived (in Latin, esse est percipi). There is no need to refer to the supposition of anything existing outside our minds, which could never be shown to resemble our ideas, since "nothing can be like an idea but an idea". Hence, there are no material objects.

Locke's reference to an "unknown substratum" in which the features of material substances inhere is a pointless assumption, according to Berkeley. Since it is the very nature of sensible objects to be perceived, on his view, it would be absurd to suppose that their reality depends in any way upon an imperceptible core. This gives rise to a perfectly general argument against even the possibility of material substance. Putting aside all of the foregoing lines of argument, Berkeley declared, the whole issue can be allowed to rest on a single question: is it possible to conceive of a sensible object existing independently of any perceiver? The challenge seems easy enough at first. All I have to do is think of something so remote—a tree in the middle of the forest, perhaps—that no one presently has it in mind. But if I conceive of this thing, then it is present in my mind as I think of it, so it is not truly independent of all perception.

According to Berkeley this argument shows irrefutably that the very concept of material substance as a sensible object existing independently of any perception is incoherent. No wonder the representationalist philosophy leads to skepticism: it introduces as a necessary element in our knowledge of the natural world a concept that is literally inconceivable!

To be means to-be-perceived, that is, to be an object for some mind or other. Thus Berkeley was not content to say merely that since (as everyone agreed) the mind knows only its own ideas, it cannot know anything that is not an idea. He also maintained that there cannot be anything that is not for-a-mind. It cannot be done, for whatever one thinks of is eo ipso for-a-mind. "All the Choir of Heaven and the furniture of earth", Berkeley urged in his florid eighteenth-century style, "in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have no substance without a mind". Berkeley's
position is thus that "existence-independent-of-mind" is a contradiction in terms: It amounts to saying that we can conceive what is unconceived.

4.2.6.1 Common Sense

The existence of what I see does not depend exclusively on my seeing it. Berkeley's central claim is that sensible objects cannot exist without being perceived, but he did not suppose that I am the only perceiver. So long as some sentient being, some thinking substance or spirit, has in mind the sensible qualities or objects at issue, they do truly exist. Thus, even when I close my eyes, the tree I now see will continue to exist, provided that someone else is seeing it. This difference, Berkeley held, precisely marks the distinction between real and imaginary things. What I merely imagine exists in my mind alone and continues to exist only so long as I think of it. But what is real exists in many minds, so it can continue to exist whether I perceive it or not. (That's why, unsure of the reality of what I seem to see, I may ask someone else, "Did you see that?") The existence of sensible objects requires that they be perceived, but it is not dependent exclusively on my perception of them.

In fact, the persistence and regularity of the sensible objects that constitute the natural world is independent of all human perception, according to Berkeley. Even when none of us is perceiving this tree, god is. The mind of god serves as a permanent repository of the sensible objects that we perceive at some times and not at others. So Berkeley's philosophy can claim to defend common sense. It emphasizes that bodies or sensible objects really are just the ideas we have of them, yet can also explain their apparent independence of our perception. All he rejects is the mysterious philosophical notion of the material object as an extended substance capable of existing independently of any perception. That supposition, he argued, is both unnecessary and untenable.

4.2.7 Science Without Matter

Even if we accept it as common sense, is Berkeley's immaterialism compatible with modern science? Certainly Galileo's astronomy, Newtonian mechanics, and the
chemistry of Boyle all took for granted the existence and operation of physical objects. But Berkeley maintained that natural science, if properly conceived, could proceed and even thrive without assuming that bodies are material substances existing outside the mind.

Astronomy and optics seem to suppose that what we see exists at some distance from us. But Berkeley argued in his *New Theory of Vision* that our apparent perception of distance itself is a mental invention, easily explained in terms of the content of visual ideas, without any reference to existing material objects. In fact, Berkeley held, our visual and tactile perceptions are entirely independent. What we see and what we touch have nothing to do with each other; we have merely learned by experience to associate each with the other, just as we have learned to associate the appearance, the taste, and the smell of an apple. There is no reason to suppose that all of these qualities inhere in a common material substratum.

It follows that Locke was mistaken in supposing that our ideas of primary qualities have a special status because they arise from more than one of our senses. Although the corpuscularian hypothesis has yielded interesting results so far, Berkeley believed that science will soon enough outgrow it, learning to rely more directly on what we perceive for its hypotheses about what new experiences we rightly anticipate. Berkeley accounted for the persistence of bodies in terms of god's continuing perception of them. The causal regularities we observe in the natural world rely upon the same source. God's mind is an orderly one, and the apparent structures of space, time, and causality are nothing more than our awareness of the divine provision for our welfare. Natural science has plenty to do even in the absence of material objects, then: it is nothing less than a systematic exploration of the mind of god. More significantly for us, he also correctly anticipated much of the physical science of the twentieth century. Like Berkeley, we believe that the solidity of bodies is merely apparent, that a proper cosmology depends upon our capacity to conceive it, and that the role of science is to gather and correlate the independent observations of human perceivers.
Berkeley’s contemporaries misunderstood the esse est percipi doctrine and assumed Berkeley to be holding that the world is a mere dream. But Berkeley had no trouble distinguishing between dream and reality. For e.g., in a “real” stone, the visual ideas of resistance and pain, when these are accompanied by the muscular sensations called kicking. In an “imaginary” stone, the visual data are accompanied neither by tactile data nor by a sensation of pain. Berkeley denied the existence, not of bodies (understood as stable collections of sensory data), but of body (the abstract idea).

4.2.8 Substance

To Berkeley, The Notion of the Material Substance is obsolete in explaining the phenomena which presumably presupposes the material substance. The Notion of the Material Substance is erroneous for "the object exists without being perceived". is a contradictory statement, once we comprehend the meanings of such terms as "object", "existence". it is also contradictory to maintain that an idea or a sensation is a copy of something which itself is neither an idea nor a sensation. for being is either "active" (as perceiving) or is, in relation to this being, "passive" (as being perceived) and this "something" cannot be here "being" in either of these two senses. The sensory qualities are subjective conditions (e.g. sweet or white), the so-called "material substance" is the aggregate of these sensory qualities (e.g. sugar). Berkeley maintained that the Material Substance does not exist, while the Spiritual Substance is the only substance that exists.

Although he maintained that there can be no material substances, Berkeley did not reject the notion of substance altogether. The most crucial feature of substance is activity, he supposed, and in our experience the most obvious example activity is that of perceiving itself. So thinking substances do exist, and for these spirits (or souls or minds) to be is just to perceive (in Latin, esse est percipere).

"The connection of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only a mark or sign with thing signified The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it. Berkeley thinks that visual ideas are God's future-tense language about the tangible world, and so he means 'the mark that forewarns me'
literally. On Berkeley’s own account of the nature of knowledge, men cannot know spirits or spiritual activity. For all that men ever know is ideas, and ideas are and passive. It was desperately necessary, Berkeley saw, to do something about this situation, and in subsequent editions of the *Principles* and in the *Dialogues* he tried to draw a distinction between ideas and “notions”. Though it is true we have no idea of God or of self, we do have a notion of them. “I own I have properly no *idea*, either of God or any other spirit. . . . I do nevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking of substance, exist as certainly as I know this immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound”. Like Descartes and Leibniz, Berkeley held that each spirit is a simple, undivided, active being whose sole function is to think—that is, to have ideas such as those of sensible objects. Although each spirit is directly aware of its own existence and nature, it cannot be perceived. Since ideas are always of sensible qualities or objects for Berkeley, we have no ideas (but only notions) of spirits. This is a complete enumeration of what is real. active thinking substances and their passive ideas.

Berkeley has entitled himself to the notion of ‘spirit other than myself’. His claim to be able to make sense of ‘spirit’ rests on the argument: I am myself, so I know myself, so I have a notion of myself, so I have a notion of spirit. Berkeley concedes that ‘we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits’ but claims that ‘there is a probability’ that such spirits exist because ‘we see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves’. The claim is, then, that ‘There are finite spirits other than myself’ is for me an explanatory hypothesis, a conjecture which explains my data better than any other. I have visual ideas which would ordinarily count as my seeing you arise your arm, and I speculate that there is another human spirit whose activity helps to explain the visual ideas in question. This approach to the ‘other minds’ problem is full of difficulties, and for Berkeley they are peculiarly acute. The problem of our knowledge of spiritual substance is not solved by drawing what amounts to a Scholastic distinction between “notion” and “idea”.

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Strange though Berkeley's immaterialism may seem, it offers many clear advantages. It is a genuinely empiricist philosophy, since it begins with what we actually experience and claims to account for everything without making extravagant suppositions about unknowable entities. Materialism leads to atheism no less than to skepticism, Berkeley believed, since its belief that bodies exist outside the mind encourages the notion that the physical realm may always have existed independently of any spiritual influence. Immaterialism, by contrast, restores god to a role of central importance, not only as the chief among active thinking substances but also as the source of all sensible objects.

God's existence is made evident by everyday instances of perception, according to Berkeley. Since sensible objects are mind-dependent yet exhibit a persistence and regularity that transcends our perception of them, it follows that there must be a master-perceiver, god, in whose mind they always are. Thus, in the *Dialogues*, Philonous extols the beauty and majesty of the natural world, attributing them to the power and elegance of the divine mind. This leads to the traditional conception of god as deserving of worship because of the benevolent creation of all that we observe. All in all, Berkeley developed a philosophical system worthy of no little respect. Immaterialism rests on the simple premise that there are no physical objects. Berkeley defended this notion with many clever arguments and worked out its implications consistently. Although counter-intuitive, immaterialism is difficult to refute.

Though the alternatives for Berkeley were either to throw out spiritual substance along with matter or to abandon the historical plain method, he never gave up either. He did what most people do in similar circumstances—first he tried to patch up the wholes in his arguments; when that failed, he went quietly away and let the argument stand. This was easy for Berkeley because, despite the verbal similarity to Locke, his mind was not critical in the Lockian sense. Locke intended to be rigorously critical. Berkeley did not. He never believed in the existence of matter, and he never stopped believing in the existence of spirits—in both cases, on grounds that had nothing to do with the historical
plain method. He used the empirical plain method to disprove what he already
disbelieved, and he abandoned it when it seemed to disprove what he wanted to believe.
In the history of philosophy, Berkeley is an empiricist in spite of himself.

It is clear that Berkeley uses axioms of Locke’s philosophy to disprove the theory
of matter, abstract ideas, and also that he proves the existence of soul, other souls and
God, in the form of substratum of ideas. The arguments used by Berkeley to disprove
Locke’s theory of matter are used by Hume to refute Berkeley’s conception of soul. It is
Hume who takes empiricism to its logical conclusion. Just as matter is not the subject of
experience, the soul, too, cannot be known to experience and if experience is the soul
criterion of knowledge, then the existence of soul is no more certain than the existence of
matter. Ideas are only the objects of our experience and we cannot proceed to real
knowledge of anything once we step outside the realm of ideas. By developing Locke’s
and Berkeley’s arguments to their logical conclusion, Hume refutes Berkeley’s theory of
soul and God. The truth of matter, as Hume himself has pointed out that the empiricist
doctrine cannot be the basis of any philosophical knowledge; if any such knowledge is to
result, it is necessary to turn to reason.

43 David Hume (1711-1776)

Hume, David (1711-76) a Scottish philosopher, essayist, and historian was the
greatest of eighteenth-century philosophers. Like Locke and Berkeley, Hume was
dissatisfied with the “abstruse speculations” and passed for philosophy among the
learned. Such speculation, he thought, was inconclusive and did not touch the lives of
common men. It was useful only to those who had a theological ax to grind and who,
“being unable to defend [their superstitious beliefs] on fair ground, raise these entangling
brambles to cover and protect their weakness”.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were debates, as there are today,
about how much of what we know is something we learned through experience and how
much of what we know is something we could have reasoned out using our human
intelligence without the benefit of particular experience. Descartes had claimed that some
of our ideas are "innate." John Locke, on the other hand, had argued that the ideas we have derived from experience. Locke spoke of the mind as a "tabula rasa" (or blank tablet) which is written on by experience. David Hume in "Of the Origin of Ideas," which is the second section of his *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, comes down firmly on the side of Locke and the dependence of all our ideas on experience.

4.3.1 Aim

Hume aimed to place 'Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics' on a new foundation: the 'science of man' and the theory of human nature. Hume famous for his scepticism in metaphysics, insisted that human nature places limits on our capacity for scepticism. In morals, Hume insists on the reality of moral distinctions, though our judgements are ultimately founded only in human sentiment. In all areas, Hume's concern is to expose the limitations of reason, and to explain how we make the judgement we do, in the absence of the illusory support of reason. According to Hume, the proper goal of philosophy is simply to explain why we believe what we do. His own attempt to achieve that goal was the focus of Book I of the *Treatise of Human Nature* and all of the first *Enquiry*.

4.3.2 Works

Hume composed his three-volume *Treatise of Human Nature*, which was published anonymously in two installments (1739, 1740). The *Treatise* explores several philosophical topics such as space, time, causality, external objects, the passions, free will, and morality, offering original and often skeptical appraisals of these notions. Book I of the *Treatise* was unfavorably reviewed in the *History of the Works of the Learned* with a succession of sarcastic comments.

In 1741 and 1742 Hume published his two-volume *Essays, Moral and Political.* The essays were written in a popular style and met with better success than the *Treatise* in 1744-1745. In 1748 he published his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, a more popular edition of Book I of his *Treatise*. The *Enquiry* also includes two sections not
found in the Treatise and which contain fairly direct attacks on religious belief: "Of Miracles" and a dialogue titled "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State." It was mostly at La Fleche that Hume wrote A Treatise of Human Nature, the most widely studied of his works today. Hume had some success with two volumes of Essays: Moral and Political (1741, 1742). The neglect of the Treatise, Hume believed, arose from going to press too early, 'carried away by the heat of youth and invention'. He reworked book I, and restored a discussion of miracles that he had cut from the earlier work. The result was a slim volume of Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding - known after 1758 as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. He developed book III into a parallel volume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). Hume later asked that his philosophical views should be judged on the basis of the Enquiries, rather than the Treatise. They are the works that spread his philosophy most widely - and in due course roused Kant from his 'dogmatic slumber'.

In 1751 Hume published his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, which recasts in a very different form parts of Book III of his Treatise. The central themes of Book I of the Treatise receive a somewhat more accessible treatment in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), a more popular summary of Hume's empiricism. According to Hume, little human knowledge can be derived from the deductively certain relations of ideas. Since the causal interactions of physical objects are known to us only as inherently uncertain matters of fact, Hume argued, our belief that they exhibit any necessary connection (however explicable) can never be rationally justified, but must be acknowledged to rest only upon our acquired habits. In similar fashion, Hume argued that we cannot justify our natural beliefs in the reality of the self or the existence of an external world. From all of this, he concluded that a severe (if mitigated) skepticism is the only defensible view of the world.

Hume recast the moral philosophy of the Treatise's Book III in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). In both texts Hume clearly maintained that human agency and moral obligation are best considered as functions of human passions rather than as the dictates of reason. A draft of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion existed by 1751, though for reasons of expediency Hume kept this dangerously sceptical work...
unpublished. In his forties, Hume's main energy turned from philosophy to politics and history. The *Political Discourses* (1752) contain important essays on money and interest.

In the posthumously published *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (1780), Hume discussed the possibility of arriving at certain knowledge of god through the application of reason and considered defense of a fideistic alternative. Later in eighteenth century, Scottish philosopher David Hume sought to develop more fully the consequences of Locke's cautious empiricism by applying the scientific methods of observation to a study of human nature itself. We cannot rely on the common-sense pronouncements of popular superstition, which illustrate human conduct without offering any illumination, Hume held, nor can we achieve any genuine progress by means of abstract metaphysical speculation, which imposes a spurious clarity upon profound issues. The alternative is to reject all easy answers, employing the negative results of philosophical skepticism as a legitimate place to start.

4.3.3 Agreements And Differences Between Berkeley And Hume

i) Nominalism (agreement).

ii) The existence of the external world (matter) is not denied, but it is construed as "unknowable" (This was succeeded by Kant.).

iii) The immediate sensation (impression in Hume's term) does contain less than was contended previously e.g., sight perceives only color and does not procure "distance" for example

iv) The radicalization of the principles which underlie nature (e.g. causality) the objective validity (necessity and universal validity) as well as the constancy and coherence of nature are denied. They only hold "psychological relevance".

v) The denial of the spiritual substance, in consequence, the notion of substance which is the basis of reality since Descartes' philosophy was thrown out of philosophy.
4.3.4 Agreements and Differences between Locke and Hume

i) The opposition between rational and empirical knowledge was radicalized by Hume
a) The analytic proposition is called the proposition about relations of ideas whose
criterion of truth is the principle of contradiction (all the mathematical knowledge)
which is radically distinguished from and opposed to: b) the synthetic proposition is
called the proposition about matter of fact whose criterion of truth is the principle of
"verifying" it by experience the synthetic versus the analytic is equated by Hume
explicitly with the opposition the a priori versus the a posteriori

ii) All the relations of ideas which are not analytic but synthetic are not based upon the
arbitrariness of our understanding, but on the psychological law. Therefore, for example,
the relationship of a cause and an effect is now founded by Hume on the psychological
law of association.

iii) Ideas are classified as follows:
ideas reflections (internal ideas), impressions (more forceful, more vivacious, more
freshly given), ideas (faded, older impressions)-difference only in degree, sensations
(external ideas) impressions.

iv) Among ideas there are simple ideas and complex ideas.

4.3.5 Hume's Psychological Law of Association

1) Resemblance, ideas which resemble each other are associated e.g., a picture, its
original object, mathematics
2) Contiguity, ideas which are contiguous, i.e., close both in terms of "space" and
"time", descriptive & experimental portion of moral and nature philosophy.
3) Cause and Effect, ideas which are related to each other by causation religion &
metaphysics; the portion of physics and morality which are beyond experience.
David Hume attempted to improve John Locke's epistemology on the basis of Berkeley's radicalization of empiricism. The most important step in Hume's philosophy was to be found in his endeavor to discover what is given to our consciousness through our senses. Locke, for example, implied far more in its content than Berkeley and Hume was far less discovering in its content than Berkeley. Naturally, the way in which the philosophical questions were raised is far more radicalized by Hume such that nominalism was pushed to its extreme. In other words, according to Hume what is to be found in the experience is no other than sense-data. Berkeley indeed called them "sensible things." Instead of admitting something like unity, Hume described the same phenomenon a bundle of ideas. According to Hume, we cannot discover such a thing as unity, such relation as the liner, mechanical causality, etc., in those impressions or sensible things. Besides, it is not necessary to assume such a thing as unity beyond what is immediately given to us in our experience.

As a philosopher, Hume believed that he must be satisfied with what is really known and it was his task that all those universals such as substance, unity, identity, relation, causality, are to be explained by some psychological law. In other words, Hume believed that we did not need all these universals, too, besides they were not known to us through our sense-data. Hume did apply literally Occam's razor (nominalist's approach to eliminate all the universals) to the question of the universal. Now, it is important to make his position intelligible such that he not only accepted everything we experience as it is, but also he did not believe anything behind what we experience. In other words, what we call something to be known by senses is pure sense-data and beyond these immediately given, Hume did not recognize anything else as the object of our knowledge. In this sense, Hume's attempt was to explain by psychological laws what was previously considered to be given in our ideas.
4.3.6 The flow chart of Hume's geography of mind is as follows:

**Hume's Geography of the Mind**

(Anatomy as it Pertains to Morals)

- **Perceptions of the mind**
  - Primary (Sensations) (relating to objects of experience)
  - Secondary (Reflections) (arising from preceding perceptions)

- **Impressions**
  - Sense Impressions (proceeding immediately from primary impressions)
  - Impressions (proceeding from preceding perceptions)

- **Passions**
  - Direct: Proceeding from pleasure & pain
  - Indirect: Proceeding from ideas of primary impressions

- **Reason (Understanding)**
  - Demonstrative (Relates to Ideas)
    - E.g., Mathematics
  - Experiential (Relates to Impressions of "objects of experience")
    - E.g., Probability, causal reasoning

- **Violent Passions**
  - Hunger
  - Lust
  - Jealousy
  - Appetite
  - Calm
  - Beaevolence
  - Benevolence
  - Love of Life
  - Kindness to Children
  - Violence
  - Aversion
  - Joy
  - Hope
  - Fear
  - Despair
  - Will (?)
  - Violent Passions
  - Calm Appetite for:
    - Good
    - Aversion to evil
    - Aesthetic
  - Violent Passions
  - Calm Approval
    - Approval
    - Love
    - Merit
    - Aesthetic
    - Vanity
    - Pity
    - Noble
Hume's first task was to reformulate Locke's theory of ideas. He abandoned Locke's distinction between ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection—which involved a metaphysics that ought to have been examined, not assumed critically at the outset. The basic distinction he introduced—a distinction between "impressions" and "ideas"—did not involve him in metaphysics. Distinguishing impressions from ideas, Hume allowed a difference in degree of "liveliness." Hume's view of meaning is essentially Locke's: to understand a word is to associate it with a kind of 'idea', and 'ideas' are quasi sensory states. Thinking, for Hume consists in mentally manipulating these same 'ideas'; and so he shares with his predecessors a general picture in which no radical line are drawn between thinking, imagining, meaning, understanding. Hume does not have a special label—'impression'—for the sense data of normal perception, but he represents the difference between 'ideas' and 'impressions' as merely one of degree. "Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning." The generic word 'perception' echoes Berkeley's view that all we strictly perceive are what he calls 'ideas', and also Locke's use of 'perceive' to cover all mental activity. As Hume says roundly: 'To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but perceive.'

Hume's 'perceptions' are Locke's and Berkeley's 'ideas'; and his distinction between 'ideas' and 'impression' marks the difference in the degree of 'force' or 'vivacity'—a difference which was equally recognized, though in different language by Locke and Berkeley. In Hume, then, we again have the assimilation of the intellectual to the sensory. Like Locke, Hume simply took for granted that every item in consciousness—every impression and every idea—is a distinct, separate, isolated unit. This assumption—called "psychological atomism" because it parallels the atomistic view of physical reality-dominated psychology for more than a century. It led further assumption that the main business of psychology was to find the laws by which supposedly separate "atoms"
of experience become “associated”. Since, according to Hume, every simple idea is an independent entity, it is theoretically possible that any one of our simple idea might precede or follow any other simple idea, in any order whatever. But even the most superficial observation of the flow of ideas in our minds shows that this is not the case. On the contrary, when we engage in conversation or argument, even when we daydream, our ideas fall into regular patterns; the relations we observe among them are not merely random or chance. There must be “some universal principles” at work among our ideas, “some bond of union among them, associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another.”121 The three principles122 Hume believed to be involve are (1) resemblance, (2) contiguity, and (3) cause and effect. As a result of the operation of these three principles complex ideas originate in our mind according to Hume’s position. The principle of resemblance is responsible for the generation of all such ideas.

There is another Division of our Perceptions; simple and complex of which Hume takes notice, and extends itself both to our Impressions and Ideas. Having by these Divisions given an Order and Arrangement to his Objects, (that is, I suppose, Ideas) he says, with the more Accuracy considered their Qualties and Relations. The first Circumstance that strikes his Eye, is the great Resemblance between our Impressions and Ideas in every Particular, except their Degree of Force and Vivacity. When he shuts his Eyes and thinks of his Chamber, the Ideas he forms are exact Representations (he tells us) of the Impressions he felt. I fancy most other People have made the same Observations. Having discovered this Relation between Impressions and Ideas, which, Hume says, requires no farther Examination, is curious to find some other of their Qualties. Therefore, Hume proceeds to consider how they stand with regard to their existence, and which of the Impressions and Ideas are Causes, and123 which Effects. The full Examination of this Question is, the Subject of this Performance of his; and therefore he here contents himself with establishing this one general Proposition, *That all our simple Ideas in their first Appearance are derived from simple Impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent*. When he has fixed this Assertion beyond Contradiction, he reflects on what he has done with great Satisfactions; saying124.
“This then is the first Principle I establish in the Science of human Nature, nor ought we to despise it because of the Simplicity of its Appearance. For it is remarkable, that the present Question is the same with what has made so much Noise in the Terms, when it has been disputed whether there be any innate Ideas, or whether all Ideas be derived from Sensations and Reflexion. We may observe, that in order to prove the Ideas of Extension and Colour not to be innate, Philosophers do nothing but shew, that they are conveyed by our Senses. To prove the Ideas of Passion and Desire not to be innate, they observe that we have a preceding Experience of these Emotions in ourselves. Now if we carefully examine these Arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing, but that Ideas are preceded by other more lively Perceptions from which they are derived, and which they represent.”

Accordingly Hume hopes his clear stating of the Question will remove all Disputes concerning it, and will render the above said Principle of more use in our Reasonings, than it seems hitherto to have been. And now having made it appear, that our simple Impressions are prior to their correspondent Ideas, a very few Instances excepted, Method seems, to require we should examine our Impressions, before we consider our Ideas. But after informing us that Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of Sensation and those of Reflexion, and briefly illustrating both sorts, he gives us to understand, that it will be necessary to reverse that Method, which at first Sight seems most natural; and, in order to explain the Nature and Principles of the human Mind, give a particular Account of Ideas. All simple ideas, Hume maintains, are memory copies of simple impressions; complex ideas are combination of simple ones. Hence a term has meaning only if there is an impression or combination of impressions of which it is a copy. The account of how abstract ideas are formed in the mind has brought Hume from psychology to epistemology.

4.3.7 Epistemology According To Hume

Locke honestly proposed the possibility of deriving knowledge from experience, but did not carry it far enough. and Berkeley noticed further implications. Now Hume has shown that empiricism inevitably leads to an utter and total skepticism. According to Hume, knowledge of pure mathematics is secure because it rests only on the relations of ideas, without presuming anything about the world. Experimental observations(conducted
without any assumption of the existence of material objects) permit us to use our experience in forming useful habits. Any other epistemological effort, especially if it involves the pretense of achieving useful abstract knowledge, is meaningless and unreliable. The most reasonable position, Hume held, is a "mitigated" skepticism that humbly accepts the limitations of human knowledge while pursuing the legitimate aims of maths and science. In our non-philosophical moments, of course, we will be thrown back upon the natural beliefs of everyday life, no matter how lacking in rational justification we know them to be.

Hume did not allow us to apply the concept of "knowledge" to natural sciences. Hume distinguished between the relations of ideas, which we now call analytic knowledge, and the idea of matter of fact, which we now call synthetic knowledge. The analytic, or a priori knowledge and the synthetic, a posteriori knowledge have two different criteria for truth. While the knowledge about relations of ideas (such as an a priori, analytic science as arithmetic, geometry) uses the principle of contradiction as its principle of truth, the knowledge of matter of fact (synthetic, a posteriori knowledge) needs to appeal for the criterion of truth to our sense experience and anything we recognize as a matter of fact, how universal it may appear, can in principle be false and thereby does not involve in a contradiction. Hume called our knowledge of relations of ideas alone "knowledge", while our knowledge obtained through our senses, our knowledge of matter of fact, is called "opinion" and did not allow it to be considered "knowledge".

4.3.8 Causation

Hume claims that there are only two kinds of reasoning, 'demonstrative' and 'probable', and neither can do the job. Demonstrative reasoning (such as deduction) cannot establish the uniformity of nature - for non-uniformity is conceivable, and therefore possible. 'Probably' reasoning - or causal reasoning from the observed to the unobserved - cannot establish the uniformity either. Probable reasoning itself presupposes the uniformity of nature, so to employ it in support of that principle would be circular. As Russell later explained, even if experience has told us that past futures resembled past pasts, we cannot
conclude that future futures will resemble future pasts - unless we already assume that the future resembles the past. The empirical sciences constantly urge from "some" to "all", or at least to "probably all". How do we acquire beliefs about things we are not currently experiencing? We see a flame, for example, and conclude that it is hot. Hume notes that we start from a present impression - the sight of the flame - and suppose a causal relation - between flames and heat. But how do we come to believe in that causal relation? Hume's great claim is that it is not because of reason. Reason alone cannot tell us that flames are hot: it is conceivable that a fire might be cold, and therefore possible. Reason and experience together cannot produce the belief either. Our experience has been confined to certain tracts of space and time. Within those reaches, we have found flame to be hot. But there is a gap between 'Observed flames have been hot' and 'All flames are hot'. To reach the second, we would need to add the principle that nature is uniform, that the future resembles the past. But how could we ever establish the uniformity principle?

We continue to believe in the uniformity of nature. This belief underlies all the empirical sciences, including physics. A physical law is the formulation of some uniformity, derived by an inference from "some" to "all". Prior to Hume everyone agreed that every event has some cause that necessarily produces it. The new scientific method rested on this belief, and the success of the method seemed to substantiate the belief. Accordingly, Hume himself set to examine the notion that a necessary connection can exist between two events, a connection that one of the event occurs, the other must inevitably also occur. Here, Hume supposed, the most obvious point is a negative one: causal reasoning can never be justified rationally. In order to learn, we must suppose that our past experiences bear some relevance to present and future cases. But although we do indeed believe that the future will be like the past, the truth of that belief is not self-evident. In fact, it is always possible for nature to change, so inferences from past to future are never rationally certain. Thus, on Hume's view, all beliefs in matters of fact are fundamentally non-rational.127

Finally, Hume128 reached the conclusion there is no reason in the nature of things why any event should not be followed by any other event. It just happens that some events follow other events consistently and that, when they have done so often enough,
we expect them to continue to do so. This is all there is to causality. It is like our idea of identity, our idea of necessary connection is derived from something in us, not in the object; like the idea of identity it is grounded in human imagination, not in the rationality of the universe. This is merely a psychological fact about human nature. It follows that the pretensions of natural sciences to demonstrative sciences are utterly without basis. The net result of Hume's analysis is: All our knowledge of what, popularly speaking, is called "objects" is merely knowledge of spatiotemporal relations among simple ideas or impressions. The same is true of our alleged knowledge of self: It amounts to no more than a knowledge of temporal relations among psychic states. Hume called this kind of knowledge, "the knowledge of matters of fact". We can only know that as a matter of fact, such-and-such a datum is followed by such-and-such another datum, is above it, or below it. We can never know it that it must be so, for every fact could always be otherwise. Its " contrary . . . is still possible; because it can imply a contradiction . . . That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Hume with the matter of facts contrasted "knowledge of the relation of ideas".

Hume's account of demonstrable knowledge brought him to mathematics. In the Enquiry Hume seems to have held that geometry as well as arithmetic yields certain knowledge. Hume tried to distinguish between (1) knowledge of a relation between two distinct ideas (causality) is such a relation, which can never be certain or demonstrative and (2) knowledge that depends on the analysis of an individual idea. Anything found to be true about some such idea would continue to be true as long as the idea did not change. But Hume forgot that, in his own view, what is before the mind is always either a simple idea (image) or a complex one. If it is complex, its parts are simple ideas, between which, according to his doctrine, no necessary relations hold. On the other hand, if it is a really simple ideas with no parts, the question of necessary relations does not enter, since there are no relations at all.

Mathematical knowledge is "universal and exact" only because it is about the agreement and disagreement of names. The certain and demonstrable knowledge that is to be contrasted with mere knowledge of "matters of fact" is not an analysis of a sensible
idea (that is, an image) into its constituent parts, but an analysis of definition of terms. The contrast is between (1) knowledge of spatio-temporal relations between sense data and (2) knowledge of the agreement and disagreement of names. The former is "instructive" (that is, informative) but always particular, the latter is universal but tells us nothing about matters of fact and existence. Unfortunately, Hume's account is marred by confusions. It may be said that Hume was correct in holding that if Geometry is "instructive" it is not certain, and that if it is certain, it is "not instructive." Though he weaved between saying that it is instructive and saying that it is certain, he was quite clear that it could not be both. Hence, he was fundamentally antagonistic to claims of rationalist philosophers that a priori insights into the nature of reality can be derived from mathematics.

4.3.9 Belief

Hume's analysis of human belief begins with a careful distinction among our mental contents: impressions are the direct, vivid, and forceful products of immediate experience; ideas are merely feeble copies of these original impressions. Thus, for example, the background color of the screen at which I am now looking is an impression, while my memory of the color of my mother's hair is merely an idea. Since every idea must be derived from an antecedent impression, Hume supposed, it always makes sense to inquire into the origins of our ideas by asking from which impressions they are derived. The apparent connection of one idea to another is invariably the result of an association that we manufacture ourselves. We use our mental operations to link ideas to each other in one of three ways: resemblance, contiguity, or cause and effect. Experience provides us with both the ideas themselves and our awareness of their association. All human beliefs (including those we regard as cases of knowledge) result from repeated applications of these simple associations. That's how we learn from experience. When I observe the constant conjunction of events in my experience, I grow accustomed to associating them with each other.

For Hume, imagination and belief differ only in the degree of conviction with which their objects are anticipated. Although this positive answer may seem disappointing, Hume maintained that custom or habit is the great guide of life and the
foundation of all natural science. According to Hume, our belief that events are causally related is a custom or habit acquired by experience: having observed the regularity with which events of particular sorts occur together, we form the association of ideas that produces the habit of expecting the effect whenever we experience the cause. But something is missing from this account: we also believe that the cause somehow produces the effect. Even if this belief is unjustifiable, Hume must offer some explanation for the fact that we do hold it. His technique was to search for the original impression from which our idea of the necessary connection between cause and effect is copied.138 Our (non-rational) expectation that the effect will follow the cause is accompanied by a strong feeling of conviction, and it is the impression of this feeling that is copied by our concept of a necessary connection between cause and effect. The force of causal necessity is just the strength of our sentiment in anticipating efficacious outcomes.

4.3.10 Substance

In a passage of the Treatise, Hume offered a similar account of the belief in the reality of the self. Here there is the ordinary human supposition that lies behind our use of first-personal pronouns. Upon this relatively simple foundation, philosophers have erected the notion of an immaterial substance, a mind or soul that persists through time on its own. Hume's question is, "From what antecedent impression does the idea of the self arise?" Hume pointed out that we do not have an impression of the self. No matter how closely I attend to my own experience, no matter how fully I notice the mental operations presently occurring "in my mind", I am never directly aware of "I". What I do experience is a succession of separate and individual ideas, associated with each other by relations of resemblance and causality. Although these relations may be extended through time by memory, there is no evidence of any substantial ground for their coherence. The persistent self and the immortal soul are philosophical fictions.

According the viewpoint of Hume, there is no foundation for us to recognize substance, which is the ultimate unit of reality since Descartes, nor the efficient causality as the principle of reality. Here all the natural sciences including the Newtonian
mechanics face a threat that all these sciences are denied its universal and necessary validity as sciences and become mere opinions. Started with Descartes' absolutely certain knowledge of self's existence and the universe through Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke and Berkeley, the Contemporary Western philosophy must now face a challenge of Hume's ultimate skeptical position that no universe (nature) is not only unknown to us, but also is not necessary for us to have our mundane everyday experience. The central concept of substance of the Contemporary Western philosophy has been completely "eloded" finally at Hume and, according to Hume, even the efficient causality which had been considered the absolute, indubitable principle of reality is now questioned and unnecessary as to its reality. Immanuel Kant's philosophy was allocated in such a spiritual, intellectual crisis of the natural sciences and philosophy. That is, the contention that no universal, necessity knowledge is possible about the universe (nature), was the outcome of Hume's philosophy.

4.3.11 Scepticism

The concluding section of the *Treatise*, book I, depicts a battle between reason and nature. Hume has exposed the weakness of the human mind - where what passed for reason turns out to be 'imagination', and even the most plausible causal inference can be made to seem uncertain. Facing his own weakness, Hume is 'ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probably or likely than another'.

Human nature saves him. 'Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose.' A few hours of good company and backgammon make his melancholy and sceptical conclusions seem ridiculous. Following one's nature, however, there will be a place for philosophy and the modest pursuit of science.

Hume here reconciles scepticism and naturalism. It is not merely that scepticism is a natural attitude. Rather, the best expression of scepticism is one where we follow our nature without pretending we have an independent justification; in doing so we may even contribute to the 'advancement of knowledge'.
There is no doubt about where Hume's own sympathies would lie—with the pragmatism and radical empiricism. But, though Hume's temper was radically empirical, he did not work out a pragmatic theory of experience. Hume shared the belief of his contemporaries and his predecessors that knowledge is something that happens to men, not something that men make happen by what they do. The discovery of knowledge occurs as a result of men's interaction with their environment was not made until much latter. Hume's contribution—and it was an important one—was rather the discovery that criticism does not destroy belief nor render men impotent. Hume mentioned that absolute rational certainty is unattainable except in pure mathematics. The philosophical sceptic, reserves his scepticism for abstract reason, having made his peace with concrete experience. Hume has come to see that action, not certainty-experience, not logic—is the criterion a man ought to accept.

Hume's philosophy has two extremely significant elements. On the one hand, Hume's viewpoint and consequences of his philosophy are an inevitable radicalization of the philosophy of consciousness. It is indeed the deadend street. On the other hand, by destroying many traditional dogmas, Hume opened up a new possible way of doing philosophy, i.e., the transcendental philosophy, even though his successor, Kant, remained also in the position of the philosophy of consciousness.

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