Chapter-5

THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLE OF RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM
CHAPTER 5

THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLE OF RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

German philosopher born in Königsberg 1724. Immanuel Kant is without a doubt one of the most prominent philosophers to have lived. Through Wolff he got to know the thoughts of Leibnitz. Locke and Berkeley were regarded primarily as stepping-stones to Hume and Hume as a stepping-stone to Kant. The understanding of Kant and Hume has likely suffered because as a skeptic and refuter of skepticism they have been set too sharp opposition to each other. Except for outright Skeptics, Aristotle's solution to the Problem of First Principles, that such propositions are known to be true because they are self-evident, endured well into Modern Philosophy. Then, when all the Rationalists, like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, appealed to self-evidence and then all came up with radically different theories, it should have become clear that this was not a good enough procedure to adjudicate the conflicting claims. This awkward situation was then blown apart by Hume, under whose skeptical examination, even the principle of causality crumbled.

5.1 Aim

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant, a watershed figure who forever altered the course of philosophical thinking in the Western tradition. Kant said, it was a careful reading of David Hume that "interrupted my dogmatic slumbers and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction". Having appreciated the full force of such skeptical arguments, Kant supposed that the only adequate response would be a "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy, a recognition that the appearance of the external world depends in some measure upon the position and movement of its observers. This central idea became the basis for his life-long project of developing a critical philosophy that could withstand them.

Kant's aim was to move beyond the traditional dichotomy between rationalism and empiricism. The rationalists had tried to show that we can understand the world by
careful use of reason, this guarantees the indubitability of our knowledge but leaves serious questions about its practical content. The empiricists, on the other hand, had argued that all of our knowledge must be firmly grounded in experience; practical content is thus secured, but it turns out that we can be certain of very little. Both approaches have failed, Kant supposed, because both are premised on the same mistaken assumption. Progress in philosophy, according to Kant, requires that we frame the epistemological problem in an entirely different way.

The crucial question is not how we can bring ourselves to understand the world, but how the world comes to be understood by us. Instead of trying, by reason or experience, to make our concepts match the nature of objects, Kant held, we must allow the structure of our concepts shape our experience of objects. This is the purpose of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, 1787) to show how reason determines the conditions under which experience and knowledge are possible. Kant's thought is truly the watershed of modern philosophy, and still the fruitful point of departure for the 21st century, no such monument could be more suggestive, encouraging and hopeful.

5.2 Works

Kant's intellectual work easily justified his own claim to have effected a Copernican revolution in philosophy. Beginning with his Inaugural Dissertation (1770) on the difference between right- and left-handed spatial orientations, Kant patiently worked out the most comprehensive and influential philosophical programme of the modern era. His central thesis—that the possibility of human knowledge presupposes the active participation of the human mind. The monumental *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Critique of Pure Reason*) (1781, 1787) fully spells out the conditions for mathematical, scientific, and metaphysical knowledge in its "Transcendental Aesthetic", "Transcendental Analytic", and "Transcendental Dialectic," but Kant found it helpful to offer a less technical exposition of the same themes in the *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissen schaft wird auftreten können* (*Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic*) (1783). Carefully distinguishing judgments as analytic or synthetic and as *a priori* or *a posteriori*, Kant held that the most interesting and useful varieties of human knowledge rely upon synthetic *a priori* judgments, which are, in turn, possible only when the mind determines the conditions of its own experience. Thus, it is we who impose the forms of space and time upon all possible sensation in mathematics, and it is we who render all experience
coherent as scientific knowledge governed by traditional notions of substance and causality by applying the pure concepts of the understanding to all possible experience. But regulative principles of this sort hold only for the world as we know it, and since metaphysical propositions seek a truth beyond all experience, they cannot be established within the bounds of reason. Significant applications of these principles are expressed in Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (Metaphysical Foundations of the Science of Nature) (1786) and Beantwortung der Frage: Ist es eine Erfahrung, daß wir denken? (On Comprehension and Transcendental Consciousness) (1788-1791).

Kant's moral philosophy is developed in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals) (1785). From his analysis of the operation of the human will, Kant derived the necessity of a perfectly universalizable moral law, expressed in a categorical imperative that must be regarded as binding upon every agent. In the Third Section of the Grounding and in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Critique of Practical Reason) (1788), Kant grounded this conception of moral autonomy upon our postulation of god, freedom, and immortality. Kant's most influential work is by no doubt "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (1781, 1787) in English: Critique of Pure Reason. The work was first published in 1781 and immediately brought Kant in the light of fame. His critics had their trouble understanding the works from Immanuel Kant, and Kant therefore published his own introduction "Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik" (1783) in English: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Six years after the Critique of Pure Reason he published a revised edition (1784), and made an eloquent plea for international cooperation in Zum ewigen Frieden (Perpetual Peace) (1795).

In later life, Kant drew art and science together under the concept of purpose in the Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of Judgment) (1790), considered the consequences of transcendental criticism for theology in Die Religion innerhalb die Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone) (1793), stated the fundamental principles for civil discourse in Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? ("What is Enlightenment?")

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Kant does not directly pose the Problem of First Principles, and the form of his approach tends to obscure it. Thus, the "Transcendental Logic" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is divided into the "Transcendental Analytic" and the "Transcendental Dialectic." The "Dialectic" is concerned with the fallacies produced when metaphysics is extended beyond possible experience. The "Analytic", about secure metaphysics, is divided into the "Analytic of Concepts" and the "Analytic of Principles" "Principles" would be *Principia* in Latin, i.e. "beginnings," "first things", "first principles", where now in English, thanks to the drift in the meaning of "principle", the term must be reduplicated with an etymologically redundant "first." Kant, however, is here writing in German, and in place of *Principia* we have *Grundsätze* (singular *Grundsatz*, "principle", "axiom"-literally "ground sentence"). The examination of the *Grundsätze*, however, is deferred until after and "Analytic of Concepts." Thus, were the Problem of First Principles to be raised, it seems like that would come after an examination of concepts. Since it is not raised at all, one is left with the impression that it has somehow, along the way, actually already been dealt with.

The peculiarity of Kant's approach, from an Aristotelian point of view, is not idiosyncratic. Kant approaches the matter as he does because he is responding to Hume, and one of Hume's initial challenges is about the origin of "ideas." While the Problem of First Principles is about the justification of propositions, Hume's Empiricist approach goes back to asking about the legitimacy of the very concepts, of which the propositions
are constituted, in the first place. The Rationalists never worried too much about that. For Descartes, any notion that could be conceived "clearly and distinctly" could be used without hesitation or doubt, a procedure familiar and unobjectionable in mathematics. It was the Empiricists who started demanding certificates of authenticity, since they wanted to trace all knowledge back to experience. Locke was not aware, so much as Berkeley and Hume, that not everything familiar from traditional philosophy (or even mathematics) was going to be so traceable; and Berkeley's pious rejection of "material substance" lit a skeptical fuse whose detonation would shake much of subsequent philosophy through Hume, thanks in great measure to Kant's appreciation of the importance of the issue.

Thus, Kant begins, like Hume, asking about the legitimacy of concepts. However, the traditional problem has already insensibly been brought up, for in his critique of the concept of cause and effect, Hume did question the principle of causality, a proposition, and the way in which he expressed the defect of such a principle uncovered a point to Kant, which he dealt with back in the Introduction to the Critique, not in the "Transcendental Logic" at all. Hume had decided that the lack of certainty for cause and effect was because of the nature of the relationship of the two events, or of the subject and the predicate, in a proposition. Hume made a distinction about how subject and predicate could be related.

"All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain [note: these are Locke's categories]. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides is a proposition, which expresses a relation between these figures."

Kant's most original contribution to philosophy is his "Copernican Revolution," that, as he puts it, it is the representation that makes the object possible rather than the object that makes the representation possible. This introduced the human mind as an active originator of experience rather than a passive recipient of perception. This all now seems obvious: the mind could be a tabula rasa, a "blank tablet," no more than a bathtub full of silicon chips could be a digital computer. Perceptual input must be processed or it would just be noise - "less even than a dream" or "nothing to us," as Kant alternatively
puts it. But if the mind actively generates perception, this raises the question whether the result has anything to do with the world, or if so, how much. The result was endless trouble both for Kant and for a posterity trying to figure him out. To the extent that knowledge depends on the structure of the mind and not on the world, knowledge would have no connection to the world and is not even true representation, just a solipsistic or inter subjective fantasy. Kantianism seems threatened with "psychologism", the doctrine that what we know is our own psychology, not external things. Kant did say, consistent with psychologism that basically we don't know about "things-in-themselves", objects, as they exist apart from perception. But at the same time Kant thought he was vindicating both a scientific realism, where science really knows the world, and a moral realism, where there is objective moral obligation, for both of which a connection to external existence is essential. And there were also terribly important features of things-in-themselves that we do have some notion about and that are of fundamental importance to human life, not just morality but what he called the three "Ideas" of reason: God, freedom, and immortality. The paradoxes of Kant's efforts to reconcile these conflicting approaches and requirements made it very difficult for most later philosophers to take the overall system seriously. Nevertheless, Kant's theory does all sorts of things that seem appropriate for a non-reductionistic philosophical system and that later philosophy has had trouble doing at all.

5.4 Introduction

Is rationalism compatible with the modern historical outlook? This is the most challenging problem left by the rationalists of the Enlightenment to their modern successors. The philosophers of the Age of Reason, starting with Descartes and following Plato, saw reason as eternal, non-temporal, and not bound by cultural and sociological factors. Even the limits of reason (when admitted) were to be understood sub specie aeternitatis. This led a view of history as a contingent empirical, affair, without rational import in itself. Whatever is Geschichte is thereby mere Historie. It consists in the simple accumulation or recounting of facts that per se neither disclose a rational pattern nor are relevant to the growth of rationality. Indeed, the very notion of the growth in rationality would at, best have only have a quantitative, not a qualitative, individual men could become more rational as they compose with the fixed and eternal norms of rationality that as such were independent of man's actual thinking and practical attitudes. But whereas individual men belonged to the world of becoming, reason "itself" was pure being it was...
an eternal truth -immovable, as such, and without change. The nascent historicism of 18th century challenged this classic view. The problem was not just to admit the rational import of history but also to supply it with a systematic ground; this suggested a reappraisal of the nature and states of rationality. Mind and reality when both from which it are distinguished have been admitted to the position of entities discontinuous with our experience; the temptation is irresistible to regard experience and knowledge as effect of some kind of interaction between them. Instead of constituting our ultimate datum, to be supplemented and interpreted by reference to which it is more complete, but continuous with itself, experience comes to be represented as the product of two factors, which are essentially incapable of being experienced.

The conflict between rationalism and empiricism had arisen within the philosophy of the Enlightenment itself, where it found an interesting expression in Kant’s system. If one had to characterize the 17th and 18th centuries by a single word, the word would be “optimistic”, because the Age of Reason-or the Enlightenment, as it is also called-was optimistic. The new science was revealing that the universe, appearances to the contrary, is a vast but simple mechanism. As a part of this orderly universe man’s behaviour should be subject to prediction, and hence, to control, in the interests of improving his material and social well being. Great progress had already been made in this respect. There seemed to be no reason why continued, indeed unlimited, progress was not possible. In Condorect’s Sketch for a historical Picture of Progress of the Human Mind, a characteristic expression of these widely held beliefs is found: “We shall find in the experience of the past, in the observation of the progress that the sciences and civilization have already made, in the analysis of the progress of the human mind and of the development of its faculties, the strongest reasons for believing that nature has set no limit to the realization of our hopes.” The key ideas that underpin Condorect’s optimistic faith are nature and reason.

Men agreed on what was unnatural and irrational, it is possible to get of the enlightenment of the 18th century excluded from nature and reason. Whether they were thinking of the time past or of the time present, whether of physical nature or of human nature, they excluded the unpredictable and miraculous, especially the possibility of intervention by supernatural forces from outside the closed system of nature. Accordingly, although few Enlightenment thinkers were explicit atheists, they, were, at most, very tepid Deists. They envisaged a God who, having created an orderly universe, left it strictly alone. Opinion varied through a broad spectrum. Montesquieu recognized
that the study of human nature is more difficult than the study of physical nature. In the opening lines of his great work on social anthropology, Montesquieu mentions: "Laws, in their most general signification, are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things. In this sense all beings have their laws: the Deity His laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences superior to man their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws." "The intelligent world is far from being so well governed as the physical. For though the former has also its laws, which of their own nature are invariable, it does not conform to them so exactly as the physical world. This is because on one hand, particular intelligent beings are of finite nature, and consequently liable to error; and on the other hand, their nature requires them to be free agents. Hence, they do not steadily conform to their primitive laws: and even those of their own instituting they frequently infringe." Hence, there are underlying regularities that can be discovered in the midst of the superficial diversities of human conduct and character.

The basic assumption of the Enlightenment was that the universe is rational in all its aspects and in every detail. Because the physical universe is rational, there are number of "rational principles" at work in it; it therefore has a simple orderly pattern. Because the human intellect is rational, it has the capacity to discover these principles. Because the human will is rational, it is capable of acting in the light of this knowledge. The French Revolution, which had promulgated the rights of man and which had been held by its supporters to herald a new age of reason collapsed into a reign of terror. This was followed by an absolutism even more formidable, because it was more efficient, than the regime that Revolution had overthrown. Far from being rational creatures able to control their destinies, men seemed driven by their hates and fears—moved less by enlightened self-interest or by cool benevolence than by irrational and destructive aggression against one another and even against themselves.

Dostoevsky's short story Notes from Underground contains one of the earliest—and also one of the most powerful-portraits of this new, anxious man. Dostoevsky quotes: "Reason is only reason, and it can only satisfy the reasoning ability of man, whereas volition is a manifestation of the whole of life. I mean, of the whole of human life, including reason with all its concomitant head-scratchings. And although our life, thus manifested, very often turns out to be a sorry business, it is life nonetheless and not merely extractions of square roots. . . . What does reason know? Reason only knows what it has succeeded in getting to know . . . . Whereas human nature acts as a whole, with everything that is in it, consciously, and unconsciously, and it may commit all sorts of absurdities, it persists . . . The whole meaning of human life can be summed up in the one statement that man only exists for the purpose of proving to himself every minute that he is a man and not an organ stop."
5.5 Subjective And Objective Side Of Reason

Immanuel Kant conceives of reason mainly as a spontaneous activity, not as a mere set of forms. Even the objective side of reason—its concepts, principles, etc.—must be construed as subjective functions, by which the human mind or ego structures itself as well as its experience. This dynamic conception of reason is relatively different from that of Plato and, indeed, breaks away from the whole classic view of the logos as fixed and independent, governing the mind and the world as a thing in itself. For Kant whatever is rational depends on the thinking subject. Reason cannot be divorced from the operation of thinking or from the practical attitudes of the mind but is formed by them while also forming them. By this Kant does not mean the psychological process of thinking as an empirical event, but the so-called “transcendental” functioning of the mind. But as such dynamic function of reason belongs to its very definition. This idea is closely connected to Kant’s concept of autonomy and his constitutional theory of rationality. In being autonomous, human reason must be able only with those universal rules it sets up with itself, and in which it can recognize the explication of its own subjective structure. Any other attitude will be “heteronymous” and thereby non-rational. This view of autonomy is based upon Kant’s constitution theory of rationality, i.e., on his Copernican revolution as it affects his view of the nature of reason itself and not only of knowledge or ethics. According to this theory reason cannot be conceived of as a system of universal norms that subsist in themselves, but must be seen as constituted by the human subject. The objective side of reason as a set of principles is thus dependent on its subjective side, i.e., upon the spontaneous activity of the rational ego, who explicates his own structure in these principles and recognizes them as his own. This model of rationality lays down the conditions by which both our subjective and objective norms themselves can gain rational status. No set of universal norms is rational in itself, except as it is constituted by the subject and can be recognized by him as such. Corresponding we become rational by setting up the norms with which we comply and not by complying a system of pre-established norms.

Hence, the status of rationality is not ready made but constituted, depending on the spontaneous activity of ego, and his supplies to systematic ground for assigning reason a “becoming” of his own. This becoming must, assume, moreover a specific historical character because of the finitude of human reason.
Kant's Criticism Against The Continental Rationalism And The British Empiricism

Living in the tradition of the Philosophy of Consciousness since Descartes, Immanuel Kant was quite unique in that he attempted to synthesize the Continental Rationalism of Descartes-Spinoza-Leibnitz and the British Empiricism of Locke-Berkeley-Hume into one so called Critical Philosophy of his own by being inspired by both, eliminating the faults of both thoughts and critically unifying the strengths of these opposing philosophical thoughts. Despite the claim that Kant renovated the philosophy by opening up the third way in the synthesis of the Continental Rationalism and the British Empiricism, Kant remained in the approach of or within Consciousness and by means of Self-reflection or Introspection. In other words, the approach Kant always took was, whether it was the dogmatic-pre-critical period or the critical period alike, the Approach of Consciousness which overwhelms the history of contemporary philosophy since Descartes even to the philosophers of modernity. That is why Hegel was called Descartes the Father of the Contemporary Philosophy as long as his philosophy made Consciousness as the principle of its philosophy This making Consciousness the Principle of philosophy applies still Kant and his philosophy even in his critical period.

According to Kant's Prolegomena to the Future Metaphysics, his central theme of his philosophical pursuit was triggered by the question of Causality. Until Kant had read Hume, such concepts as "substance", "causality", "the universal validity of knowledge" were taken for granted as a priori, self-evident not only in the Continental Rationalism (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz) and in the philosophy of Kant in the dogmatic period Following the model of mathematical truth, those philosophers did not question the substances, which were not knowable to us immediately, but are known by means of their attributes, and e.g. once we accepted the definition of the material substance (for example by Descartes), then because extension is the attribute (the necessary characteristic) of matter (the material substance), "Matter extends" is necessary, analytic, thus a priori. Kant, without questioning it, accepts this. However, Kant also was well aware and had to take a critical stance against the philosophical spiritual crisis that, according to Hume, the substance, whether it is spiritual or material, is obsolete and explained by means of psychological laws, while causality was considered not as the objective, absolute relationship, but as a mere product of the psychological law of association. Thus, the cause and effect relationship is only highly probable, practical for our everyday life. Kant
was well acquainted with the nature of Newtonian physics and was a firm believer of Newtonian physics and mathematics as the sciences necessary and universally valid to nature (in Kantian sense this is "experience")

5.6.1 Disputes Between Rationalism And Empiricism

Whether or not the ideas derive from Experience alone or may be obtained from something else (as Kant thought that it was from Understanding = Reason) Whether all the ideas derives from externally or may be gained internally? In other words, is knowledge a product of senses or a product of pure thought? Although Empiricism rejects the super-sensory knowledge (the knowledge from reason), if they were right, it is no longer possible for us to have empirical sciences of nature (with universality and necessary validity), because no knowledge derived from experience cannot be universally valid and necessary true. In other words, perception does not give any knowledge, which is both universally and necessarily valid. As rationalism was right, knowledge cannot deserve the true name of knowledge, unless it is apodectic (universally and necessary true). Empiricism, therefore, had to abandon the claim for the possibility of knowledge and ended up with Hume's skepticism and Probablism.

The European Rationalism turned into an eclectic, vulgar philosophy. According to Rationalism, the claim for the universal and necessary truth was the leading motive of their philosophical pursuit. And yet, when in reality, the criteria of "clear and distinct" for the truth is believed to have discovered while the model after mathematics was considered as the ideal of a system of sciences, they had in these two respects dogmatism. Take for example, Spinoza and Leibnitz developed two mutually inconsistent philosophical systems on the same criteria of clarity and distinctness of truth. Thus, Spinoza's pantheism and Leibnitz's monadology are equally true, that is untenable. To model a philosophical system after mathematics is wrong. For the indubitable and universal validity of mathematics does not, according to Kant, come from the clarity and distinctness of the mathematical concepts, but in reality, it depends upon special kinds of a priori intuition (space for geometry and time for arithmetic's) which the mathematical thinking can change their concepts into, in other words, the mathematical thinking can produces its objects or represents them in sensory experience. Philosophical thinking cannot do it, i.e., to the philosophical thinking, its objects must be given. Only through the sensory intuition an object can be given the human spirit. Metaphysics wants to be a
science of reality, but being or existence (reality) cannot be deducible from thinking, i.e.,
reality cannot be demonstrated from the concept. Rationalism's error was to regard such
supersensory objects as substance, the universe as the whole, or God, as the genuine
objects of metaphysics, because our Understanding (Reason) is capable of producing
those concepts

However, Understanding cannot provide the objects. Only by means of intuition
(other than Understanding) the objects given are recognized. Here is the mistake of
Rationalism which failed to see the difference between mathematics and metaphysics.
Rationalism's failure also lies in not being able to see that mathematics is intuitive, i.e.,
synthetic in its scienticity (However, today's philosophy of mathematics agrees with
Hume's approach and is critical of Kant's contention). Knowledge which is not empirical
and yet would increase our knowledge of nature (reality) is synthetic, this is not analytic
either and yet universally and necessarily valid, is the a priori. In other words, We have to
inquire How the synthetic a priori knowledge possible?

The controversy between rationalism and empiricism about the question about
how to evaluate Senses and Understanding (Reason). Rationalists considered that
everything active is superior, while something passive is inferior. So they considered that
Understanding (Reason) which was able to grasp the nature of things beyond what is
given by senses is superior to Senses which are basically able to provide us with various,
confused multitude of idea. This resulted from the faulty belief that we are able to attain
the (knowledge of) reality by analyzing concepts. Kant held that those rationalists forgot
that Understanding provides the form of our knowledge, while Senses provide us with the
material elements of knowledge, both of these elements are indispensable for knowledge.

Kant objected both the Empiricism and Rationalism in that they both were in their own
ways one-sided, which is to be corrected by Kant's Critical approach.
i) The difference between the concept and intuition consisted in the difference of degree.
In reality, according to Kant, the difference between the concept and intuition is the
difference of kind.

ii) Kant criticized both Rationalists and Empiricists that both of them tried to deal with
the question of knowledge without asking the question about the possibility of knowledge.
The Rationalists dogmatically believed in the possibility and the limit of knowledge, while the Empiricists skeptically denied the possibility and the limit of knowledge. Kant urged to critically inquire the origin and the scope of knowledge that is why Kant called his own standpoint of "Criticism" In stead of asking, "Is knowledge possible"? Kant asked, "How, under what conditions is knowledge possible"? To question the latter, the former is presupposed as already possible. Is thereby the possibility of knowledge presupposed? Yes, of course. However, Kant stood on the viewpoint of the philosophy of consciousness as his predecessors and this knowledge of knowledge is reflection!

5 7 Kant Theory Of Knowledge

The central problem of Kant's philosophy is the synthetic a priori knowledge or judgment. The ideal of this new knowledge came from disputes between Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism. Kant presented the central themes of the first Critique, starting from instances in which we do appear to have achieved knowledge and asking under what conditions each case becomes possible. He began by carefully drawing a pair of crucial distinctions among the judgments we do actually make

1] The first distinction separates a priori from a posteriori judgments by reference to the origin of our knowledge of them. A priori judgments are based upon reason alone, independently of all sensory experience, and therefore apply with strict universality. A posteriori judgments, on the other hand, must be grounded upon experience and are consequently limited and uncertain in their application to specific cases

2] Kant made a less familiar distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Analytic judgments are those whose predicates are wholly contained in their subjects; since they add nothing to our concept of the subject, such judgments are purely explicative and can be deduced from the principle of non-contradiction. While, in Synthetic judgments, the predicates are wholly distinct from their subjects, to which they must be shown to relate because of some real connection external to the concepts themselves. Hence, synthetic judgments are genuinely informative but require justification by reference to some outside principle.
Kant supposed that previous philosophers had failed to differentiate properly between these two distinctions. Both Leibniz and Hume had made just one distinction, between matters of fact based on sensory experience and the uninformative truths of pure reason. In fact, Kant held, the two distinctions are not entirely coextensive; we need at least to consider all four of their logically possible combinations:

- **Analytic a posteriori** judgments cannot arise, since there is never any need to appeal to experience in support of a purely explicative assertion.
- **Synthetic a posteriori** judgments are the relatively uncontroversial matters of fact we come to know by means of our sensory experience.
- **Analytic a priori** judgments, everyone agrees, include all merely logical truths and straightforward matters of definition; they are necessarily true.
- **Synthetic a priori** judgments are the crucial case, since only they could provide new information that is necessarily true. But neither Leibniz nor Hume considered the possibility of any such case.

Kant, unlike his predecessors, maintained that synthetic a priori judgments not only are possible but actually provide the basis for significant portions of human knowledge. In fact, he supposed (pace Hume) that arithmetic and geometry comprise such judgments and that natural science depends on them for its power to explain and predict events. What is more, metaphysics—if it turns out to be possible at all—must rest upon synthetic a priori judgments, since anything else would be either uninformative or unjustifiable. But how are synthetic a priori judgments possible at all? This is the central question Kant sought to answer.

### 5.7.1 Mathematics

In mathematics consider, for example, our knowledge that two plus three is equal to five and that the interior angles of any triangle add up to a straight line. These (and similar) truths of mathematics are synthetic judgments, Kant held, since they contribute significantly to our knowledge of the world; the sum of the interior angles is not contained in the concept of a triangle. Yet, clearly, such truths are known a priori, since they apply with strict and universal necessity to all of the objects of our experience, without having been derived from that experience itself. In these instances, Kant supposed, no one will ask whether or not we have synthetic a priori knowledge; plainly,
we do. The question arises is, how do we come to have such knowledge? If experience does not supply the required connection between the concepts involved, what does?

Kant answers it that we do it ourselves. Conformity with the truths of mathematics is a precondition that we impose upon every possible object of our experience. Just as Descartes in Fifth Meditation had noted, the essence of bodies is manifested to us in Euclidean solid geometry, which determines \textit{a priori} the structure of the spatial world we experience. In order to be perceived by us, any object must be regarded as being uniquely located in space and time, so it is the spatio-temporal framework itself that provides the missing connection between the concept of the triangle and that of the sum of its angles. Since mathematics derives from our own sensible intuition, we can be absolutely sure that it must apply to everything we perceive, but for the same reason we can have no assurance that it has anything to do with the way things are apart from our perception of them. Kant does not see the process of synthesis producing anything relativistic or subjectivist: the realism of phenomena is fully meant. The knock-offs of Kant are rarely realistic.

While the knock-offs occupy fashionable opinion, basic misconceptions about Kantian theory are casually perpetuated. For instance, a defining characteristic of Kantian philosophy is that synthetic \textit{a priori} propositions are \textit{not} self-evident and can be denied without contradiction. What makes them true \textit{a priori} is that they have a cognitive ground, which is not in empirical intuition (i.e. perception). Although it is often claimed, as by the great French mathematician Poincaré, that the existence of non-Euclidean geometry refutes Kant's philosophy of geometry, in fact Kant's view of the nature of the axioms of geometry as synthetic \textit{a priori} propositions means that Kant could have \textit{predicted} the existence of non-Euclidean geometry. This should be obvious given any clear understanding of the meaning of "synthetic". Only Leonard Nelson\textsuperscript{8} fully appreciated this circumstance.

5.7.2 Natural Science

In natural science just like in mathematics, Kant held, synthetic \textit{a priori} judgments provide the necessary foundations for human knowledge. The most general laws of nature, like the truths of mathematics, cannot be justified by experience, yet must apply to it universally. In this case, the negative portion of Hume's analysis—his
demonstration that matters of fact rest upon an unjustifiable belief that there is a necessary connection between causes and their effects—was entirely correct. But of course Kant's more constructive approach is to offer a transcendental argument from the fact that we do have knowledge of the natural world to the truth of synthetic a priori propositions about the structure of our experience of it. The possibility of scientific knowledge requires that our experience of the world be not only perceivable but thinkable as well, and Kant held that the general intelligibility of experience entails the satisfaction of two further conditions:

1. It must be possible in principle to arrange and organize the chaos of our many individual sensory images by tracing the connections that hold among them. Kant called this the synthetic unity of the sensory manifold.

2. It must be possible in principle for a single subject to perform this organization by discovering the connections among perceived images. This is satisfied by what Kant called the transcendental unity of apperception.

Experiential knowledge is thinkable only if there is some regularity in what is known and there is some knower in whom that regularity can be represented. Since we do actually have knowledge of the world as we experience it, Kant held, both of these conditions must in fact obtain. Kant maintained that we are justified in applying the concepts of the understanding to the world by making a priori determinations of the nature of any possible experience. Each concept of relation establishes one of the preconditions of experience under one of the modes of time: duration, succession, and simultaneity. The experience of any change requires not only the perception of the altered qualities that constitute the change but also the concept of an underlying substance which persists through this alteration (E.g., in order to know by experience that the classroom wall has changed in colour from blue to yellow, I must not only perceive the different colours—blue then, yellow now—but also suppose that the wall itself has endured from then until now.) Thus, Kant supposed that the philosophical concept of substance (reflected in the scientific assumption of an external world of material objects) is an a priori condition for our experience.

Kant managed to provide, in phenomenal reality (phaenomena = "appearances"), for a sphere for science that was distinct and separate from anything that would relate to
morality or religion. The endless confusion and conflict that still results from people trying to figure out whether or how science and religion should fit together is deftly avoided by Kant, who can say, for instance, that God and divine creation cannot be part of any truly scientific theory because both involve "unconditioned" realities, while science can only deal with conditioned realities - in the world, everything affects everything else, but the traditional view, found even in Spinoza, is that God is free of any external causal influences. Similarly, Kant can be a phenomenal determinist with science yet simultaneously allow for free will, and that in a way that will not be entirely explicable to us - a virtue when the very idea of a rational and purposive free will, and not just arbitrary choices, has involved obscurities that no one has been able to illuminate. Kant's theory prevents psychological explanations for behavior, however illuminating, being used to excuse moral responsibility and accountability.

5.8 Phenomena And Noumena

In clear distinction from Berkeley and Hume, Kant held that anything that appears, as a phenomenon is not individual's, but a phenomenon which is of superindividual consciousness. The phenomenon is independent of any empirical individual subject, but depends upon the subject in general, the Transcendental Subject. We are never able to recognize things in themselves. Any quality, which is to belong to the thing in itself, can never be known to us through senses. At the same time, anything, which is given in Time, is not the thing in itself: In other words, what we intuitively recognize ourselves by reflection, is how we appear as a phenomenon, and not how we really are. The empirical Reality of Space and Time, i.e., to limit the validity of Space and Time to the phenomenal world, does not destroy the certainty of our cognition of experience. The certainty of our cognition is the same, whether Space and Time as the forms of our empirical intuition belong to the thing in itself or to the transcendental subjectivity.

According to Kant, there is no doubt that something corresponds to a phenomenon and affects our senses. The concept of phenomenon refers to something other than the phenomenon itself, i.e., indicates the existence of something which is independent of senses. However, this thing in itself is unknowable. Therefore, any phenomenon is objective and the phenomenal world constitutes the objective world. In this sense, Kant held objectivity to be synonymous with universal validity.
To Kant, *Phenomena* are the appearances, which constitute our experience; *noumena* are the (presumed) things themselves, which constitute reality. All of our synthetic *a priori* judgments apply only to the phenomenal realm, not the noumenal. (It is only at this level, with respect to what we can experience, that we are justified in imposing the structure of our concepts onto the objects of our knowledge.) Since the thing in itself (*Ding an sich*) would by definition be entirely independent of our experience of it, we are utterly ignorant of the noumenal realm. Hence, according to Kant's, the most fundamental laws of nature, like the truths of mathematics, are knowable precisely because they make no effort to describe the world as it really is but rather prescribes the structure of the world as we experience it. By applying the pure forms of sensible intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding, we achieve a systematic view of the phenomenal realm but learn nothing of the noumenal realm. *Maths* and *science* are certainly true *of the phenomena*, only *metaphysics* claims to instruct us about the *noumena*.

Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories as pure concepts of the understanding applicable *a priori* to every possible experience, but these these regulative principles really true. Are there substances? Does every event have a cause? Do all things interact? Given that we must suppose them in order to have any experience, do they obtain in the world itself? To these further questions, Kant firmly refused to offer any answer.

Kant's theory does all things that seem appropriate for a non-reductionistic philosophical system and that later philosophy has had trouble doing *at all*. Kant's approach is also comparative because of the similar ancient Buddhist philosophical distinction between conditioned realities, which mostly means the world of experience, and unconditioned realities, which interestingly include, not only the sphere of salvation, *Nirvana*, but also space, which of course for Kant was a form imposed *a priori* on experience by the mind. Kantian transcendental idealism is equally attended by empirical realism. How Kant can be certain that reason connects us directly to things-in-themselves is an question that he cannot answer.

All the Transcendental Deduction Kant aimed at was showing that particular concepts, like causality or substance, are "necessary conditions for the possibility of
experience”. If successful, the Deduction limits the application of the concepts to experience, but doesn’t help when he turns to morality and the "Postulates of Practical Reason". There his basic, but unjustified, theory of reason emerges. This shortcoming is what was directly addressed and answered by Jacob Fries, whose epistemology thus could save the generality of Kant's theory without falling back, like Hegel, into speculative metaphysics. That Kant’s theory is one of empirical realism is difficult to understand. Since phenomena are undoubtedly mental contents, a point repeatedly stressed by Kant, it is natural and easy to infer from this a Cartesian "transcendental realism", according to which "real" objects, which are not mental contents, are things that we do not experience.

A transcendental realism clearly contradicts Kant's transcendental idealism, but we can still be left thinking that what we really have is an empirical (subjective) idealism with a kind of transcendental agnosticism - we don't know transcendent Cartesian objects, but they are the real objects (the Greek ontós ónta, "beingly beings") The lack of clear settlement in this area of basic ontology is the most intractable problem in Kant's philosophy. The situation, however, is not unique to Kant. Something very similar can be found in Chinese T'ien-t'ai Buddhism (Japanese Tendai). There we find the doctrine of the "three truths" of "Emptiness" (neither existence nor non-existence nor both nor neither), "conventional existence", and "the Middle". "Emptiness" is rather like Kantian things-in-themselves where "dialectical illusion" is revealed by the Antinomies (a device similar to that employed by Nagarjuna, c.200 AD); "conventional existence" is empirical realism; and "the Middle" the Buddhist reconciliation of the two - not a Hegelian "synthesis" because no absolute knowledge is produced to overcome the inconceivability of Emptiness. The T'ien-t'ai "Middle", however consistent with the paradoxes of Buddhist philosophy, is not a marked improvement over the balancing act in which Kant himself leaves us.

Schopenhauer simplified the problem by completely eliminating individuality from the thing-in-itself. It only existed in space, the principium individuationis. That, however, also eliminated any possibility of individual immortality, which Kant thought was rather important. I do not think, indeed, that much progress has been made beyond that. Something new is required, as suggested in The Origin of Value in a Transcendent Function, "Ontological Undecidability," and "A New Kant-Friesian System of
Metaphysics." If neither subject nor object, internal nor external, is ontologically fundamental, then we can stop worrying about in which place the real things really are, and the threat of either transcendental realism or empirical idealism disappears. That brings us back to the datum of morality.

Indeed, Kant's whole system does seem to come down to the "starry heavens above and the moral law within" If the existence of morality is as evident as the existence of physical objects, then Kant's dualism (empirical and transcendental) is required. If the existence of morality is not so evident, as with Nietzsche and currently nihilism, then there seems to be nothing left to motivate Kant's concern with transcendent objects. But something that Kant overlooks is the Platonic overtone of his own famous statement. The "starry heavens" are especially striking because they are beautiful. Most people see them, not as factual objects of science, but as things of awe, wonder, mystery, and beauty. Unfortunately, Kant does not have the aesthetic realism of Plato and Schopenhauer. To Plato, the beauty is a clue to the transcendent; but Kant decided that only morality played that part. This only reinforces Kant's moralism and weakens his overall theory of value, let alone the metaphysics into which that fits.

The hope of fixing the loose ends of transcendental idealism, and of giving morality itself a credible realistic basis, lies back in the consideration of empirical realism. The unresolved paradox of a "realism" that was also a phenomenalism is the root of the greater difficulties. If objects are immanent in experience but independent in their existence, then clearly there is a transcendent aspect to them, however that is construed. God, freedom, and immorality are not actually essential to that, and Schopenhauer did not believe in any of them, but Schopenhauer also overlooked Kant's analysis of "conditioned" versus "unconditioned" objects. Even a physical object, the universe, passes beyond experience and generates metaphysical paradoxes (the Antinomy of space and time), in so far as it is, in its entirety, an unconditioned whole. All these matters in Kant's thought are still open for clarification and development.

Despite, but also because of, the paradoxes of his thought, much of philosophy in the Twentieth Century has been ill conceived knock-offs of Kant's theory. The idea that the mind produces the world it knows conspicuously turns up in Wittgenstein's theory of language and now with tedious, endless repetition in "post-modern" theories that see all
reality as "socially constructed" on the basis of no more than "power" relationships. These all produce a fundamental paradox that was avoided by Kant, for they are all relativistic and subjectivist denials that knowledge even exists, which nevertheless maintain that this circumstance is a fact that can be known and demonstrated with some certainty -- though the "edifying" version of this recognizes the paradox by not trying such a demonstration, while still expecting us to accept the conclusion.

5 9 Conception And Perception

Most important is the confusion that results from Kant mixing together two entirely different theories in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). The first theory is that the fundamental activity of the mind, called "synthesis", is an activity of thought that applies certain concepts to a previously given perceptual datum from experience. It is upon this theory that the Critique of Pure Reason was planned with its fundamental division between the "Transcendental Aesthetic", about the conditions of perception (empirical "intuition"), and the "Transcendental Logic", about the conditions of thought. Thus, Kant still says, as late as page 91 of the first edition ("A"), 11 "But since intuition [Anschauung] stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearances [Erscheinungen] would none the less present objects to our intuition" (A 90-91, Norman Kemp Smith translation, 1929, St Martin's, 1965)

However, right in the middle of his subsequent argument for why certain concepts would be necessary and known a priori with respect to experience 12, Kant realized that "synthesis" would have to produce, not just a structure of thought, but the entire structure of consciousness within which perception also occurs. Thus he says, "What is first given to us is appearance. When combined with consciousness [Bewuβtsein], it is called perception [Wahrnehmung]." 13 It is the structure of consciousness that turns "appearances" into objects and perceptions, without which they would be nothing. Consequently Kant made synthesis a function of imagination rather than thought, as a bridge between thought and perception, though this creates its own confusions. This move occurred because Kant hit upon the idea that synthesis produced the unity that we actually find in "apperception", i.e. in the unity of consciousness. Synthesis therefore brings things into consciousness, making it possible for us to subsequently recognize that our consciousness exists and that there are things in it. These were all revolutionary ideas, exploring both the logical and the psychological principles on which the complex whole
of consciousness could be generated, but they tore up Kant's original plan for his system so much that he was never quite comfortable with them. He then tried to paper over his most daring insights when he came to write both the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (1783) and the changes that he introduced into the second edition of the Critique itself (1787, "B")

The path to resolving the paradoxes of Kant's theory opens up with two basic realizations: (1) Kant always believed that reason connected us directly to things-in-themselves, and (2) Kant's system is not a Cartesian theory of hidden, transcendent objects, but a version of empirical realism, that we are directly acquainted with real objects. Kant's notion that reason connects us directly to things-in-themselves does not allow for speculative metaphysics as practiced by the Rationalists because reason alone does not determine any positive content of knowledge. For that some datum is required. According to Kant we possess two sources of input that can serve as such a datum. [1] Physical sensation: Physical sensation precipitates an application of reason to experience, producing the perception of phenomenal objects. [2] Sense of moral duty: The supreme rational expression of this is science. The sense of moral duty precipitates an application of reason that generates ethics and religion. The supreme rational expression of this is the "Postulates of Practical Reason", the "Ideas" of God, freedom, and immortality which, to Kant, are required as conditions of the Moral Law

Kant thought that he could tackle problems at once by means of his 'Copernican revolution in philosophy', since he compared his innovation to the 'first thoughts of Copernicus'. This involves reversing the usual way of viewing cognition and instead of thinking of our knowledge as conforming to a realm of objects, we think of objects as conforming to our ways of knowing. The latter include 'forms of sensibility', through which objects are given to the mind in sensory experience, and pure concepts or categories, through which they are thought. [In Kant's words, "Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind" Bertrand Russell expressed it thus: "the outer world causes only the matter of sensation, but our own mental apparatus orders this matter in space and time, and supplies the concepts by means of which we understand experience"] Since objects must appear to us in accordance with these sensible forms in order to be known, it follows that we can know them only as they appear, not as they may be in themselves. For Kant human knowledge is limited to appearances or phenomena,
whereas things-in-themselves or noumena are thinkable but not actually knowable. Kant termed this doctrine transcendental idealism; and, given this idealism, which he distinguished sharply from that of Berkeley, the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge of objects of possible experience is easily explicable, since such objects must necessarily conform to the conditions under which they can become objects for us.

This whole project assumes, however, that the human mind is, in fact, endowed with such conditions, and demonstrating this is the main task of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic. In the former, Kant argued that space and time are subjective forms of human sensibility, through which the manifold of sense is given to the mind, rather than either self-subsisting realities (Newton) or relations between self-subsisting things (Leibnitz). He also argued that only this conception of space is capable of accounting for the possibility of geometry. In the latter, he first tried to establish by means of a transcendental deduction that certain pure concepts or categories, including substance and causality, are universally valid with respect to possible experience, since they are necessary conditions of the empirical thought of an object. On the basis of these results, he then argued for a set of synthetic a priori principles regarding nature, considered as the sum total of objects of possible experience. Prominent among these are the principles that substance in nature remains permanent throughout all change and that every alteration has a cause.

Immediate consequence of Kant's limitation of knowledge is to rule out virtually all traditional metaphysics, which is concerned precisely with such 'transcendent' questions as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will, which cannot be resolved by any appeal to possible experience. Kant spells out the negative implications of this result in his Transcendental Dialectic, which provides a systematic account of metaphysical illusion. Nevertheless, this limitation also enables him to resolve the problem of the antinomies. Since the appearance of contradiction arises from considering the spatio-temporal world as if it were a self-contained realm of things-in-themselves, once this assumption is rejected, it can be seen first that the sensible world is neither finite nor infinite in the relevant respects and second that it is possible to reconcile the causal determinism operative in nature with the freedom required for morality. Although everything in the realm of appearance, including human actions, is subject to the category of causality and thus causally determined, it remains at
least conceivable that human beings, considered as things-in-themselves our noumena, are free, and this conceivability, is sufficient to morality by Kant

The differences between reality as seen in science and reality as seen in morality and religion reveal that there are aspects to existence that are not revealed by either datum alone. The two sources are also unequal in the magnitude and ultimate significance of their content. What science can investigate and know is apparently all but endless, but it still leaves us wondering, "What is it all for?" Morality and religion have a far more limited rational content, returning to many of the same issues over and over again, but such issues happen to include, not just the questions about how to live, but the ultimate questions about the meaning of life and existence ("Life, the Universe and Everything", in the memorable formula of Douglas Adams). Our moral datum does not lead to direct, positive knowledge of things that we are able to conceive, like God, leads Kant to characterize his system as transcendental idealism, that we have a subjective representation of such things, without the real intuition that we have of physical objects. The reality revealed by morality is thus for Kant a matter of faith (Glaube), an inference from the Moral Law which is itself present to us with an inexplicable authority. Kantian transcendental idealism is equally attended by empirical realism. How Kant can be certain that reason connects us directly to things-in-themselves is a question that Kant is unable to answer. That Kant's theory is one of empirical realism is difficult to understand and easily forgotten. Since phenomena are undoubtedly mental contents, a point repeatedly stressed by Kant, it is natural and easy to infer from this a Cartesian "transcendental realism", according to which "real" objects, which are not mental contents, are things that we do not experience.

How synthetic a priori knowledge possible? According to Kant, all the laws and knowledge of sciences are stated in its synthetic a priori form. However, there are differences between the pure mathematics - pure natural sciences and metaphysics. In the case of the former, we can ask only how they are possible at all. For we have evidence (intuition and categories) while in the latter, we must ask, in addition to how, therefore, if synthetic a priori knowledge possible at all. For we do not have evidence, but all those propositions in metaphysics have been disputed. How is pure mathematics possible? In the transcendental Aesthetics. The Critique of Senses. It is possible because there are Pure A Prior Intuition. How is pure physics possible? In the transcendental Analytic.
The Critique of Understanding: It is possible because there are Categories (Concepts of Understanding) How is metaphysics as natural faculty possible? In the transcendental Dialectics: The Critique of Reason: It is possible because there are Concepts of Reason (God, Immortality and Freedom) How is metaphysics as a science possible? In the transcendental Methodology: i) It is possible as Metaphysics of Nature or Metaphysics of Knowledge by teaching the proper uses of categories and delimiting the scope. ii) It is possible as Practical Sciences a) What ought I do? In Ethics. b) What may I hope? Philosophy of Religion

5.10 Deduction Of The Categories

Since (as Hume had noted) individual images are perfectly separable as they occur within the sensory manifold, connections between them can be drawn only by the knowing subject, in which the principles of connection are to be found. As in mathematics, so in science the synthetic a priori judgments must derive from the structure of the understanding itself. Kant called the Pure Concepts of Understanding "Categories" and derived them from the forms (kinds) of judgment, where the subject and the Predicate are variously unified. Therefore, Kant called Categories the Concepts of Conjecture.

5.10 1 Kinds Of Judgement

1. Quantity

(1) Universal- Unity
(2) Particular- Plurality
(3) Individual - Totality

2. Quality
(1) Affirmative - Reality
(2) Negative - Negation
(3) Infinite - Limitation

3. Relation
(1) Categorical- Inherence and Substance
(2) Hypothetical - Causality and Dependence
(3) Disjunctive - Community
4 Modality

(1) Problematic - Possibility and Impossibility
(2) Assertorical - Existence and Non-Existence
(3) Apodeictic - Necessity and Accident

"Among" each of these four groups, the third one is resulted from the synthesis of the preceding two. This observation Kant called "cute". This will gain an important effect as the Dialectic development in the German Idealism. The first six Categories of Quantity and Quality are sometimes called Mathematical Categories, while the second six are called Dynamic Categories. The mathematical categories are related to the objects of pure or empirical intuition, while the dynamic categories are applied to the beings of the objects. The most important one for developing Kant's transcendental philosophy was the category of Causality. Hume denied the objective validity of Causality because it originated from experience and was considered as developed by our psychological law of association. Kant agreed with Hume that anything derived from experience does not have objective validity. However, Kant held that Causality does not derive from experience, but pure, a priori form of Understanding. Thus Causality is necessary and universally valid.

Kant named this the Transcendental Deduction, which the demand of the right is just. Kant wanted to demonstrate the justness (correctness and appropriateness) the right of the objective validity of Categories. There is the other kind of Deduction, which is called Empirical. It is to demonstrate how Categories are obtained factually from experience and its reflection. To derive Categories from the kinds of judgment called Kant the Metaphysical Deduction. Kant supposed that any intelligible thought can be expressed in judgments of these kinds. But then it follows that any thinkable experience must be understood in these ways, and we are justified in projecting this entire way of thinking outside ourselves, as the inevitable structure of any possible experience. According to Kant, most of our fundamental convictions about the natural world derive from these concepts. The most general principles of natural science are not empirical generalizations from what we have experienced, but synthetic a priori judgments about what we could experience, in which these concepts provide the crucial connectives.
5 11 Cause And Effect

Kant\textsuperscript{15} stated that his recollection of David Hume awoke him from his dogmatic slumber. Hume argued against the \textit{a priori} justification of causal judgments on the grounds that it is impossible to foretell how objects have behaved prior to having experienced them. One would have to invent an effect, and such invention is arbitrary.

"The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and can never be discovered in it. \ldots And as the first imagination or invention of a particular effect, in all natural operations, is arbitrary, where we consult not experience; so must we also esteem the supposed tie or connection between cause and effect, which binds them together, and renders it impossible that any other effect could result from the operation of that cause" \textsuperscript{16}

Next, Hume launched a two-pronged attack against the \textit{a posteriori} justification of causal inference. The two arguments are directed respectively against the \textit{universality} and the \textit{necessity} of judgments concerning causal connections (This distinction accords well with Kant's distinction in the Aesthetic between two marks of the \textit{a priori}).

[1] The first prong is the celebrated attack on the justification of induction. We are never entitled to infer from the fact that a certain pattern of succession has always been observed to the conclusion that the pattern holds in all cases, including those which are unobserved. To do so requires the assumption of the uniformity of nature, which itself is an inductive generalization standing in need of justification. "It is impossible \ldots that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded upon the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular, that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue to do so" \textsuperscript{17}

[2] The second prong is directed against necessity. Hume claimed that the only necessary connections of which human beings have any knowledge are those found in mathematics. In all "matters of fact", the only connection we can find is made in the imagination. After repeated exposure to a pattern of succession, we expect the customary pattern to repeat itself yet again. There arises a feeling of connection, which is the origin...
of the idea of a necessary connection. "When one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning, which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object, \textit{Cause}; the other \textit{Effect}. We suppose that there is some connection between them, some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity".\footnote{18}

Hume's argument is as follows. As noted above, one can never observe in a single instance what event will follow what other event, given that one has never experienced the first before. This can be seen experimentally, in cases in which a person is confronted with something entirely new to him. After experiencing a repeated pattern of succession of kinds of events, we predict that the pattern will repeat itself at every future time. But there is no difference, in our perception of the events themselves, between the first observation and any of the later ones, except that they have repeated themselves. We can find nothing in the events which can be called "cause", "power", "force", or what have you. So our expectation must have its origin in a customary transition in the mind. Hence, we must replace the objective definition of cause, "an object, followed by another, and where all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second" with a subjective definition "an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other."\footnote{19} To Kant, this is tantamount to making causality an illusion.

In the \textit{Prolegomena}, Kant stated that Hume "\textit{justly maintains that we cannot comprehend by reason the possibility of causality, that is, of the reference of the existence of one thing to the existence of another which is necessitated by the former}. . . . \textit{But I am very far from holding these concepts to be derived merely from experience, and the necessity represented in them to be imaginary and a mere illusion produced in us by long habit. On the contrary, I have amply shown that they and the principles derived from them are firmly established a priori before all experience and have their undoubted objective value, though only with regard to experience}"\footnote{20} The proof is found in the Second Analogy in the \textit{Critique}.

In Introduction to \textit{Prolegomena} Kant described the concept of cause, on Hume's treatment, as "a bastard of the imagination, impregnated by experience".\footnote{21} He found the consequences of Hume's arguments to be altogether destructive of metaphysics, and accused Hume of overlooking "the positive injury which results if reason be deprived of
its most important prospects".22 Though "a great thinker", Hume was "hasty and mistaken" in his argument.23 Kant even indulged in speculation about how Hume's thinking would have been different had he recognized that mathematical judgments are not only a priori but synthetic. "The good company into which metaphysics would thus have been brought would have saved it from the danger of a contemptuous ill-treatment, for the thrust intended for it must have reached mathematics, which was not and could not have been Hume's intention. Thus that acute man would have been led into considerations which must needs be similar to those that now occupy us, but which would have gained inestimably by his inimitably elegant style".24

The experience of events requires not only awareness of their intrinsic features but also that they be regarded as occurring one after another, in an invariable regularity determined by the concept of causality. (E.g., in order to experience the flowering of this azalea as an event, I must not only perceive the blossoms as they now appear but must also regard them as merely the present consequence of a succession of prior organic developments.) Thus, Kant25 responded to Hume's skepticism by maintaining that the concept of cause is one of the synthetic conditions we determine for ourselves prior to all experience.

5.12 The Limits Of Reason26

As constitutive of the real nature of the world synthetic a priori judgments which properly serve as regulative principles governing our experience can never be shown to have any force. Pure reason inevitably reaches for what it cannot grasp. What most clearly is not possible is any legitimate synthetic a priori judgment about things in themselves. Limitation to phenomena the only thing that justifies the application of regulative principles in mathematics and natural science. Sensible intuition and the understanding both deal with the conditions under which experience is possible. The whole point of speculative metaphysics is to transcend experience entirely in order to achieve knowledge of the noumenal realm. Only the faculty of reason is relevant here, but its most crucial speculative conclusions, its deepest convictions about the self, the world, and god, are all drawn illegitimately.

According to Kant indeed, what is possible is, what we are bound by our very nature as rational beings to do—is to think of the noumenal realm as if the speculative principles were true (whether or not they are). By the nature of reason itself, we are
required to suppose our own existence as substantial beings, the possibility of our free action in a world of causal regularity, and the existence of god. The absence of any formal justification for these notions makes it impossible for us to claim that we know them to be true, but it can in no way diminish the depth of our belief that they are. According to Kant, then, the rational human faculties lead us to the very boundaries of what can be known, by clarifying the conditions under which experience of the world as we know it is possible. But beyond those boundaries our faculties are useless. The shape of the boundary itself, as evidenced in the Paralogisms and Antinomies, naturally impels us to postulate that the unknown does indeed have certain features, but these further speculations are inherently unjustifiable.

Therefore, the only legitimate, "scientific" metaphysics that the future may hold, Kant held, would be a thoroughly critical, non-speculative examination of the bounds of pure reason, a careful description of what we can know accompanied by a clear recognition that our transcendental concepts (however useful they may seem) are entirely unreliable as guides to the nature of reality.

5.13 Transcendental Idealism And Empirical Realism

![Square of opposition]

[1] [2]
According to Kant the obscurity is when it comes to the theory of empirical realism and transcendental idealism is largely due to his terminology and the difficulties of reconciling parts of his theory. Since "transcendental" is contrasted with "empirical", the two terms are epistemological and mean "independent of (i.e. transcending) experience" and "immanent in experience". Since "realism" is contrasted with "idealism", those two terms are ontological and mean "independent of my existence" and "dependent on my existence". Berkeley was for Kant the characteristic "idealist", and undoubtedly an empiricist, while Descartes was a "realist", believing commonsensically that objects exist independent of us, but who also thought that we could only know their essences through "clear and distinct" innate ideas, not experience. This made Descartes a "transcendental" realist. In Transcendental conditions are to be a priori for the knowledge is indeed the object of experience, but the conditions of its possibility must not be come from experience, but independent of experience equals to a priori. Thus transcendental knowledge is the knowledge about a priori way of knowledge and its relationship to its object of experience.

"Ich nenne alle Erkenntnis transcendental, die sich nicht, sowohl mit Gegenstanden, sondern mit unserer Erkenntnissart von Gegenstanden, insofern diese a priori moglich sein soll, uberhaupt beschäftigt." [21]

(I call all the knowledge transcendental, which is not concerned with objects, but with our way of knowledge of objects, as long as this knowledge is to be a priori possible.)

If we construct a square of opposition using Kant's two distinctions, we have some trouble in it. A strictly constructed square of opposition would look like the figure [1]. "Transcendental" (e) is the negation of "empirical" (c), and "idealism" (r) is the negation of "realism" (r). The figure, which we get, however, does not work for Kant's theory. Transcendental idealism and empirical realism would be contradictories and so cannot both be true, as Kant requires. Similarly, transcendental realism and empirical idealism are also contradictories and so cannot both be false, as Kant requires. The features of the square of opposition that we would expect Kant's theory to conform to would be that "contraries", the two upper members, are both false, while the "sub contraries", the two lower members, are both true. If we want such a square of...
opposition, it will have to be rearranged without regard for the strict logical properties of
the terms.

When we do that, we then get a square like figure [2]. In this the definition of
"transcendental idealism" has actually been left out. Kant's position, although
terminologically embracing the two lower members, is really well defined by only one of
them, empirical realism. However, saying that the objects of knowledge are immanent in
experience and independent of our existence involves a paradox. How can something be
independent in existence and yet dependent or immanent in our experience, our
representation?

"... The representation alone must make the object possible... representation in itself does
not produce its object in so far as existence is concerned...".28

The direct acquaintance of common sense with objects is the part of what Kant
appears to mean by his empirical realism, while the paradoxical, "in me but not of me",
metaphysics is what he means by "transcendental idealism." In strict terms,
"transcendental idealism" means, epistemically, "independent of experience", but
"idealism" means, ontologically, "dependent on subjective (my) existence", then
"transcendental idealism" would have to mean knowledge of objects that are dependent
on my existence but independent of my experience. This seems to be, not just a paradox,
but also a contradiction, since if something exists as an epiphenomenon of myself, it
hardly seems like it could be independent of my experience. Berkeley's principle was "to
be is to be perceived", but this kind of "transcendental idealism" would require that
something is because of my existence but then is not perceived. This might work on the
basis of Spinoza's metaphysics, where my existence is God's existence, but God's
knowledge far transcends mine. Nevertheless, since anything is God, God is part of my
experience after all.

What this peculiar meaning of "transcendental idealism" reveals, along with the
failure of the strict square of opposition, are the loosest ends of Kant's thought. The
terminology of "transcendental", "empirical", "realism", and "idealism" does not seem
well ordered for Kant's purposes, in part because those purposes are unsettled. The
contradiction of the strict rendering of "transcendental idealism" might be resolved if we
say that there is simply no knowledge in this case, which is what Kant says about things-in-themselves - the soul certainly depends on my existence but is not part of my experience because I don’t have any knowledge of it. But then Kant doesn’t want to go all the way with that. Morality doesn’t fit into empirical reality, but then may be that isn’t too bad, since morality is really "regulative" rather than "constitutive" (of metaphysical entities). What is bad are "God, freedom, and immorality", which totally upset the applecart. If there are such things, they are about transcendent objects, which, at least in one case, are independent of my existence. If they are only objects of "faith", we want to know how that is motivated, and if they are motivated as necessary conditions of the Moral Law, then it seems like they would be as much matters of knowledge as the necessary conditions of experience, i.e. causality, substance, etc.

"Transcendental idealism" is thus profoundly different from other forms of "idealism," like the "subjective idealism" of Berkeley (what Kant called "empirical idealism") or the "objective idealism" of Hegel, both of which offer speculative certainties about the ultimate nature of things, which Kant does not do. The nature of things that we can know about concretely, for Kant, is revealed by science.

5.14 Intuition Mysticism

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**Intuitionism**

- post-reflective
- pre-reflective
- Anselmian
- self-evident
- first principles
- concrete
- abstract
- infallible
- belief

- immanent
- mundane
- sensible
- perceptual
- belief

- transcendent
- mystical

- identical
- independent

- object

- God, Roman Catholic
- Orthodox Islamic
- Dharmic Vedanta

- insubstantial
- substantial

- Buddhist
- Empiricist

- personal
- impersonal

- Brahman, qualified
- Advaita Vedanta

- part
- whole

- self-caused
- uncaused

[God, no particular doctrinal identity]

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**Kant-Friesian Intuition**

- mediate
- immediate

- meaning
- object

- Intuition
- Anschauung

- sensible
- intellectual

- passive
- active

- pure
- empirical

- space
- time

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Kant's term "intellectual intuition" is thrown around rather casually in post-Kantian philosophy; the usage rarely conforms to Kant's meaning. Kant contrasts "intellectual" with "sensible" intuition (Anschauung) on the basis of the active or passive role of the object. Thus, while objects are presented to a (passive) sensible intuition, objects are created by an (active) intellectual intuition. To Kant himself, this meant that only God would have an intellectual intuition. In the history of philosophy, the "active intellect" of Aristotle and Neo-Platonism may be the antecedent of the idea of intellectual intuition, though this would tend to blur the difference between the self and God, since it looks like there is only one active intellect - which was precisely the point for a system of mysticism like Neo-Platonism.

Kant, had no interest in mysticism, famously pillorying the Swedish spiritualist, Emanuel Swedenborg. Any kind of mysticism is going to be a kind of immediate knowledge that is an intuitive understanding, i.e. the opposite of a discursive understanding, where an intuitive understanding is immediate and unarticulated, while a discursive understanding is mediate and articulated. There is going to be no intuitive understanding in Kantian philosophy - i.e. no understanding that stands on its own as knowledge, an understanding that is a ground for substantive truths. An intuitive understanding which is not knowledge is the common and essential experience of insight which is ordinarily and non-technically called "intuition", e.g. "My intuition is that murder is wrong" (in German, Nelson called it Intuition in contrast to Kantian Anschauung). This kind of "intuition" is not evidentiary, i.e. it doesn't prove anything. In Socratic/Platonic terms, it is only opinion. It can only be justified when analyzed, reduced to discursive understanding, and grounded accordingly. Were ordinary "intuitions" evidentiary, and so items of knowledge (Erkenntnisse, cognitions), then this would be "intuitionism", the theory that knowledge is grounded by such intuitions. The self-evidence of Aristotelian first principles is a theory of this kind, with the provision that intuitive self-evidence follows, rather than precedes, discursive understanding. Other forms of intuitionism may claim intuitive understanding prior to discursive, if the latter is considered even possible.

Mysticism is a form of intuitionism, not all intuitionism is mysticism. The difference, again, will be in the objects. Mysticism is intuitive knowledge of transcendent
concrete objects, i.e. not the phenomenal or material concrete objects of ordinary perception. The mystic sees things that are not part of ordinary experience. In Kantian terms, transcendent objects cannot be understood because they cannot be consistently articulated. For Kant, a theory of transcendent objects ("dialectic") generates antinomies. If a Kantian theory allowed for mystical knowledge, it would have to be unanalyzable, unrenderable into a system of discursive understanding of transcendent objects. This is rather like what many mystics say, since they gain knowledge, which is ineffable and inexpressible. On the other hand, mystics also claim to intuitively derive knowledge, which is analyzable and expressible, although only intuitively justified.

The intuitive apprehension of abstract objects does not rise to the level of mysticism, since abstract objects do not have independent existence - except when substantialized in Platonism, a theory rarely followed since. Intuitions of abstract objects concern meaning, and in general the ordinary sense of "intuition" (Intuition) applies to this. Such intuitions, when analyzed, are the basis of analytic truths, but whether the meanings apply to existence is a separate question (pace St. Anslem and Descartes), which requires an evidentiary basis. The mystical claim would have to be that an intuitively apprehended abstract object is also intuitively known to apply to existence, in a way, analyzable (as in Anselm's "ontological argument") or unanalyzable, that transcends ordinary perception and experience.

An important distinction in mystical claims will be between objects which are independent and which are identical to the subject of mystical knowledge. This itself is an analyzable characteristic of mystical intuition. In monotheistic religions, God will tend to be seen as independent. This was not an open question, and the Christian mystic always ran the risk that contrary truths learned through mystical intuition might conflict with Orthodoxy - but the Catholic Church never denied that such an avenue of knowledge existed. In Judaism and Islām, with looser institutional authority over doctrine, the drift of claims towards extinction of self and identity with God is conspicuous. Some efforts were made in Islām to suppress this, like the execution of al-Hallāj (in 922), but the precedent was powerful. An artifact of this in Judaism remained with the philosopher To Spinoza, sense of identity with God is crystal clear, but who cannot properly be considered a mystic, since his God is not transcendent, but immanent, identical with all the objects of perception, and who does not claim intuitive knowledge beyond the
minimal Aristotelian claims about first principles. Nevertheless, Spinoza retains a strong mystical affect, the "intellectual love of God", which helps explain the meaning to him of a system that otherwise is rationalistic and seems devoid of religious appeal.

The distinction between independent and identical objects can be seen to overlap Kant's between intellectual and sensible intuition. Only a sensible intuition could relate one to an independent transcendent object, since such a thing clearly cannot be created by one's knowing it. However, if the mystic is identical to the transcendent object, this could allow for an intellectual intuition, depending on the metaphysics of the object. It is possible for God's existence to be presented to him passively, in which case he would have sensible knowledge of himself; or, God may actually create his own existence, like that of anything else, merely by knowing it. This fits Spinoza's principle of a substance, namely God (Spinoza's only substance), being self-caused. There, if the mystic is identical to God, who also creates everything else through intellectual intuition, all mystical knowledge will be of the nature of an intellectual intuition.

The natures of transcendent objects, to the extent that they can be theorized at all, are matters of rational Kant-Friesian metaphysics (after the fashion of Kant's "postulates of practical reason", which resolve some antinomies); and Kant-Friesian metaphysics tends to dismiss more substantive doctrine from historic religions (e.g. the Trinity, transubstantiation, etc.). Otto's famous theory of "numinosity" is about a property, and so an abstraction, whose existence is certified by its presence in the objects of experience, but which in an important way is not a natural property, since it is invisible to science and is unrelated to mundane utility. The numinosity of God is natural to Otto, but his God comes from the Kantian Ideas, besides historic religions, and divine numinosity derives from no more than a phenomenology of such religions.

So is there mysticism? But there is no philosophical mysticism in the sense that philosophy could, as the Neo-Platonists believed, certify, verify, and theorize the antinomical choices between mystical intuitions as intellectual or sensible, of independent or identical objects, of a divine substance (personal or impersonal) or ultimate Emptness, cannot be resolved on the evidence of mystical knowledge, since the knowledge of different mystics confirms each of these and, as Hume would say, the evidence of one tends to refute the evidence of the other. This in itself is one of the most
important features of human existence, since it leaves us without any rational certainty that there are transcendent objects at all. The mystic may just be hallucinating (or lying), whether beholding the Virgin Mary or visualizing the Pure Land. As considered elsewhere, however, this simply leaves us faced with the choices of the right and the good without any confidence in the ulterior considerations of reward and punishment. Behind our veil of ignorance, it is character and benevolence that are proven.

5.15 Antinomy Space And Time

Kant argued in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the first Critique, Space and time are "pure forms of sensible intuition" under which we perceive what we do. Understanding mathematics in this way makes it possible to rise above an old controversy between rationalists and empiricists regarding the very nature of space and time. Leibniz had maintained that space and time are merely a product of our minds and not the intrinsic features of world itself. Kant now declared both of them to be correct, Space and Time do derive from our minds, but are absolute. As synthetic a prior judgments, the truths of mathematics are both informative and necessary.

Pure Intuitions. According to Kant's transcendental Aesthetics, Space and Time do not exist by themselves, i.e., they are not real things existing outside of our mind, even if they were not intuited, Space and Time are not qualities, nor relations belonging to the things in themselves. Space and Time are the forms of our empirical intuition and are rooted in the subjective structure of our mind. Once from Space and Time those, which are thought of by Understanding by concepts, are stripped way and those, which belong to the senses as well, we are left with two forms of empirical intuition and they themselves are intuition at the same time. These intuitions (Space and Time) are pure, since they are capable of becoming objects of our inquiry quite apart and independent from our empirical intuition. They (Space and Time) are also a priori, because these intuitions as the forms of empirical intuitions proceed from all empirical intuitions, as long as they are the subjective conditions in which something can be an object of our empirical intuition. Space and Time are the forms of our intuition. Our ideas are in regards to their origin either pure or empirical. Our ideas are in terms of kind either intuitions or concepts. Kant tried to demonstrate that Space and Time are neither of experience, nor of concepts, but they are pure Intuition, by the five proofs. Kant named these the Metaphysical Demonstrations (Erörterungen) of Space and Time. These discussions reveal the a priori
nature and intuitiveness of Space and Time. In addition to these, Kant wrote the Transcendental Discussions of Space and Time. Kant attempted that only by means of Space and Time being pure intuition, the possibility of the synthetic a priori knowledge is explained.

5.15.1 Metaphysical Demonstrations

1] "Space" is not an empirical concept obtained by abstraction. (Against Locke [abstraction theory], Berkeley [representation theory] and Hume [association theory]: Take for example, a concept of plant is an empirical concept obtained by abstraction of different particular perceptions and memories of different plants.). Any empirical concept obtained from the external senses such as even "next to each other" presupposes the notion of Space (when we conceive of "next to each other", the notion of Space has to be thought already, i.e., prior to (thus as the condition for) the notion of "next to each other".) speaking differently, this means that two things are located at two different spaces. In terms of our idea of inner senses such as simultaneous or successive, Time is not obtained by abstraction or association from our empirical experience, but is prior to (the condition for) the notion of simultaneous or successive. They are possible "within" Time. [This is Eiichi's critical comment: According to Henri Bergson, the great French non- rationalistic philosophy who criticized Kant on the basis of our uncritically accepted notion that we have connection with Space and Spaciality are so strong that we do Spacialize Time. For example, Time may be divisible, but isn't "divisibility" primarily a Space concept? So is our notion of "in". Isn't "before" and "after" also primarily spatial concepts?] Space enables us to have external experience, while Time enables us to have internal experience. Kant said, Space and Time are anticipations of perception and are not the products of our abstraction.

2] The idea (representation) of Space is necessary. We are not able to think of Space without everything in it, but we are not able to disregard Space itself. So is the time. I can think of Time without any phenomenon, but it is not possible to think of any phenomenon without Time. Space and Time are a priori as the conditions for the possibility of phenomena.
3] The idea of *Space is not a universal concept*. It is an individual idea or an intuition. There is only one Space. Each and every particular space is as limited to this one whole Space. In other words, a part is possible in relation to the whole. *So is Time.* There is only one Time and various special times are parts of the whole Time. The Whole is prior to its parts.

4] *Space is infinite.* Space contains in itself infinitely many partial spaces. This is not possible for a universal concept. Various particular trees, for instances, are subsumed ("subsume" is a logical relationship) under a general concept of tree, but the latter does not in itself contain the former as its parts. *So is Time.*

5] The directions such as right, left, above, below, etc. are not logically explainable from the idea of Space. Such time specifications as before or after cannot be conceptually explained from the idea of Time. Space and Time can only felt and understood *by intuition*.

5.15.2 Transcendental Demonstrations

There are four transcendental demonstrations are so called because the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge are proven only on the basis of Space and Time.

1] The synthetic nature of Geometric cognition is demonstrated from Space's being an intuition. If Space is a mere concept (and not an intuition), a proposition, which expands our knowledge about the characters of Space beyond the concept, cannot be analyzed from that concept. The possibility of synthesis and expansion of Geometric knowledge is thus based on Space's being intuited or on the fact that such a proposition may be known true only intuition. The truth of a Geometric proposition (which asserts that the sum of any two lines of a given triangle are larger than the third) can be demonstrated only in intuition. *So is Time.*

2] The apodeicticity of Geometric knowledge is explained from the apriority of intuition of Space. The apodeicticity of Arithmetic knowledge is explained from the apriority of intuition of Time. Should Space and Time be empirical, they do not have necessity. However, both Geometric and Arithmetic propositions are universally valid and necessary true. Thus, Space and Time on which Geometric and Arithmetic knowledge are based on are a priori and therefore, apodictic.
Space and Time's are explained by the conditions from which the possibility of sense perception that mathematical knowledge has the objective reality, i.e., that the mathematic principles are based on Space and Time by means of which our experiences are possible.

Particularly in regard to Time, Change and motion are only possible on the basis of Time. E.g., change is understood in applying two contradictory attributes such as being and non-being to one and the same thing, which cannot be explained by a concept, but by an intuition of Time. Kant pointed out that his philosophy is not idealism, as long as he recognized the existence of "thing in itself".

Hence, from The Empirical Reality, the Transcendental Ideality of Space and Time, and the Irrecognizability of Thing in itself, it is ascertained that the relations which are a priori recognizable in Space and Time are valid to all the possible objects of experience. However, they are valid only to the phenomena and not to the things in themselves. Thus, it is said that Space and Time have the Empirical Reality and the Transcendental Ideality at the same time. Any thing as long as it is an external phenomenon necessarily appears as in Space and Spacial relationship; any phenomenon necessarily is in Time and Temporal relationship. Therefore, it is said that Space and Time are objective to everything, which is given in experience; therefore, Space and Time are empirically real. This is called the Empirical Reality of Space and Time.

However, Space and Time do not have the absolute Reality, because they do not apply to things in themselves, whether as substances or as attributes. For, once we remove Space and Time from actual sensory experience, they disappear (have no reality). In other words, apart from the transcendental subjectivity, Space and Time have no reality, but are ideal. This is called the Transcendental Ideality of Space and Time.

The Analysis of Concepts: What is given to senses needs Space and Time in order to a perception (intuition) or a phenomenon. Intuition needs the synthesis by concepts in order to be an Experience, i.e., a unified cognition of an object. A variety of intuitions are ordered by Space and Time as the a priori forms of intuition. In order for this variety of
intuitions to become an objective cognition, they need to be synthesized in the unity of concepts. While Senses give variety, while Understanding (=concepts) give unity and Intuition consists in "affection," Concept, in "function". Finally it is concluded that the principles of pure understanding follow from conceptual analysis.

5.17 Evaluation

The merit and characteristic difference of Kant's method lies, not simply insetting up tentatively a hypothesis and testing it by admitted facts, but in the comprehensiveness within which he has stated the problem of philosophy, and in the solution he proposes. He began with certain facts and like them he was assisted in making his discovery by observing the failures of his predecessors. This accounts to great extent for peculiarities of his mode of statement. All over through his critique he combines with a statement of his own theory of knowledge a polemic against the theory of others. The union of exposition and criticism makes it extremely difficult to follow the course of his thought. The central concern of Kant's greatest masterpiece, the Critique of Pure Reason, is with the possibility of metaphysics, understood as philosophical knowledge that transcends the bounds of experience. Metaphysics purports to provide necessary truths, which, as such, cannot be based on empirical evidence (their apriority), but which also claim more of their referents than can be derived from an analysis of their concepts. As a result of his reflections on the concept of a world, Kant became convinced that reason inevitably falls into contradiction with itself when it endeavours to 'think the whole', that is, when it ventures beyond experience in order to answer such questions as whether the universe has a beginning in time, limit in space, or first cause, or is, rather, infinite in these respects. The contradiction or antinomy arises because it is possible to construct valid proofs for each of the two conflicting positions: the universe has a beginning in time; the universe has existed for an infinite period of time, etc. He also thought that, if unresolved, this problem would lead to a hopeless skepticism, which he termed the 'euthanasia of pure reason'. Consequently, Kant came to see the 'fate of metaphysics' as crucially dependent on a successful resolution of the antinomies as well as an account of the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge.

Kant was warned by the utter failure of previous dogmatic systems—a failure which he regards Hume as having proved beyond dispute, so far at least as the principle of causality is concerned that the mode of experience must follow a completely new track.
In his own theory Kant starts provisionally from the dualism of knowledge and reality and seek to develop a tree theory by a gradual transformation of the false theory. Adopting the objection made by Hume against the ordinary proof of causality, and experience it, to borrow the language of mathematicians, in its utmost generality he points out that the principle upon which it goes cannot possibly account for the fact or real knowledge.

If known objects, as the dogmatists assumes, are without consciousness, and yet are known as they exist, we must, account for that knowledge, say that we go to them and apprehend them one by one; and also observed that they are permanent, that they undergo changes and act and reacts on eachother. Our knowledge of concrete things and of their succession and coexist is thus resolved into series of particular perceptions, most that we can philosophically bade upon a series of feelings or ideas is a knowledge of particular objects, particular series of event, and particular co-existence. This is what Hume pointed out, so far as the sequence or causal connection of events is concerned. On perception, generalizing Hume, no judgment in regard to the existence of real objects, or of their connection or co-existence, can properly be founded. The affirmation of the reality of objects, or of relations of objects, is something that we add to perception, not something actually given in perception. This leads us to ask whether we are more successful when we attempt to prove permanence, the causal connection, or the interactions of the objects, from conceptions instead of perceptions.

To dogmatists, conceptions are simply ideas in the mind, which are completely separated from the things without the mind. The conception of permanence, the changes and the mutual influence of the substances, are separated by an impassable gulf from the substances themselves. It is evident that from the conception of a substance to the substance itself is impossible to pass. The mere analysis of the conception of substance no more shows that there are real substances in return nature that the analysis of the conception of a hundred entitles me to say that I have a hundred dollar in my pocket. The dogmatists never gets beyond purely analytical or tautological judgments of this kind; the account it gives of the nature of knowledge is such that we cannot understand from. Accepting Hume’s criticism of dogmatism and rejecting its psychological account of the principle of causality, Kant endeavours to show that we can have a synthetical apriori judgment of causality as well as other judgments of the same kind which Hume overlooked.
From the exposition of Kant's philosophy we come to the conclusion that knowledge is in its very constitution purely subjective, ergo relative. Knowledge of things per se (Dinge an sich) is impossible, as long as knowledge remains composed as at present; consequently Ontology, as a science, is impossible. The existence of an external world is a necessary postulate, but its existence is only logically affirmed. Our knowledge, though relative, is certain. We have ideas independent of experience, and these ideas have the character of universality and necessity. Although we are not entitled to conclude that our subjective knowledge is completely true as an expression of the objective fact, yet we are forced to conclude that within its own sphere it is true. The most important result of the critical account of knowledge is to establish the correlativity of the inner world and the outer world, as both alike only existing in relation to our intelligence. Hence with the veracity of consciousness is established the certainty of morals.

A generation age the philosophers who supported Kant in his view of the physical view were generally rationalistic, monistic and metaphysical, those who support Kant's view in this respect now are more usually empiricist, pluralistic and positivistic. Kant carried out three great and enduring tasks of purification, the purification of science from metaphysics, the purification of ethics from hedonism and theology, and the purification of religion from superstition and logical fallacies. Kant originated the critical, empirical attitude of modern times while retaining safeguards which modern positivists would have done better not to cast away, and as if by the way he sent out influences which have fundamentally affected almost every present-day school of philosophers.

Taken as a whole, the 19th century philosophy can be characterized as a series of attempts to deal with the problems created by the collapse of the worldview of the Age of Reason. Of the many solutions proposed, none came to dominate Western culture. Indeed, one of the chief characteristics of the 19th and 20th centuries, as compared with the earlier ages, is the diversity of worldviews. The philosophers that follow Kant found his position an unsatisfactory form of fence sitting, and most of them climbed down from the fence to one side or the other. Depending on their underlying values, post-Kantian philosophers either maintained that we do after all have access to things-in-themselves or denied that there are things-in-themselves and limited reality to space-time manifold and to what Kant called the empirical self. In general, these philosophers also concluded that reason plays either a much larger or a much smaller role—both in cognition and in the
moral life-than Kant had allowed. Yet none of these philosophers remained untouched by Kant. Those who reaffirmed that knowledge of a transempirical reality is possible did not return to a pre-Kantian type of rationalism; those who limited reality to the space-time manifold did not return directly to Hume.

Why did post-Kantian philosophers accept Kant's distinctions rather than simply revert to earlier theories? In the first place, Kant's influence was too powerful. Everyone had to take account of his views; in fact, for a long time to come everyone thought not only in his terms but also largely in his vocabulary. Even those philosophers who reached conclusions very remote from Kant's were nevertheless Kantian in the sense that they started out from a basically Kantian orientation and merely found reasons for developing his thought in a different direction and with a different emphasis. Hence, the whole mood of Western culture had changed since Kant's time and developed its thought towards different directions. We have here taken into consideration the complementary role of rationalism and empiricism in Immanuel Kant now we will proceed further and consider the culmination of Rationalism and Empiricism in post Kantian period.

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